Refugees: A Terminal Parasite on the Host?

The Case of Cameroon

By Dr. Ignatius Gwanmesia

Abstract

A rare Island of relative stability within Africa’s war-torn zone, Cameroon seems the
unfortunate victim of unsustainable convergence of Africa’s refugees by virtue of the
centrality of her geographical position. This analysis appraises the potentially terminal
impact of hosting essentially dependent displaced population.

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 Chapter One

Introduction

Despite the fact that refugee issues are a global phenomena, as a result of the incessant
upheavals and related crisis that are ravaging Sub Saharan Africa, this region “has
become the foremost world producer of refugees and internally displaced people” Ellis,
(1994, p. 205). By virtue of the centrality of her geographical position, and as a rare
island of relative stability in a sea of Africa’s stormy political upheavals, Cameroon, much
more than others African states has been experiencing a focused convergence of
Africa’s displaced populations. With a finite and diminishing resources; supplemented by
a corresponding dwindling relief from humanitarian organisations and related NGOs; yet
cognizant of the reality that some refuges are actively contributing to Cameroon’s
economy, opinions are highly polarised on Cameroon claims about the terminality of her
circumstance.

How real is Cameroon’s claim that she can no longer cope with her ever-
increasing refugee influx?
With seemingly no substantive or systematic policies to either regulate or manage
Africa’s exodus of refugees into Cameroon, the kaleidoscope of analysis the is by no
means claims the panacea to the complex problem of Cameroon’s dilemma, but rather
an objective analysis of some of the polarised opinions that seek elucidate Cameroons
refugee problems. Consequently issues raised within this discourse should instigate
further dialogues on the complex issues relating to:
- the rights of refugees to sanctuary;
- the duty of the hoist to protect and meet their assessed needs;
- and how these rights and obligations relate to the dynamics of our globalised
(capitalist) society.

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 Discourse Framework

Fig. A Location of Cameroon in Africa

Cameroon is a multi-ethnic but principally French-English speaking country located in

Western Africa, sharing borders with Nigeria to the west, Chad in the north and north
east, Central African Republic to the east; Republic of the Congo, Gabon and Equatorial
Guinea to the south. (See figure A.) Despite Cameroon’s rich and diverse natural
resources, Cameroon is not impervious to the endemic human deprivation and
marginalisation that typifies the rest of Africa. With finite or diminishing resources, the
nation’s perception is that she is heading for the rocks unless drastic measures are taken
to address her chronic refugee afflictions. In the words of one indigene: Cameroon’s
refugee problem is like a terminally holed liner being asked to take on passengers from
Africa’s sinking ships during very stormy weather. Arguments used in this discourse are
based essentially on secondary data derived from reports from existing literature,
feedbacks from the non-partisan humanitarian relief organisations operating in the

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refugee occupied areas in Cameroon and the outcome of my personal knowledge and
experience on a purposive working holiday to Cameroon in 2008. On this visit I
experienced at first hand both the circumstance of the guess and host in Kousserie and
Madana, located very close to the bridge crossing near Lake Chad in North Cameroon;
Borongo in East Cameroon and the logistic constraints experienced by the various relief
organisations (UNHRC, World Food Programme, the Cameroon and International Red
Cross, UNICEF) in addressing both refugee, local and national problems.

A comparative analysis of relevant literature and the outcome of my field study show that,
while most refugees perceive themselves as victims, with human rights to access
relevant welfare services in Cameroon, the indigenes think otherwise. Similarly, while the
humanitarian relief organisations thought that they were doing a lot to alleviate
Cameroon’s burden in protecting and sustaining the refugees, Cameroonians, especially
the local population in the refugee zones predominantly perceive these efforts as not
enough. The presenting circumstance is a relationship of constant tensions and potential
conflict between the guests (refugees) and host (Cameroonians) as both struggle to
share the latter’s finite resources.

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 Chapter Two

Conceptualisation and Background

Conceptualisation

To mitigate ambiguity and ensure that related dialogues are perceived and understood
from a common perspective, it is vital to define the various terms employed within the
essay. According to the Geneva Refugee Convention of 1951, refugees are “persons
who for a well-founded fear of prosecution on account of their race, religion, nationality,
affiliation to a social group, or political conviction are staying outside of the country
whose nationality they posses” Hauhler and Kennedy, (1994, p. 128). While this rather
universalised conception seems adequate in qualifying refugeeism from a broad
perspective, it fails to adequately accommodate the particularity of the African situation.
As such, the OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in
Africa 1969 had to redefine the phenomenon to render it regionally appropriate to the
African context

Article 1 s.1 of the Convention Governing the Specific Aspect of Refugee Problems in
Africa, defines a refugee as;
“every person who, owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such
fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country, or who, not
having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence
as a result of such events is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to
it.” OAU, (1969, p. 3)

Section 2 0f the Convention further states that,

"refugee" shall also apply to every person who, owing to external aggression,
occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either
part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his

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 place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his
country of origin or nationality.” OAU, (1969, p. 3)

Background

In emphasising the gravity and prevalence of Africa’s refugee problems, Ellis, (1996, p.
202) pointed out that “the more than 23 million refugees around the world come from 10
countries off which 8 are African.” Rather than the preserve of particular nations, Bennett,
(1995, p. 370) asserts that contemporary politics and history show that refugee problems
tend to prevail in areas experiencing “wars, revolutions and natural disasters” While the
assertion about wars or conflicts is implicitly applicable to Sub Sahara Africa, additional
factors include the fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, or political
opinion, with Cameroon as the primary environment for sanctuary. The receipt of
refugees into Cameroon, as with any other host nation is arguably associated essentially
with negative ramifications as will be seen later. Usually, while fleeing African nationals
would be displaced internally to safer parts of their own country, the fear of further
persecution has led to spontaneous cross-border migration into Cameroon.

The principal pull factors for the refugee influx into Cameroon include her relative
stability; an island of tranquillity in the sea of nations experiencing ravageous instability.
Additionally, Cameroon, with her multiple and porous borders which colludes with a
similar endemic corruption to compromise immigration control, are incentive-enough to
potential refugees heading for Cameroon. Also, potential refugees are aware that once in
Cameroon, the host is legally duty-bound to protect and service provide for them as
mandated by the Geneva Convention 1951 and the similar OAU Convention 1969.
Referring to those factors that compel people to flee from the hitherto safe environment
their home countries, Hauhler and Kennedy, (1994, p. 125) point out that in Sub Sahara
Africa, ‘conflict’ with its multifaceted ramifications and the fear of persecution constitute
the primary push factor.

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Referring to the magnitude of refugee influx into Cameroon from Chad, the United
Nation’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs asserted that “so far, no
refugee arrivals have been recorded in Chad’s other neighbours Niger, Central African
Republic, Sudan or Nigeria” Within the context of mass refugee capability management,
Bennett, (1995, p. 370) asserts that, “small numbers might be readily dispersed or
assimilated, but mass movement of thousands or even millions of persons confronts the
host country with a dilemma of such proportions that international assistance is often
welcome and necessary” This scenario is Cameroon in a nut-shell; with incessant and
spontaneous influx of massive displaced population into Cameroon, subjective argument
would suggest that; barely able to sustain the subsistent need of her own people,
Cameroon, without adequate international support would eventfully crumble under the
yoke of her refugee influx. Assuming this was the case, then Cameroon will be implicitly
justified in her claim of being unable to cope with her refugee influx. But as a factor of
myriads of inter-related and conflicting factors, the complex issue of refugee
management cannot be reduced merely to host’s visible ability to cope.

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 Chapter Three

Population Increase

The most visible effect of the influx of refugees into any area is in the population
increase. As a natural phenomenon, population increase is caused when there is excess
birth over death. However in the ongoing cases of North and Eastern Cameroon, the
uncontrollable population explosion is the consequence of excess immigration (refugee
influx over emigration.) There is consensus amongst NGOs, UN Organisations and
relevant professional that “as a consequence of the constant upheaval that is rampaging
Sub Sahara Africa, the regional migration into Cameroon is showing no signs of abating.”
UNHRC, (2008). According to the representative of UNHCR in Cameroon, the refuges in
Cameroon come “from as far as Sierra Leone, Libya, Rwanda, Burundi, Central African
Republic, Togo, Chad, Sudan amongst other countries in the African continent” Tandafor,
(2005); http://www.IRINnews.org. The holistic impact of this refugee convergence which
is compounding Cameroon already crumbling welfare system is that relevant needs for
both refugees and the indigenes have to be met from a finite source or reserve. This
being the case, while still acknowledging those relief aids from relevant humanitarian
organisations, it opinions are still polarised as to whether Cameroon could adequately
continue to cope. In fact from a Malthusian perspective, if the uncontrolled refugee-
induced increase in Cameroon’s population was left uncheck, then the impact on the
host’s resources could be terminal. Exacerbating Cameroon’s woes is the realisation by
Cameroon’s immigration authorities that, apart from those actual refugees fleeing from
the ongoing conflicts in the surrounding neighbouring states, some of the so-called
refugees are economic migrants. The realisation of this complex situation is cited by
Tandafor, (2005) who points to the proposition by the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugee; Jacques Franquin who pointed out that, to be able to cope with her refugee
influx “Cameroon needs to adopt a law on refugees that would not only protect those who
come to seek solace in Cameroon, but would also enable the government to sort out real
refugees from mere migrants” http://www.postnewsline.com/2005/06/strongcameroon-
2.html. Cameroon’s problems here are the inherent difficulties in distinguishing ‘refugee’

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as defined by the 1951 UN Convention on Refugees from economic migrants. Bearing in
mind that inherently, the indigenous birth rate is high, the combination of this with the
refugee influx is bound to produce environmental, social and economic ramifications
beyond the capability of any one nation. Theorising from a Malthusian perspective, where
“economic development and sustainability are directly proportional to population growth,”
Cameroon’s high birth-rate; the spontaneous population increase due to refugee influx
and her ineffective reproductive policies would serve as major causations of negative
economic growth. Compounded by a myriad of other factors, this in a nutshell is
Cameroon’s circumstance with predictable ramifications. Compared to the developed
world where populations are shrinking and the average age is rising, Cameroon with its
multifaceted impoverishment is experiencing unwanted population explosion thanks to
the additional impact of her refugee influx. The terminologies, ‘terminal, suicidal,
overwhelming, unsustainable, catastrophic and crisis’ World Vision, (2008, p. 1);
UNICEF, (2008, p. 1); have consistently been used to describe Cameroon burden under
the yoke of her refugee influx. If credence could be given to these observations, then
Cameroon’s claims of the inability to cope with the influx would be circumstantial.
Nevertheless, if her apparent state of crisis could be attributed to her own shortcomings
like; mismanagement of available resources or a similar failure to control migration for
whatever reason, then her claims cannot be implicitly justified. In fact, within such
circumstances, she could be viewed as the architect of her own shortcomings.
Unfortunately, the latter seem to be the case. While the alarming refugee figures;
(essentially questmatics) being branded about by the Cameroon authorities and related
humanitarian organisations seem to suggest that Cameroon is terminally and incessantly
being flooded with refugees from almost every part of Sub Sahara Africa, there is
plausible argument to question the reliability and motivation underpinning such statistics.
In fact, rumours abounds within political spheres in Cameroon that the authorities were
inflating refugee figures to attract foreign aids. More so, critics seem to attribute the
startling figures in the mass media to habitual sensationalisation. Kaplan, (1994, p. 76).
This and similar information, if certified, would significantly compromise Cameroon’s
claims.

