David vs.

Arroyo
G.R. No. 171396
May 3, 2006
Facts of the case:
During the celebration of People Power I, President Arroyo issued Presidential
Proclamation 1017 (PP 1017 for brevity) declaring a state of national emergency.
The President also issued General Order (G.O.) No. 5 implementing PP 1017.
The President stated that over the past months, elements in political opposition
have conspired with extreme left represented by NDF- CCP- NPA and military
adventurists, which caused her to declare such order. The President considered aims
to oust the President and take- over reigns of government as clear and present
danger.
On March 3, President Arroyo lifted PP 1017.
Solicitor General argued that the basis of declaring PP 1017 was that the intent of
the Constitution is to give full discretionary powers to the President in determining
the necessity of calling out the AFP.
However despite the contentions of the Solicitor General, the Magdalo group
indicted the Oakwood mutiny and called to wear red bands on their left arms to
show disgust.
At the same time Oplan Hackle I was discovered, which constitutes plans of
bombings and attacks on PMA Alumni Homecoming in Baguio, the same event
where the President was invited. The next morning after the alumni homecoming
celebration, a bomb was found inside the campus.
PNP Chief Arturo Lomibao also intercepted information that PNP- SAF members are
planning to defect from the administration, while on the same view Congressman
Peping Cojuanco plotted moves to bring down the Arroyo Administration.
Huge number of soldiers joined the rallies to provide critical mass and armed
component to Anti- Arroyo protests.
Bombings of telephone communication towers and cell sites in Bulacaan and Bataan
was also considered as an additional factual basis after the issuance of PP 1017 and
GO 5.
Because of these incidental series of events which clearly presents a critical
situation, President Arroyo cancelled all activities related to EDSA People Power I.
Mike Arroyo, then Executive Secretary, announced that warrantless arrest and
takeover of facilities can be implemented.
Succeeding this announcement was the arrest of Randy David, a Filipino journalist
and UP professor due to a mistake of fact that he was actually involved in the street
rallies. Seizure of Daily Tribune, Malaya and Abante-- all local news publication, took
place which, according to the PNP, was meant to show a strong presence to tell the
media outlets not to connive or do anything that would help rebels in bringing down
the government. Police also arrested Congressman Crispin Beltran, who then
represented the Anakpawis Party.
Issue:
Whether or not the issuance of Presidential Proclamation PP 1017 is
unconstitutional? Whether or not the arrest of Randy David and the seizure of Daily
Tribune et. al., is unconstitutional?
Ruling of the court:

Respondents claim that such petition is moot and academic based on the issuance
of PP 1017, but the Court rejects such contention. A moot and academic case is one
that ceases to present a justiciable controversy. In this case, the Court is convinced
that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017 which calls for military aid.
Most people then equate it to martial law, but such case is different wherein the
basis then was the 1973 Constitution. Under the present 1987 Constitution, the
President may summon armed forces to aid him in supporting lawless violence.
The President's declaration of state rebellion was merely an act declaring a status or
conduction of a public moment of interest. State of national emergency, however, is
the prerogative of the President. Her exercise of emergency powers such as the
taking over of privately owned utility requires delegation from the Congress, which
is entirely different from the martial law.
As to the seizure of the Daily Tribune and the arrest of Randy David, the Court
considers those actions unlawful based on the fact that it violates the constitutional
mandate of freedom of expression.
Jose Burgos vs. Chief of Staf
G.R. No L-64261
December 26, 1984
Facts:
Two warrants were issued against petitioners for the search on the premises of
Metropolitan Mail and We Forum newspapers and the seizure of items alleged to
have been used in subversive activities. Petitioners prayed that a writ of preliminary
mandatory and prohibitory injunction be issued for the return of the seized articles,
and that respondents be enjoined from using the articles thus seized as evidence
against petitioner.
Petitioners questioned the warrants for the lack of probable cause and that the two
warrants issued indicated only one and the same address. In addition, the items
seized subject to the warrant were real properties.
Issue:
Whether or not the two warrants were valid to justify seizure of the items.
Held:
The defect in the indication of the same address in the two warrants was held by
the court as a typographical error and immaterial in view of the correct
determination of the place sought to be searched set forth in the application. The
purpose and intent to search two distinct premises was evident in the issuance of
the two warrant.
As to the issue that the items seized were real properties, the court applied the
principle in the case of Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo, ruling that machinery which is
movable by nature becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the
tenement, property or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or
any other person having only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the
agent of the owner. In the case at bar, petitioners did not claim to be the owners of
the land and/or building on which the machineries were placed. This being the case,
the machineries in question, while in fact bolted to the ground remain movable
property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.
However, the Court declared the two warrants null and void.
Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been

committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the
place sought to be searched.
The Court ruled that the affidavits submitted for the application of the warrant did
not satisfy the requirement of probable cause, the statements of the witnesses
having been mere generalizations.
Furthermore, jurisprudence tells of the prohibition on the issuance of general
warrants. (Stanford vs. State of Texas). The description and enumeration in the
warrant of the items to be searched and seized did not indicate with specification
the subversive nature of the said items.

Columbia Pictures v. Flores

G.R. No. 78631
June 29, 1993
I.
THE FACTS
As a consequence of a complaint filed by the Motion Picture Association of America,
Inc., NBI agents conducted surveillance operations on certain video establishments,
among them respondent FGT Video Network, Inc. (FGT), for unauthorized sale,
rental, reproduction and/or disposition of copyrighted film," a violation of PD 49 (the
old Intellectual Property Law). After an NBI agent was able to have copyrighted
motion pictures Cleopatra (owned by 20th Century Fox) and The Ten
Commandments (owned by Paramount) reproduced in video format in FGT, the NBI
applied for and was able to obtain from the respondent judge the subject Search
Warrant No. 45 which reads:
TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:
GREETINGS:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the Undersigned after examining under oath NBI
Senior Agent Lauro C. Reyes and his witnesses Mr. Danilo Manalang and Ms.
Rebecca Benitez-Cruz, that there is a probable cause to believe that Violation of
Section 56 P.D. No. 49 as amended by P.D. No. 1988 (otherwise known as the
Decree on Protection of Intellectual Property) has been committed and that there
are good and sufficient reasons to believe that FGT Video Network, Inc., Manuel
Mendoza, Alfredo C. Ongyanco, Eric Apolonio, Susan Yang and Eduardo Yotoko are
responsible and have in control/possession at No. 4 Epifanio de los Santos corner
Connecticut, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila (per attached sketch and list of
MPAA member Company Titles) the following properties to wit:
(a) Pirated video tapes of the copyrighted motion pictures/films the titles of which
are mentioned in the attached list;
(b) Posters, advertising leaflets, flyers, brochures, invoices, lists of titles being
reproduced or retaped, journals, ledgers, jon (sic) order slips, delivery slips and
books of accounts bearing and/or mentioning the pirated films with titles (as per
attached list), or otherwise used in the reproduction/retaping business of the
defendants;

