CASE 16

Baylon v Judge Sison

A.M. No. 92-7-360-0
April 6, 1995

Facts:
Respondent judge is accused for malfeasance in granting bail to the accused charged with double murder. Prosecution was not
given notice of at least 3 days before the scheduled hearing for bail in violation of Rule 15, section 4 of the Rules of Court and
the filing of petition for bail has only 2 non-working day interval from the schedule of the hearing. Moreover the prosecution also
assails that they were not given the chance to present evidence that strongly prove the guilt of the accused. Respondent judge
justifies not having committed grave abuse of discretion since the prosecution did not interpose objection with his orders and the
lack of previous notice was cured with the filing of motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent judge exercised abuse in discretion in the grant of bail to the accused.

HELD:
The Supreme Court held that there was abuse in the discretion of the judge in granting bail to the accused considering
that the motion for bail was filed on a Saturday and the hearing was immediately conducted on Monday thereby depriving the
prosecution to make an opposition thereto and violating the 3-day notice rule embodied in Rule 15, Sec. 4 of Rules of Court. It is
a well-established rule of law that bail is not a matter of right and requires a hearing where the accused is charged with an offense
which is punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Respondent judge should have carefully scrutinized the
validity of petition for bail before making an outright grant of this motion.

A guided legal principle in the right to bail includes:

. . The prosecution must first be accorded an opportunity to present evidence because by the very nature of deciding applications
for bail, it is on the basis of such evidence that judicial discretion is weighed against in determining whether the guilt of the
accused is strong. In other words, discretion must be exercised regularly, legally and within the confines of procedural due
process, that is, after evaluation of the evidence submitted by the prosecution. Any order issued in the absence thereof is not a
product of sound judicial discretion but of whim and caprice and outright arbitrariness.

CASE 17
Manotoc v Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-62100
May 30, 1986

FACTS:
There was a torrens title submitted and accepted by Manotoc Securities Inc., which was suspected to be fake. Six of its
clients filed separate criminal complaints against the petitioner and Leveriza, President and V-President respectively. He was
charged with estafa and was allowed by the Court to post bail. Petitioner filed before each trial court motion for permission to
leave the country stating his desire to go to U.S. relative to his business transactions and opportunities. Such was opposed by the

prosecution and was also denied by the judges. He filed petition for certiorari with CA seeking to annul the prior orders and the
SEC communication request denying his leave to travel abroad. According to the petitioner, having been admitted to bail as a
matter of right, neither the courts that granted bail nor SEC, which has no jurisdiction over his liberty, could prevent him from
exercising his constitutional right to travel.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitioners motion for permission to leave
the country.

HELD:
A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a necessary
consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. Rule 114 Section 1 of the Rules of Court defines bail as the security
required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of the law, that he will appear before any court in which his
appearance may be required as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance. The condition imposed upon petitioner to make
himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. If the
accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of the courts. As
petitioner has failed to satisfy the trial courts and the appellate court of the urgency of his travel, the duration thereof, as well as
the consent of his surety to the proposed travel, we find no abuse of judicial discretion in their having denied the petitioners
motion for permission to leave the country, in much the same way, albeit with contrary results, that we found no reversible error
to have been committed by the appellate court in allowing him to leave the country after it had satisfied itself that she would
comply with the conditions of her bail bond.

Case 18
Government of the U.S. v. Judge Puruganan,
G.R. No. 148571,
September 24, 2002; December 17, 2002.
FACTS:
The United States Government sent to the Philippine Government Note Verbale No. 0522dated June 16, 1999, supplemented by
Note Nos. 0597, 0720 and 0809 requesting theextradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also known as Mario Batacan Crespo.Upon
learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez sought and was granted a TRO by the RTC of Manila, Branch 25. The TRO
prohibited the DOJ from filing with the RTCa petition for his extradition.Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Respondent
Jimenez filed before it an UrgentManifestation/Ex-Parte Motion, which prayed that petitioners application for an arrestwarrant
be set for hearing.The RTC granted the Motion of Jimenez and set the case for hearing on June 5, 2001.After the hearing, the
court a quo required the parties to submit their respectivememoranda. In his Memorandum, Jimenez sought an alternative prayer:
that in case awarrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100, 000.The alternative prayer of Jimenez was
also set for hearing on June 15, 2001. Thereafter,the court below issued its questioned July 3, 2001 Order, directing the issuance
of awarrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at one million pesos incash. After he had surrendered his
passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenezwas granted provisional liberty via the challenged Order dated July 4, 2001.
ISSUES:
1.Whether or not Jimenez is entitled to notice and hearing before a warrant for hisarrest can be issued, and
2.Whether or not he is entitled to bail and to provisional liberty while theextradition proceedings are pending.

HELD:
1. No. There is no requirement to notify and hear the accused before the issuance of warrants of arrest. The case under
consideration is an extradition and not acriminal action; therefore it is not sufficient to justify the adoption of a set of procedures
more protective of the accused.
2. No. The constitutional provision on bail applies only when a person has beenarrested and detained for violation of Philippine
criminal laws. It does not applyto extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or
acquittal.