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 Chapter Four

The Eco Perspective

Environment

Hitherto, the realisation that Cameroon constituted one of the few environments with very
rear fauna and wildlife had led to significant conservation initiatives nationwide, with
relevant support at international level. However the spontaneous influx of desperately
mal-nourished homeless refugees into what would rightly be called a ‘reserve’ is undoing
whatever progress had been achieved, while Cameroon powerlessly watches. According
to Harte, (2007), the spontaneous influx of massive population into a region like North
Cameroon “with very delicate ecosystem will inevitably have significant impact on the
environment.” Harte, (2007). These refugees, who arrive in an alien situation away from
their homes, “face hunger, fatigue, humiliation and grief.” Aliko, (2008). Driven by the will
to survive, but more so compelled by their circumstance, their primary instinct is to find
food, water and shelter. The results of their indiscriminate and ravageous harvests of
Cameroon forest (deforestation) or vegetation cover to satisfy their basic human needs is
terminally leading to land degradation and depletion especially in the already water and
vegetation-hungry North Cameroon. While refugees may argue that they are being
scapegoat for destroying a landscape that nature had already made hostile for human
habitation, there is consensus that the arrivals of refugees in North and East Cameroon
have permanently altered the ecosystem. Harte, (2007). For example, in Cameroon with
her limited and intermittent electrify supply, and where majority of the population are too
impoverished to buy into the national network, firewood to the indigenes in general and
the refugees in particular constitutes “the primary source of fuel and shelter material.”
http://www.tropmed.orgrieh/vol.9htm. As such, persons who do not have access to wood
or alternative fuel may not be able to cook nor keep themselves warm in the extremely
cold nights of the Sahel zone; thereby becoming vulnerable to malnutrition and illness.
The locust-like harvest of the natural vegetation for firewood and wood for shelter in north
Cameroon has virtually eradicated the landscape of its natural cover. In fact to suggest

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that the inadvertent activities of refugees have provided areas in, and adjacent to the
refugee settlements with a lunar landscape would not be far from the truth. To a country
already impoverished by multi faceted deprivations, the added pressure of the refugee
influx have resulted in reduced level of incomes and a corresponding lower quality of life.
Here, Cameroon’s claim of the inability to cope with her refugee influx seem clearly
evident in her inability to safe the indiscriminate harvest of her natural vegetation despite
its eventual impact on the quality of her citizen’s lives. In North Cameroon, Harte, (2007)
observed that the irresponsible action of refugees in their desperation to harvest wood for
cooking and shelter, “is degrading the capacity of the natural ecosystem to regenerate or
maintain renewable resources and ecosystem services such as provision of clean water
and the regeneration of fertile soil.” Similarly, the resulting and unavoidable competitions
for Cameroon’s diminishing natural resources, between the hosts and guests in areas
like Kousserie in the semi arid zone have critical implication not only on the well being of
the refugees but on their relationship with their host. While the local communities in
Cameroon may not always be as vociferous in their objection to hosting refugees, the
general perception is that the tensions are nonetheless there and potentially explosive.
For example while the host government’s call for international assistance to install more
refugee-friendly amenities like adequate sanitation and water points maybe genuine, the
local communities have come to perceive such pleas as focusing on the welfare of
foreigners at their own expense. In consensus the director of the UNHRC in Cameroon
pointed out that the sight of Cameroon workers providing services to refugees are
increasingly leading to open confrontations from other citizens. While the receipt of
refugees might have initially been perceived as virtuous, the UNHRC, (2008) have
identified the competition for natural resources as a source of conflict and tension.
Quoting the words of a Cameroon civil servant in reference to the indiscriminate and
terminal destruction of the ecosystem, “what can anyone one do? The government is not
God to replant forest and put elephants in them overnight.” This and similar feelings,
typify the general sense of desperation that Cameroon is powerless to control the impact
of the influx of refugees in Cameroon. However, critics would always ponder whether
things could be different if the Cameroon government were implicitly transparent in their
operation of refugee policies vis-a-vis her environmental policies. This doubt is derived

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from the widespread rumours that, rather than the refugees, it is the indigenes who
spend days cutting and burning the natural forest for charcoal to sell to both refugees
and the local communities. As such, while the reality that the influx of refugees has
accelerated the destruction of the natural vegetation; there is corresponding counter
argument that the wounds of Cameroon’s eco-degradation is essentially self-inflicted by
indigenes.

Water, health and Sanitation

As elsewhere in the world, water in the refugee-settled parts of Cameroon, is a

prerequisite for the production of food, raising of livestock, the prevention of diseases
and the provision of hygiene and sanitation. This being the case, any deficiency or
related mismanagement of available water; as is the case in North Cameroon where the
influx of refugee is alleged to have exerted excessive, unmanageable and unsustainable
pressure on the water supply, the economic and health ramification on the quality of life
are far-reaching. For example, since the northern refugee settlements of Kousserie and
Madana are situated in the semi arid or Sahel zone, where water has always been a very
scarce commodity. In the Sahel zone in North Cameroon, the vision of spending three to
four hours trekking only to fetch water from either wells or haphazardly dispersed water
points is not an exception but the inherent way of life. Tearfund, (2004). For example
during my field study in Kousserie, Amina, a twenty two year old member of a family of
six children told me, “I leave the settlement early in the morning and travel for over one
hour to join a long queue at the water point. The water is not even very clean, yet this is
all we have. Sometimes tempers flare and people fight” This situation has been
compounded by the massive and incessant influx of refugees from neighbouring states in
conflict. According to International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC)(2008) the influx of
refugees has pushed the water demand to an unsustainable level; the infrastructure in
Kousserie town is not equipped to meet the new needs arising from refugee influx.”
Theorised from a Malthusian perspective, the increasing water demand from a finite and
diminishing source could prove terminal if the international society abandon Cameroon to
her own fate. Where supplementary supply of water from Lake Chad would have

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mitigated the acute shortage in the refugee camps and surrounding communities,
Cameroon’s woes is compounded by the appropriately termed “shrinking Lake Chad” In
fact it has been observed that, “Lake Chad, once the primary source of water in the
extreme north Cameroon and neighbouring countries “has shrunk by 95% in the past 38
years” http://news/news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/1234244.stm. Despite this acute
shrinkage, over 20million people in six African countries in West and Central Africa rely
on Lake Chad for water. With virtually no means of remedying this natural wastage of
water through excessive evaporation, Cameroon may be justified in claiming the inability
to cope with the ramifications of her refugee influx. In fact the UNHRC, (2008) attributes
part of the refugee influx into Cameroon to the fact that, “some of those seeking
sanctuary in Cameroon are environmental refugees forced to migrate because of the
shrinking Lake Chad.”

Where the humanitarian organisations have had to dig wells as the alternative water
source to the highly contaminated lake, these wells have themselves become
contaminated with human waste. As typical with any mass influx of people into a
restricted environment, in the refugee camps in Cameroon, there is production of great
deal of excreta and other waste material. Where human waste and other by-products
from the refugee camps are never properly treated, the Cameroon Ministry of Health
alleged that both the water and soil in these areas have become badly contaminated.
Moreover, UNHRC asserted that, because over pumping had depleted the local aquifer,
villagers could no longer reach water. http://www.peopleandplanet.net/doc.phd?id=2134.
In the end these villagers may in turn become environmental refugees themselves.
Cameroon’s dilemma here is that despite the realisation that using contaminated water
has far-reaching health ramifications to both the host and guest communities, her finite
resources does provide for adequate means to address such sudden crisis. Where
relevant and appropriate medical interventions would have mitigated the health impact of
water-related infections, MSF, (2008) points out that, “at times medical workers lack even
the most basic skills”. Similarly, MSF, (2008) assert that, with the overuse of water and
its pollution, the incidences of related death resulting from dehydration and infectious
diseases abound.” For an impoverished nation like Cameroon, remedying all these
problems is unsustainably expensive; and seeming to justify Cameroon’s inability claim.

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Similarly, the dwindling water resources are making food supplies prohibitively
expensive. With water posited as “one of man’s most vital resource for his survival, any
lack of it is bound to result in complex health problems.” Harte, (2007).

Wildlife

In Cameroon as elsewhere globally, recent years have witnessed concerted efforts to

protect and conserve endangers species especially primates like baboons, chimpanzees
monkeys etc. In addition to the terminal destruction of the Cameroon’s ecosystems that
is having corresponding ramifications on the natural wildlife, various studies and reports
by conservationists are consensual that, primarily motivated by the desperation to
survive, refugees in particular and the indigenes in general are indiscriminately hunting
Cameroon’s wildlife for bush meat. In East Cameroon, the UNHRC states that refugees
communities impact on forest by settling in inhabited areas, placing increasing pressure
on resources through demands for fuel wood and food resources such as bush meat”
http://www.biodiversityscience.org/publications/hotspot/CapeFloristticRegion.html. My
knowledge and experience of Cameroon subsistence life give me the privilege mandate
to attribute the increasing ravages on Cameroon’s indigenous wildlife partly to the lack of
alternative means of survival or exit option from abject poverty. For local hunters I met in
Borongo in East Cameroon analogised their decision to engage in bush meat activities
as a question of life or death. Pertaining to the concept of conservation of endangered
species, a resident in Madana in the refugees-settled area in north Cameroon questioned
the ethics of preserving “what are suppose to be natural human food while human beings
are dying of starvation or malnutrition?” Similarly, Redmon, (1998) pose the ethical
questions; “Are we right to impose our ethical or cultural values on other societies?
However, he goes on to ponder what our response would be, “if animals were killed for
profit rather than survival?” as is increasingly becoming the case with the refugee-
induced bush-meat trade in Cameroon? The paradox in the bush-meat for survival
argument is that, it directly conflicts “with the long-term objective for of environmental
protection which ironically in turn will sustain live.” http://www.tropmed.org/rreh/vol1-
9.htm. As identified in Borongo where the refugees from the Central African Republic

14
have settled in Cameroon, the greatest demand for bush meat comes from non-
traditional urban consumers and the commercial hunters and traders who use non-
traditional weapons to mass harvest wildlife. In fact, in areas experiencing refugee influx
in Cameroon, unsubstantiated allegations and reports abound of armed militias including
Cameroon soldiers (sent to protect refugees and the local communities) engaging in
hunting-for-profit. While Cameroon’s inability to stem this and similar practices may
provide plausible reason to justify the claim that she is unable to cope with the pressures
and impacts derived from the refugee influx, there is reason to question whether the
alleged refugee-induced bush-meat activities would be so acute if available protection
and conservation resources were well-managed or members of the militia appropriately
disciplined for misuse of resources for personal gains by covertly engaging in hunting.
While refugees may be scapegoat and vilified for exhaustively harvesting Cameroon’s
wildlife, Redmond, (1998, p. 2) points out that “primatologists have long perceived the
predation by Africans in general and Cameroonians in particular of primates as endemic
practices with terminal effect on endangered species.” The debate is whether given the
relevant support, both refugees and their host would abstain from their ravageous wild
life activities that are essentially endemic cultural norms? With an economy that is visibly
impoverished, and considering “the current global economic crunch that is debilitating
even the world’s financial giants like America and Great Britain” Guardian (2008, p. 25), it
would be too optimistic if not wholly subjective to expect Cameroonians, whose abject
living is partly mitigated by hunting for local consumption and commercial purposes to
abstain from this inherent life-sustaining practice. Nevertheless, considering the
concerted efforts to protect and conserve those rare species particular to Cameroon like
the Maka monkeys, it is arguable that the increasing indiscriminate refugee-induced
predation on the wildlife is evidence of Cameroon’s inability to cope. The presenting
question is identifying where to lay the blame specifically; are refugees wholly to blame
or is the increasing wildlife predation evidence of systemic failures within the host’s
governance? Whatever the response, Cameroon’s claim of excessive pressure from
refugee influx suggests that she rather be perceived as a victim of circumstances beyond
her control.

