Ch-5 Preventive, Emergency & Restorative Control PDF

2/16/2015
180906
Advanced Power System-II
Chapter-5
p
Preventive, Emergency and Restorative Control
Prof.ChintanPatel
AssistantProfessor
DepartmentofElectricalEngineering
G.H.PatelCollegeofEngineeringand
Technology VVNagar(Gujarat)
Email:chintanpatel@gcet.ac.in
Introduction
Nature of Control Actions in a Power System
1) Frequency, voltage and power flow control
2) Real and Reactive power scheduling
These are "routine" control actions.
manual controller ( a system/plant operator)
an automatic controller (a generator voltage regulator)
These
Th
actions
ti
ensure a good
d quality
lit supply
l att a low
l
cost.
t
However, an important class of control actions are
appropriate when a system is not in a "normal" state.
Prof.ChintanPatel(EE GCET)
2/16/2015
Operating states and nature of control actions

The state (or condition) of a power system can be judged
from the answers to the following questions:
Is the demanded load being met ? (i.e. is there a real and
reactive
ti power balance?)
b l
?)
Are all equipments within their current and voltage limits?
Can the system withstand stresses due to a possible
contingency (leading to a loss of equipment)?
Definition of states and control actions

System operation in steady state is governed by equations
which express:
Real and Reactive power balance at each node
((Equality
q
y Constraints))
Limitations of physical equipment, such as currents
and voltages must not exceed maximum limits
(Inequality Constraints)
(1) Normal (Secure) State
q
y ((E)) & inequality
q
y ((I)) constraints are satisfied.
All equality
Generation is adequate to supply the existing load
demand and no equipment is overloaded.
The reserve margins are sufficient.
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(2) Alert (Insecure) State
The security level is below some threshold of adequacy.
There is a danger of violating some of the inequality (I)
constraints when subjected to disturbances (stresses).
Security constraints are not met.
Preventive control enables the transition from an alert
state to a secure state.

(3) Emergency State
Due to a severe disturbance, the system can enter
emergency state.
the
Here Inequality (I) constraints are violated.

The system, would still be intact and emergency control
action can be initiated to restore the system to an alert
state.
The system may breakdown & enter the In Extremis state if
measures are not taken in time or are ineffective
the initiating disturbance or a subsequent one is severe
enough to overstress the system
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(4) In Extremis State
Both (E) and (I) constraints are violated.
The violation of equality constraints implies that parts
of the system load are lost.
Emergency control action
avoiding total collapse.
should
be
directed
for
(5) Restorative State

This is a transitional state in which I constraints are
met from emergency
g
y control actions taken but the E
constraints are yet to be satisfied.
From this state, the system can transmit to either the
alert or the normal state depending on the circumstances.

NORMAL
E,I
Load tracking, Economic dispatch
Ev,I
RESTORATIVE
ALERT
Resynchronization
Preventive Control
Ev,IIv
IN-EXTREMIS
protect equipments
E: Equality Constraints
I : Inequality Constraints
Ev, Iv: Constraints not satisfied
System
litti
splitting
Load
Loss
SECURE
E,I
INSECURE
E,IIv
E
EMERGENCY
Heroic Action
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The power system emergency is defined as due to either

Viability crisis:
resulting from an imbalance between generation,
load and transmission whether local or system-wise.
Stability crisis:
resulting
lti from
f
energy accumulated
l t d att sufficient
ffi i t level
l
l
in swings of the system to disrupt its integrity.
In-Extremis state
characterized by
corresponds
to
system
failure
the loss of system integrity involving uncontrolled

islanding (fragmentation) of the system
uncontrolled loss of large blocks of load.
The objective of the emergency control action is to avoid
transition from emergency state to a failure state (InExtremis).
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Load Dispatch Centre (LDC)

A load dispatch center (or more appropriately, an Energy
Management Centre) enables operators & other supporting
engineers
to monitor a power system in real time
to capture the current operating state of the system
to instruct a generating plant or any other controllable
system components so that a system operates with
good quality and security.
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The major components of a load dispatch centre are:
1) Engineers for carrying out scheduling and monitoring
2) Software programs to carry out monitoring and
scheduling functions
3) Displays for adequate visualization
There is a hierarchy of controls in a power system.
National Load Dispatch Centre
Regional
g
Load Dispatch
p
Centre
State Load Dispatch Centre
Area Load Dispatch Centre
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A Central Load Dispatch centre oversees the operation of
the entire grid using a SCADA system.
A SCADA system obtains data from various levels in the
control hierarchy and displays it in a meaningful way (like a
one line mimic diagram on a large LCD screen).
screen)
Prof.Chintan Patel (EE GCET)
12
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13

