THE THEORY OF NATURAL BEAUTY AND ITS

EVIL STAR: KANT, HEGEL, ADORNO

by
RODOLPHE GASGHE
University at Buffalo, Stale University of New l'ork

ABSTRACT

In the artcrmath of K,anl, thai is, wilh Scbelling ancl He^cl, lhe natural bcauliful is
no longc^r a ma.ior concern of aesthetic, theoiy. According La Adomo, an tvil star hangs
over Lhe Lheor>' oi" natural bcauLy. The essay examines Lhe reasons for Lhis neglect of
thl.- beautiful of naLure by confronting Kant's account of natural beauty with Hegd's
theory about the fundamental deficiencies of beauty in nature and locates them in the
essential indeterminacy of eveiytliing that belongs to nature. Inquiring into wbat Adorno
seeks to achieve by playing Kant and Hegel off against one anotlier, it is shown that
this indeterminacy of nature is bolli an index of nature's interconnectedness with mythical violence and the promise of 3 freedom iri)m myth.

For quite some time now, it has been taken for granled that aesthetic theoiy i5 primarily, if nol exelusively, eoncerned with the arts.
Securing its disciplinary status .seems to have been a ritnction of this
self-limitation to artifieial beauty, Indeed., dttring the past two eenturies, aesthetic thcoiy seems to have only been able to caive out an
independent area of competence for itself by excluding natural beauty
as a pre-Romantic and, above all, Romantic remnant from its concerns. Indeed, the natural beautiful has been neglected in aesthetic
reflection, even outrightiy repressed, as Adorno contends. In light of
the critical reevaluation of aesthetic ihcoiy that is underway today-
the renewed interest in the sublime is one, but only one, indication
in whieh this reassessment is taking placeit is only iiatLiral thai we
should seek to remind ourselves of the concept of natural beauty and
of what it promised. Furthermore, this situation also gives us, perhaps,
an opportunity lo rethink this eoncept by inquiring into the epistemie
and ethical underpinnings that have infoi-med (lie modern concept
of natural beauty. In preparation of sueh a refleclion that, I believe,
would restore to aesthetics its philosophieal credetitials, the status
of this concept in the histoiy of aesthetics, inevitably, beeomes an
Research in Pkenornenohin-'-. '"^2

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RODOLPHE GASCHE

issue. Highly predominant in the aesthetic theories of the eighteenth

centuiy up lo Kant, the notion of the beautiful of nature becomes
suddenly irrelevant in aesthetic refiection afier Kant. In Aesthetic Theoiy,
Theodor W. Adorno holds that at least since Schelling and Hegel an
unliieky, ill-fated, or even evil starUnsternhas hung over the theory' of natural beauty.' Aecoixling to Adorno, the reason for this theory's lack of good fortune derives precisely from the fact that it is a
theory about nature. Following Benjamin, Adorno explains this negative valuation of nature oti the grounds that what natural beauty tells
us is not only itncertain but that "in its uncertainty, natural beauty
inherits the ambiguity of ni)^.""-' Ftirthermore, as his taik <;>f an unlticky
star suggests, the repression and, espeeially, the sacrifice of natural
beauty in Idealist aesthetics is tied to an aspeet of nature that Benjamin
repeatedly associated with mythical violence.'^ But befotT we ean itiquire
into tliis evW star that is the cause of die dismissal (jf the theoiy of
natural beauty and tlic "saeriliee" of its very object, we need to address
some of the more basic questions, namely: Why is natural beauty the
prime paradigm of the beautiful in Kant's aesthetics; what Is at stake
for Hegel in relegating the beautiful of nature to a secondary role in
his aesthetics; and finally, what does Adotiio seek to achieve in playing Kant and Hegel ofT against one another? But wiiile we seek to
address these quesdons in order to determine what the theory of aesthetics' unlucky star is, an additional question eannot be avoided.
Undoitbtedly, natural beauty has received short shrift in aesthetie theory" itl the aftermath of Idealism. But does a rettirn to the qtiestion
of natural beatity mean that it is time to reverse the liierarchical relation between it and the beauty of art? Does one not need to acknowledge diat it is tiot possible to conceive of the beautiful withotit weighing natural beauty against die beauty of art, and viee-versa? Thus any
difFerenee between the two invariably imjslies some sort of hierarchy.
Bnt in order to do justice to the tiegleeted natural beautiful, is it necessary (or even possible) to reverse the dominant hierarehy? What if
the reasons for subordinating nattiral beauty to artificial beauty are
compelling, even tu the point tliat the only way of doing justice to
the beauty of nature is to rethink the hieraixhy that exists between
the two kinds of beauty?
1 start my investigatioti with Kant's theoiy of natural beauty. The
Cntique uf Jiid^nenl is manifestly the plaee to start sueh ati itiquiiy. Yet,
for reasons that will only become elear later, I ttu^n Lo a mnch more
unlikely source, namely, a short paragraph in tlie part on "The Doetrine

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of Virliif'" in Tfte Metaphysics of Morals, where Kant briefly broaches

ihc queslion of the beautiful of nature. This ehoicc may seem strange,
if not even aberrant, but 1 begin here for several reasons: first., because
in this veiy shorl reference lo natural beaut)', the question ot the natural beautiful is not set oil' against the problematic of artihcial beauty.
Furtbermore, beanty is discussed entirely in view of Kant's moral concerns and thus quite at a remove from ihe epistemic treatment of tbe
beautiful that, in my view, dominates the Critique of Judgment (even
though moral issues play an important role there as well). But above
all, to begin a discussion of natural beauty on the basis of this brief
reference may appear odd because in this passage, Kant, as we will
see, makes a statement regarding tbe beauty of nature that seems to
squarely eontradict his assessment of beauty in the third Critique. And
yet, however peculiar, this remarkable statement is signiflcant in that
it can sen'e to reflne tbe line that separates Kant's evaluation and
]:)rivileging of natural beauty from HegeFs derogative treatment of nalural beauty. Kant writes;
A propensity in wanton dcsirucUon of vvhidl is beautiful in inanimate nature
{spivitus deslrucdonis) is opposi-d to a Iniman being\s duty to himself [In
Ansehung de.s Sclioneii. obgleich Lcbloscn in der NatLir ist em Hang zum
blossen Zerstoren . . . der Pflieht des Mensehen gcgcn sich sclbst ziiwider];
lor il weakens or- upi'oots that feeling in him whieh, though not of itself
moral, is still a disposition of sensibility thai greatly promotes morality
or at lea.st prepares the way lor it; thr disposiiion, namely, to love something (e.g., beautiful crystal formations, the indescribable beauiy of plants)
even apart from any intention to use it.
With regard to ihc animate but nonrational part of creation, violent
and (TLiel treatment ol animals is lar more iiititnately opposed to a human
being's duty to himself, and he has a duty to refrain from this; for il
dulLs hi.s .shared feeling of their suffering and so weakens and gradually
uproots a natural predisposition that is veiy .sei"vir.eabie to morahty in
one's relations with other men. The human being is authorized to kill
animals quickly (without pain) and to put them to work that docs nol
strain them beyond their capacities (such work as he himself must submit to). But agonizing physical experimenis ibr the sake of mere speculation, when the end could also be achieved without the.se, are to be
abhorred.'