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 Chapter Five

Legal Perspective

Whether judged from a humanitarian or Right-based perspective, most critics would

argue that if we accept the principles of universal human rights, then there are “strong
grounds for recognising the right of free mobility as core human rights” Moses, (2006, p.
60) including the rights for refugees to migrate without restriction. However, within the
context of an objective reality of the rights of refugees, Moses, (2006, p. 60) cautions
that, “The validity of these rights depends critically on the willingness of a legitimate
political authority to secure and defend them.” Fittingly, the relevant instruments have
not only secured and are defending the rights of refugees like those displaced due to the
multifaceted factors in sub Saharan Africa, signatories to these instruments are obliged
not to refuse refugees entry at their frontiers. This legal stipulation deprives impoverished
host like Cameroon from instituting draconian measures such zero-migration to
safeguards her own welfare. Moreover, as Garson, (2001) points out, within the
contemporary borderless or globalised world, “zero immigration is just pure fancy.” At its
most extreme in emphasising the right of refugees to seek sanctuary in a host country
like Cameroon, Melville, (1987) asserts that, “if they can get here, they have God’s right
to come.”

Despite proceeding arguments for a more liberal policy towards refugees arriving in
Cameroon, and the apparent benefits derived thereof, most Cameroonian are convinced
that overall, the Cameroon government and her people are significantly short-changed
as a result of accepting refugees into Cameroon. As such, rather than adopt an open
border refugee policy at the expense of relevant domestic policies, they argue for
restricting massive influx in the principal refugee entry points in north and East
Cameroon. From an egalitarian and anti discriminatory perspective, Moses, (2006, p.
113) cites arguments by communitarians that an unrestricted or open border policy as is
prevalently the case in Cameroon today “may undermine the host ability to offer equal
guarantees to immigrants, or to lower the overall level of guarantee offered to both

16
residents and immigrants.” Moreover, the fact that the Cameroon is having to provide for
an increasing population (thanks to the refugee influx) from her finite resources calls into
question the rationality of her response to what is by and large Africa’s, if not an
international problem. Despite this, and considering that the Cameroon government is
barely struggling to meet the needs of her citizens, moral critics of altruistic virtue will
perceive the host response of continuous acceptance of refugees as morally
irresponsible if not suicidal. In line with this argument and maybe offering Cameroon an
alternative opt-out solution, the 1985 Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals
Who Are Not Nationals of the Country in Which they Live state that, “Nothing in this
declaration shall be interpreted as legitimising any alien’s illegal entry into and presence
in a State, nor shall any provision be interpreted as restricting the right of any State to
promulgate laws and regulations concerning the entry of aliens and the terms and
conditions of their stay” Moses , (2006, p. 54). Cameroon in face of the mounting cost of
accommodating the influx of Africa’s refugees could adopt a stringent control mechanism
to either limit or stop further influx. However, although as a signatory to the OUA refugee
convention, Cameroon would be in breach of her obligation, she would not setting a
precedent. Taking into consideration the argument that the cost of controlling
Cameroon’s borders or the corresponding “checking to deter refugees from working
illegally would out-weigh the cost of adopting a more liberal approach”, it becomes
evident that the argument for or against accepting refugee is not only very complex, but
open to much polarised opinions. Thus, rather than resource constraints, maybe what
Cameroon actually need is a better way of managing her guests.

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 Chapter Six

Burden Sharing and the inadequacies of relevant instruments

As emphasised in the preamble of the OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects
of Refugee Problems and the Geneva Convention 1951 and its subsequent amendment
by the Protocol of 31st January 1951, the concept of ‘burden sharing’ in response to
refugee influx is underpinned by the realisation that its ramifications transcends national
boundaries. The notion of ‘Burden Sharing’ “was first used to refer to the concept for
sharing responsibility for the protection of refugees in situations of mass influx” Boswell,
(2003). Founded on the principle of promoting international solidarity among states like
Cameroon receiving refugees, under the current global economy, different protagonist
have used it to justify divergent policies. In fact, the mere fact that granting asylum or
sanctuary “may place unduly heavy burden on certain countries, the preamble to the
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees implied the need for international
cooperation. An equal realisation is embedded in the preamble of the similar OAU
convention 1969. Yet, to date, the experience and desperation of Cameroon to cope with
her refugee influx is symbolic of the non-functionality of these seemingly altruistic
instruments. Assuming as Ellis, (1996, p. xvii) noted in Africa that “the problem of
refugees or other individuals in adversity can be understood only by reference to larger
structures, even national or international affairs.”, Cameroon as an overburden host
should by right expect non-affected countries to rally to her assistance or would they?
Bearing in mind that “in 1969 all member states of the OAU signed the Convention
Governing the Specific Aspects of refugees Problem in Africa aimed at helping refugee,
while at the same time preventing refugee problems from growing into inter-state
conflict,” Davidson, (1994, p. 254) Cameroon maybe legally justified in her feeling of
desertion in times of need. In fact, as a safeguard against an already impoverished
economy like Cameroon experiencing difficulties in coping with the ramifications of
refugee influx, articles 2, section 4 of the OAU convention calls for member states to act
in “the spirit of African Solidarity and international Co-operation to take appropriate
measures to lighten the burdens of the members state giving asylum” Davidson, (1994,

18
p. 254) A critical analysis of such seemingly responsible legal statements show that the
seeds of their own ineffectiveness are embedded in the use of vague terminologies like
‘lighten the burden’. Deprived of specificity in their concept, they also carry no legal
obligation to comply. According to the Centre for International Governance Innovation,
“since the inception of even the African Union to assist host countries cope with refugees
impact, the Pan African body has lacked the funds and leadership to take effective
actions in the continent” http://www.igloo.org/community.igloo?
o=scripts/announcement/view. Similarly, and pertaining to the obligation to receive
refugees, article 2, section 3 of the OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspect of
Refugee Problem in Africa 1969; while it prohibits signatories from subjecting potential
refugees to rejection at the frontiers for fear of revictimisation or persecution, no
consideration seem to have been accorded to the readiness of a country like Cameroon
to adequately accommodate the duties or responsibilities derived thereof. In a nutshell,
this has been Cameroon’s problem; having to continuously provide sanctuary to refugees
within her finite budget and with whatever limited support that can be squeezed out of
organisations like the UNHRC and related NGOs. Considering that the same instruments
makes it illegal to refuse refugees entry into the first country of sanctuary, as a signatory
Cameroon has self-detrimentally been accomplishing her duty as a host. However, the
expected supports from non-affected nations have yet to materialise. Under the current
climate of economic crunch when nation the world over are facing potential recession yet
with increasing welfare demands from their citizens, Guardian (2008, p. 25) it would be
virtuously altruistic if the refugee problem of Cameroon were to be prioritised on the
policy agendum of foreign nations. Unfortunately as Cameroon is learning, the reverse
seems to the preferred option.

Double standards

Within a global climate where global citizenship seems to be imperceptibly replacing

sovereignty, and where signatories of the various refugee-related conventions have
consented to the principle of ‘burden sharing’ to relief the pressure on refugee-receiving
countries, Davidson, (1994, p. 254), Cameroon with her acute refugee problem would

19
have expected other nations to automatically step in to share the burden derived thereof.
As Cameroon has noted to her cost, in practice within a global society where even relief
assistance is covertly underpinned by the capitalist aspiration for profit, the irrespective
expectation of aids when in need is an anachronism. In what clearly seem a case of
double standards, it defies rationality why international humanitarian organisations;
managed by supposedly rational beings, rather rally to provide humanitarian aid to
comparatively capable countries like Iraq, while a visibly incapable country like
Cameroon gradually choke under the overwhelming burden of the world’s refugee
problems? Within the capitalist context where profit alone is the primary determinant in
who gets what help from the West irrespective the gravity of their pathological condition,
Hilton, (2006, p. 20)... observed that , “when there is no pressing military or colonial
imperative, the developed world loses interest in tropical diseases.” Using the case of the
pharmaceutical company to illustrate the West’s double standard, Hilton, (2006, p. 20)
further pointed out that the overwhelmingly risk drug company who could have morally
and spontaneously come to the aid of that patient; Cameroon, neglect the latter, “not
because the sciences is impossible but because there is , in the cold economies of drugs
companies, no markets.” In justifying Cameroon’s claim of the inability to cope with the
overwhelming burden of her refugee influx, there is rational argument to consent with
Hilton, (2006, p. 20) analogy that, the trouble with humanitarian or “charitable gestures is
that they are only gestures.’ As the situation in Cameroon has shown, the relief aid that
emanate from the various relief organisations are token gestures compared to what
those same organisations would lavish on less-needy countries like the rich oil nations of
the Middle East. If the World wanted to show rationality in their attempt to rescue
Cameroon’s sinking ship, something more systematic and underpinned by implicit
rationality is required. In fact there would be need for the West and their multinationals to
set aside respective corporate greed and bureaucratic complacency, and let moral ethics
and the condition of their patient, Cameroon be the primary determinant of needs and
relief provisions. Cameroon’s claims of the inability to cope with her refugee seem like to
still fall, on deaf ears since she does not possess or aspire to possess those elitist
credential that will forever give her the green card for that privileged club. As a non-card
holder, suffice to say she has to keep feeding on the crumbs that falls from the master’s

20
table, while the plates of the already well-fed, oil-rich nations of Iraq and Afghanistan are
constantly top-up. For example, in what the refugee magazine has termed “the reputed
double standard, uprooted Africans do not get as much comparative aid as refugees in
other parts of the world. African commentators point “to the huge but empty tent cities on
the desert fringes of Iraq waiting for refugees who may never arrive as compared to the
tens of thousands of people who fled the West Africa State of Ivory Coast.” Hayter,
(2000). In fact Vincent and Sorensen, (2001, p. 122-125) ponders why Iraq and
Afghanistan can receive such concentrated and lavished attention while Africa still seem
so desperate and so ignored” The prevalence of this and similar tendencies give
credence to Cameroon’s claims of desperation by virtue of either abandonment or
neglect by peer nations. Compared to the ad hoc establishment of badly organised
refugee camps as in Garoua and Kousserie in northern Cameroon to accommodate
refugees from Sudan and Chad, Vincent and Sorensen, (2001, p. 122) state that, “in
Afghanistan, relief agencies opened several camps for the displaced in Jalalabad area.
Other camps were opened in the area around Mazar-i-Sharif in the north and in Herat in
the West; housing over 400,000 refugees” Within this visible demonstration of
economically motivated discrimination or ‘reputed double standard’ is Cameroon not
justified to feel abandoned and unable to cope when faced with a refugee problem with a
greater magnitude to that of Afghanistan and yet receiving comparatively negligible
international relief aid? Whatever the arguments for or against this seemingly
discriminatory foreign policy approach, the net result is that an already impoverished
economy like Cameroon is virtually abandoned to her own faith in a crisis that legally
should instigate an international response? Within this context, Cameroon’s inability
claim would be justified.

