[G.R. No. 182435. August 13, 2012.

]
LILIA B. ADA, et al.,
vs
. FLORANTE BAYLON
FACTS:
This case involves the estate of spouses Florentino Baylon and Maximina Elnas Baylon (Spouses
Baylon)who died on November 7, 1961 and May 5, 1974, respectively.
At the time of their death, SpousesBaylon were survived by their legitimate children, namely, Rita
Baylon (Rita), Victoria Baylon(Victoria), Dolores Baylon (Dolores), Panfila Gomez (Panfila), Ramon
Baylon (Ramon) and herein petitioner Lilia B. Ada (Lilia).Dolores died intestate and without issue
on August 4, 1976. Victoria died on November 11, 1981 and wassurvived by her daughter, herein
petitioner Luz B. Adanza. Ramon died intestate on July 8, 1989 and wassurvived by herein
respondent Florante Baylon (Florante), his child from his first marriage, as well as
by petitioner Flora Baylon, his second wife, and their legitimate children,
namely, Ramon, Jr. and herein petitioners Remo, Jose, Eric, Florentino and Ma. Ruby, all
surnamed Baylon.
Petitioners filed with the RTC complaint for partition, accounting, and damages
against respondentFlorante, Rita, and Panfila. They alleged that Spouses
Baylon owned 43 parcels of land. Theyclaimed that Rita took possession of the
land and appropriated the income derived therefrom.Florante, Rita and Panfila
asserted, in their answer, that the co-owned the properties in question.On July
1997, Rita donated a parcel of land to Florante. In July 2000, Rita died.
Petitioners learnedof the donation made by Rita in favor of Florante. They filed
for a Supplemental Pleading, askingthe court to rescind the Deed of
DonationThe RTC rendered a decision, finding the existence of co-ownership but ordered the partition
of theestate of the Spouses Baylon. RTC also rescinded the donation made.The case was appealed to the
CA. The appellate court set aside the decision and remanded the caseto determine ownership of Lot Nos.
4706 and 4709.
The complaint filed by the petitioners with the RTC involves two separate, distinct and
independentactions

partition and rescission.

First,
the petitioners raised the refusal of their co-heirs,Florante, Rita and Panfila, to partition the properties
which they inherited from SpousesBaylon.
Second,
in their supplemental pleading, the petitioners assailed the donation
inter vivos
ofLot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706 made by Rita in favor of Florante
pendente lite.
ISSUE/S: W/NRULING:
By a joinder of actions, or more properly, a joinder of causes of action is meant the uniting of two or
moredemands or rights of action in one action, the statement of more than one cause of action in a declaration.It is the union of two
or more civil causes of action, each of which could be made the basis of a separatesuit, in the same complaint, declaration or petition.
A plaintiff may under certain circumstances joinseveral distinct demands, controversies or rights of action in one declaration,
complaint or petition.
29
While parties to an action may assert in one pleading, in the alternative or otherwise, as many causes ofaction as they may have
against an opposing party, such joinder of causes of action is subject to thecondition,
inter alia,
that the joinder shall not include special civil actions governed by special rules.
31
Here, there was a misjoinder of causes of action. The action for partition filed by the petitioners could not be joined with the
action for the rescission of the said donation
inter vivos
in favor of Florante. Lest it beoverlooked, an action for partition is a special civil action governed by Rule 69 of the Rules of
Courtwhile an action for rescission is an ordinary civil action governed by the ordinary rules of civil procedure.The variance in
the procedure in the special civil action of partition and in the ordinary civil action ofrescission precludes their
joinder in one complaint or their being tried in a single proceeding to avoidconfusion in determining what rules shall

govern the conduct of the proceedings as well as in thedetermination of the presence of requisite elements of each particular cause of
action.
32
Nevertheless, misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for dismissal. Indeed, the courts have the power,
acting upon the motion of a party to the case or
sua sponte,
to order the severance of the misjoinedcause of action to be proceeded with separately.
33
However, if there is no objection to the improper joinder or the court did not
motu proprio
direct a severance, then there exists no bar in the simultaneousadjudication of all the erroneously joined causes
of action.It should be emphasized that the foregoing rule only applies if the court trying the case has
jurisdictionover all of the causes of action therein notwithstanding the misjoinder of the same. If the court trying thecase has no
jurisdiction over a misjoined cause of action, then such misjoined cause of action has to be severed from the other causes of action,
and if not so severed, any adjudication rendered by the court withrespect to the same would be a nullity.Here, Florante posed no
objection, and neither did the RTC direct the severance of the petitioners' actionfor rescission from their action for partition. While
this may be a patent omission on the part of the RTC,this does not constitute a ground to assail the validity and correctness of its
decision. The RTC validlyadjudicated the issues raised in the actions for partition and rescission filed by the petitioners.
Asserting a New Cause of Action in a Supplemental Pleading
Section 6, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court reads:Sec. 6.
Supplemental Pleadings.

Upon motion of a party the court may, uponreasonable notice and upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve a
supplemental pleading setting forth transactions, occurrences or events which have happened sincethe date of the
pleading sought to be supplemented. The adverse party may pleadthereto within ten (10) days from notice of the order admitting the
supplemental pleading.In
Young v. Spouses Sy,
36
this Court had the opportunity to elucidate on the purpose of a supplemental pleading. Thus:As its very name denotes, a
supplemental pleading only serves to bolster or addsomething to the primary pleading. A supplement exists side by side with the
original.It does not replace that which it supplements. Moreover, a supplemental pleadingassumes that the original pleading is to
stand
and
that
the
issues
joined
with
the
original pleading remained an issue to be tried in the action. It is but a continuation of thecomplaint.
Its usual office is to set up new facts which justify, enlarge or changethe kind of relief with respect to the
same subject matter as the controversyreferred to in the original complaint.
The purpose of the supplemental pleading is to bring into the records new factswhich will enlarge or
change the kind of relief to which the plaintiff is entitled;hence, any supplemental facts which further
develop the original right of action,or extend to vary the relief, are available by way of supplemental
complaint eventhough they themselves constitute a right of action
.
37
(Citations omitted andemphasis ours)Thus, a supplemental pleading may properly allege transactions, occurrences or events
which hadtranspired after the filing of the pleading sought to be supplemented, even if the said supplemental
factsconstitute another cause of action.Here, the issue as to the validity of the donation
inter vivos
of Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706made by Rita in favor of Florante is a new cause of action that occurred after the
filing of the originalcomplaint. However, the petitioners' prayer for the rescission of the said donation
inter vivos
in theirsupplemental pleading is germane to, and is in fact, intertwined with the cause of action in the partitioncase. Lot No. 4709
and half of Lot No. 4706 are included among the properties that were sought to be partitioned he petitioners' supplemental
pleading merely amplified the original cause of action, on account of thegratuitous conveyance of Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No.
4706 after the filing of the original complaintand prayed for additional reliefs,
i.e.
, rescission. Indeed, the petitioners claim that the said lots form partof the estate of Spouses Baylon, but cannot be partitioned unless
the gratuitous conveyance of the same isrescinded. Thus, the principal issue raised by the petitioners in their original complaint
remained thesame.Petition is partly granted. The case is remanded to the RTC