The tniusual point that Kant makes at the beginning of these two
paragraphs (whieh are framed by a distinction tbal has no role in ihc
"Analytie of the Beaudful" in the Cntiqiie of Judgment, that is, the distinction between inanimate anci animate nature) is that lbe beautiful

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RODOLPHE GASCHE

in nature is restricted to certain phenomena \\athin inanimate nature.

The English translation Ls misleadiiig. It suggests that Kant speaks "of
what is beautiful in inanimate nature," thus leaxniig open the possibility tliat animate nature loo can be beautiful. Even though ihe meaning ofthe conjunction "obglcich" in the German original"'In Ansehung
des Schonen obglcich Leblosen in der Natur"is somewhat ambiguous
(but is it not primarily because the claim is so strange?), the most proximate reading of it .seems to exclude the possibility that there could
aiso be beauty in animate nature.' Indeed, the passage should read:
"As regards the beautiful, thougii [though corresponding lo the] inanimate, in nature." However, such identification of ihe beautiful in
nature witli inatiimatc nature is rather .suq^rising. Already the examples given, which include the indescribable beauty of plants, seem to
contradict the claim.'* What, indeed, does it mean to include plants in
inanimate nature? In addition to the examples of plants and especially
flowers that figure among the main examples ofthe Critique oJ Judgment,
the third Critique does in no way exclude the beauty of animal life.
However, it should be pointed out right away (hat the example.s of
animal beauty that Kant offers are mainly examples of exolie animals.
For example: "Many birds (aueh as the parrot, the humming bird, the
bird of paradise) and many sea shells are beauties in themselves, whieh
do not belong to any object determineel in respeet of its puipose by
concepts, ijul please freely and in themselves."' Bul rather tlian pursuing the seemingly ineongruous elaim that the beauty of nature is
limited to its inanimate aspect, I nole only, for the moment, that the
propensity to destroy things of nature that are beautiful prcstipposes
a prior awareness, or rather judgment, that certain natural things arc
beautiful. Kant's concern here is vrith the destruction not of inanimate
things in nature in general fthotigli this does not imjjly thai ho therefore would condone their destruction for the sheer sake of de.stroying
them), but exclusively of those things that in inanimate nature are
found beaulifui. Kant criticizes such a pi'opensity as loeing contrary to
the human being's duty to himself It is contrary to the human being's
duly to himself because, as he explains, it is detrimental to the feeling that causes us to love something that is of no use to us. Sinee this
latter disposition, or attunement, of sensibility [Stitrmmng der Sinnlichlceil)
is one that gready promotes morality, to destroy beautiful inanimale
things of nature is to inhibit the development of a sensible feeling that
is beneficial to (he formation uf morality, and henee, contrary to die
human being's destiny. Yet what is it about tliis love of (seemingly)

THE THEORY OF NATURAL BEAUTY AND ITS EVIL STAR

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inanimate things (alone) that have no use for us, but that (therefore?)
can be heid to be beautifui, ihat makes it benclicial for the development ot" morality? More preciseiy on what basis do bcautilui tilings in
inanimate natnre Ibster in us this love for things that we have no
intention to use?
The dnty to refrain from mistreating animate, though nonrational,
that is, animal, nature, has notliing to do with beauty. Even in view
of the fact that in the Critique of Judgment Kant acknowledges beauty
in animal nature, even there only certain kinds of animaismostiy
exotic animais, and in some cases oniy the strnctures attached to, or
covering, their bodie.sgive rise to truly pnre aestiieticai Judgments.
As the exampie of the horse demonstrates, its beauty "presupposes a
concept of tiie purpose whicli determines wiiat the thing is to be, and
consequcntiy a concept of its perfection; it is tiiereforc adiierent [and
not free] beauty."" Horses, thereibre, are not Iseautifui in tiie strict
sense; tiie jtidgmeiu about their beauty is not a pure aestheticai judgment. Tt foiiows tiiat, animais, or at least the animals Kant refers to
in The Melaphy.ncs of Moralshorses and dogsdo not fall into the category of natural things tiiat conid be ioved for their own sake, that
is, iovcd without interest. If, according to tliis iatter work, the entire
animai realm is to be protected against crueity, it is because cruel
treatment of animais duils the human being's abiiity to feei the animals' stiffering, atid tiiis duiiing, in turn, is detrimentai to the moraiity in one's reiation to other human beings. But to refrain from treating animais crueiiy is aiso, and even more so dian in tiie case of the
l:>eautifui things in inanimate nature, a duty of the human l^eing to
himself. Indeed, Kant specifies that such treatment is "far more intimately opposed to a human being's duty to inmself" But it aiso needs
to be pointed out that even though nature's inanimate resources are
rigiitfuiiy at men's disposai as Kant argues in tlie "Doctrine of Rigiit"
indeed, humanity lias a duty to make use of themand even thougii
they arc authorizeci to kili animais for tiieir subsistence or to put them
to work, to refrain from violence against nature is not, it would seem,
primarily grounded in a respect for natnre, but in the duty that man
has to himself This is evident in particuiar from the concluding remarks
tiiat Kant makes in this short ciiapter in 77?^ Metaphyics of Morals, where
he suggests that some domestic animals at least are to be treated iike
famiiy members, that is, treated according to the eontractuai rigiit
that consdtutes iicre tlie reiation to others. Kant writes: ''Even gratitude for die long service of an oici horse or dcjg (just as ii" they were