21
 Chapter Seven

Feminisation in Cameroon’s Refugeeship

While on a purposive working holiday to North Cameroon as part of my research project

in late August 2008, to late October, I suddenly became aware that most of the refugees
who were camped near river the bridge separating Chad from Cameroon) were women,
children or the elderly. In fact, Evidence by the UNICEF representative was consensual
with outcome of my literature review which attributed the invisibility of men in the refugee
population to the fact that; most of the men were either engaged in the ongoing conflicts,
had been killed in battled. As for the women their over representation was explained by
their maternal tendency to seek sanctuary when faced with danger to provide enhanced
or secure and stable environment in which to give their children and themselves a better
chance in life. Some analysts attribute Cameroon inability to cope with her refugee
problem to the failure to accommodate the ramifications of refugee feminisation in
relevant national and international refugee policies. Considering that African cultures in
general and Cameroon society in particular are essentially patriarchal; Morokvasic,
(1984a); with most decisions taken by male chauvinist, it would be naive to expect
related refugee policies to be derived from a feminist perspective. This is despite the fact
that, “of the over 50,000 refugees that entered Cameroon from the Central African
Republic; across all ages, girls and women accounted for more than 70 per cent of
refugees”. UNICEF, (2008, p. 2). In consensus, UNHCR, (2006) assert that, “the faces
of refugees are overwhelmingly those of women and children, as they comprise up to 80
per cent of most refugee population” Similarly, 60% of participants in the survey
suggested that “refugee feminisation in Cameroon is driven by the desire of women to
better their lives and those of their children” Pertaining to the latter, a respondent in the
survey explained; “if not that I want to save my life to care for my children I would have
preferred to die. You see I can stay without food so long as my two children have
something to eat”. Inferring from this and similar accounts, it is plausible to infer that
gender structures the refugee process and therefore Cameroon’s refugee problems
cannot be effectively addressed without treating gender as a central organising principle

22
in her refugee influx. In fact, while the host government of Cameroon may appear to
blame the ramifications of external or international politics for her refugee influx, a critical
analysis of Cameroon’s ongoing refugee policies, in conjunction with relief approaches
from related Non Governmental Organisations partly attribute this fiasco to the exclusion
of women’s perspective in relevant policy making. As earlier mentioned, the
discriminatory normative in Cameroon is “the predominance of the model of the
patriarchal family”, Morokvasic, (1984a) whereby women “are relegated to the private
space of the home, and their economic contribution to society is largely ignored” Oso and
Catarino, (1996). As such, this has led to a reciprocal refugee policies that seem to
overlook or sideline the capability of women to be proactive participants in decisions and
actions that affect their lives. If women are perceived as the foundation of nation’s
economy, Oso and Catarino, (1996); if women are able to manage the family in time of
crisis; if women constitute the majority of refugees, and since user-involvement has been
proven to produce enhance outcomes, then there is plausible argument to suggest that
Cameroon’s claim of the inability to cope with her refugee influx is significantly
compromise with her exclusion of women in relevant decision-making process. As a
remedial approach, Freeman and Jamal, (2008, p. 1) argue that, related policies will only
be effective and appropriate if the prevailing ‘invisibility’ of women refugees in academic
research; the exploration of the causes of the feminisation of migration and the gendered
impacts of national and supranational policies and legislation, including the rights of
refugees to seeks asylum and their integration into the host country are implicit in
relevant policy making. With almost 75 per cent (80 out of 236) of participants in the
sample survey suggesting that they were not treated as human beings or as women with
children by the Cameroon government; with a similar percentage declaring that they do
not want hand outs but the opportunity within a stable environment to earn their own
upkeep, then there is reason to question whether Cameroons inability to cope with the
refugees influx is not rather due to the wrong approach of focussing on handouts rather
than supporting the women to support their families? Irrespective of the polarised and
contentious opinions, Freeman and Jamal, (2008, p. 2) observed that their very
stereotypical status as refugees can arguably be said to limit whatever constructive
contributions refugee women would have offered to their own self-development and the

23
development of the host’s economy at large. A comprehensive examination of this
perspective is beyond the remit of this discourse but it constitutes imperative material for
future research. Suffice here to note that, research on the experiences of female
refugees; views expressed by refugee women respondents in the sample survey as well
as analyst like Boswell, (2000) believe that “the impact of gender inequalities in
refugeeship”; “the non-recognition of persecution specific to women” Freeman and
Valluy, (2007); “gendered forms of vulnerability linked to social and welfare rights and to
the problem of detention, deportation and externalisation” Freeman, (2007) can collude
to worsen Cameroon’s refugee crisis. As Yinger, (2007) points out, “these deficiencies
need to be filled, to assist with the development of evidence-based policies that would
improve the migration experience for women and children. It is only there and then that
Cameroon could justifiably derive her inability claim from a feminine perspective.

Gender-Based Violence

According to UNHRC, (2006) during the process of refugee exodus and settling in a host
country, “social structures are disrupted, with family members often dispersed during
flight, leaving children separated from the rest of their families and women as solely
responsible for protecting and maintaining their households” As preceding analysis has
hinted, these women and children, both within and beyond the refugee camps faced
multifaceted threat not just from cross-border raiders who either rape or kidnap them for
human trafficking or as sex slaves; because of their powerlessness and vulnerability,
these refugees also face abuse from the very staff and authorities charged with their
protection and welfare. As in most cases of vulnerability, the abuse of women and
children refugees can be attributed to the disproportional power relationship between the
vulnerable refugees as compared to the power-wielding NGO, UN agencies and local
government authorities. Feedback from refugees in the sample survey suggest that,
where local authorities would have intervened to protect vulnerable women and children,
their lack of control over United Nation’s personnels and relevant relief organisations

24
denies the latter any effective means to act. In fact, rumours abound within the refugee-
settled areas of Cameroon that, indigenes with good knowledge of the local geography
proactively coerce or forcefully procure females for prostitution. As if to emphasise
Cameroon’s inability to cope, nowhere within or beyond the camps operational
framework is there any formal structure, (apart from the codes of ethics by the UNHRC
for its staff) to caution against women refugee abuse. Consequently, females in
sanctuary in Cameroon face,“ Sexual attack, coercion, extortion by persons in authority;
sexual abuse of separated children in foster care; domestic violence; sexual assault
when in transit facilities, collecting wood, water, etc.; sex for survival/forced prostitution;
sexual exploitation of persons seeking legal status” UNHRC, (2008). While sex for
recreation rather than procreation seems to be the driving force behind gender-based
violence towards refugees in Cameroon, there is consensus that this gross violation of
the refugees’ human rights is being sustained by the endemic corruption that permeates
almost every orifice of the Cameroon society.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/country-profile/1021488.stm. In fact allegations of
indigenous law officers raping victims in their care are not uncommon. While power
abuse seem to underpin most gender-based violence against refugees, the fact that
Cameroon authorities seem incapable of protecting women refugees or tackling gender-
based violence which by every definition constitutes infringements of the victim’s human
rights; the fact that even Cameroon officers and agency staff are party to these crimes
confirms Cameroons, inability to act. Again, the question here is whether Cameroon
could do better. A yes answers would compromise any justification in the claims that she
is unable to cope with her refugee influx. Nevertheless, an objective answers will need to
take into consideration many variables.

25
 Chapter Eight

Stereotype and Pathology in Cameroon’s refugeeism

The general impression one gets from global analysis of refugee issues is the
indiscriminate tendency within humanitarian organisations to perceive refugees as
‘victims’. In fact, my experience with refugees in Cameroon is that while their
circumstance might have made them dependable, by referring to them as victims, they
are stripped of their identities and stereotypically lumped together within the traditional
hegemonic humanitarian label of ‘vulnerable groups’ “beneficiaries” DREF, (2008, p. 1);
and “recipients’” Sorensen, (1998). This is despite the fact that refugees arriving in
Cameroon constitute heterogeneous groups with competing interest and ambition. By
treating refugees as relatively homogeneous groups; maybe based solely on their
experience of conflict, Cameroon in particular and humanitarians in general blind
themselves to the resourcefulness of the refugee communities and individuals. From a
user-involvement perspective, there is plausible argument to infer that, by so
pathologising refugees and failing to harness their inert potentials to survive and prosper,
Cameroon is significantly compromising her ability to cope. In line with this argument,
Lautze and Hammock, (1996) argues that, if the capacity building potentials of refugees
were properly managed and implemented, it could mitigate the cost of addressing
refugee needs” For example, as evidence of the resourcefulness and resilience of
refugees, Lindley, (2007, p. 17) points to their ability to undertake even menial chores in
order to send remittance to those they left behind. In fact despite attempts to confine
refugees to remote camps so as to limit their contact with adjacent local communities, a
twenty two year old, refugee mother of two described in the survey how she has to leave
her children with camp neighbours to covertly trek over 20 kilometres to provide cheap
labour to local farmers in return for exploitatively low pay. Similarly, despite being far
from the consciousness of the international communities, nomadic refugees in isolated
and inaccessible hills in east Cameroon have demonstrated through their subsistence
skills (collecting firewood or providing labour for others) that given the appropriate
assistance they could appreciably moderate Cameroon’s apparent inability to cope with

26
her refugee influx. At a macro level, it would not be far-fetched to infer that, compared to
some indigenes who rather sit idle or drinking all day, if the work-conscience of refugees
were harnessed or incorporated into relevant refugee interventions, Cameroon’s ability to
cope with her refugee influx would be significantly enhanced. With the critical observation
that “even within the refugee camps, people tend to establish microcosms of their former
communities, with inherent survival skills” Vincent and Sorensen, (2001), Cameroon’s
lack of an in-depth understanding of what these refugee communities are already doing
to compliment their humanitarian relief supplies, deprives Cameroon the justifications she
craves to establish her case of inability to cope. The reverse would only be true if efforts
to harness refugee capacity building are based on an analysis of who the local
communities are, their internal social structures and the different vulnerability patterns
within them” Vincent and Sorensen, (2001, p. 4). Holistically, until the proactive
participation of refugees, in addition to related empowering efforts have been exhausted,
Cameroon will continue to be overwhelmed with her increasing refugee influx as a result
of her own policy failures rather than justifiable inabilities.

At a material level, most Cameroonians seem to talk or refer to all things related to
refugees in negative or derogatory terms. Nevertheless, all is not gloom as the influx of
refugees can be argued to have heralded much-needed developed previously ignored by
the Cameroon government. For example, to meet the complex logistics in meeting the
needs of refugees, the international relief organisations have had to invest in improved
physical infrastructure and road network to enhance the movement of relief aids. The
new road networks have a spill-over effect for host communities; allowing for more trade,
travel and services in these regions. In Madana in East Cameroon for example,
previously unreachable areas are now within easy reach of the urban areas, thanks to
the combined effort of UNHRC, IRCF, WFP, and MSF. Similarly, as a side effect of
addressing the health needs of refugees, international assistance in Cameroon’s social
services sector has been significant. For example, in health, the supply of personnel and
training; the establishments of better equipped refugee hospitals that offer free services
even to Cameroonians; the construction and/or rehabilitation of local district health
facilities as in Kousserie; the donation of equipment, transport and drugs; and direct
delivery of health services like vaccination; therapeutic feeding have been significant.

27
The realisation that these investments are saving Cameroon, significantly compromise
her claim of not being able to cope with the apparent influx of refugees. In fact according
to IFRC, (2008), Borongo district is now well above the national average on several
health indicators; with over 26% of the population living within five kilometres of a health
centre compared to the national average of 30. Education-wise, the refugee-settled areas
of Cameroon have benefited from the provision of teacher and student books and
increased number of qualified primary school teachers. In fact rumors abound of
indigenes drifting into the refugee camps so as to access free education and other relief
aids for themselves and their families. Compared to welfare investment by the Cameroon
government in the remote areas of North and East Cameroon, the contribution of
international humanitarian agencies, especially in the health and water sectors has been
significant. In terms of direct support to Cameroon effort in meeting refugee needs and
those of her own people; The International Federation’s Disaster Relief Emergency Fund
(DREF); a source of un-earmarked money created by the Federation in 1985 to ensure
that immediate financial support is available for Red Cross and Red Crescent response
to emergencies, has played a vital part in increasing Cameroon’s response to her
refugee influx. In February 2008, it allocated “CHF 300,000 to support Cameroon’s in
delivering assistance to some 15,000 beneficiaries.” DREF, (2008, p. 1).This example is
replicated amongst other international organisations. With Cameroon deriving so much
benefit as a result of the influx of refugees into the country, it becomes problematic to
provide sustainable argument to the fact that Cameroon is unable to cope with her
refugee influx. This is because the viability of such claims is can only be founded if
Cameroon was left to cope with the refugees problem solely on her own.

