THOMAS C. CHEESMAN, petitioner, vs.

IAC
Criselda Cheesman without the knowledge of her husband
whom she had been separated sold to Padilla a property
which Criselda alleged to have bought from her own funds
during their marriage. Hence, the tax declarations for the
property were issued in her name only and she assumed
exclusive management and administration of said property.
Thirty days after the sale, Thomas brought against his wife
and Padilla, praying for the annulment of the sale on the
ground that the transaction had been executed without his
knowledge and consent. An answer was filed in the names of
both defendants, alleging that (1) the property said was
paraphernal, having been purchased by Criselda with funds
exclusively belonging to her ("her own separate money"); (2)
Thomas Cheesman, being an American, was disqualified to
have any interest or right of ownership in the land; and (3)
Estelita Padilla was a buyer in good faith. The parties
ultimately agreed on the rendition by the court of a summary
judgment declaring "the sale executed by . . . Criselda
Cheesman in favor of . . . Estelita Padilla to be valid,"
dismissing Thomas Cheesman's complaint and ordering him
"to immediately turn over the possession of the house and lot
subject of . . . (the) case to . . . Estelita Padilla . . . Thomas
Cheesman appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court
assailing among others the declaration of the court that the
sale to Estelita Padilla was valid despite the lack of consent
thereto by him, and the presumption of the conjugal
character of the property in question pursuant to Article 160
of the Civil Code. His contention was found to be without
merit by the Appellate Tribunal and affirmed the summary
judgment. Once more, Thomas Cheesman availed of the
remedy of appeal, this time to this Court. Here, he argues
that it was reversible error for the Intermediate Appellate
Court 1)to find that the presumption that the property in
question is conjugal in accordance with Article 160 had been

satisfactorily overcome by Estelita Padilla; 2) to rule that

Estelita Padilla was a purchaser of said property in good faith.

Held:
Both the Trial court and the appellate court reached the same
conclusions: that (1) fraud, mistake or excusable negligence
existed in the premises justifying relief to Estelita Padilla
under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, or (2) that Criselda
Cheesman had used money she had brought into her
marriage to Thomas Cheesman to purchase the lot and house
in question, or (3) that Estelita Padilla believed in good faith
that Criselda Cheesman was the exclusive owner of the
property that she (Estelita) intended to and did in fact buy
all of which are conclusions or findings of fact and these
determinations of fact will not be disturbed. Question of facts
as distinguished from a question of law which exists "when
the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a
certain state of facts" "there is a question of fact when the
doubt or difference arises as to the truth or the falsehood of
alleged facts;" Now, it is axiomatic that only questions of law,
distinctly set forth, may be raised in a petition for the review
on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals presented
to this Court. As everyone knows or ought to know, the
appellate jurisdiction of this Court is limited to reviewing
errors of law, accepting as conclusive the factual findings of
the lower court upon its own assessment of the evidence.
The creation of the Court of Appeals was precisely intended
to take away from the Supreme Court the work of examining
the evidence, and confine its task to the determination of
questions which do not call for the reading and study of
transcripts containing the testimony of witnesses. The rule
of conclusiveness of the factual findings or conclusions of the

Court of Appeals is, to be sure, subject to certain exceptions,

none of which however obtains in the case at bar.

