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Analysis

March 11, 2015

Summary: Illiberalism cannot be


wished away, and deserves to be
taken seriously on a number of
fronts. How the debate about the
nature of successful governance
will be settled in one country
has repercussions for others.
Erdoans 11-year tenure as
prime minister was marked by
an exceptionally successful
period in Turkish history, but
his mode of governance is
deeply illiberal. While Erdoans
sympathizers argue that he is
authoritarian but successful,
Erdoans core team argues that
he is successful because he is
authoritarian. Those who wish for
a less authoritarian Turkey ought
to redeem liberalism globally
and nationally. And liberals and
secularists in Turkey have yet
to prove that they will govern
effectively and democratically,
and that they will sincerely
respect the rights of the pious.

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Taking Illiberalism Seriously


by Hakan Altinay

In 2014, Hungarian Prime Minister


Viktor Orban made a speech arguing
for the superiority of illiberal forms
of governance over liberal ones. He
pointed to Turkeys successes under
Recep Tayyip Erdoan as one key point
of evidence. The standard Western
responses to illiberalism, whether in
Turkey, Hungary, or elsewhere, have
oscillated between arrogant contempt
and wishful dismissal. Yet, illiberalism
cannot be wished away, and deserves
to be taken seriously on a number of
fronts.
For starters, liberalism and democracy no longer necessarily go together.
Seventy years ago, there were less than
a dozen democracies in the world,
and they happened also to be the most
liberal societies in the world. Today
there are more than 120 democracies,
and they represent a more normal
distribution in terms of their inherent
commitment to a liberal vocation.
There have also been other global
tectonic shifts. The Italian economy
was twice the size of that of China in
1980; it is now one-tenth the size of
the Chinese economy. In 1950, the
population of sub-Saharan Africa
was less than half of that of Europe;
in 2050, there will be four times more

sub-Saharan Africans than Europeans.


Two recent projections for 2030, by the
European Union Institute for Security
Studies and the U.S. National Intelligence Council, heralded the end of
Western hegemony, which has been
the norm since 1750. It would be
foolish to ignore these shifts.
There is a pervasive impression that
liberalism has been too patient and too
complicit with the elites. As a rule, the
elites are difficult to like. Research has
shown them to be more self-regarding
and less charitable that the average
person.1 Traditionally, societies have
tolerated this disagreeable bunch
because of their ability to contribute to
the overall welfare of society, including
the less well-off. Unlike what Thomas
Pikkety2 implies, global income
inequality is very high, but it is not
getting worse and may even be getting
slightly better. What is instead getting
worse is national income inequality. As
Branko Milanovic3 has demonstrated,
the global elite and the global middle
class have experienced significant real
1 Higher social class predicts increased unethical behavior, Paul Piff et al, Proceedings of the National Academy
of Sciences, 2012.
2 Thomas Pikkety, Capital in the Twenty-First Century,
Belknap, 2014
3 Branko Milanovic, lecture at the Global Civics Academy,
September 25, 2013.