28
 Chapter Nine

Remittance

While conventional misperceptions seem to synonymise refugees with ‘deep material

deprivation, physical insecurities and dependency’ or surviving on relief handouts, Crisp,
(1999); Horst, (2006); Hyndman, (2000); Milner, ( 2005) , critical investigations into the
dynamics of the remittance process and the effects on people’s lives show that, “given
the opportunity, refugees are more predispose to work and earn their survival compared
to complacent indigenes.” Lindley, (2007, p. 1); Wichterich, (2007). Nowhere is this
statement given such lucid credence than in discourses on refugee remittance. For the
purpose of this discourse remittance denotes, “that portion of a migrant’s earnings sent
from the migration destination to the place of origin.” Sorensen, (2004, p. 3). More
specifically and limiting ‘remittance’ to financial transactions, refugee remittance in the
Cameroon situation applies to cash (money) earned or acquired by refugees while in
Cameroon and repatriated to their environment of origin. In consensus and judging
remittance as a prevalently one-way financial transaction depriving Cameroon of the
financial ability to cope with her refugee influx, Arnold, (1992, p. 205-220) points out that
much of the income refugees earn “is sent back home in the form of remittance to
families and friends.’ In consensus while responding to the question how he thinks
remittance or sending money away by refugees affects Cameroon’s ability to cope with
the massive refuge influx, a worker for the United Nation’s relief organisation, UNHRC
asserted that, “as elsewhere in any refugee situation, repatriating money deprives a host
country like Cameroon of much needed fund to defray social imperatives like welfare
entitlements for her citizens in particular and the refugees themselves in general.” In fact,
according to Sorensen, (2004, p. 1), remittances constitutes “the most potent tool in
maintaining the survival or livelihood strategy between the refugee (migrant) and those
left behind in particular and their homeland as a whole.” Asked why they sent cash back
home, majority of refugee respondents in the survey suggested that, “in the absence of
any formal access or relevant banking infrastructure for refugee savings; but more so
compelled by the stringent credentials requirement from potential customers by financial

29
organisations in Cameroon, refugees who work mainly on cash-basis had resorted to
sending their hard-earned-cash back home.” This practice was confirmed amongst
refugees in the almost town-like or permanent-like refugee settled-camps of Kousserie
and Madana in Northern Cameroon and Borongo and in Eastern Cameroons. Despite
the negative depiction of refugee settlements “with dilapidated infrastructures and crime”
Lindley, (2007, p. 5)’ analyst like Horst (2006) rather paint a constructive environment
where industrious refugees are developing lucrative entrepreneurial ventures even
though on a rudimentary scale. For example, despite the Cameroon’s government’s
attempts to contain refugees in remote regions, or prevent them from formal
employment, respondents in the survey admitted to earning by doing prevalently menial
chores for indigenes and sending cash back to their families in their country of origin. In
consensus, Lindley, (2007, p. 17) in her study into ‘Protracted displacement and
remittances: the view from Eastleigh, Nairobi’ pointed out that remittances are also sent
to refugees both within and beyond the refugee camps. Within this context, feedback
from the survey and literature review show that it is this class of refugees (with the
aspiration to return home) who repatriate cash that are perceived as depriving their host
of the necessary fund for relevant investment. On the contrary, some refugees with
relatives or friends abroad have been known to receive regular remittance while in
Cameroon to enable them start up small businesses.
Although the extent of repatriation of Cameroon’s cash far exceeds the meager
remittance received by refugees or funds emanating from international relief
organisations, there is no doubt that refugees can, and do boost local economy.
Moreover, in remittance, Wichterich, (2007, p. 11) in making a comparison to remittance
in Europe argue that “there is huge profit for the host’s financial service sector due to the
high fees for transnational money transfer.” This and similar net benefits can plausibly
be argued to compromise Cameroon’s claims of being unable to cope with her refugee
problem. Additionally, with regards to the advantage to indigenous work force Moses,
(2006, p. 131) argues that remittance can contribute to a convergence of wages between
traditional and modern sectors of the economy with the resulting pay rise in rural wages
forcing farmers and rural employers to pay a better wage; which in turn encourages
multiplier effect.” Although this impact is yet to be significantly felt in Cameroon due to

30
the normalised practice of treating the minority elites preferentially compared to the
subsistence majority populace, any positive change in the latter’s wellbeing derived as a
result of refugee-induced competition is change indeed. For this, the host Cameroon
should be grateful rather than being resentful towards refugees. While refugee
remittances may be seen as terminally draining the life blood of Cameroon economy,
whether as a formal transaction on which tax is minimally paid or as a black market
practice that deprives the Cameroon treasury of significantly much needed income, there
is general consensus amongst migration analysts that “remittance is not only a global
phenomenon but here to stay so long as the world is engulfed in actions that lead to the
displacement or migration of people.” Lindley, (2007); Wichterich, (2007, p. 11). In
arguing the case for the positivity of remittance to a host country like Cameroon,
Sorensen, (2004) denigrates Cameroon’s claims of the inability to cope with the refugee
influx by stating that, “an increasing number of governments are beginning to view
migrants and their economic transfers as strategic resources to be ‘captured’ and
incorporated in national development processes.” Moreover in an increasingly unstable
financial world, Engberg-Pedersen (2003, p. 1) observed that, remittance “is a practice
said to have the potential of being more stable than private capital flows and to be less
volatile to changing economic cycles.” This being the case, a host country like
Cameroon ought to develop systematic ways of accommodating the dynamics of
remittance within relevant policy as any related shortcomings would be evidence of her
incompetence; not the inadvertent actions of refugees. Preceding argument about the
impact of remittance on Cameroon’s ability to cope with her refugee influx suggest that
remittance is not just a highly polarise and contentious issues, but that whatever answer
that is arrived at, is a factor the purpose for which the answer is sort as well as relevant
vested interest. In the latter, there is suggestion by Riak, (2005) that by emphasising the
negativity of remittance, an already impoverished host like Cameroon hopes to win
sympathy votes from potential relief agencies. In their investigation into ‘remittance
during crises; implications for humanitarian response” Savage and Harvey, (2005)
suggest that, unless a comprehensive approach emanating from a supranational
perspective is adopted to achieve a sustaining global stability with a guarantee for human
rights, refugees will keep repatriating the hard currencies of their host, while the latter,

31
typified by Cameroon imperceptibly bleed to death. Within this context, considering the
superfluous flow of refugees into Cameroon compared to her already constraint
economy, It appears implicit that the economy and social circumstance of Cameroon
would be terminally afflicted if all the refugees were to repatriate their earnings to their
homelands. This being the case, and compounded with other factors, Cameroon will be
justified in claiming the inability to cope with her incessant refugee influx. Yet, in
Cameroon’s Eastern province, the feeling is that the authorities’ failure to contain or
regulate remittance by refugees has led to an employment boom in the black economy
where despite being exploited; refugees will do just about anything to scrape enough
living to send some remittance to their homelands. Rather than a liability, remittance can
be an asset if only the Cameroon would manage it properly. Cameroon’s claims of the
inability to cope with her refugee influx cannot be justified if related arguments are
founded solely on her badly managed remittance practice.

32
 Chapter Ten

Transparency

Corruption in Cameroon’s refugee activities

As elsewhere in humanitarian interventions in Africa’s multifaceted disasters, allegations

of aids plundering are the norm rather than the exception and Cameroon is no exception
to this scourge. In the attempt to establish the pull factors that motivated refugees to
prevalently opt for Cameroon as their sanctuary destination, majority cited Cameroon’s
geographical position and relative stability with a zone ravaged by multifaceted
upheavals. While this does not justify or compel Cameroon to accept refugees some
political analyst suggests a self-interest motive. In a nation where almost every orifice of
governance is infused with acute and endemic corruption, it is suggested that the affluent
charge with managing relief aids for refugees stand to lucratively gain from
misappropriating relevant finance and resources. For example, rather than the exception,
it is the norm to find official privately selling humanitarian or relief aids hitherto destined
for refugees and the local civil society. If credence were to be accorded to this and
similar allegations, then there is circumstantial argument to dismiss Cameroon’s claim of
the inability to cope with her refugee influx.

Feedback from both the local communities and refugees suggest that the refugee
situation in Cameroon is being maintained to serve the vested profit interest of corrupt
Cameroon authorities. While there is no systematic investigation to ascertain this
allegation, there is plausible reason not to dispel them completely. This argument is
based on the fact that, the BBC News reported that, “in 1998, Cameroon was classed as
the most corrupt country in the world by business monitor Transparency International,
and in October 2000, Roman Catholic Churches in Cameroon denounced corruption
saying it has permeated all level of society”
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/country-profile/1021488.stm.

33
Access to NGO Services

While there is substantiated evidence to so that Cameroonians are feeling the strain of
having to share their finite welfare resources with refugees, there are counter claims
especially by refugees that impoverished Cameroonians are infiltrating refugee camps
and using bogus means to share what limited aids that the various NGOs have for the
refugees. For example, access to services offered by either international like the
UNHRC, WFP and MSF or local organisations like the Cameroon Red Cross requires a
variety of strategies through which refugees will be recognised as vulnerable and in need
of assistance. To be eligible for relief assistance, some refugee participants in the survey
alleged that, members of the local communities are deliberately keeping their children
malnourished; keeping some members of their families in camps for registration and
ration purposes; and moving from one camp to another to maximise benefits from NGOs.
While this allegation may seem far-fetched, it would not be out of character for
unscrupulous indigenes to mount such scamps; being citizens of a country where almost
every orifice of governance is infused with corruption. Moreover this and similar
allegations directly correlate with findings by Vincent and Sorensen, (2001, p.) in similar
refugees situations in Sudan. In Sudan, in a practice locally know as ‘birth for food’
women “deliberately got pregnant to qualify for food rations allocated for pregnant
women and lactating women.” At its most extreme, it is suggested that rations from the
relief organisations are then resold on the streets in Cameroon to generate much-needed
cash. Furthermore, it is equally alleged that Cameroonians are sending their children to
the temporary though better sponsored education facilities organised by organisations
like UNICEF and churches which distribute free breakfast and uniforms. While my visit to
the refugee camps failed to uncover any instances of the preceding allegations; but while
it would be naive to comprehensively ignore such claims, if these claims could be
certified, then, Cameroon’s claim of the negative impact of the refugee impact would be
significantly compromised. In fact within the context and certification of the scamp, it
would be plausible to argue that Cameroon actually stands to benefit since some of her
welfare responsibilities are being shouldered by the relief organisations. Nonetheless,
basing such simply judgement solely on subjective incidences of impropriety would be
rather naive if not simplistic. For example, a noticeable and counter argument mounted

34
by Lindley, (2007) is that whatever relief or benefits that are unscrupulously taken away
from the humanitarian reserves, will be less than enough to completely cover the
benefactor’s needs; especially if they have families to support.” As such, the horizontal
rather than vertical movement in the well-being of refugees and indigenes who receive
relief aids means that the Cameroon government may still have to shoulder the burden of
supplementing identified needs from the finite national resources. Presuming that
whatever is derived from humanitarian aids is barely able to sustain subsistence survival,
there could be plausible argument to argue that Cameroon would be unable to cope with
her refugee influx. The problem with things to do with Cameroon is that it’s hard to
quantify anything; the figures hardly ever add up.

35
 Chapter Eleven

Quantification in Cameroon’s refugee Crisis

Cognisant of the consensus that refugeeism (especially under globalisation) is an

international rather than national problem and requiring a corresponding need for
multilateral burden-sharing to alleviate the burden on the host country, UNHRC, (2008);
there is need for implicit statistics in campaigns or appeals to emphasise the gravity of
particular situations as in Cameroon. In the statement by Reuters, (2007) that “of 60,000
refugees who crossed the border into Cameroon; most of them who arrived in family
groups were already dehydrated and showing signs of precarious health from malaria,
respiratory problems, and flu.” the former, referring to numbers is ‘quantification’, while
the latter describing the state of the refugees is qualification. Specifically, in qualification,
and describing the circumstance of children refugees from the war-torn CAR, Grimaldi; a
UHHRC worker said, “we realised that many children will not eat because they were
traumatised by what they had seen and lived through” http://www.IRINnews.org.
Qualification in Cameroon’s refugeeism denotes both the physical and psychological
wellbeing of refugees as imposed by their diminished access to vital survival needs; food,
water, shelter and the minutiae logistics required to address identified needs.

