Section 2.

All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and
fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of
agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration,
development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may
enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino
citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is
owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five
years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and
conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply
fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use
may be the measure and limit of the grant.
The State shall protect the nations marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial
sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to
Filipino citizens.
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino
citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and
fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving
either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and
utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms
and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and
general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the
development and use of local scientific and technical resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance
with this provision, within thirty days from its execution.

Section 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber,
mineral lands and national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further
classified by law according to the uses to which they may be devoted. Alienable lands of
the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or
associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, for
a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years,
and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area. Citizens of the Philippines may lease
not more than five hundred hectares, or acquire not more than twelve hectares thereof,
by purchase, homestead, or grant.
Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and development, and
subject to the requirements of agrarian reform, the Congress shall determine, by law,
the size of lands of the public domain which may be acquired, developed, held, or
leased and the conditions therefor.
Section 5. The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national development
policies and programs, shall protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their
ancestral lands to ensure their economic, social, and cultural well-being.

Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred

or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or
hold lands of the public domain.
Section 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of
private lands, subject to limitations provided by law.

Section 1. Title of Decree. This Decree shall be known as the PROPERTY

REGISTRATION DECREE.
CASES
Cruz vs DENR

Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity of the RA 8371 or the

Indigenous Peoples Rights Act on the ground that the law amount to an unlawful
deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the public domain as well as
minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine
embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. The IPRA law basically
enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over ancestral domains which
may include natural resources. Cruz et al contend that, by providing for an allencompassing definition of ancestral domains and ancestral lands which
might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b)
of said law violate the rights of private landowners.

ISSUE: Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional.

HELD: The SC deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation they voted and
reached a 7-7 vote. They deliberated again and the same result transpired. Since
there was no majority vote, Cruzs petition was dismissed and the IPRA law was
sustained. Hence, ancestral domains may include public domain somehow
against the regalian doctrine.

Sec. of DENR vs Yap

FACTS: On
November
10, 1978, then
President
Marcos
issued
Proc.
No. 1801 declaring Boracay Island, among other islands, caves and peninsulas in
the Philippines, as tourist zones and marine reserves under the administration
of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). President Marcos later approved the
issuance of PTA Circular 3-82 dated September 3, 1982, to implement
Proclamation No. 1801.
Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded them from
filing an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for
titling purposes, respondents-claimants Mayor . Yap, Jr., and others filed a petition
for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan

In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proc. No. 1801 and PTA Circular
No. 3-82 raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied lands. They
declared that they themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest, had been
in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in Boracay
since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time immemorial. They declared their lands for
tax purposes and paid realty taxes on them. Respondents-claimants posited that
Proclamation No. 1801 and its implementing Circular did not place Boracay beyond
the commerce of man. Since the Island was classified as a tourist zone, it was
susceptible of private ownership. Under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, they
had the right to have the lots registered in their names through judicial confirmation
of imperfect titles.
The Republic, through the OSG, opposed the petition for declaratory relief. The OSG
countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. It
formed part of the mass of lands classified as public forest, which was not
available for disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of the Revised Forestry Code, as
amended. The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants reliance on PD No. 1801
and PTA Circular No. 3-82 was misplaced. Their right to judicial confirmation of title
was governed by Public Land Act and Revised Forestry Code, as amended. Since
Boracay Island had not been classified as alienable and disposable, whatever
possession they had cannot ripen into ownership.
On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents-claimants,
declaring that, PD 1810 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 Revised Forestry Code,as
amended.
The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied. The Republic then
appealed to the CA. On In 2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto the RTC
decision. Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly denied. Hence,
the present petition under Rule 45.
On May 22, 2006, during the pendency the petition in the trial court, President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064 classifying Boracay Island
partly reserved forest land (protection purposes) and partly agricultural land
(alienable and disposable).
On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Sacay,and other landowners in Boracay
filed with this Court an original petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification
of Proclamation No. 1064. They allege that the Proclamation infringed on their
prior vested rights over portions of Boracay. They have been in continued
possession of their respective lots in Boracay since time immemorial.
On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of the two petitions
ISSUE: the main issue is whether private claimants have a right to secure titles
over their occupied portions in Boracay.