Analysis
income gains in the last two decades. Yet, the Western
middle class has not. The Western middle class no longer
has any reason to put up with the self-regarding elites, and
political entrepreneurs both from the right and the left have
seized on that temperament.
Then there are the cracks and omissions in the liberal moral
matrix. In his brilliant book, The Righteous Mind, Jonathan
Haidt demonstrates that thinking of morality only in terms
of harm and fairness is a minority point of view around the
world, possibly even in the West.4 He shows that people
also care about other considerations such as authority and
sanctity, themes not subsumed under the harm- and fairnesscentric notions of morality. Today, this matters even more
because the pace of change has accelerated, and at times of
rapid change, people yearn for an effective compass, the lack
of which leads to anomy.5 It is not surprising that people
yearn for some predictability and familiarity. If liberalism
cannot appreciate that urge, and respond to it effectively, we
should not be surprised that people trade certainty of process
for certainty of outcomes, and pave the way for illiberal
constellations.
In addition to the intellectual reasons for taking illiberalism
seriously, there are also political ones. We study each other
and draw inspiration and occasionally material support
from like-minded parties across national borders.6 How the
debate about the nature of successful governance will be
settled in one country has repercussions for others.
Let us consider a counterfactual. After the Charlie Hebdo
attacks, Timothy Garton Ash thundered that We do not
resolve our differences by violence. We do it by speech, and
invited the European media to republish Charlie Hebdos
cartoons featuring Mohammed and other revered figures
because Thats what satire does.7 Ash logic was that people
should get used to it and grow a thicker skin. There is,
obviously, no doubt whatsoever that the perpetrators of the
Paris attacks acted in the most heinous manner, and deserve
to be universally condemned. Yet, imagine a scenario
where, instead of killing 12 people, 12 Muslims kill them4 Jonathan Haidt, The Righteous Mind, Vintage, 2012.
5 In Pursuit of a Global Civics, Hakan Altinay, Blue Dot, UNESCO MGIEP, 2015.
6 For one recent account of cross-border consequences, see The Russian Connection by
Peter Kreko, Political Capital: Budapest, 2014.
7 Europes media must unite and stand against the assassins veto by Timothy Garton Ash, The
Globe and Mail, January 8, 2015.

selves because they cannot bear what they hold sacred to be


violated through satire. Should the liberal response still be
regurgitation of some cardinal tenets, or should it instead be
genuine curiosity about those who are different from us? If
nothing can get us to revisit our cherished convictions, what
does that make us? The alternative to illiberal hubris cannot
be liberal hubris. True liberals should welcome the lessening
of power disparities in the world as a way to engage in a
productive conversation. The days we could argue Be like
us and you will get rich are over. We now need to figure out
a way to make liberalism relevant for a post-Western world.
If we are sincere about our liberal and democratic convictions, we should cherish that task, and not lament it.

The alternative to illiberal hubris


cannot be liberal hubris. True
liberals should welcome the
lessening of power disparities in
the world as a way to engage in a
productive conversation.
What does all this mean in the case of Turkey? Take note
of how successful Erdoan has been. His 11-year tenure as
prime minister was marked by an exceptionally successful
period in Turkish history with GDP growing from $200
billion to $800 billion. It is one of the rare countries with
income inequality on decline. Access to health care has
become universal, and social policies that once benefitted
just the middle class have been recalibrated to address the
legitimate needs of the poor. Turkish students not only
receive free textbooks, but also tuition-free higher education. Half a million units of public social housing have
been completed. Infrastructure projects have multiplied.
The number of passengers on domestic flights went from
9 million annually to 76 million. The average Turk leads
a far better life today than a decade ago. But at the same
time, Erdoans mode of governance is deeply illiberal. He
is convinced that he knows best, and has little patience for

Analysis
dissent or due process. There are no instances where he has
admitted to having learned something from his detractors.
He is explicit about viewing the judiciary and other checks
and balances as hindrance. For years, he has demonized
journalists and media groups who question his tactics.
Countless journalists have been fired, and even arrested; the
largest media group in the country has been fined $1 billion.
While Erdoans sympathizers argue that he is authoritarian,
but he is successful, Erdoans core team argues that he is
successfulbecausehe is authoritarian. Liberals from Turkey
and Europe have not yet made the case that he is successful
despite his authoritarianism. Turkey needs a different strain
of liberalism, as does the rest of Europe.
To be sure, much of Turkeys success has more to do with
a favorable constellation of circumstances than Erdoans
Midas touch: Turkey refinanced its high public debt of 2002
with a much lower interest rate made possible through
the global liquidity glut and increased its creditworthiness
because of its EU membership prospects. Without the fiscal
space made possible by these two developments, the health
care expansion, social policies, and infrastructure upgrades
would have been impossible. The World Bank argues that
the policies and practices that enabled this leap will not be
sufficient to allow Turkey to break out of the middle income
trap. They call attention to low female participation in the
labor force as one crucial impediment. It is also difficult
to overlook the opportunity cost of demonizing the most
creative circles in the society. For example, the Gezi Park
protests were frequented by actors, directors, and scriptwriters from Turkeys phenomenally successful soap operas.