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members of ihe household) belongs indireclly to a human being's ckiLy

wilh regard to these animals; considered a.s a direet duty, however, it is
always only a duty of the human being to himself.""'
In nature, the beauty of certain inanimate things promc^tes a disposition that, although it is not moral in itself, is benclicial to the
deveiopment of morality, and consequently tlie destruction of such
things is adverse to the human being's iiumanity. The beautiful in
nature becomes significant in view of the duty that man has to himself as a moral being. Distinct from that part of nature that is put to
use by humans and whose use is regulated by laws that also cierivc
from the human being's duty to himself, the beautiful of nature refers
to natural phenomena that are not pan of man's utilitarian world.
The beauty of nature is seen as limited to inanimate naitire and to
certain foi'ms of animate life that, in distinction from the horse and
the dog, are not part of the sphere of things that are considered purposive. But what is it then about the natural beautiful that makes it
morally imporlant, even though the duty that il invokes is, as Kant
suggests, less intimate diaii with regard to animate nature? This is the
poinl where we need return (o the qiiestion of why Kant considers
beauty only in connection with inanimate nature even tliotigh this may
include flowers and birds. I recall that according to the third Critic/ue.
which is primarily concerned with an aesthetics of natural beauty, only
such ihings of nature for which we have no (determinate) concept can
be found to be beautiful. To judge as beautiful a thing that 1 do not
know and for which I have no use is lo judge that it has the form of
an object (though it remains undetermined which one), and henee that
it is in principle cognizable. Natural beauty is thus intimately tied to
the indeierminaey of cognitively unfamiliar and undomestieated nature.
For sure, it is not the indeterminacy that makes natural things beautiful, but the fact that they have a form that raises them to the dignity of a thing, and that, therefore, makes them determinabie. By limiting the beautiful of natui'e to inanimate nature (even though it may
include flowers and certain birds), Kanl suggests thai only such things
of nature where die jtidgment tipon their form seeures their objeetivity in the absence of determined concepts of tiie understanding can
be called beautiful. To JLidge that these things, inanimate or not, are
beautiful is to be concerned exelusively with their l'orm as things and
not as life forms. The pleasure associated with the judgment tlial something is beautiful is ihe pleasure of this thing's eonformity to our eog~
nitive faculties. Tlie existence of beautiful things in nature is testimony

K THEORY OF NATURAL BEAUTY ;^ND ITS EVIL STAR

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to nature's conformity to reason even when no concepts of the underslanding arc at hand to determine them. If Tlie Metaphyics of Morals
holds thai to refrain from destroying inanimate, but beautiful, things
of nature is a duty to ourselves, it is first aud foremost because such
destruclion vvould be opposed to our destiny to make nature knowable. Natural beauty is an index of nature's cognizability, and it is in
this respect that ii becomes a moral issue. The pleasure felt at the
reeognition that an unknown thing of nature has form derives from
the epistemic aceomplishment of the faculties. But the fact that such
an accomplishment makes us love what is of no use to us since vve
don't know what il is, or good for, becomes iiUeresting* from a practical point of view. And henee to destroy a beauliful thing of nature
is contrary to our moral destiny. In the context of 'The Metaphysia of
A4omls, the question of beauty is not essential to animate nature. As
fbrms of life, the constituents of animal nature refer to a determined
concept. The awareness that a thing of nature is alive implies the
idea of a natural puiposc. It submits, therefore, from die start to the
moral law.
Life {Lehendigkeil], however, and as far as nature is concerned, natural life, is for Hegel (he sole thing that is beautiful. Whereas for
Kant the beautiful of nature is the eminently beantiful, and according
to The h4etaphy.si.cs of Morals., First and foremost, certain things in inanimate nature, the intereonneelion between life and beauty compels
Hegel not only to exclude objects of inanimate naLure from beauty
bnl also to value (he beauty of art o\'er that of nature. The distinction between natural beauty and artificial beauty is of course an issue
fbr Kant as well. But it is not only because of its para-epistemie concerns that the tliird Critique gives clear priority to the natural beautiful; the contemplation of the beauty of natnre. Kant explain.s, is also
more beneficial to the developmenl ol' morality tlian that of the arts.
It is not because of its living things, but because of its conformity to
our cognitive faculties tliai nature fosters tlie development of" onr moral
sense. By contrast, the intimate connection of beauty with life leads
Hegel to find beauty first in animate natnre, in order then to judge
it deficient and to replace it with the higher beauty of man-made art.
Wbereas in Kant a concern witb hnman dignity and freedom leads
to a valorization of natural beauty, this same concern with freedom
motivates Hegel's devaluation of natuial beauty.
Jusl as I did in the case- of Kant, I wish Lo jjlace a specific passage
at the center of my discussion of naiiual b(?anty in Hegel's aesthetics.

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RODOLPIIE GASCHE

After having estalslished that animal life is "the summit of natural

beauty,"'" Hegel writes:
The living thing slill tacks frfcdom, owing tn iis inability i:o bring itscIC
into appearance as an individual point, i.e. as a subject, in contrast to
the display of its members in exlei^nai reality. The real seat of the activities of organic life remains veiled from our vision; we see only the external outlines nf the animal's shape, and this again is covered throughout
by leathers, scales, hair, pelt, prickles, or shells. Sucli covering docs belong
lo the animal kingdom, but in animals it ha.s ibrms drawn from the kingdom of plants. Here at once lies one chief dcHciency in the beauty of
animal Iiie. Whal is visible to us in the organism h not the soul; what
i,s turned outwards and appears everywhere is not inner life, but forms
drawn froin a lower stage tliaii that of lile proper. The animal is living
only within its covering, i.e. this 'insideness' is not itsell real in the lorm
of an inner conseiousness and therefore ihis hlc is not visible over ;ill the
aniinal. Because the inside remains j!;.v/ an inside, the outside too appears
o?dji as an outside and not completely penetrated in evciy part by die
soul. (A., 145-46).