(c) Television sets, video cassette recorders, rewinders, tape head cleaners,
accessories, equipment and other machines and paraphernalia or materials used or
intended to be used in the unlawful sale, lease, distribution, or possession for
purpose of sale, lease, distribution, circulation or public exhibition of the abovementioned pirated video tapes which they are keeping and concealing in the
premises above-described, which should be seized and brought to the Undersigned.
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time in the day
between 8:00 A.M. to 5:00 P.M. of the premises above-described and forthwith seize
and take possession of the above-enumerated personal properties, and bring said
properties to the undersigned immediately upon implementation to be dealt with as
the law directs.
In the course of the implementation of the search warrant in the premises of FGT,
the NBI agents found and seized various video tapes of copyrighted films owned
and exclusively distributed by petitioners. Also seized were machines and
equipment, television sets, paraphernalia, materials, accessories, rewinders, tape
head cleaners, statements of order, return slips, video prints, flyers, production
orders, and posters.
FGT moved for the release of the seized television sets, video cassette recorders,
rewinders, tape head cleaners, accessories, equipment and other machines or
paraphernalia seized by virtue of the subject warrant. It argued that as a licensed
video reproducer, it had the right possess the seized reproduction equipment, which
are not illegal per se, but are rather exclusively used and intended to be used for
reproduction and not in the sale, lease, distribution or possession for purposes of
sale, lease distribution, circulation or public exhibition of pirated video tapes.
Finding that FGT was a registered and duly licensed distributor and in certain
instances and under special instructions and conditions reproducer of videograms
and that, therefore, its right to possess and use the seized equipment had been
placed in serious doubt, the lower court ordered the return of the television sets,
video cassette recorders, rewinders, tape head cleaners, accessories, equipment
and other machines or paraphernalia to FGT.
II. THE ISSUE
Did the respondent judge act with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in ordering the immediate return of some of the items seized by virtue of
the search warrant?
III. THE RULING
[The High Tribunal DISMISSED the petition and AFFIRMED the order of the
respondent Judge Flores.]
NO, the respondent judge DID NOT act with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction in ordering the immediate return of some of the items seized by
virtue of the search warrant.
Search Warrant No. 45 fails to satisfy the test of legality. This is more so because the
Court has previously decided a case dealing with virtually the same kind of search
warrant. In 20th Century Fox vs. CA, the Court upheld the legality of the order of the
lower court lifting the search warrant issued under circumstances similar to those
obtaining in the case at bar. A striking similarity between this case and 20th
Century Fox is the fact that Search Warrant No. 45, specifically paragraph (c)
thereof describing the articles to be seized, contains an almost identical description
as the warrant issued in the 20th Century Fox case, to wit:
(c) Television sets, Video Cassettes Recorders, rewinders, tape head cleaners,
accessories, equipments and other machines used or intended to be used in the

unlawful reproduction, sale, rental/lease, distribution of the above-mentioned video

tapes which she is keeping and concealing in the premises above-described.
On the propriety of the seizure of the articles above-described, the Court held in
20th Century Fox:
Television sets, video cassette recorders, rewinders and tape cleaners are articles
which can be found in a video tape store engaged in the legitimate business of
lending or renting out betamax tapes. In short, these articles and appliances are
generally connected with, or related to a legitimate business not necessarily
involving piracy of intellectual property or infringement of copyright laws. Hence,
including these articles without specification and/or particularity that they were
really instruments in violating an Anti-Piracy law makes the search warrant too
general which could result in the confiscation of all items found in any video store.
The language used in paragraph (c) of Search Warrant No. 45 is thus too allembracing as to include all the paraphernalia of FGT in the operation of its business.
As the search warrant is in the nature of a general one, it is constitutionally
objectionable.
The Court concluded that the respondent judge did not gravely abuse his discretion
in ordering the immediate release of the enumerated items, but that he was merely
correcting his own erroneous conclusions in issuing Search Warrant No. 45. This can
be gleaned from his statement that . . . the machines and equipment could have
been used or intended to be used in the illegal reproduction of tapes of the
copyrighted motion pictures/films, yet, it cannot be said with moral certainty that
the machines or equipment(s) were used in violating the law by the mere fact that
pirated video tapes of the copyrighted motion pictures/films were reproduced. As
already stated, FGT Video Network, Inc. is a registered and duly licensed distributor
and in certain instances and under special instructions . . . reproducer of
videograms, and as such, it has the right to keep in its possession, maintain and
operate reproduction equipment(s) and paraphernalia(s).
Valmonte v. De Villa
G.R. No. 83988
September 29, 1989 (173 SCRA 211)
I.
THE FACTS
On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was
activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General
Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting security operations within its
area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an
effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an
atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political development of the
National Capital Region. As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC
installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
Petitioners Atty. Ricardo Valmonte, who is a resident of Valenzuela, Metro Manila,
and the Union of Lawyers and Advocates For Peoples Rights (ULAP) sought the
declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and elsewhere as
unconstitutional. In the alternative, they prayed that respondents Renato De Villa
and the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) be directed to formulate
guidelines in the implementation of checkpoints for the protection of the people.
Petitioners contended that the checkpoints gave the respondents blanket authority

