G.R. No.

176240

October 17, 2008

ROLANDO SASAN, SR., LEONILO DAYDAY, MODESTO AGUIRRE, ALEJANDRO ARDIMER, ELEUTERIO SACIL,
WILFREDO
JUEGOS,
PETRONILO
CARCEDO
and
CESAR
PACIENCIA, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION 4TH DIVISION, EQUITABLE-PCI BANK and HELPMATE,
INC.,respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Assailed in this Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the Decision 1 dated 24 April 2006 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79912, which affirmed the Decision dated 22 January 2003 of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) in NLRC Case No. V-000241-2002 finding that Helpmate, Inc. (HI) is a legitimate independent job
contractor and that the petitioners were not illegally dismissed from work; and the Resolution 2 dated 31 October 2006 of
the same court denying the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the petitioners.
Respondent Equitable-PCI Bank (E-PCIBank),3 a banking entity duly organized and existing under and by virtue of
Philippine laws, entered into a Contract for Services 4 with HI, a domestic corporation primarily engaged in the business of
providing janitorial and messengerial services. Pursuant to their contract, HI shall hire and assign workers to E-PCIBank
to perform janitorial/messengerial and maintenance services. The contract was impliedly renewed year after year.
Petitioners Rolando Sasan, Sr.,5 Leonilo Dayday,6 Modesto Aguirre,7 Alejandro Ardimer,8 Eleuterio Sacil,9 Wilfredo
Juegos,10Petronilo Carcedo,11 and Cesar Peciencia12 were among those employed and assigned to E-PCIBank at its
branch along Gorordo Avenue, Lahug, Cebu City, as well as to its other branches in the Visayas. 13
O 23 July 2001, petitioners filed with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC in Cebu City separate complaints14 against EPCIBank and HI for illegal dismissal, with claims for separation pay, service incentive leave pay, allowances, damages,
attorneys fees and costs. Their complaints were docketed as NLRC RAB-VII Case No. 07-1381-2001 and raffled to Labor
Arbiter Jose G. Gutierrez (Labor Arbiter Gutierrez) for their proper disposition. Subsequently, on 22 August 2001, the
petitioners15 amended their complaints to include a claim for 13th month-pay.
Several conciliation hearings were scheduled by Labor Arbiter Gutierrez but the parties still failed to arrive at a mutually
beneficial settlement; hence, Labor Arbiter Gutierrez ordered that they submit their respective position papers.
In their position papers, petitioners claimed that they had become regular employees of E-PCIBank with respect to the
activities for which they were employed, having continuously rendered janitorial and messengerial services to the bank for
more than one year; that E-PCIBank had direct control and supervision over the means and methods by which they were
to perform their jobs; and that their dismissal by HI was null and void because the latter had no power to do so since they
had become regular employees of E-PCIBank.
For its part, E-PCIBank averred that it entered into a Contract for Services with HI, an independent job contractor which
hired and assigned petitioners to the bank to perform janitorial and messengerial services thereat. It was HI that paid
petitioners wages, monitored petitioners daily time records (DTR) and uniforms, and exercised direct control and
supervision over the petitioners and that therefore HI has every right to terminate their services legally. E-PCIBank could
not be held liable for whatever misdeed HI had committed against its employees.
HI, on the other hand, asserted that it was an independent job contractor engaged in the business of providing janitorial
and related services to business establishments, and E-PCIBank was one of its clients. Petitioners were its employees,
part of its pool of janitors/messengers assigned to E-PCIBank. The Contract for Services between HI and E-PCIBank
expired on 15 July 2000. E-PCIBank no longer renewed said contract with HI and, instead, bidded out its janitorial
requirements to two other job contractors, Able Services and Puritan. HI designated petitioners to new work assignments,
but the latter refused to comply with the same. Petitioners were not dismissed by HI, whether actually or constructively,
thus, petitioners complaints before the NLRC were without basis.
Labor Arbiter Gutierrez focused on the following issues: (a) whether petitioners were regular employees of HI; (b) whether
petitioners were illegally dismissed from their employment; and (c) whether petitioners were entitled to their money claims.
On 7 January 2002, on the basis of the parties position papers and documentary evidence, Labor Arbiter Gutierrez
rendered a Decision finding that HI was not a legitimate job contractor on the ground that it did not possess the required

substantial capital or investment to actually perform the job, work, or service under its own account and responsibility as
required under the Labor Code.16 HI is therefore a labor-only contractor and the real employer of petitioners is E-PCIBank
which is held liable to petitioners. According to Labor Arbiter Gutierrez:

[T]he undisputed facts show that the [herein petitioners] were made to perform not only as janitors but also as
messengers, drivers and one of them even worked as an electrician. For us, these jobs are not only directly related
to the main business of the principal but are, likewise deemed necessary in the conduct of respondent EquitablePCI Banks principal business. Thus, based on the above, we so declare that the [petitioners] are employees of
respondent Equitable-PCI Bank. And having worked with respondent Equitable-PCI Bank for more than one (1)
year, they are deemed regular employees. They cannot, therefore, be removed from employment without cause and
without due process, which is wanting in this case. Hence, the severance of their employment in the guise of
termination of contract is illegal.17
In the dispositive portion of his 7 January 2002 Decision, Labor Arbiter Gutierrez awarded to petitioners the following
amounts:

I. CESAR PACIENCIA
a) Backwages
July 15, 2001 to January 8, 2002
= P190.00 per day

= P25,840.00

= 5 months and 6 days

= 136 days x P190.00
b)
Separation
Pay
June
10,
1996
to
July
15,
2001
=
5
years
=P190.00 x 26 days x 5 years / 2
c)
13th Month
Pay
= P190.00 x 26 days
Total
II Dominador Suico, Jr. (did not file Amended
Complaint)
a)
Backwages
July
15,
2001
to
January
15,
2002
same as Paciencia
b)
Separation
Pay
Feb.
2,
1999
to
July
15,
2001
= P190.00 x 26 days x 2.5 years / 2
Total
III Roland Mosquera (did not file Amended
Complaint)
a)
Backwages
(same as Paciencia)
b)
Separation
Pay
March
8,
1998
to
July
15,
2001
= P190.00 x 26 days x 3 yrs. / 2
Total
IV Petronillo Carcedo
a)
Backwages
(same as Paciencia)
b)
Separation
Pay
Sept.
16,
1984
to
July
15,
2001
= P190.00 x 26 days x 17 yrs. / 2

=P12,350.00

= P4,940.00
P43,130.00

= P25,840.00

= P6,175.00

= P32,015.00

= P25,840.00
= P7,410.00

= P33,250.00
= P25,840.00
= P41,990.00

c)
13th Month
= P190.00 x 26 days
Total
V Rolando Sasan, Sr.
a)
(same as Paciencia)
b)
Separation
October
1989
to
July
= P190.00 x 26 days x 12 yrs. / 2
c)
13th Month
= P190.00 x 26 days
Total
VI Leonilo Dayday
a)
(same as Paciencia)
b)
Separation
Feb.
8,
1983
to
July
= P190.00 x 26 days x 18 yrs. / 2
c)
13th Month
= P190.00 x 26 days
Total
VII Eleuterio Sacil
a)
(same as Paciencia)
b)
Separation
June
2,
1992
to
July
= P190.00 x 26 days x 9 yrs. / 2
c)
13th Month
= P190.00 x 26 days
Total
VIII Mario Juntilla
a)
(same as Pacencia)
b)
Separation
October
7,
1987
to
July
= P190.00 x 26 days x 14 yrs. / 2
c)
13th Month
= P190.00 x 26 days
Total
IX Wilfredo Juegos
a)
(same as Pacencia)
b)
Separation
July
23,
1990
to
July
= P190.00 x 26 days x 11 yrs. / 2
c)
13th Month
= P190.00 x 26 days
Total
X Modesto Aguirre
a)
(same as Paciencia)
b) Separation Pay
= Jan. 5, 1992 to July 15, 2001

Pay

= P4,940.00
= P72,770.00

Backwages

15,

Pay
2001
Pay

= P25,840.00
= P29,640.00

= P4,940.00
= P60,420.00

Backwages

15,

Pay
2001
Pay

= P25,840.00
= P44,460.00

= P4,940.00
= P75,240.00

Backwages

15,

Pay
2001
Pay

= P25,840.00
= P22,230.00

= P4,940.00
= P53,010.00

Backwages

15,

Pay
2001
Pay

= P25,840.00
= P34,580.00

= P4,940.00
= P65,360.00

Backwages

= P25,840.00

Pay
2001

= P27,170.00

15,

Pay

= P4,840.00
= P57,950.00

Backwages

= P25,840.00

= P23,465.00

= P190.00 x 26 days x 9.5 yrs. / 2

c)
13th Month
= P190.00 x 26 days
Total
XI Alejandro Ardimer
a) Backwages
(same as Paciencia)
b)
Separation
=
Jan.
20,
1990
to
July
= P190.00 x 26 days x 11.5 yrs. / 2
c)
13th Month
= P190.00 x 26 days
Total

Pay

= P4,940.00
= P54,245.00
= P25,840.00

15,

Pay
2001
Pay

= P28,405.00

= P4,940.00
= P59,185.00

xxxx
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered directing the respondents
Equitable PCI Bank and Helpmate, Inc. to pay jointly and solidarily the complainants as follows:
1. Cesar Paciencia

- P 43,130.00

2. Dominador Suico, Jr.

- 32,015.00

3. Roland Mosquera

- 33,250.00

4. Petronilo Carceda

- 72,770.00

5. Roland Sasan, Sr.

- 60,420.00

6. Leonilo Dayday

- 75,240.00

7. Eleuterio Sacil

- 53,010.00

8. Mario Juntilla

- 65,360.00

9. Wilfredo Juegos

- 57,950.00

10. Modesto Aguirre

- 54,245.00

11. Alejandro Ardimer

- 59,185.00

TOTAL

- P606,575.0018

Aggrieved by the decision of Labor Arbiter Gutierrez, respondents E-PCIBank and HI appealed the same to the NLRC,
4thDivision, stationed in Cebu City. Their appeals were docketed as NLRC Case No. V-000241-2002. In support of its
allegation that it was a legitimate job contractor, HI submitted before the NLRC several documents which it did not present
before Labor Arbiter Gutierrez. These are:

1. Certificate of Filing of Certificate of Increase of Capital Stock, Certificate of Filing Amended Articles of
Incorporation, and General Information Sheet Stock Corporation of HI showing therein that it increased its
authorized capital stock from P1,500,000.00 to P20,000,000.00 on 12 March 1999 with the Securities and Exchange
Commission;
2. Audited Financial Statement of HI showing therein that it has Total Assets of P20,939,935.72 as of 31 December
2000;

3. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 110173 and Tax Declaration No. GR2K-09-063-00582 registered under the name
of HI showing that it has a parcel of land with Market Value of P1,168,860.00 located along Rizal Avenue (now
Bacalso Avenue), Cebu City, and
4. Tax Declaration No. GR2K-09-063-00583 registered under the name of HI showing that it has a commercial
building constructed on the preceding lot located along Bacalso Avenue, Cebu City with market value
of P2,515,170.00.19
The NLRC promulgated its Decision on 22 January 2003 modifying the ruling of Labor Arbiter Gutierrez. The NLRC took
into consideration the documentary evidence presented by HI for the first time on appeal and, on the basis thereof,
declared HI as a highly capitalized venture with sufficient capitalization, which cannot be considered engaged in "laboronly contracting."
On the charge of illegal dismissal, the NLRC ruled that:

The charge of illegal dismissal was prematurely filed. The record shows that barely eight (8) days from 15 July 2001
when the complainants were placed on a temporary "off-detail," they filed their complaints on 23 July 2001 and
amended their complaints on 22 August 2001 against the respondents on the presumption that their services were
already terminated. Temporary "off-detail" is not equivalent to dismissal. x x x.20
The NLRC deleted Labor Arbiter Gutierrezs award of backwages and separation pay, but affirmed his award for
13thmonth pay and attorneys fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the 13 th month pay, to the petitioners.21 Thus, the
NLRC decreed in its 22 January 2003 Decision, the payment of the following reduced amounts to petitioners:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of Labor Arbiter Jose G. Gutierrez dated 7 January 2002 is
MODIFIED, to wit:
Ordering respondents Helpmate, Inc. and Equitable PCI Bank to jointly and severally22 pay the complainants of their
13th month pay and attorneys fees in the aggregate amount of Forty-Three Thousand Four Hundred Seventy-Two
and 00/100 (P43,472.00), broken down as follows:

1. Aguirre, Modesto

P 5,434.00

2. Ardimer, Alejandro

5,434.00

3. Carcedo, Petronilo

5,434.00

4. Dayday, Leonilo

5,434.00

5. Juegos, Wilfredo

5,434.00

6. Juntilla, Mario

5,434.00

7. Paciencia, Cesar

5,434.00

8. Sacil, Eleuterio

5,434.00

TOTAL

P43,472.0023

Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the NLRC in its Resolution dated 1 July 2003. 24
Distressed by the decision of the NLRC, petitioners sought recourse with the Court of Appeals by filing a Petition
forCertiorari25 under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 79912.
In its Decision dated 24 April 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the NLRC that HI was a legitimate job
contractor and that it did not illegally dismiss petitioners:

As to the question of whether or not, as a legitimate independent job contractor, respondent HI illegally dismissed
the petitioners. We rule in the negative.
It is undisputed that the contract between respondent HI and its client E-PCIBank expired on July 15, 2000. The
record shows that after said expiration, respondent HI offered the petitioners new work assignments to various
establishments which are HIs clients. The petitioners, therefore, were not even placed on "floating status." They
simply refused, without justifiable reason, to assume their new work assignments which refusal was tantamount to
abandonment. There being no illegal dismissal, petitioners are not entitled to backwages or separation pay.26
The fallo of the 24 April 2006 Decision of the appellate court reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us DENYING the petition filed in
this case and AFFIRMING the decision of the NLRC, Fourth Division, in NLRC Case No. V-000145-2003
promulgated on June 22, 2003.27
Petitioners now come before us via the instant Petition raising the following issues:
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED IN EXCESS OF THEIR JURISDICTION
AND/OR COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN UPHOLDING THE NLRC 4 THDIVISIONS DECISION
AND GRAVELY ERRED IN:
I. ACCEPTING AND APPRECIATING THE PIECES OF EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY RESPONDENTS DURING
APPEAL, ALL EXISTING DURING THE TIME THE NLRC RAB 7S TRIAL, CONTRARY TO THIS HONORABLE
COURTS PREVIOUS ESTABLISHED DECISIONS.
II. REVERSING, WITHOUT ANY LEGAL BASIS, THE FACTUAL FINDING OF NLRC RAB 7 THAT THE
RESPONDENT HI WAS LABOR ONLY CONTRACTOR.
III. RULING, WITHOUT ANY LEGAL BASIS, THAT THE ILLEGAL DISMISSAL COMPLAINTS WERE
PREMATURELY FILED.28
Before proceeding to the substantive issues, we first address the procedural issues raised by petitioners.
Petitioners object to the acceptance and consideration by the NLRC of the evidence presented by HI for the first time on
appeal. This is not a novel procedural issue, however, and our jurisprudence is already replete with cases29 allowing the
NLRC to admit evidence, not presented before the Labor Arbiter, and submitted to the NLRC for the first time on appeal.
Technical rules of evidence are not binding in labor cases. Labor officials should use every reasonable means to ascertain
the facts in each case speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of
due process.30
The submission of additional evidence before the NLRC is not prohibited by its New Rules of Procedure. After all, rules of
evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity are not controlling in labor cases. The NLRC and labor arbiters are directed
to use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively, without regard to
technicalities of law and procedure all in the interest of substantial justice. In keeping with this directive, it has been held
that the NLRC may consider evidence, such as documents and affidavits, submitted by the parties for the first time on
appeal. The submission of additional evidence on appeal does not prejudice the other party for the latter could submit
counter-evidence.31
In Clarion Printing House, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,32 we again emphasized that:

[T]he NLRC is not precluded from receiving evidence, even for the first time on appeal, because technical rules of
procedure are not binding in labor cases.
The settled rule is that the NLRC is not precluded from receiving evidence on appeal as technical rules of evidence
are not binding in labor cases. In fact, labor officials are mandated by the Labor Code to use every and all
reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law
or procedure, all in the interest of due process. Thus, in Lawin Security Services v. NLRC, and Bristol Laboratories
Employees Association-DFA v. NLRC, we held that even if the evidence was not submitted to the labor arbiter, the

fact that it was duly introduced on appeal to the NLRC is enough basis for the latter to be more judicious in admitting
the same, instead of falling back on the mere technicality that said evidence can no longer be considered on appeal.
Certainly, the first course of action would be more consistent with equity and the basic notions of fairness.
For the same reasons, we cannot find merit in petitioners protestations against the documentary evidence submitted by
HI because they were mere photocopies. Evidently, petitioners are invoking the best evidence rule, espoused in Section
3, Rule130 of the Rules of Court. It provides that:

Section 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself x x x.
The above provision explicitly mandates that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall
be admissible other than the original document itself. Notably, certified true copies of these documents, acceptable
under the Rules of Court33 were furnished to the petitioners. Even assuming that petitioners were given mere photocopies,
again, we stress that proceedings before the NLRC are not covered by the technical rules of evidence and procedure as
observed in the regular courts. Technical rules of evidence do not apply if the decision to grant the petition proceeds from
an examination of its sufficiency as well as a careful look into the arguments contained in position papers and other
documents.34
Petitioners had more than adequate opportunity when they filed their motion for reconsideration before the NLRC, their
Petition to the Court of Appeals and even to this Court, to refute or present their counter-evidence to the documentary
evidence presented by HI. Having failed in this respect, petitioners cannot now be heard to complain about these
documentary evidences presented by HI upon which the NLRC and the Court of Appeals based its finding that HI is a
legitimate job contractor.
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, a fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain one's side. It is also an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. It is not the denial of the right to be heard but denial of the opportunity to be heard that constitutes violation
of due process of law. Petitioners herein were afforded every opportunity to be heard and to seek reconsideration of the
adverse judgment against them. They had every opportunity to strengthen their positions by presenting their own
substantial evidence to controvert those submitted by E-PCIBank and HI before the NLRC, and even before the Court of
Appeals. It cannot win its case by merely raising unsubstantiated doubt or relying on the weakness of the adverse parties
evidence.
We now proceed to the resolution of the substantive issues submitted by petitioners for our consideration, particularly,
whether HI is a labor-only contactor and E-PCIBank should be deemed petitioners principal employer; and whether
petitioners were illegally dismissed from their employment.
Permissible job contracting or subcontracting refers to an arrangement whereby a principal agrees to put out or farm out
to a contractor or subcontractor the performance or completion of a specific job, work or service within a definite or
predetermined period, regardless of whether such job, work or service is to be performed or completed within or outside
the premises of the principal.35 A person is considered engaged in legitimate job contracting or subcontracting if the
following conditions concur:

(a) The contractor or subcontractor carries on a distinct and independent business and undertakes to perform the
job, work or service on its own account and under its own responsibility according to its own manner and method,
and free from the control and direction of the principal in all matters connected with the performance of the work
except as to the results thereof;
(b) The contractor or subcontractor has substantial capital or investment; and
(c) The agreement between the principal and contractor or subcontractor assures the contractual employees
entitlement to all labor and occupational safety and health standards, free exercise of the right to self-organization,
security of tenure, and social and welfare benefits.36
In contrast, labor-only contracting, a prohibited act, is an arrangement where the contractor or subcontractor merely
recruits, supplies or places workers to perform a job, work or service for a principal. 37 In labor-only contracting, the
following elements are present:

(a) The contractor or subcontractor does not have substantial capital or investment to actually perform the job, work
or service under its own account and responsibility; and
(b) The employees recruited, supplied or placed by such contractor or subcontractor are performing activities which
are directly related to the main business of the principal.38
In distinguishing between permissible job contracting and prohibited labor-only contracting,39 we elucidated in Vinoya v.
National Labor Relations Commission,40 that it is not enough to show substantial capitalization or investment in the form of
tools, equipment, etc. Other facts that may be considered include the following: whether or not the contractor is carrying
on an independent business; the nature and extent of the work; the skill required; the term and duration of the
relationship; the right to assign the performance of specified pieces of work; the control and supervision of the work to
another; the employers power with respect to the hiring, firing and payment of the contractors workers; the control of the
premises; the duty to supply premises, tools, appliances, materials and labor; and the mode and manner or terms of
payment.41 Simply put, the totality of the facts and the surrounding circumstances of the case are to be considered.42 Each
case must be determined by its own facts and all the features of the relationship are to be considered. 43
In the case at bar, we find substantial evidence to support the finding of the NLRC, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that
HI is a legitimate job contractor.
We take note that HI has been issued by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Certificate of
Registration44Numbered VII-859-1297-048. The said certificate states among other things:

"CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION
Numbered VII-859-1297-048
is issued to
HELPMATE, INCORPORATED
330 N. Bacalso Avenue, Cebu City
for having complied with the requirements as provided for under the Labor Code, as amended, and its Implementing
Rules and having paid the registration fee in the amount of ONE HUNDRED PESOS (P100.00) per Official Receipt
Number 9042769, dated October 16, 1997.
In witness whereof, and by authority vested in me by the Labor Code, as amended, and its Implementing Rules
specifically Department Order No. 10 series of 1997, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the Official on this
23rd day of December 1997."45
Having been issued by a public officer, this certification carries with it the presumption that it was issued in the regular
performance of official duty.46 In the absence of proof, petitioners bare assertion cannot prevail over this presumption.
Moreover, the DOLE being the agency primarily responsible for regulating the business of independent job contractors,
we can presume in the absence of evidence to the contrary that it thoroughly evaluated the requirements submitted by HI
as a precondition to the issuance of the Cerificate of Registration.
The evidence on record also shows that HI is carrying on a distinct and independent business from E-PCIBank. The
employees of HI are assigned to clients to perform janitorial and messengerial services, clearly distinguishable from the
banking services in which E-PCIBank is engaged.
Despite the afore-mentioned compliance by HI with the requisites for permissible job contracting, Labor Arbiter Gutierrez
still declared that HI was engaged in prohibited labor-only contracting because it did not possess substantial capital or
investment to actually perform the job, work or service under its own account or responsibility. Both the NLRC and the
Court of Appeals ruled to the contrary, and we agree.
"Substantial capital or investment" refers to capital stocks and subscribed capitalization in the case of corporations, tools,
equipments, implements, machineries and work premises, actually and directly used by the contractor or subcontractor in
the performance or completion of the job, work or service contracted out. 47 An independent contractor must have either

substantial capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises, among others. The law
does not require both substantial capital and investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, etc.48 It is enough
that it has substantial capital. In the case of HI, it has proven both.
We have expostulated that once it is established that an entity such as in this case, HI has substantial capital, it was no
longer necessary to adduce further evidence to prove that it does not fall within the purview of "labor-only"
contracting.49There is even no need for HI to refute the contention of petitioners that some of the activities they performed
such as those of messengerial services are directly related to the principal business of E- PCIBank.
In any event, we have earlier declared that while these services rendered by the petitioners as janitors, messengers and
drivers are considered directly related to the principal business of a bank, in this case E-PCIBank, nevertheless, they are
not necessary in the conduct of its (E-PCIBANKs) principal business.50
HI has substantial capital in the amount of P20,939,935.72. It has its own building where it holds office and it has been
engaged in business for more than a decade now. 51 As observed by the Court of Appeals, surely, such a well-established
business entity cannot be considered a labor-only contractor.
Etched in an unending stream of cases are four standards in determining the existence of an employer-employee
relationship, namely: (a) the manner of selection and engagement of the putative employee; (b) the mode of payment of
wages; (c) the presence or absence of power of dismissal; and, (d) the presence or absence of control of the putative
employees conduct. Most determinative among these factors is the so-called "control test."52
The presence of the first requisite for the existence of an employer-employee relationship to wit, the selection and
engagement of the employee is shown by the fact that it was HI which selected and engaged the services of petitioners as
its employees. This is fortified by the provision in the contract of services between HI and E-PCIBank which states:

Selection, Engagement, Discharge. [HI] shall have exclusive discretion in the selection, engagement, investigation,
discipline and discharge of its employees.53
On the second requisite regarding the payment of wages, it was HI who paid petitioners their wages and who provided
their daily time records and uniforms and other materials necessary for the work they performed. Therefore, it is HI who is
responsible for petitioners claims for wages and other employees benefits. Precisely, the contract of services between HI
and E-PCIBank reveals the following:

Indemnity for Salaries and Benefits, etc. [HI] shall be responsible for the salaries, allowances, overtime and holiday
pay, and other benefits of its personnel including withholding taxes.54
As to the third requisite on the power to control the employees conduct, and the fourth requisite regarding the power of
dismissal, again E-PCIBank did not have the power to control petitioners with respect to the means and methods by which
their work was to be accomplished. It likewise had no power of dismissal over the petitioners. All that E-PCIBank could do
was to report to HI any untoward act, negligence, misconduct or malfeasance of any employee assigned to the premises.
The contract of services between E-PCIBank and HI is noteworthy. It states:

[HI] shall have the entire charge, control and supervision over all its employees who may be fielded to [E-PCIBank].
For this purpose, [HI] shall assign a regular supervisor of its employees who may be fielded to the Bank and which
regular supervisor shall exclusively supervise and control the activities and functions defined in Section 1 hereof. x x
x.55
All these circumstances establish that HI undertook said contract on its account, under its own responsibility, according to
its own manner and method, and free from the control and direction of E-PCIBank. Where the control of the principal is
limited only to the result of the work, independent job contracting exists. The janitorial service agreement between EPCIBank and HI is definitely a case of permissible job contracting.
Considering the foregoing, plus taking judicial notice of the general practice in private, as well as in government
institutions and industries, of hiring an independent contractor to perform special services, 56 ranging from janitorial,
security and even technical services, we can only conclude that HI is a legitimate job contractor. As such legitimate job
contractor, the law creates an employer-employee relationship between HI and petitioners 57 which renders HI liable for the
latters claims.

In view of the preceding conclusions, petitioners will never become regular employees of E-PCIBank regardless of how
long they were working for the latter.58
We further rule that petitioners were not illegally dismissed by HI. Upon the termination of the Contract of Service between
HI and E-PCIBank, petitioners cannot insist to continue to work for the latter. Their pull-out from E-PCIBank did not
constitute illegal dismissal since, first, petitioners were not employees of E-PCIBank; and second, they were pulled out
from said assignment due to the non-renewal of the Contract of Service between HI and E-PCIBank. At the time they filed
their complaints with the Labor Arbiter, petitioners were not even dismissed by HI; they were only "off-detail" pending their
re-assignment by HI to another client. And when they were actually given new assignments by HI with other
clients,59petitioners even refused the same. As the NLRC pronounced, petitioners complaint for illegal dismissal is
apparently premature.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated 24 April 2006 and
Resolution dated 31 October 2006 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 180291

July 27, 2010

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) and WINSTON F. GARCIA, in his capacity as PRESIDENT
and
GENERAL
MANAGER
of
the
GSIS, Petitioners,
vs.
DINNAH VILLAVIZA, ELIZABETH DUQUE, ADRONICO A. ECHAVEZ, RODEL RUBIO, ROWENA THERESE B.
GRACIA, PILAR LAYCO, and ANTONIO JOSE LEGARDA, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the August
31, 2007 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 98952, dismissing the petition for certiorari of
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) assailing the Civil Service Commission's Resolution No. 062177.
THE FACTS:
Petitioner Winston Garcia (PGM Garcia), as President and General Manager of the GSIS, filed separate formal charges
against respondents Dinnah Villaviza, Elizabeth Duque, Adronico A. Echavez, Rodel Rubio, Rowena Therese B. Gracia,
Pilar Layco, and Antonio Jose Legarda for Grave Misconduct and/or Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Service pursuant to the Rules of Procedure in Administrative Investigation (RPAI) of GSIS Employees and Officials, III, D,
(1, c, f) in relation to Section 52A (3), (20), Rule IV, of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
(URACCS), in accordance with Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987, committed as follows:
That on 27 May 2005, respondent, wearing red shirt together with some employees, marched to or appeared
simultaneously at or just outside the office of the Investigation Unit in a mass demonstration/rally of protest and support
for Messrs. Mario Molina and Albert Velasco, the latter having surreptitiously entered the GSIS premises;
xxx

xxx

xxx

That some of these employees badmouthed the security guards and the GSIS management and defiantly raised clenched
fists led by Atty. Velasco who was barred by Hearing Officer Marvin R. Gatpayat in an Order dated 24 May 2005 from
appearing as counsel for Atty. Molina pursuant to Section 7 (b) (2) of R.A. 6713 otherwise known as the Code of Conduct
and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees;
That respondent, together with other employees in utter contempt of CSC Resolution No. 021316, dated 11 October 2002,
otherwise known as Omnibus Rules on Prohibited Concerted Mass Actions in the Public Sector caused alarm and
heightened some employees and disrupted the work at the Investigation Unit during office hours. 2
This episode was earlier reported to PGM Garcia, through an office memorandum dated May 31, 2005, by the Manager of
the GSIS Security Department (GSIS-SD), Dennis Nagtalon. On the same day, the Manager of the GSIS Investigation
Unit (GSIS-IU), Atty. Lutgardo Barbo, issued a memorandum to each of the seven (7) respondents requiring them to
explain in writing and under oath within three (3) days why they should not be administratively dealt with. 3
Respondents Duque, Echavez, Rubio, Gracia, Layco, and Legarda, together with two others, submitted a letterexplanation to Atty. Barbo dated June 6, 2005. Denying that there was a planned mass action, the respondents explained
that their act of going to the office of the GSIS-IU was a spontaneous reaction after learning that their former union
president was there. Aside from some of them wanting to show their support, they were interested in that hearing as it
might also affect them. For her part, respondent Villaviza submitted a separate letter explaining that she had a scheduled
pre-hearing at the GSIS-IU that day and that she had informed her immediate supervisor about it, attaching a copy of the
order of pre-hearing. These letters were not under oath.4
PGM Garcia then filed the above-mentioned formal charges for Grave Misconduct and/or Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service against each of the respondents, all dated June 4, 2005. Respondents were again directed to
submit their written answers under oath within three (3) days from receipt thereof. 5 None was filed.
On June 29, 2005, PGM Garcia issued separate but similarly worded decisions finding all seven (7) respondents guilty of
the charges and meting out the penalty of one (1) year suspension plus the accessory penalties appurtenant thereto.

On appeal, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) found the respondents guilty of the lesser offense of Violation of
Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations and reduced the penalty to reprimand. The CSC ruled that respondents were
not denied their right to due process but there was no substantial evidence to hold them guilty of Conduct Prejudicial to
the Best Interest of the Service. Instead,
x x x. The actuation of the appellants in going to the IU, wearing red shirts, to witness a public hearing cannot be
considered as constitutive of such offense. Appellants' (respondents herein) assembly at the said office to express
support to Velasco, their Union President, who pledged to defend them against any oppression by the GSIS management,
can be considered as an exercise of their freedom of expression, a constitutionally guaranteed right.6 x x x
PGM Garcia sought reconsideration but was denied. Thus, PGM Garcia went to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for
Review under Rule 43 of the Rules on Civil Procedure. 7 The CA upheld the CSC in this wise:
The Civil Service Commission is correct when it found that the act sought to be punished hardly falls within the definition
of a prohibited concerted activity or mass action. The petitioners failed to prove that the supposed concerted activity of the
respondents resulted in work stoppage and caused prejudice to the public service. Only about twenty (20) out of more
than a hundred employees at the main office, joined the activity sought to be punished. These employees, now
respondents in this case, were assigned at different offices of the petitioner GSIS. Hence, despite the belated claim of the
petitioners that the act complained of had created substantial disturbance inside the petitioner GSIS' premises during
office hours, there is nothing in the record that could support the claim that the operational capacity of petitioner GSIS was
affected or reduced to substantial percentage when respondents gathered at the Investigation Unit. Despite the hazy
claim of the petitioners that the gathering was intended to force the Investigation Unit and petitioner GSIS to be lenient in
the handling of Atty. Molina's case and allow Atty. Velasco to represent Atty. Molina in his administrative case before
petitioner GSIS, there is likewise no concrete and convincing evidence to prove that the gathering was made to demand
or force concessions, economic or otherwise from the GSIS management or from the government. In fact, in the separate
formal charges filed against the respondents, petitioners clearly alleged that respondents "marched to or appeared
simultaneously at or just outside the office of the Investigation Unit in a mass demonstration/rally of protest and support
for Mssrs. Mario Molina and Albert Velasco, the latter surreptitiously entered the GSIS premises." Thus, petitioners are
aware at the outset that the only apparent intention of the respondents in going to the IU was to show support to Atty.
Mario Molina and Albert Velasco, their union officers. The belated assertion that the intention of the respondents in going
to the IU was to disrupt the operation and pressure the GSIS administration to be lenient with Atty. Mario Molina and
Albert Velasco, is only an afterthought.8
Not in conformity, PGM Garcia is now before us via this Petition for Review presenting the following:

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

I
WHETHER AN ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL MAY APPLY SUPPLETORILY THE PROVISIONS OF THE RULES
OF COURT ON THE EFFECT OF FAILURE TO DENY THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT AND FAILURE
TO FILE ANSWER, WHERE THE RESPONDENTS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS DID NOT FILE
ANY RESPONSIVE PLEADING TO THE FORMAL CHARGES AGAINST THEM.
II
WHETHER THE RULE THAT ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS CANNOT BE EQUATED WITH DUE PROCESS
IN JUDICIAL SENSE AUTHORIZES AN ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL TO CONSIDER IN EVIDENCE AND GIVE
FULL PROBATIVE VALUE TO UNNOTARIZED LETTERS THAT DID NOT FORM PART OF THE CASE RECORD.
III
WHETHER A DECISION THAT MAKES CONCLUSIONS OF FACTS BASED ON EVIDENCE ON RECORD BUT
MAKES A CONCLUSION OF LAW BASED ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF A DOCUMENT THAT NEVER FORMED
PART OF THE CASE RECORDS IS VALID.
IV

WHETHER FURTHER PROOF OF SUSBTANTIAL REDUCTION OF THE OPERATIONAL CAPACITY OF AN

AGENCY, DUE TO UNRULY MASS GATHERING OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSIDE OFFICE PREMISES
AND WITHIN OFFICE HOURS, IS REQUIRED TO HOLD THE SAID EMPLOYEES LIABLE FOR CONDUCT
PREJUDICIAL TO THE BEST INTEREST OF THE SERVICE PURSUANT TO CSC RESOLUTION NO. 021316.
V
WHETHER AN UNRULY MASS GATHERING OF TWENTY EMPLOYEES, LASTING FOR MORE THAN AN
HOUR DURING OFFICE HOURS, INSIDE OFFICE PREMISES AND WITHIN A UNIT TASKED TO HEAR AN
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE, TO PROTEST THE PROHIBITION AGAINST THE APPEARANCE OF THEIR LEADER
AS COUNSEL IN THE SAID ADMINISTRATIVE CASE, FALLS WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE TO FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY.
VI
WHETHER THE CONCERTED ABANDONMENT OF EMPLOYEES OF THEIR POSTS FOR MORE THAN AN
HOUR TO HOLD AN UNRULY PROTEST INSIDE OFFICE PREMISES ONLY CONSTITUTES THE
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFENSE OF VIOLATION OF REASONABLE OFFICE RULES AND REGULATIONS.9
The Court finds no merit in the petition.
Petitioners primarily question the probative value accorded to respondents' letters of explanation in response to the
memorandum of the GSIS-IU Manager. The respondents never filed their answers to the formal charges. The petitioners
argue that there being no answers, the allegations in the formal charges that they filed should have been deemed
admitted pursuant to Section 11, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court which provides:
SECTION 11. Allegations not specifically denied deemed admitted.- Material averment in the complaint, other than those
as to the amount of liquidated damages, shall be deemed admitted when not specifically denied. Allegations of usury in a
complaint to recover usurious interest are deemed admitted if not denied specifically and under oath.
According to the petitioners, this rule is applicable to the case at bench pursuant to Rule 1, Section 4 of the Rules of Court
which reads:
SECTION 4. In what cases not applicable. - These Rules shall not apply to election cases, land registration, cadastral,
naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory
character and whenever practicable and convenient. (underscoring supplied)
The Court does not subscribe to the argument of the petitioners. Petitioners' own rules, Rule XI, Section 4 of the GSIS'
Amended Policy and Procedural Guidelines No. 178-04, specifically provides:
If the respondent fails to file his Answer within five (5) working days from receipt of the Formal Charge for the supporting
evidence, when requested, he shall be considered to have waived his right to file an answer and the PGM or the Board of
Trustees, in proper cases, shall render judgment, as may be warranted by the facts and evidence submitted by the
prosecution.
A perusal of said section readily discloses that the failure of a respondent to file an answer merely translates to a waiver
of "his right to file an answer." There is nothing in the rule that says that the charges are deemed admitted. It has not done
away with the burden of the complainant to prove the charges with clear and convincing evidence.
It is true that Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides that the rules can be applied in a "suppletory character." Suppletory
is defined as "supplying deficiencies."10 It means that the provisions in the Rules of Court will be made to apply only where
there is an insufficiency in the applicable rule. There is, however, no such deficiency as the rules of the GSIS are explicit
in case of failure to file the required answer. What is clearly stated there is that GSIS may "render judgment as may be
warranted by the facts and evidence submitted by the prosecution."
Even granting that Rule 8, Section 11 of the Rules of Court finds application in this case, petitioners must remember that
there remain averments that are not deemed admitted by the failure to deny the same. Among them are immaterial
allegations and incorrect conclusions drawn from facts set out in the complaint. 11 Thus, even if respondents failed to file

their answer, it does not mean that all averments found in the complaint will be considered as true and correct in their
entirety, and that the forthcoming decision will be rendered in favor of the petitioners. We must not forget that even in
administrative proceedings, it is still the complainant, or in this case the petitioners, who have the burden of proving, with
substantial evidence, the allegations in the complaint or in the formal charges. 12
A perusal of the decisions of the CA and of the CSC will reveal that the case was resolved against petitioners based, not
on the absence of respondents' evidence, but on the weakness of that of the petitioners. Thus, the CA wrote:
Petitioners correctly submitted the administrative cases for resolution without the respondents' respective answer to the
separate formal charges in accordance with Section 4, Rule XI of the RPAI. Being in full control of the administrative
proceeding and having effectively prevented respondents from further submitting their responsive answer and evidence
for the defense, petitioners were in the most advantageous position to prove the merit of their allegations in the formal
charges. When petitioner Winston Garcia issued those similarly worded decisions in the administrative cases against the
respondents, it is presumed that all evidence in their favor were duly submitted and justly considered independent of the
weakness of respondent's evidence in view of the principle that ''the burden of proof belongs to the one who alleges and
not the one who denies."13
On the merits, what needs to be resolved in the case at bench is the question of whether or not there was a violation of
Section 5 of CSC Resolution No. 02-1316. Stated differently, whether or not respondents' actions on May 27, 2005
amounted to a "prohibited concerted activity or mass action." Pertinently, the said provision states:
Section 5. As used in this Omnibus Rules, the phrase ''prohibited concerted activity or mass action'' shall be understood to
refer to any collective activity undertaken by government employees, by themselves or through their employees
organizations, with intent of effecting work stoppage or service disruption in order to realize their demands of force
concession, economic or otherwise, from their respective agencies or the government. It shall include mass leaves,
walkouts, pickets and acts of similar nature. (underscoring supplied)
In this case, CSC found that the acts of respondents in going to the GSIS-IU office wearing red shirts to witness a public
hearing do not amount to a concerted activity or mass action proscribed above. CSC even added that their actuations can
be deemed an exercise of their constitutional right to freedom of expression. The CA found no cogent reason to deviate
therefrom.
As defined in Section 5 of CSC Resolution No. 02-1316 which serves to regulate the political rights of those in the
government service, the concerted activity or mass action proscribed must be coupled with the "intent of effecting work
stoppage or service disruption in order to realize their demands of force concession." Wearing similarly colored shirts,
attending a public hearing at the GSIS-IU office, bringing with them recording gadgets, clenching their fists, some even
badmouthing the guards and PGM Garcia, are acts not constitutive of an (i) intent to effect work stoppage or service
disruption and (ii) for the purpose of realizing their demands of force concession.
Precisely, the limitations or qualifications found in Section 5 of CSC Resolution No. 02-1316 are there to temper and focus
the application of such prohibition. Not all collective activity or mass undertaking of government employees is prohibited.
Otherwise, we would be totally depriving our brothers and sisters in the government service of their constitutional right to
freedom of expression.
Government workers, whatever their ranks, have as much right as any person in the land to voice out their protests
against what they believe to be a violation of their rights and interests. Civil Service does not deprive them of their
freedom of expression. It would be unfair to hold that by joining the government service, the members thereof have
renounced or waived this basic liberty. This freedom can be reasonably regulated only but can never be taken away.
A review of PGM Garcia's formal charges against the respondents reveals that he himself was not even certain whether
the respondents and the rest of the twenty or so GSIS employees who were at the GSIS-IU office that fateful day marched
there or just simply appeared there simultaneously.14 Thus, the petitioners were not even sure if the spontaneous act of
each of the twenty or so GSIS employees on May 27, 2005 was a concerted one. The report of Manager Nagtalon of the
GSIS-SD which was the basis for PGM Garcia's formal charges reflected such uncertainty. Thus,
Of these red shirt protesters, only Mr. Molina has official business at the Investigation Unit during this time. The rest
abandoned their post and duties for the duration of this incident which lasted until 10:55 A.M. It was also observed that the
protesters, some of whom raised their clenched left fists, carefully planned this illegal action as evident in their behavior of
arrogance, defiance and provocation, the presence of various recording gadgets such as VCRs, voice recorders and

digital cameras, the bad mouthing of the security guards and the PGM, the uniformity in their attire and the collusion
regarding the anomalous entry of Mr. Albert Velasco to the premises as reported earlier.15
The said report of Nagtalon contained only bare facts. It did not show respondents' unified intent to effect disruption or
stoppage in their work. It also failed to show that their purpose was to demand a force concession.
In the recent case of GSIS v. Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa GSIS, 16 the Court upheld the position of petitioner GSIS
because its employees, numbering between 300 and 800 each day, staged a walkout and participated in a mass protest
or demonstration outside the GSIS for four straight days. We cannot say the same for the 20 or so employees in this case.
To equate their wearing of red shirts and going to the GSIS-IU office for just over an hour with that four-day mass action
inKapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa GSIS case and to punish them in the same manner would most certainly be unfair
and unjust.
Recent analogous decisions in the United States, while recognizing the government's right as an employer to lay down
certain standards of conduct, tend to lean towards a broad definition of "public concern speech" which is protected by their
First Amendment. One such case is that of Scott v. Meters. 17 In said case, the New York Transit Authority (NYTA),
responsible for operation of New York City's mass transit service, issued a rule prohibiting employees from wearing
badges or buttons on their uniforms. A number of union members wore union buttons promoting their opposition to a
collective bargaining agreement. Consequently, the NYTA tried to enforce its rule and threatened to subject these union
members to discipline. The court, though recognizing the government's right to impose reasonable restrictions, held that
the NYTA's rule was "unconstitutionally overboard."
In another case, Communication Workers of America v. Ector County Hospital District,18 it was held that,
A county hospital employee's wearing of a "Union Yes" lapel pin during a union organization drive constituted speech on a
matter of public concern, and the county's proffered interest in enforcing the anti-adornment provision of its dress code
was outweighed by the employee's interest in exercising his First Amendment speech and associational rights by wearing
a pro-union lapel button.19
Thus, respondents' freedom of speech and of expression remains intact, and CSC's Resolution No. 02-1316 defining what
a prohibited concerted activity or mass action has only tempered or regulated these rights. Measured against that
definition, respondents' actuations did not amount to a prohibited concerted activity or mass action. The CSC and the CA
were both correct in arriving at said conclusion.
WHEREFORE, the assailed August 31, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals as well as its October 16, 2007 Resolution
in CA G.R. SP No. 98952 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 116437 March 3, 1997

THE
PEOPLE
OF
THE
vs.
PABLITO ANDAN y HERNANDEZ @ BOBBY, accused-appellant.

PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

PER CURIAM:

Accused-appellant Pablito Andan y Hernandez alias "Bobby" was accused of the crime of rape with homicide
committed as follows:
That on or about the 19th day of February 1994, in the municipality of Baliuag, province of Bulacan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd
design, by means of violence and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have carnal knowledge of one Marianne Guevarra y Reyes against her will and without her consent;
and the above-named accused in order to suppress evidence against him and delay (sic) the identity
of the victim, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill the said
Marianne Guevarra y Reyes, attack, assault and hit said victim with concrete hollow blocks in her
face and in different parts of her body, thereby inflicting upon her mortal wounds which directly
caused her death.
Contrary to Law. 1

The prosecution established that on February 19, 1994 at about 4:00 P.M., in Concepcion Subdivision, Baliuag,
Bulacan, Marianne Guevarra, twenty years of age and a second-year student at the Fatima School of Nursing, left
her home for her school dormitory in Valenzuela, Metro Manila. She was to prepare for her final examinations on
February 21, 1994. Marianne wore a striped blouse and faded denim pants and brought with her two bags
containing her school uniforms, some personal effects and more than P2,000.00 in cash.
Marianne was walking along the subdivision when appellant invited her inside his house. He used the pretext that the
blood pressure of his wife's grandmother should be taken. Marianne agreed to take her blood pressure as the old woman
was her distant relative. She did not know that nobody was inside the house. Appellant then punched her in the abdomen,
brought her to the kitchen and raped her. His lust sated, appellant dragged the unconscious girl to an old toilet at the back
of the house and left her there until dark. Night came and appellant pulled Marianne, who was still unconscious, to their
backyard. The yard had a pigpen bordered on one side by a six-foot high concrete fence. On the other side was a vacant
lot. Appellant stood on a bench beside the pigpen and then lifted and draped the girl's body over the fence to transfer it to
the vacant lot. When the girl moved, he hit her head with a piece of concrete block. He heard her moan and hit her again
on the face. After silence reigned, he pulled her body to the other side of the fence, dragged it towards a shallow portion
of the lot and abandoned it. 2

At 11:00 A.M. of the following day, February 20, 1994, the body of Marianne was discovered. She was naked from
the chest down with her brassiere and T-shirt pulled toward her neck. Nearby was found a panty with a sanitary
napkin.
The autopsy conducted by Dr. Alberto Bondoc revealed that Marianne died of "traumatic injuries" sustained as
follows:
1. Abrasions:
1.1 chest and abdomen, multiple, superficial, linear, generally oblique from right to
left.
2. Abrasions/contusions:
2.1 temple, right.

2.2 cheek, right.

2.3 upper and lower jaws, right.
2.4 breast, upper inner quadrant, right.
2.5 breast, upper outer quadrant, left.
2.6 abdomen, just above the umbilicus, rectangular, approximate 3 inches in width,
from right MCL to left AAL.
2.7 elbow joint, posterior, bilateral.
3. Hematoma:
3.1 upper and lower eyelids, bilateral.
3.2 temple, lateral to the outer edge of eyebrow, right.
3.3 upper and lower jaws, right.
4. Lacerated wounds:
4.1 eyebrow, lateral border, right, 1/2 inch.
4.2 face, from right cheek below the zygoma to midline lower jaw, 4 inches.
5. Fractures:
5.1 maxillary bone, right.
5.2 mandible, multiple, complete, right, with avulsion of 1st and 2nd incisors.
6. Cerebral contusions, inferior surface, temporal and frontal lobes, right.
7. External genitalia
7.1 minimal blood present.
7.2 no signs of recent physical injuries noted on both labia, introitus and exposed
vaginal wall.
8. Laboratory examination of smear samples from the vaginal cavity showed negative for
spermatozoa (Bulacan Provincial Hospital, February 22, 1994, by Dr. Wilfredo S. de Vera).
CAUSE OF DEATH: Cardiorespiratory Arrest due to Cerebral Contusions due to Traumatic Injuries,
Face. 3
Marianne's gruesome death drew public attention and prompted Mayor Cornelio Trinidad of Baliuag to form a crack team
of police officers to look for the criminal. Searching the place where Marianne's body was found, the policemen recovered
a broken piece of concrete block stained with what appeared to be blood. They also found a pair of denim pants and a
pair of shoes which were identified as Marianne's. 4
Appellant's nearby house was also searched by the police who found bloodstains on the wall of the pigpen in the
backyard. They interviewed the occupants of the house and learned from Romano Calma, the stepbrother of appellant's
wife, that accused-appellant also lived there but that he, his wife and son left without a word. Calma surrendered to the

police several articles consisting of pornographic pictures, a pair of wet short pants with some reddish brown stain, a towel
also with the stain, and a wet T-shirt. The clothes were found in the laundry hamper inside the house and allegedly
belonged to appellant. 5
The police tried to locate appellant and learned that his parents live in Barangay Tangos, Baliuag, Bulacan. On February
24 at 11:00 P.M., a police team led by Mayor Trinidad traced appellant in his parents' house. They took him aboard the
patrol jeep and brought him to the police headquarters where he was interrogated. Initially, appellant denied any
knowledge of Marianne's death. However, when the police confronted him with the concrete block, the victim's clothes
and the bloodstains found in the pigpen, appellant relented and said that his neighbors, Gilbert Larin and Reynaldo Dizon,
killed Marianne and that he was merely a lookout. He also said that he knew where Larin and Dizon hid the two bags of
Marianne. 6 Immediately, the police took appellant to his house. Larin and Dizon, who were rounded up earlier, were
likewise brought there by the police. Appellant went to an old toilet at the back of the house, leaned over a flower pot and
retrieved from a canal under the pot, two bags which were later identified as belonging to Marianne. Thereafter,
photographs were taken of appellant and the two other suspects holding the bags. 7
Appellant and the two suspects were brought back to the police headquarters. The following day, February 25, a physical
examination
was
conducted
on
the
suspects
by
the
Municipal
Health
Officer,
Dr.
Orpha
Patawaran. 8 Appellant was found to sustain:
HEENT: with multiple scratches on the neck Rt side. Chest and back: with abrasions (scratches at the
back). Extremities: freshly-healed wound along index finger 1.5 cm. in size Lt. 9
By this time, people and media representatives were already gathered at the police headquarters awaiting the results of
the investigation. Mayor Trinidad arrived and proceeded to the investigation room. Upon seeing the mayor, appellant
approached him and whispered a request that they talk privately. The mayor led appellant to the office of the Chief of
Police and there, appellant broke down and said "Mayor, patawarin mo ako! I will tell you the truth. I am the one who killed
Marianne." The mayor opened the door of the room to let the public and media representatives witness the confession.
The mayor first asked for a lawyer to assist appellant but since no lawyer was available he ordered the proceedings
photographed and videotaped. 10 In the presence of the mayor, the police, representatives of the media and appellant's
own wife and son, appellant confessed his guilt. He disclosed how he killed Marianne and volunteered to show them the
place where he hid her bags. He asked for forgiveness from Larin and Dizon whom he falsely implicated saying he did it
because of ill-feelings against them. 11 He also said that the devil entered his mind because of the pornographic
magazines and tabloid he read almost everyday. 12 After his confession, appellant hugged his wife and son and asked the
mayor
to
help
him. 13 His confession was captured on videotape and covered by the media nationwide. 14
Appellant was detained at the police headquarters. The next two days, February 26 and 27, more newspaper, radio and
television reporters came. Appellant was again interviewed and he affirmed his confession to the mayor and reenacted
the crime. 15
On arraignment, however, appellant entered a plea of "not guilty." He testified that in the afternoon of February 19, 1994
he was at his parent's house in Barangay Tangos attending the birthday party of his nephew. He, his wife and son went
home after 5:00 P.M. His wife cooked dinner while he watched their one-year old son. They all slept at 8:00 P.M. and
woke up the next day at 6:00 in the morning. His wife went to Manila to collect some debts while he and his son went to
his parents' house where he helped his father cement the floor of the house. His wife joined them in the afternoon and
they stayed there until February 24, 1994 when he was picked up by the police. 16
Appellant was brought by the police to a hotel at Bagong Nayon, Baliuag. In one of the rooms, the policemen covered his
face with a bedsheet and kicked him repeatedly. They coerced him to confess that he raped and killed Marianne. When
he refused, they pushed his head into a toilet bowl and injected something into his buttocks. Weakened, appellant
confessed to the crime. Thereafter, appellant was taken to his house where he saw two of his neighbors, Larin and Dizon.
He was ordered by the police to go to the old toilet at the back of the house and get two bags from under the flower pot.
Fearing for his life, appellant did as he was told. 17

In a decision dated August 4, 1994, the trial court convicted appellant and sentenced him to death pursuant to
Republic Act No. 7659. The trial court also ordered appellant to pay the victim's heirs P50,000.00 as death
indemnity, P71,000.00 as actual burial expenses and P100,000.00 as moral damages, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Pablito Andan y Hernandez alias "Bobby is found guilty by
proof beyond a scintilla of doubt of the crime charged in the Information (Rape with Homicide) and

penalized in accordance with R.A. No. 7659 (Death Penalty Law) Sec. 11, Par. 8, classifying this
offense as one of the heinous crimes and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of DEATH; to
indemnify the family of Marianne Guevarra the amount of P50,000. 00 for the death of Marianne
Guevarra and P71,000.00 as actual burial and incidental expenses and P100,000.00 as moral
damages. After automatic review of this case and the decision becomes final and executory, the
sentence be carried out.
SO ORDERED. 18

This case is before us on automatic review in accordance with Section 22 of Republic Act No. 7659 amending
Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code.
Appellant contends that:
I THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AND USING AS BASIS OF JUDGMENT OF
CONVICTION THE TESTIMONIES OF THE POLICE INVESTIGATORS, REPORTERS AND THE
MAYOR ON THE ALLEGED ADMISSION OF THE ACCUSED DURING THE CUSTODIAL
INVESTIGATION, THE ACCUSED NOT BEING ASSISTED BY COUNSEL IN VIOLATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION;
II THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS RAPE WHEN THERE IS NO
EVIDENCE OF ANY KIND TO SUPPORT IT;
III THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN MAKING A FINDING OF CONVICTION WHEN THE EVIDENCE IN
ITS TOTALITY SHOWS THAT THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVE BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED. 19

The trial court based its decision convicting appellant on the testimonies of the three policemen of the investigating
team, the mayor of Baliuag and four news reporters to whom appellant gave his extrajudicial oral confessions. It was
also based on photographs and video footages of appellant's confessions and reenactments of the commission of
the crime.
Accused-appellant assails the admission of the testimonies of the policemen, the mayor and the news reporters
because they were made during custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel. Section 12, paragraphs
(1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 12 (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to
be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably
of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one.
These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
(2) . . .
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) . . .
Plainly, any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right (1) to remain
silent; (2) to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice; and (3) to be informed
of
such
rights. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. 20 Any confession or
admission obtained in violation of this provision is inadmissible in evidence against him. 21 The exclusionary
rule is premised on the presumption that the defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and runs
through menacing police interrogation procedures where the potentiality for compulsion physical and
psychological, is forcefully apparent. 22 The incommunicado character of custodial interrogation or
investigation also obscures a later judicial determination of what really transpired. 23

It should be stressed that the rights under Section 12 are accorded to "[a]ny person under investigation for the
commission of an offense." An investigation begins when it is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but starts
to focus on a particular person as a suspect, i.e., when the police investigator starts interrogating or exacting a confession
from the suspect in connection with an alleged offense. 24 As intended by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, this covers
"investigation conducted by police authorities which will include investigations conducted by the municipal police, the PC
and the NBI and such other police agencies in our government." 25

When the police arrested appellant, they were no longer engaged in a general inquiry about the death of Marianne.
Indeed, appellant was already a prime suspect even before the police found him at his parents' house. This is clear
from the testimony of SPO4 Danilo S. Bugay, the police chief investigator of the crime, viz:
COURT How did you come about in concluding that it was accused who did this act?
WITNESS: First, the place where Marianne was last found is at the backyard of the house of the
accused. Second, there were blood stains at the pigpen, and third, when we asked Romano Calma
who were his other companions in the house, he said that, it was Pablito Andan who cannot be
found at that time and whose whereabouts were unknown, sir.
Q: So you had a possible suspect?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You went looking for Pablito Andan?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And then, what else did you do?
A: We tried to find out where we can find him and from information we learned that his
parents live in Barangay Tangos in Baliuag. We went there, found him there and
investigated him and in fact during the investigation he admitted that he was the culprit. 26

Appellant was already under custodial investigation when he confessed to the police. It is admitted that the
police failed to inform appellant of his constitutional rights when he was investigated and interrogated. 27 His
confession is therefore inadmissible in evidence. So too were the two bags recovered from appellant's
house. SPO2 Cesar Canoza, a member of the investigating team testified:
Atty. Valmores: You told the court that you were able to recover these bags marked
as Exhs. B and B-1 because accused pointed to them, where did he point these
bags?
A: At the police station, sir, he told us that he hid the two (2) bags beneath the canal
of the toilet.
Q: In other words, you were given the information where these two (2) bags were
located?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And upon being informed where the two (2) bags could be located what did you
do?
A: We proceeded to the place together with the accused so that we would know
where the two (2) bags were hidden, sir.
Q: And did you see actually those two (2) bags before the accused pointed to the
place where the bags were located?

A: After he removed the broken pots with which he covered the canal, he really showed
where the bags were hidden underneath the canal, sir. 28
The victim's bags were the fruits of appellant's uncounselled confession to the police. They are tainted evidence, hence
also inadmissible. 29

The police detained appellant after his initial confession. The following day, Mayor Trinidad visited the appellant.
Appellant approached the mayor and requested for a private talk. They went inside a room and appellant confessed
that he alone committed the crime. He pleaded for forgiveness. Mayor Trinidad testified, viz:
Mayor Trinidad: . . . . During the investigation when there were already many people
from the media, Andan whispered something to me and requested that he be able to
talk to me alone, so what I did was that, I brought him inside the office of the chief of
police.
Private Prosecutor Principe: And so what happened inside the office of the Chief of
Police, mayor?
A: While inside the office of the headquarters he told me "Mayor patawarin mo ako,! I will
tell you the truth. I am the one who killed Marianne." So when he was telling this to me, I
told him to wait a while, then I opened the door to allow the media to hear what he was
going to say and I asked him again whether he was the one who did it, he admitted it, sir.
This was even covered by a television camera. 30

xxx xxx xxx

Q: During that time that Pablito Andan whispered to you that he will tell you
something and then you responded by bringing him inside the office of the Chief of
Police and you stated that he admitted that he killed Marianne . . .
Court: He said to you the following words . . .
Atty. Principe: He said to you the following words "Mayor, patawarin mo ako! Ako ang
pumatay kay Marianne," was that the only admission that he told you?
A: The admission was made twice. The first one was, when we were alone and the
second one was before the media people, sir.
Q: What else did he tell you when you were inside the room of the Chief of Police?
A: These were the only things that he told me, sir. I stopped him from making further
admissions because I wanted the media people to hear what he was going to say, sir. 31
Under these circumstances, it cannot be successfully claimed that appellant's confession before the mayor is
inadmissible.
It
is
true
that
a
municipal
mayor
has
"operational
supervision
and
control"
over
the
local
police 32 and may arguably be deemed a law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article
III of the Constitution. However, appellant's confession to the mayor was not made in response to any interrogation by the
latter. 33 In fact, the mayor did not question appellant at all. No police authority ordered appellant to talk to the mayor. It
was appellant himself who spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the mayor for a private meeting. The mayor did
not know that appellant was going to confess his guilt to him. When appellant talked with the mayor as a confidant and not
as a law enforcement officer, his uncounselled confession to him did not violate his constitutional rights. 34 Thus, it has
been held that the constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not
elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby appellant orally admitted having
committed the crime. 35 What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. The
rights under Section 12 are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state as would lead the accused to
admit something false, not to prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. 36 Hence, we hold that appellant's
confession to the mayor was correctly admitted by the trial court.

Appellant's confessions to the media were likewise properly admitted. The confessions were made in response to
questions by news reporters, not by the police or any other investigating officer. We have held that statements
spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters on a televised interview are deemed voluntary an are admissible in
evidence. 37
The records show that Alex Marcelino, a television reporter for "Eye to Eye" on Channel 7, interviewed appellant on
February 27, 1994. The interview was recorded on video and showed that appellant made his confession willingly, openly
and publicly in the presence of his wife, child and other relatives. 38 Orlan Mauricio, a reporter for "Tell the People" on
Channel 9 also interviewed appellant on February 25, 1994. He testified that:

Atty. Principe: You mentioned awhile ago that you were able to reach the place
where the body of Marianne was found, where did you start your interview, in what
particular place?
Mr. Mauricio: Actually, I started my newsgathering and interview inside the police
station of Baliuag and I identified myself to the accused as I have mentioned earlier,
sir. At first, I asked him whether he was the one who raped and killed the victim and I
also learned from him that the victim was his cousin.
Q: And what was the response of Pablito Andan?
A: His response was he is a cousin of the victim and that he was responsible for
raping and killing the victim, sir. And then I asked him whether his admission was
voluntary or that there was a threat, intimidation or violence that was committed on
his person because I knew that there were five other suspects in this case and he
said that he was admitting it voluntarily to the policemen. I asked him whether he was
under the influence of drugs but he said no, and "nakainom lang," sir.
Q: You mentioned earlier that the uncle of the accused was present, was the uncle
beside him at the time that you asked the question?
A: The uncle was there including the barangay captain whose name I cannot recall
anymore. A barangay captain of the place, I don't know if it is the place of the crime
scene or in the place where Marianne Guevarra resides but . . . All throughout the
scene inside the office of the Station Commander, there was no air of any force or
any threatening nature of investigation that was being done on the suspect, that is
why, I was able to talk to him freely and in a voluntary manner he admitted to me that
he was the one who raped and killed, so we went to the next stage of accompanying
me to the scene of the crime where the reenactment and everything that transpired
during the killing of Marianne Guevarra.
Q: Before you started that interview, did you inform or ask permission from the
accused Pablito Andan that you were going to interview him?
A: Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: You mentioned that after interviewing the accused at the office of the Baliuag
PNP, you also went to the scene of the crime?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Who accompanied you?
A: I was accompanied by some Baliuag policemen including Mayor Trinidad and
some of the relatives of the accused.

Q: At this time, did you see the wife of the accused, Pablito Andan?
A: Yes, sir, I saw her at the place where the body of Guevarra was recovered.
Q: How many relatives of accused Pablito Andan were present, more or less?
A: There were many, sir, because there were many wailing, weeping and crying at
that time when he was already taken in the patrol jeep of the Baliuag police, sir.
Q: Now, Mr. Mauricio, upon reaching the scene of the crime in Concepcion, Baliuag,
Bulacan, what transpired?
A: I started my work as a reporter by trying to dig deeper on how the crime was
committed by the accused, so we started inside the pigpen of that old house where I
tried to accompany the accused and asked him to narrate to me and show me how
he carried out the rape and killing of Marianne Guevarra, sir.
Q: Did he voluntarily comply?
A: Yes, sir, in fact, I have it on my videotape.
Q: It is clear, Mr. Mauricio, that from the start of your interview at the PNP Baliuag up
to the scene of the crime, all the stages were videotaped by you?
A: Yes, sir. 39

Journalist Berteni Causing of "People's Journal Tonite" likewise covered the proceedings for three
successive days.40 His testimony is as follows:
Atty. Principe: You mentioned that you had your own inquiries?
A: We asked first permission from the mayor to interrupt their own investigation so
that we can have a direct interview with the suspect.
Q: Were there people?
A: The people present before the crowd that included the mayor, the deputy chief of
police, several of the policemen, the group of Inday Badiday and several other
persons. I asked the suspect after the mayor presented the suspect to us and after
the suspect admitted that he was the one who killed Marianne. I reiterated the
question to the suspect. Are you aware that this offense which is murder with . . .
rape with murder is a capital offense? And you could be sentenced to death of this?
And he said, Yes. So do you really admit that you were the one who did it and he
repeated it, I mean, say the affirmative answer.
Q: And that was in the presence of the crowd that you mentioned a while ago?
A: Yes, yes, sir. And if I remember it right, as I took my camera to take some pictures
of the suspect, the mayor, the policemen and several others, I heard the group of
Inday Badiday asking the same questions from the suspect and the suspect
answered the same.
Q: Also in the presence of so many people that you mentioned?
A: The same group of people who were there, sir.

Q: You mentioned that the answer was just the same as the accused answered you
affirmatively, what was the answer, please be definite?
Court: Use the vernacular.
A: I asked him the question, after asking him the question," Ikaw ba talaga and
gumawa ng pagpatay at pag-rape sa kay Marianne? Ang sagot nya, "Oo." Alam mo
ba itong kasalanang ito, kamatayan ang hatol, inaamin mo pa ba na ikaw and
gumawa sa pagpatay at pag-rape kay Marianne?" Sagot pa rin siya ng "Oo."
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Did you ask him, why did you kill Marianne?
A: I asked him, your Honor and the reason he told me was because a devil gripped
his mind and because of that according to him, your Honor, were the pornographic
magazines, pornographic tabloids which he, according to him, reads almost everyday
before the crime.
Atty. Principe: At the time of your interview, Mr. Reporter, will you tell the court and
the public what was the physical condition of accused Pablito Andan?
A: As I observed him that time, there was no sign on his body that he was really
down physically and I think he was in good condition.
Court: So he was not happy about the incident?
A: He even admitted it, your Honor.
Court: He was happy?
A: He admitted it. He was not happy after doing it.
Court: Was he crying?
A: As I observed, your Honor, the tears were only apparent but there was no tear that
fell on his face.
Court: Was he feeling remorseful?
A: As I observed it, it was only slightly, your Honor.
xxx xxx xxx 41

Another journalist, Rey Domingo, of "Bandera" interviewed appellant on February 26, 1994. 42 He also
testified that:
Atty. Principe: Now, Mr. Witness, did the accused Pablito Andan give you the
permission that you asked from him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And when he allowed you to interview him, who were present?

A: The first person that I saw there was Mayor Trinidad, policemen from Baliuag, the
chief investigator, SPO4 Bugay, and since Katipunan, the chief of police was
suspended, it was the deputy who was there, sir.
Q: Were they the only persons who were present when you interviewed the
accused?
A: There were many people there, sir. The place was crowded with people. There
were people from the PNP and people from Baliuag, sir.
Q: How about the other representatives from the media?
A: Roy Reyes, Orlan Mauricio arrived but he arrived late and there were people from
the radio and from TV Channel 9.
Q: How about Channel 7?
A: They came late. I was the one who got the scoop first, sir.
Q: You stated that the accused allowed you to interview him, was his wife also
present?
A: Yes, sir, and even the son was there but I am not very sure if she was really the
wife but they were hugging each other and she was crying and from the questions
that I asked from the people there they told me that she is the wife, sir.
Q: How about the other members of the family of the accused, were they around?
A: I do not know the others, sir. but there were many people there, sir.
Q: Now, according to you, you made a news item about the interview. May we know
what question did you ask and the answer.
A: My first question was, is he Pablito Andan and his answer was "Yes."
Q: What was the next question?
A: I asked him how he did the crime and he said that, he saw the victim aboard a
tricycle. He called her up. She entered the house and he boxed her on the stomach.
Q: What was the next question that you asked him?
A: He also said that he raped her and he said that the reason why he killed the victim
was because he was afraid that the incident might be discovered, sir.
Q: Now, after the interview, are we correct to say that you made a news item on
that?
A: Yes, sir, based on what he told me. That's what I did.
Q: Were there other questions propounded by you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: "Ano iyon?"

A: He said that he threw the cadaver to the other side of the fence, sir.
Q: Did he mention how he threw the cadaver of Marianne to the other side of the
fence?
A: I cannot remember the others, sir.
Q: But can you produce the news item based on that interview?
A: I have a xerox copy here, sir.
xxx xxx xxx 43
Clearly, appellant's confessions to the news reporters were given free from any undue influence from the police
authorities. The news reporters acted as news reporters when they interviewed appellant. 44 They were not acting under
the direction and control of the police. They were there to check appellant's confession to the mayor. They did not force
appellant to grant them an interview and reenact the commission of the crime. 45 In fact, they asked his permission before
interviewing him. They interviewed him on separate days not once did appellant protest his innocence. Instead, he
repeatedly confessed his guilt to them. He even supplied all the details in the commission of the crime, and consented to
its reenactment. All his confessions to the news reporters were witnessed by his family and other relatives. There was no
coercive atmosphere in the interview of appellant by the news reporters.
We rule that appellant's verbal confessions to the newsmen are not covered by Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the
Constitution. The Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation between a private individual and another
individual.46 It governs the relationship between the individual and the State. The prohibitions therein are primarily
addressed to the State and its agents. They confirm that certain rights of the individual exist without need of any
governmental grant, rights that may not be taken away by government, rights that government has the duty to
protect. 47 Governmental power is not unlimited and the Bill of Rights lays down these limitations to protect the individual
against aggression and unwarranted interference by any department of government and its agencies. 48
In his second assigned error, appellant questions the sufficiency of the medical evidence against him. Dr. Alberto Bondoc,
a Medical Specialist with the Provincial Health Office, conducted the first autopsy and found no spermatozoa and no
recent
physical
injuries
in
the
hymen. 49 Allegedly,
50
the minimal blood found in her vagina could have been caused by her menstruation.

We are unpersuaded. A second autopsy was conducted on March 1, 1994 by Dr. Dominic L. Aguda, a medico-legal
officer of the National Bureau of Investigation. His findings affirmed the absence of spermatozoa but revealed that
the victim's hymen had lacerations, thus:
Hymen contracted, tall, thin with fresh lacerations with clotted blood at 6 and 3 o'clock positions
corresponding
to
the
walls
of
the
clock. 51

Dr. Aguda testified that the lacerations were fresh and that they may have been caused by an object forcibly
inserted into the vagina when the victim was still alive, indicating the possibility of penetration. 52 His
testimony is as follows:
Witness: When I exposed the hymen, I found lacerations in this 3 o'clock and 6
o'clock position corresponding to the walls of the clock. . . . .
Court: Include the descriptive word, fresh.
Witness: I put it in writing that this is fresh because within the edges of the
lacerations, I found blood clot, that is why I put it into writing as fresh.
Atty. Valmonte: Now, Doctor, you told the Court that what you did on the cadaver
was merely a re-autopsy, that means, doctor the body was autopsied first before you
did you re-autopsy?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: Could it not be, doctor, that these injuries you found in the vagina could have
been sustained on account of the dilation of the previous autopsy?
A: Well, we presumed that if the first doctor conducted the autopsy on the victim
which was already dead, no amount of injury or no amount of lacerated wounds
could produce blood because there is no more circulation, the circulation had already
stopped. So, I presumed that when the doctor examined the victim with the use of
forceps or retractor, vaginal retractor, then I assumed that the victim was already
dead. So it is impossible that the lacerated wounds on the hymen were caused by
those instruments because the victim was already dead and usually in a dead person
we do not produce any bleeding.
Q: What you would like to tell the Court is this: that the lacerations with clotted blood
at 6 and 3 o'clock positions corresponding to the walls of the clock could have been
inflicted or could have been sustained while the victim was alive?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: This clotted blood, according to you, found at the edges of the lacerated wounds,
now will you kindly go over the sketch you have just drawn and indicate the edges of
the lacerated wounds where you found the clotted blood?
A: This is the lacerated wound at 3 o'clock and this is the lacerated wound at 6
o'clock. I found the blood clot at this stage. The clotted blood are found on the edges
of the lacerated wounds, sir.
Q: What could have caused those lacerations?
A: Well, it could have been caused by an object that is forcibly inserted into that small
opening of the hymen causing lacerations on the edges of the hymen, sir.
Q: If the victim had sexual intercourse, could she sustain those lacerations?
A: It is possible, sir. 53
We have also ruled in the past that the absence of spermatozoa in the vagina does not negate the commission of
rape 54nor does the lack of complete penetration or rupture of the hymen. 55 What is essential is that there be penetration
of the female organ no matter how slight. 56 Dr. Aguda testified that the fact of penetration is proved by the lacerations
found in the victim's vagina. The lacerations were fresh and could not have been caused by any injury in the first autopsy.

Dr. Aguda's finding and the allegation that the victim was raped by appellant are supported by other evidence, real
and testimonial, obtained from an investigation of the witnesses and the crime scene, viz:
(1) The victim, Marianne, was last seen walking along the subdivision road near appellant's house;
(2) At that time, appellant's wife and her step brother and grandmother were not in their house;

57

58

(3) A bloodstained concrete block was found over the fence of appellant's house, a meter away from the wall. Bloodstains
were also found on the grass nearby and at the pigpen at the back of appellant's house; 59
(4) The victim sustained bruises and scars indicating that her body had been dragged over a flat rough surface.
supports the thesis that she was thrown over the fence and dragged to where her body was found;

(5) Appellant's bloodstained clothes and towel were found in the laundry hamper in his house;

60

This

(6) The reddish brown stains in the towel and T-shirt of appellant were found positive for the presence of blood type "B,"
the probable blood type of the victim. 61 Marianne 's exact blood type was not determined but her parents had type "A" and
type "AB." 62 The victim's pants had bloodstains which were found to be type "O," appellant's blood type; 63
(7) Appellant had scratch marks and bruises in his body which he failed to explain; 64
(8) For no reason, appellant and his wife left their residence after the incident and were later found at his parents' house in
Barangay Tangos, Baliuag, Bulacan; 65

In fine, appellant's extrajudicial confessions together with the other circumstantial evidence justify the conviction of
appellant.
Appellant 's defense of alibi cannot overcome the prosecution evidence. His alibi cannot even stand the test of physical
improbability at the time of the commission of the crime. Barangay Tangos is only a few kilometers away from Concepcion
Subdivision and can be traversed in less than half an hour. 66

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, Malolos, Bulacan in Criminal Case No.
1109-M-94 is affirmed and accused-appellant Pablito Andan y Hernandez is found guilty of the special complex
crime of rape with homicide under Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659 amending Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code and is sentenced to the penalty of death, with two (2) members of the Court, however, voting to
impose reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant is also ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim, Marianne
Guevarra, the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for her death and P71,000.00 as actual damages.
In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659 amending Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, upon
finality of this decision, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for possible
exercise of the pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.