HELD: petitions DENIED. The CA decision is reversed.

Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an
unclassified land of the public domain prior to Proclamation No. 1064.
Such unclassified lands are considered public forest under PD No. 705.
PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of the
public domain as public forest. Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a public forest
as a mass of lands of the public domain which has not been the subject of the
present system of classification for the determination of which lands are needed for
forest purpose and which are not. Applying PD No. 705, all unclassified lands,
including those in Boracay Island, are ipso facto considered public forests. PD No.
705, however, respects titles already existing prior to its effectivity.
The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest
or timber, such classification modified by the 1973 Constitution. The 1987
Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution classification with one addition:
national parks. Of these, only agricultural lands may be alienated. Prior to
Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006, Boracay Island had never been expressly
and administratively classified under any of these grand divisions. Boracay was an
unclassified land of the public domain.
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In
keeping with the presumption of State ownership, the Court has time and again
emphasized that there must be a positive act of the government, such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action;
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a
statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the
land claimed to have been possessed for the required number of years is alienable
and disposable. The burden of proof in overcoming suchpresumption is on the
person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the
land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action,
report, statute, or certification was presented to the Court. The records are bereft
of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by
private claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the land is
alienable and disposable. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be
assumed. They call for proof.
Proc. No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to classify Boracay Island
as alienable and disposable land. If President Marcos intended to classify the island
as alienable and disposable or forest, or both, he would have identified the specific

limits of each, as President Arroyo did in Proclamation No. 1064. This was not done
in Proclamation No. 1801.
REPUBLIC VS LAO
Facts:

Lao filed before the RTC of Tagaytay City application for registration of a parcel of
land. She allegedly acquired the land by purchase from the siblings Raymundo
Noguera and Ma. Victoria Valenzuela who inherited it from Generosa Medina. The
latter, in turn, inherited the land from her father, Jose Medina, who acquired the
same from Edilberto Perido by transfer. She prayed that the land be registered in
her name under Commonwealth Act 141 (Public Land Act) based on her and her
predecessor-in-interests open, public, actual, continuous, exclusive, notorious and
adverse possession and occupancy under bona fide claim of ownership for more
than thirty (30) years. She presented witnesses and evidence constituting of deed
of sale, survey plan, the technical description of property and tax declarations in her
and her predecessors names. The court approved the application. The petitioner
represented by the Solicitor General appealed the decision before the CA which reaffirmed the lower court decision, hence this petition for review before the SC. The
petitioner contends that there is no sufficient evidence to warrant the issuance of
the title to the respondent as she fails to comply with the required periods and acts
of possession mandated by law and her failure to prove that the land is alienable
and disposable land of the public domain.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent sufficiently provided evidence that she meets the
qualifications required by law on the manner of possession (continuous, adverse,
notorious, etc..) and the period of time (30 years) necessary to have a bonafide
claim of ownership under C.A. 141?
Whether or not respondent was able to show that the land subject of her application
was disposable and alienable land of the public domain?

Ruling:
The court held that Commonwealth Act 141 requires that before one can register his
title over a parcel of land, the applicant must show that he, by himself or through
his predecessors-in-interest, has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945 or earlier; in adverse possession over the land for at least 30
years and the land subject of the application is alienable and disposable land of the

public domain. Petitioner was right to contend that the respondent did not prove by
incontrovertible evidence that she possessed the property in the manner and time
required by law. She did not provide the exact period when her predecessors-ininterest started occupying the property. No extrajudicial settlement of the property
from its previous owners was shown and she did not show any relationship between
the parties where she obtained her deed of sale. She further did not present any
certification from appropriate government agency to show that the property is reclassified as disposable and alienable land of the public domain. It is incumbent for
an applicant of a land registration to provide these incontrovertible evidences to
support her claim for her application. In the absence of these evidences, her
application shall fail. Hence the petition was granted and her application was
denied.