to make searches and seizures without search warrant or court order in violation of
the Constitution.
II.
THE ISSUE
WON the military and police checkpoints violate the right of the people against
unreasonable search and seizures?
III.
THE RULING
[The Court, voting 13-2, DISMISSED the petition.]
NO, military and police checkpoints DO NOT violate the right of the people against
unreasonable search and seizures.
xxx. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are
not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but
is to be resolved according to the facts of each case.
Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle
which is parked on the public fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle, or flashes
a light therein, these do not constitute unreasonable search.
The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other
areas) may be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its
mission of establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order
for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to
thwart plots to destabilize the government, in the interest of public security. In this
connection, the Court may take judicial notice of the shift to urban centers and their
suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in the increased killings in
cities of police and military men by NPA sparrow units, not to mention the
abundance of unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence
in such urban centers, not all of which are reported in media, most likely brought
about by deteriorating economic conditions which all sum up to what one can
rightly consider, at the very least, as abnormal times. Between the inherent right of
the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual's
right against a warrantless search which is however reasonably conducted, the
former should prevail.
True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men
in uniform, in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse.
But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the
citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted within
reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful
community.
PRUDENTE vs DAYRIT
G.R. No. 82870
December 14, 1989
FACTS:
The Chief of the Intelligence Special Action Division (ISAD) filed with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) Manila, Judge Abelardo Dayrit, for the issuance of Search Warrant
for violation of PD No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearm, etc). In the deposition of
witness (P/Lt. Florencio C. Angeles), it was made mentioned of result of our
continuous surveillance conducted for several days. We gathered information from
verified sources that the holders of said firearms and explosives as well as
ammunitions arent licensed to possess said firearms and ammunition. Further, the

premises is a school and the holders of these firearms are not student who were not
supposed to possess firearms, explosives and ammunitions.
Person to be searched in Nemesio Prudente at the Polytechnic University of the
Philippines, Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila, has in his control or possession firearms,
explosives hand grenades and ammunitions which are illegally possesses at the
office of Department of Military Science and Tactics and at the office of the
President.
Petitioner moved to quash the Search Warrant. He claimed that:
Petitioners, had no personal knowledge of the facts
The examination of the said witness was not in form of searching questions and
answers
Search warrant was a general warrant
Violation of Circular No. 19 of the Supreme Court in that the complainant failed to
allege under oath that the issuance of the search warrant on a Saturday, urgent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the search and seizure was valid?
HELD:
Search Warrant annulled and set aside.
RATIONALE:
Valid search warrant to issue, there must be probable cause, which is to be
determined personally by the Judge, after examination under oath and affirmation
of the complainant, and that witnesses he may produce and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons and things to be seized. The probable
cause must be in connection with one specific offense and the Judge must, before
issuing Search Warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and
answers, In writing and under oath, the complainant and any witnesses he may
produce, on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn
statements together with any affidavits submitted.
Probable Cause for a valid search warrant, has been defined as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe
that an offense has been committed, and that objects sought in connection which
the offense are in the place sought to be searched.
This probable case must be shown to be personal knowledge and of the
complainant and witnesses he may produce and not based on mere hearsay.
PARTICULARITY
For violation of PD 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.) while the said decree
punishes several offenses, the alleged violation in this case was, qualified by the
phrase illegal possession of firearms etc. Reformed to ammunitions and
explosives. In other words, the search warrant was issued for the specific offense of
illegal possession of firearms and explosives. Hence, the failure of the Search
Warrant to mention the particular provision of PD1-866 that was violated is not of
such gravity as to call for the invalidation of this case.
Pollo v. Constantino-David
G.R. No. 181881
18 October 2011
Facts
Respondent CSC Chair Constantino-David received an anonymous letter complaint
alleging of an anomaly taking place in the Regional Office of the CSC. The