Quantification or numbers are an important part of any campaign because they endow it
with urgency and an overwhelming sense of importance” Ennew, et al (2003, p. 15).
Refugee analysts like Vincent and Sorensen, (2001, p. 1) state that, “Statistics are
necessary to appreciate the size of the problem; but they are, at best, estimates, and at
worst, misleading” For example in Cameroon’s refugee policies where numbers have
been the most potent tools used in drawing attention to the gravity of the refugee influx;
there is plausible argument to infer that the lack of specificity in these numbers are
colluding to compromise the host’s ability to adequately address her refugee influx.
Inaccurate or misleading statistics can become a liability in relevant relief interventions.

36
Premising a utopian scenario in Cameroon’s refugee sphere where related statistics and
facts are absolute; the allocation of available resources and the implementation of
relevant policies would be very specific and possibly tailored to suit qualified needs.
Unfortunately the reverse is true. Firstly, given the lack of any consensual and systematic
way to quantify either the regional, national or international scale of refugees; coupled
with the virtual lack of a systematically organised central data base in Cameroon in
particular and the Sub Sahara region in general, there is plausible argument to infer that
most of the figures being branded by the media and by the different organisations are
essentially guesstimates.

However guesstimates in Cameroon’s refugee policies though potentially misleading, in

the short term are not devoid of significance in the formulation of spontaneous
interventions. Within the confines of informed theory, in the early stages of research,
guesstimates constitute baseline hypothesis, to be proved or disproved so that the true
scale of the refugee problem can be understood. Additionally, since in refugeeism it is
the quality of life of the refugee or their host that is of the essence, the critique Fernand-
Laurent, (1983, p. 14) in analysing the association of human trafficking with refugee influx
argue that, “is not the scale of the problem but the degree of seriousness as a violation of
the fundamental rights of the human person.” However, the impression so far gained
from both the literature review my field study is that through repetition and cross
referencing, subjective statistics on Cameroon’s refugees have actually become facts,
partly because they have become inscribed in rhetorical discourses aimed to raise
awareness. As such, faced with figures that are hard to validate, it becomes increasingly
problematic to absolutely justify Cameroon’s claims of not being able to cope with here
apparent refugee crisis. Credence is given to this argument since there is
unsubstantiated allegation that Cameroon has been inflating or massaging the refugee
figures so as to gain sympathy and relief for national impoverishment that are derived
from national shortcomings rather than the fault of refugees.

While this seemingly misleading practice may effectively serve to galvanise public
awareness by stressing the scale rather than the true extent of Cameroon’s refugee
problems, research-wise, “this is neither ethically acceptable nor logical.” Ennew, (1996,

37
p. 12); and does nothing to justify Cameroon’s inability claim. More so, from a policy
response and scientific perspective, vagueness in the use of figures can mislead,
producing a detrimental effect on response. For example statements like “tens of
thousands of refugees are fleeing into Cameroon” www.irinnews.org; or “over 70,000
refugees have cross the border into Cameroon from the Central Africa Republic” seem to
say everything about the refugees and yet nothing specific for implicit policy formulation.
For example there are no detail breakdowns of statistics in terms of gender or age. More
so, even where refugees have actually been registered, the non-permanent nature of the
refugee population in the different parts of Cameroon provides plausible argument to be
sceptical about quoted figures; on what are the calculations based? Without these
specifics, how can one start to justify Cameroon’s claims of the inability to cope with a
supposed population increase? Considering that the refugees in Cameroon hold a
different relationship to space than indigenous Cameroon citizens, and being prevalently
nomadic rather than sedentary, Cameroon’s refugees are defined by movement across
and between political spaces. For example, in Cameroon, refugees from the Central
African Republic continuously cross into Cameroon at remote porous border areas and
indiscernibly merge with a corresponding population in Cameroon. Implicit in this fluid
demographic scenario is how one even starts to quantify these nomadic cattle herders
who “problematise and defy the territorial imperative of the sovereign state?” Burchill et
al., (2001, p. 199). This is because the wandering movement of refugees within and
beyond Cameroon “dislocates the ontological norm which seeks to fix people’s identities
within the spatial boundaries of the nation-state.” Soguk and Whitehall, (1999, p. 697).
As suggested by some analysts, is Cameroon exaggerating the magnitude of her refugee
crisis to gain global or multilateral sympathy vote or attention? If credence could be given
to this premise, then Cameroon’s claims of the inability to cope would be significantly
compromised and versa-a-versa. To date, the impression gained from prevailing
statistics is that they seem to refer exclusively to persons who have crossed the border
into Cameroon while internally displaced persons like those in the Bakassi areas are
overlooked. As such, there is strong argument to question the methodology and
mathematical calculations employed to arrive at these statistics; are they based on
“incidence” or “prevalence”, where the former denotes cases of actual refugees

38
registered and visible on formal databases; or the latter which includes both economic
migrants and refugees who might be in Cameroon? Whatever the criteria for measuring
or accounting for the refugees in Cameroon, the inherent fluidity associated with
migration in general and refugeeism in particular means that quantification is
correspondingly problematic, and fraught with relativities. The danger is that where the
information gathered is partial or even inaccurate, intervention will not be effective. If the
allocation of resources to mitigate Cameroon’s inability claims is to be specific,
appropriate, effective and adequate, then a more scientifically-based model of
quantification detailing the precise source country of the refugees, gender, age, actual
numbers and special characteristics must constitute the core of relevant statistics. For
example, gender details could help in addressing gender-based violence against
refugees while the actual number of refugees within a given environment would
determine the type and extent or resources needed. As Ennew et al, (1996, p.12) points
out, any shortcomings in quantification will have negative ramifications on intervention in
terms of planning, budgeting, resource allocation and evaluation and monitoring of
outcomes. Consequently, until the necessary monitoring mechanisms are in place and
functioning efficiently, Cameroon’s claims of the inability to cope with her apparent
refugee influx will be hard to justify with specificity. Similarly, until then, it will be morally
unethical to give the impression that that the guesstimates on which most campaign are
based, are factual.

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 Chapter Thirteen

Refugees, Deviance and need to control immigration

In any situation where the concentrations of large number of desperate refugees are
struggling to survive, it is inevitable that robbery and other crimes would become the
order of the day. In Kousserie in North Cameroon and Borongo in Eastern Cameroon,
relevant relief organisations, NGOs and the indigenes all agree that robbery and banditry
are rampant daily activities both within and beyond the camps. Talking to Aladji Musa, a
nomad in Eastern Cameroon, he describes how gangs of marauding refugees would raid
cattle and crops, and even raping their women; “these menace will stop at nothing just to
steal your wife’s washings from the line.” he said. With limited resources or implicit
means with which to protect her own citizens let alone refugees, the United Nation’s
Humanitarian relief agency IRIN, (2007) noticed that in Cameroon, “the bororo ethnic
group who are mostly nomadic pastoralist are specially targeted because they are
considered to be rich because of their herds.” Living and roaming the valleys with their
livestock in search of green pastures and waterholes, they make easy prey and stand no
chance against determined and armed raiders. In fact Reuters-AlterNet reports on July
16th 2007 stated that kidnapping for ransom by refugees, and cross-border bandits is
becoming another means of extorting money from these wealthy but vulnerable nomads.
Similar and collaborative report by the Fund For Peace (FFP) (2007) noted that “bandits
and former soldiers from the Central African Republic have launched cross-border raids
into Cameroon, creating internal displacement.” In consensus, Jacques Franquin,
representative in Cameroon for the UN refugee agency, UNHRC said to Reuters “We are
very worried by the growing activities of rebels from Central African Republic who are
creating an almost permanent situation of insecurity along the borders with Cameroon”
Musa, (2007).

Within the camps and local communities, refugees are seen essentially as people who
will use any means to deprive people of their legal belongings, given the opportunity.
Starting with petit theft like pick up washings from the line to raiding relief convoys,

40
refugees and indigenes are said to be the reason for the increasing crime rate in the
Northern and Eastern Cameroon. Cameroon’s inability to address this prevalence of
banditry and similar criminal acts despite the visible presence of soldiers on the streets
are evidence-enough to believe that she is unable to cope with the ramifications of her
refugee influx. Nevertheless, while refugees maybe vilified for most deviances in and
beyond the camps, this subjective view may give the misrepresentation that refugees are
devious, or are they? For example, justification for Cameroon’s inability claims is
compromised by national media report that “Cameroonians are proactively colluding with
foreign bandits to rob and strip refugees of their wealth.” Musa, T. (2007). For example,
Cameroon radio pointed out that, “of the bandits who kidnapped 13 local Fulani children
in 2007, “one of those captured was a Cameroonian who helped the bandits; headed by
a dissident Chadian army captain”
http://www.alernet.org/thenews/newsdesk/l16741175.htm. Similarly, reports by the Fund
for Peace states that: “the police frequently commit human rights violations searching
and harassing refugees and illegal immigrants demanding bribes from Chadians and
Nigerian refugees residing in Cameroon” FFP, (2007). For a country so impoverished
that providing subsistence to her own people is essentially problematic, it would be naive
to expect the Cameroon government to operationalise the relevant logistics to adequately
address refugee-derived crimes. Whatever the arguments, the fact that Cameroon can
watch helplessly while the very people she is mandated to protect by the Geneva
Convention 1951 and the OUA, 1969 are assaulted and robbed, cast doubts about her
ability to cope with her refugee problems.

The Need for controlled immigration

Whether instigated from an environmental, economic, security or welfare perspective, the

consensual acknowledgement even within related instruments that no one nation can
adequately cope with the spontaneous massive influx of refugees without international
support seem to provide rational argument to restrict immigration if ongoing relief
initiatives are to be sustained. In consensus, most Cameroonians I talked to, were
convinced that overall, they and their government are significantly short-changed as a

41
result of hosting Africa’s refugees. This feeling is not particular to Cameroonians alone.
In the United Kingdom, a YouGo poll conducted for The Economist found that “74 per
cent of British respondents believed there were too many people coming into their
country; most were concerned about immigration putting too much pressure on public
services, including the effect on ‘racial balance’, crime and the domestic job market” The
Economist, (2004, p. 51-52). Just as the British, rather than adopt an open border
refugee policy at the expense of relevant domestic policies, Cameroon would have been
expected to restrict the massive influx of refugees at the principal entry points in North
and East Cameroon. The fact that the Cameroon is having to indiscriminately provide for
an ever-increasing refugee population from her finite resources calls into question the
rationality of her response to what is by and large Africa’s, if not an international problem.
Despite this, and considering that the Cameroon government is barely struggling to meet
the subsistence needs of her citizens, moral critics will perceive her response of
continuous acceptance of refugees as morally irresponsible if not suicidal. In line with this
argument and maybe offering Cameroon an alternative opt-out solution, the 1985
Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals Who Are Not Nationals of the Country in
Which They Live state that, “Nothing in this declaration shall be interpreted as
legitimising any alien’s illegal entry into and presence in a State, nor shall any provision
be interpreted as restricting the right of any State to promulgate laws and regulations
concerning the entry of aliens and the terms and conditions of their stay” Moses , (2006,
p. 54). In the face of the mounting cost of accommodating Africa’s refugees, Cameroon
would have been expected to adopt stringent control mechanisms to either limit or stop
further influx. Such policies may not only enable Cameroon to cope with her refugee
influx, supplementing this with better management may actually enable the host country
to exploit the inert resilience and resourcefulness of the refugees.