This passage contains not only the reasons why beauty is linked exclusively to the manifestation of life but also why natural life and,
hence, natural beauty are found lacking. But before I can elaborate
on these reasons, and the subsecjuent privileging of artifieial beauty, I
must hrst secure the basics of die argument.
Following the definition of the Idea as the Concept, the real existence ofthe Concept, and the unity ofthe two. Hegel opens the chapter devotee! to ''The Beauty of Nature" in Aesthetics. Leclures on Fine Art
by saying that: "The beautiful is the Idea as the immediate unity of
the Concept with its reality, the Idea, however, only in so far as this
its unity is present immediately in sensuous and real appearance. Now
the first existence of the Idea is nature^ and beauty begins as the beauty
of nature [die erste Schonheit is die Naturschdnhei.i]'''' {A, I 16). If the
beautiful is the sensible appearance ofthe Idea (as the immediate unity
of the eoncept and its reality)^ natural beauty is the first manifestation
of beauty. Right from the start, natural beauty is thus positioned in
\aew of its sublation iuto a highei" form of beauty. Qualified as first
beauty, naturai beauty not only suggests that there is an additional
kind of beauty but also, since "first" means abstract, formal, limited,
a beauty iu whieh the Idea finds a sensible appearanee that is more
appropriate to the concept in this stage o^ its sell-development. Now
what causes natural beauty to provide only an inhei'cntly limited medium

THE THEORY OF NATL'RAL BEAUTY AND ITS EVIL STAR

1 1 1

of real and sensible appearance for the Idea is that nature is \'iewcd
by Hegel, from the outset, in terms of life and the li\dng thing {Leben,
das I^hendige). Tt is only insofar as nature yields to what Hegel ealls the
"idealism of life"" thai it is beautiful. However, sueh an understanding of the natural beauty inherently implies the limitation of such
beauty. Or differently worded, beeause beauty manilests itself only in
eonnecdon with Life, natural beauty is not ranked as high as artifieial
beauty. For, indeed, the life that manifests itself in naturestarting
with "organic arlieulation" and culminating in airimal lifeis found
to be deficient, and nature itself is a medium in whieh life cannot
unfoid its full potential. But before I elaborate on ihe dehcieneies of
natural beauty, 1 would like to firsi consider Hegel's concept of Life.
The "Concept's first mode of existence" oc(_iu\s in the shape of the
manifold of the piireiy mechanical and physieal separate and partieuiar bodies. The higher way in whieh the Concept beeomes real takes
place by way of "higher natural objects" sueh as the heavenly bodies,
which though fully independent, close together in one and the same
system in which, in addition, the very unity of the differences is
objeetihed by way of one such body (for example, the sun in the solar
system). But in both cases the Coneept .sinks itself (versenkl .deh) .so eompletely in reality "thai it does not itself appear as subjectively ideal
unity" (A, 116). In these forms of sensible existence ofthe Concept,
the latter is only secretly at work and does not itself shine forth as the
ideality and the inner being-for-itself [Fursicksein) of the independent
externality (]f the Concept's different moments. Yet, as Hegel remarks,
the "true existence of the Concept requires . . . that the real differences
(namely the reality of the independent diflcrences and their equally
independently objeetified unity as such) be themselves brought back
into unity; i.e. that such a whole of natural differcnees siiouid on the
one hand make the Coneept explicit as a real mntual exrcrnality of
its specific delerminations, and yet on the other hand set down as canceled in rveiy particular thing its self-enclosed independence; and now
make the ideality, in whieh the differences are tiirncd back into subjeetive unity, emerge in them as their universal animating souf (..4,
118). However, such true objeetification ofthe Concept occurs exclusively in organic articulation in which the independent moments of
the Concept are no longer parts of a physical and mechanical system.
Rather, the Concept's moments have been transformed here into members of an organism, and in wliich, furthermore, the ideal unity ofthe
members manifests itself as such in the shape of die body's immanent

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soul. In other words, in natural life, in nature as organic nature, "alone

is an existence ofthe Idea, tlie Idea in natural form as Life" {A., 118).
Indeed, from the very way in whicli Hegel understands the Idea,
namely, as the unity of the Concept, its real existence, and the unity
of both, it follows that in ihe realm of nature, natural life is the Idea's
most appropriate realization or objectification. Instead of ha\ing its
being immediately in itself, the reality that ihe Idea accjuires in natural life is at the same time negated and affirmatively idealized by the
soul as the ideal unity within tlie living organism. The soul of the living
organism, whieh "displays itself as the power against die independent
particularizadon of the members," also forms these members insofar
as it contains '"as inward and ideal what is imprinted externally on
the members and forms [of the body]" [A., 122). The soul thus actualizes in natural life the Idea's relation to self. But the liNTUg organism is also ihe most appropriate form of the existence of the Idea in
the sphere of nature because nalural life alone is the reality in whieh
the reladon to self can become subjective self-awareness. Natural life's
propensity to take the shape of living beings makes it nature's most
apt objeetifieadon of the Idea. Hegel writes: "In the living organism
we have an outer in which the inner appears, since the outer displays
itself in itself as this inner whieh is its Concept. To this Concept again
there belongs the reality in which the Concept appears as Concept.
But since in objectivity the Concept as such is the self-related subjectivity that in its reality is still confronted by itself, life exists only as a
living beings as an indi\iduai snbject. . . . Life is only now actual as individual living subject" (/I, 122)- The natural life in wiiich tbe Idea finds
its adequate sensible reality is one of individnal subjects who arc
invoh'ed in a constant process of idealization (thai is, ihrough activities such as spontaneous movement and especially assimilation of the
external worid, so tlial "by means of what ia his opposite, he [the living individual] continually reproduces himself as an individual").
Consequently, the ideality of the ensouled living individual being "is
not at all only our refiection on life [Ijutj is objectively presenl in the living subject itself" (J4, 123). But precisely beeause the ideality oi' the
li\'irig subject is objective and not merely the result of our refiection,
as in the case of inanimate objects of uatnrc sueh as crystals, the objectivity of the ideal unity that animates life in nature is also bound to
be deficient. Even though (he presence of the Idea in indi\ddual and
adequate nalural actuality causes life in nature to be beaudful, the
very objectivit)-" of this Idea as soul, that is, its sensible objectivity.