respondent then formed a team and issued a memo directing the team to back up
all the files in the computers found in the Mamamayan Muna (PALD) and Legal
divisions.
Several diskettes containing the back-up files sourced from the hard disk of PALD
and LSD computers were turned over to Chairperson David. The contents of the
diskettes were examined by the CSCs Office for Legal Affairs (OLA). It was found
that most of the files in the 17 diskettes containing files copied from the computer
assigned to and being used by the petitioner, numbering about 40 to 42 documents,
were draft pleadings or lettersin connection with administrative cases in the CSC
and other tribunals. On the basis of this finding, Chairperson David issued the ShowCause Order, requiring the petitioner, who had gone on extended leave, to submit
his explanation or counter-affidavit within five days from notice.
In his Comment, petitioner denied the accusations against him and accused the CSC
Officials of fishing expedition when they unlawfully copied and printed personal
files in his computer.
He was charged of violating R.A. No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
for Public Officials and Employees). He assailed the formal charge and filed an
Omnibus Motion ((For Reconsideration, to Dismiss and/or to Defer) assailing the
formal charge as without basis having proceeded from an illegal search which is
beyond the authority of the CSC Chairman, such power pertaining solely to the
court.
The CSC denied the omnibus motion and treated the motion as the petitioners
answer to the charge. In view of the absence of petitioner and his counsel, and upon
the motion of the prosecution, petitioner was deemed to have waived his right to
the formal investigation which then proceeded ex parte.
The petitioner was dismissed from service. He filed a petition to the CA which was
dismissed by the latter on the ground that it found no grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the respondents. He filed a motion for reconsideration which was further
denied by the appellate court. Hence, this petition.
Issue
WON the search conducted by the CSC on the computer of the petitioner
constituted an illegal search and was a violation of his constitutional right to privacy
Ruling
The search conducted on his office computer and the copying of his personal files
was lawful and did not violate his constitutional right.
Ratio Decidendi
In this case, the Court had the chance to present the cases illustrative of the issue
raised by the petitioner.
Katz v. United States 389 U.S. 437 (1967), the US Supreme Court held that the act
of FBI agents in electronically recording a conversation made by petitioner in an
enclosed public telephone booth violated his right to privacy and constituted a
search and seizure. Because the petitioner had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in using the enclosed booth to make a personal telephone call, the
protection of the Fourth Amendment extends to such area. Moreso, the concurring
opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan noted that the existence of privacy right under prior
decisions involved a two-fold requirement: first, that a person has exhibited an
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy; and second, that the expectation be one
that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable (objective).

Mancusi v. DeForte 392 U.S. 364, 88 S.Ct. 2120, 20 L.Ed2d 1154 (1968),thus
recognized that employees may have a reasonable expectation of privacy against
intrusions by police.
OConnor v. Ortega 480 U.S. 709 (1987), the Court categorically declared that
[i]ndividuals do not lose Fourth Amendment rights merely because they work for
the government instead of a private employer. In OConnor the Court recognized
that special needs authorize warrantless searches involving public employees for
work-related reasons. The Court thus laid down a balancing test under which
government interests are weighed against the employees reasonable expectation
of privacy. This reasonableness test implicates neither probable cause nor the
warrant requirement, which are related to law enforcement.
Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs Board G.R. Nos. 157870, 158633 and
161658, November 3, 2008, 570 SCRA 410, 427, (citing Ople v. Torres, G.R. No.
127685, July 23, 1998, 293 SCRA 141, 169), recognized the fact that there may be
such legitimate intrusion of privacy in the workplace.
The Court ruled that the petitioner did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy
in his office and computer files.
As to the second point of inquiry, the Court answered in the affirmative. The search
authorized by the CSC Chair, the copying of the contents of the hard drive on
petitioners computer reasonable in its inception and scope.
The Court noted that unlike in the case of Anonymous Letter-Complaint against Atty.
Miguel Morales, Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila A.M. Nos. P-082519 and P-08-2520, November 19, 2008, 571 SCRA 361, the case at bar involves
the computer from which the personal files of the petitioner were retrieved is a
government-issued computer, hence government property the use of which the CSC
has absolute right to regulate and monitor.
Virgilio Callanta vs. Carnation Philippines Inc.
GR No. 70615, Oct. 28, 1986
Facts:
1. Petitioner Virgillio Callanta was employed by Carnation Philippines, Inc. as a
salesman in the Agusan del Sur Area. Five years later or June 1, 1979, respondent
Carnation filed with the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE), Regional Office
X, an application for clearance to terminate the employment of Virgillio Callanta on
the alleged grounds of serious misconduct and misappropriation of company funds
amounting to P12,000.00 more or less.
2. On June 26, 1979 MOLE approved the said clearance and Virgillio Callanta was
terminated effective June 1, 1979.
3. On July 5, 1982, Callanta filed with MOLE Regional Office X, a complaint for illegal
dismissal with claims for reinstatement, back wages and damages against
respondent Carnation.
4. On October 5, 1982- Carnation put in issue the timeliness of Callantas complaint,
alleging that the same is barred by prescription for having been filed more than
three years after Callantas dismissal.