G. R. No. 153699 August 22, 2005

CIRSE
FRANCISCO
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

"CHOY"

TORRALBA, Petitioners,

DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 promulgated on 22 May 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR No. 24818 which affirmed, with modification, the trial courts 2 decision finding petitioner Cirse Francisco "Choy"
Torralba guilty of the crime of libel in Criminal Case No. 9107.
Culled from the records are the following facts:
Petitioner Torralba was the host of a radio program called "Tug-Ani ang Lungsod" which was aired over the radio station
DYFX in Cebu City. On 12 September 1994, an information for libel was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Tagbilaran City against petitioner Torralba. The information states:
The undersigned, City Prosecutor II, City of Tagbilaran, Philippines, hereby accuses CIRSE FRANCISCO "CHOY"
TORRALBA for the crime of Libel, committed as follows:
That, on or about the 11th day of April, 1994, in the City of Tagbilaran, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with deliberate and
malicious intent of maligning, impeaching and discrediting the honesty, integrity, reputation, prestige and honor of late CFI
Judge Agapito Y. Hontanosas, who was during his [lifetime] a CFI Judge of Cebu and a man of good reputation and social
standing in the community and for the purpose of exposing him to public hatred, contempt, disrespect and ridicule, in his
radio program "TUG-ANI AND LUNGSOD" (TELL THE PEOPLE) over radio station DYFX, openly, publicly and
repeatedly announce[d] the following: "KINING MGA HONTANOSAS, AGAPITO HONTANOSAS UG CASTOR
HONTANOSAS, MGA COLLABORATOR SA PANAHON SA GUERRA. SA ATO PA, TRAYDOR SA YUTANG
NATAWHAN." X X X."DUNAY DUGO NGA PAGKATRAYDOR ANG AMAHAN NI MANOLING HONTANOSAS," which in
English means: "THESE HONTANOSAS, AGAPITO HONTANOSAS AND CASTOR HONTANOSAS, ARE
COLLABORATORS DURING THE WAR. IN OTHER WORDS, THEY ARE TRAITORS TO THE LAND OF THEIR
BIRTH." X X X. "THE FATHER OF MANOLING HONTANOSAS HAD TREACHEROUS BLOOD," and other words of
similar import, thereby maliciously exposing the family of the late Judge Agapito Hontanosas including Atty. Manuel L.
Hontanosas,3 one of the legitimate children of [the] late CFI Judge Agapito Y. Hontanosas to public hatred, dishonor,
discredit, contempt and ridicule causing the latter to suffer social humiliation, embarrassment, wounded feelings and
mental anguish, to the damage and prejudice of said Atty. Manuel L. Hontanosas in the amount to be proved during the
trial of the case.
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 355 of the same
Code.
City of Tagbilaran, Philippines, September 8, 1994.
(SGD.) ADRIANO P. MONTES
City Prosecutor II
APPROVED:
(SGD) MARIANO CAPAYAS
City Prosecutor4
Upon arraignment on 12 March 1996, petitioner Torralba pleaded not guilty to the crime he was charged with. 5

On 14 May 1998, petitioner Torralba filed before the RTC, Branch 1, Tagbilaran City, where Crim. Case No. 9107 was
raffled off, a motion for consolidation6 alleging therein that private complainant Atty. Manuel Hontanosas (Atty.
Hontanosas) filed a total of four (4) criminal cases for libel against petitioner Torralba, three of which Crim. Cases No.
8956, No. 8957, and No. 8958 were then pending with the RTC, Branch III, Tagbilaran City. As the evidence for the
prosecution as well as the defense were substantially the same, petitioner Torralba moved that Crim. Case No. 9107 be
consolidated with the three other cases so as to save time, effort, and to facilitate the early disposition of these cases.
In its order dated 25 May 1998,7 the motion for consolidation filed by petitioner Torralba was granted by the RTC, Branch
1, Tagbilaran City.
During the trial on the merits of the consolidated cases, the prosecution presented as witnesses Segundo Lim, private
complainant Atty. Hontanosas, and Gabriel Sarmiento.
Lim testified that he was one of the incorporators of the Tagbilaran Maritime Services, Inc. (TMSI) and was at that time the
assigned manager of the port in Tagbilaran City. According to him, sometime during the Marcos administration, petitioner
Torralba sought TMSIs sponsorship of his radio program. This request was approved by private complainant Atty.
Hontanosas who was then the president of TMSI. During the existence of said sponsorship agreement, the management
of TMSI noticed that petitioner Torralba was persistently attacking former Bureau of Internal Revenue Deputy Director
Tomas Toledo and his brother Boy Toledo who was a customs collector. Fearing that the Toledos would think that TMSI
was behind the incessant criticisms hurled at them, the management of TMSI decided to cease sponsoring petitioner
Torralbas radio show. In effect, the TMSI sponsored "Tug-Ani ang Lungsod" for only a month at the cost of P500.00.
Soon thereafter, petitioner Torralba took on the management of TMSI. Lim testified that petitioner Torralba accused TMSI
of not observing the minimum wage law and that said corporation was charging higher handling rates than what it was
supposed to collect.
On 17 December 1993, private complainant Atty. Hontanosas went on-air in petitioner Torralbas radio program to explain
the side of TMSI. The day after said incident, however, petitioner Torralba resumed his assault on TMSI and its
management. It was petitioner Torralbas relentless badgering of TMSI which allegedly prompted Lim to tape record
petitioner Torralbas radio broadcasts. Three of the tape recordings were introduced in evidence by the prosecution, to wit:
Exhibit B - tape recording of 19 January 19948
Exhibit C - tape recording of 25 January 19949
Exhibit D - tape recording of 11 April 199410
During his testimony, Lim admitted that he did not know how to operate a tape recorder and that he asked either his
adopted daughter, Shirly Lim, or his housemaid to record petitioner Torralbas radio program. He maintained, however,
that he was near the radio whenever the recording took place and had actually heard petitioner Torralbas radio program
while it was being taped. This prompted petitioner Torralba to pose a continuing objection to the admission of the said
tape recordings for lack of proper authentication by the person who actually made the recordings. In the case of the
subject tape recordings, Lim admitted that they were recorded by Shirly Lim. The trial court provisionally admitted the tape
recordings subject to the presentation by the prosecution of Shirly Lim for the proper authentication of said pieces of
evidence. Despite petitioner Torralbas objection to the formal offer of these pieces of evidence, the court a quo eventually
admitted the three tape recordings into evidence.11
It was revealed during Lims cross-examination12 that petitioner Torralba previously instituted a criminal action for
libel13against the former arising from an article published in the Sunday Post, a newspaper of general circulation in the
provinces of Cebu and Bohol. In said case, Lim was found guilty as charged by the trial court 14 and this decision was
subsequently affirmed, with modification, by the Court of Appeals in its decision promulgated on 29 July 1996 in CA-G.R.
CR No. 16413 entitled, "People of the Philippines v. Segundo Lim and Boy Guingguing." 15 In our resolution of 04
December 1996, we denied Lims petition for review on certiorari.16
For his part, private complainant Atty. Hontanosas testified that he was at that time the chairman and manager of TMSI;
that on 20 January 1994, Lim presented to him a tape recording of petitioner Torralbas radio program aired on 18
January 1994 during which petitioner Torralba allegedly criticized him and stated that he was a person who could not be
trusted; that in his radio show on 25 January 1994, petitioner Torralba mentioned that "he was now [wary] to interview any
one because he had a sad experience with someone who betrayed him and this someone was like his father who was a
collaborator"; that on 12 April 1994, Lim brought to his office a tape recording of petitioner Torralbas radio program of 11

April 1994 during which petitioner Torralba averred that the Hontanosas were traitors to the land of their birth; that Judge
Agapito Hontanosas and Castor Hontanosas were collaborators during the Japanese occupation; and that after he
informed his siblings regarding this, they asked him to institute a case against petitioner Torralba.17
When he was cross-examined by petitioner Torralbas counsel, private complainant Atty. Hontanosas disclosed that he
did not actually hear petitioner Torralbas radio broadcasts and he merely relied on the tape recordings presented to him
by Lim as he believed them to be genuine.18
Sarmiento testified that he was the former court stenographer and interpreter of RTC, Branch 3, Tagbilaran City, and that
he translated the contents of the tape recordings in 1994 upon the request of private complainant Atty. Hontanosas.
The defense presented, as its sole witness, petitioner Torralba himself. Petitioner Torralba maintained that he was a
member of the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas and other civic organizations in Cebu. In the course of his
profession as a radio broadcaster, he allegedly received complaints regarding the services of TMSI particularly with
respect to the laborers low pay and exhorbitant rates being charged for the arrastre services. As he was in favor of
balanced programming, petitioner Torralba requested TMSI to send a representative to his radio show in order to give the
corporation an opportunity to address the issues leveled against it; thus, the radio interview of private complainant Atty.
Hontanosas
on
17 December 1993.
When petitioner Torralba was cross-examined by private complainant Atty. Hontanosas,19 he denied having called former
CFI Judge Hontanosas a traitor during his 11 April 1994 radio broadcast. Petitioner Torralba admitted, though, that during
the 17 December 1993 appearance of private complainant Atty. Hontanosas in his radio program, he did ask the latter if
he was in any way related to the late CFI Judge Hontanosas. Petitioner Torralba averred that he posed said question as
mere backgrounder on his interviewee.
On 24 August 2000, the trial court rendered an omnibus decision 20 acquitting petitioner Torralba in Crim. Cases No. 8956,
No. 8957, and No. 8958 but holding him guilty of the crime of libel in Crim. Case No. 9107. The dispositive portion of the
trial courts decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court hereby ACQUITS from criminal liability herein accused Cirse
Francisco Choy Torralba of the charges alluded in Criminal Cases Nos. 8956, 8957, and 8958 being an exercise of
legitimate self-defense, as afore-discussed. Consequently, the corresponding cash bonds of the accused in said cases as
shown by OR No. 5301156, No. 5301157, and No. 5301158, all dated February 23, 2000, issued by the Clerk of Court of
Multiple Salas in the amount of P4,200.00 each representing cash deposits therefore are hereby cancelled and released.
However, the Court finds the same accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt in Crim. Case No. 9107 for his
unwarranted blackening of the memory of the late Hon. CFI Judge Agapito Y. Hontanosas through the air lanes in his
radio program resulting to the dishonor and wounded feelings of his children, grandchildren, relatives, friends, and close
associates. For this, the Court hereby sentences the accused to imprisonment for an indeterminate period of FOUR
MONTHS of Arresto Mayor to THREE YEARS of Prision Correccional medium period pursuant to Art. 353 in relation to
Art. 354 and Art. 355 of the Revised Penal Code under which the instant case falls. Furthermore, he is ordered to
indemnify the heirs of the late Judge Agapito Y. Hontanosas for moral damages suffered in the amount of ONE MILLION
PESOS (P1,000,000.00), as prayed for, considering their good reputation and high social standing in the community and
the gravity of the dishonor and public humiliation caused.21
Petitioner Torralba seasonably filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals which, in the challenged decision before us,
affirmed, with modification, the findings of the court a quo, thus:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the court a quo is AFFIRMED with the modification that accused-appellant is
hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of four (4) months of arresto mayor to two (2) years, eleven (11) months and ten
(10) days of prision correccional and to pay moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00.22
Hence, the present recourse where petitioner Torralba raises the following issues:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SPEAKING THROUGH ITS SPECIAL FIFTEENTH DIVISION GRAVELY
ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT A QUO (WITH MODIFICATION), CONVICTING
PETITIONER-APPELLANT [TORRALBA] FOR THE CRIME OF LIBEL AS DEFINED AND PENALIZED UNDER

ARTICLES 353 AND 355 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE BASED SOLELY ON THE ALLEGED TESTIMONY OF
SEGUNDO LIM . . . AS BORNE OUT BY THE STENOGRAPHIC NOTES WOULD NOT SUPPORT THE FINDING THAT
HE TESTIFIED ON THE MALICIOUS IMPUTATIONS PURPORTEDLY MADE BY PETITIONER-APPELLANT
[TORRALBA] IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 9107.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY COMMITTED AN ERROR IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE AN
UNAUTHENTICATED AND SPURIOUS TAPE RECORD OF A RADIO BROADCAST (EXHIBIT "D") ALLEGEDLY BY
HEREIN PETITIONER-APPELLANT [TORRALBA] ON THE BASIS OF WHICH THE LATTER WAS CONVICTED FOR
THE CRIME OF LIBEL.
III
ASSUMING WITHOUT ADMITTING THAT PETITIONER-APPELLANT [TORRALBA] MADE UTTERANCES CONTAINED
IN THE TAPE RECORD MARKED AS EXHIBIT "D," THE HONORABLE COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT
CONSIDERING THE PRIVILEGE[D] NATURE OF HIS ALLEGED STATEMENTS IN FEALTY ADHERRENCE TO THE
LANDMARK DECISION OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT IN BORJAL VS. CA, 301 SCRA 01 (JAN. 14, 1999).
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR IN AWARDING DAMAGES AGAINST THE
PETITIONER ABSENT ANY SHOWING OF EVIDENT BAD FAITH ON THE PART OF THE PETITIONER-APPELLANT
[TORRALBA] WHO ACTED WITH UBERIMA FIDES (OVERWHELMING GOOD FAITH) IN EXERCISING THE
CONSTITUTIONALLY ENSHRINED FREEDOM OF THE PRESS (ARTICLE 2220, NEW CIVIL CODE). 23
This Court deems it proper to first resolve the issue of the propriety of the lower courts admission in evidence of the 11
April
1994
tape
recording.
Oddly, this matter was not addressed head-on by the Office of the Solicitor General in its comment.
Petitioner Torralba vigorously argues that the court a quo should not have given considerable weight on the tape
recording in question as it was not duly authenticated by Lims adopted daughter, Shirly Lim. Without said authentication,
petitioner Torralba continues, the tape recording is incompetent and inadmissible evidence. We agree.
It is generally held that sound recording is not inadmissible because of its form 24 where a proper foundation has been laid
to guarantee the genuineness of the recording.25 In our jurisdiction, it is a rudimentary rule of evidence that before a tape
recording is admissible in evidence and given probative value, the following requisites must first be established, to wit:
(1) a showing that the recording device was capable of taking testimony;
(2) a showing that the operator of the device was competent;
(3) establishment of the authenticity and correctness of the recording;
(4) a showing that changes, additions, or deletions have not been made;
(5) a showing of the manner of the preservation of the recording;
(6) identification of the speakers; and
(7) a showing that the testimony elicited was voluntarily made without any kind of inducement. 26
In one case, it was held that the testimony of the operator of the recording device as regards its operation, his method of
operating it, the accuracy of the recordings, and the identities of the persons speaking laid a sufficient foundation for the
admission of the recordings.27 Likewise, a witness declaration that the sound recording represents a true portrayal of the
voices contained therein satisfies the requirement of authentication.28 The party seeking the introduction in evidence of a
tape recording bears the burden of going forth with sufficient evidence to show that the recording is an accurate
reproduction of the conversation recorded.29

These requisites were laid down precisely to address the criticism of susceptibility to tampering of tape recordings. Thus,
it was held that the establishment of a proper foundation for the admission of a recording provided adequate assurance
that proper safeguards were observed for the preservation of the recording and for its protection against tampering.30
In the case at bar, one can easily discern that the proper foundation for the admissibility of the tape recording was not
adhered to. It bears stressing that Lim categorically admitted in the witness stand that he was not familiar at all with the
process of tape recording31 and that he had to instruct his adopted daughter to record petitioner Torralbas radio
broadcasts, thus:
ATTY. HONTANOSAS:
q Was this radio program of the accused recorded on April 11, 1994?
a Yes, sir.
q Who recorded the same radio program of April 11, 1994?
a It was my adopted daughter whom I ordered to tape recorded the radio program of Choy Torralba. 32
Clearly, Shirly Lim, the person who actually recorded petitioner Torralbas radio show on 11 April 1994, should have been
presented by the prosecution in order to lay the proper foundation for the admission of the purported tape recording for
said date. Without the requisite authentication, there was no basis for the trial court to admit the tape recording Exhibit
"D" in evidence.
In view of our disallowance of the 11 April 1994 tape recording, we are constrained to examine the records of this case in
order to determine the sufficiency of evidence stacked against petitioner Torralba, bearing in mind that in criminal cases,
the guilt of the accused can only be sustained upon proof beyond reasonable doubt.
In his comprehensive book on evidence, our former colleague, Justice Ricardo Francisco, wrote that "[e]vidence of a
message or a speech by means of radio broadcast is admissible as evidence when the identity of the speaker is
established either by the testimony of a witness who saw him broadcast his message or speech, or by the witness
recognition of the voice of the speaker."33
The records of this case are bereft of any proof that a witness saw petitioner Torralba broadcast the alleged libelous
remarks on 11 April 1994. Lim, however, stated that while petitioner Torralbas radio program on that date was being tape
recorded by his adopted daughter, he was so near the radio that he could even touch the same. 34 In effect, Lim was
implying that he was listening to "Tug-Ani ang Lungsod" at that time. In our view, such bare assertion on the part of Lim,
uncorroborated as it was by any other evidence, fails to meet the standard that a witness must be able to "recognize the
voice of the speaker." Being near the radio is one thing; actually listening to the radio broadcast and recognizing the voice
of the speaker is another. Indeed, a person may be in close proximity to said device without necessarily listening to the
contents of a radio broadcast or to what a radio commentator is saying over the airwaves.
What further undermines the credibility of Lims testimony is the fact that he had an ax to grind against petitioner Torralba
as he was previously accused by the latter with the crime of libel and for which he was found guilty as charged by the
court. Surely then, Lim could not present himself as an "uninterested witness" whose testimony merits significance from
this Court.
Nor is this Court inclined to confer probative value on the testimony of private complainant Atty. Hontanosas particularly in
the light of his declaration that he did not listen to petitioner Torralbas radio show subject of this petition. He simply relied
on the tape recording handed over to him by Lim.
Time and again, this Court has faithfully observed and given effect to the constitutional presumption of innocence which
can only be overcome by contrary proof beyond reasonable doubt -- one which requires moral certainty, a certainty that
convinces and satisfies the reason and conscience of those who are to act upon it. 35 As we have so stated in the past
Accusation is not, according to the fundamental law, synonymous with guilt, the prosecution must overthrow the
presumption of innocence with proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. To meet this standard, there is need for the most
careful scrutiny of the testimony of the State, both oral and documentary, independently of whatever defense is offered by
the accused. Only if the judge below and the appellate tribunal could arrive at a conclusion that the crime had been

committed precisely by the person on trial under such an exacting test should the sentence be one of conviction. It is thus
required that every circumstance favoring innocence be duly taken into account. The proof against him must survive the
test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. 36
Confronted with what the State was able to present as evidence against petitioner Torralba, this Court is compelled to
overturn the decision of the Court of Appeals due to insufficiency of evidence meriting a finding of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision promulgated on 22 May 2002 of the Court of Appeals, affirming
the omnibus decision dated 24 August 2000 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, Tagbilaran City, is
hereby REVERSEDand SET ASIDE. Instead, a new one is entered ACQUITTING petitioner Cirse Francisco "Choy"
Torralba of the crime of libel. The cash bond posted by said petitioner is ordered released to him subject to the usual
auditing and accounting procedures. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 110662 August 4, 1994

TERESITA
SALCEDO-ORTANEZ, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ROMEO F. ZAMORA, Presiding Judge, Br. 94, Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City and RAFAEL S. ORTANEZ, respondents.
Oscar A. Inocentes & Associates Law Office for petitioner.
Efren A. Santos for private respondent.

PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which seeks to reverse the decision * of respondent Court
of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 28545 entitled "Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez versus Hon. Romeo F. Zamora, Presiding
Judge, Br. 94, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and Rafael S. Ortanez".

The relevant facts of the case are as follows:

On 2 May 1990, private respondent Rafael S. Ortanez filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint
for annulment of marriage with damages against petitioner Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez, on grounds of lack of
marriage license and/or psychological incapacity of the petitioner. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. Q90-5360 and raffled to Branch 94, RTC of Quezon City presided over by respondent Judge Romeo F. Zamora.
Private respondent, after presenting his evidence, orally formally offered in evidence Exhibits "A" to "M".
Among the exhibits offered by private respondent were three (3) cassette tapes of alleged telephone conversations
between petitioner and unidentified persons.
Petitioner submitted her Objection/Comment to private respondent's oral offer of evidence on 9 June 1992; on the
same day, the trial court admitted all of private respondent's offered evidence.
A motion for reconsideration from petitioner was denied on 23 June 1992.
A petition for certiorari was then filed by petitioner in the Court of Appeals assailing the admission in evidence of the
aforementioned cassette tapes.
On 10 June 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment which is the subject of the present petition, which in part
reads:
It is much too obvious that the petition will have to fail, for two basic reasons:
(1) Tape recordings are not inadmissible per se. They and any other variant thereof can be admitted
in evidence for certain purposes, depending on how they are presented and offered and on how the
trial judge utilizes them in the interest of truth and fairness and the even handed administration of
justice.
(2) A petition for certiorari is notoriously inappropriate to rectify a supposed error in admitting
evidence adduced during trial. The ruling on admissibility is interlocutory; neither does it impinge on
jurisdiction. If it is erroneous, the ruling should be questioned in the appeal from the judgment on the
merits and not through the special civil action of certiorari. The error, assuming gratuitously that it
exists, cannot be anymore than an error of law, properly correctible by appeal and not
by certiorari. Otherwise, we will have the sorry spectacle of a case being subject of a
counterproductive "ping-pong" to and from the appellate court as often as a trial court is perceived to

have made an error in any of its rulings with respect to evidentiary matters in the course of trial. This
we cannot sanction.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari being devoid of merit, is hereby DISMISSED. 1

From this adverse judgment, petitioner filed the present petition for review, stating:
Grounds for Allowance of the Petition
10. The decision of respondent [Court of Appeals] has no basis in law nor previous decision of the
Supreme Court.
10.1 In affirming the questioned order of respondent judge, the Court of Appeals has
decided a question of substance not theretofore determined by the Supreme Court
as the question of admissibility in evidence of tape recordings has not, thus far, been
addressed and decided squarely by the Supreme Court.
11. In affirming the questioned order of respondent judge, the Court of Appeals has likewise
rendered a decision in a way not in accord with law and with applicable decisions of the Supreme
Court.
11.1 Although the questioned order is interlocutory in nature, the same can still be [the]
subject of a petition for certiorari. 2

The main issue to be resolved is whether or not the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was
properly availed of by the petitioner in the Court of Appeals.
The extraordinary writ of certiorari is generally not available to challenge an interlocutory order of a trial court. The
proper remedy in such cases is an ordinary appeal from an adverse judgment, incorporating in said appeal the
grounds for assailing the interlocutory order.
However, where the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford
adequate and expeditious relief, the Court may allow certiorari as a mode of redress. 3
In the present case, the trial court issued the assailed order admitting all of the evidence offered by private respondent,
including tape recordings of telephone conversations of petitioner with unidentified persons. These tape recordings were
made and obtained when private respondent allowed his friends from the military to wire tap his home telephone. 4

Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled "An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of the
Privacy of Communication, and for other purposes" expressly makes such tape recordings inadmissible in evidence.
The relevant provisions of Rep. Act No. 4200 are as follows:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any
private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device
or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken
word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or
walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or however otherwise described. . . .
Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport,
or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained, obtained or
secured by any person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be
admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or
investigation.
Clearly, respondents trial court and Court of Appeals failed to consider the afore-quoted provisions of the law in
admitting in evidence the cassette tapes in question. Absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone

conversations allowed the recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under Rep.
Act No. 4200.
Additionally, it should be mentioned that the above-mentioned Republic Act in Section 2 thereof imposes a penalty of
imprisonment of not less than six (6) months and up to six (6) years for violation of said Act. 5

We need not address the other arguments raised by the parties, involving the applicability of American
jurisprudence, having arrived at the conclusion that the subject cassette tapes are inadmissible in evidence under
Philippine law.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 28545 is hereby SET ASIDE. The subject
cassette tapes are declared inadmissible in evidence.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 168644

February 16, 2010

BSB
GROUP,
INC.,
represented
by
its
vs.
SALLY GO a.k.a. SALLY GO-BANGAYAN, Respondent.

President,

Mr.

RICARDO

BANGAYAN, Petitioner,

DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 876001 dated April 20, 2005, which reversed and set aside the September 13, 2004 2 and November 5,
20043Orders issued by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 36 4 in Criminal Case No. 02-202158 for qualified theft.
The said orders, in turn, respectively denied the motion filed by herein respondent Sally Go for the suppression of the
testimonial and documentary evidence relative to a Security Bank account, and denied reconsideration.
The basic antecedents are no longer disputed.
Petitioner, the BSB Group, Inc., is a duly organized domestic corporation presided by its herein representative, Ricardo
Bangayan (Bangayan). Respondent Sally Go, alternatively referred to as Sally Sia Go and Sally Go-Bangayan, is
Bangayans wife, who was employed in the company as a cashier, and was engaged, among others, to receive and
account for the payments made by the various customers of the company.
In 2002, Bangayan filed with the Manila Prosecutors Office a complaint for estafa and/or qualified theft5 against
respondent, alleging that several checks 6 representing the aggregate amount of P1,534,135.50 issued by the companys
customers in payment of their obligation were, instead of being turned over to the companys coffers, indorsed by
respondent who deposited the same to her personal banking account maintained at Security Bank and Trust Company
(Security Bank) in Divisoria, Manila Branch.7 Upon a finding that the evidence adduced was uncontroverted, the assistant
city prosecutor recommended the filing of the Information for qualified theft against respondent. 8
Accordingly, respondent was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 36, in an Information, the
inculpatory portion of which reads:
That in or about or sometime during the period comprised (sic) between January 1988 [and] October 1989, inclusive, in
the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent [to] gain
and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, take, steal and carry away cash money in the total amount
ofP1,534,135.50 belonging to BSB GROUP OF COMPANIES represented by RICARDO BANGAYAN, to the damage and
prejudice of said owner in the aforesaid amount of P1,534,135.50, Philippine currency.
That in the commission of the said offense, said accused acted with grave abuse of confidence, being then employed as
cashier by said complainant at the time of the commission of the said offense and as such she was entrusted with the said
amount of money.
Contrary to law.9
Respondent entered a negative plea when arraigned.10 The trial ensued. On the premise that respondent had allegedly
encashed the subject checks and deposited the corresponding amounts thereof to her personal banking account, the
prosecution moved for the issuance of subpoena duces tecum /ad testificandum against the respective managers or
records custodians of Security Banks Divisoria Branch, as well as of the Asian Savings Bank (now Metropolitan Bank &
Trust Co. [Metrobank]), in Jose Abad Santos, Tondo, Manila Branch. 11 The trial court granted the motion and issued the
corresponding subpoena.12
Respondent filed a motion to quash the subpoena dated November 4, 2003, addressed to Metrobank, noting to the court
that in the complaint-affidavit filed with the prosecutor, there was no mention made of the said bank account, to which
respondent, in addition to the Security Bank account identified as Account No. 01-14-006, allegedly deposited the
proceeds of the supposed checks. Interestingly, while respondent characterized the Metrobank account as irrelevant to
the case, she, in the same motion, nevertheless waived her objection to the irrelevancy of the Security Bank account
mentioned in the same complaint-affidavit, inasmuch as she was admittedly willing to address the allegations with respect
thereto.13

Petitioner, opposing respondents move, argued for the relevancy of the Metrobank account on the ground that the
complaint-affidavit showed that there were two checks which respondent allegedly deposited in an account with the said
bank.14 To this, respondent filed a supplemental motion to quash, invoking the absolutely confidential nature of the
Metrobank account under the provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1405. 15 The trial court did not sustain respondent;
hence, it denied the motion to quash for lack of merit.16
Meanwhile, the prosecution was able to present in court the testimony of Elenita Marasigan (Marasigan), the
representative of Security Bank. In a nutshell, Marasigans testimony sought to prove that between 1988 and 1989,
respondent, while engaged as cashier at the BSB Group, Inc., was able to run away with the checks issued to the
company by its customers, endorse the same, and credit the corresponding amounts to her personal deposit account with
Security Bank. In the course of the testimony, the subject checks were presented to Marasigan for identification and
marking as the same checks received by respondent, endorsed, and then deposited in her personal account with Security
Bank.17 But before the testimony could be completed, respondent filed a Motion to Suppress, 18 seeking the exclusion of
Marasigans testimony and accompanying documents thus far received, bearing on the subject Security Bank account.
This time respondent invokes, in addition to irrelevancy, the privilege of confidentiality under R.A. No. 1405.
The trial court, nevertheless, denied the motion in its September 13, 2004 Order.19 A motion for reconsideration was
subsequently filed, but it was also denied in the Order dated November 5, 2004. 20 These two orders are the subject of the
instant case.
Aggrieved, and believing that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in acting the way it did, respondent elevated the
matter to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Finding merit in the petition, the Court of Appeals
reversed and set aside the assailed orders of the trial court in its April 20, 2005 Decision. 21 The decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed orders dated September 13, 2004 and November 5, 2004
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The testimony of the SBTC representative is ordered stricken from the records.
SO ORDERED.22
With the denial of its motion for reconsideration, 23 petitioner is now before the Court pleading the same issues as those
raised before the lower courts.
In this Petition24 under Rule 45, petitioner averred in the main that the Court of Appeals had seriously erred in reversing
the assailed orders of the trial court, and in effect striking out Marasigans testimony dealing with respondents deposit
account with Security Bank.25 It asserted that apart from the fact that the said evidence had a direct relation to the subject
matter of the case for qualified theft and, hence, brings the case under one of the exceptions to the coverage of
confidentiality under R.A. 1405.26 Petitioner believed that what constituted the subject matter in litigation was to be
determined by the allegations in the information and, in this respect, it alluded to the assailed November 5, 2004 Order of
the trial court, which declared to be erroneous the limitation of the present inquiry merely to what was contained in the
information.27
For her part, respondent claimed that the money represented by the Security Bank account was neither relevant nor
material to the case, because nothing in the criminal information suggested that the money therein deposited was the
subject matter of the case. She invited particular attention to that portion of the criminal Information which averred that she
has stolen and carried away cash money in the total amount of P1,534,135.50. She advanced the notion that the term
"cash money" stated in the Information was not synonymous with the checks she was purported to have stolen from
petitioner and deposited in her personal banking account. Thus, the checks which the prosecution had Marasigan identify,
as well as the testimony itself of Marasigan, should be suppressed by the trial court at least for violating respondents right
to due process.28 More in point, respondent opined that admitting the testimony of Marasigan, as well as the evidence
pertaining to the Security Bank account, would violate the secrecy rule under R.A. No. 1405. 29
In its reply, petitioner asserted the sufficiency of the allegations in the criminal Information for qualified theft, as the same
has sufficiently alleged the elements of the offense charged. It posits that through Marasigans testimony, the Court would
be able to establish that the checks involved, copies of which were attached to the complaint-affidavit filed with the
prosecutor, had indeed been received by respondent as cashier, but were, thereafter, deposited by the latter to her
personal account with Security Bank. Petitioner held that the checks represented the cash money stolen by respondent
and, hence, the subject matter in this case is not only the cash amount represented by the checks supposedly stolen by
respondent, but also the checks themselves.30

We derive from the conflicting advocacies of the parties that the issue for resolution is whether the testimony of Marasigan
and the accompanying documents are irrelevant to the case, and whether they are also violative of the absolutely
confidential nature of bank deposits and, hence, excluded by operation of R.A. No. 1405. The question of admissibility of
the evidence thus comes to the fore. And the Court, after deliberative estimation, finds the subject evidence to be indeed
inadmissible.
Prefatorily, fundamental is the precept in all criminal prosecutions, that the constitutive acts of the offense must be
established with unwavering exactitude and moral certainty because this is the critical and only requisite to a finding of
guilt. 31 Theft is present when a person, with intent to gain but without violence against or intimidation of persons or force
upon things, takes the personal property of another without the latters consent. It is qualified when, among others, and as
alleged in the instant case, it is committed with abuse of confidence.32 The prosecution of this offense necessarily focuses
on the existence of the following elements: (a) there was taking of personal property belonging to another; (b) the taking
was done with intent to gain; (c) the taking was done without the consent of the owner; (d) the taking was done without
violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things; and (e) it was done with abuse of confidence.33 In turn,
whether these elements concur in a way that overcomes the presumption of guiltlessness, is a question that must pass
the test of relevancy and competency in accordance with Section 334 Rule 128 of the Rules of Court.

addressed by considering whether they have such direct relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or
non-existence; or whether they relate collaterally to a fact from which, by process of logic, an inference may be made as
to the existence or non-existence of the fact in issue.35
The fact in issue appears to be that respondent has taken away cash in the amount of P1,534,135.50 from the coffers of
petitioner. In support of this allegation, petitioner seeks to establish the existence of the elemental act of taking by
adducing evidence that respondent, at several times between 1988 and 1989, deposited some of its checks to her
personal account with Security Bank. Petitioner addresses the incongruence between the allegation of theft of cash in the
Information, on the one hand, and the evidence that respondent had first stolen the checks and deposited the same in her
banking account, on the other hand, by impressing upon the Court that there obtains no difference between cash and
check for purposes of prosecuting respondent for theft of cash. Petitioner is mistaken.
In theft, the act of unlawful taking connotes deprivation of personal property of one by another with intent to gain, and it is
immaterial that the offender is able or unable to freely dispose of the property stolen because the deprivation relative to
the offended party has already ensued from such act of execution. 36 The allegation of theft of money, hence, necessitates
that evidence presented must have a tendency to prove that the offender has unlawfully taken money belonging to
another. Interestingly, petitioner has taken pains in attempting to draw a connection between the evidence subject of the
instant review, and the allegation of theft in the Information by claiming that respondent had fraudulently deposited the
checks in her own name. But this line of argument works more prejudice than favor, because it in effect, seeks to

Moreover, that there is no difference between cash and check is true in other instances. In estafa by conversion, for
instance, whether the thing converted is cash or check, is immaterial in relation to the formal allegation in an information
for that offense; a check, after all, while not regarded as legal tender, is normally accepted under commercial usage as a
substitute for cash, and the credit it represents in stated monetary value is properly capable of appropriation. And it is in
this respect that what the offender does with the check subsequent to the act of unlawfully taking it becomes material
inasmuch as this offense is a continuing one.37 In other words, in pursuing a case for this offense, the prosecution may
establish its cause by the presentation of the checks involved. These checks would then constitute the best evidence to
establish their contents and to prove the elemental act of conversion in support of the proposition that the offender has
indeed indorsed the same in his own name.38
Theft, however, is not of such character. Thus, for our purposes, as the Information in this case accuses respondent of
having stolen cash, proof tending to establish that respondent has actualized her criminal intent by indorsing the checks
and depositing the proceeds thereof in her personal account, becomes not only irrelevant but also immaterial and, on that
score, inadmissible in evidence.
We now address the issue of whether the admission of Marasigans testimony on the particulars of respondents account
with Security Bank, as well as of the corresponding evidence of the checks allegedly deposited in said account,
constitutes an unallowable inquiry under R.A. 1405.

It is conceded that while the fundamental law has not bothered with the triviality of specifically addressing privacy rights
relative to banking accounts, there, nevertheless, exists in our jurisdiction a legitimate expectation of privacy governing
such accounts. The source of this right of expectation is statutory, and it is found in R.A. No. 1405,39 otherwise known as
the Bank Secrecy Act of 1955. 40
R.A. No. 1405 has two allied purposes. It hopes to discourage private hoarding and at the same time encourage the
people to deposit their money in banking institutions, so that it may be utilized by way of authorized loans and thereby
assist in economic development.41 Owing to this piece of legislation, the confidentiality of bank deposits remains to be a
basic state policy in the Philippines.42 Section 2 of the law institutionalized this policy by characterizing as absolutely
confidential in general all deposits of whatever nature with banks and other financial institutions in the country. It declares:
Section 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the Philippines including investments in
bonds issued by the Government of the Philippines, its political subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are hereby
considered as of an absolutely confidential nature and may not be examined, inquired or looked into by any person,
government official, bureau or office, except upon written permission of the depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or
upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or in cases where the money
deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation.
1avv phi1

Subsequent statutory enactments43 have expanded the list of exceptions to this policy yet the secrecy of bank deposits
still lies as the general rule, falling as it does within the legally recognized zones of privacy. 44 There is, in fact, much
disfavor to construing these primary and supplemental exceptions in a manner that would authorize unbridled discretion,
whether governmental or otherwise, in utilizing these exceptions as authority for unwarranted inquiry into bank accounts.
It is then perceivable that the present legal order is obliged to conserve the absolutely confidential nature of bank
deposits.45
The measure of protection afforded by the law has been explained in China Banking Corporation v. Ortega. 46 That case
principally addressed the issue of whether the prohibition against an examination of bank deposits precludes garnishment
in satisfaction of a judgment. Ruling on that issue in the negative, the Court found guidance in the relevant portions of the
legislative deliberations on Senate Bill No. 351 and House Bill No. 3977, which later became the Bank Secrecy Act, and it
held that the absolute confidentiality rule in R.A. No. 1405 actually aims at protection from unwarranted inquiry or
investigation if the purpose of such inquiry or investigation is merely to determine the existence and nature, as well as the
amount of the deposit in any given bank account. Thus,
x x x The lower court did not order an examination of or inquiry into the deposit of B&B Forest Development Corporation,
as contemplated in the law. It merely required Tan Kim Liong to inform the court whether or not the defendant B&B Forest
Development Corporation had a deposit in the China Banking Corporation only for purposes of the garnishment issued by
it, so that the bank would hold the same intact and not allow any withdrawal until further order. It will be noted from the
discussion of the conference committee report on Senate Bill No. 351 and House Bill No. 3977which later became
Republic Act No. 1405, that it was not the intention of the lawmakers to place banks deposits beyond the reach of
execution to satisfy a final judgmentThus:
x x x Mr. Marcos: Now, for purposes of the record, I should like the Chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means to
clarify this further. Suppose an individual has a tax case. He is being held liable by the Bureau of Internal Revenue [(BIR)]
or, say, P1,000.00 worth of tax liability, and because of this the deposit of this individual [has been] attached by the [BIR].
Mr. Ramos: The attachment will only apply after the court has pronounced sentence declaring the liability of such person.
But where the primary aim is to determine whether he has a bank deposit in order to bring about a proper assessment by
the [BIR], such inquiry is not allowed by this proposed law.
Mr. Marcos: But under our rules of procedure and under the Civil Code, the attachment or garnishment of money
deposited is allowed. Let us assume for instance that there is a preliminary attachment which is for garnishment or for
holding liable all moneys deposited belonging to a certain individual, but such attachment or garnishment will bring out
into the open the value of such deposit. Is that prohibited by... the law?
Mr. Ramos: It is only prohibited to the extent that the inquiry... is made only for the purpose of satisfying a tax liability
already declared for the protection of the right in favor of the government; but when the object is merely to inquire whether
he has a deposit or not for purposes of taxation, then this is fully covered by the law. x x x
Mr. Marcos: The law prohibits a mere investigation into the existence and the amount of the deposit.