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113

brings with it a standard in light of which this objectivity proves to

be lacking. Full objectivity' of the Idea can only be achieved where
the individual living subject is the self-conseious agent of the idealism
in question, something that life in nature is ineapable of achieving. As
a consequerice, natural beauty as the beaut)' of natural life appears to
be deficieni as well.
Even drougli the ideality is objecdvely present in the living subjeet,
"in its earliest natural form as life," it is only "immediately present
there in individual and adequate actuality." The living individual makes
"the external world something/(^r himself^' and continnally reproduces
himself as an individual. However, this objective idealism is present
only in immediate fashion; it is not yet subjective. Hegel writes: "because
of this purely sensuous immediacy, the living beauty of nature is produced neither Tor nor out of itself as beautiful and for t!ie sake of a beautiful appearance. The beauty of nature is beautiful only for another,
i.e. for us, for the mind [Bewwistseiril whieh apprehends beauty" (/I,
123). Undoubteelly, life in nature is beautiful. Bul the very immediacy
of the Idea's actuality as natural life causes natural life's beauty to be
beaudful only for others and not for itseif. I'here is thus something
accidental about natural beauty. It cannoi be beautiful for itself, because
it itself is not the active agent of ils own shining forth. Its beauty has
not been self-produced. By definition, natural beauty, as lhe immediate presence of the Idea, lacks a relation to itself; it is oniy for others, more precisely it is only for a consciousness that apprehends it.
Hegel asserts that "in nature the soul as such cannot make itself recognizable, because subjeetive unity in its ideality lias not yel become
explicit to itself" {A, 128). Natural beauty, Hegei concludes, "proceeds
from the activity of our intellect [Versiand]" {A, 124). As we will see,
Hegel not only hnds natural beauty lacking, he also sees the perception of nature as beautiful as further evidence of the shortcomings of
its object. Indeed, when we look at natural forms and find them beautiful, it is beeause we foreshadow a eorrespondenee hetween nature
and the Coneept. Hegel writes: "The perception of nature as licautiful goes no further than this foreshadowing {Ahnung) of the Concept.
But the consequence is that this apprehension of nalure . . . remains
purely indeterminate and abstract. The inner unity remains inward; fbr
perception it does not emerge in a concretely ideal form, and consideradon acquiesces iu the universality of some sort of a necessary
animating harmony" (/I, 130). Jtist as the ideal unity ofthe soul does
not come forth itself as such in the totalitv of the members that it

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RODOLPHE OASCHE

animai.es in natural life, so perccprion of natural beaut)' leaves this inner

unity in natural forms just there where it foreshadows it, that is, sunk
into nature. However objectively ideal, tfie unity of natural life, that
is, the soul, does not possess itselfit is not ''in and for itself full of
content"nor does it permeate its external reality so as to "make the
real outward shape an obvious nianilestation ofthe inner" [A, 133).
This then is also the point at which we ean return to the passage
that I put foi-ward, in order to ask, with Hegel, ''why is nature necessarily imperfect in its beauty, and what is the origin of ttiis imperfection?'" {A^ 143). In spite of the faet tliat even though animal life is
tlic summit of natural beauty in that it is in possession of some kind
of soul, "nevertheless every animal life is throughout restricted and tied
down to entirely specific qualities.'" As a consequence, the animal's
"soul-life, as what is inticr and what gains expression in its outward
shape, is [not only] poor, abstract, and worthless [gehaltlos, lacking content]," it does not "emerge into appearance as inner.'''' Hegel wiites:
"the lix'ing thing in nature does not reveal ils soul iti itself, for the
thing in nature is just this, diat its soul remains purely inward, i.e.
does not express itself as something ideal." The reason ibr this is that
the soul of the animal is "not present to itself as this ideaJ unity; if it
were, then it would also numifest itself to others in this self-awareness."
Therefore, "the animal dirough its form enables onr observation only
to snrmise [ahnen] a soul." Compared to the conscious ego tliat is
explicitly, and Ibr itself, the unity of the Concept and a realit)' that
has the form of the ConeepI, and which consequently "is no mere
external, .sensuous, and bodily reality, but is ifself one of an ideal kind,"
the animal "has itself no more than a cloudy appearance of a soul as
the breat!) and li-agranee which is diffused over the whole, [and whieh]
brings the members into unity, and reveds in the animal's whole mode
of living only die beginning of a pardcular character. This is the primary deficiency in the beauty of nature, even when considered in its
highest eonfignration, a defieiency which will lead us on to the necessity ofthe Ideal as the beauty oi art'' {A, 132). Let us now look at this
"eliief deficiency" {Hciuptniangei) a bit more carefully. Even thougii in
disdnction from plants, the animal is "ensouled"" and has "a feeling of
itself whereby it acquires enjoyment of itself as an individual," tlie animal, as the sumtnit of natural life, c!ocs not show "this point of unity of
iife, bul only the iiariety of organs." As Hegel holds, "the real seat of
the activities of organic life remains veiled from onr vision." Instead,
what we see are "feathers, seales, hair, pelt, prickles, or shells" that