The software tools in an LDC process data obtained from
field measurements to identify the topology of the network
in real time.
Along
Al
with
ith voltage
lt
and
d currentt measurements,
t this
thi data
d t is
i
used to estimate the "state" of the system.
Since the number of components need to be monitored are
very large, a sophisticated digital processing of the data is
required.
If data is simply displayed, then an operator has to use his
past experience to co-relate the displayed data and the
system state and even take remedial actions.
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Normal and Alert State in a Power System

A Power System in the Normal State:
After collecting all the data, the operator checks the state
of the system.
The state may be
Normal State
Alert State
Emergency State
When the dynamic state information is also available, the
operator may not be able to utilize it due to the limited time
frame. (e.g. loss of synchronism takes place in few seconds)
Therefore dynamic measurements can be made use of
mainly by automatic control or protection strategies.
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If all the equipments in the system are within their
respective limits, then a system could be in the normal or
alert state.
If a system can withstand potential contingencies without
equipment limits being violated or without losing stability,
then we say that the system is in a normal or "secure state.
A network configuration or loading state which can
withstand an element outage without loss off supply to any
load is called "n-1" secure.
Otherwise we classify the system as being "insecure", i.e.,
in the alert state.
The classification of secure and insecure is done by
simulating contingencies on a computer.
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Normal and Alert state:
To distinguish between a normal state and an alert state, a
system operator carries out the following studies
(1) Static Security analysis
(2) Dynamic Security analysis
For the purpose, the operator essentially needs
the network configuration
load
generation
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(1) Static Security analysis
This involves checking for equipment limit violations if
any of the equipments is tripped due to contingency.
This element is not actually tripped by an operator, but
only simulated using a computer program.
(2) Dynamic Security analysis
This involves checking
g the stability
y of the system
y
if
any of the equipments is tripped due to contingency.
This element is not actually tripped by an operator, but
only simulated using a computer transient analysis
program.
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It is important to carefully choose the element whose
outage is to be simulated.
A set of critical elements are chosen by some rough
screening
i based
b
d on an operator's
t ' experience.
i
If the security analysis shows that the system is secure, it
is classified as a normal state.
If the state is normal, then a system operator may wish to
do some minor changes in real and reactive scheduling
(from an economic perspective).
However any such change should not bring the system out
of the secure state.
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If the system is not secure (alert), then the operator has to
try to steer it into the secure state by real or reactive
power re-scheduling (Preventive Control - rescheduling).
This re-scheduling is done to improve security and may
result in higher cost.
So, even if preventive control is to be done, it should be
done in a way which will minimize any cost increase while
simultaneously
i
lt
l ensuring
i security.
it
This is done using a security constrained optimal power
flow program.
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Schematic of Security Assessment Procedure
21
An Example
It is assumed that voltages at all buses are equal to the

nominal value (1.0 pu).
Also, we assume that sin(ddiff) = ddiff and cos(ddiff) = 1,
where ddiff is the phase angle difference between the
voltages at any 2 buses.
We assume that the thermal limits of all the lines are equal
and should not exceed 1500 MW.
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An Example: Case 1
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24
An Example: Case 1
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An Example: Case 2
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An Example: Case 2
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Preventive Re-scheduling of generation
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Preventive Re-scheduling of generation
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System security cannot be assessed by only considering

post-contingency steady state power flows (as is done in
the example presented).
A system could be unstable for a disturbance even if
a post-disturbance steady state exists
power-flows and voltages for that steady state are
within equipment limits
If a system is unstable, it will not settle down to that steady
state.
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Emergency Control
Transition from an alert state to an emergency state
It is possible that the system operator is unable to act in
time before a contingency actually occurs.
A grid may even be operated insecurely (in an alert state)
due to a high cost of preventive control or due to inadequate
reserve margins.
This situation is undesirable since it may lead to blackouts
((if emergency
g
y control actions fail)) which can cause g
great
economic loss.
Even though the system has been classified as being in a
normal state, several improbable disturbances take place.
30
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Therefore the system can transit from a perceived alert
state to an emergency state.
The system
into an emergency state may cause a
complete blackout.
blackout
Emergency control actions (manual or automatic) are
required to retrieve the situation.
If there is a thermal overload of an equipment then there is
some time
ti
t actt & quick
to
i k "heroic
"h
i action
ti would
ld be
b needed.
d d
However in most cases one has to rely on automatic
controls to quickly respond to such a situation.
31