ORTIGAS & CO. LTD. PARTNERSHIP, petitioner, vs. Velasco

Ortigas in this case filed a petition for Judge Velascos
removal from the Judiciary for his grievous transgressions of
quite elementary procedural and jurisdictional rules. Some of
the said transgressions are that he dismissed Ortigas appeal
pronouncing its notice of appeal as a mere scrap of paper
because Ortigas allegedly had no material interest in the
litigation. Judge Velasco also threw out the appeal of the
Office of the Solicitor General. He branded the appeal "sham"
because said Office had "not filed any formal opposition to
the petition and neither has it introduced and/or formally
offered any evidence to warrant its dismissal, etc.," and
declared that the appeal was tardily attempted. He
authorized the immediate execution of the judgment
rendered by him just twenty-one (21) days earlier (on
September 23, 1992), directing reconstitution of Molina's
title. In that Order he opined that, on the ostensible basis of
cited precedents. Ortigas' appeal was "frivolous and
interposed only for purposes of delay;" hence, immediate
execution was warranted not only by Molina's advanced age,
but also to "prevent wastage of (her) income," "avoid the
possibility of . . . judgment becoming illusory or to "prevent
further damage" to her or "minimize damage unduly suffered
by . . . (her)."
Held:
A rule of long standing and uniform application is that
dismissals by Regional Trial Courts of appeals from their
judgments are allowed "where the notice of appeal, appeal
bond, or record on appeal is not filed within the period of
time herein provided. It has no power to disallow an appeal
on any other ground, e.g., that it is frivolous, or the case has
become moot, etc. The reason is obvious: otherwise, "the
way would be opened for courts . . . to forestall review or

reversal of their decisions by higher courts, no matter how

erroneous or improper such decisions should be
Now, it is axiomatic that execution of judgments pending
appeal is allowed only as an exception to the general rule
that only judgment which have become final and executory
may be executed. The element that gives validity to an order
of execution pending appeal, it will be noted, is the existence
of good reasons, to be stated in a special order. The
discretion to authorize immediate execution, is sound
discretion, which so authorizes it only where there are good
reasons therefor. Insofar as immediate execution is premised
on the theory that Ortigas' appeal was "frivolous and
interposed only for purposes of delay," such rationalization is
indefensible for the reasons already stated relative to the
Judge's disallowance of Ortigas' appeal.

Bugarin v Palisoc
The court in this ejectment case declared respondents as the
rightful possessors of the properties in dispute and ordered
the petitioners to vacate the premises and pay to private
respondents the rentals. Petitioners appealed to the RTC
while private respondents moved for execution pending
appeal. RTC affirmed the MeTC decision so petitioners filed a
Motion for Reconsideration with Opposition to the Issuance of
a Writ of Execution which was denied and granted instead
private respondents' motion for execution for failure of
petitioners to post a supersedeas bond. Petitioners then filed
a Motion to Defer Implementation of the Writ of Execution
while private respondents filed a Motion to Issue a Special
Order of Demolition since petitioners refused to vacate the
premises. The RTC declared the decision denying petitioners'
appeal final and executory, and remanded the records of the
case to the MeTC without acting on the motions. Petitioners
filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition. The court
granted the motion for Special order of demolition. Petitioner
filed a motion to quash but was denied. Hence, this petition
where petitioners raise the lone error that
Issue: Are the Orders of the MeTC proper?
Held: Under Section 19, 10 Rule 70 of the Revised Rules on
Civil Procedure, a judgment on a forcible entry and detainer
action is immediately executory to avoid further injustice to a
lawful possessor, and the court's duty to order the execution

is practically ministerial. The defendant may stay it only by

(a) perfecting an appeal; (b) filing a supersedeas bond; and
(c) making a periodic deposit of the rental or reasonable
compensation for the use and occupancy of the property
during the pendency of the appeal. Once the Regional Trial
Court decides on the appeal, such decision is immediately
executory without prejudice to an appeal, via a petition for
review, before the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court.
However, petitioners failed to file a petition for review.
Instead, they filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition. In
said petition, which is still pending, petitioners contended
that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming
the MeTC decision and insisted that the latter court had no
jurisdiction over the complaint.
The remedy to obtain reversal or modification of the
judgment on the merits in the instant case is appeal. This
holds true even if the error ascribed to the court rendering
the judgment is its lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter, or the exercise of power in excess thereof, or grave
abuse of discretion in the findings of fact or of law set out in
the decision. The existence and availability of the right of
appeal prohibits the resort to certiorari because one of the
requirements for the latter remedy is that "there should be
no appeal." Clearly, petitioners' petition for certiorari before
the Court of Appeals was filed as a substitute for the lost
remedy of appeal. Certiorari is not and cannot be made a
substitute for an appeal where the latter remedy is available
but was lost through fault or negligence. Thus, the filing of
the petition for certiorari did not prevent the RTC decision
from becoming final and executory.

Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy

of courts as the appropriate forum for the relief desired.

ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOME, petitioner, vs. NLRC

Bienvenido filed an illegal dismissal case against St. Martin
Funeral Home which alleged that he had misappropriated its
payment for value added tax. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor
of St. Martin Funeral Home declaring that since Bienvenido
was a volunteer worker, there was no employer-employee
relationship that existed between the parties, and therefore,
his office had no jurisdiction over the case. On appeal, the
National Labor Relations Commission rendered a resolution
setting aside the questioned decision and remanding the
case to the labor arbiter for immediate appropriate
proceedings. After the motion for reconsideration of the
herein petitioner was denied, it filed before the SC the instant
petition for certiorari but SC remanded the case to the CA.
Held:
All references in the amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to
supposed appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court are
interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer to
petitions for certiorari under Rule 65. Consequently, all such
petitions should henceforth be initially filed in the Court of

Habaluyas v Japson
Respondents have filed a motion for reconsideration of the
Decision of the Second Division of the Court promulgated on
August 5, 1985 which granted the petition for certiorari and
prohibition and set aside the order of respondent Judge
granting private respondents' motion for new trial.
ISSUE
Whether the fifteen-day period within which a party may file
a motion for reconsideration of a final order or ruling of the
Regional Trial Court may be extended.
1.) Beginning one month after the promulgation of this
Resolution, the rule shall be strictly enforced that no motion
for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or
reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or
Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the
Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion may be filed
only in cases pending with the Supreme Court as the court of
last resort, which may in its sound discretion either grant or
deny the extension requested.

2.) In appeals in special proceedings under Rule 109 of the

Rules of Court and in other cases wherein multiple appeals
are allowed, a motion for extension of time to file the record
on appeal may be filed within the reglementary period of
thirty (30) days. If the court denies the motion for extension,
the appeal must be taken within the original period (Bello vs.
Fernando, January 30, 1962, 4 SCRA 135), inasmuch as such
a motion does not suspend the period for appeal (Reyes vs.
Sta. Maria, November 20, 1972, 48 SCRA 1). The trial court
may grant said motion after the expiration of the period for
appeal provided it was filed within the original period. All
appeals heretofore timely taken, after extensions of time
were granted for the filing of a motion for new trial or
reconsideration, shall be allowed and determined on the
merits.

NYK v NLRC
Private respondent Publico was sewer of petitioner
corporation. On May 7, 1997, Publico went home early
despite refusal of petitioner because she was not feeling well.
The next day, she notified petitioner that she was still
recovering from her sickness. On May 9, 1997, however,
Publico was refused entry for work and later informed of her
dismissal. The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC both ruled the
dismissal illegal. A special civil action for certiorari was then

filed in the Court of Appeals by petitioner, but the same was

dismissed outright because it was not accompanied by a
certified true copy of the assailed NLRC decision, but by a
certified xerox copy of the assailed NLRC decision.
ISSUE: Did the Court of Appeals err in refusing to rule on the
correctness of the NLRC's findings that private respondent
was illegally dismissed?
Held: Petitioners raise factual questions which are improper
in a petition for review on certiorari. Findings of facts of the
NLRC, particularly in a case where the NLRC and the Labor
Arbiter are in agreement, are deemed binding and conclusive
upon this Court. Hence, petitioners' bare allegations of
abandonment cannot stand the unswerving conclusion by
both quasi-judicial agencies below that private respondent
was unlawfully dismissed. We find no reason to deviate from
the consistent findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC that
there was no basis to find that Virginia abandoned her work.
Indeed, factual findings of the NLRC affirming those of the
Labor Arbiter, both bodies being deemed to have acquired
expertise in matters within their jurisdictions, when
sufficiently supported by evidence on record, are accorded
respect if not finality, and are considered binding on this
Court. As long as their decisions are devoid of any unfairness
or arbitrariness in the process of their deduction from the
evidence proffered by the parties, all that is left is for the
Court to stamp its affirmation and declare its finality. No
reversible error may thus be laid at the door of the Court of
Appeals when it refused to rule that the NLRC committed a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to want or excess of
jurisdiction in holding that private respondent was illegally
dismissed.