Mr. Ramos: Into the very nature of such deposit. x x x47

In taking exclusion from the coverage of the confidentiality rule, petitioner in the instant case posits that the account
maintained by respondent with Security Bank contains the proceeds of the checks that she has fraudulently appropriated
is the subject matter in litigation. To highlight this thesis, petitioner avers, citing Mathay v. Consolidated Bank and Trust
Co.,48 that the subject matter of the action refers to the physical facts; the things real or personal; the money, lands,
chattels and the like, in relation to which the suit is prosecuted, which in the instant case should refer to the money
deposited in the Security Bank account.49 On the surface, however, it seems that petitioners theory is valid to a point, yet
a deeper treatment tends to show that it has argued quite off-tangentially. This, because, while Mathay did explain what
the subject matter of an action is, it nevertheless did so only to determine whether the class suit in that case was properly
brought to the court.
What indeed constitutes the subject matter in litigation in relation to Section 2 of R.A. No. 1405 has been pointedly and
amply addressed in Union Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,50 in which the Court noted that the inquiry into bank
deposits allowable under R.A. No. 1405 must be premised on the fact that the money deposited in the account is itself the
subject of the action.51 Given this perspective, we deduce that the subject matter of the action in the case at bar is to be
determined from the indictment that charges respondent with the offense, and not from the evidence sought by the
prosecution to be admitted into the records. In the criminal Information filed with the trial court, respondent, unqualifiedly
and in plain language, is charged with qualified theft by abusing petitioners trust and confidence and stealing cash in the
amount of P1,534,135.50. The said Information makes no factual allegation that in some material way involves the checks
subject of the testimonial and documentary evidence sought to be suppressed. Neither do the allegations in said
Information make mention of the supposed bank account in which the funds represented by the checks have allegedly
been kept.
In other words, it can hardly be inferred from the indictment itself that the Security Bank account is the ostensible subject
of the prosecutions inquiry. Without needlessly expanding the scope of what is plainly alleged in the Information, the
subject matter of the action in this case is the money amounting to P1,534,135.50 alleged to have been stolen by
respondent, and not the money equivalent of the checks which are sought to be admitted in evidence. Thus, it is that,
which the prosecution is bound to prove with its evidence, and no other.
It comes clear that the admission of testimonial and documentary evidence relative to respondents Security Bank account
serves no other purpose than to establish the existence of such account, its nature and the amount kept in it. It constitutes
an attempt by the prosecution at an impermissible inquiry into a bank deposit account the privacy and confidentiality of
which is protected by law. On this score alone, the objection posed by respondent in her motion to suppress should have
indeed put an end to the controversy at the very first instance it was raised before the trial court.
In sum, we hold that the testimony of Marasigan on the particulars of respondents supposed bank account with Security
Bank and the documentary evidence represented by the checks adduced in support thereof, are not only incompetent for
being excluded by operation of R.A. No. 1405. They are likewise irrelevant to the case, inasmuch as they do not appear to
have any logical and reasonable connection to the prosecution of respondent for qualified theft. We find full merit in and
affirm respondents objection to the evidence of the prosecution. The Court of Appeals was, therefore, correct in reversing
the assailed orders of the trial court.
A final note. In any given jurisdiction where the right of privacy extends its scope to include an individuals financial privacy
rights and personal financial matters, there is an intermediate or heightened scrutiny given by courts and legislators to
laws infringing such rights.52 Should there be doubts in upholding the absolutely confidential nature of bank deposits
against affirming the authority to inquire into such accounts, then such doubts must be resolved in favor of the former.
This attitude persists unless congress lifts its finger to reverse the general state policy respecting the absolutely
confidential nature of bank deposits.53
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87600 dated April 20,
2005, reversing the September 13, 2004 and November 5, 2004 Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 36
in Criminal Case No. 02-202158, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 176389

December 14, 2010

ANTONIO
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

LEJANO, Petitioner,

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 176864
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
HUBERT JEFFREY P. WEBB, ANTONIO LEJANO, MICHAEL A. GATCHALIAN, HOSPICIO FERNANDEZ, MIGUEL
RODRIGUEZ, PETER ESTRADA and GERARDO BIONG, Appellants.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
Brief Background
On June 30, 1991 Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters Carmela, nineteen years old, and Jennifer, seven, were brutally
slain at their home in Paraaque City. Following an intense investigation, the police arrested a group of suspects, some of
whom gave detailed confessions. But the trial court smelled a frame-up and eventually ordered them discharged. Thus,
the identities of the real perpetrators remained a mystery especially to the public whose interests were aroused by the
gripping details of what everybody referred to as the Vizconde massacre.
Four years later in 1995, the National Bureau of Investigation or NBI announced that it had solved the crime. It presented
star-witness Jessica M. Alfaro, one of its informers, who claimed that she witnessed the crime. She pointed to accused
Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio "Tony Boy" Lejano, Artemio "Dong" Ventura, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio "Pyke"
Fernandez, Peter Estrada, Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez, and Joey Filart as the culprits. She also tagged accused police
officer, Gerardo Biong, as an accessory after the fact. Relying primarily on Alfaro's testimony, on August 10, 1995 the
public prosecutors filed an information for rape with homicide against Webb, et al. 1
The Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City, Branch 274, presided over by Judge Amelita G. Tolentino, tried only seven of
the accused since Artemio Ventura and Joey Filart remained at large.2 The prosecution presented Alfaro as its main
witness with the others corroborating her testimony. These included the medico-legal officer who autopsied the bodies of
the victims, the security guards of Pitong Daan Subdivision, the former laundrywoman of the Webbs household, police
officer Biongs former girlfriend, and Lauro G. Vizconde, Estrellitas husband.
For their part, some of the accused testified, denying any part in the crime and saying they were elsewhere when it took
place. Webbs alibi appeared the strongest since he claimed that he was then across the ocean in the United States of
America. He presented the testimonies of witnesses as well as documentary and object evidence to prove this. In
addition, the defense presented witnesses to show Alfaro's bad reputation for truth and the incredible nature of her
testimony.
But impressed by Alfaros detailed narration of the crime and the events surrounding it, the trial court found a credible
witness in her. It noted her categorical, straightforward, spontaneous, and frank testimony, undamaged by grueling crossexaminations. The trial court remained unfazed by significant discrepancies between Alfaros April 28 and May 22, 1995
affidavits, accepting her explanation that she at first wanted to protect her former boyfriend, accused Estrada, and a
relative, accused Gatchalian; that no lawyer assisted her; that she did not trust the investigators who helped her prepare
her first affidavit; and that she felt unsure if she would get the support and security she needed once she disclosed all
about the Vizconde killings.
In contrast, the trial court thought little of the denials and alibis that Webb, Lejano, Rodriguez, and Gatchalian set up for
their defense. They paled, according to the court, compared to Alfaros testimony that other witnesses and the physical
evidence corroborated. Thus, on January 4, 2000, after four years of arduous hearings, the trial court rendered judgment,
finding all the accused guilty as charged and imposing on Webb, Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, and Rodriguez

the penalty of reclusion perpetua and on Biong, an indeterminate prison term of eleven years, four months, and one day
to twelve years. The trial court also awarded damages to Lauro Vizconde.3
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision, modifying the penalty imposed on Biong to six years
minimum and twelve years maximum and increasing the award of damages to Lauro Vizconde. 4 The appellate court did
not agree that the accused were tried by publicity or that the trial judge was biased. It found sufficient evidence of
conspiracy that rendered Rodriguez, Gatchalian, Fernandez, and Estrada equally guilty with those who had a part in
raping and killing Carmela and in executing her mother and sister.
On motion for reconsideration by the accused, the Court of Appeals' Special Division of five members voted three against
two to deny the motion,5 hence, the present appeal.
On April 20, 2010, as a result of its initial deliberation in this case, the Court issued a Resolution granting the request of
Webb to submit for DNA analysis the semen specimen taken from Carmelas cadaver, which specimen was then believed
still under the safekeeping of the NBI. The Court granted the request pursuant to section 4 of the Rule on DNA
Evidence6to give the accused and the prosecution access to scientific evidence that they might want to avail themselves
of, leading to a correct decision in the case.
Unfortunately, on April 27, 2010 the NBI informed the Court that it no longer has custody of the specimen, the same
having been turned over to the trial court. The trial record shows, however, that the specimen was not among the object
evidence that the prosecution offered in evidence in the case.
This outcome prompted accused Webb to file an urgent motion to acquit on the ground that the governments failure to
preserve such vital evidence has resulted in the denial of his right to due process.
Issues Presented
Accused Webbs motion to acquit presents a threshold issue: whether or not the Court should acquit him outright, given
the governments failure to produce the semen specimen that the NBI found on Carmelas cadaver, thus depriving him of
evidence that would prove his innocence.
In the main, all the accused raise the central issue of whether or not Webb, acting in conspiracy with Lejano, Gatchalian,
Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, Ventura, and Filart, raped and killed Carmela and put to death her mother and sister. But,
ultimately, the controlling issues are:

1. Whether or not Alfaros testimony as eyewitness, describing the crime and identifying Webb, Lejano,
Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, and two others as the persons who committed it, is entitled to
belief; and
2. Whether or not Webb presented sufficient evidence to prove his alibi and rebut Alfaros testimony that he
led the others in committing the crime.
The issue respecting accused Biong is whether or not he acted to cover up the crime after its commission.
The
Due to Loss of DNA Evidence

Right

to

Acquittal

Webb claims, citing Brady v. Maryland,7 that he is entitled to outright acquittal on the ground of violation of his right to due
process given the States failure to produce on order of the Court either by negligence or willful suppression the semen
specimen taken from Carmela.
The medical evidence clearly established that Carmela was raped and, consistent with this, semen specimen was found
in her. It is true that Alfaro identified Webb in her testimony as Carmelas rapist and killer but serious questions had been
raised about her credibility. At the very least, there exists a possibility that Alfaro had lied. On the other hand, the semen
specimen taken from Carmela cannot possibly lie. It cannot be coached or allured by a promise of reward or financial
support. No two persons have the same DNA fingerprint, with the exception of identical twins.8 If, on examination, the
DNA of the subject specimen does not belong to Webb, then he did not rape Carmela. It is that simple. Thus, the Court
would have been able to determine that Alfaro committed perjury in saying that he did.

Still, Webb is not entitled to acquittal for the failure of the State to produce the semen specimen at this late stage. For one
thing, the ruling in Brady v. Maryland9 that he cites has long be overtaken by the decision in Arizona v.
Youngblood,10where the U.S. Supreme Court held that due process does not require the State to preserve the semen
specimen although it might be useful to the accused unless the latter is able to show bad faith on the part of the
prosecution or the police. Here, the State presented a medical expert who testified on the existence of the specimen and
Webb in fact sought to have the same subjected to DNA test.
For, another, when Webb raised the DNA issue, the rule governing DNA evidence did not yet exist, the country did not yet
have the technology for conducting the test, and no Philippine precedent had as yet recognized its admissibility as
evidence. Consequently, the idea of keeping the specimen secure even after the trial court rejected the motion for DNA
testing did not come up. Indeed, neither Webb nor his co-accused brought up the matter of preserving the specimen in the
meantime.
Parenthetically, after the trial court denied Webbs application for DNA testing, he allowed the proceeding to move on
when he had on at least two occasions gone up to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court to challenge alleged
arbitrary actions taken against him and the other accused. 11 They raised the DNA issue before the Court of Appeals but
merely as an error committed by the trial court in rendering its decision in the case. None of the accused filed a motion
with the appeals court to have the DNA test done pending adjudication of their appeal. This, even when the Supreme
Court had in the meantime passed the rules allowing such test. Considering the accuseds lack of interest in having such
test done, the State cannot be deemed put on reasonable notice that it would be required to produce the semen specimen
at some future time.
Now, to the merit of the case.
Alfaros Story
Based on the prosecutions version, culled from the decisions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, on June 29, 1991
at around 8:30 in the evening, Jessica Alfaro drove her Mitsubishi Lancer, with boyfriend Peter Estrada as passenger, to
the Ayala Alabang Commercial Center parking lot to buy shabu from Artemio "Dong" Ventura. There, Ventura introduced
her to his friends: Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio "Tony Boy" Lejano, Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez, Hospicio "Pyke"
Fernandez, Michael Gatchalian, and Joey Filart. Alfaro recalled frequently seeing them at a shabu house in Paraaque in
January 1991, except Ventura whom she had known earlier in December 1990.
As Alfaro smoked her shabu, Webb approached and requested her to relay a message for him to a girl, whom she later
identified as Carmela Vizconde. Alfaro agreed. After using up their shabu, the group drove to Carmelas house at 80
Vinzons Street, Pitong Daan Subdivision, BF Homes, Paraaque City. Riding in her car, Alfaro and Estrada trailed Filart
and Rodriguez who rode a Mazda pick-up and Webb, Lejano, Ventura, Fernandez, and Gatchalian who were on a Nissan
Patrol car.
On reaching their destination, Alfaro parked her car on Vinzons Street, alighted, and approached Carmelas house. Alfaro
pressed the buzzer and a woman came out. Alfaro queried her about Carmela. Alfaro had met Carmela twice before in
January 1991. When Carmela came out, Alfaro gave her Webbs message that he was just around. Carmela replied,
however, that she could not go out yet since she had just arrived home. She told Alfaro to return after twenty minutes.
Alfaro relayed this to Webb who then told the group to drive back to the Ayala Alabang Commercial Center.
The group had another shabu session at the parking lot. After sometime, they drove back but only Alfaro proceeded to
Vinzons Street where Carmela lived. The Nissan Patrol and the Mazda pick-up, with their passengers, parked somewhere
along Aguirre Avenue. Carmela was at their garden. She approached Alfaro on seeing her and told the latter that she
(Carmela) had to leave the house for a while. Carmela requested Alfaro to return before midnight and she would leave the
pedestrian gate, the iron grills that led to the kitchen, and the kitchen door unlocked. Carmela also told Alfaro to blink her
cars headlights twice when she approached the pedestrian gate so Carmela would know that she had arrived.
Alfaro returned to her car but waited for Carmela to drive out of the house in her own car. Alfaro trailed Carmela up to
Aguirre Avenue where she dropped off a man whom Alfaro believed was Carmelas boyfriend. Alfaro looked for her group,
found them, and relayed Carmelas instructions to Webb. They then all went back to the Ayala Alabang Commercial
Center. At the parking lot, Alfaro told the group about her talk with Carmela. When she told Webb of Carmelas male
companion, Webbs mood changed for the rest of the evening ("bad trip").
Webb gave out free cocaine. They all used it and some shabu, too. After about 40 to 45 minutes, Webb decided that it
was time for them to leave. He said, "Pipilahan natin siya [Carmela] at ako ang mauuna." Lejano said, "Ako ang susunod"

and the others responded "Okay, okay." They all left the parking lot in a convoy of three vehicles and drove into Pitong
Daan Subdivision for the third time. They arrived at Carmelas house shortly before midnight.
Alfaro parked her car between Vizcondes house and the next. While waiting for the others to alight from their cars,
Fernandez approached Alfaro with a suggestion that they blow up the transformer near the Vizcondes residence to cause
a brownout ("Pasabugin kaya natin ang transformer na ito"). But Alfaro shrugged off the idea, telling Fernandez, "Malakas
lang ang tama mo." When Webb, Lejano, and Ventura were already before the house, Webb told the others again that
they would line up for Carmela but he would be the first. The others replied, "O sige, dito lang kami, magbabantay lang
kami."
Alfaro was the first to pass through the pedestrian gate that had been left open. Webb, Lejano, and Ventura followed her.
On entering the garage, Ventura using a chair mounted the hood of the Vizcondes Nissan Sentra and loosened the
electric bulb over it ("para daw walang ilaw"). The small group went through the open iron grill gate and passed the dirty
kitchen. Carmela opened the aluminum screen door of the kitchen for them. She and Webb looked each other in the eyes
for a moment and, together, headed for the dining area.
As she lost sight of Carmela and Webb, Alfaro decided to go out. Lejano asked her where she was going and she replied
that she was going out to smoke. As she eased her way out through the kitchen door, she saw Ventura pulling out a
kitchen drawer. Alfaro smoked a cigarette at the garden. After about twenty minutes, she was surprised to hear a
womans voice ask, "Sino yan?" Alfaro immediately walked out of the garden to her car. She found her other companions
milling around it. Estrada who sat in the car asked her, "Okay ba?"
After sitting in the car for about ten minutes, Alfaro returned to the Vizconde house, using the same route. The interior of
the house was dark but some light filtered in from outside. In the kitchen, Alfaro saw Ventura searching a ladys bag that
lay on the dining table. When she asked him what he was looking for, he said: "Ikaw na nga dito, maghanap ka ng susi."
She asked him what key he wanted and he replied: "Basta maghanap ka ng susi ng main door pati na rin ng susi ng
kotse." When she found a bunch of keys in the bag, she tried them on the main door but none fitted the lock. She also did
not find the car key.
Unable to open the main door, Alfaro returned to the kitchen. While she was at a spot leading to the dining area, she
heard a static noise (like a television that remained on after the station had signed off). Out of curiosity, she approached
the masters bedroom from where the noise came, opened the door a little, and peeked inside. The unusual sound grew
even louder. As she walked in, she saw Webb on top of Carmela while she lay with her back on the floor. Two bloodied
bodies lay on the bed. Lejano was at the foot of the bed about to wear his jacket. Carmela was gagged, moaning, and in
tears while Webb raped her, his bare buttocks exposed.
Webb gave Alfaro a meaningful look and she immediately left the room. She met Ventura at the dining area. He told her,
"Prepare an escape. Aalis na tayo." Shocked with what she saw, Alfaro rushed out of the house to the others who were
either sitting in her car or milling on the sidewalk. She entered her car and turned on the engine but she did not know
where to go. Webb, Lejano, and Ventura came out of the house just then. Webb suddenly picked up a stone and threw it
at the main door, breaking its glass frame.
As the three men approached the pedestrian gate, Webb told Ventura that he forgot his jacket in the house. But Ventura
told him that they could not get in anymore as the iron grills had already locked. They all rode in their cars and drove away
until they reached Aguirre Avenue. As they got near an old hotel at the Tropical Palace area, Alfaro noticed the Nissan
Patrol slow down. Someone threw something out of the car into the cogonal area.
The convoy of cars went to a large house with high walls, concrete fence, steel gate, and a long driveway at BF Executive
Village. They entered the compound and gathered at the lawn where the "blaming session" took place. It was here that
Alfaro and those who remained outside the Vizconde house learned of what happened. The first to be killed was
Carmelas mother, then Jennifer, and finally, Carmella. Ventura blamed Webb, telling him, "Bakit naman pati yung bata?"
Webb replied that the girl woke up and on seeing him molesting Carmela, she jumped on him, bit his shoulders, and
pulled his hair. Webb got mad, grabbed the girl, pushed her to the wall, and repeatedly stabbed her. Lejano excused
himself at this point to use the telephone in the house. Meanwhile, Webb called up someone on his cellular phone.
At around 2:00 in the morning, accused Gerardo Biong arrived. Webb ordered him to go and clean up the Vizconde house
and said to him, "Pera lang ang katapat nyan." Biong answered, "Okay lang." Webb spoke to his companions and told
them, "We dont know each other. We havent seen each otherbaka maulit yan." Alfaro and Estrada left and they drove
to her fathers house.12

1. The quality of the witness

Was Alfaro an ordinary subdivision girl who showed up at the NBI after four years, bothered by her conscience or egged
on by relatives or friends to come forward and do what was right? No. She was, at the time she revealed her story,
working for the NBI as an "asset," a stool pigeon, one who earned her living by fraternizing with criminals so she could
squeal on them to her NBI handlers. She had to live a life of lies to get rewards that would pay for her subsistence and
vices.
According to Atty. Artemio Sacaguing, former head of the NBI Anti-Kidnapping, Hijacking, and Armed Robbery Task Force
(AKHAR) Section, Alfaro had been hanging around at the NBI since November or December 1994 as an "asset." She
supplied her handlers with information against drug pushers and other criminal elements. Some of this information led to
the capture of notorious drug pushers like Christopher Cruz Santos and Orlando Bacquir. Alfaros tip led to the arrest of
the leader of the "Martilyo gang" that killed a police officer. Because of her talent, the task force gave her "very special
treatment" and she became its "darling," allowed the privilege of spending nights in one of the rooms at the NBI offices.
When Alfaro seemed unproductive for sometime, however, they teased her about it and she was piqued. One day, she
unexpectedly told Sacaguing that she knew someone who had the real story behind the Vizconde massacre. Sacaguing
showed interest. Alfaro promised to bring that someone to the NBI to tell his story. When this did not happen and
Sacaguing continued to press her, she told him that she might as well assume the role of her informant. Sacaguing
testified thus:

ATTY. ONGKIKO:
Q. Atty. Sacaguing, how did Jessica Alfaro become a witness in the Vizconde murder case? Will you tell the
Honorable Court?
xxxx
A. She told me. Your Honor, that she knew somebody who related to her the circumstances, I mean, the
details of the massacre of the Vizconde family. Thats what she told me, Your Honor.
ATTY. ONGKIKO:
Q. And what did you say?
xxxx
A. I was quite interested and I tried to persuade her to introduce to me that man and she promised that in
due time, she will bring to me the man, and together with her, we will try to convince him to act as a state
witness and help us in the solution of the case.
xxxx
Q. Atty. Sacaguing, were you able to interview this alleged witness?
WITNESS SACAGUING:
A. No, sir.
ATTY. ONGKIKO:
Q. Why not?
WITNESS SACAGUING:
A. Because Jessica Alfaro was never able to comply with her promise to bring the man to me. She told me
later that she could not and the man does not like to testify.

ATTY. ONGKIKO:
Q. All right, and what happened after that?
WITNESS SACAGUING:
A. She told me, "easy lang kayo, Sir," if I may quote, "easy lang Sir, huwag kayong"
COURT:
How was that?
WITNESS SACAGUING:
A. "Easy lang, Sir. Sir, relax lang, Sir, papapelan ko, papapelan ko na lang yan."
xxxx
ATTY. ONGKIKO:
Q. All right, and what was your reaction when Ms. Alfaro stated that "papapelan ko na lang yan?"
WITNESS SACAGUING:
A. I said, "hindi puwede yan, kasi hindi ka naman eye witness."
ATTY. ONGKIKO:
Q. And what was the reply of Ms. Alfaro?
WITNESS SACAGUING:
A. Hindi siya nakakibo, until she went away.
(TSN, May 28, 1996, pp. 49-50, 58, 77-79)
Quite significantly, Alfaro never refuted Sacaguings above testimony.
2. The suspicious details
But was it possible for Alfaro to lie with such abundant details some of which even tallied with the physical evidence at the
scene of the crime? No doubt, yes.
Firstly, the Vizconde massacre had been reported in the media with dizzying details. Everybody was talking about what
the police found at the crime scene and there were lots of speculations about them.
Secondly, the police had arrested some "akyat-bahay" group in Paraaque and charged them with the crime. The police
prepared the confessions of the men they apprehended and filled these up with details that the evidence of the crime
scene provided. Alfaros NBI handlers who were doing their own investigation knew of these details as well. Since Alfaro
hanged out at the NBI offices and practically lived there, it was not too difficult for her to hear of these evidentiary details
and gain access to the documents.
Not surprisingly, the confessions of some members of the Barroso "akyat bahay" gang, condemned by the Makati RTC as
fabricated by the police to pin the crime on them, shows how crime investigators could make a confession ring true by
matching some of its details with the physical evidence at the crime scene. Consider the following:

a. The Barroso gang members said that they got into Carmelas house by breaking the glass panel of the front door using
a stone wrapped in cloth to deaden the noise. Alfaro could not use this line since the core of her story was that Webb was
Carmelas boyfriend. Webb had no reason to smash her front door to get to see her.
Consequently, to explain the smashed door, Alfaro had to settle for claiming that, on the way out of the house, Webb
picked up some stone and, out of the blue, hurled it at the glass-paneled front door of the Vizconde residence. His action
really made no sense. From Alfaros narration, Webb appeared rational in his decisions. It was past midnight, the house
was dark, and they wanted to get away quickly to avoid detection. Hurling a stone at that glass door and causing a
tremendous noise was bizarre, like inviting the neighbors to come.
b. The crime scene showed that the house had been ransacked. The rejected confessions of the Barroso "akyat-bahay"
gang members said that they tried to rob the house. To explain this physical evidence, Alfaro claimed that at one point
Ventura was pulling a kitchen drawer, and at another point, going through a handbag on the dining table. He said he was
looking for the front-door key and the car key.
Again, this portion of Alfaros story appears tortured to accommodate the physical evidence of the ransacked house. She
never mentioned Ventura having taken some valuables with him when they left Carmelas house. And why would Ventura
rummage a bag on the table for the front-door key, spilling the contents, when they had already gotten into the house. It is
a story made to fit in with the crime scene although robbery was supposedly not the reason Webb and his companions
entered that house.
c. It is the same thing with the garage light. The police investigators found that the bulb had been loosened to turn off the
light. The confessions of the Barroso gang claimed that one of them climbed the parked cars hood to reach up and
darken that light. This made sense since they were going to rob the place and they needed time to work in the dark trying
to open the front door. Some passersby might look in and see what they were doing.
Alfaro had to adjust her testimony to take into account that darkened garage light. So she claimed that Ventura climbed
the cars hood, using a chair, to turn the light off. But, unlike the Barroso "akyat-bahay" gang, Webb and his friends did not
have anything to do in a darkened garage. They supposedly knew in advance that Carmela left the doors to the kitchen
open for them. It did not make sense for Ventura to risk standing on the cars hood and be seen in such an awkward
position instead of going straight into the house.
And, thirdly, Alfaro was the NBIs star witness, their badge of excellent investigative work. After claiming that they had
solved the crime of the decade, the NBI people had a stake in making her sound credible and, obviously, they gave her all
the preparations she needed for the job of becoming a fairly good substitute witness. She was their "darling" of an asset.
And this is not pure speculation. As pointed out above, Sacaguing of the NBI, a lawyer and a ranking official, confirmed
this to be a cold fact. Why the trial court and the Court of Appeals failed to see this is mystifying.
lavvphil

At any rate, did Alfaro at least have a fine memory for faces that had a strong effect on her, given the circumstances? Not
likely. She named Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez as one of the culprits in the Vizconde killings. But when the NBI found a
certain Michael Rodriguez, a drug dependent from the Bicutan Rehabilitation Center, initially suspected to be Alfaros
Miguel Rodriguez and showed him to Alfaro at the NBI office, she ran berserk, slapping and kicking Michael, exclaiming:
"How can I forget your face. We just saw each other in a disco one month ago and you told me then that you will kill me."
As it turned out, he was not Miguel Rodriguez, the accused in this case. 13
Two possibilities exist: Michael was really the one Alfaro wanted to implicate to settle some score with him but it was too
late to change the name she already gave or she had myopic vision, tagging the wrong people for what they did not do.
3. The quality of the testimony
There is another thing about a lying witness: her story lacks sense or suffers from inherent inconsistencies. An
understanding of the nature of things and the common behavior of people will help expose a lie. And it has an abundant
presence in this case.
One. In her desire to implicate Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, and Filart, who were supposed to be Webbs
co-principals in the crime, Alfaro made it a point to testify that Webb proposed twice to his friends the gang-rape of
Carmela who had hurt him. And twice, they (including, if one believes Alfaro, her own boyfriend Estrada) agreed in a
chorus to his proposal. But when they got to Carmelas house, only Webb, Lejano, Ventura, and Alfaro entered the house.

Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, and Rodriguez supposedly stayed around Alfaros car, which was parked on the street
between Carmelas house and the next. Some of these men sat on top of the cars lid while others milled on the sidewalk,
visible under the street light to anyone who cared to watch them, particularly to the people who were having a drinking
party in a nearby house. Obviously, the behavior of Webbs companions out on the street did not figure in a planned gangrape of Carmela.
Two. Ventura, Alfaros dope supplier, introduced her for the first time in her life to Webb and his friends in a parking lot by
a mall. So why would she agree to act as Webbs messenger, using her gas, to bring his message to Carmela at her
home. More inexplicably, what motivated Alfaro to stick it out the whole night with Webb and his friends?
They were practically strangers to her and her boyfriend Estrada. When it came to a point that Webb decided with his
friends to gang-rape Carmela, clearly, there was nothing in it for Alfaro. Yet, she stuck it out with them, as a police asset
would, hanging in there until she had a crime to report, only she was not yet an "asset" then. If, on the other hand, Alfaro
had been too soaked in drugs to think clearly and just followed along where the group took her, how could she remember
so much details that only a drug-free mind can?
Three. When Alfaro went to see Carmela at her house for the second time, Carmella told her that she still had to go out
and that Webb and his friends should come back around midnight. Alfaro returned to her car and waited for Carmela to
drive out in her own car. And she trailed her up to Aguirre Avenue where she supposedly dropped off a man whom she
thought was Carmelas boyfriend. Alfaros trailing Carmela to spy on her unfaithfulness to Webb did not make sense since
she was on limited errand. But, as a critical witness, Alfaro had to provide a reason for Webb to freak out and decide to
come with his friends and harm Carmela.
Four. According to Alfaro, when they returned to Carmelas house the third time around midnight, she led Webb, Lejano,
and Ventura through the pedestrian gate that Carmela had left open. Now, this is weird. Webb was the gang leader who
decided what they were going to do. He decided and his friends agreed with him to go to Carmelas house and gang-rape
her. Why would Alfaro, a woman, a stranger to Webb before that night, and obviously with no role to play in the gang-rape
of Carmela, lead him and the others into her house? It made no sense. It would only make sense if Alfaro wanted to feign
being a witness to something she did not see.
Five. Alfaro went out of the house to smoke at the garden. After about twenty minutes, a woman exclaimed, "Sino yan?"
On hearing this, Alfaro immediately walked out of the garden and went to her car. Apparently, she did this because she
knew they came on a sly. Someone other than Carmela became conscious of the presence of Webb and others in the
house. Alfaro walked away because, obviously, she did not want to get involved in a potential confrontation. This was
supposedly her frame of mind: fear of getting involved in what was not her business.
But if that were the case, how could she testify based on personal knowledge of what went on in the house? Alfaro had to
change that frame of mind to one of boldness and reckless curiosity. So that is what she next claimed. She went back into
the house to watch as Webb raped Carmela on the floor of the masters bedroom. He had apparently stabbed to death
Carmelas mom and her young sister whose bloodied bodies were sprawled on the bed. Now, Alfaro testified that she got
scared (another shift to fear) for she hurriedly got out of the house after Webb supposedly gave her a meaningful look.
Alfaro quickly went to her car, not minding Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, and Filart who sat on the car or
milled on the sidewalk. She did not speak to them, even to Estrada, her boyfriend. She entered her car and turned on the
engine but she testified that she did not know where to go. This woman who a few minutes back led Webb, Lejano, and
Ventura into the house, knowing that they were decided to rape and harm Carmela, was suddenly too shocked to know
where to go! This emotional pendulum swing indicates a witness who was confused with her own lies.
4. The supposed corroborations
Intending to provide corroboration to Alfaros testimony, the prosecution presented six additional witnesses:
Dr. Prospero A. Cabanayan, the NBI Medico-Legal Officer who autopsied the bodies of the victims, testified on the stab
wounds they sustained14 and the presence of semen in Carmelas genitalia,15 indicating that she had been raped.
Normal E. White, Jr., was the security guard on duty at Pitong Daan Subdivision from 7 p.m. of June 29 to 7 a.m. of June
30, 1991. He got a report on the morning of June 30 that something untoward happened at the Vizconde residence. He
went there and saw the dead bodies in the masters bedroom, the bag on the dining table, as well as the loud noise
emanating from a television set.16

White claimed that he noticed Gatchalian and his companions, none of whom he could identify, go in and out of Pitong
Daan Subdivision. He also saw them along Vinzons Street. Later, they entered Pitong Daan Subdivision in a three-car
convoy. White could not, however, describe the kind of vehicles they used or recall the time when he saw the group in
those two instances. And he did not notice anything suspicious about their coming and going.
But Whites testimony cannot be relied on. His initial claim turned out to be inaccurate. He actually saw Gatchalian and his
group enter the Pitong Daan Subdivision only once. They were not going in and out. Furthermore, Alfaro testified that
when the convoy of cars went back the second time in the direction of Carmelas house, she alone entered the
subdivision and passed the guardhouse without stopping. Yet, White who supposedly manned that guardhouse did not
notice her.
Surprisingly, White failed to note Biong, a police officer, entering or exiting the subdivision on the early morning of June 30
when he supposedly "cleaned up" Vizconde residence on Webbs orders. What is more, White did not notice Carmela
arrive with her mom before Alfaros first visit that night. Carmela supposedly left with a male companion in her car at
around 10:30 p.m. but White did not notice it. He also did not notice Carmela reenter the subdivision. White actually
discredited Alfaros testimony about the movements of the persons involved.
Further, while Alfaro testified that it was the Mazda pick-up driven by Filart that led the three-vehicle convoy,17 White
claimed it was the Nissan Patrol with Gatchalian on it that led the convoy since he would not have let the convoy in
without ascertaining that Gatchalian, a resident, was in it. Security guard White did not, therefore, provide corroboration to
Alfaros testimony.
1avv phi1

Justo Cabanacan, the security supervisor at Pitong Daan Subdivision testified that he saw Webb around the last week of
May or the first week of June 1991 to prove his presence in the Philippines when he claimed to be in the United States.
He was manning the guard house at the entrance of the subdivision of Pitong Daan when he flagged down a car driven by
Webb. Webb said that he would see Lilet Sy. Cabanacan asked him for an ID but he pointed to his United BF Homes
sticker and said that he resided there. Cabanacan replied, however, that Pitong Daan had a local sticker.
Cabanacan testified that, at this point, Webb introduced himself as the son of Congressman Webb. Still, the supervisor
insisted on seeing his ID. Webb grudgingly gave it and after seeing the picture and the name on it, Cabanacan returned
the same and allowed Webb to pass without being logged in as their Standard Operating Procedure required. 18
But Cabanacan's testimony could not be relied on. Although it was not common for a security guard to challenge a
Congressmans son with such vehemence, Cabanacan did not log the incident on the guardhouse book. Nor did he,
contrary to prescribed procedure, record the visitors entry into the subdivision. It did not make sense that Cabanacan was
strict in the matter of seeing Webbs ID but not in recording the visit.
Mila Gaviola used to work as laundry woman for the Webbs at their house at BF Homes Executive Village. She testified
that she saw Webb at his parents house on the morning of June 30, 1991 when she got the dirty clothes from the room
that he and two brothers occupied at about 4.a.m. She saw him again pacing the floor at 9 a.m. At about 1 p.m., Webb left
the house in t-shirt and shorts, passing through a secret door near the maids quarters on the way out. Finally, she saw
Webb at 4 p.m. of the same day.19
On cross-examination, however, Gaviola could not say what distinguished June 30, 1991 from the other days she was on
service at the Webb household as to enable her to distinctly remember, four years later, what one of the Webb boys did
and at what time. She could not remember any of the details that happened in the household on the other days. She
proved to have a selective photographic memory and this only damaged her testimony.
Gaviola tried to corroborate Alfaro's testimony by claiming that on June 30, 1991 she noticed bloodstains on Webb's tshirt.20 She did not call the attention of anybody in the household about it when it would have been a point of concern that
Webb may have been hurt, hence the blood.
Besides, Victoria Ventoso, the Webbs' housemaid from March 1989 to May 1992, and Sgt. Miguel Muoz, the Webbs'
security aide in 1991, testified that Gaviola worked for the Webbs only from January 1991 to April 1991. Ventoso further
testified that it was not Gaviola's duty to collect the clothes from the 2nd floor bedrooms, this being the work of the
housemaid charged with cleaning the rooms.
What is more, it was most unlikely for a laundrywoman who had been there for only four months to collect, as she
claimed, the laundry from the rooms of her employers and their grown up children at four in the morning while they were
asleep.

And it did not make sense, if Alfaros testimony were to be believed that Webb, who was so careful and clever that he
called Biong to go to the Vizconde residence at 2 a.m. to clean up the evidence against him and his group, would bring his
bloodied shirt home and put it in the hamper for laundrywoman Gaviola to collect and wash at 4 a.m. as was her
supposed habit.
Lolita De Birrer was accused Biongs girlfriend around the time the Vizconde massacre took place. Birrer testified that
she was with Biong playing mahjong from the evening of June 29, 1991 to the early morning of June 30, when Biong got a
call at around 2 a.m. This prompted him, according to De Birrer, to leave and go to BF. Someone sitting at the backseat of
a taxi picked him up. When Biong returned at 7 a.m. he washed off what looked like dried blood from his fingernails. And
he threw away a foul-smelling handkerchief. She also saw Biong take out a knife with aluminum cover from his drawer
and hid it in his steel cabinet.21
The security guard at Pitong Daan did not notice any police investigator flashing a badge to get into the village although
Biong supposedly came in at the unholy hour of two in the morning. His departure before 7 a.m. also remained unnoticed
by the subdivision guards. Besides, if he had cleaned up the crime scene shortly after midnight, what was the point of his
returning there on the following morning to dispose of some of the evidence in the presence of other police investigators
and on-lookers? In fact, why would he steal valuable items from the Vizconde residence on his return there hours later if
he had the opportunity to do it earlier?
At most, Birrers testimony only established Biongs theft of certain items from the Vizconde residence and gross neglect
for failing to maintain the sanctity of the crime scene by moving around and altering the effects of the crime. Birrers
testimony failed to connect Biong's acts to Webb and the other accused.
Lauro Vizconde testified about how deeply he was affected by the loss of her wife and two daughters. Carmella spoke to
him of a rejected suitor she called "Bagyo," because he was a Paraaque politicians son. Unfortunately, Lauro did not
appear curious enough to insist on finding out who the rejected fellow was. Besides, his testimony contradicts that of
Alfaro who testified that Carmela and Webb had an on-going relation. Indeed, if Alfaro were to be believed, Carmela
wanted Webb to come to her house around midnight. She even left the kitchen door open so he could enter the house.
5. The missing corroboration
There is something truly remarkable about this case: the prosecutions core theory that Carmela and Webb had been
sweethearts, that she had been unfaithful to him, and that it was for this reason that Webb brought his friends to her
house to gang-rape her is totally uncorroborated!
For instance, normally, if Webb, a Congressmans son, courted the young Carmela, that would be news among her circle
of friends if not around town. But, here, none of her friends or even those who knew either of them came forward to affirm
this. And if Webb hanged around with her, trying to win her favors, he would surely be seen with her. And this would all
the more be so if they had become sweethearts, a relation that Alfaro tried to project with her testimony.
But, except for Alfaro, the NBI asset, no one among Carmelas friends or her friends friends would testify ever hearing of
such relationship or ever seeing them together in some popular hangouts in Paraaque or Makati. Alfaros claim of a fivehour drama is like an alien page, rudely and unconnectedly inserted into Webb and Carmelas life stories or like a piece of
jigsaw puzzle trimmed to fit into the shape on the board but does not belong because it clashes with the surrounding
pieces. It has neither antecedent nor concomitant support in the verifiable facts of their personal histories. It is quite
unreal.
What is more, Alfaro testified that she saw Carmela drive out of her house with a male passenger, Mr. X, whom Alfaro
thought the way it looked was also Carmelas lover. This was the all-important reason Webb supposedly had for wanting
to harm her. Again, none of Carmelas relatives, friends, or people who knew her ever testified about the existence of
Mr.X in her life. Nobody has come forward to testify having ever seen him with Carmela. And despite the gruesome news
about her death and how Mr. X had played a role in it, he never presented himself like anyone who had lost a special
friend normally would. Obviously, Mr. X did not exist, a mere ghost of the imagination of Alfaro, the woman who made a
living informing on criminals.
Webbs U.S. Alibi
Among the accused, Webb presented the strongest alibi.

a. The travel preparations

Webb claims that in 1991 his parents, Senator Freddie Webb and his wife, Elizabeth, sent their son to the United
States (U.S.) to learn the value of independence, hard work, and money.22 Gloria Webb, his aunt, accompanied him.
Rajah Tours booked their flight to San Francisco via United Airlines. Josefina Nolasco of Rajah Tours confirmed that
Webb and his aunt used their plane tickets.
Webb told his friends, including his neighbor, Jennifer Claire Cabrera, and his basketball buddy, Joselito Orendain
Escobar, of his travel plans. He even invited them to his despedida party on March 8, 1991 at Faces Disco along
Makati Ave.23 On March 8,1991, the eve of his departure, he took girlfriend Milagros Castillo to a dinner at
Bunchums at the Makati Cinema Square. His basketball buddy Rafael Jose with Tina Calma, a blind date arranged
by Webb, joined them. They afterwards went to Faces Disco for Webb's despedida party. Among those present
were his friends Paulo Santos and Jay Ortega.24
b. The two immigration checks
The following day, March 9, 1991, Webb left for San Francisco, California, with his Aunt Gloria on board United
Airlines Flight 808.25 Before boarding his plane, Webb passed through the Philippine Immigration booth at the airport
to have his passport cleared and stamped. Immigration Officer, Ferdinand Sampol checked Webbs visa, stamped,
and initialed his passport, and let him pass through.26 He was listed on the United Airlines Flights Passenger
Manifest.27
On arrival at San Francisco, Webb went through the U.S. Immigration where his entry into that country was
recorded. Thus, the U.S. Immigration Naturalization Service, checking with its Non-immigrant Information System,
confirmed Webb's entry into the U.S. on March 9, 1991. Webb presented at the trial the INS Certification issued by
the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service,28 the computer-generated print-out of the US-INS indicating Webb's
entry on March 9, 1991,29 and the US-INS Certification dated August 31, 1995, authenticated by the Philippine
Department of Foreign Affairs, correcting an earlier August 10, 1995 Certification.30
c. Details of U.S. sojourn
In San Francisco, Webb and his aunt Gloria were met by the latters daughter, Maria Teresa Keame, who brought
them to Glorias house in Daly City, California. During his stay with his aunt, Webb met Christopher Paul Legaspi
Esguerra, Glorias grandson. In April 1991, Webb, Christopher, and a certain Daphne Domingo watched the concert
of Deelite Band in San Francisco.31 In the same month, Dorothy Wheelock and her family invited Webb to Lake
Tahoe to return the Webbs hospitality when she was in the Philippines.32
In May 1991, on invitation of another aunt, Susan Brottman, Webb moved to Anaheim Hills, California. 33During his
stay there, he occupied himself with playing basketball once or twice a week with Steven Keeler 34and working at his
cousin-in-laws pest control company.35 Webb presented the companys logbook showing the tasks he
performed,36 his paycheck,37 his ID, and other employment papers. On June 14, 1991 he applied for a driver's
license38 and wrote three letters to his friend Jennifer Cabrera.39
On June 28, 1991, Webbs parents visited him at Anaheim and stayed with the Brottmans. On the same day, his
father introduced Honesto Aragon to his son when he came to visit.40 On the following day, June 29, Webb, in the
company of his father and Aragon went to Riverside, California, to look for a car. They bought an MR2 Toyota
car.41 Later that day, a visitor at the Brottmans, Louis Whittacker, saw Webb looking at the plates of his new
car.42 To prove the purchase, Webb presented the Public Records of California Department of Motor Vehicle 43 and a
car plate "LEW WEBB."44 In using the car in the U.S., Webb even received traffic citations.45
On June 30, 1991 Webb, again accompanied by his father and Aragon,46 bought a bicycle at Orange Cycle
Center.47 The Center issued Webb a receipt dated June 30, 1991.48 On July 4, 1991, Independence Day, the
Webbs, the Brottmans, and the Vaca family had a lakeside picnic.49
Webb stayed with the Brottmans until mid July and rented a place for less than a month. On August 4, 1991 he left
for Longwood, Florida, to stay with the spouses Jack and Sonja Rodriguez.50 There, he met Armando Rodriguez
with whom he spent time, playing basketball on weekends, watching movies, and playing billiards. 51 In November