Some emergency control actions are :
Generator / Load tripping or fast change of generation
or load.
Control of voltage (Tap changers, PST)
Power flow control devices (FACTS Devices)
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34
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Emergency Control
A system in an alert state may cascade into an emergency
and subsequently into a total blackout if no control actions
are taken.
Emergency control measures can try to arrest this.
Since
Si
mostt equipment
i
t can withstand
ith t d a short-time
h t ti
th
thermal
l
overload, there is a small window of time in which some
manual emergency measures can be executed.
For other emergency situations (like instability), time may
be too short and predesigned automatic emergency
measures are necessary.
One may consider the following alternatives:
a) Control of generation
b) Tripping of generation or load
c) Re-routing of power flows
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Emergency Control
37
38
Emergency Control
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Emergency Control
39
Emergency Control
We have restricted our discussion of alert and emergency
states arising from line thermal overload.
However, it should be recognized that many disturbances
may lead
l d to
t other
th equipment
i
t limits
li it being
b i violated.
i l t d
A sudden loss of generation or load due to some fault.
Large disturbances may cause Angular Instability.
Weakening of transmission system along with heavy
reactive power demand and low reactive power
generation margin may cause voltage instability
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Emergency Control : An example

Consider the two machine system shown below:
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This fault is cleared by tripping the lines using Circuit
Breakers which are triggered by protective relays
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What are the possible consequences of such disturbance ?
Possible Consequences are
a)) The system
y
settles to a new acceptable
p
equilibrium
q
after
some initial transients die down.
b) The system settles to a new equilibrium, but the
equilibrium is violative of some steady state equipment
limit (leading to tripping out of that equipment).
c) The system does not attain a new equilibrium due to
angular or voltage instability.
43

Voltage instability leads to unacceptably low voltages.
Angular instability (loss of synchronism) leads to violent
excursions in current, voltage and power leading to
equipment damage.
damage
Therefore, the generators which have lost synchronism
have to be disconnected from each other.
This situation
is shown.
44
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A Blackout
When can a blackout occur ?
Preventive Control actions ensure that any contingency (if
it occurs) does not lead to equipment limit violation or
instability.
y
Emergency control actions come into play if an actual
disturbance is occurred.
These actions try to prevent an emergency situation to
transit into a near-complete loss of generation and load (a
blackout !).
In spite of security analysis and preventive actions (done
during actual operation), and emergency control actions
(usually pre-designed offline), blackouts do occur.
45
When can a blackout occur ?

Following are some of the reasons of blackout:
Unnoticed disturbance or contingency scenario
Cascade tripping
pp g
Malfunctioning of protective equipments and relays
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BLACKOUT-2012
There were major grid disturbances in Northern Region at
02.33 hrs on 30/07/2012 and
13.00 hrs on 31/07/2012.
Due to the first disturbance which led to the collapse of NR
Electricity grid, following states were suffered:
Uttar Pradesh,
Uttarakhand,
Rajasthan,
Punjab,
Haryana
Haryana,
Himachal Pradesh,
Jammu & Kashmir,
Delhi ,
Union Territory of Chandigarh.
47
BLACKOUT-2012
Northern Regional Grids load was about 38,000 MW at the
time of disturbance.
The reasons of the blackout on 30/07/2012 are as follow:
Extremely heavy over-drawal by the constituents of NR
grid.
Some thermal/gas generating units in the NR were
under forced outage either due to technical reasons or
due to unavailability of coal.
Forced outage of few hydro-generating units in NR due
to high silt.
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BLACKOUT-2012
Plot of Frequency in WR and NR

49
BLACKOUT-2012

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BLACKOUT-2012
Small pockets of generation and loads in the Northern
Region survived the blackout.
3 generating units at Badarpur thermal power station
with approximately 250 MW load in Delhi
Narora Atomic Power Station in UP
Some parts of Rajasthan system (around Bhinmal) that
remained connected to the Western Grid
Some parts of Uttar Pradesh system (around Sahupuri)
that remained connected with Eastern region
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BLACKOUT-2012
The second incident which was more severe than the
previous one occurred at 13.00 hours on 31/07/2012, leading
to loss of power supply in
NR
ER
NER
The total load of about 48,000 MW of 18 states was affected
in this black out.
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BLACKOUT-2012

53
BLACKOUT-2012
India on 31st July 2012
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BLACKOUT-2012: Effects
Over 600 million people & all community power-dependent
systems affected.
Power grids in 18 of Indias States stretching from Assam
to the Himalayas and the northwestern deserts of
Rajasthan, shut down.
On Monday (July 30th), India was forced to buy power from
tiny Bhutan.
The scale of the blackouts caused
embarrassment on the international stage.
stage
India
acute
Two hundred miners were stranded in three deep coal

shafts in the state of West Bengal when their electric
elevators stopped working.
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BLACKOUT-2012: Effects
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BLACKOUT-2012
Animated view of Blackout-2012.

57
Power System Restoration

After a blackout
If a blackout takes place, efforts have to be taken to bring
back the system to a normal state at the earliest.
This (black starting) is not an easy task.
Once a generator is tripped, it needs a significant amount
of power to restart it.
Power is required for 2 types of activities:
Survival Power: For emergency lighting, battery chargers, etc.
( 0.3% of generator capacity)
Startup Power: For starting unit auxiliaries.