5. On March 24, 1983- Labor Arbiter Pedro C. Ramos ruled in favor of Callanta and
ordered re-instatement.
6. On April 18, 1983, respondent Carnation appealed to respondent National Labor
Relations Commission [NLRC].
7. NLRC set aside the decision of the Labor Arbiter and it declared that the
complaint for illegal dismissal filed by Virgilio Callanta to have already prescribed.
Labor Code provides that:
Art. 291. Offenses. Offenses penalized under this Code and the rules and
regulations issued
pursuant thereto shall prescribe in three [3] years.
Art. 292. Money claims. All money claims arising from employeremployee relations
accruing during the effectivity of this Code shall be
filed within three [3] years from the time the cause of action accrued; otherwise,
they shall
be forever barred.
Callanta filed a petition in the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not Callantas case of illegal dismissal prescribes in 3 years,
pursuant to Art. 291 and Art. 292 of the Labor Code.
Callantas Contention:
Callanta contends that since the Labor Code is silent as to the prescriptive period of
an action for illegal dismissal with claims for reinstatement, backwages and
damages, the applicable law, by way of supplement, is Article 1146 of the New Civil
Code which provides a four [4]-year prescriptive period for an action predicated
upon "an injury to the rights of the plaintiff".
He added that, an action for illegal dismissal is neither a "penal offense" nor a mere
"money claim," as contemplated under Articles 291 and 292, respectively, of the
Labor Code.
Petitioner further claims that an action for illegal dismissal is a more serious
violation of the rights of an employee as it deprives him of his means of livelihood;
thus, it should correspondingly have a prescriptive period longer than the three [ 3]
years provided for in "money claims."
Carnation Phil.s Contention
Carnation, counters that a case for illegal dismissal falls under the general category
of "offenses penalized under this Code and the rules and regulations pursuant
thereto" provided under Article 291 or a money claim under Article 292, so that
petitioner's complaint for illegal dismissal filed on July 5, 1982, or three [3] years,
one [1] month and five [5] days after his alleged dismissal on June 1, 1979, was
filed beyond the three-year prescriptive period as provided under Labor Code,
hence, barred by prescription;

SCs Decision:
The Supreme Court Find for Callanta.
It reasoned that, the dismissal without just cause of an employee from his
employment constitutes a violation of the Labor Code and its implementing rules
and regulations.
Such violation, however, does not amount to an "offense" as understood under
Article 291 of the Labor Code.
The confusion arises over the use of the term "illegal dismissal" which creates the
impression that termination of an employment without just cause constitutes an
offense.
It must be noted, however that unlike in cases of commission of any of the
prohibited activities during strikes or lockouts under Article 265, unfair labor
practices under Article 248, 249 and 250 and illegal recruitment activities under
Article 38, among others, which the Code itself declares to be unlawful, termination
of an employment without just or valid cause is not categorized as an unlawful
practice.
In the case, of illegal dismissal, no penalty of fine nor imprisonment is imposed on
the employer upon a finding of illegality in the dismissal. By the very nature of the
reliefs sought, therefore, an action for illegal dismissal cannot be generally
categorized as an "offense" as used under Article 291 of the Labor Code, which
must be brought within the period of three[3] years from the time the cause of
action accrued, otherwise, the same is forever barred.
The case of Valencia vs. Cebu Portland Cement, et al., 106 Phil. 732, a 1959 case
cited by petitioner, is applicable in the instant case insofar as it concerns the issue
of prescription of actions.
In said case, this Court had occasion to hold that an action for damages involving a
plaintiff seperated from his employment for alleged unjustifiable causes is one for "
injury to the rights of the plaintiff, and must be brought within four [4] years.
Art. 1146. The following actions must be instituted within four years.
[1] Upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff.
SC grant the petition and the decision of the NLRC was reversed and set aside.
Gacal Vs. Judge Infante
FACTS:
It is axiomatic that bail cannot be allowed to a person charged with a capital
offense, or an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
without a hearing upon notice to the Prosecution. Any judge who so allows bail is