THE 'rHEORY OF NATURAL BEAUTY AND ITS EVIL STAR

1 15

cover, like so many remnants of the lower kingdom of plants, the point
of unity of animal life. More precisely, the chief deficiency of animal
life, and hence of natural beauty, is this point of unity's lack of power
to fully radiate through the externality of the organism, negate that
exteriority, and give it the necessary form to enable it lo be the adec[nate realit>' ofthe ideal unity.'^ In short, the animal is not sufficiently
alive. Its hfe is not strong enongh to permeate all its coverings. Indeed:
'"The animal is living only within its covering, i.e. this 'insicledness' is
not itself real in the form of an inner consciousness and therefore this
life is not visible over all the animal" (yl, 145). The Idea that shines
forth within animal life cannot, therefore, "make explicit the endre
gennine totality of its content" {A, 144); the reahty that is achieved in
the animal organism is not yet the full reality of Life, Beeause the
Idea is understood as the unity of the Concept and its reality, the only
actuality that can be fully adequate to the Idea is one in whieh the
full content of the Idea - its affirmative "self-knowing, self-relating,
infinite unity and subjecdvit>'" (-4, 144)can display itself in full transparency. Natural life is not yet this actuality. Lacking the vision of
independence and freedom, it is not yet truly beautifnl.''^ Therefore,
the spirit "is compelled to .satisfy the need for this freedom . . . on
other and higher ground. This ground h art, and art's aetnalily i.s the
Ideal" [A, 152).
As we have seen, the privilege that Kant attributes to natural as
opposed to artificial beauty derives from the assumption that natural
beauty is by far more beneficial to the development of monility than
the beauty of art. If Hegel holds natural beauty to be inferior to
artificial beauty, it is because the spiritual life at work in man-made
art achieves a much fuller subjecti\Tiy than the Idea in natural life,
which fails to fully penneate the surface ofthe living organism. Freedom
is the standard in both assessments. Now, even though, in die ehapter of Aesthetic TJieory devoted to "Natural Beauty," Adorno clearly
emphasizes that the idealist understanding of art as spiritual represents
an "immeasnrable progress," he judges lhe neglect of natural beauty
in aesthetic theory in the aftermath of Kant to be a repression due
to lbe exclusive concern by Idealism with human freedom. He writes:
"Natnral beauty vanisfied from aesthetics as a result of the burgeoning domination of the concept of freedom and human dignity, which
was inanguratecl by Kant and then rigorously transplanted into aesthetics by Schiller and Hegel; in accord with this eoncept nothing in
the world is worthy of attention except that for whieh the autonomous

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RODOLPHE GASCHE

subject has itself to tliank" {AT, 62). According lo Adonio, the terror
that Iclcaiist aesthetics exercises by degrading natural beauty, namely,
by depriving freedom from everything that is other than the subject,
is rooted in the self-elevation of the hnman animal above the nonhuman animal. He adds: "For this reason die tnrn against natural
beaut\', in spite of the immeasurable progress it made possible in the
eomprehending of art as spiritual, does not lack an element of destructiveness, just as the concept ol' dignity does not lack it in its turn
against natnre" {AT, 62). If Adorno plays oH'Kant against Hegel, it is
not to pnt the lattcr's valorization of man-made art into question.
Indeed, in spite of lii,s scathing cridcism of idealist aesthetics' destructive bent, Adorno docs not wish to overturn the hierarchy that the
latter established between the two kinds of beauty. Understanding ait
as spiritual implies a valorization that he does not wish to undo. Rather,
the confrontation of Hegel with Kant allows Adorno to jiut into question the way the hierarchy is diought in Idealism.
I eannot take up here in detail Adorno's diaJeetica! treatment of tiie
distincdon between natural and artificial beauty. 1 must restrict myself
to a few remarks. Against the depreciation of nainral beauty in Hegcl'.s
aesthetics, Adorno argnes "that genuine experience of art is not possible without the experience of that elusive dimension whose name
natural beauty[has] faded" (AT, 63). But not only Ls artificial beant)-'
tributaiy to natural beauty, the latter too is intrinsieally bound up with
the beauty (jf the arts. Adoruo argues tliat indeed nature's beautiful
appearance is never iminediate. Rather, it shines forth in the shape
ol'images. As though recalling the remarkable artificiality of Holderlin's
landscape images in his poetiy after 1806, Adorno holds that images
are, indeed, what the aestlietie ex]3erienee oi' nature is about. Furthermore:
"Nature, as appearing beauty, is not peireived as an object of action.
The sloughing off of the aims of self-preser\'ationwhich is emphatic
in art-is carried out to the same degree in aesthetic experience ol
nature. To this extent the differenee between the two forms of beauty
is hardly evident. Mediation is no less to be inferred from the relation of art to nature than from the inverse reladon. Art is not nature,
a belief that Idealism hoped to inculcate, bul art does want to keep
nature's promise" [AT, 63). Now even though Adorno has set out to
confront tiie idealist valorization of art with the nature diat it represses,
natural beauty, as we have already seen, is not simply tiiken fbr granted.
By virtue of the character of images, nainral beauty i.s always already
intereonnected with die arts. Furthermore, according to Adorno, not

I'HE THEORY O NATURAL BEAUTY AND ITS EVIL STAR

1 1/

only is lhe experience of nalure entirely mediated by historical and

social conventions, it is aiso largely rooted in ideolo^gv'. Even more
telling is his association of nature with the constraints of mythical violence. In a passage reminiscent of eeriain statements by Benjamin, he
writes: "The anamnesis of freedom in natural beauty deceives beeause
its seeks freedom in the old unfreedom. Natural beauty is myth transposed into the imagination and thus, perhaps, requited. The song of
birds is found beautiful by eveiyone . . . Yel something frightening lurks
in the song of birds preeisely because it is not a song but obeys the
spell ill whieh it is enmeshed" (AT, 66). By contrast, "art extricates
itself completely from mylli and thus from the spell of nature," and
thus points to what Adorno had Cjualified as the immeasurable progress
that idealist aesthetics made wlien it conceived of art as spiritual. Il
is true that Adorno holds that the spell of nature "eontinues in the
subjective domination of nature'" by art. Still, art and its beauly are
valued higlier ihan natural beauty. Bul this judgment is dialectical in
that art is shown to lie able to hold ils claim cjf superiority only to
the exient ihat it recalls whal it exelucies, bul wilh respect to which
it derives its intelligibility in lhe hrst place. However, what art musl
recall to itself to seeure its superiority over nature and the beautiful
of nature is not just natural beauty itself or what goes by that name.
Given lhe fluctuadons of whal is considered beautiful in nature, and
considering that, according to Adorno, there are no Bxed criteria of
natural beauty, whal artificial beauty musl refer to in order to ensure
its freedom from myth is tluU of whieh natural beauly, 'in spite of its
mediation through social immanence," is (only) an allegory (AT, 69).
In other words, whal natural beauty once promised must constitute
the essence oi' lhe beautiful arts. The content of this promise however
escapes conceptualization. Adorno writes: "Aecording to lhe eanon of
uuiversal concepts [natnral beauly] is undehnalile precisely beeause its
own eoneept has its substance in what withdraws from universal conceptuality" {AT, 70). The superiorit)- of artificial beauty, then, is dependent on its ability to inseribe within itself a referenee to the lack of
conceptuality and tiie indeterminacy of natural beauty. More preeisely,
unless art can recall that which in natural beauty points beyond the
mere liberation al the hands of art from die constraints of mythical
nature and mythical violence in universal idenlity, there is no genuine
superiority of artificial over natural beauty. As Adorno obsei'ves: "What
is beautiful in nature is what appears to be more than what is literally there" (AT, 70-71).