1991, Webb met performing artist Gary Valenciano, a friend of Jack Rodriguez, who was invited for a dinner at the
Rodriguezs house.52 He left the Rodriguezs home in August 1992, returned to Anaheim and stayed with his aunt
Imelda Pagaspas. He stayed there until he left for the Philippines on October 26, 1992.
d. The second immigration checks
As with his trip going to the U.S., Webb also went through both the U.S. and Philippine immigrations on his return
trip. Thus, his departure from the U.S. was confirmed by the same certifications that confirmed his
entry.53 Furthermore, a Diplomatic Note of the U.S. Department of State with enclosed letter from Acting Director
Debora A. Farmer of the Records Operations, Office of Records of the US-INS stated that the Certification dated
August 31, 1995 is a true and accurate statement. And when he boarded his plane, the Passenger Manifest of
Philippine Airlines Flight No. 103,54 certified by Agnes Tabuena55 confirmed his return trip.
When he arrived in Manila, Webb again went through the Philippine Immigration. In fact, the arrival stamp and initial
on his passport indicated his return to Manila on October 27, 1992. This was authenticated by Carmelita Alipio, the
immigration officer who processed Webbs reentry.56 Upon his return, in October 1992, Paolo Santos, Joselito
Erondain Escobar, and Rafael Jose once again saw Webb playing basketball at the BF's Phase III basketball court.
e. Alibi versus positive identification
The trial court and the Court of Appeals are one in rejecting as weak Webbs alibi. Their reason is uniform: Webbs
alibi cannot stand against Alfaros positive identification of him as the rapist and killer of Carmela and, apparently,
the killer as well of her mother and younger sister. Because of this, to the lower courts, Webbs denial and alibi were
fabricated.
But not all denials and alibis should be regarded as fabricated. Indeed, if the accused is truly innocent, he can have
no other defense but denial and alibi. So how can such accused penetrate a mind that has been made cynical by
the rule drilled into his head that a defense of alibi is a hangmans noose in the face of a witness positively swearing,
"I saw him do it."? Most judges believe that such assertion automatically dooms an alibi which is so easy to
fabricate. This quick stereotype thinking, however, is distressing. For how else can the truth that the accused is
really innocent have any chance of prevailing over such a stone-cast tenet?
There is only one way. A judge must keep an open mind. He must guard against slipping into hasty conclusion, often
arising from a desire to quickly finish the job of deciding a case. A positive declaration from a witness that he saw the
accused commit the crime should not automatically cancel out the accuseds claim that he did not do it. A lying witness
can make as positive an identification as a truthful witness can. The lying witness can also say as forthrightly and
unequivocally, "He did it!" without blinking an eye.
Rather, to be acceptable, the positive identification must meet at least two criteria:
First, the positive identification of the offender must come from a credible witness. She is credible who can be trusted to
tell the truth, usually based on past experiences with her. Her word has, to one who knows her, its weight in gold.
And second, the witness story of what she personally saw must be believable, not inherently contrived. A witness who
testifies about something she never saw runs into inconsistencies and makes bewildering claims.
Here, as already fully discussed above, Alfaro and her testimony fail to meet the above criteria.
She did not show up at the NBI as a spontaneous witness bothered by her conscience. She had been hanging around
that agency for sometime as a stool pigeon, one paid for mixing up with criminals and squealing on them. Police assets
are often criminals themselves. She was the prosecutions worst possible choice for a witness. Indeed, her superior
testified that she volunteered to play the role of a witness in the Vizconde killings when she could not produce a man she
promised to the NBI.
And, although her testimony included details, Alfaro had prior access to the details that the investigators knew of the case.
She took advantage of her familiarity with these details to include in her testimony the clearly incompatible act of Webb
hurling a stone at the front door glass frames even when they were trying to slip away quietlyjust so she can
accommodate this crime scene feature. She also had Ventura rummaging a bag on the dining table for a front door key

that nobody needed just to explain the physical evidence of that bag and its scattered contents. And she had Ventura
climbing the cars hood, risking being seen in such an awkward position, when they did not need to darken the garage to
force open the front doorjust so to explain the darkened light and foot prints on the car hood.
Further, her testimony was inherently incredible. Her story that Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, and Filart
agreed to take their turns raping Carmela is incongruent with their indifference, exemplified by remaining outside the
house, milling under a street light, visible to neighbors and passersby, and showing no interest in the developments inside
the house, like if it was their turn to rape Carmela. Alfaros story that she agreed to serve as Webbs messenger to
Carmela, using up her gas, and staying with him till the bizarre end when they were practically strangers, also taxes
incredulity.
To provide basis for Webbs outrage, Alfaro said that she followed Carmela to the main road to watch her let off a lover on
Aguirre Avenue. And, inexplicably, although Alfaro had only played the role of messenger, she claimed leading Webb,
Lejano, and Ventura into the house to gang-rape Carmella, as if Alfaro was establishing a reason for later on testifying on
personal knowledge. Her swing from an emotion of fear when a woman woke up to their presence in the house and of
absolute courage when she nonetheless returned to become the lone witness to a grim scene is also quite inexplicable.
Ultimately, Alfaros quality as a witness and her inconsistent, if not inherently unbelievable, testimony cannot be the
positive identification that jurisprudence acknowledges as sufficient to jettison a denial and an alibi.
f. A documented alibi
To establish alibi, the accused must prove by positive, clear, and satisfactory evidence 57 that (a) he was present at
another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was physically impossible for him to be at the
scene of the crime.58
The courts below held that, despite his evidence, Webb was actually in Paraaque when the Vizconde killings took place;
he was not in the U.S. from March 9, 1991 to October 27, 1992; and if he did leave on March 9, 1991, he actually returned
before June 29, 1991, committed the crime, erased the fact of his return to the Philippines from the records of the U.S.
and Philippine Immigrations, smuggled himself out of the Philippines and into the U.S., and returned the normal way on
October 27, 1992. But this ruling practically makes the death of Webb and his passage into the next life the only
acceptable alibi in the Philippines. Courts must abandon this unjust and inhuman paradigm.
If one is cynical about the Philippine system, he could probably claim that Webb, with his fathers connections, can
arrange for the local immigration to put a March 9, 1991 departure stamp on his passport and an October 27, 1992 arrival
stamp on the same. But this is pure speculation since there had been no indication that such arrangement was made.
Besides, how could Webb fix a foreign airlines passenger manifest, officially filed in the Philippines and at the airport in
the U.S. that had his name on them? How could Webb fix with the U.S. Immigrations record system those two dates in its
record of his travels as well as the dates when he supposedly departed in secret from the U.S. to commit the crime in the
Philippines and then return there? No one has come up with a logical and plausible answer to these questions.
The Court of Appeals rejected the evidence of Webbs passport since he did not leave the original to be attached to the
record. But, while the best evidence of a document is the original, this means that the same is exhibited in court for the
adverse party to examine and for the judge to see. As Court of Appeals Justice Tagle said in his dissent,59 the practice
when a party does not want to leave an important document with the trial court is to have a photocopy of it marked as
exhibit and stipulated among the parties as a faithful reproduction of the original. Stipulations in the course of trial are
binding on the parties and on the court.
The U.S. Immigration certification and the computer print-out of Webbs arrival in and departure from that country were
authenticated by no less than the Office of the U.S. Attorney General and the State Department. Still the Court of Appeals
refused to accept these documents for the reason that Webb failed to present in court the immigration official who
prepared the same. But this was unnecessary. Webbs passport is a document issued by the Philippine government,
which under international practice, is the official record of travels of the citizen to whom it is issued. The entries in that
passport are presumed true.60
The U.S. Immigration certification and computer print-out, the official certifications of which have been authenticated by
the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs, merely validated the arrival and departure stamps of the U.S. Immigration
office on Webbs passport. They have the same evidentiary value. The officers who issued these certifications need not
be presented in court to testify on them. Their trustworthiness arises from the sense of official duty and the penalty
attached to a breached duty, in the routine and disinterested origin of such statement and in the publicity of the record. 61

The Court of Appeals of course makes capital of the fact that an earlier certification from the U.S. Immigration office said
that it had no record of Webb entering the U.S. But that erroneous first certification was amply explained by the U.S.
Government and Court of Appeals Justice Tagle stated it in his dissenting opinion, thus:
While it is true that an earlier Certification was issued by the U.S. INS on August 16, 1995 finding "no evidence of lawful
admission of Webb," this was already clarified and deemed erroneous by no less than the US INS Officials. As explained
by witness Leo Herrera-Lim, Consul and Second Secretary of the Philippine Embassy in Washington D.C., said
Certification did not pass through proper diplomatic channels and was obtained in violation of the rules on protocol and
standard procedure governing such request.
The initial request was merely initiated by BID Commissioner Verceles who directly communicated with the Philippine
Consulate in San Francisco, USA, bypassing the Secretary of Foreign Affairs which is the proper protocol procedure. Mr.
Steven Bucher, the acting Chief of the Records Services Board of US-INS Washington D.C. in his letter addressed to
Philip Antweiler, Philippine Desk Officer, State Department, declared the earlier Certification as incorrect and erroneous
as it was "not exhaustive and did not reflect all available information." Also, Richard L. Huff, Co-Director of the Office of
Information and privacy, US Department of Justice, in response to the appeal raised by Consul General Teresita V.
Marzan, explained that "the INS normally does not maintain records on individuals who are entering the country as visitors
rather than as immigrants: and that a notation concerning the entry of a visitor may be made at the Nonimmigrant
Information system. Since appellant Webb entered the U.S. on a mere tourist visa, obviously, the initial search could not
have produced the desired result inasmuch as the data base that was looked into contained entries of the names of
IMMIGRANTS and not that of NON-IMMIGRANT visitors of the U.S..62
The trial court and the Court of Appeals expressed marked cynicism over the accuracy of travel documents like the
passport as well as the domestic and foreign records of departures and arrivals from airports. They claim that it would not
have been impossible for Webb to secretly return to the Philippines after he supposedly left it on March 9, 1991, commit
the crime, go back to the U.S., and openly return to the Philippines again on October 26, 1992. Travel between the U.S.
and the Philippines, said the lower courts took only about twelve to fourteen hours.
If the Court were to subscribe to this extremely skeptical view, it might as well tear the rules of evidence out of the law
books and regard suspicions, surmises, or speculations as reasons for impeaching evidence. It is not that official records,
which carry the presumption of truth of what they state, are immune to attack. They are not. That presumption can be
overcome by evidence. Here, however, the prosecution did not bother to present evidence to impeach the entries in
Webbs passport and the certifications of the Philippine and U.S. immigration services regarding his travel to the U.S. and
back. The prosecutions rebuttal evidence is the fear of the unknown that it planted in the lower courts minds.
7. Effect of Webbs alibi to others
Webbs documented alibi altogether impeaches Alfaro's testimony, not only with respect to him, but also with respect to
Lejano, Estrada, Fernandez, Gatchalian, Rodriguez, and Biong. For, if the Court accepts the proposition that Webb was in
the U.S. when the crime took place, Alfaros testimony will not hold together. Webbs participation is the anchor of Alfaros
story. Without it, the evidence against the others must necessarily fall.
CONCLUSION
In our criminal justice system, what is important is, not whether the court entertains doubts about the innocence of the
accused since an open mind is willing to explore all possibilities, but whether it entertains a reasonable, lingering doubt as
to his guilt. For, it would be a serious mistake to send an innocent man to jail where such kind of doubt hangs on to ones
inner being, like a piece of meat lodged immovable between teeth.
Will the Court send the accused to spend the rest of their lives in prison on the testimony of an NBI asset who proposed to
her handlers that she take the role of the witness to the Vizconde massacre that she could not produce?
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Decision dated December 15, 2005 and Resolution dated
January 26, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. 00336 and ACQUITS accused-appellants Hubert Jeffrey P.
Webb, Antonio Lejano, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio Fernandez, Miguel Rodriguez, Peter Estrada and Gerardo Biong
of the crimes of which they were charged for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. They
are ordered immediately RELEASED from detention unless they are confined for another lawful cause.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director, Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City for immediate
implementation. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED to report the action he has taken to this Court
within five days from receipt of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
DISSENTING OPINION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
With all due respect to my colleagues, I dissent from the majority decision acquitting all the accused-appellants.
In the middle part of 1991, the gruesome deaths of 19-year old Carmela Vizconde, her mother Estrellita and 7-year old
sister Jennifer in the hands of unknown assailants inside their home in a private subdivision shocked our countrymen and
alarmed the authorities of the rise in heinous crimes, particularly those committed by individuals under the influence of
drugs. Investigations conducted by the police and other bodies including the Senate, and even the arrest of two (2) sets of
suspects ("akyat-bahay" gang and former contractor/workers of the Vizcondes), failed to unravel the truth behind the
brutal killings until an alleged eyewitness surfaced four (4) years later. The ensuing courtroom saga involving sons of
prominent families had become one (1) of the most controversial cases in recent history as the entire nation awaited its
long-delayed closure.
The Case
Subject of review is the Decision1 dated December 15, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR H.C. No. 00336
affirming with modifications the Decision dated January 4, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Paraaque City,
Branch 274 finding the accused-appellants Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio "Tony Boy" Lejano, Michael A. Gatchalian,
Hospicio "Pyke" Fernandez, Peter Estrada and Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals,
and accused-appellant Gerardo Biong as accessory, of the crime of Rape with Homicide.
The petition for review on certiorari filed earlier by accused Lejano (G.R. No. 176389) is hereby treated as an appeal,
considering that said accused had in fact filed a notice of appeal with the CA.2 In view of the judgment of the CA imposing
the penalty of reclusion perpetua, such appeal by notice of appeal is in accord with A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC (Amendments to
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure to Govern Death Penalty Cases)3 which provides under Rule 124 (c):
(c) In cases where the Court of Appeals imposes reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or a lesser penalty, it shall render
and enter judgment imposing such penalty. The judgment may be appealed to the Supreme Court by notice of appeal
filed with the Court of Appeals.
Accordingly, G.R. No. 176389 was consolidated with the present appeal by all accused (G.R. No. 176864) except Artemio
Ventura and Joey Filart who are still at large.4 Only Webb and Gatchalian filed their respective supplemental briefs in
compliance with our April 10, 2007 Resolution.5
The Facts
The Information filed on August 10, 1995 reads:
That on or about the evening of June 29 up to the early morning of June 30, 1991, in the municipality of Paraaque,
province of Rizal, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb
conspiring and confederating with accused Antonio "Tony Boy" Lejano, Artemio "Dong" Ventura, Michael Gatchalian y
Adviento, Hospicio "Pyke" Fernandez, Peter Estrada, Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez and Joey Filart, mutually helping one
another, while armed with bladed instruments, with the use of force and intimidation, with lewd design, with abuse of
superior strength, nighttime and with the use of motor vehicle, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge
of the person of Carmela Vizconde against her will and consent.
That by reason or on the occasion of the aforesaid rape or immediately thereafter, the above-named accused with intent
to kill, conspiring and confederating together, mutually helping one another, did then and there, and with evident
premeditation, abuse of superior strength, nighttime, with the use of motor vehicle, assault and stab with bladed
instruments Carmela Vizconde, Estrellita Vizconde and Jennifer Vizconde, thereby inflicting upon them numerous stab
wounds in different parts of their bodies which caused their instantaneous death.

That accused GERARDO BIONG and JOHN DOES having knowledge after the commission of the above-mentioned
crime, and without having participated therein as principals or accomplices, took part subsequent to its commission by
assisting, with abuse of authority as a police officer, the above-named principal accused, to conceal or destroy the effects
or instruments thereof by failing to preserve the physical evidence and allowing their destruction in order to prevent the
discovery of the crime.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
The RTC and CA concurred in their factual findings based mainly on the testimony of the prosecutions principal witness,
Jessica M. Alfaro who is a confessed former drug user, the declarations of four (4) other witnesses and documentary
exhibits.
Alfaro testified that on June 29, 1991 at around 8:30 in the evening, she drove her Mitsubishi Lancer and, with her then
boyfriend Peter Estrada, went to the Ayala Alabang Commercial Center parking lot to get her order of one (1) gram
ofshabu from Artemio "Dong" Ventura. There she met and was introduced to Venturas friends: Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb,
Antonio "Tony Boy" Lejano, Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez, Hospicio "Pyke" Fernandez, Michael Gatchalian and Joey Filart
(she had previously seen them in a shabu house located in Paraaque which they frequented as early as January
1991,7 while she had known Ventura since December 19908). After paying for her shabu and while she was smoking it,
Webb approached her and requested a favor for her to relay a message to a certain girl who happened to be Carmela, to
which she agreed. After the group finished their shabu session, they proceeded to Carmelas place at No. 80 Vinzons
Street, Pitong Daan Subdivision, BF Homes, Paraaque City. She and Estrada in her car followed the two (2) vehicles:
Webb, Lejano, Ventura, Fernandez and Gatchalian on board a Nissan Patrol car; while Filart and Rodriguez rode a
Mazda pick-up.9
Upon reaching the area, Alfaro parked her car along Vinzons St. and approached the gate of the house pointed to by
Webb. She pressed the buzzer and when a woman came out, she asked for Carmela. When she was able to talk to
Carmela (an acquaintance she had met only twice in January 1991 10), Alfaro relayed Webbs message that he was
around. However, Carmela said she cannot make it as she had just arrived home and told Alfaro to come back after
twenty (20) minutes. She relayed the answer of Carmela to Webb who then instructed the group to return to Ayala
Alabang Commercial Center.11
At the same parking lot, the group had another shabu session before proceeding again to Carmelas residence in a
convoy. Alfaro went to Vinzons St. alone while the Nissan Patrol and Mazda parked somewhere along Aguirre Avenue.
Upon seeing Carmela who was at their garden, Alfaro was approached by Carmela saying she was going out for a while.
Carmela told Alfaro that they come back before 12:00 midnight and she would just leave the pedestrian gate, as well as
the iron grill gate leading to the kitchen door, open and unlocked. 12 Carmela further instructed Alfaro to blink her cars
headlights twice before reaching the pedestrian gate to signal her arrival. Alfaro returned to her car but waited for
Carmelas car to get out of the gate. Carmela drove ahead and Alfaro likewise left Vinzons St. Upon reaching the main
road, Aguirre Avenue, she saw Carmela drop off the man who was with her in the car (whom she thought to be her
boyfriend13). Alfaro looked for the group and relayed Carmelas instructions to Webb. Thereafter, they all went back to the
Ayala Alabang Commercial Center.14
At the parking lot, Alfaro relayed to the group what transpired during her last conversation with Carmela. She also told
Webb about Carmelas male companion; this changed his mood for the rest of the evening ("bad trip" already15). Webb
then gave out complimentary cocaine and all of them used shabu and/or cocaine.16 After about 40 to 45 minutes, Webb
decided it was time to leave, declaring: "Pipilahan natin siya [Carmela] at ako ang mauuna." Lejano said: "Ako ang
susunod" and the others responded "Okay, okay." They all left the parking lot and their convoy of three (3) vehicles
entered Pitong Daan Subdivision for the third time. They arrived at the Vizconde residence between 11:45 to 11:55 p.m. 17
Alfaro parked her car in between the Vizconde house and its adjacent house. While waiting for the rest of the group to
alight from their cars, Fernandez approached her suggesting that they blow up the transformer near the pedestrian gate of
the Vizconde residence in order to cause a brownout ("Pasabugin kaya natin ang transformer na ito"). She shrugged off
the idea and told Fernandez "Malakas lang ang tama mo." When Webb, Lejano and Ventura were already standing infront
of the Vizconde residence, Webb repeated to the boys that they will line up for Carmela but he will be the first, and the
others said, "O sige, dito lang kami, magbabantay lang kami."18
Alfaro entered first the pedestrian gate which was left open, followed by Webb, Lejano and Ventura. At the garage,
Ventura pulled out a chair to get on top of the hood of the Vizcondes Nissan Sentra car and loosened the electric bulb
("para daw walang ilaw"). They proceeded to the iron grill gate which was likewise left open, and passed through the dirty
kitchen. It was Carmela who opened the aluminum screen door of the kitchen for them to enter. Carmela and Webb for a

moment looked at each other in the eye, and then proceeded towards the dining area. As she lost sight of Carmela and
Webb, Alfaro decided to go out of the house. Lejano asked where she was going and she told him she will smoke outside.
On her way to the screen door, she saw Ventura pulling a drawer in the kitchen. At the garden area, she smoked a
cigarette. After about twenty (20) minutes, she was surprised upon hearing a female voice uttered "Sino yan?" and she
immediately walked out towards her car. She found the others still outside around her car and Estrada who was inside the
car said: "Okay ba?" After staying in her car for about ten (10) minutes, she returned to the house passing through the
same iron grill gate and dirty kitchen. While it was dark inside the house, there was light coming from outside. In the
kitchen, she saw Ventura searching a ladys bag on top of the dining table. When she asked Ventura what was it he was
looking for, he said: "Ikaw na nga dito, maghanap ka ng susi." She asked him what particular key and he replied: "Basta
maghanap ka ng susi ng main door pati na rin ng susi ng kotse." When she found a bunch of keys in the bag, she tried
them on the main door of the house but none of them fitted the lock; she also did not find any car key. 19
Unable to open the main door, Alfaro walked back towards the kitchen but upon reaching the spot leading to the dining
area, she heard a very loud static sound (like that coming from a television which had signed off). Out of curiosity, she
went to the door of the masters bedroom where the sound was coming from and peeped inside. She pushed the slightly
ajar door with her fingers and the sound grew even louder. After pushing the door wider, she walked into the room. There
she saw a man on top of Carmela who was lying on the floor, two (2) bloodied bodies on top of the bed and Lejano who
was at the foot of the bed about to wear his jacket. She turned her eyes on Carmela who was gagged, moaning and in
tears while Webb was pumping her, his bare buttocks exposed. Webb gave her a look and she immediately left the room.
At the dining area, she met Ventura who told her: "Prepare an escape. Aalis na tayo." Shocked by what she saw, Alfaro
rushed out of the house and found the rest of the group outside, in her car and on the sidewalk. 20
Alfaro boarded her car and started the engine but did not know where to proceed. She saw Webb, Lejano and Ventura
leaving the house already. Webb suddenly picked up a stone and threw it to the main door, breaking its glass frame.
When the three (3) were near the pedestrian gate, Webb told Ventura that he left behind his jacket. But Ventura said they
cannot make it anymore as the iron grills were already locked. They all rode in their cars and drove away until they
reached Aguirre Avenue. Near an old hotel in the Tropical Palace area, Alfaro saw the Nissan Patrol slow down and
something thrown out into a cogonal area. They went to a large house with high walls and concrete fence, steel gate and
long driveway located at BF Executive Village. They parked their cars inside the compound and gathered in the lawn area
where the "blaming session" took place. It was only at this point that Alfaro and the others came to know fully what
happened at the Vizconde house. The mother was the first one (1) killed, then Jennifer and the last, Carmela. 21
Ventura was blaming Webb telling him: "Bakit naman pati yung bata?" According to Webb, the girl was awakened and
upon seeing him molesting Carmela, she jumped on him, bit his shoulders and pulled his hair. Webb got mad and
grabbed the girl, pushed her to the wall and stabbed her several times. Lejano excused himself and used the telephone
inside the house, while Webb called up someone on his cellular phone. At around 2:00 in the morning, Gerardo Biong
arrived and talked to Webb who ordered him to clean up the Vizconde house, and said "Pera lang ang katapat
nyan." Biong answered "Okay lang." Webb addressed the group and gave his final instructions: "We dont know each
other. We havent seen each other...baka maulit yan." She and Estrada then departed and went to her fathers house.22
Dr. Prospero A. Cabanayan, medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), who conducted the
autopsy on the cadavers of the victims, testified on his findings as stated in the autopsy reports he submitted to the court.
The bodies were photographed showing their condition before the start of the post-mortem examination.23 Considering
that they were almost in complete rigor mortis, the victims must have been dead for twelve (12) hours. Carmelas hands
were on her back hogtied with an electric cord and her mouth gagged with a pillow case. She had contusions on her right
forearm and thighs, ligature marks on her wrists and nine (9) stab wounds on her chest (five [5] wounds are "connecting"
or reaching to the back of the body). Further, specimen taken from her genitalia tested positive for the presence of human
spermatozoa, which is indicative of complete penetration plus ejaculation of the male sex organ into the female sex organ.
The contusions on her thighs were probably due to the application of blunt force such as a fist blow.24
Dr. Cabanayan further testified that Estrellita was also hogtied from behind and her wrists bore ligature marks from an
electric cord with a plug. She sustained twelve (12) stab wounds, eight (8) of which are "communicating" or perforating
(through and through stab wounds) which are fatal since vital organs are involved. 25 As to Jennifer, her stab wounds,
nineteen (19) in all, had the characteristics of one (1) which is extremely blunt, the other extremely sharp. These wounds
are located in different parts of her body, most of which are on the left anterior chest. But unlike Carmela and Estrellita,
Jennifer had two (2) stab wounds on her back and incise wounds on her left and right forearms, the latter usually referred
to as defense wounds. Seven (7) of the nine (9) stab wounds on her chest were perforating, hence fatal wounds. 26Judging
from the characteristics of the stab wounds sustained by the victims, Dr. Cabanayan concluded that they could have been
inflicted using sharp-edged, pointed and single-bladed instruments such as a kitchen knife.27

Normal E. White, Jr., one (1) of four (4) security guards assigned at Pitong Daan Subdivision which is part of the United
BF Homes, testified that he and Edgar Mendez were the guards on duty on the night of June 29, 1991, starting at 7:00
oclock in the evening until 7:00 oclock in the morning of June 30, 1991. On June 30, 1991, at around 6:00 a.m., a
homeowner called his attention on the incident the previous night at the Vizconde house. He immediately proceeded to
said house where there were already many people. The housemaids of the Vizcondes led him to the entrance at the
kitchen and pointed to the masters bedroom. Upon entering the room, he saw the bloodied bodies of the victims: two (2)
were on top of the bed, and one (1) lying down on the floor. He is familiar with Mrs. Vizconde, Carmela and Jennifer
because they were kind to the guards and usually greeted them. Mrs. Vizconde was gagged and her hands tied, while
Jennifer was also lying on top of the bed. Carmela was lying on her back with one (1) of her legs raised, her dress pulled
up and her genitals exposed. He also noticed that the TV was still on with loud sound. He went out to call the police but he
met their Security Chief whom he informed about the killings at the Vizconde house. He then proceeded directly to the
entrance/guard post of the subdivision and was told by Mendez that there were already policemen who had arrived. 28
Having been apprised of the arrival of the police, White, Jr. returned to the Vizconde house to observe what was going on.
He saw the policemen already investigating the crime scene and one (1) of them he later came to know as Gerardo
Biong. There was also a woman who was with Biong when he was conducting the investigation inside the Vizconde
premises at the garage area. The maids were being asked if they were able to hear the breaking of the main doors glass
frame, and he saw Biong in the act of further breaking the remaining glass. He recognized other homeowners who were
also there, including Michael Gatchalian who passed by infront of the house. Afterwards, he returned to their guard post
where their Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Justo Cabanacan, probed him and Mendez on anything they had observed the
previous night. He and Mendez told Cabanacan that they did not notice anything unusual except "Mike" (Michael
Gatchalian) and his friends entering and exiting the subdivision gate ("labas-masok").29
White, Jr. recounted that Mikes group entered the subdivision on the night of June 29, 1991. Upon approaching the gate,
Mikes car slowed down on the hump. He was about to flag down and verify ("sisitahin") but Mike (who was at the right
front seat) immediately opened his window to show his face and pointed to two (2) vehicles behind him as his
companions. Because of their policy allowing outsiders to enter the subdivision as long as they are accompanied by a
homeowner, he and Mendez just let the three (3) vehicles in (Mike was in the first car). That was actually the second time
he saw Mike and his "barkada" that night because he had earlier seen them at Vinzons St. near the Gatchalian residence.
However, he could no longer remember the precise time he saw the group on these two (2) instances. 30
White, Jr. further testified that on the night of June 30, 1991, policemen took him from the Pitong Daan Subdivision
Homeowners Association and brought him to the Paraaque Municipal Building. Biong was forcing him to admit that he
was one (1) of those who killed the Vizconde women. Biong boxed him insisting he was among the perpetrators and had
no mercy for the victims. He and Mendez were later fetched by the Chief of Security of Pitong Daan Subdivision
Homeowners Association, Nestor Potenciano Jr., and OIC Justo Cabanacan. 31 Biong had also taken their logbook where
they list down the names of visitors, plate number of vehicles, name and street of the homeowner they were staying at,
etc. However, when presented with the alleged logbook, White, Jr. said it was not the same logbook, he could not
recognize its cover and could not categorically confirm the entries supposedly made in his own handwriting. 32
Justo Cabanacan, another security guard assigned at the Pitong Daan Subdivision and the one (1) supervising his coguards White, Jr., Mendez and Tungo, testified that when he reported for duty on June 30, 1991 at about 7:00 oclock in
the morning, he was met by Mendez who told him about the killing of a homeowner and her family. When he asked
Mendez if he and White, Jr. noticed anything unusual during their tour of duty the previous night, Mendez said everything
was alright except for Mike and his friends who had gone in and out of the subdivision ("labas-masok") until the wee hours
in the morning of June 30, 1991. White, Jr. also reported to him that on the night of June 29, 1991, while doing his roving
duty around the subdivision, he noticed vehicles parked along Vinzons St. near the house of Mr. Almogino where there
seemed to be a drinking party, and that Mike was "labas-masok" through the subdivision gate. He confirmed it was indeed
their policy that if one (1) is a son/daughter of a homeowner, or accompanied by a homeowner or any relative of
homeowner, he/she will no longer be stopped or queried by the guards. In particular, he knows Mike and had seen him
visit the house of Lilet Sy, another homeowner. He often goes to Lilet Sys house because of the various complaints of
homeowners against her like the presence of too many people at her house until midnight and the vehicles of her visitors
running over her neighbors plants. This Lilet Sy is also a suspected drug pusher within the subdivision.33
Cabanacan further testified that around the last week of May or first week of June 1991, he came to know Hubert Webb
because he had stopped his car at the subdivision gate as it had no local sticker of Pitong Daan Subdivision. It was
around 7:00 oclock in the evening when Webb arrived. He greeted Webb and asked about his destination. Webb replied
he was going to see Lilet Sy. When he asked Webb to leave an identification card, Webb pointed to his car sticker saying
he is also a BF Homes resident. He explained to Webb that the sticker on his car was for United BF Homes and not the
local sticker of Pitong Daan Subdivision. Webb then said: "Taga-diyan lang ako sa Phase III...saka anak ako ni
Congressman Webb." He insisted on seeing Webbs ID card and grudgingly Webb obliged and pulled out his wallet.

Webb gave him a laminated ID card with Webbs picture and with the name "Hubert Webb" written on it. After seeing the
ID card, he returned the same to Webb and allowed him to enter the subdivision. However, he did not anymore record this
incident in their logbook because anyway Webb is the son of the Paraaque Congressman, a well-known personality.34
In the morning of June 30, 1991, Cabanacan said he also went to the Vizconde house upon being told by Mendez and
White, Jr. of the killings. By afternoon of the same day, he came to meet Biong who was conducting the investigation.
Based on the information given by Mendez and White, Jr., he prepared a written report on the incident which he submitted
to Nestor Potenciano, Jr. After the incident, Biong frequented their place to investigate and asserting he had no female
companion while conducting his investigation at the Vizconde house on June 30, 1991. Aside from taking their logbook,
Biong also took his two (2) guards (Mendez and White, Jr.) to the police headquarters on June 30, 1991 at around 7:00
p.m. The said guards also related to him what Biong did to them. They said Biong punched them and forced them to admit
having participated in the Vizconde killings.35
Mila Solomon Gaviola, a laundrywoman who worked at the Webb residence located at Aguirre Avenue, BF Homes,
Paraaque from January to July 199136 testified that on June 30, 1991 at around 4:00 in the morning, she went to the
room of Hubert to get his and his brothers (Jason and Michaels) dirty clothes, using the small "secret door" at the second
floor near the servants quarters. She noticed that Michael and Jason were still asleep while Hubert was sitting on the bed
wearing only his pants. When she finished collecting dirty clothes including those of Senator Webb, she brought them
down to the laundry area. She ate breakfast and rested for a while. Afterwards, she started washing first Senator Webbs
clothes and then those of the sons. She washed Huberts white shirt with round neck and found it had fresh blood stains
at the stomach area and also splattered blood ("tilamsik lang") on the chest. She had difficulty removing the blood stains
and had to use Chlorox. After she finished washing the clothes, she hanged them to dry on the second floor. Returning to
the servants quarters, she peeped into Huberts room through the "secret door." She saw Hubert pacing the floor ("di
mapakali"); this was about 9:00 a.m. already. She saw Hubert again around 1:00 oclock in the afternoon as he left the
house passing through the "secret door"; he was clad in t-shirt and shorts. Hubert was back at the house by 4:00 oclock
in the afternoon. She never saw him again until she left in July 1991.37
Gaviola further testified that on June 30, 1991 at around 7:00 oclock in the morning, she saw Senator Webb at the sala
reading a newspaper.38
Lolita Carrera Vda. de Birrer, a widow and resident of United Paraaque Subdivision 5, testified that on June 29, 1991
at around 6:00 p.m., Biong who was then her boyfriend, asked her to come to the Paraaque police station to play
"mahjong" at Aling Glos canteen located at the back of their office. They started playing at 6:30 in the evening. Between
1:00 and 2:00 in the morning of June 30, 1991, the radio operator at the police station went down to the canteen telling
Biong he has a call. She took Biongs place at the game while Biong went to the headquarters. After a while, she followed
Biong to ask if he was joining the next bet. Biong was on the telephone talking with someone and visibly irked. She heard
Biongs words: "Ano?... Saan?... Mahirap yan ah! O sige, dadating ako... Ano?... Saan?... Dilaw na taxi?" Biong then told
her he was leaving and shortly thereafter a taxicab arrived with a man seated at the back seat. Biong bade her good-bye
saying he was going to BF Homes. She continued playing "mahjong" until morning. At around 7:00 a.m., Biong came back
and went straight to the washing area of the canteen. She followed him and saw him cleaning blood stains on his
fingernails. After wiping his face and hands with a handkerchief, he threw it away and when she asked why, Biong said it
smelled stinky. Biong was in bad mood ("aburido") and complained, "Putang inang mga batang yon, pinahirapan ako
nang husto". Afterwards, Biong took out a knife with aluminum cover from his drawer and put it in his steel cabinet. She
invited him for lunch but another policeman, Galvan, came and told Biong to proceed to BF Homes and investigate the
three (3) dead persons there. Biong answered, "Oo, susunod na ako" and then proceeded to Capt. Bartolomes office.
With Capt. Bartolomes permission, she joined them in going to the Vizconde residence. 39
Upon arriving at the Vizconde house, Biong asked that the victims relatives and the homeowners association President
be summoned. A certain Mr. Lopez and Ms. Moreno arrived and also a security guard named White, Jr. who pointed to
the location of the victims bodies. They entered the masters bedroom and she saw the mother and a small girl on top of
the bed, and a young woman sprawled on the floor. After inspecting the bodies, Biong went to the toilet and turned on the
faucet; the running water washed out the blood on the flooring of the toilet. Biong searched the drawers using his ballpen.
She saw him took a round pendant watch and pocketed it. They went out of the room and on the top of the dining table
they saw a shoulder bag and scattered next to it were various items such as Carmelas ATM card, her drivers license and
calling cards. Biong proceeded to the main door and removed its chain lock. When they came out towards the garage
area, Biong saw a stone by the window. He then asked Capt. Bartolome to go inside the room of the two (2) maids to see
for himself if indeed the noise of the breaking glass could not be heard. When Capt. Bartolome was already inside the
middle room, Biong shattered the remaining glass of the main door with the butt of his gun. When Biong asked if he could
hear it, Capt. Bartolome answered in the affirmative. Biong next inspected the garage where he saw the footmarks on the
cars hood; Biong also found fingerprints on the electric bulb. She was just beside Biong at the time. They followed Biong
towards the back of the house but upon seeing another shoe print on the ground just outside the masters bedroom, he

directed them not to proceed any further. They left the Vizconde house at around 10:00 a.m. and proceeded to the
Paraaque Municipal Building.40
Birrer further testified that on July 1, 1991 at 10:00 oclock in the morning, Biong arrived at her house bringing along with
him the two (2) maids of the Vizcondes. He asked her to cook something for the maids to eat. Biong also instructed her to
interview the maids on what they know about the killings. She did as told but the maids said they do not know anything as
they were asleep. After they had lunch, Biong told her to let the maids rest. While she and the maids were resting at the
sala, Biong requested to use her bathroom. Before taking a bath, Biong took out the contents of his pockets which he put
on the dining table. She saw Carmelas ATM card and drivers license, bracelet, earrings and the round pendant watch
Biong had taken from a jewelry box while they were inside the Vizconde house. When Biong left her house, he brought all
said items with him.41
On July 2, 1991 at around 6:00 p.m., Birrer was at the Paraaque Municipal Building inside Biongs office. She saw Biong
open his steel cabinet and took out a brown leather jacket which she thought was imported. When she asked him where it
came from, Biong initially just said it was given as a gift but when she further queried, he answered: "Natatandaan mo ba
yong nirespondehan ko noong gabi sa BF Homes? Doon galing yon." She asked Biong whether those were the youths
he had mentioned earlier and he said yes. As to the jewelries taken by Biong from the Vizconde house, she was with
Biong when the latter pawned them at a pawnshop near Chow-Chow; Biong got P20,000.00 for the pawned items.42
Birrer further testified that two (2) weeks after they went to the Vizconde residence to investigate, Biong on two (2)
occasions brought her along to a certain house. It was only Biong who went inside the said house as she waited in a
taxicab. In both instances, Biong came out of the house with an envelope containing an undisclosed amount of money.
She remembered this because when she was already staying in Pangasinan on December 7, 1995, she saw flashed on
ABS-CBNs TV Patrol News 7:00 p.m. newscast on television, a video footage of the house of Senator Webb. She was
certain it was that house where Biong went and came out carrying cash in an envelope. 43
Lauro G. Vizconde, husband of Estrellita and father of Carmela and Jennifer, testified on the personal circumstances of
the victims. At the time of their deaths, Estrellita was engaged in business (at one [1] time or another she was a garment
manufacturer, taxi operator, canteen owner and local employment recruiter), Carmela was a graduating B.S. Psychology
student at the University of Santo Tomas, while Jennifer was a Grade I pupil at Bloomfield Academy at BF Resort, Las
Pias, Metro Manila. He left the Philippines in November 1989 to work in the United States of America. He had not since
returned to the country -- until this unfortunate tragedy befell his family -- but communicated with his wife through
telephone once or twice a month.44
Lauro G. Vizconde further testified that his daughter, when she was still alive, was so close to him that she confides her
daily activities, dreams, ambitions and plans in life. She intended to pursue further masteral and doctoral degrees in
business psychology in the U.S.A. In fact, that was the reason he transferred from one (1) state to another looking for a
school where Carmela could enroll. However, he had to come home in July 1991 and bury his wife and daughters whose
violent deaths he was informed of only upon arriving in the country and when he saw their bodies with stab wounds at the
funeral parlor just before burial. He spent burial expenses in the amount of P289,000.00, plus P103,000.00 incidental
expenses, P300,000.00 paid for memorial lots and around P100,000.00 for the construction of the mausoleum - with a
grand total of P793,950.00. He likewise incurred litigation expenses in the amount of P97,404.50.45
In one (1) of their telephone conversations when he was still in the U.S.A., Lauro Vizconde recounted that Carmela
mentioned to him that she had turned down a suitor whom she called "Bagyo," who is a son of politician in Paraaque and
comes from an affluent family. He also expressed his mental anguish, wounded feelings, emotional suffering due to the
untimely demise of his family. It actually cost him his life, his heart bled all the time and only time can tell when he can
fully cope with the situation. He is presently totally displaced and jobless; he misses his family and he now lives an
abnormal life with no inspiration and no more challenge to work for. When asked how much compensation he will ask for
moral damages, he answered saying he leaves the matter to the sound discretion of the court as in truth, no amount can
truly compensate him for the loss of his loved ones. He sought justice for the death of his family and hoped that the
culprits, whoever they were, will be punished so that the souls of his departed loved ones may rest in peace. 46
Defense Evidence
The accused chiefly assailed the credibility of prosecution star witness Alfaro, in particular her execution of two (2)
allegedly inconsistent affidavits (one on April 28, 1995 and another on May 22, 1995) and raised alibi and denial as
defenses to the charge of rape with homicide attended by conspiracy. During the trial, no less than 95 witnesses 47 were
presented, and voluminous documentary exhibits were submitted.