guilty of gross ignorance of the law and the rules, and is subject to appropriate
administrative sanctions.
Atty. Franklin Gacal, the private prosecutor in Criminal Case No. 1136-03 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Alabel, Sarangani entitled People v. Faustino Ancheta, a
prosecution for murder arising from the killing of Felomino O. Occasion, charges
Judge Jaime I. Infante, Presiding Judge of Branch 38 of the RTC to whose Branch
Criminal Case No. 1136-03 was raffled for arraignment and trial, with gross
ignorance of the law, gross incompetence, and evident partiality, for the latters
failure to set a hearing before granting bail to the accused and for releasing him
immediately after allowing bail.
Antecedents
On March 18, 2003, Judge Gregorio R. Balanag, Jr. of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
of Kiamba-Maitum, Sarangani issued a warrant for the arrest of Faustino Ancheta in
connection with a murder case. Judge Balanag did not recommend bail. Ancheta,
who had meanwhile gone into hiding, was not arrested. Upon review, the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor, acting through Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Alfredo
Barcelona, Jr., affirmed the findings and recommendation of Judge Balanag on the
offense to be charged, and accordingly filed in the RTC an information for murder on
April 21, 2003 (Criminal Case No. 1136-03), but with a recommendation for bail in
the amount of P400,000.00. Criminal Case No. 1136-03 was raffled to Judge
Infantes Branch.
On April 23, 2003, Judge Infante issued twin orders, one granting bail to
Ancheta, and another releasing Ancheta from custody.
On April 25, 2003, Atty. Gacal, upon learning of the twin orders issued by Judge
Infante, filed a so-called Very Urgent Motion For Reconsideration And/Or To Cancel
Bailbond With Prayer To Enforce Warrant Of Arrest Or Issue Warrant Of Arrest Anew
Or In The Alternative Very Urgent Motion For This Court To Motu Prop[r]io Correct An
Apparent And Patent Error (very urgent motion).
On May 21, 2003, Judge Infante denied Atty. Gacals very urgent motion on the
ground that the motion was pro forma for not bearing the conformity of the public
prosecutor, and on the further ground that the private prosecutor had not been
authorized to act as such pursuant to Section 5, Rule 110, of the Rules of Court.
Atty. Gacal contended that Judge Infante was not worthy of his position as a
judge either because he unjustifiably failed to exercise his judicial power or because
he did not at all know how to exercise his judicial power; that his lack of judicial will
rendered him utterly incompetent to perform the functions of a judge; that at one
time, he ordered the bail issue to be submitted for resolution, with or without the
comment of the public prosecutor, but at another time, he directed that the bail
issue be submitted for resolution, with his later order denoting that he would resolve
the issue only after receiving the comment from the public prosecutor; that he
should not be too dependent on the public prosecutors comment considering that
the resolution of the matter of bail was entirely within his discretion as the judge;[4]
[4] and that the granting of bail without a petition for bail being filed by the accused
or a hearing being held for that purpose constituted gross ignorance of the law and
the rules.[5][5]
ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Jaime Infante is guilty of Gross ignorance of the law.
HELD:
The Court imposed a fine of P20,000.00 on the respondent judge in Docena-Caspe v.
Bugtas.[32][32] In that case, the respondent judge granted bail to the two accused

who had been charged with murder without first conducting a hearing. Likewise, in
Loyola v. Gabo,[33][33] the Court fined the respondent judge in the similar amount
of P20,000.00 for granting bail to the accused in a murder case without the requisite
bail hearing. To accord with such precedents, the Court prescribes a fine of
P20,000.00 on Judge Infante, with a stern warning that a repetition of the offense or
the commission of another serious offense will be more severely dealt with.
WHEREFORE, we FIND AND DECLARE Judge Jaime I. Infante guilty of gross
ignorance of the law and the rules; and, accordingly, FINE him in the amount of
P20,000.00, with a stern warning that a repetition of the offense or the commission
of another serious offense will be more severely dealt with.