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RODOLPHJi GASCHE

According to Hegel, natural beauty is inferior because it is not beautiful from itself, but is only found to be so in an act of intellectual
refiection. Furthermore, the Idea tbat gains actuality in natural life is
not yet the Idea in all of its aspects. Bnt, writes Adorno: "Guilt for
the evil star tbat hangs over the theory of natnral beauty is borne neither by the corrigible weakness of thonght [Rc/Jexionen] about it nor by
the impoverished aim of such thought. It is determined, rallier, by the
indeterminateness of natural beauty, that of the objeet no less than
that of the concept. As indeterminate, as antithetical to ciefinitions,
natural beaut}' is indefinable." Indeterminateness, which for Kant characterizes ail natural beauty in that only things for which a determined
concept is lacking qualify for pure aesthetic judgment.s, is what lead
to its depreciation in Idealist aesthetics. However, Adorno claims that
"Solger's and Hegel's judgment which derived the inferiority of natural beauty from its emerging indeterminacy, missed the mark" {^7^ 72).
Undoubtedly, thi.s insufiicieney of natural beauty, which according to
Adorno, is the cipher of the nonidcntical. and of what i.s nol yetthe
possible"may in factin accord with Hegel's theoiy of aesthetic
stageshave played a role in mofivating emphatic art," bnt precisely
because "in art the evanescent is objectified and summoned to duration" [AT., 73). Emphatic art has learned what it takes to be beautiful from natural beaut)'. Even tbough art is highly determined, it is
beautiful only to the extent tliat it takes its model from the indeterminacy of natnral beanty. "To whatever degree the determinacy of art
surpasses that of nature, the exemplar of art is provided by what natnre
expresses and not by the spirit with whieh men endow nature" {AT, 75).
WTiile Adorno endorses Hegel's criticism of natnral beauty on the
basis that "natural beauty, the unexpected promise of something that
is highe.st, cannot remain locked in itself but is rescued only through
that consciousness that is sel in opposition to it" [AT, 75), namely, in
man-made art, he criticizes Hegel at the same lime for deriving the
natural beautiful from the place thai nalure occupies within his "theodicy of lhe real" and for making it, therefore, "more impoverished than
it [already] is" {AT, 74). By casting natural beauty as the first realization ofthe Idea, natural beauty is, from the start, measured in relation to lhe Spirit to which nature, as the Spirit's other, shonld be, in
prinei]3le, irreducible. Not only ihat: by eoneeiving of natural i:)eauty
as the first actualization of the Idea, natural beauty is made to relate
to an Other to whieh it is essentially inadequate. The most proximate
eonsequence of this inadequaieness is thai natural beamy rests on its

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119

apprehension by us, that is, by a consciousness. Yet, says Adorno,

''thus the essence of natural beauty, the anamnesis of precisely what
does not exist for-an-other, is let slip. This critique of natural beauty
follows an inner tendency of Hcgefs aesthetics as a vvh(.)le, follows its
objectivistic turn against tiie cotitingencc of sitbjectivc sentiment. Precisely
the beautiful, which presents itself as independent from ihe sttbjeet, as
absolutely somethiitg not made, falls under suspicion of being feebly
subjective; Hegel equates this directly wilh tlie indeterminacy of natural beauty" {AT, 74-75). Because of this indeterminacy, natural beauty
must make room for the higher, more spiritual form of exteriorization
of the Idea, tiamely, art. As Adorno concludes, in Hegefs aesthetics
"natural beauty gains legitimacy only by its decline, in such a way
that its deficieticy becomes the raison d'etre of art beauty . . . What
Hegel chalks up as tbe deficiency of natural beautytbe characteristic of escaping from fixed eonceptis however the snbstance oi beauty
itself In Hegefs transition from nature to art, oti the other hand, the
much touted polysigtiiheance of Aujhebung is nowhere to be found.
Natural beauty flickers out widioitt a trace of it being reeognizable in
an beaut)'. Becatise natural beaut}' is not thoroughly ruled and dehned
by spirit, Hegel considers il preaestliede" (/IT, 76), The indeterminacy
that Adorno holds to be tbe substance of beauty itself (whedier natural or artistic) refers to the nonidenticalthat which is dissonant with
I'espect to the Conceptand which art seeks to bring to langitage. But
in all fairness to Hegel, it must be said that the substance of beauty
is the Idea that shines forth in tiatural iife, and not the indcterminaey
that results from the dialeclieal avatars of such shining. This is the
reason whyif it is indeed true, as Adorno contends, that indeterminaey is not in Hegefs aesthetics sitblated into man-made art (a question which would require a lengthy investigatioti)nalurai beanty is
tio longer rccognizalilc in artificial beauty. But, for Adorno, natural
beauty is a reminder of the limits of everything man-made, including
conceptual thitiking. Hence, by abandotiing it entirely, tbe aits demonstrate an exclusive partisanship for subjective spirit. By lurning indeterniinaey into the substance of beanty, in other words, by raising what
Hegel considered a deficiency to a positive feature of tiattjral beant)',
Adorno takes on the evil star that hangs over the theory of natural
beauty. As the history of aesthetics in the aftermath of Kant e\'idences,
it is this indetertiihiacy of natural beauty that has contributed to its
cletiiise. As we liave becti able to see, such devaluation takes place
not without some good reasons since the nncettainiy, ambiguity, and