La Bugal-B'Laan Tribal Assn vs Ramos Case Digest

Facts :
On July 25, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order (E.O.) No.
2796 authorizing the DENR Secretary to accept, consider and evaluate proposals from
foreign-owned corporations or foreign investors for contracts or agreements involving
either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and
utilization of minerals, which, upon appropriate recommendation of the Secretary, the
President may execute with the foreign proponent.
On March 3, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos approved R.A. No. 7942 to "govern
the exploration, development, utilization and processing of all mineral resources." R.A.
No. 7942 defines the modes of mineral agreements for mining operations, outlines the
procedure for their filing and approval, assignment/transfer and withdrawal, and fixes
their terms. Similar provisions govern financial or technical assistance agreements.
On April 9, 1995, 30 days following its publication on March 10, 1995 in Malaya and
Manila Times, two newspapers of general circulation, R.A. No. 7942 took effect. Shortly
before the effectivity of R.A. No. 7942, however, or on March 30, 1995, the President
entered into an FTAA with WMCP covering 99,387 hectares of land in South Cotabato,
Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato.

On August 15, 1995, then DENR Secretary Victor O. Ramos issued DENR Administrative
Order (DAO) No. 95-23, s. 1995, otherwise known as the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of R.A. No. 7942. This was later repealed by DAO No. 96-40, s. 1996 which
was adopted on December 20, 1996.
On January 10, 1997, counsels for petitioners sent a letter to the DENR Secretary
demanding that the DENR stop the implementation of R.A. No. 7942 and DAO No. 9640, giving the DENR fifteen days from receipt to act thereon. The DENR, however, has
yet to respond or act on petitioners' letter.
Petitioners claim that the DENR Secretary acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.
They pray that the Court issue an order:
(a) Permanently enjoining respondents from acting on any application for Financial or
Technical Assistance Agreements;
(b) Declaring the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 or Republic Act No. 7942 as
unconstitutional and null and void;
(c) Declaring the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Philippine Mining Act
contained in DENR Administrative Order No. 96-40 and all other similar administrative
issuances as unconstitutional and null and void; and
(d) Cancelling the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement issued to Western
Mining Philippines, Inc. as unconstitutional, illegal and null and void.
Issue :
Whether or not Republic Act No. 7942 is unconstitutional.
Ruling :
The Court finds the following provisions of R.A. No. 7942 to be violative of Section 2,
Article XII of the Constitution and hereby declares unconstitutional and void:
(1) The proviso in Section 3 (aq), which defines "qualified person," to wit:

Provided, That a legally organized foreign-owned corporation shall be deemed a

qualified person for purposes of granting an exploration permit, financial or technical
assistance agreement or mineral processing permit.
(2) Section 23, which specifies the rights and obligations of an exploration permittee,
insofar as said section applies to a financial or technical assistance agreement,
(3) Section 33, which prescribes the eligibility of a contractor in a financial or technical
assistance agreement;
(4) Section 35, which enumerates the terms and conditions for every financial or
technical assistance agreement;
(5) Section 39, which allows the contractor in a financial and technical assistance
agreement to convert the same into a mineral production-sharing agreement;
(6) Section 56, which authorizes the issuance of a mineral processing permit to a
contractor in a financial and technical assistance agreement;
The following provisions of the same Act are likewise void as they are dependent on the
foregoing provisions and cannot stand on their own:
(1) Section 3 (g), which defines the term "contractor," insofar as it applies to a financial
or technical assistance agreement.
Section 34, which prescribes the maximum contract area in a financial or technical
assistance agreements;
Section 36, which allows negotiations for financial or technical assistance agreements;
Section 37, which prescribes the procedure for filing and evaluation of financial or
technical assistance agreement proposals;
Section 38, which limits the term of financial or technical assistance agreements;