Cameroon’s presenting circumstance and dilemma is that as a signatory to the OUA

Refugee Convention, she is legally duty bound not to reject refugees; but so are other
signatories who are turning away refugees at their borders. While the Cameroon
government has opted for compliance, most of her citizens perceive and judge the cost
of this liberal policy as irrational; with foreigners readily accessing the already
constrained welfare system while the indigenes are visibly marginalised. This argument

42
is applicable within any refugee context since any mass influx of refugee is bound to
exert unsustainable strain on the welfare system. These realities raise the logical
question, why to date Cameroon has failed to institute appropriate refugee management
measures to enable her cope with restrictions as other countries to limit related influx to
enhance her coping capabilities? As the saying in Cameroon goes, “what is the use
blaming the sun when you build your house without a roof? If you don’t close your roof,
don’t blame the rain for flooding the house.” The lesson from this proverb is that, if
Cameroon has left her borders open, then she should expect refugees to flood country.
This being the case, rather than a victim, Cameroon is justifiably the architect of her
refugee problem.

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 Chapter Fourteen

Ethical Perspective

For an already impoverished nation like Cameroon that is barely able to provide basic life
necessities to her own indigenes, there is plausible logic to suggest that Cameroon’s
seemingly irrational open refugee policy is analogous to Garrett’s (2004, p. 526-534)
Lifeboat Ethics. Within this context, Cameroon is akin to a holed-boat, virtually able to
keep afloat with her cargo of needy passengers; yet still willing to take on passengers
from Africa’s other sinking ship. As such, while the impending catastrophic fate of a
nearby terminally-holed boat may evoke sympathy, the moral dilemma is whether it is
responsible and just to knowingly risk the survival chances of the Cameroon boat by
taking on excess passengers (refugees) from the other boats? The ethical dilemma is
whether altruism for compassion sake is responsible or sustainable, knowing that the
ultimate consequence would be terminal? Under the current global climate of economic
crunch where “even the superfluously rich like America and Britain are virtually drifting
into recession” Gaurdian, (2008) it seems arguably hypocritical and irresponsible for non-
affected nations to ignore their ‘burden sharing’ obligations as imposed by relevant
refugee-related instruments and expect Cameroon to continuously accommodates
Africa’s refugee exodus. Nevertheless, and noting that most countries and signatories to
relevant refugee-related conventions have instituted seemingly draconian measures to
regulate their refugee influx, it seems rather paradoxical for an impoverished country like
Cameroon; experiencing chronic poverty and multifaceted deprivation to seem
predisposed to welcome Africa’s refugees irrespectively. This is more so when one takes
into consideration and acknowledge that even in instances that within our contemporary
global village where citizenship would have inherently impose a duty to assist, the ruling
philosophy is profit not humanitarian gestures. The case of the double standard in burden
sharing has been critical analysed and demonstrated by Davidson, (1994, p. 254) in his
comparison of the lavished relief allocated for the oil-rich Iraq compared to African
nations experiencing similar problems. If only Cameroon could self-sensitise to the reality
that within contemporary politics where the capitalist ideology of profit and the self, rather

44
than altruistic humanitarian actions constitute governance, then she would objectify her
responses to the issue of the refugee influx to suit her means rather than vices a versa.
Thus, as for the expectation of aids from non-affected states, Cameroon, despite her
plausible and founded reasons to complain need to realise that the ‘self’ not the
‘beneficiaries’ should be the vogue. Even under globalisation with its increasing concept
of citizenship, the dogma of unreserved humanitarian benevolence is neither universal
nor inherent.

Humanitarianism as a liability

While humanitarian virtues will suggest that human beings are inherently “communally
orientated and altruistically motivated” Campling, (1982, p. 289); with the habitual
tendency to respond sympathetically to others in need, the incessant deluge of refugees
into Cameroon from most African countries in crisis, have exhauster Cameroon’s
benevolence. As Hayter, (2000, p. 67) points out, “the treatment and admission of
refugees is surrounded by rhetoric of humanitarianism and altruism” For example article
2 of the Convention Governing the Specific Aspect of Refugee Problems in Africa; akin to
article of the 1951 Geneva convention, implicitly emphasised “the need for and especially
humanitarian approach towards solving the problems of refugees” OAU, (1969, p. 1).
This rather simplistic prescription relating to the treatment of refugees seems to be
presumably based on some virtue or “sympathy with the plight of people who are forced
to flee from imprisonment, torture, or death as opposed to economic refugees;
considered to have more choice.” Hayter, (2000, p. 67). In any critical attempt to
correlate this legal call for humanitarianism with the realities of Cameroon’ ability to cope,
there seems an extravagant degree of rationality that an already impoverished host
country like Cameroon should be expected to be so virtuous towards an ever-increasing
refugee population without reference to her own ability to comply with such dogmatic
ethics. While it could be argued that the moral conscient of the Cameroonian had hitherto
enabled refugees to be given the ‘good Samaritan treatment’ of unreserved care, the
current feeling is that the guests or refugees have long overstayed their welcome. The
impression gained from the sample survey is the tendency for indigenes to question why

45
they are suffering because some strangers are drinking their water, occupying the limited
beds in their hospitals, and generally being treated with better respect than
Cameroonians.

Implicitly, Cameroon’s claim of the inability to cope with her refugee influx is never taken
seriously by Cameroonians, who question the logic of such claims when they see
refugees surviving at the expense of indigenes? In fact, most Cameroonian respondents
in the sample survey ponder and blame their government for continuing to welcome
refugees from Chad and the Central African Republic despite the realisation that such
reckless benevolence was not only potentially suicidal but unsustainable. Faced with the
question whether they think Cameroon is unable to cope with the spontaneous influx of
refugees, the ordinary Cameroonian, as oppose to the elites believed that Cameroon
was quite capable if only relevant policies and actions were derived from a rational
perspective. Expounding on this conditionality, respondents in the survey adopted the
virtue perspective to demonstrate that Cameroon’s ‘softly softly’ approach towards
refugee has been the root of her current so-called inability to cope. A twenty six year
mother of three living in the refugee settled area of Borongo actually question why
Cameroon should continue to welcome refugees when she cannot be provided her with
just dried milk for her children. Is not this, kindness gone mad?” This statement typifies
the feeling and argument that Cameroon’s indiscriminate altruism is debilitating her
coping potentials not the shortage of resources. Within the context where Cameroon has
continued for whatever reason to carry on taking in refugees despite the chronic
constraint in her ability to sustain such extreme humanitarianism, it would be hard to
rationally justify her inability claim.

To date, the impression in Cameroon is that her current circumstance of being unable to
cope with her refugee-induce duties is because hitherto Cameroon had naively played
the ‘good Samaritan to anyone presenting themselves at her borders claiming to be
fleeing from some potential danger. Within the context of being the architect of her own
incapability, many indigenes believe that it is Cameroon’s hitherto excessive liberal
refugee policy that served as a potent pull factor for refugees whose incessant influx has
overwhelmed Cameroon’s ability to cope with needs derived as a result thereof.

46
Presuming that the duty for mutual humanitarian virtues is implicit in the concept of
globalisation’s citizenship, then Cameroon and her people owe refugees the duty to care
and provide. Additionally, within the current integrated society where global citizenship
seem to be imbued with refugee’s cosmopolitan rights, Wichterich, (2007, p. 16),
Cameroon can be argued to be accomplishing her legal duties by continuing to welcome
refugees. In fact without recourse to what it takes to service-provide for refugees,
relevant instruments advise against turning away or refusing entry to refugees at the
borders. From the preceding discourse, there is rational argument to suggest that, it is
Cameroon’s diligent adherence to the humanitarian dogma that is partly to blame for her
presenting circumstance. If there is one lesson that should be learned from Cameroon’s
altruistic or liberal refugee policy, it is the imperative to control immigration; then there
would be no reason to complain or claim the inability to cope with refugee influx.

47
 Chapter Fifteen

Constraints in tackling Cameroon’s refugee problem.

Whether derived from a conceptual, moral, economic, political or personal perspective,

debates of refugee issues will always be problematic. As elsewhere in the world where
the influx of refugee is of concern, in Cameroon, “non-standardised categories,
inaccurate definitions, insufficient information and tenuous estimates makes it difficult to
draw a reliable map of the reality of the refugees crisis” Hauchler and Kennedy, (19984,
p. 124). In fact, the experience in Cameroon has soon that often push and pull factors
combine and obfuscate the delineation between more or less voluntary migration and
enforced flight. For example some refugees fleeing into Cameroon from the Central
African Republic declared that while the risk of persecution was the primary motive
behind their migration, they were attracted into Cameroon because of the promising
potential to remain and work there. Referring to this double standard in refugee status,
Burchill et al, (2001, p. 199) point out that refugees and migrants hold a different
relationship to space than citizens. For example since the refugee from Chad and Central
African Republic are nomadic rather than sedentary, they are defined by movement
across and between political spaces.” As such they problematise and defy the territorial
imperative of the sovereign state which is a prerequisite to problem identification and
relevant resource allocation. In consensus, Soguk and Whitehall, (1999, p. 697) state
that, “indeed, their wandering movement dislocates the ontological norm which seeks to
fix people’s identities within the spatial boundaries of the nation state” It is argued that it
is this polymorphous citizenship or “the figure of the refugee as one who cannot claim to
be a member of a proper political community” Nyers, (1999), with its association with
non-accountability that underpins some of the deviance like “robbery, rape abuse and
murder that are typical of refugee camps” Burchill et al., (2001) as typical of both
Kousserie and Borongo in North and Eastern Cameroon respectively. Moreover, by
moving across the different entry points across borders into Cameroon and avoiding
capture, “refugees have the effect of rupturing traditional constitutive concept of
international relations.”Soguk and Whitehall, (1999, p. 675).

48
Another problem with attempting to address refugee issues in Cameroon, as elsewhere
in the World is that their physical and psychological problems are inextricably linked. For
example, describing the circumstance of children refugees from the war-torn CAR,
Grimaldi; a UHHRC worker said, “we realised that many children will not eat because
they were traumatised by what they had seen and lived through” He observed that
“unfortunately, no one has taken the time or has the time for the moment to treat these
psychological problems” http://www.IRINnews.org. With her indigenous population that is
essentially impoverished, any notion of addressing refugee’s psychological problem may
seem irrational. Nonetheless the whole issue of refugees in Cameroon seem to have
irrationality at its core; the very people that have been given sanctuary hardly show
corresponding attitudes towards their peers as women and children are raped in camps.
This dilemma is further exacerbated by the constant movement of refugees which
presents relief organisations and the local government with logistic problems in planning
and execution of relief.

While the mere presence of several relief charities and NGOs is indicative of the
humanitarian willingness to help, international organisations like the UNHRC can only
take curative action once people have already become refugees. Moreover as the UN
representative for the coordination of refugees noted, its relief and repatriation
programme North Cameroon are restricted by shortage of money. Without enforceable
authority, money or adequate resources; and having to rely on voluntary contributions,
the UNHRC and the Cameroon government are experiencing significant problems in
addressing both national and refugee needs. The concern with Cameroon’s relief
campaign is the allegations that ‘Cameroon would do whatever it takes to exaggerate the
magnitude of her refugee problem to attract international sympathy. In Cameroon, the
use of numbers in galvanising public opinion has become so patronising through
number-inflation that they have ceased to be valuable. Premising that statistics are
necessary to appreciate the magnitude of Cameroon’s refugee problem, in Cameroon,
they are no longer just guesstimates, even indigenes are uncompromising to the fact that
Cameroon refugee statistics are a ‘con’ (intensionally misleading). As such opinions are
highly polarised amongst resource allocators about the specificity of Cameroon’s refugee
influx. In Cameroon, transparency is an endemic concern. Similarly the widespread

49
corruption which enable illegal immigrants to buy their way into the country make
immigration control very ineffective. On these counts, Cameroon may rightfully be judge
to be the architect of her presenting refugee circumstance. Although addressing these
concerns may not be a panacea to her ability to address her refugee issues, it could
significantly enhance her ability to cope.