The testimonies of the principal witnesses for the defense are summarized as follows:
Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb testified that at the time of the killings between June 29 and 30, 1991, he was still in Anaheim
Hills, California, U.S.A., having departed from the Philippines on March 9, 1991 on board a United Airlines flight bound for
San Francisco. He was accompanied by Gloria Webb, whose husband Richard Webb is the eldest brother of his father
Senator Freddie Webb. It was the first time he traveled to the US and he returned to the Philippines only on October 25,
1992. On the eve of his departure, he, Rael, Tina and his then girlfriend Milagros Castillo went out and had dinner at
Bunchchums. Later that night, they went to Faces Disco at Makati Avenue where his friends Paulo Santos and Jay Ortega
followed. They went home at 3:00 oclock in the morning already. After driving around in the city and bringing Milagros
home, he arrived at his house at around 5:00 a.m. His parents were already preparing to leave and so they headed to the
airport.48 Webbs friend Rafael Jose, Paulo Santos, Senator Webbs security staff Miguel Muoz, Webbs secretary
Cristina Magpusao and house girl Victoria Ventoso corroborated Webbs testimony that he departed from the Philippines
on March 9, 1991.49
Webb further testified that he stayed at the house of her Auntie Gloria and Uncle Dinky at San Francisco until late April to
May 1991. Upon the invitation of her aunt Susan Brottman, sister of his mother, he rode a train and went to Anaheim
where he stayed until mid-July 1991. Thereafter, he rented a nearby place but did not complete the one (1) month prepaid lease period as he proceeded to Longwood, Florida. He stayed at the residence of his Uncle Jack and Sonia
Rodriguez for almost a year (August 1991-August 1992). He went back to Anaheim and stayed at the house of his
godmother and sister of his mother, Imelda Pagaspas, until October 1992. He met his relatives and other personalities
while in the US; visited Lake Tahoe with the Wheelock family; toured Disneyland where Luis Wheelock filmed them and
attended a concert with Christopher Esguerra who also took him out to the malls. 50
Webb further testified that in the later part of June 1991, his parents joined him in the US. He applied for and was issued a
drivers license on June 14, 1991. He also worked at the pest control company of his cousin-in-law Alex del Toro. Aside
from his passport and airline ticket for return flight to the Philippines, Webb presented before the court the logbook of
jobs/tasks kept by del Toro, in which he pointed to the entries therein which were actually performed by him; and also his
purported pay check ($150 "pay to Cash"), ID and other employment papers. He also identified some handwritten letters
he mailed while he was in the US and sent to his friend Jennifer Cabrera in the Philippines; photographs and video tape
clips taken during his cousin Marie Manlapits wedding to Alex del Toro which wedding he attended in the US together
with his mother; and receipt issued for the mountain bicycle he bought on June 30, 1991 from the Orange Cycle store in
Anaheim.51
Webb denied having met Carmela Vizconde and neither does he know Jessica Alfaro. He had been jailed since August 9,
1995. When asked about his co-accused, Webb said the only ones he had met before June 29, 1991 were Fernandez
and Rodriguez. He used to play basketball with Fernandez at BF Homes Phase III, during which he also met Rodriguez.
While he admitted having gone out on a group with Fernandez to the houses of their basketball buddies, he denied having
gone out with Rodriguez at any time.52 He also denied knowing Biong who is neither a driver nor security aide of his
father.53
Gloria Webb testified that on March 9, 1991, she traveled with Webb on a United Airlines flight to San Francisco. Webb
stayed at her residence at 639 Gellert Boulevard, Daly City, California until May 1991 when he left to be with his mothers
sister and relatives in Anaheim. Webb and her grandson attended a "concierto" in the evenings and he also joined and
helped her son-in-law with his business. Webb went with them to church, to the malls and in shopping. In April 1991,
Webb went on a trip to Lake Tahoe with Mr. Wheelock and family.54
Dorothy Wheelock testified that she became a US citizen in 1974 and has been residing at 877 Las Lomas Drive,
Milpitas, California. Webbs mother is her childhood friend and schoolmate. When she heard that Webb was in the US
looking for a job, she invited him, and her husband Louis Wheelock picked him up at Daly City in April 1991. To
reciprocate the Webbs hospitality while they visited the Philippines in 1990, she and her family took Webb to a trip to
Lake Tahoe in Nevada during which they even took a video tape. Senator Freddie and Mrs. Webb also visited and stayed
with them for four (4) days in July 1991. They took them to a trip to Yosemite Park, also with video footages taken by her
husband.55
Steven Keeler testified that he had been an American citizen since 1982 and resident of 4002 River Street, Newport
Beach, California. He met Webb at a dinner in the house of Webbs aunt Susan Brottman in Anaheim Hills around May or
June 1991. Brottmans son, Rey Manlapit, was his good friend. They played basketball with Webb, went to bars, shopped
and watched TV. He also knew that Webb bought a car and worked for Alex del Toro for Environment First Termite
Control. He believed that Webb left for Florida towards the end of summer (July 1991). He could not recall any specific
dates he was with Webb.56

Honesto Aragon testified that he went to the US in 1967 and became a US citizen in 1989. On June 28, 1991, he met
then Congressman Freddie Webb at the house of the latters sister-in-law, Susan, at Anaheim. Congressman Webb
introduced to him his son Hubert Webb. He, Congressman Webb and Hubert went to some stores to go shopping for a
bicycle for Hubert. But they only bought bike accessories. He invited them to snack before he brought them to his own
house where he introduced to them his son Andrew. The following day, June 29, 1991, they went to Riverside, California
to shop for a car for Hubert; though they found a Toyota MR2, they did not buy it because it has questionable ownership.
Early morning the next day, he picked up Congressman Webb and they played tennis from 7:00 to 10:00 a.m. He and
Congressman Webb were close friends, as both of them were members of a basketball team in Letran. The first time he
saw Hubert was when he was still a small kid and the other time on June 28, 1991 at the Brottmans residence in
Anaheim.57
Senator Freddie Webb testified that his son Hubert left for the US on March 9, 1991, the first time he had gone out of the
country. Hubert stayed with his sister-in-law Gloria. They wanted to show Hubert the value of independence, hard work
and perseverance, and for him to learn how to get along and live with other people. Hubert resigned from his job at Saztec
before departing for the US. He and his wife also went to the US on June 28, 1991. They stayed at the house of his sisterin-law, Susan Brottman at Anaheim. From San Francisco, they went to Orlando, Florida, then back to Los Angeles and
returned to the Philippines on July 21, 1991. Among the places he visited while in the US were the Yosemite Park,
Nordstrom, Disneyland, Disneyworld. Upon arriving at Anaheim, he saw his son Hubert and also informed Honesto
Aragon regarding their plan to procure a bicycle for Hubert. Hubert was with them again on June 29, 1991 at dinner in the
residence of his sister-in-law. On July 1, 1991, they went shopping for some clothes. Together with Aragon, he and Hubert
looked for a Toyota MR2 car and paid for it with a check (the car was priced at $6,000-$7,000).58
Senator Webb further testified that he knows Mila Gaviola who used to be their "labandera." She left their house but
returned to work for them again about a couple of months after the Mt. Pinatubo eruption. As to Alfaros statements
implicating his son Hubert in the Vizconde killings, he said the statements were not accurate because it was physically
impossible for Hubert to have participated in the crime as he was abroad at the time. 59
Louis Whitaker testified that he left the Philippines and resided in the US since September 1964. He met Jack Rodriguez
when the latter fetched him and his wife Sonia at the Los Angeles International Airport on June 28, 1991 upon their arrival
from the Philippines. They proceeded to the house of a mutual friend, Salvador Vaca, at Moresbay Street in Lake Forest.
They went to see Congressman Webb at a house in Anaheim. That was the first time he met Congressman Webb, Mrs.
Webb, the sister-in-law and a Mr. Aragon. On June 29, 1991, he and Rodriguez invited Congressman Webb to see Mr.
Vaca perform at La Calesa Restaurant in the City of Testin. When they fetched Congressman Webb at his sister-in-laws
house, he met again Mrs. Webb, and also Hubert. He saw Hubert for the second time at Orlando, Florida when he went to
the house of Jack Rodriguez there; this was about July or August 1991. 60
Sonia H. Rodriguez testified that she was appointed UNESCO Commissioner by then President Fidel V. Ramos. She
has known accused Webb since he was a child. On June 28, 1991, she and her husband boarded a plane for Los
Angeles, California. They were fetched at the LA airport by old-time friend Salvador Vaca and proceeded to the latters
house in Orange County, California. They had dinner that evening with spouses Freddie and Elizabeth Webb at the house
of Susan Brottman. The next day, in the afternoon of June 29, 1991, her husband and Salvador Vaca picked up Senator
Webb from the house of Susan Brottman and then came back to fetch her and Mrs. Vaca to go to La Calesa, a restaurant
owned by Mario Benitez, also a Filipino. However, she and Mrs. Vaca decided to stay home. On June 30, 1991 at around
8:00 p.m., she and her husband went to the house of Susan Brottman, together with Salvador and Mrs. Vaca and Louis
Whitaker. She recalled that Hubert was there at the time. She saw Hubert again on July 4, 1991 when they went on a
lakeside picnic with the Webb family, Brottmans and Vacas. After watching the fireworks, they went to Sizzler Restaurant.
The next day, she and her husband stayed overnight at San Francisco where they also met Senator and Mrs. Webb. On
August August 4, 1991, Hubert arrived in her home in Florida with her son Tony, daughter-in-law Ana, and stayed with
them for almost one (1) year. The last time she saw Hubert was when he left Orlando, Florida on January 27, 1992. 61
Webb presented other witnesses to buttress his defense of alibi: Victor Yap (who took video shots of Congressman Webb
during a boat ride in Disneyland);62 Armando Rodriguez (who testified seeing Hubert in Orlando either August or
September 1991);63 performing artist Gary Valenciano (who testified meeting Hubert at a dinner at the Rodriguez
residence in Orlando on November 24, 1991, Jack Rodriguez being the father of his high school classmate Antonio
Rodriguez;64 and Christopher Paul Legaspi Esguerra (grandson of Gloria Webb who went with Hubert Webb to watch the
concert of the Deelite Band in San Francisco in the later part of April 1991 and saw Hubert Webb for the last time in May
1991).65
Then a practicing lawyer, Atty. Antonio T. Carpio (now an Associate Justice of this Court) testified that on June 29, 1991
between 10:00 and 11:00 oclock in the morning, he had a telephone conversation with former Congressman Webb who
said he was calling from Anaheim, U.S.A., where he and his wife went to look for a job for their son Hubert. They also

talked about bills to be drafted as his law office had been engaged by Congressman Webb for bill drafting services as well
as preparation of his speeches and statements. When asked if he had personal knowledge that Congressman Webb was
really in the US at that time, he replied that since Webb had told him he was leaving for the US, he just presumed it was
so when Webb said he was then at Anaheim. Neither did he have personal knowledge that Hubert Webb was in the US at
the time of his conversation with Congressman Webb.66
Webb submitted the following documentary evidence in connection with his sojourn in the US:

1) Video Tape recording of Disneyland trip on July 3, 1991;67

2) Official Receipt issued by Orange Cycle Center dated June 30, 1991,68 photographs of the bicycle
purchased by Webb from said store;69
3) Car plate with the name "Lew Webb";70
4) Passport with Philippine Immigration arrival stamp;71
5) Photographs of Webb with Rodriguez family;72
6) California Drivers License of Webb,73 Original License Card of Webb issued on June 14, 1991;74
7) Statement of Account issued to Environment First Termite Control showing Check No. 0180; 75 Bank of
America Certification on Check Nos. 0122 and 0180;76
8) Public Records of California Department of Motor Vehicle on sale to Webb of Toyota MR2 car;77 Traffic
citations issued to Webb;78 Import documents of said car into the Philippines;79
9) Certification issued by the US Immigration and Naturalization Service and correspondence between US
and Philippine Government;80 computer-generated print-out of the US-INS indicating date of Webbs entry in
USA as March 9, 1991 and his date of departure as October 26, 1992;81 US-INS Certification dated August
31, 1995 authenticated by the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs, correcting the earlier August 10,
1995 Certification;82
10) Certification issued by Agnes Tabuena;83 Passenger Manifest of PAL Flight No. 103;84 PAL ticket issued
to Webb,85 Arrival in Manila Certification issued by the Philippine Immigration,86 Diplomatic Note of the US
Department of State with enclosed letter from Acting Director Debora A. Farmer of the Records Operations,
Office of Records of the US-INS stating that the Certification dated August 31, 1995 is a true and accurate
statement;87 and Certificate of Authentication of Philippine Consul Herrera-Lim.88
Accused Antonio Lejano and Michael Gatchalian likewise raised the defense of alibi claiming that they spent the night
of June 29, 1991 until early morning of June 30, 1991 watching video tapes at the house of Carlos Syap at Ayala Alabang
Village.
Lejano further testified that with the exception of Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez and Michael "Mike" Gatchalian who are his
former schoolmates, he does not know any of his co-accused. They left the house of Syap brothers early morning of June
30, 1991; it was Cas Syap who brought him and Mike home. On July 5, 1991, he and Cas Syap went to the police station
where Mike, who was picked up as a suspect by the police on July 4, was detained. When they met Biong there, they told
him they are willing to vouch for Mikes innocence and even volunteered to give statements. Biong told them to return the
following day. However, when he returned in the morning of July 6, 1991, Biong wanted his fingerprints taken right away
but he told Biong he needed to consult someone first. He eventually submitted himself for fingerprinting after his name
came out in the media. Lejano pointed out that Alfaro failed to identify him even as she passed by him three (3) times, and
was able to do so only when she was coached by the prosecution camp. 89
On the part of Michael Gatchalian, he presented nine (9) witnesses: Atty. Porfirio "Perry" Pimentel, RPN 9 broadcast
executive who testified that he personally took video footages of Mon Tulfos interviews with some persons in America
(including Honesto Aragon and the bicycle shop owner) who attested that Hubert Webb was there at the time of the
Vizconde killings, but which segment was edited out in the program he produced (Action 9); 90 Mark Anthony So, a former
NBI intelligence agent who was tasked to confirm photos of Hubert Webb (his classmate at DLSU St. Benilde) to

familiarize Alfaro with his facial features;91 Matthew John Almogino, a childhood friend and neighbor of Gatchalian, who
testified that he was among those who went inside the Vizconde house in the morning of June 30, 1991 and Biong even
asked him to take pictures; thereupon at around 9:30 a.m., he saw Gatchalian in front of the Vizconde residence telling
him that he just woke up and exchanged pleasantries with him; and that as far as he knows, Webb, Fernandez, Lejano
and Gatchalian are not "magbabarkada";92 Atty. Leny Mauricio and Ana Marie Pamintuan of The Philippine
Star wherein a news article was published stating that Michael Gatchalian had rejected governments offer for him to turn
state witness in the Vizconde case;93 Atty. Camilo Murillo who accompanied Gatchalian on July 19, 1991 when he gave
his statement to the NBI, testified that Atty. Pete Rivera relayed to Gatchalian the request of then NBI Director Honesto
Aragon for him to turn state witness and which offer was refused by Gatchalian and his father;94 and Atty. Manuel
Sunga who accompanied Gatchalian to the Department of Justice (DOJ) when he submitted his counter-affidavit (where
there were already media people), testified that they were invited to the conference room where State Prosecutor Zuo in
the presence of then Secretary Guingona made the offer for Gatchalian to turn state witness but it was rejected. 95
Atty. Francisco C. Gatchalian confirmed that the NBI and later the DOJ made offers for his son to turn state witness in
this case but they refused for the reason that his son was innocent of the crime charged. Michael had told him that on the
night of June 29, 1991 until early morning of June 30, 1991, Michael was with his friends at Ayala Alabang Village in
Muntinlupa at the residence of the Syaps. Gatchalian narrated that when he woke up to jog in the morning of June 30,
1991 around 7:00 to 7:30, he passed by the Vizconde house and saw people milling in front. At about 8:30 a.m., he saw
the crowd getting bigger and so he instructed Michael who had wakened up, to find out and check what happened to their
neighbor. Michael rushed out towards the Vizconde residence and when he came back about 10:00 oclock that same
morning, he reported that the house was robbed and people were killed inside the house. Both of them stayed in their
house that day. He denied Alfaros claim that she was their distant relative. 96
Accused Miguel Rodriguez maintained he was at home when the killings took place. He presented as witness his first
cousin Mark Josef Andres Rualo who testified that at around 1:00 in the morning of June 30, 1991, he called up
Rodriguez asking why he has not yet proceeded to the birthday party of Rualo at their house. Rodriguez replied that he
could not make it because he was not fetched by his brother Art (who was the one with a car). So he handed the
telephone to Art (who had arrived at the party around 9:30 to 10:00 p.m.) for them to talk. From Rodriguezs residence at
Pilar Village, it will take about fifteen (15) to twenty (20) minutes by car. It was a big party attended by some eighty (80)
guests and which ended by 3:30 to 4:00 a.m. But it was only the first time he had invited Rodriguez to his birthday party.
He knows Lejano, Rodriguezs close friend and classmate, because Rodriguez used to bring him along when Rodriguez
comes to his house.97
The other witnesses presented by Rodriguez, Col. Charles Calima, Jr. and Michael Rodriguez, testified on the alleged
incident of "mistaken identity" wherein Alfaro supposedly pointed to one (1) "Michael Rodriguez," a drug dependent who
was pulled out by Col. Calima from the Bicutan Rehabilitation Center on the basis of the description given by NBI agents.
They testified that when Alfaro confronted this "Michael Rodriguez," she became very emotional and immediately slapped
and kicked him telling him, "How can I forget your face. We just saw each other in a disco one month ago and you told me
then that you will kill me." Contrary to the physical description given by the NBI, the accused Miguel Rodriguez he saw
inside the court room had no tattoo on his arm and definitely not the same "Michael Rodriguez" whom Alfaro slapped and
kicked at the NBI premises. Michael Rodriguez testified that he was blindfolded and brought to the comfort room by NBI
agents and forced to admit that he was Miguel Rodriguez; he identified Alfaro and Atty. Figueras from a collage of
photographs shown to him in court.98
Accused Gerardo Biong testified that the last time he handled this case was when General Filart announced the case as
solved with the presentation of suspects sometime in October 1991. However, he was subpoenaed by the NBI for the
taking of his statement because Lauro Vizconde complained that he had stolen jewelries at the Vizconde house. He had
sought the examination of latent fingerprints lifted from the crime scene but the suspects turned out negative when tested.
He denied the accusation regarding the destruction of evidence as well as missing items during his investigation at the
Vizconde residence. The bloodied bed, mats, pillows and bed sheets were burned by people at the funeral parlor as
ordered by Mr. Gatmaitan. Among the suspects he had then were Michael Gatchalian, Tony Boy Lejano and Cas Syap.
As to the testimony of Birrer that they played "mahjong" on the night of June 29, 1991, he said it was not true because the
place was closed on Saturdays and Sundays. After a surveillance on Birrer, he discovered she had in her possession
Carmelas drivers license and was driving a car already. He denied Birrers account that he went to a place after receiving
a telephone call at 2:30 in the morning of June 30, 1991. As to Alfaro, he met her for the first time at the NBI on June 23,
1995. His brown jacket was given to him long ago by a couple whose dispute he was able to settle. He only met Webb
and Estrada at the NBI. Biong denied the accusations of Birrer, saying that she was angry at him because they separated
and he had hit her after he heard about her infidelity. Neither has he seen Alfaro before the filing of this case. He was
administratively charged before the Philippine National Police (PNP) for Grave Misconduct due to non-preservation of
evidence. He was offered by the NBI to turn state witness but he declined as he found it difficult to involve his co-accused
whom he does not really know.99

Biong admitted that Birrer went along with him, Galvan and Capt. Bartolome to the Vizconde residence in the morning of
June 30, 1991. Upon arriving at the Vizconde house, he looked for the victims relatives and the homeowners association
president; Atty. Lopez and Mrs. Mia came. In going inside the house, they passed through the kitchen door which was
open already. On top of the kitchen table, there was a ladys bag with things scattered; he later inspected them but did not
think of examining the bag or taking note of the calling cards and other items for possible relevance to the investigation.
Upon entering the masters bedroom, he saw the bloodied bodies. Mrs. Vizcondes hands were hogtied from behind and
her mouth gagged while Jennifers body was also bloodied. Carmela who was lying on a floor carpet was likewise gagged,
her hands hogtied from behind and her legs spread out, her clothes raised up and a pillow case was placed on top of her
private part. He had the bodies photographed and prepared a spot report. 100
Biong also admitted that before the pictures were taken, he removed with his bare hands the object, which was like a
stocking cloth, that was wrapped around Carmelas mouth and neck. As to the main door glass, it was the upper part
which he broke. There was a red jewelry box they saw where a pearl necklace inside could be seen; he remembered he
had it photographed but he had not seen those pictures. They left the Vizconde house and brought the cadavers to the
funeral parlor. He did not take steps to preserve the bloodied carpet, bed sheets and blankets because they have been
previously told by NBI that no evidence can be found on such items. As for the footprint and shoe print found on the hood
of the car and at the back of the house, he also could not recall if he had those photographed. It was only the following
day that he brought an employee of the Paraaque police to lift fingerprints from the crime scene; he was the one (1)
giving instructions at the time. However, no latent fingerprints had been taken; despite attempts, no clear fingerprint had
been lifted and he did not any more ask why.101
Biong further admitted that he was so angry with the Vizconde housemaids as he did not believe they did not hear
anything despite the loud sound of the breaking of the main door glass. He also admitted mauling Normal E. White, Jr.
because he thought he was withholding information during the investigation. Edgar Mendez did not tell him about the
entry of a three (3)-vehicle convoy into the subdivision on the night of June 29, 1991. As for Michael Gatchalian, he knows
him because on July 3, 1991 at 4:30 a.m., they caught him at Vinzons St. at the entrance of Pitong Daan Subdivision for
possession of marijuana. However, he does not know any more what happened to that case he filed against Gatchalian
as he was already dismissed from the service. 102 He also admitted having mauled Gatchalian while interrogating him for
his participation in the Vizconde killings.103
Ruling of the Trial Court
On January 4, 2000, the trial court rendered its Decision 104 finding all the accused guilty as charged, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby finds all the principal accused GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE
CRIME OF RAPE WITH HOMICIDE AND HEREBY SENTENCES EACH ONE OF THEM TO SUFFER THE PENALTY
OFRECLUSION PERPETUA. This Court likewise finds the accused Gerardo Biong GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT AS AN ACCESSORY AFTER THE FACT, AND HEREBY SENTENCES HIM TO SUFFER AN IMPRISONMENT
OF ELEVEN (11) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY TO TWELVE (12) YEARS. In addition, the Court
hereby orders all the accused to jointly and severally pay the victims surviving heir, Mr. Lauro Vizconde, the following
sums by way of civil indemnity:

1. The amount of P150,000.00 for wrongful death of the victims;

2. The amount of P762,450.00 representing actual damages sustained by Mr. Lauro Vizconde;
3. The amount of P2,000,000.00 as moral damages sustained by Mr. Lauro Vizconde;
4. The amount of P97,404.55 as attorneys fees;
Let an alias warrant of arrest be issued against the accused Artemio "Dong" Ventura and Joey Filart for their eventual
apprehension so that they can immediately be brought to trial.
SO ORDERED.105
The trial court found Alfaro as a credible and truthful witness, considering the vast details she disclosed relative to the
incident she had witnessed inside the Vizconde house. The trial court noted that Alfaro testified in a categorical,
straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner, and has remained consistent in her narration of the events despite a

lengthy and grueling cross-examination conducted on her by eight (8) defense lawyers. Neither was her credibility and
veracity of her declarations in court affected by the differences and inconsistencies between her April 28, 1995 and May
22, 1995 affidavits, which she had satisfactorily explained during the trial considering the circumstances that she initially
desired to protect her former boyfriend Estrada and her relative Gatchalian, the absence of a lawyer during the first taking
of her statements by the NBI, her distrust of the first investigators who took her statements and prepared her April 28,
1995 affidavit, and her uncertainty if she could obtain adequate support and security for her own life were she to disclose
everything she knows about the Vizconde killings.
On the other hand, the trial court ruled that principal accused Webb, Lejano, Rodriguez and Gatchalian failed to establish
their defense of alibi, the accused having been positively identified by Alfaro as the group who conspired and assisted one
(1) another in plotting and carrying out on the same night the rape of Carmela, on the occasion of which Carmelas mother
and sister were also stabbed to death. The trial court held that Alfaro gave a clear, positive and convincing testimony
which was sufficiently corroborated on its material points by the testimonies of other witnesses and confirmed by the
physical evidence on record.
The Court of Appeals Ruling
By Decision of December 15, 2005, the CA affirmed with modification the trial courts decision:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 274 of Paraaque City in Criminal
Case No. 95-404, finding accused-appellants Hubert "Jeffrey" Webb y Pagaspas, Antonio "Tony Boy" Lejano, Michael
Gatchalian y Adviento, Hospicio "Pyke" Fernandez, Peter Estrada, Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT as principals, and Gerardo Biong as accessory, of the crime of RAPE with HOMICIDE, is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, as indicated:

1). We AFFIRM the sentence of accused-appellants Webb. Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, and
Rodriguez to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and its corresponding accessory penalties under
Article 41 of the Revised Penal Code;
2). We MODIFY the penalty of Gerardo Biong who is an accessory to the crime. Accused-appellant Biong is
sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to twelve
(12) years of prision mayor, as maximum, and absolute perpetual disqualification under Article 58 of the
Revised Penal Code; and
3). We MODIFY the civil indemnity. Accused-appellants Webb. Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada and
Rodriguez are ORDERED to pay jointly and severally the surviving heir of the victims, Mr. Lauro Vizconde.
the amounts of P200,000.00 as civil indemnity, P762,450.00 as actual damages, P2,000,000.00 as moral
damages and P97,404.55 as attorney's fees, with the corresponding subsidiary liability against accusedappellant Biong pursuant to Article 110, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code.
SO ORDERED.106
The CA upheld the trial court in giving full weight and credence to the eyewitness testimony of Alfaro which was duly
corroborated by other prosecution witnesses who had not been shown to have ill-motive and malicious intent in revealing
what they know about the Vizconde killings. It disagreed with the appellants view that they were victims of an unjust
judgment upon their mere allegations that they were tried by publicity, and that the trial judge was biased whose
discriminatory and hostile attitude was demonstrated by her rejection of 132 out of 142 exhibits of the defense during the
bail hearings and her refusal to issue subpoenas to prospective defense witnesses such as former Secretary Teofisto
Guingona and Antonio Calvento.
The CA also fully concurred with the trial courts conclusion that all the principal accused failed to establish their defense
ofalibi after carefully evaluating the voluminous documentary and testimonial evidence presented by the defense. On the
issue of conspiracy, the CA found that the prosecution was able to clearly and convincingly establish its presence in the
commission of the crime, notwithstanding that appellants Rodriguez, Gatchalian, Estrada and Fernandez did not actually
rape Carmela, nor participated in killing her, her mother and sister.
On motion for reconsideration filed by the appellants, the CAs Special Division of Five, voting 3-2, affirmed the December
15, 2005 Decision.107 In the Resolution dated January 26, 2007, the majority reiterated that it has fully explained in its
Decision why the US-INS Certifications submitted by appellant Webb deserve little weight. It stressed that it is a case of

positive identification versus alibi founded on documentary evidence. On the basis of the rule that alibi is accepted only
upon the clearest proof that the accused was not and could not have been at the crime scene when it was committed, the
CA in resolving the appeal considered the weight of documentary evidence in light of testimonial evidence -- an
eyewitness account that the accused was the principal malefactor. As to the issue of apparent inconsistencies between
the two (2) affidavits executed by Alfaro, the CA said this is a settled matter, citing the Joint Decision in CA-G.R. SP No.
42285 and CA-G.R. SP No. 42673 entitled "Rodriguez v. Tolentino" and "Webb, et al. v. Tolentino, et al.," which had long
become final.
Appellants Arguments
Appellants Webb and Lejano set forth the following arguments in their Supplemental Appeal Brief as grounds for the
reversal of the CA Decision and their acquittal in this case:

I
THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHING APPELLANT WEBB'S ABSENCE FROM PHILIPPINE TERRITORY BETWEEN 9
MARCH 1991 AND 27 OCTOBER 1992 ENGENDERS A REASONABLE DOUBT AND PRECLUDES AN ABIDING
CONVICTION, TO A MORAL CERTAINTY, OF HIS GUILT OF THE CRIME CHARGED. THUS, AS CORRECTLY
APPRECIATED BY JUSTICES TAGLE AND DACUDAO IN THEIR SEPARATE DISSENTING OPINIONS A. THE PASSPORT OF APPELLANT WEBB, AS THE OFFICIAL TRAVEL DOCUMENT ISSUED
BY THE PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT TO HIM, IS STAMPMARKED AND INITIALED WITH THE
DEPARTURE DATE OF 9 MARCH 1991 AND ARRIVAL DATE OF 27 OCTOBER 1992, SHOWING
THAT HE WAS NOT IN THE PHILIPPINES BUT ABROAD AT THE TIME OF THE COMMISSION
OF THE CRIME ON 29 JUNE 1991.
B. THE CERTIFICATIONS AND COMPUTER PRINTOUT ISSUED BY THE UNITED STATES INS
NON-IMMIGRANT INFORMATION SYSTEM, WHICH INDICATE EXACTLY THE SAME
DEPARTURE AND ARRIVAL DATES OF 9 MARCH 1991 AND 27 OCTOBER 1992, CONFIRM
THAT IT WAS PHYSICALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR APPELLANT WEBB TO HAVE COMMITTED THE
CRIME.
C. THE RULING THAT APPELLANT WEBB WAS "SMUGGLED" INTO AND OUT OF THE
PHILIPPINES WITHIN 9 MARCH 1991 AND 27 OCTOBER 1992, WITH THE US INS
CERTIFICATIONS BEING THE PROBABLE PRODUCT OF "MONEY, POWER, INFLUENCE, OR
CONNECTIONS" IS BASED ON PURE SPECULATION AND BIASED CONJECTURE AND NOT
ON A CONCLUSION THAT ANY COURT OF LAW SHOULD MAKE.
D. NO LESS THAN THE HONORABLE JUSTICE ANTONIO T. CARPIO TESTIFIED IN OPEN
COURT THAT IN THE MORNING OF 29 JUNE 1991, OR BEFORE THE COMMISSION OF THE
CRIME, HE HAD AN OVERSEAS CONVERSATION WITH SEN. FREDDIE N. WEBB ON THE
LATTERS PRESENCE IN THE UNITED STATES WITH HIS WIFE AND APPELLANT WEBB.
II
THE DISSENTING JUSTICES CORRECTLY REJECTED JESSICA ALFARO FOR NOT BEING A CREDIBLE
WITNESS AND FOR GIVING INCONSISTENT AND UNRELIABLE TESTIMONY.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS MANIFESTLY ERRED IN DISCARDING EACH AND EVERY PIECE OF THE
ACCUSEDS EVIDENCE AND PRACTICALLY REDUCING THE APPEAL BELOW INTO AN EXERCISE OF
FINDING GROUNDS TO DOUBT, SUSPECT AND ACCORDINGLY REJECT THE PROOF OFFERED BY THEM
IN THEIR DEFENSE INSTEAD OF GIVING DUE WEIGHT AND CONSIDERATION TO EACH IN ORDER TO
THOROUGHLY SATISFY ITSELF OF THE "MORAL CERTAINTY" REQUIREMENT IN CRIMINAL CASES.
IV

IN LIGHT OF THE BASIC TENETS UNDERLYING OUR CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, WHICH ESCHEW A
FINDING OF GUILT UNLESS ESTABLISHED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AND ORDAIN THE RESOLUTION
OF ALL DOUBTS IN FAVOR OF THE ACCUSED, THE COURT OF APPEALS MANIFESTLY ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION OF APPELLANT WEBB WHEN THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI HE ESTABLISHED BY
OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO ENGENDER REASONABLE DOUBT AS TO HIS GUILT OF
THE OFFENSE CHARGED. THE SCALES OUGHT TO HAVE BEEN TILTED IN HIS, AND NOT THE
PROSECUTIONS, FAVOR.108
Appellant Gatchalian reiterates the arguments he had raised in his appeal brief and motion for reconsideration filed before
the CA, as follows:

I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE INCREDIBLE TESTIMONY OF
SUPPOSED EYEWITNESS JESSICA ALFARO AND CORROBORATING WITNESSES NORMAL WHITE AND
JUSTO CABANACAN.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION HAS PROVED THE
CONSPIRACY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AND IN CONVICTING HEREIN ACCUSED-APPELLANT BASED
ON SUCH CONSPIRACY.
III
THE PROCEEDING BELOW WAS ATTENDED BY IRREGULARITIES SHOWING PARTIALITY ON THE PART OF
THE TRIAL JUDGE IN VIOLATION OF HEREIN ACCUSED-APPELLANTS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING HEREIN ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
xxxx
I
BY ALL STANDARDS OF FAIRNESS AND JUSTICE, THE TESTIMONY OF JESSICA ALFARO CANNOT BE
JUDICIALLY RECOGNIZED.
II
THE CRIMINAL CONNECTION OF MICHAEL GATCHALIAN TO THE GRUESOME VIZCONDE MURDERS HAS
NOT EVEN BEEN REMOTELY SHOWN TO SERVE AS A BASIS FOR CONVICTION.
III
IN THE REQUIRED JUDICIAL EVALUATION PROCESS, THE ENVIRONMENTAL CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE
RECORD OF THIS CASE POINT UNERRINGLY TO THE INNOCENCE OF MICHAEL GATCHALIAN.
IV
THE RULES ON EVIDENCE ON BURDEN OF PROOF AND OF THE STANDING PRESUMPTIONS IN LAW HAVE
BEEN GROSSLY VIOLATED.
V

MICHAEL GATCHALIAN RESPECTFULLY INVOKES HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS ON

THE GROUNDS OF BIAS AND PREJUDICE, AND FOR ALL THAT IT IS WORTH, HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
TO A SPEEDY TRIAL AND A SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF HIS CASE.109
Additionally, Gatchalian assails the denial by the trial court of his motion (and also appellant Webbs) for DNA testing
despite a certification from the NBI that the specimen semen remained intact, which Justice Tagle in his dissenting
opinion also found as unjust. He further argues that the right to a speedy trial is violated even if the delay was not caused
by the prosecution but by events that are not within the control of the prosecution or the courts. Thus, the length of time
which took Alfaro to come forward and testify in this case is most conspicuous. Her delay of four (4) years in reporting the
crime has to be taken against her, particularly with the story behind it. She volunteered to come forward only after the
arrests of previous accused did not lead anywhere. Moreover, it is clear that she adopted the version previously advanced
by an "akyat-bahay" gang, as noted by Justice Dacudao in his dissenting opinion. Gatchalian thus contends that the delay
occurred even before a preliminary investigation was conducted and cites cases upholding the right of accused persons to
a speedy trial where there was delay in the preliminary investigation. 110
Totality
of
Guilt of Appelants Beyond Reasonable Doubt