Section 40, which allows the assignment or transfer of financial or technical assistance
agreements;
Section 41, which allows the withdrawal of the contractor in an FTAA;
The second and third paragraphs of Section 81, which provide for the Government's
share in a financial and technical assistance agreement; and
Section 90, which provides for incentives to contractors in FTAAs insofar as it applies to
said contractors;
When the parts of the statute are so mutually dependent and connected as conditions,
considerations, inducements, or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief
that the legislature intended them as a whole, and that if all could not be carried into
effect, the legislature would not pass the residue independently, then, if some parts are
unconstitutional, all the provisions which are thus dependent, conditional, or
connected, must fall with them.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
LEGARDA VS SALEEBY
Facts: A stone wall stands between the adjoining lot of Legarda and Saleeby. The
said wall and the strip of land where it stands is registered in the Torrens system
under the name of Legarda in 1906. Six years after the decree of registration is
released in favor of Legarda, Saleeby applied for registration of his lot under the
Torrens system in 1912, and the decree issued in favor of the latter included the
stone wall and the strip of land where it stands.
Issue: Who should be the owner of a land and its improvement which has been
registered under the name of two persons?
Held: For the issue involved, The Land Registration Act (Act 496) affords no remedy.
However, it can be construed that where two certificates purports to include the
same registered land, the holder of the earlier one continues to hold title and will
prevail.
The real purpose of the Torrens system of registration, is to quiet title to land; to put
a stop forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims which were
noted at the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent

thereto. That being the purpose of the law, once a title is registered the owner may
rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in
the mirador de su casa, to avoid the possibility of losing his land.
The law guarantees the title of the registered owner once it has entered into the
Torrens system.
REPUBLIC VS MALABANAN
FACTS:
On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration
before the RTC of Cavite-Tagaytay, covering a parcel of land situated in Silang
Cavite, consisting of 71,324 square meters. Malabanan claimed that he had
purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, and that he and his predecessors-ininterest had been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful
possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years. Velazco testified that the
property was originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare property owned by his
great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four sons Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo
and Estebanthe fourth being Aristedess grandfather. Upon Linos death, his four
sons inherited the property and divided it among themselves. But by 1966,
Estebans wife, Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the properties
inherited by the Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the death of Esteban and
Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in administering the properties,
including Lot 9864-A, which originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was
this
property
that
was
sold
by
Eduardo
Velazco
to
Malabanan.
Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated
11 June 2001, issued by the Community Environment & Natural Resources Office,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated
that the subject property was verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land
per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and
approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982. On 3 December 2002, the
RTC
approved
the
application
for
registration.
The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan
had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land
of the public domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in
possession of the property in the manner and for the length of time required by law
for confirmation of imperfect title. On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals
reversed the RTC ruling and dismissed the appliocation of Malabanan.

ISSUES:

1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be
registered under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as
the Property Registration Decree, should the land be classified as alienable and
disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it sufficient that such classification occur at any
time prior to the filing of the applicant for registration provided that it is established
that the applicant has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier?
2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree may a parcel of
land classified as alienable and disposable be deemed private land and therefore
susceptible to acquisition by prescription in accordance with the Civil Code?
3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either because of its
use or because its slope is below that of forest lands be registrable under Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in relation to the provisions of the Civil
Code
on
acquisitive
prescription?
4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names
under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or both?
HELD:
The

Pertition

is

denied.

(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that those who by themselves
or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12,
1945 have acquired ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the
length
and
quality
of
their
possession.
(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not
require that the lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire
period of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his
title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to the
timeframe
imposed
by
Section
47
of
the
Public
Land
Act.
(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is further
confirmed
by
Section
14(1)
of
the
Property
Registration
Decree.
(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider
that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring
ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain lands become only

patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are alienable or
disposable. There must also be an express government manifestation that the
property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the
development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when
the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition
of
property
of
the
public
dominion
begin
to
run.
(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acquires
ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to
secure registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be
acquired, one ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive
prescription, a person acquires ownership of a patrimonial property through
possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title. Under
extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a persons uninterrupted adverse possession
of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of good faith or just
title,
ripens
into
ownership.
It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan
has acquired ownership over the subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act. There is no substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or
petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property
since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date back their
possession, according to their own evidencethe Tax Declarations they presented
in particularis to the year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration
under
Section
14(1)
of
the
Property
Registration
Decree.
Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While
the subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no
competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use service or for the
development of the national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil
Code. The classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable land of
the public domain does not change its status as property of the public dominion
under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by
prescription.