( for nuclear & thermal : 8% of unit capacity)
( for hydro & gas: 0.5-2% of unit capacity)
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The major steps required for restoration are:
(1) Islands which have survived need to be stabilized for
frequency and need to be used for starting other units.
(2) Hydro/Gas units which require less startup power need to
be started using in-house DG sets.
(3) Larger thermal units need to be fed "startup power" from:
Islands which have survived
Black-started generators
Other synchronous grids (temporarily)
(4) Started units are synchronized with one another.

(5) Loads and Generation have to be matched as much as
possible to avoid large frequency variations (Using
Governors).
59

Problems in Restoration
a) Securing Islands
b) Extending
E t di
P
Power
t Loads
to
L d from
f
G
Generators
t
which
hi h are
black-started
c) Re-integrating the grid
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a) Securing Islands
After a blackout a few islands may survive due to
separation of the system in time.
A few hydro or gas generators could be black-started using
in-house D-G sets.
So, some small pockets will be there in the blacked out grid
wherein generators are supplying some loads.
The situation in these islands is usually precarious due to
the small number of generators within the island.
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a) Securing Islands
So if the load in the island is fluctuating (traction loads),
the rate of change of frequency within the island may be
quite large.
Due to this, the island will be collapsed because of
excessive frequency variations.
Therefore control of generated power (by governors) and
frequency based tripping or energisation of load is
important
important.
Black-starting of large generators is done by availing
startup power from other started generators or islands.
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a) Securing Islands
Startup power may also be availed from neighboring
synchronous grids if an AC transmission link exists.
Startup power cant be availed via DC links as AC
voltages are not available in the blacked out system.
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b) Extending Power to Loads from Generators which are
black-started
The next step in power system restoration is to supply
g
loads from black-started generators.
Some of these loads may be in the form of the startup
loads of other larger generating plants which need to be
black-started.
These loads are supplied via transmission lines.
Energizing a transmission line initially without any load
can cause over-voltages.
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b) Extending Power to Loads from Generators which are
black-started
This is avoided by:
1) Energizing fewer high voltage lines
2) Operating generators at minimum voltage levels
3) Deactivating switchable capacitors
4)
Connecting shunt reactors and tertiary reactors
5)
Pick up loads with lagging power factor
6)
Charging more transformers
7)
Charging shorter lines
8)
Operating synchronous condensers / SVCs where available
9) Avoiding charging lines with series capacitors

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Some islands, which have been secured, should be
connected with each other so that a better generation-load
balance can be achieved.
An important step in reconnecting islands to one another is
"synchronization".
The basic requirements for successful synchronization of
two systems are the same as those for an individual
generator connected to a large grid.
The frequencies should be practically the same and phase
angular difference at the instant of connection should be
small.
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Reference: Web course of Power System Operation and Control by

Prof. A.M.Kulkarni (IITB-Mumbai)
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Ch-5 Preventive, Emergency & Restorative Control PDF

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2/16/2015

Operating states and nature of control actions

Definition of states and control actions

Definition of states and control actions

Definition of states and control actions

Here Inequality (I) constraints are violated.

Definition of states and control actions

(5) Restorative State

Definition of states and control actions

Load tracking, Economic dispatch

The power system emergency is defined as due to either

the loss of system integrity involving uncontrolled

Load Dispatch Centre (LDC)

Load Dispatch Centre (LDC)

Load Dispatch Centre (LDC)

Prof.Chintan Patel (EE GCET)

Load Dispatch Centre (LDC)

Load Dispatch Centre (LDC)

Normal and Alert State in a Power System

Normal and Alert State in a Power System

Normal and Alert State in a Power System

Normal and Alert State in a Power System

Normal and Alert state:

Normal and Alert state:

Schematic of Security Assessment Procedure

It is assumed that voltages at all buses are equal to the

Preventive Re-scheduling of generation

Preventive Re-scheduling of generation

System security cannot be assessed by only considering

Transition from an alert state to an emergency state

Transition from an alert state to an emergency state

Transition from an alert state to an emergency state

Transition from an alert state to an emergency state

Transition from an alert state to an emergency state

Emergency Control : An example

Emergency Control : An example

Emergency Control : An example

Emergency Control : An example

When can a blackout occur ?

Plot of Frequency in WR and NR

Plot of Frequency in WR and NR

Plot of Frequency in WR and NR

India on 31st July 2012

Two hundred miners were stranded in three deep coal

Animated view of Blackout-2012.

Power System Restoration

Startup Power: For starting unit auxiliaries.

Power System Restoration

(4) Started units are synchronized with one another.

Power System Restoration

Connecting shunt reactors and tertiary reactors

Pick up loads with lagging power factor

Charging more transformers

Charging shorter lines

Operating synchronous condensers / SVCs where available

9) Avoiding charging lines with series capacitors

Reference: Web course of Power System Operation and Control by

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