While Erdoans sympathizers


argue that he is authoritarian,
but he is successful, Erdoans
core team argues that he
is successfulbecausehe is
authoritarian.
3

Liberals and secularists have yet to prove that they will


govern effectively and democratically, and that they will
respect the rights of the pious in a bona fide manner.
Fortunately, there are a number of promising developments. Some of the children of military officers jailed for
years in anti-coup trials on thin or fabricated evidence have
expressed sympathy for and solidarity with Kurdish politicians detained on similarly dubious grounds. When a senior
member of the Nationalist Movement Party expressed his
disapproval of the prosecution of students for throwing
eggs, he made clear that his sympathy would extend to
communist protesters against his own party; until recently,
a nationalist supporting communist students right to
protest would have been inconceivable. In a similar vein,
notable Kurdish voices have challenged their brethren to
stop assuming that they were the only ones who suffered in
the 1990s, and urged them to demonstrate sympathy and
respect for other Turkish citizens losses during the same
period. Many who were demonized in the recent past by the
Gulenist media, chose not to gloat but instead condemn the
ongoing witchhunt against the Gulenists.
During the protests in Gezi Park, young demonstrators
responded to government brutality with remarkable humor
and empathy. While such protests have historically been full
of anger, this time the new generation shifted the tone and
demonstrated they were a new breed. Although largely a
non-secular group, they went out of their way to make sure
the devout among them would not feel out of place. On one
holy day, they campaigned for no alcohol at the otherwisefestive park and distributed food special for the occasion.
A previous generation would not have cared, and may even
have felt contempt for the pious. When a police chief died
after falling off a cliff while chasing a protester, this generation of protesters held placards of sympathy for police:
Your loss is our loss; Your grief is our grief. At a time
when police were responsible for several deaths and several
hundred serious injuries, this level of empathy and readiness to engage was unheard of. Beyond anecdotal evidence,
survey research consistently shows that Turks are becoming
more comfortable with difference. Another strain of liberalism, it seems, is not only necessary, but also possible.
Mocking Erdoan, or Orban, is not difficult. They provide
ample reasons to loathe them. Those who wish for a less
authoritarian Turkey ought to redeem liberalism globally

Analysis
and nationally. That is not as easy a task as we may assume.
Truly recognizing the challenge would be a good step
toward starting to address it.

The views expressed in GMF publications and commentary are the


views of the author alone.

About the Author


Hakan Altinay is the director of the European School of Politics in
Istanbul, and a non-resident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution.

About GMF
The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) strengthens
transatlantic cooperation on regional, national, and global challenges
and opportunities in the spirit of the Marshall Plan. GMF contributes
research and analysis and convenes leaders on transatlantic issues
relevant to policymakers. GMF offers rising leaders opportunities to
develop their skills and networks through transatlantic exchange, and
supports civil society in the Balkans and Black Sea regions by fostering
democratic initiatives, rule of law, and regional cooperation. Founded
in 1972 as a non-partisan, non-profit organization through a gift from
Germany as a permanent memorial to Marshall Plan assistance, GMF
maintains a strong presence on both sides of the Atlantic. In addition
to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has offices in Berlin,
Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara, Bucharest, and Warsaw. GMF also
has smaller representations in Bratislava, Turin, and Stockholm.

About the On Turkey Series


GMFs On Turkey is an ongoing series of analysis briefs about Turkeys
current political situation and its future. GMF provides regular
analysis briefs by leading Turkish, European, and U.S. writers and
intellectuals, with a focus on dispatches from on-the-ground Turkish
observers. To access the latest briefs, please visit our web site at www.
gmfus.org/turkey.

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