50
 Chapter Sixteen

Appraisal

Attempting to justify Cameroon’s ability to cope with her refugee influx seems to
presuppose that refugees are a burden or are they? The problem with this presumption is
that, while individual refugees may be leading a virtuous life; and could actually
contribute to the welfare of the host country, in related debates and interactions, refugees
are stereotypically lumped together and assigned negative labels. In Cameroon,
refugees have been indiscriminately referred to as . scroungers, thieves, armed robbers,
parasites, rapists etc; pathologising labels that may reciprocate some of the harsh
realities of live in a host country. Responding to my question about how he felt about
being called a scrounger, a refugee and head of his father from the Democratic Republic
of Congo vehemently declared “we refugees are not scroungers but hard working,
trustworthy human beings; victims of circumstance seeking a diligent exit option within a
safe environment. Cameroon just happens to be that environment” This and similar
arguments, conflicts with the general portrayal of refugees as dependent vampire-like
scroungers who drain the life blood of the host economy. Similarly, within the context of
refugees as a productive work force, Moses, (2006, p. 112) questioned the validity of the
popular misguided perception that “immigrant labour, on average, may be less skilled or
less educated comparable to native workers.” In fact, Simon, (1989, p. 299) analysis of
migrant workers and refugees is consensual with similar studies by Swan et al., (1991);
Nevile, (1991) and Withers, (1987) showing that migrants especially refugees “tend to
work harder, save more, have a higher propensity to start new business, and are more
likely to innovate compared to native workers of the same sex and age.” In positing
refugees as potentially productive labour force, Moses, (2006, p. 113) assert that, “the
sort of people who actually pick up and move across borders are not the sort of people
who sit idly around waiting for hand-outs” The extent of refugees remittances, though
detrimental to the economy of Cameroon, is plausible evidence for the resilience of
refugees; wishing to diligently earn for their future. Equally, the suggestion that
Cameroon’s apparent inability to cope could be partly due to job lost to refugees seemed
too simplistic. Firstly, the extent to which refugees could actively engage in employment

51
in Cameroon is comparatively negligible. Moreover, rather than taking local jobs, my
experience of refugee life in East Cameroon show that they prevalently only take the jobs
that indigenous Cameroonians rather shunt. By so doing refugees actually bridge a job
gap by feeling those hard-to-fill gabs in the host country’s labour force. Faced with highly
polarised and anecdotal evidence about refugees in the labour work force in Cameroon,
there seem to be much uncertainty about whether refugees who are predominantly
nomadic herdsmen; with little knowledge of modern technology can actually compete
with Cameroon’s technocrats. Cameroon’s inability to cope with her refugee influx would
be significantly compromised if relevant arguments were to be based on increasing
unemployed as a result thereof. In fact Hillmam and Weiss, (1999, p. 585-604) observed
that, “many states are turning a blind eye to much refugee labour in order to exploit a
needed yet undersupplied type of labour.” The logical inference here is that, rather than
blaming refugees for her own shortcomings; properly managed; refugees labour could be
harnessed to boost Cameroon’s development rather than become a liability. Within the
context of refugees as assets in Cameroon development, a local entrepreneur in Eastern
Cameroon noticed that as a result of the refugee influx into Cameroon, affected areas;
usually remote from civilisation, were experiencing fast-track development of relevant
infrastructures to meet the logistic requirements of providing for refugee needs. He
explained that what the Cameroon government could not do for the local community was
being done by the humanitarian organisations in terms of road building. Similarly, a water
tanker driver for the relief organisations was so happy that, having to transport water to
the settlement camps had provided him with the means to support his family. Indeed I
observed that most local communities living in the proximity of the refugee camps,
especially Kousserie had developed markets responsive to both local and refugee needs.
From this, it would not be far-fetched to infer that the arrival of refugees in Cameroon has
led to the creation of new urban commercial communities within easy reach of the camps
to supply firewood; bush meat and other basic necessities to refugees.

Presuming that these are positive developments, then there is plausible argument to
counter any negative suggestion that the influx of refugee is essentially detrimental.
Indeed, proponents of liberal mobility like Moses, (2006, p. 10) actually advocates
accepting refugees because, “it is the right thing to do: an argument for free human

52
mobility is not only a reasonable argument; it is a good and just argument as well.”
Pursuing this moral perspective as well as reflecting on the alternative fate of refugees
prior to the exodus, Moses, (2006, p. 10) point out that “there are no frontiers for hunger.
You have the right to look for opportunity wherever you can” For those persons seeming
to face hunger and persecution from the different African unstable nations, Cameroon
constitutes that ideal sanctuary to offer them a feasible opportunity for a better future. If
only the local communities and their governments would use their different skills
constructively, they may not have cause to complaint about not being able to cope. For
critics and indigenes who blame Cameroon for the continuous receipt of refugees
despite her claims of the inability to cope, it is morally arguably that within the presumed
utilitarian citizenship or brotherhood under globalisation, it hold that in every
circumstance it is one’s duty to do whatever will have the best overall consequences for
everyone concerned. The problem with Cameroon’s seemingly virtuous approach in her
refugee crisis is that, while she perceived her positive actions as virtuous; inaction within
certain context or controlling the entry of refugees into Cameroon can be virtuous. For
example most indigenes for their government to put her self-interest first and opt for
either limited action or no action at all. If this happened, she would not have to claim that
she is incapable of coping with the excessive pressure of her refugee influx. The
rationality of the arguments raised, show that within our global citizenship where relevant
instruments emphasise humanitarianism, the qualification of virtue should be contextual.
As such, for Cameroon to enhance her coping capability by saying ‘NO’ to any influx
would be virtuous. With both positive and negative actions, and non-actions being
argued as virtuous, there is room to argue that both refugees and the indigenes in
Cameroon will have cause to justify Cameroon’s refugee policies from vested interest
perspectives.

53
 Chapter Seventeen

Policy Recommendation

That Cameroon is experiencing overwhelming refugee influx is irrefutable, but justifying

her inability to cope can only be justified if related policy shortcomings have been
addressed. As a starting point and to ensure that critically scare relief aid go only to
‘refugees’, the representative of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees;
Jacques Franquin (2005) advised that at a national level, “Cameroon needs to adopt a
law on refugees that would not only protect those who come to seek solace in
Cameroon, but would also enable the government to sort out real refugees from mere
migrants.” Tandafor, (2005). Additionally, and at a regional and international level;
bearing in mind that Cameroon’s refugee crisis has its roots in the ethno-national, social
and religious tensions that is ravaging Sub Sahara Africa, analysts suggest that “only a
comprehensive reform of the international mechanism for conflict prevention and
settlement will bring a reverse in the steady rise in wars” Hauchler and Kennedy, (1994,
p. 12). At a local level, to ensure that relevant policies are appropriate and derived from
refugee’s objective needs; Lindley, (2007, p. 17) advocates the proactive involvement of
service users in decisions that not only affect the lives of refugees but also enhance
Cameroon’s ability to cope in relevant responses. Similarly, with the consensus that
refugee problems constitute international problems way beyond the capability of any one
nation, Okoth-obbo, (1999, p. 59); Hauhler and Kennedy, (1994, p. 141) highlights the
implicit need to reform or reconstruct those inherent constraints in both the Geneva
Convention 1951; the 1969 OAU Convention and relevant instruments that have to date
failed to alleviate host nation’s obligations of protecting and proving for refugees through
‘burden-sharing’. Similarly, having hitherto established that the various humanitarian
organisations in Cameroon operate in isolation; which at best could lead to specialized
service delivery but at worst in replication of services or complete omission, there is an
implicit need for a collaborative working partnership framework in relevant interventions.
In fact, there seems a need for a specific Sub Sahara Regional Refugee Bureau to
coordinate and ensure a non-partisan and collaborative operational partnership between

54
all relief agencies in the region’s refugee crisis. While the problem of quantification in
refugeeism is universal, the realisation that Cameroon’s refugee problem is compounded
by endemic corruption, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/country-
profile/1021488.stm; and the tendency to massage relevant statistics to attracted
humanitarian aids, it is imperative to address the host’s corruption and associated
practices as an integral part of the national refugee policy. For example, with Cameroon
having been identified as the most corrupt country in the world by world transparency;
and where the there is widespread allegation that relief aids is being illegally siphoned by
unscrupulous Cameroon authorities, their families and friends for personal gains; where
there is plausible argument to believe that Cameroon’s borders and authorities are as
porous as one is willing to buy one’s way in; there is need to intensify the fight against
Cameroon’s endemic corruption. Within this context, the there is need for greater
transparency in the frontline allocation of resources and the vetting of relevant staff. As in
the United Kingdom where various mechanisms have been incorporated into the asylum
policies to control migration, Cameroon needs to control the so far indiscriminate influx of
refugees especially through her porous borders. Holistically, the paradigm of refugee
politics and research need call not only for a better understanding but a corresponding
change of attitude from the stereotypical victims images towards a more empowering and
constructive perception. Any arguments that, implementing these recommendations
would be costly, or beyond the capability of Cameroon and relevant humanitarians,
would be thwarted by the realisation that the alternative would be catastrophic, if not
economically terminal. As such, any shortcomings that persist despite the exhaustion of
these recommendations and related initiatives would implicitly justify Cameroon claims of
not being able to cope.

55
 Chapter Eighteen

Conclusion

The preceding critical analysis has lucidly established that within the current climate of
global economic crunch, where even the richest nations are facing economic gloom to
adequately meet the multifaceted obligations derived from the spontaneous influx of
refugees into an already impoverished nation like Cameroon; while correspondingly
meeting the local and national needs of the Cameroon people is arguably a herculean
task; unsustainably costly, excessively complex, inherently problematic and way beyond
the reach of even the most wealthy Western Nation. Okoth-obbo, (1999); Hauhler and
Kennedy, (1994). As an impoverished economy, meeting the needs of both refugees
and her own citizens from her finite resources in face of an ever-increasing demand is
not only unsustainable, but potentially terminal. Counter arguments that Cameroon could
actually benefit from effective management of her refugee population is outweighed by
the multi faceted nature of the impact of massive population influx into Cameroon’s
already harsh environment. Additionally, the logistics required to manage Cameroon’s
focused immigration of vastly non-product population is virtually unattainable within a
society where almost every orifice of governance is infused with corruption and
mismanagement. Ethical judgements aside, there is plausible argument to judge
Cameroon’s inability to cope with her refugee problem as valid.

The prognostic derived from preceding analysis is that in a world governed by capitalist
ideologies, it is neither the magnitude of Cameroon’s refugee problems; nor the
circumstance of the refugees, or even the obligations prescribed by relevant legislations
that will entice relevant sectors to collaboratively enhance Cameroon’s coping ability by
burden-sharing, but rather “the profit potential that would be derived thereof.”
McChesney, (1999) As such, so long as Cameroon has little to offer, even if her claims of
the inability to cope are justified, not even moral ethics will adequately come to her
rescue. Similarly, so long as Africa’s rich resources give the capitalists reasons to sustain

56
the prevailing upheavals, Cameroons ability to cope with the resulting focused population
influx will not only be unsustainable, but may become potentially terminal.

FIN

Facts that might affect your appraisal of some facts within the discourse

With the security paranoid in Cameroon, and the corresponding ‘Big brother attitude to
media freedom, I felt forever conscious and very vulnerable undertaking my field study;
having been warned by the security authorities to abstain from photographing places of
security interest. Moreover, advised by humanitarian relief workers about the constant
cross-border raids by bandits increased my sense of insecurity. Talking to both guests
and hosts, I observed a tendency for both to noticeably over-dramatise their respective
experiences. While desperately seeking to remain non-judgemental, I had the general
impression that participants from the Cameroon government were trying to be patronising
or always seeking to gain attention by exaggerating the magnitude of Cameroon’s
problem under the yoke of the refugee influx. Despite all these, this analysis constitutes
an objective appraisal of a highly controversial and politically sensitive topic.

Disclaimer

While every effort has been taken to ensure the accuracy of facts within this discourse,
the author is not liability for any eventualities derived from misinterpretation or
misapplications.

Opinions and comments to:

Dr Ignatius Gwanmesia, antichildtraffic@yahoo.co.uk. Tel: 07951 622137

57
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