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RODOLPHE GASGl-lE

indeterminacy of natui'e testify also to its mythical entanglement. But

indeterrninaey has another side as well. Adorno remarks: "In its uncertainty, natural beauty inherits the ambiguity of myth, while at the same
time its echo^eonsolationdistances itself from mylh in appearing
nature. Contrary to that philosopher of idendty, Hegel, natural beauty
is close to the truth but \'eils itself at lhe mometit of greatest proximity" (AT, 73-74). Indeed, as we have seen, the indeterminacy of natural beauty hints at a freedom from the straightjaeket of the Concept
to put it bluntly, a liberation from the kind of freedom understood
exclusively in light of (human) subjectivity. By thus asserting that 'indeterminacy' has also a posidve side, Adorno would seem to perfbrm a
regression of sorts to Kant. As we have seen, for Kant things of nature
for whieh no coneept is available and hence eannot be cognitively
determined, are beautiful if they display form, that is, the form of
objectivity, while it remains cognitively undetermined what precise
objects they are. The beautiful form's indeterminacy is valued by Kant
preeisely because it is the characteristic of an object whose form shows
this object to meet the demands of cognition in general. The indeterminaey of natural beauly is thus thoughl here primarily in view of
possible cognition. For Adorno, however, Ibr whom the indeterminacy
ofthe heaudful hints at a freedom from the constraints ofthe Coneept,
indeterminacy does not so mueh suggest a possible cognizability of
nature, as the ethieal limit to conceptual eognidon in the hrst place.
Furthermore, ihis indeterminacy of natural, that is, nonhuman, beaut)'
is not to be respected merely because of a duty of mankind to itself,
but beeause of an ethical limit to the ibundation of ethics froTii and
in view of the human. How one is to conceive of this limit becomes
perhaps tangible in the Ibllowing passage in whicli Adorno returns to
the question ofthe task of art in light of what he has established about
natural beauty: "The lota! subjective elaboration of art as a nonconeeplual language is the only figure, at the contemporary stage of rationality, in which something like the language of divine creation is
reflected, qualified by the paradox tiiat what is refieelcd is bioekcd.
Art attempts to imitate an expression that would not be interpolated
human intendon" (/IT, 78). The kind oi' indeterminacy that in natural
beauty does not let itself be reduced to mythical ambiguity, and its
lack of difference and hierarciiy, is the indeterminacy of ''that aspect
in which human domination has its limits and that calls to mind the
powerlessness of human busde" {AT, 70). With this notion of indeterminacy, Adorno seeks to change the fate that natural beauty has

THE THEORY OF NATURAL BEAUTY AND ITS EVIL UTAR

121

suffered at the hands of idealist aesthetics. And yet, by eoncei\'ing of

natural beanty in this manner, Adorno does not wish lo radically overturn the relation ol" superiority of lhe arts. It remains, however, thai
Adorno'.s ncnion of natural beauty transforms significantly the reladon
beiween nattiral beauty and the arts. Indeed, if for Hegel "tbe transition from natnral beauty to art beauty is dialectical as a transition
in the form of domination" [AT, 77) and reveals a contempt for everything that is not the product of human aetivity, the way art relates lo
nattn^al beauty in Adorno's aesthetics is eharacterized by the constitutive effort of die arts to save wbat fieetingly promises itself in mule
natnre and lo give il expression in the nonconccj^iual language that
i.s .specific to the arts. However, the arts can snccessfully accomplish
tbis task only if they keep their distanee from nature, thai is, as long
as they do not relinquish their character as art. Adorno concludes:
"The more strictly artworks abstain from naturalness {Natwunichsigkeit}
and the replieadon of natnre, die more the snccessful ones apj^roach
nature" [AT, IT).

NOTES
1. 'rhi.'Mi.i(ir \V. Adomo, .-h'itJiclic 'f/miy, iraiis. R. Hulli)l-K(-]iU)r (MJiiiu-ajjiilis: IJiilvcrsiiy
DC MlniiesoUi Press. 1997). 72. Hercafier ciicti us .'17^ Ibilowcd by page nuinlKT.
2. Ibid.. 73.
3. Ibid.. 76.
4. Itnnuinu<-I K;iiil. 'flw Metaplmin of Mouiis. (nuLs. LUKI cd. M, (irci^'or ;'C:;inil)ixlge:
Cambridge UnivcrsiLy Press, 1998), 192 9S.
5. Vet supposing dial Kant intends htve lo speak only ol' lin.- kind oi'bcauly associated vvi(h inanimate nature, implying that animate nature ciui be beautiful as wt-ll.
the C|Lic.stion remains as Lo why, in tbe present conlcxt, lbe beauly of animate
nature does nol become an issue al all.
6. I note dial ibe example of tlic "beautiful ciystal formations" is no less sur|)rising.
since lo judge crystals beauiil'ul implies a roneept, and Lbus is noi an aeslbcliijudgment sLricdy speaking.
7. Immanuel Kanl, Critique oJ Judgmeiil. tran^. J. H. Bernard iiVew Yi)rk; Hatiier Press,
li).^!;, 66.
8. Ibid., 66.
9. Kaiit, Ihf .Mdaphyms of Morats, 193.
III. (/. VV. 1''. Hegel, Ai'sltietics. [jTltiies on l-'iiie Art. Irans. T. M. Knox ;C)xfoi-d; Claiendon
Press. I97.~)i, 132: berealiei' ciitxl a.s .1. liillowed by page luuuber.
II, Ibid,. 120,
I'2, i'oi- Hegel, die buman body is only gi-adual!y ditlerent from tbe animal body.
.\ldiougb ibc buman body makes its life appear outwardly, Uie human skin remains
an external covering diat inhibits die full shining forlb of tbis life.
13. "I'bis deficiency of beauly a.s related to nalural life is seen as a consequence ofthe
fact tbiti in animal life only "an indeienninaie and wbolly abstract possession of
soul [Hcehiitmftis^hntf emerges into appearance in the sbape of the interconnected

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RODOLPHE GASCHE
parts of the organism and as the "unifying point of a possession of soui whirh
larks any lilliiig of sLibaianliiil worth (^eliallvollirr I'jj'iiltungf (ibid., ['.VS). The Hi'si consequences of lliis piimaiy lack of nitiural bcatUy is thus not only that ii concerns
the abstract form of tbe external appearance of the living organism's organization,
and tlie abstract unily of the senstiotis material of this external appearance, bul
that what is found beautiful in sucb appearance is modeled after the order of ihc
inanimate^ namely, its rc^ilarity and symmeCiy, its conformity to taw, and to some
extent, its harmony, on lbe nne hand, on (he otber, tbe purity of matter.