Evidence

Established

the

Appellants assail the lower courts in giving full faith and credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses,
particularly Jessica Alfaro despite inconsistencies and contradictions in her two (2) affidavits, and the alleged "piece by
piece discarding" of their voluminous documentary exhibits and testimonies of no less than ninety-five (95) witnesses.
They contend that the totality of evidence engenders a reasonable doubt entitling them to acquittal from the grave charge
of rape with homicide.
After a thorough and conscientious review of the records, I firmly believe that the CA correctly upheld the conviction of
appellants.
Credibility
Witnesses

of

Prosecution

The determination of the competence and credibility of a witness rests primarily with the trial court, because it has the
unique position of observing the witness deportment on the stand while testifying. 111 It is a fundamental rule that findings
of the trial courts which are factual in nature and which involve credibility are accorded respect when no glaring errors,
gross misapprehensions of facts and speculative, arbitrary and unsupported conclusions can be gathered from such
findings.112 When the trial courts findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally conclusive
and binding upon this Court.113
Reexamining the testimony of Alfaro, who underwent exhaustive and intense cross-examination by eight (8) defense
lawyers, it is to be noted that she revealed such details and observations which only a person who was actually with the
perpetrators could have known. More importantly, her testimony was corroborated on its material points by the
declarations of other prosecution witnesses, to wit: [1] that their convoy of three (3) vehicles repeatedly entered the Pitong
Daan Subdivision on the night of June 29, 1991 was confirmed by the security guard on duty, Normal White, Jr., who also
testified that he had seen Gatchalian and his group standing at the vicinity of the Almogino residence located near the end
of Vinzons St., which is consistent with Alfaros testimony that on their first trip to the subdivision she parked her car
infront of the Vizconde house while appellants parked their respective cars near the dead end of Vinzons St.; [2] that
Ventura climbed on the hood of the Nissan Sentra car and loosened the light bulb to turn it off was confirmed by the
testimony of Birrer and appellant Biong that they found a shoe print on the hood of the car parked inside the garage of the
Vizconde house; even defense witnesses Dennis Almogino (neighbor of the Vizcondes) and SPO2 Reynaldo Carbonnel
declared that the garage was totally without light; [3] that a ladys bag was on top of the dining table in the kitchen was
likewise confirmed by Birrer and Biong; [4] that a loud static sound coming from the TV set inside the masters bedroom
which led Alfaro to the said room, matched with the observations of the Vizconde housemaids, Birrer and Biong that when
they went inside the Vizconde house in the morning of June 30, 1991, the TV set inside the masters bedroom was still
turned on with a loud sound; [5] the positioning of the dead bodies of Carmela, Estrellita and Jennifer and their physical
appearance or condition (hogtied, gagged and bloodied) was correctly described by Alfaro, consistent with the
declarations of White, Jr., Birrer and Biong who were among those who first saw the bodies in the morning of June 30,
1991; [6] that Carmela was raped by Webb and how the three (3) women were killed as Alfaro learned from the
conversation of the appellants at the BF Executive Village house, was consistent with the findings of Dr. Cabanayan who
conducted the autopsy and post-mortem examination of the cadavers in the morning of June 30, 1991 showing that the
victims died of multiple stab wounds, the specimen taken from Carmelas vaginal canal tested positive for spermatozoa
and the approximate time of death based on the onset of rigor mortis, which would place it between midnight and 2:00

oclock in the morning of June 30, 1991; [7] that Webb, just before going out of the gate of the Vizconde house, threw a
stone which broke the glass frame of the main door, jibed with the testimony of Birrer who likewise saw a stone near the
broken glass panel at the living room of the Vizconde house, and Biong himself testified that he even demonstrated to
Capt. Bartolome and the housemaids the loud sound by again hitting the glass of the main door;114 and [8] that after Webb
made a call on his cellular phone, Biong arrived at around 2:00 oclock in the morning of June 30, 1991 at the BF
Executive Village house where she and appellants retreated, was consistent with the testimony of Birrer that Biong left the
"mahjong" session to answer a telephone call between 1:00 to 2:00 oclock in the morning of June 30, 1991 and thereafter
Birrer asked where he was going, to which Biong replied "BF" and shortly thereafter a taxicab with a man at the backseat
fetched Biong.
Indeed, Alfaro could not have divulged the foregoing details of the crime if she did not really join the group of Webb in
going to the Vizconde residence and witness what happened during the time Webb, Lejano and Ventura were inside the
house and when the group retreated to BF Executive Village. Contrary to appellants contention, Alfaros detailed
testimony appears clear and convincing, thus giving the Court the impression that she was sincere and credible. She even
opened her personal life to public scrutiny by admitting that she was addicted to shabu for sometime and that was how
she came to meet Webbs group and got entangled in the plot to gang-rape Carmela. Her being a former drug user in no
way taints her credibility as a witness. The fact that a witness is a person of unchaste character or even a drug dependent
does notper se affect her credibility.115
Alfaros ability to recollect events that occurred four (4) years ago with her mental condition that night of June 29, 1991
when she admittedly took shabu three (3) times and even sniffed cocaine, was likewise questioned by the appellants.
When the question was posed to Alfaro on cross-examination, she positively stated that while indeed she had
taken shabuat that time, her perception of persons and events around her was not diminished. Her faculties unimpaired
by the drugs she had taken that night, Alfaro was able to vividly recall what transpired the whole time she was with
appellants. Alfaro testified that even if she was then a regular shabu user, she had not reached that point of being
paranoid ("praning"). It was the first time Alfaro sniffed cocaine and she described its initial effect as being "stoned," but
lasting only five (5) to seven (7) minutes. However, she did not fall asleep since shabu and "coke" are not downers.
Alfaro further explained her indifference and apathy in not dissuading Webb and her group from carrying out their evil plan
against Carmela as due to the numbing effect of drugs, which also enabled her to dislodge from her mind the harrowing
images of the killings for quite sometime. Eventually, the chance to redeem herself came when she was invited to a
Christian fellowship, and with her childs future in mind, her desire to transform her life grew stronger. As she cast off her
addiction to drugs, its desensitizing effect began to wear off and her conscience bothered her no end. Under such
circumstances, the delay of four (4) years in admitting her involvement in the Vizconde killings cannot be taken against
Alfaro. In fact, she had to muster enough courage to finally come out in the open considering that during her last
encounter with appellants at a discotheque in 1995, she was threatened by appellant Rodriguez that if she will not keep
her mouth shut, she will be killed. He even offered her a plane ticket for her to go abroad. Coming from wealthy and
influential families, and capable of barbaric acts she had already seen, appellants instilled such fear in Alfaro that her
reluctance to report to the authorities was perfectly understandable.
I find that the circumstances of habitual drug use and delay in reporting a crime did not affect the competence and
credibility of prosecution witness Alfaro. It bears stressing that the fact of delay alone does not work against the
witnesses. Delay or vacillation in making a criminal accusation does not necessarily impair the credibility of the witness if
such delay is satisfactorily explained.116
Besides, appellants failed to adduce any evidence to establish any improper motive that may have impelled Alfaro to
falsely testify against them, other than their allegation that she regularly associated with NBI agents as one (1) of their
informants. The absence of evidence of improper motive on the part of the said witness for the prosecution strongly tends
to sustain the conclusion that no such improper motive exists and that her testimony is worthy of full faith and
credit.117 Neither had appellants established any ill-motive on the part of the other prosecution witnesses.
Inconsistencies and Discrepancies in Alfaros April 28, 1995 and May 22, 1995 Affidavits
Appellants, from the start of preliminary investigation, have repeatedly harped on the discrepancies and inconsistencies in
Alfaros first and second affidavits. However, this Court has repeatedly ruled that whenever there is inconsistency
between the affidavit and the testimony of a witness in court, the testimony commands greater weight. 118 With greater
relevance should this rule apply in situations when a subsequent affidavit of the prosecution witness is intended to amplify
and correct inconsistencies with the first affidavit, the discrepancies having been adequately explained. We held in People
v. Sanchez119

...we advert to that all-too familiar rule that discrepancies between sworn statements and testimonies made at the witness
stand do not necessarily discredit the witnesses. Sworn statements/affidavits are generally subordinated in importance to
open court declarations because the former are often executed when an affiants mental faculties are not in such a state
as to afford him a fair opportunity of narrating in full the incident which has transpired. Testimonies given during trials are
much more exact and elaborate. Thus, testimonial evidence carries more weight than sworn statements/affidavits. 120
Alfaro explained the circumstances surrounding her execution of the first Affidavit dated April 28, 1995 which was done
without the presence of a lawyer and at the house of agent Mario Garcia where she was brought by Atty. Sacaguing and
Moises Tamayo, another agent of task force Anti-Kidnapping, Hijack and Robbery (AKHAR). The unusual questioning of
these men gave her the impression that she was merely being used to boost their career promotion and her distrust was
even heightened when they absolutely failed to provide her security. She was aghast upon discovering the completed
affidavit which falsely stated that it was made in the presence of her lawyer of choice (Atty. Mercader who was not actually
present). Agent Tamayo also incorporated inaccurate or erroneous information indicating that she was a college graduate
even if she tried to correct him. Tamayo simply told her to just let it remain in the statement as it would not be noticed
anyway.121 Moreover, on account of her urgent concern for her own security and fear of implicating herself in the case,
Alfaro admitted down playing her own participation in her narration (including the circumstance that she had previously
met Carmela before the incident) and those of her ex-boyfriend Estrada and her relative, Gatchalian.
Prosecution Evidence Sufficient to Convict Appellants
This Court has consistently held that the rule on the trial courts appreciation of evidence must bow to the superior rule
that the prosecution must prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The law presumes an accused
innocent, and this presumption must prevail unless overturned by competent and credible proof. 122 Thus, we are tasked to
consider two crucial points in sustaining a judgment of conviction: first, the identification of the accused as perpetrator of
the crime, taking into account the credibility of the prosecution witness who made the identification as well as the
prosecutions compliance with legal and constitutional standards; and second, all the elements constituting the crime were
duly proven by the prosecution to be present.123
There appears to be no question about the fact that a horrible and most unfortunate crime has been committed. It is, in
this case, indeed a given fact, but next to it is the pivotal issue of whether or not the prosecution has been able to
discharge its equal burden in substantiating the identities of accused-appellants as the perpetrators of the crime. As well
said often, conviction must rest on the strength of the prosecutions case and not on the weakness of the defense.
Positive
of Accused-Appellants

Identification

Eyewitness identification constitutes vital evidence and, in most cases, decisive of the success or failure of the
prosecution.124 Both the RTC and CA found the eyewitness testimony of Alfaro credible and competent proof that
appellants Webb, Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Rodriguez and Estrada were at the scene of the crime and that Webb
raped Carmela as the bloodied bodies of her mother and sister lay on top of the bed inside the masters bedroom, and
right beside it stood Lejano while Ventura was preparing for their escape. At another house in BF Executive Village where
the group retreated after leaving the Vizconde house, Alfaro witnessed the blaming session, particularly between Ventura
and Webb, and thereupon learned from their conversation that Carmelas mother and sister were stabbed to death before
she herself was killed. Alfaro likewise positively identified appellant Biong, whom somebody from the group described as
the driver and bodyguard of the Webb family, as the person ordered by Webb to "clean the Vizconde house."
The testimony of Alfaro on its material points was corroborated by Birrer, Dr. Cabanayan, White, Jr., Cabanacan and
Gaviola. Appellants presence at the scene of the crime before, during and after its commission was duly established.
Their respective participation, acts and declarations were likewise detailed by Alfaro who was shown to be a credible
witness. It is axiomatic that a witness who testifies in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner and
remains consistent on cross-examination is a credible witness.125
A criminal case rises or falls on the strength of the prosecutions case, not on the weakness of the defense. Once the
prosecution overcomes the presumption of innocence by proving the elements of the crime and the identity of the accused
as perpetrator beyond reasonable doubt, the burden of evidence then shifts to the defense which shall then test the
strength of the prosecutions case either by showing that no crime was in fact committed or that the accused could not
have committed or did not commit the imputed crime, or at the very least, by casting doubt on the guilt of the accused. 126
Appellants Alibi and Denial

We have held in a number of cases that alibi is an inherently weak and unreliable defense, for it is easy to fabricate and
difficult to disprove.127 To establish alibi, the accused must prove (a) that he was present at another place at the time of
the perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime. Physical
impossibility "refers to the distance between the place where the accused was when the crime transpired and the place
where it was committed, as well as the facility of access between the two places." 128 Due to its doubtful nature, alibi must
be supported by clear and convincing proof.129
"Alibi, the plea of having been elsewhere than at the scene of the crime at the time of the commission of the felony, is a
plausible excuse for the accused. Let there be no mistake about it. Contrary to the common notion, alibi is in fact a good
defense. But, to be valid for purposes of exoneration from a criminal charge, the defense of alibi must be such that it
would have been physically impossible for the person charged with the crime to be at the locus criminis at the
time of its commission, the reason being that no person can be in two places at the same time. The excuse must
be so airtight that it would admit of no exception. Where there is the least possibility of accuseds presence at
the crime scene, the alibi will not hold water. 130 [emphasis supplied.]
The claim of appellant Webb that he could not have committed the crime because he left for the United States on March
9, 1991 and returned to the Philippines only on October 26, 1992 was correctly rejected by the RTC and CA. These dates
are so distant from the time of the commission of the crime, June 29, 1991 and June 30, 1991, and it would not have been
impossible during the interregnum for Webb to travel back to the country and again fly to the US several times considering
that the travel time on board an airline from the Philippines to San Francisco, and from San Francisco to the Philippines
takes only about twelve (12) to fourteen (14) hours. Given the financial resources and political influence of his family, it
was not unlikely that Webb could have traveled back to the Philippines before June 29-30, 1991 and then departed for the
US again, and returning to the Philippines in October 1992. There clearly exists, therefore, such possibility of Webbs
presence at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission, and his excuse cannot be deemed airtight.
This Court in People v. Larraaga131 had similarly rejected the defense of alibi of an accused, involving a shorter travel
distance (Quezon City to Cebu) and even shorter period of time showing the least possibility of an accuseds presence at
the time of the commission of the crime (a matter of hours) than in the case at bar (March 9, 1991 to June 29, 1991 which
is three [3] months). In denying the motion for reconsideration of accused Larraaga, we held that accused Larraaga
failed to establish his defense of alibi, which is futile in the face of positive identification:
This case presents to us a balance scale whereby perched on one end is appellants alibi supported by witnesses who
were either their relatives, friends or classmates, while on the other end is the positive identification of the herein
appellants by the prosecution witnesses who were not, in any way, related to the victims. With the above jurisprudence as
guide, we are certain that the balance must tilt in favor of the latter.
Besides, a thorough examination of the evidence for the prosecution shows that the appellants failed to meet the
requirements of alibi, i.e., the requirements of time and place. They failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence
that it was physically impossible for them to be at the Ayala Center, Cebu City when the Chiong sisters were abducted.
What is clear from the evidence is that Rowen, Josman, Ariel, Alberto, James Anthony and James Andrew were all within
the vicinity of Cebu City on July 16, 1997.
Not even Larraaga who claimed to be in Quezon City satisfied the required proof of physical impossibility. During the
hearing, it was shown that it takes only one (1) hour to travel by plane from Manila to Cebu and that there are four
(4) airline companies plying the route. One of the defense witnesses admitted that there are several flights from
Manila to Cebu each morning, afternoon and evening. Indeed, Larraagas presence in Cebu City on July 16, 1997
was proved to be not only a possibility but a reality. Four (4) witnesses identified Larraaga as one of the two
men talking to Marijoy and Jacqueline on the night of July 16, 1997. Shiela Singson testified that on July 16, 1997, at
around 7:20 in the evening, she saw Larraaga approach Marijoy and Jacqueline at the West Entry of Ayala Center. The
incident reminded her of Jacquelines prior story that he was Marijoys admirer. Shiela confirmed that she knows
Larraaga since she had seen him on five (5) occasions. Analie Konahap also testified that on the same evening of July
16, 1997, at about 8:00 oclock, she saw Marijoy and Jacqueline talking to two (2) men at the West Entry of Ayala Center.
She recognized the two (2) men as Larraaga and Josman, having seen them several times at Glicos, a game zone,
located across her office at the third level of Ayala Center. Williard Redobles, the security guard then assigned at Ayala
Center, corroborated the foregoing testimonies of Shiela and Analie. In addition, Rosendo Rio, a businessman from
Cogon, Carcar, declared that he saw Larraaga at Tan-awan at about 3:30 in the morning of July 17, 1997. The latter was
leaning against the hood of a white van. And over and above all, Rusia categorically identified Larraaga as one of the
participes criminis.132 [emphasis supplied]

In the light of relevant precedents, I find no reversible error committed by the RTC in refusing to give credence to
appellant Webbs argument that he could not have committed the crime of rape with homicide because he was still in the
US on June 29 and 30, 1991. The RTC thus correctly ruled:
Granting for the sake of argument that the claim of departure for the United States of the accused Webb on March 9, 1991
and his arrival in the Philippines on October 26, 1992 had been duly established by the defense, it cannot prove that he
remained in the United States during the intervening period. During the long span of time between March, 1991 to
October, 1992, it was not physically impossible for the accused Webb to have returned to the Philippines,
perpetrate the criminal act, and travel back to the United States.
It must be noted that the accused Webb is a scion of a rich, influential, and politically powerful family with the financial
capacity to travel back and forth from the Philippines to the United States. He could very well afford the price of a plane
ticket to free him from all sorts of trouble. Since there are numerous airlines plying the route from Manila to the United
States, it cannot be said that there was lack of available means to transport. Moreover, the lapse of more than three (3)
months from the time the accused Webb left the Philippines for the United States on March 9, 1991 to June 29 and 30,
1991 when the crime was committed is more than enough time for the accused Webb to have made several trips from the
United States to the Philippines and back. The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that it only requires the short
period of approximately eighteen (18) hours to reach the Philippines from the United States, with the advent of
modern travel.
It must likewise be noted that the father of the accused Webb, besides being rich and influential, was at that time in 1991,
the Congressman of Paraaque and later became a Senator of the Republic of the Philippines. Thus, the Webb money
and connections were at the disposal of the accused Webb, and it is worthy of belief that the accused Webb could have
departed and entered the country without any traces whatsoever of his having done so. In fact, defense witness Andrea
Domingo, former Commissioner of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation testified on the practice of "human
smuggling" at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport.
On this point, the Supreme Court has declared in a case that even the lapse of the short period of one (1) week was
sufficient for an accused to go to one place, to go to another place to commit a crime, and then return to his point of origin.
The principal factor considered by the Supreme Court in denying the defense of alibi in People vs. Jamero (24 SCRA 206)
was the availability to the accused of the means by which to commit a crime elsewhere and then return to his
refuge. x x x133 [emphasis supplied]
There is likewise no merit in appellant Webbs contention that the CA misappreciated his voluminous documentary
evidence and numerous witnesses who testified on his stay in the US. The CA, after a meticulous and painstaking
reevaluation of Webbs documentary and testimonial evidence, sustained the RTCs conclusion that these pieces of
evidence were either inadmissible, incompetent or irrelevant. I quote with approval the CAs findings which are wellsupported by the evidence on record:
(a) U.S. INS Certifications
xxxx
The Court seriously doubts that evidentiary weight could be ascribed to the August 31, 1995 and October 13, 1995
Certifications of the U.S. INS and computer print-out of the Nonimmigrant Information System (NIIS) which allegedly
established Webbs entry to and exit from the United States. This is due to the fallibility demonstrated by the US INS with
regard to the certifications which the said office issued regarding the basic information under its direct control and
custody.
It is to be remembered that as part of his evidence, Webb presented the explanation of one Steven P. Bucher, Acting
Chief of Records Services Branch of the U.S. INS, who admitted that the U.S. INS had previously reported on August 10,
1995, erroneously, that it had no record of the arrival and departure of Webb to and from the United States. The said
office later on admitted that it failed to exhaustively study all information available to it. We are not convinced with this
explanation. It is to be noted that the U.S. INS is an agency well known for its stringent criteria and rigid procedure in
handling documents relating to ones travel into and out of its territory. Such being the case, it would therefore be hard to
imagine that the said agency would issue a certification that it had no record of a persons entry into and exit from the
United States without first conducting an efficient verification of its records.
We do not also believe that a second search could give rise to a different conclusion, considering that there is no showing
that the records searched were different from those viewed in the first search. The later certifications issued by the U.S.

INS modifying its first certification and which was issued only a few weeks earlier, come across as a strained effort by
Webb at establishing his presence in the United States in order to reinforce his flimsy alibi.
It is not amiss to note that a reading of the first Certificate of Non-existence of Record (Exhibit "212-D") subscribed by
Debora A. Farmer of the U.S. INS would show that the U.S. INS had made a "diligent" search, and found no record of
admission into the United States of Webb. The search allegedly included an inquiry into the automated and nonautomated records systems of the U.S. INS. Be it also noted that the basis of the U.S. INS second certification (Exhibit
"218") was a printout coming also from automated information systems.
As pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General in its appeal brief, "how it became possible for the U.S. INS
Archives in Washington, which is supposed to merely download and copy the information given by the San
Francisco INS, to have an entry on accused-appellant Webb when the said port of entry had no such record was
never sufficiently addressed by the defense."
It is with this view that the Court recognizes little if not nil probative value in the second certification of the U.S. INS.
xxxx
(b) Passenger Manifest of United Airlines Flight
The purported passenger manifest for the United Airlines flight that allegedly conveyed accused-appellant Webb for the
United States, was not identified by the United Airlines personnel who actually prepared and completed the
same.Instead, the defense presented Dulcisimo Daluz, the supervisor of customer services of United Airlines in Manila,
who had no hand in the actual preparation or safekeeping of the said passenger manifest. It must be stressed that to
satisfactorily prove the due execution of a private document, the testimony of the witness with regard to the execution of
the said document must be positive. Such being the case, his testimony thereto is at most hearsay and therefore not
worthy of any credit.
Likewise, we note that the said passenger manifest produced in court is a mere photocopy and the same did not
comply with the strict procedural requirement of the airline company, that is, all the checking agents who were
on duty on March 9, 1991 must sign or initial the passenger manifest. This further lessens the credibility of the said
document.
(c) United Airline Ticket
...the alleged United Airline ticket of accused-appellant Webb offered in evidence is a mere photocopy of an alleged
original, which was never presented below. Other than the submission that the original could no longer be produced in
evidence, there is no other proof that there ever was an original airline ticket in the name of Webb. This does not satisfy
the requirements set forth under Section 5 of Rule 130. x x x we find that the photocopy presented in evidence has little if
no probative value. Even assuming there was such an original ticket in existence, the same is hardly of any weight, in the
absence of clear proof that the same was indeed used by accused-appellant Webb to go to the United States.
(d) Philippine passport
The passport of accused-appellant Webb produced in evidence, and the inscriptions appearing thereon, also offer little
support of Webbs alibi. Be it noted that what appears on record is only the photocopy of the pages of Webbs
passport. The Court therefore can only rely on the appreciation of the trial court as regards the authenticity of the
passport and the marks appearing thereon, as it is the trial court that had the exclusive opportunity to view at first hand
the original of the document, and determine for itself whether the same is entitled to any weight in evidence.
(e) Video footage of accused-appellant Webbs parents in Disneyland and Yosemite Park.
The video footage serendipitously taken by Victor Yap allegedly of Senator Webb and his family while on vacation at
Disneyland in Anaheim, California on July 3, 1991 does little to support the alibi of accused-appellant Webb for it is quite
interesting to note that nowhere did accused-appellant Webb appear in this footage. None of the people shown in the
film was identified as the accused-appellant Webb. Moreover, the records disclose that just before the segment of the film
that showed Senator Webb, there was a gap or portion of static that appeared which did not appear in any other portion of
the footage. We find that this supports the conclusion that the videotape was possibly tampered as an additional
support to the alibi of accused-appellant that he was in the United States.

xxxx
(f) Video footage at Lake Tahoe and the del Toro-Manlapit Wedding
...the video footage showing accused-appellant Webb seemingly on holiday at Lake Tahoe with the Wheelocks, to our
mind does not disprove that Webb was in the country at the time of the Vizconde killing. Firstly, the date being shown
intermittently in the footage was not the same or near the date of the Vizconde killing. As we have earlier stated,
we do not discount the possibility that Webb was in the Philippines during the time he was supposed to have been in the
United States, especially, when there are eyewitnesses who testified to the effect that Webb was in the Philippines only a
couple of weeks before the killing and who also testified of Webbs participation in the crime. In any case, we take judicial
notice that modern electronic and photographic advances could offer a means to splice or modify recorded images to
configure to a desired impression, including the insertion or annotation of numeric figures on a recorded image.
Likewise, the videotape and photographs taken on Alex del Toros wedding also fail to convince, as this was allegedly
taken on October 10, 1992 well after the fateful days of June 29 and 30, 1991.
(g) Photograph of Webb and Christopher Esguerra before the Dee Lite Concert
The photograph of accused-appellant Webb with Esguerra allegedly taken in late April 1991 before they went to a band
concert has little probative value. It must be pointed out that the image in the picture itself does not depict the date or
place it was taken, or of any Dee Lite concert allegedly attended by Webb. Likewise, we observed that the
photograph appears to have been trimmed down from a bigger size, possibly to remove the date printed therein. It is
also to be noted that Esguerra admitted that the inscription appearing at the back of the photograph of, "Hubert and I
before the Dee Lite Concert, April 1991" was only written by him in 1995, after it was given to him by accused-appellants
mother, Elizabeth, before he took the witness stand. The Court cannot therefore but cast suspicion as to its authenticity.
(h) Webbs Drivers License
We agree with the trial court's observation that the Drivers License allegedly obtained by accused-appellant from the
California Department of Motor Vehicle sometime in the first week of June 1991 is unworthy of credit, because of
the inconsistencies in Webbs testimony as to how he obtained the same. In one testimony, Webb claimed he did
not make an application but just walked in the licensing office and he did not submit any photograph relative to his
application. In a later testimony, he claimed that he submitted an ID picture for his drivers license, and that the picture
appearing on his drivers license was the very same picture he submitted together with his application for the drivers
license. These are two inconsistent testimonies on the same subject matter, which render the said drivers license and the
alleged date when the same was obtained, unworthy of credit.
(i) Logbook of Alex del Toro and Check Payments of Webbs salary
The employment records of accused-appellant, which include the alleged logbook of del Toro in his pest control business,
and check payments to Webb were also offered to support the latters alleged presence in the United States on the dates
near the day of the Vizconde killings. A review of the logbook shows that the same is unworthy of any evidentiary
weight.The entries where the accused Webb were indicated to have performed work for del Toro, showed that the
name of Webb ("Hubie"/"U.B.") was merely superimposed on the actual entries and could have been easily
fabricated to create the impression that Webb had some participation in the business of del Toro, and therefore, are not
reliable proofs of Webbs presence and occupation in the United States around the time of the Vizconde killing.
The alleged check payments of Webbs salary are also unreliable. The check dated June 13, 1991 was made payable to
"Cash", while the other check which appeared to be payable to "Hubert Webb" was however dated only July 10,
1991.Neither of the said checks squarely placed accused-appellant Webb in the United States at the time of the
Vizconde killings. Simply put, neither check is therefore clear proof to support Webbs alibi.
(j) Bicycle/Sportscar
The Toyota MR2 sportscar and Cannondale bicycle allegedly purchased by accused-appellant Webb and his father in the
United States appear to have been purchased with great haste, and under suspicious circumstances.
Consider that immediately after the accused-appellants father, former Senator Freddie Webb, arrived in the United
States, the first thing he did was go out with his friend Honesto Aragon and accused-appellant to look for a bicycle and a

car to be used by the latter in going to and from work. The car was bought sometime in early July 1991 and the bicycle
sometime on June 30, 1991. It is a wonder to this Court that the accused-appellant and his father would buy a bicycle and
a sportscar at practically the same time to provide the accused-appellant transportation to his work. Would not just a car
or a bicycle do for him? Also, the hurried purchase of the car right after the arrival of Freddie Webb appears at the very
least, suspicious, as a prospective car-buyer would understandably want to make a canvas first for the best car to buy,
and not just to purchase the first car he sees.
Moreover, as aptly observed by the trial court, though it was made clear that the purpose of purchasing the said bicycle
and car was for accused-appellants convenience in going to and from his work -- we find, that this contradicts the other
evidence presented by accused-appellant because it appears from his evidence that other than his brief stint in del Toros
pest control company business and his employment as a gasoline station attendant which incidentally was not sufficiently
proven, all that accused-appellant did in the United States was to go sightseeing, shopping and meet with family and
friends.
Lastly, the fact that the car and the bicycle were allegedly purchased in close proximity to the date of the rape and killing
of the Vizconde women does little to dissuade the perception that the car and bicycle were purchased only for the purpose
of providing a plausible defense of alibi for Webb.
(k) Letters to Jennifer Claire Cabrera
Cabrera, a friend and neighbor of accused-appellant in BF Homes, Paraaque, produced four (4) letters allegedly written
and sent to her by Webb while he was in the United States, in order to support the accused-appellants alibi. These were
allegedly the only letters sent by Webb to her.
The letters were allegedly written and posted at around the same time the Vizconde rape and killing happened, such that,
if the letters were to be duly considered, they would place Webb in the United States at the same time the June 30, 1991
killings occurred; thus, bolstering Webbs defense of alibi.
However, the said letters, to our mind, are not convincing proof of alibi, inasmuch said letters were produced only in 1995
at the time she gave a statement, and the same time Webb was charged. However, Cabrera admitted that she knew
Webb was being involved or accused in the Vizconde killings as early as 1991 and that she was shocked upon learning
that he was being implicated therein.
The Court finds it incredible that despite being shocked in 1991, about the involvement of her friend, accused-appellant in
the Vizconde rape-slay, Cabrera would wait until 1995 to "produce" the letters that could have cleared her friends name.
An interregnum of four years before coming out with valuable proof in support of a friend is to our mind, a telling factor on
the credibility of the alleged letters.
Also, the impression that may be inferred from reading the letters was one of a man who was pining away for his ladylove.
Webb was quite expressive with his feelings when he wrote that he missed Cabrera, "a lot," yet after only four letters that
was conveniently written sometime in June 1991, he thereafter stopped writing letters to Cabrera as if the whole matter
was already forgotten. It is highly suspicious therefore that the only letters of accused-appellant Webb to Cabrera were
written and sent at the exact opportune time that the Vizconde killings occurred which conveniently supplied a basis for
his defense of alibi.
Moreover, from the contents of the letters, we can deduce that there was some sort of romantic relationship with the
accused-appellant Webb and Cabrera. In fact, Webb in his letters referred to Cabrera as his "sweetheart" and "dearest",
and confessed to her that all he thinks about was her, and he was hoping he would dream of her at night. It is not
improbable, therefore, that Cabrera could have prevaricated herself to save her friend.
In sum, accused-appellant tried vainly to establish his defense of alibi with the presentation of not only a substantial
volume of documentary evidence but also testimonies of an overwhelming number of witnesses which were comprised
mostly of relatives and family friends who obviously wanted him to be exonerated of the crime charged. It is for this reason
that we regard their testimonies with an eye of suspicion for it is but natural, although morally unfair, for a close relative or
friend to give weight to blood ties and close relationship in times of dire needs especially when a criminal case is
involved.134[emphasis supplied]
The rule is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that in determining the value and credibility of evidence, witnesses are to be
weighed, not numbered. The testimony of only one witness, if credible and positive, is sufficient to convict. 135 As to
appellant Webbs voluminous documentary evidence, both the RTC and CA judiciously examined each exhibit and

concluded that these do not pass the test of admissibility and materiality insofar as proving the physical impossibility of his
presence at the Vizconde residence on June 29, 1991 until the early morning of June 30, 1991.
Appellant Webb cites the opposite view taken by Justices Tagle and Dacudao in their dissenting opinions and urges this
Court to accord the US INS certification and other documents relative to his arrival and departure in the US on the dates
March 9, 1991 and October 26, 1992, respectively, the presumption of regularity being official documents issued by US
authorities. Justices Tagle and Dacudao concurred in stating that the conclusion of their three (3) colleagues (majority)
that the US INS certifications did not exclude the possibility of Webb traveling back to the Philippines and again departing
for the US between March 9, 1991 and October 26, 1992 -- is nothing but speculation and conjecture. Webb further
mentions that since a Justice of this Court "confirmed appellant Webbs alibi of being in the United States on 29 June
1991[,] [a]t the very least, such exculpatory testimony coupled with the plethora of appellant Webbs other documentary
and testimonial evidence on his presence in the United States on 29 June 1991 raises reasonable doubt as to appellant
Webbs guilt of the crime charged."136
I find the contentions bereft of merit.
In the first place, let it be emphasized that Justice Carpios testimony before the trial court confirmed merely the fact that
his conversation with then Congressman Webb took place on June 29, 1991 and what the latter relayed to him about his
location at the time such telephone call was made, who was with him in the US (his wife and appellant Webb) and the
purpose of their US trip (to find a job for appellant Webb). Said witness even admitted that he had no personal knowledge
that appellant Webb was in fact in the United States at the time of his telephone conversation with Congressman Webb. 137
As to the travel documents consisting of his US passport, US INS certifications and other evidence presented by appellant
Webb in support of his alibi, while it is true that such presentation of passport, plane ticket and other travel documents can
serve as proof that he was indeed out of the country at the time of the Vizconde killings, 138 it must still be shown that the
evidence is clear and convincing, and the totality of such evidence constitutes an airtight excuse as to exclude the least
possibility of his presence at the crime scene. However, appellant Webb failed in this regard and the RTC and CA did not
err in giving scant weight to his arsenal of evidence, particularly so on the strength of the positive identification of
appellant Webb as Carmelas rapist and one of those who actually took part in the brutal killing of Carmela, her mother
and sister between midnight of June 29, 1991 and early morning of June 30, 1991.
Indeed, alibi cannot be sustained where it is not only without credible corroboration, but also where it does not, on its face,
demonstrate the physical impossibility of the accuseds presence at the place and time of the commission of the
crime.139Against positive evidence, alibi becomes most unsatisfactory. Alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification
of a credible witness.140 Appellant Webb was placed at the crime scene by Alfaro who positively identified him as the one
(1) who plotted and committed the rape of Carmela, and later fatally stabbed her, her mother and sister, aided by or in
concert with Lejano and Ventura. Gaviola and Cabanacan gave corroborating testimonies that appellant Webb was here
in the country, as he was just in his house at BF Homes Subdivision Phase III, at least a few weeks prior to and on June
29 to 30, 1991.
Verily, it is only when the identification of the accused as the author of the crime charged is inconclusive or unreliable
thatalibi assumes importance. Such is not the situation in the case at bar where the identification of the perpetrators by a
lone eyewitness satisfied the moral certainty standard.
It is the prosecutions burden to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Definitely, "reasonable doubt" is
not mere guesswork whether or not the accused is guilty, but such uncertainty that "a reasonable man may entertain after
a fair review and consideration of the evidence." Reasonable doubt is present when -after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidences, leaves the minds of the [judges] in that condition that
they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the charge; a certainty that convinces
and directs the understanding, and satisfies the reason and judgment of those who are bound to act conscientiously upon
it.141
That reasonable doubt is not engendered by the presentation of certifications of entry into and exit from the US, passport
with stamp marks of departure and declarations of witnesses who are mostly relatives and friends of appellant Webb, can
be gleaned from the fact that passports and plane tickets indicating dates of arrival and departure do not necessarily
prove that the very same person actually took the flight. This Court takes judicial notice of reported irregularities and
tampering of passports in the years prior to the recent issuance by the DFA of machine-readable passports. In fact, the
proliferation of photo-substituted passports, fake immigration stamps, assumed identity and double passports, among
others, have been cited as grounds to justify the necessity of amending the Philippine Passport Act of 1996 (R.A. No.

8239) as proposed in the Senate, "x x x to rally for the issuance of passports using tamper proof and the latest data
encryption technology; and provide stiffer penalties against proliferators of fake passports."142
It is worthy of note I note that the original of Webb's passport was not offered in evidence and made part of the records,
which only gives credence to the prosecutions allegation that it bore signs of tampering and irregularities. And as earlier
mentioned, the much vaunted US-INS second certification dated August 31, 1995 based on a mere computer print-out
from the Non-immigrant Information System (Exhibit "213-1-D") retrieved from the US- INS Archives in Washington, and
the accompanying certifications, have little probative value, the truth of their contents had not been testified to by the
persons who issued the same. Moreover, the issuance of this certification only a couple of weeks after the August 10,
1995 US-INS Office in San Francisco was issued, only raised questions as to its accuracy. Said earlier certification
through Debora A. Farmer stated that:
[a]fter diligent search no record is found to exist in the records of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. The
search included a review of the Service automated and nonautomated records system; there is no evidence of any
lawful admission to the United States as an immigrant, or as a nonimmigrant, relating to Hubert P. Webb, born
November 7, 1968, in the Philippines. The records searched are current as of July 1, 1995 for the immigrants and
nonimmigrants.143 [emphasis supplied]
The above finding was relayed by Thomas Schiltgen, District Director of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, San
Francisco to Ms. Teresita V. Marzan, Consul General of the Philippines:

SUBJECT: WEBB, HUBERT

RE: Hubert Jeffrey Webb
Dear Requester:
YOUR REQUEST WAS RECEIVED BY THIS OFFICE ON 07/10/95.
WE HAVE COMPLETED OUR SEARCH FOR RECORDS RESPONSIVE TO YOUR REQUEST BUT DID NOT
LOCATE ANY. IF YOU STILL BELIEVE THAT WE HAVE RECORDS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF YOUR REQUEST,
AND CAN PROVIDE US WITH ADDITIONAL INFORMATION, WE WILL CONDUCT ANOTHER SEARCH. IF YOU
ELECT TO REQUEST ANOTHER SEARCH, WE RECOMMEND THAT YOU NOT FOLLOW THE APPEALS
PROCEDURE DESCRIBED BELOW UNTIL WE HAVE COMPLETED THAT SEARCH.
YOU MAY APPEAL THE FINDING IN THIS MATTER BY WRITING TO THE OFFICE OF INFORMATION AND
PRIVACY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SUITE 570, 1310 G. STREET, N.W., FLAG BUILDING,
WASHINGTON D.C., 20530 WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS OF RECEIPT OF THIS LETTER. YOUR LETTER
SHOULD REFERENCE THE INS CONTROL NUMBER ABOVE AND THE LETTER AND THE ENVELOPE
SHOULD BE CLEARLY MARKED FOIA/PA APPEAL.
SINCERELY,
(SGD.) DISTRICT DIRECTOR144 [emphasis supplied]
To show that the August 10, 1995 US-INS Certification was erroneous, appellant Webb presented the Memorandum
addressed to Secretary Domingo L. Siazon signed by Consul Leo M. Herrera-Lim, the Diplomatic Note dated October 30,
1995 and the letter of Debora Farmer stating that the San Francisco certification was erroneous. 145 The prosecution,
however, presented another document which indicated that an appeal to the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of
Information and Privacy yielded a negative result on any record on file that one (1) Hubert Webb arrived in the United
States on March 9, 1991, and further that Richard L. Huff, Co-Director of the Office of Information and Privacy had in
effect sustained as correct the US-INS San Francisco report that there is no such data on Hubert Webb in the San
Francisco database so that the Philippine Embassy in Washington, D.C. should instead ask the assistance of other U.S.
government agencies in their search for data on appellant Webb.146
The defense endeavored to explain why the US-INS Archives in Washington could have made the "mistake" of stating
that it had no data or information on the alleged entry of appellant Webb on March 9, 1991 and his exit on October 26,
1992. However, it had not satisfactorily addressed the nagging question of how it became possible for the US-INS

Archives in Washington, which is supposed to merely download and copy the information given by the San Francisco INS,
to have an entry on appellant Webb when the said port of entry had no such record. Considering that many visitors
(nonimmigrants) are admittedly not entered into the NIIS database, and that diligent search already yielded a negative
response on appellant Webbs entry into the US on March 9, 1991 as per the August 10, 1995 Certification, as to what US
government agency the alleged computer-generated print-out in the August 31, 1995 certification actually came from
remains unclear.
Appellant Webbs reliance on the presumption of regularity of official functions, stressing the fact that the US-INS
certifications are official documents, is misplaced. The presumption leaned on is disputable and can be overcome by
evidence to the contrary.147 In this case, the existence of an earlier negative report on the NIIS record on file concerning
the entry of appellant Webb into and his exit from the US on March 9, 1991 and October 26, 1992, respectively, had
raised serious doubt on the veracity and accuracy of the subsequently issued second certification dated August 31, 1995
which is based merely on a computer print-out of his alleged entry on March 9, 1991 and departure on October 26, 1992.
As to the testimony of former Foreign Affairs Secretary Domingo L. Siazon, the same cannot be given due credence since
he is incompetent to testify on the contents of the August 31, 1995 US-INS Certification, having merely received the said
document in his capacity as the head of the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines. Consul Leo M. Herrera-Lims
testimony likewise did not carry much weight considering that its significance is confined to the fact that the document
from the US-INS was transmitted and received by the DFA. It is to be noted that the certification issued by the Philippine
Embassy with respect to the US-INS Certifications contained a disclaimer, specifically stating that the Embassy assumed
no responsibility for the contents of the annexed document. 148 The same observations regarding the "consularized
certifications" was reflected in the Decision dated April 16, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP No. 42285 ("Miguel Rodriguez v. Amelita
Tolentino") and CA-G.R. SP No. 42673 ("Hubert P. Webb v. Amelita Tolentino").149
Appellant Webbs travel documents and other supposed paper trail of his stay in the US are unreliable proof of his
absence in the Philippines at the time of the commission of the crime charged. The non-submission in evidence of
his original passport, which was not formally offered and made part of the records, had deprived the RTC, CA and this
Court the opportunity to examine the same. Such original is a crucial piece of evidence which unfortunately was placed
beyond judicial scrutiny.
IWe quote the following observations made by the prosecution on Webbs passport from the appeal brief of the OSG:
In tandem with the presentation of the various U.S. INS certifications to bolster appellant Webbs story of a U.S. sojourn
before, during and after the commission of the offense charged, he further anchors his defense on his passport (Exh.
AAAAAA and 294) ostensibly to show, among others, that the grant by the United States government granted him a visa
effective from April 6, 1989 to April 6, 1994 and the U.S. Immigration in San Francisco stampmarked it on March 9, 1991
(Exh. AAAAAA-6) on page 30 thereof (Exh. AAAAAA-2 and 294-D).
On its face, what the entries in the passport plainly suggest is that appellant Webb violated U.S. immigration laws by
"overstaying" beyond the usual six-(6) month period allowed for tourists. However, he being the son of a Senator would
not unnecessarily violate U.S. immigration laws. It would be quite easy for him to apply for and secure an extension of his
authorized stay in the U.S., if only he requested. But why did not he or his parents secure the extension? Why was there
no evidence to show that he ever requested an extension? Did he really overstay in the U.S. or could he simply enter and
leave the U.S. and the Philippines without marking his passport? These raise serious questions on the integrity of the
passport.
Is appellant Webb really untouchable that even U.S. authorities in various states would let him get "off the hook" without
much of a fuss after his alleged brushes with the law (TSN - Hubert Webb dated September 10, 1997, p. 82)? This is
especially incredible considering that he was allegedly apprehended in the United States near the U.S. border (Ibid., pp.
82-83) where authorities are always on the look out for illegal aliens.
The questions involving appellant Webbs passport are not limited to the stamp marks (or lack of stamp marks) therein.
There are unusual things about his passport which he has been unable to explain satisfactorily.
The passport of her mother, Elizabeth Webb, for example, appears to be well preserved despite having been
used morefrequently than that of appellant Webb who supposedly used it in only one trip abroad. Not only do some of the
pages appear smudged or untidy, but more significantly, the perforations on the passport pages indicating the serial
number of appellant Webbs passport no longer fit exactly on the pages -- that is, they are no longer aligned. The
perforations are intended not only to indicate the serial number of the passport but more importantly to countercheck
intercalations and tampering. The "non-alignment" of the perforations is thus significant.