Case 19
Government of Hong Kong v. Hon. Olalia,
G.R. No. 153675,
April 19, 2007.
FACTS:
On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the then British Crown Colony of Hong Kong signed an "Agreement
for the Surrender of Accused an Convicted Persons" effective June 20, 1997. On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong reverted back to the
Peoples Republic of China and became the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Juan Antonio Muoz was charged
before the Hong Kong Court with 3 counts of the offense of "accepting an advantage as agent" in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of
the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance of Hong Kong and 7 counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the
common law of Hong Kong and a warrant for his arrest was issued on August 23, 1997 and October 25, 1999.
On September 13, 1999, the DOJ forwarded the received request from the Hong Kong
Department of Justice for the provisional arrest of Muoz to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which filed with the RTC
of Manila, Branch 19 an application for his provisional arrest.
On September 23, 1999, the RTC issued an Order of Arrest and the NBI agents arrested and detained him. Muoz filed with the
Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus withapplication for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or
writ of habeas corpus questioning the validity of the Order of Arrest. The Court of Appeals rendered the Order of Arrest void.
This Court granted the petition for review on certiorari filed by the DOJ praying the reversal of the Court of Appeals decision
which became final and executory on April 10, 2001.
Meanwhile, on November 22, 1999, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the
extradition of Muoz where the latter filed a petition for bail. Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the petition for bail,
holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private respondent is a high "flight risk." Judge
Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself so the case was re-raffled to Hon. Olalia Jr. who on the motion for reconsideration, allowed the
posting of bail. Hongkong filed an urgent motion to vacate the order for bail which was denied. Thus, Hongkong filed an instant
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, seeking to nullify the 2 orders of the RTC
ordering post bail and denying the motion to vacate order on the grounds of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction as there is no provision in the Constitution granting bail to a potential extraditee.

ISSUE: Whether or NOT bail can be granted.

HELD: YES. DISMISS the petition. T REMANDED to the trial court determine whether private respondent is entitled to bail on
the basis of "clear and convincing evidence
1) The exercise of the States power to deprive an individual of his liberty is not necessarily limited to criminal proceedings
2) Philippine jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings only
If bail can be granted in deportation cases such as in US v. Go-Sioco, Mejoff v.

Director of Prisons and Chirskoff v. Commission of Immigration, we see no justification why it should not also be allowed in
extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation cases, there is no
reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt
of the person detained is not in issue.
The right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various treaty
obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the
presumption lies in favor of human liberty.
An extradition proceeding is not by its nature criminal, for it is not punishment for a crime, even though such punishment may
follow extradition. It is sui generis, tracing its existence wholly to treaty obligations between different nations. It is not a trial to
determine the guilt or innocence of the potential extraditee. Nor is it a full-blown civil action, but one that is merely
administrative in character. Its object is to prevent the escape of a person accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his return
to the state from which he fled, for the purpose of trial or punishment. But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is
characterized by the following:
1) it entails a deprivation of liberty on the part of the potential extraditee and
2) the means employed to attain the purpose of extradition is also "the machinery of criminal law
This is shown by Section 6 of P.D. No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) which mandates the "immediate arrest and
temporary detention of the accused" if such "will best serve the interest of justice." We further note that Section 20 allows the
requesting state "in case of urgency" to ask for the "provisional arrest of the accused, pending receipt of the request for
extradition;" and that release from provisional arrest "shall not prejudice re-arrest and extradition of the accused if a request for
extradition is received subsequently."
Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal process. A potential
extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced to transfer to the demanding state following
the proceedings. "Temporary detention" may be a necessary step in the process of extradition, but the length of time of the
detention should be reasonable.
By any standard, detention for over 2 years without having been convicted of any crime is a seriousdeprivation of his
fundamental right to liberty which prompted the extradition court to grant him bail. While our extradition law does not provide
for the grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to
due process under the Constitution.
In criminal proceedings, the standard of due process is premised on the presumption of innocence of the accused. While in an
extradition proceeding, the assumption is that the extraditee is a fugitive from justice, thus, he bears the onus probandi of
showing that he or she is not a flight risk and should be granted bail. The potential extraditee must prove by "clear and
convincing evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court.
It does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations under the time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda
that the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditees rights to life, liberty, and due process. More so, where these rights are
guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by international conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We should not
deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.
CASE 20
Tatad v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. Nos. L-72335-39
March 21, 1998
Facts:
The complainant, Antonio de los Reyes, originally filed what he termed "a report" with the Legal Panel of the Presidential
Security Command (PSC) on October 1974, containing charges of alleged violations of RA No. 3019 against then Secretary of
Public Information Francisco S. Tatad. The "report" was made to "sleep" in the office of the PSC until the end of 1979 when it
became widely known that Secretary Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos and had resigned from the Cabinet. On
December 12, 1979, the 1974 complaint was resurrected in the form of a formal complaint filed with the Tanodbayan. The

Tanodbayan acted on the complaint on April 1, 1980 which was around two months after petitioner Tatad's resignation was
accepted by Pres. Marcos by referring the complaint to the CIS, Presidential Security Command, for investigation and report. On
June 16, 1980, the CIS report was submitted to the Tanodbayan, recommending the filing of charges for graft and corrupt
practices against former Minister Tatad and Antonio L. Cantero. By October 25, 1982, all affidavits and counter-affidavits were
in the case was already for disposition by the Tanodbayan. However, it was only on June 5, 1985 that a resolution was approved
by the Tanodbayan. Five criminal information were filed with the Sandiganbayan on June 12, 1985, all against petitioner Tatad
alone.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused was deprived of his constitutional right to due process?
Ruling:
Yes. Due process and right to speedy disposition of trial were violated. First, the complaint came to life, only after petitioner
Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos. Second, departing from established procedures prescribed by law for preliminary
investigation, which require the submission of affidavits and counter-affidavits by the complainant and the respondent and their
witnesses, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the Presidential Security Command for finding investigation and report. P.D.
911 prescribes a ten-day period for the prosecutor to resolve a case under preliminary investigation by him from its termination.
Although, the period fixed by law was merely directory, a delay of close to three years cannot be deemed reasonable.