In addition to the over-all shabby appearance of appellant Webbs passport, what is evident is the torn plastic portion of
the dorsal page thereof near the holders signature. There is also the matter of the marked difference in the signatures of
appellant Webb as appearing on the dorsal side of the passport (Exh. AAAAAA-3 and 294-A-1) as compared with that
appearing on his laminated photograph (Exh. AAAAAA-5 and 294-C-1). Of course, he tried to offer an explanation on the
variance in the two (2) signatures. All he could reason out, however, was that he wrote his name using his normal
penmanship when in a lazy mood (TSN -- Hubert Webb dated August 14, 1997, p. 27), implying that the signature
appearing on his laminated photograph is his real signature. A review of his other documentary evidence supposedly
bearing his signature shows that what appears therein is his name written in his "normal penmanship," and that it is only
in the laminated picture (Exh. AAAAAA-5 and 294-C) that such "real signature" appears. Following appellant Webbs
explanation, it means that he was in a lazy mood all the time! 150
Two (2) more documents presented by appellant Webb deserve a close look -- his US Drivers License supposedly issued
on June 14, 1991, and the Passenger Manifest. The RTCs evaluation of said documents revealed their lack of probative
value, thus:
On August 14, 1997, [Webb] testified that he did not make any application since the procedure in California provides for a
walk-in system, that he did not submit any photograph relative to his application for a Californian Drivers License,
inasmuch as a photograph of him was taken, and that, his drivers license was issued sometime on the first week of June,
1991. On the other hand, on September 1, 1997, the accused suddenly and completely changed his testimony while still
on direct examination. He claims that the picture appearing on the drivers license was the very same he submitted
together with his application for the drivers license. Thus, the discrepancy as to the source of the photograph (Exhibit
"334-E") between the testimony given on August 14, 1997 where the accused Webb said that the California Department
of Motor Vehicle took his picture, and the testimony given on September 1, 1997 where he said that he submitted it to the
California DMV as an attachment to his supposed drivers license application renders the accused Webbs testimony as
unbelievable and unworthy of credence.
It is beyond belief that the same picture submitted by the accused Webb became the picture in the drivers license
allegedly issued on June 14, 1991. Moreover, it is contrary to human nature and experience, aside from the fact that it is
likewise contrary to the procedure described by the accused Webb in obtaining a drivers license in the State of California.
Since a drivers license is one of the principal means of identification in the United States as well as in the Philippines, to
allow the applicants to produce their own pictures would surely defeat the purpose in requiring them to appear before the
Department of Motor Vehicle, that is, to ensure the integrity and genuineness of the drivers license.
The Court takes note that the accused Webb, in his fervent desire to exculpate himself from criminal liability, earlier
offered in evidence the letter dated January 10, 1992 of Mr. Robert L. Heafner, Legal Attache of the Embassy of the
United States to the then Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, Alfredo S. Lim, (Exhibit "61") which stated in
very clear terms that the accused Webbs California Drivers License Number A8818707 was issued on August 9,
1991. Furthermore, the said letter states the listed address of the accused Webb at the time of the issuance of the drivers
license was 532 So. Avenida Faro Ave., Anaheim, California 92807. The said listed address of the accused Webb at the
time his drivers license was issued has demolished the testimony of the defense witness Sonia Rodriguez that the
accused Webb was supposed to be already living with the Rodriguez family in Longwood, Florida by the first week of
August, 1991.
The accused Webb likewise offered in evidence the official communication coming from the Federal Bureau of
Investigation dated December 31, 1991 (Exhibit "MMM" and submarkings; Exhibit "66-C" and submarkings) which
likewise gave the information that the accused Webb was issued California Drivers License No. 8818707 on August
9, 1991, and that as of August 9, 1991, the address of the accused Webb was 532 South Avenida Faro, Anaheim,
California 92807. The fact that the alleged Drivers License No. A8818707 was issued on two (2) different dates (August
9, 1991 and June 14, 1991) casts a serious doubt on its provenance and authenticity.
xxxx
In order to establish that the accused Hubert Webb departed from the Philippines on 09 March 1991 on board UA flight
808 the defense also presented witness Dulcisimo Daluz, Station Manager of United Airlines for Manila who in turn
presented a document purporting to be the Passenger Manifest for the flight departing on 09 March 1991 (Exhibits
"233-A" to "233-N").
This document merits outright rejection considering that the defense witness Daluz confirmed that the same was prepared
by the UA departure area personnel and not by himself. Thus, this document is merely hearsay and is devoid of any merit
whatsoever.

In respect of the plane ticket of the accused Hubert Webb, what was likewise offered as part of the testimony of Daluz
was a mere photo copy, wherein Daluz also admitted not having any direct participation in its preparation.
The spurious nature of the document was observed by the witness Daluz himself who admitted that there
wereirregularities in the Passenger Manifest presented by the defense. According to Daluz, it is a strict procedural
requirement that all the checking agents who were on duty on March 9, 1991 were supposed to initial the Passenger
Manifest, However, he admitted that Exhibits "223" and "223-N" did not contain the initials of the checking agents
who were supposed to initial the same.
The defense presented Agnes Tabuena, Vice-President for Finance and Administration of the Philippine Airlines for the
purpose of establishing that Hubert Webb arrived in the Philippines only on 26 October 1992.
Like witnesses Daluz and Nolasco, Tabuenas statements on the witness stand and the Certification was based
exclusively on the Passenger Manifest of PALs PR 103. Unfortunately for the defense, the said testimony is of no
probative value and of doubtful veracity considering that the witness did not prepare the same, nor did the witness identify
the persons who prepared the same other than that they were "airport staff", nor did she had any idea when the document
was transmitted to her office. In fact, the witness could not even interpret the contents of the said Passenger Manifest,
much more testify as to the due execution and genuineness thereof.
In view of the vital necessity to the other accused of establishing accused Webbs alibi, it is important to note that Atty.
Francisco Gatchalian, father of the accused Michael Gatchalian was then a high ranking PAL Official and a colleague of
Tabuena. This makes the source of the document, even ignoring the fact of its inadmissibility, suspicious. 151 [emphasis
supplied.]
The alibi of appellants Gatchalian and Lejano, who claimed they were at the Syap residence at Ayala Alabang Village
watching video tapes the whole night of June 29, 1991 until early morning of June 30, 1991, was even less plausible
considering the distance of that place from Pitong Daan Subdivision, which is just a few minutes ride away. The RTC
noted the manifestation of the defense on Andrew Syaps refusal to testify on Gatchalian and Lejanos whereabouts
during the night in question, despite their efforts to convince him to do so. It further noted the testimony of Assistant NBI
Director Pedro Rivera that Carlos Syap upon seeing Gatchalian with their group even berated Gatchalian for dragging him
into his (Gatchalians) own problem. Aside from Alfaro, security guard Normal White, Jr. also testified that the presence of
Gatchalian (son of a homeowner), who pointed to the other appellants in the two (2) cars behind him as his companions,
was the reason they allowed his friends to enter the subdivision on the night of June 29, 1991. White, Jr. also categorically
declared he had, earlier that same night, seen Gatchalian with his friends standing at Vinzons St. Thus, other than the
hearsay declaration of his father who merely testified on what his son told him about spending the night watching video
tapes at the Syap residence on June 29, 1991, Gatchalian presented no corroborative evidence of his alibi.
As to appellant Lejano, he was positively identified by Alfaro as the first to express approval of Webbs plan to gang-rape
Carmela by saying, "Ako ang susunod." Lejano was also with Alfaro, Webb and Ventura in going inside the Vizconde
house, and whom she later saw inside the masters bedroom, at the foot of the bed where the bloodied bodies of Estrellita
and Jennifer lay, and just standing there about to wear his jacket while Webb was pumping the hogtied and gagged
Carmela on the floor. His alibi is likewise feeble, as he could have easily gone to the Vizconde house within a few minutes
from the Syap residence where he and Gatchalian allegedly watched video tapes.
Appellant Fernandez, on his part, insisted that Alfaros story was simply fabricated by her "hidden mentors" who
considered the sworn statement of Roberto D. Barroso taken on November 4, 1991. Barroso was one (1) of the members
of the "Akyat Bahay" gang who were earlier charged before the Makati City RTC in Criminal Case Nos. 91-7135-37 for
Rape with Homicide and for Robbery with Homicide in connection with the Vizconde killings. There is an uncanny
congruence in the details of the incident as testified to by Alfaro, with the sworn statement of Barroso particularly
pertaining to the manner by which the garage light of the Vizconde house was put out, the smashing of the glass panel of
the main door, and the appearance of a woman who opened the main door saying "Sino kayo?"152
Such submissions are inane, in view of the dismissal of those cases filed against the first set of suspects based on lack of
evidence. Contrary to Fernandezs insinuation of a fabricated eyewitness account, Alfaro gave much more minute details
than the limited narration given by Barroso. More important, Alfaros testimony was sufficiently corroborated on its material
points, not only by the physical evidence, but also by the testimonies of four (4) disinterested witnesses for the
prosecution: White, Jr., Cabanacan, Gaviola and Birrer.
Fernandez also cited as among the reasons why Alfaros declarations were far from positive, the non-recovery of the fatal
weapons used in the killings. He contended that a crucial link in the prosecutions physical evidence was thus missing, as

Alfaro could not even say what was the "object" or "thing" which she saw thrown out of the Nissan Patrol while the group
was on their way to the BF Executive Village. Hence, her suggestion that what she saw Ventura took from the kitchen
drawer may have been kitchen knives used to kill the victims must fail. 153
Such proposition fails to persuade. The failure to present the murder weapon will not exculpate the accused from criminal
liability. The presentation and identification of the weapon used are not indispensable to prove the guilt of the accused,
much more so where the perpetrator has been positively identified by a credible witness. 154
Appellant Rodriguez denies being a conspirator with Webbs group in the commission of the crime, asserting that his
presence and participation in the Vizconde killings, from the time of its inception up to its consummation, was not
established beyond reasonable doubt. He cites the failure of Alfaro to mention his name as part of the "group" twice in her
testimony. These instances refer to Alfaros direct examination when she was asked to name the persons riding the
convoy of three (3) vehicles when they left Ayala Alabang Commercial Center parking lot to proceed to the Vizconde
residence at Pitong Daan Subdivision,155 and the second time when she was asked to enumerate the members of the
"group" who were waiting along Aguirre Avenue during their second trip to the Vizconde residence. 156 Thus, when Alfaro
testified that the rest of the group acted as lookouts while she, Webb, Lejano and Ventura went inside the Vizconde
house, it must be understood as limited only to those she had previously enumerated, which definitely did not include
Rodriguez.157
The argument is untenable. The mere fact that Alfaro missed out naming Rodriguez in two (2) instances during her direct
examination does not give rise to the conclusion that he was not positively identified by Alfaro as among those present
and participated prior to, during and after the commission of the crime as lookouts along with the rest of the group.
Contrary to Rodriguezs claim, the first time that Alfaro referred to and enumerated the members of the "group" which she
had unexpectedly joined that night, was at the beginning of her narration on how she met Venturas friends when she got
her order of shabu at the Ayala Alabang Commercial Center parking lot.

Q. And you said that Dong Ventura introduced you to this group, will you name the group that was
introduced to you by Dong Ventura?
A. First, he introduced me to Hubert Webb, then Fyke Fernandez, Miguel Rodriguez, and then Tonyboy
Lejano, Michael Gatchalian.158
Alfaro was again asked to enumerate the members of the "group" when the prosecution asked her to name the members
of the group, in the later part of her direct examination during the same hearing.159 She also testified that after everyone,
including Rodriguez, took part in a shabu session, they left the parking lot.160 It thus logically follows that whenever Alfaro
made reference to the "group" in her entire narration, it necessarily included those she had enumerated she had met and
had a shabu session with at the Ayala Alabang Commercial Center parking lot. This same group was with her from their
first trip to the Vizconde residence until the time they left Pitong Daan Subdivision and retreated to a house at BF
Executive Village early morning of June 30, 1991. Alfaro had specifically mentioned Rodriguez when asked by Prosecutor
Zuo to describe their relative positions at the lawn area of the BF Executive Village house, thus establishing his presence
during the "blaming session":

A. x x x kalat kami, sir, pero hindi kami magkakalayo x x x

xxxx
Q. How about Miguel Rodriguez, how far was he from Hubert?
A. Two meters away.
xxxx
A. Mike is very very near Ging Rodriguez.161
It must be stressed that Alfaro categorically declared it was Rodriguez who approached her at Faces Disco on March 30,
1995 and told her to shut up or she would be killed. Aside from making that threat, Rodriguez also offered Alfaro a plane
ticket so she could leave the country.162 Rodriguezs bare denial cannot be given any evidentiary weight. We have ruled
that denial is a self-serving negative evidence that cannot be given greater weight than the declaration of a credible
witness who testified on affirmative matters.163

Rodriguezs attempt to set up an alibi through the testimony of his cousin Mark Rualo was equally frail. Even assuming as
true Rualos testimony that he had indeed invited Rodriguez to attend his birthday party on June 29, 1991 but Rodriguez
opted to stay in his house and even talked to him on the phone when he called Rodriguez to ask why he was not yet at
the party, it cannot serve as proof of Rodriguezs whereabouts at the time of the commission of the crime. It did not rule
out the actual presence of Rodriguez at the crime scene.
Appellant Estrada, just like Rodriguez and Fernandez, did not take the witness stand and simply relied on
the alibi defense of his co-accused, principally that of Webb. Alfaro testified that it was Estrada, then her boyfriend, who
was together with her in her car throughout the night of June 29, 1991 until early morning of June 30, 1991. Estrada was
among those who acted as lookouts outside the Vizconde house after they all concurred in the plan of Webb to gang-rape
Carmela while they were still at the parking lot of the Ayala Alabang Commercial Center.
Conspiracy among appellants duly proven
The existence of conspiracy between appellants Webb, Ventura, Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Rodriguez and Filart
was satisfactorily proven by the prosecution. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy comes to life at the very instant the plotters
agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the felony and forthwith decide to actually pursue it. It may be proved by direct or
circumstantial evidence.164 Although only one (1) rape was actually proven by the prosecution, as conspirators who
mutually agreed to commit the crime and assisted one (1) another in its commission, on the occasion of which the rape
victim Carmela, her mother Estrellita and sister Jennifer, were killed, each of the accused-appellants shall be criminally
liable for rape with homicide.
Indeed, appellants by their individual acts, taken as a whole, showed that they were acting in unison and cooperation to
achieve the same unlawful objective, even if it was only Webb, Ventura and Lejano who actually went inside the Vizconde
house while Estrada, Fernandez, Rodriguez, Gatchalian and Filart stood as lookouts outside the house. Under these
premises, it is not even necessary to pinpoint the precise participation of each of the accused-appellants, the act of one
being the act of all.165
One who participates in the material execution of the crime by standing guard or lending moral support to the actual
perpetrators thereof is criminally responsible to the same extent as the latter. There being conspiracy among the accusedappellants, they are liable as co-principals regardless of the manner and extent of their participation.166
Biong guilty as accessory after the fact
Appellant Biong contends that he cannot be convicted as accessory to the crime of rape with homicide because the acts
imputed to him did not result in the hiding of the case. There was no evidence that such indeed was his intent or motive.
He points out that the bodies of the victims were found at their respective places where they were assaulted and there
was no evidence that they had been moved an inch from where they breathed their last. He asserts that non-preservation
of the evidence is not an accessory crime under the Revised Penal Code. 167
The contentions have no merit.
The Revised Penal Code in Article 19 defines an accessory as one who has knowledge of the commission of the crime,
yet did not take part in its commission as principal or accomplice, but took part in it subsequent to its commission by any
of three modes: (1) profiting himself or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime; (2) concealing or
destroying the body of the crime, or the effects or instruments thereof in order to prevent its discovery; and (3) harboring,
concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principals of the crime, provided the accessory acts with abuse of his public
functions or when the offender is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive,
or is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime.168
Under paragraph 3 of Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, there are two (2) classes of accessories, one of
which is a public officer who harbors, conceals or assists in the escape of the principal. Such public officer must have
acted with abuse of his public functions, and the crime committed by the principal is any crime, provided it is not a light
felony. Appellant Biong is one (1) such public officer, and he abused his public function when, instead of immediately
arresting the perpetrators of the crime, he acceded to the bidding of appellant Webb to "clean the Vizconde house," which
means he must help hide any possible trace or sign linking them to the crime, and not necessarily to prevent the discovery
of the bodies in such actual condition upon their deaths. Hence, such "cleaning" would include obliterating fingerprints and
other identifying marks which appellants Webb, Lejano and Ventura might have left at the scene of the crime.

Contrary to Biongs assertion, his failure to preserve evidence at the crime scene such as fingerprints on the doors and
objects inside the masters bedroom where the bodies were found, the bloodied floor of the toilet, the actual material used
in gagging Carmela and Estrellita, the bloodied blankets and bed sheets, the original condition of the broken glass panel
of the main door, the shoe print and foot prints on the car hood and at the back of the house, fingerprints on the light bulb
at the garage -- was a form of assistance to help the perpetrators evade apprehension by confusing the investigators in
determining initially what happened and the possible suspects. Consequently, Biongs unlawful taking of the jewelries and
Carmelas ATM card and drivers license, his act of breaking the larger portion of the main door glass, the washing out of
the blood on the toilet floor and permitting the relatives to burn the bloodied bed sheets and blankets -- had in fact misled
the authorities in identifying potential suspects. Thus, the police had a difficult time figuring out whether it was robbers
who entered the Vizconde house and perpetrated the rape-slay, or drug-crazed addicts on the loose, or other persons
having motive against the Vizconde family had exacted revenge, or a brutal sexual assault on Carmela by men who were
not strangers to her which also led to the killings.
On the basis of strong evidence of appellant Biongs effort to destroy crucial physical evidence at the crime scene, I hold
that the RTC did not err in convicting him as an accessory to the crime of rape with homicide.
Penalty
The CA was correct in affirming the sentence imposed by the RTC upon each of the accused-appellants Webb, Lejano,
Gatchalian, Rodriguez, Fernandez and Estrada. The proper penalty is reclusion perpetua because the imposition of the
death penalty under the Revised Penal Code (in Article 335 thereof, as amended by R.A. No. 2632 and R.A. No. 4111,
when by reason or on the occasion of rape, a homicide is committed), was prohibited by the Constitution at the time the
offense was committed.169 At any rate, the subsequent passage of R.A. No. 9346 entitled "An Act Prohibiting the
Imposition of the Death Penalty in the Philippines," which was signed into law on June 24, 2006, would have mandated
the imposition on accused-appellants the same penalty of reclusion perpetua.
As to the penalty imposed by the CA on appellant Biong as accessory after the fact to the crime of rape with homicide, we
find the same proper and in order.
DNA Testing
Appellant Gatchalian reiterates his and appellant Webbs motion for DNA testing of the semen specimen taken from the
vaginal cavity of Carmela during the autopsy conducted by Dr. Cabanayan, which motion was denied by the RTC for lack
of available scientific expertise and technology at the time.
With the great advances in forensic science and under pertinent state laws, American courts allow post-conviction DNA
testing when its application has strong indications that the result could potentially exonerate the convict. Indeed, even a
convicted felon has the right to avail of new technology not available during his trial.
On October 2, 2007, this Court approved the Rule on DNA Evidence170 which took effect on October 15, 2007.
Pursuant to Section 4 of the Rule, the court may at any time, either motu proprio or on application of any person who has
a legal interest in the matter in litigation, order a DNA testing after due notice and hearing. Such order shall issue upon
showing of the following:

(a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;

(b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing now requested; or (ii)
was previously subjected to DNA testing, but the results may require confirmation for good reasons;
(c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique;
(d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new information that is relevant to the proper
resolution of the case; and
(e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as potentially affecting the accuracy
or integrity of the DNA testing.171

By Resolution dated April 20, 2010, this Court granted appellant Webbs request to submit for DNA analysis the semen
specimen taken from the cadaver of Carmela Vizconde under the custody of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
We ordered (1) the NBI to assist the parties in facilitating the submission of the said specimen to the UP-Natural Science
and Research Institute (UP-NSRI), Diliman, Quezon City; and (2) the NBI and UP-NSRI to report to this Court within
fifteen (15) days from notice regarding compliance with and implementation of the said resolution.
In his Compliance and Manifestation dated April 27, 2010, Atty. Reynaldo O. Esmeralda, NBI Deputy Director for
Technical Services, informed this Court that the semen specimen/vaginal smear taken from the cadaver of Carmela
Vizconde and all original documents (autopsy and laboratory reports, and photographs) are no longer in the custody of the
NBI as these were submitted as evidence to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Paraaque City, Branch 274 by then NBI
Medico-Legal Chief, Prospero A. Cabanayan, M.D., when the latter testified on direct and cross-examination on January
30, 31, February 1, 5, 6 and 7, 1996. Attached thereto are certified true copies of Laboratory Report No. SN-91-17 (stating
positive result for the presence of human spermatozoa), Autopsy Report No. N-91-1665 (with remarks: "Smear for
presence of spermatozoa"), copy of the sworn statement of Dr. Cabanayan and certified true copy of the envelope bearing
his signed handwritten notation that all original photographs have been submitted as evidence during the aforementioned
hearing dates.172
On May 11, 2010, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Motion for Reconsideration of our Resolution dated
April 20, 2010 on grounds that (a) the DNA testing order was issued in disregard of Section 4 of the Rule on DNA
Evidence which requires prior hearing and notice; (b) a determination of propriety of DNA testing at this stage under the
presentRule, separate from that filed by Webb before the trial court on October 6, 1997, is necessary as there was no
opportunity back then to establish the requisites for a DNA testing order under the Rule which took effect only in 2007; (c)
the result of the DNA testing will constitute new evidence, which cannot be received and appreciated for the first time on
appeal; and (d) this Court failed to elucidate an exceptional circumstance to justify its decision to consider a question of
fact, as this Court itself acknowledged in its April 20, 2010 Resolution that the result of DNA testing is not crucial or
indispensable in the determination of appellant Webbs guilt for the crime charged. 173
On May 21, 2010, Atty. Roberto Makalintal, Jr., Branch Clerk of RTC Paraaque City, Branch 274, submitted his
Comment on The Compliance and Manifestation Dated April 27, 2010 of the NBI stating that: (a) There is no showing of
actual receipt by RTC Branch 274 of the specimen/vaginal smear mentioned in Dr. Cabanayans affidavit dated April 27,
2010; (b) Based on available records such as the TSN of January 31, 1996 and February 7, 1996 during which Dr.
Cabanayan testified, no such specimen/vaginal smear was submitted to RTC Branch 274; (c) The TSN of January 31,
1996 on pages 57, 58 and 69 suggest that marked in evidence as Exhibits "S", "T" and "U" by then Chief State Prosecutor
Jovencito Zuo were only the photographs of the three slides containing the semen specimen; (c) In the hearing of
February 7, 1996, Dr. Cabanayans last testimony before RTC Branch 274 in this case, he testified that the last time he
saw those slides was when he had the photographs thereof taken in 1995 (the first time was when he examined them in
1991), and as far as he knows between 1991 and 1995, those slides were kept in the Pathology Laboratory of the NBI;
and (d) The entire records of the cases were already forwarded to this Court a long time ago, including the evidence
formally offered by the prosecution and the accused.174
Under our Resolution of June 15, 2010, we required the NBI to (a) show proof of the release of the semen specimen to
the RTC of Paraaque City, Branch 274 in 1996; and (b) comment on the alleged conflicting representations in its
Compliance and Manifestation dated April 27, 2010, both within ten days from notice. However, the NBI has not complied
with said directive.
In his Comment on the OSGs motion for reconsideration, appellant Fernandez argued that when this Court, in the higher
interest of justice, relaxed the Rule on DNA Evidence to afford Webb the fullest extent of his constitutional rights, the
prosecution was not thereby denied its equally important right to due process. Contrary to the OSGs claim that this Court
immediately granted DNA testing without observing the requisites under Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence, and
without due notice and hearing, appellant asserts that the Resolution dated April 20, 2010 clearly defines the parameters
of the DNA analysis to be conducted by the UP-NSRI assisted by the NBI. Indeed, there are ample safeguards in
the Rule to assure the reliability and acceptability of the results of the DNA testing. Fernandez, however, objected to the
statement of the OSG that "in the light of positive identification" of appellant Webb by the principal witness for the
prosecution, Jessica Alfaro, the existing circumstances more than warrant the affirmation of Webbs guilt. Alfaros crossexamination exposed her as an "out-and-out perjurer, a bold and intentional liar under oath" and a "fake witness" whose
account of the incident is "shot-through with fatal omissions, self-contradictions, inconsistencies and inherent
improbabilities."175
Appellant Lejano likewise filed his comment, pointing out that the trial court denied Webbs motion to direct the NBI to
submit semen specimen for DNA analysis on November 25, 1997 only after lengthy exchange of pleadings between the
defense and prosecution, the latter having properly opposed said motion. Hence, the People cannot now rightfully claim

that there was no notice or hearing on the issue of submitting the semen specimen for DNA analysis. Citing Brady v.
Maryland,176 Lejano contended that the suppression of exculpatory evidence or evidence that will show reasonable
probability that the verdict would have been different had the evidence been disclosed grossly violates an accuseds
right to due process. In this case, the evidence needs only to be subjected to DNA analysis to establish the innocence of
appellant Webb, as well as of petitioner and appellant Lejano. It was further asserted that the semen specimen was
already existing at the time of the trial, and hence can hardly be considered as "new evidence" and that DNA testing of
said semen specimen taken from the victim Carmela Vizconde "has the scientific potential to produce new information that
is relevant to the proper resolution of the case" (Sec. 4 (d), Rule on DNA Evidence).177
On his part, appellant Webb stressed that there are exceptional circumstances that justify this Courts order to
immediately conduct the DNA analysis. He has been behind bars for more than fifteen (15) years. He has filed a motion
for DNA analysis as early as 1997 or thirteen (13) years ago. The result of such test could yield evidence that could acquit
him while no damage will be suffered by the prosecution considering that this Court emphasized in its Resolution of April
20, 2010 that the prosecutions evidences and concerns regarding the proper preservation of evidence in the custody of
the NBI would have to be addressed in the light of the requirements laid down by the Rule on DNA Evidence. As to the
prosecutions argument that this Court cannot receive and appreciate "new evidence," Section 4 of the Rule states that
"the appropriate court may, at any time, either motu proprio or on application of any person who has a legal interest in the
matter in litigation, order a DNA testing"; DNA testing is even available post-conviction (Ibid, Sec. 6). This Court in
accordance with proper procedure thus decided to receive DNA evidence in order not to further delay the case, appellants
after all, were convicted more than ten (10) years ago in 2000 and have been incarcerated for fifteen (15) years now.
Webb further underscored that where the evidence has not been offered, it is the prosecution who should have the legal
custody and responsibility over it.178 The NBIs letter dated April 23, 1997 confirmed that the semen specimen was in its
custody. The NBIs repudiation of such fact is belied by the records; the Prosecutions Formal Offer of Evidence shows
that Exhibits "S", "T" and "U" were merely photographs of the slides containing the vaginal smear. Also, nowhere in the
transcript of stenographic notes taken during Dr. Cabanayans testimony was it shown that he turned over the actual
slides to the trial court. On the contrary, when Dr. Cabanayan was asked on February 6, 1996 to produce the slides,
which he had promised to bring during the previous hearing, he admitted that he "forgot all about it" when he came to the
hearing. Thus, it appears from the record that from the time the semen specimen was taken from Carmela Vizcondes
cadaver, it has always been in the custody of the NBI. 179
Evidently, the NBI could no longer produce the semen specimen/vaginal smear taken from the cadaver of Carmela
Vizconde and consequently DNA analysis of said physical evidence can no longer be done. Hence, this Court set aside
the April 20, 2010 resolution and forthwith proceeded to resolve the present appeal on the basis of existing evidence
which have been formally offered by the parties and/or made part of the records.
Appellant Webbs Urgent
Motion To Acquit
With the recall of the order for DNA testing, appellant Webb moved for his acquittal on the ground of violation of his
constitutional right to due process by reason of the States failure to produce the semen specimen, either through
negligence or willful suppression. Webb argues that the loss or suppression by the prosecution of the semen specimen
denied him the right to avail of the latest DNA technology and prove his innocence. Citing American jurisprudence (Matter
of Dabbs v. Vergari,180 California v. Trombetta181 and Brady v. Maryland182), Webb contends that in disallowing the DNA
examination he had requested, the RTC denied him from presenting a "complete defense" through that "singular piece of
evidence that could have definitively established his innocence," the trial court relying instead on the identification of
Jessica Alfaro, a "perjured witness." The constitutional duty of the prosecution to turn over exculpatory evidence to the
accused includes the duty to preserve such evidence.
Webb maintains that the semen specimen extracted from the cadaver of Carmela had exculpatory value, as even NBIs
Dr. Cabanayan testified during the hearing of February 7, 1996, that it was still possible to subject the same to DNA
analysis to identify the person to whom the sperm belonged. Thus, a DNA analysis of said semen specimen excluding
appellant Webb as the source thereof would disprove the prosecutions evidence against him. Further, Webb points out
that the prosecution considered the presence of spermatozoa on the body of Carmela as evidence that she was raped,
offering the photographs of the glass slides containing the sperm cells as proof that she was in fact raped on or about the
late evening of June 29, 1991 or early morning of June 30, 1991. But the only evidence of the prosecution that it was
Webb who raped Carmela was the testimony of Alfaro which was given full credit by the RTC and CA despite all its
inconsistencies, and despite all documentary and testimonial evidence presented by the defense proving that Webb was
at the United States at the time the crime was committed.

On the matter of preserving DNA evidence, Webb cites Section 12 of the Rule on DNA Evidence which authorizes the
court to order the appropriate government agency to preserve the DNA evidence during trial and even when the accused
is already serving sentence, until such time the decision of the court has become final and executory. While this Court has
given Webb the best opportunity to prove his innocence in the order granting DNA analysis of the sperm specimen taken
from Carmelas cadaver, such potentially exculpatory evidence could not be produced by the State. Webb now claims that
as a result of the destruction or loss of evidence under the NBIs custody, he was effectively deprived of his right to
present a complete defense, in violation of his constitutional right to due process, thus entitling him to an acquittal.
Loss
Not
Acquittal of Webb

of

Semen
Ground

Specimen
For

Webbs argument that under the facts of this case and applying the cited rulings from American jurisprudence, he is
entitled to acquittal on the ground of violation of his constitutional right to due process,is without merit.
In Brady v. Maryland183 it was held that "the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon
request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith
or bad faith of the prosecution." In said case, the petitioner was convicted of murder committed in the course of robbery
and sentenced to death. He later learned that the prosecution suppressed an extrajudicial confession made by his
accomplice who admitted he did the actual killing. The US Supreme Court granted a new trial and remanded the case but
only on the question of punishment.
In Matter of Dabbs v. Vergari,184 the court ordered DNA testing of specimen taken from a rape victim after the sexual
assault and from the accused who was convicted, DNA testing being unavailable at the time of the trial. Accused therein
was identified by the victim as her attacker. The court found the factual circumstances clearly showed that the semen
specimen could have come only from the accused. It noted that the witness testified that accused acted alone, had
ejaculated and she did not have sexual intercourse with any other person within 24 hours prior to the sexual assault. DNA
testing ultimately revealed that petitioners DNA composition did not match with that found on the victims underwear.
Consequently, the court granted petitioners subsequent motions to vacate the judgment of conviction.
In California v. Trombetta,185 a case involving the prosecution for drunk driving, the US Supreme Court ruled that the Due
Process Clause of the Constitution does not require that law enforcement agencies preserve breath samples in order to
introduce breath-analysis tests at trial.
Given our precedents in this area, we cannot agree with the California Court of Appeal that the States failure to retain
breath samples for respondents constitutes a violation of the Federal Constitution. To begin with, California authorities in
this case did not destroy respondents breath samples in a calculated effort to circumvent the disclosure requirements
established by Brady v. Maryland and its progeny. In failing to preserve breath samples for respondents, the officers here
were acting "in good faith and in accord with their normal practice." x x x The record contains no allegation of official
animus towards respondents or of a conscious effort to suppress exculpatory evidence.
More importantly, Californias policy of not preserving breath samples is without constitutional defect. Whatever duty the
Constitution imposes on the States to preserve evidence, that duty must be limited to evidence that might be expected to
play a significant role in the suspects defense.
To meet this standard of constitutional materiality, x x x evidence must both possess an exculpatory value that was
apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and be of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain
comparable evidence by other reasonably available means. Neither of these conditions is met on the facts of this case.
[italics supplied.]
From the above cases, it is clear that what is crucial is the requirement of materiality of the semen specimen sought for
DNA testing. Appellant Webb must be able to demonstrate a reasonable probability that the DNA sample would prove his
innocence. Evidence is material where "there is reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the
defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different."186
In People v. Yatar,187 decided before the promulgation of the Rule on DNA Evidence, the Court expounded on the nature
of DNA evidence and the factors to be considered in assessing its probative value in the context of scientific and legal
developments. The proper judicial approach is founded on the concurrence of relevancy and reliability. Most important,
forensic identification though useful does not preclude independent evidence of identification.

DNA is a molecule that encodes the genetic information in all living organisms. A persons DNA is the same in each cell
and it does not change throughout a persons lifetime; the DNA in a persons blood is the same as the DNA found in his
saliva, sweat, bone, the root and shaft of hair, earwax, mucus, urine, skin tissue, and vaginal and rectal cells. Most
importantly, because of polymorphisms in human genetic structure, no two individuals have the same DNA, with the
notable exception of identical twins.
DNA print or identification technology has been advanced as a uniquely effective means to link a suspect to a crime, or to
exonerate a wrongly accused suspect, where biological evidence has been left. For purposes of criminal investigation,
DNA identification is a fertile source of both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence. It can assist immensely in effecting a
more accurate account of the crime committed, efficiently facilitating the conviction of the guilty, securing the acquittal of
the innocent, and ensuring the proper administration of justice in every case.
DNA evidence collected from a crime scene can link a suspect to a crime or eliminate one from suspicion in the same
principle as fingerprints are used. Incidents involving sexual assault would leave biological evidence such as hair, skin
tissue, semen, blood, or saliva which can be left on the victims body or at the crime scene. Hair and fiber from clothing,
carpets, bedding, or furniture could also be transferred to the victims body during the assault. Forensic DNA evidence is
helpful in proving that there was physical contact between an assailant and a victim. If properly collected from the victim,
crime scene or assailant, DNA can be compared with known samples to place the suspect at the scene of the crime.
The U.P. National Science Research Institute (NSRI), which conducted the DNA tests in this case, used the Polymerase
chain reaction (PCR) amplification method by Short Tandem Repeat (STR) analysis. With PCR testing, tiny amounts of a
specific DNA sequence can be copied exponentially within hours. Thus, getting sufficient DNA for analysis has become
much easier since it became possible to reliably amplify small samples using the PCR method.
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider, inter alia, the following factors: how the
samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in
analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the
qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.
In the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria was duly qualified by the prosecution as an expert witness on
DNA print or identification techniques. Based on Dr. de Ungrias testimony, it was determined that the gene type and DNA
profile of appellant are identical to that of the extracts subject of examination. The blood sample taken from the appellant
showed that he was of the following gene types: vWA 15/19, TH01 7/8, DHFRP2 9/10 and CSF1PO 10/11, which are
identical with semen taken from the victims vaginal canal. Verily, a DNA match exists between the semen found in the
victim and the blood sample given by the appellant in open court during the course of the trial.
Admittedly, we are just beginning to integrate these advances in science and technology in the Philippine criminal justice
system, so we must be cautious as we traverse these relatively unchartered waters. Fortunately, we can benefit from the
wealth of persuasive jurisprudence that has developed in other jurisdictions. Specifically, the prevailing doctrine in the
U.S. has proven instructive.
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow, it was ruled that pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid principles could be used as
long as it was relevant and reliable. Judges, under Daubert, were allowed greater discretion over which testimony they
would allow at trial, including the introduction of new kinds of scientific techniques. DNA typing is one such novel
procedure.
Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or
non-existence. Applying the Daubert test to the case at bar, the DNA evidence obtained through PCR testing and utilizing
STR analysis, and which was appreciated by the court a quo is relevant and reliable since it is reasonably based on
scientifically valid principles of human genetics and molecular biology.
Independently of the physical evidence of appellants semen found in the victims vaginal canal, the trial court appreciated
the following circumstantial evidence as being sufficient to sustain a conviction beyond reasonable doubt: (1) Appellant
and his wife were living in the house of Isabel Dawang together with the victim, Kathylyn Uba; (2) In June 1998,
appellants wife left the house because of their frequent quarrels; (3) Appellant received from the victim, Kathylyn Uba, a
letter from his estranged wife in the early morning of June 30, 1998; (4) Appellant was seen by Apolonia Wania and
Beverly Denneng at 1:00 p.m. of June 30, 1998 near the kitchen of the house of Isabel Dawang, acting strangely and
wearing a dirty white shirt with collar; (5) Judilyn Pas-a saw appellant going down the ladder of the house of Isabel at
12:30 p.m., wearing a dirty white shirt, and again at 1:30 p.m., this time wearing a black shirt; (6) Appellant hurriedly left
when the husband of Judilyn Pas-a was approaching; (7) Salmalina Tandagan saw appellant in a dirty white shirt coming

down the ladder of the house of Isabel on the day Kathylyn Uba was found dead; (8) The door leading to the second floor
of the house of Isabel Dawang was tied by a rope; (9) The victim, Kathylyn Uba, lay naked in a pool of blood with her
intestines protruding from her body on the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang, with her stained pants, bra,
underwear and shoes scattered along the periphery; (10) Laboratory examination revealed sperm in the victims vagina
(Exhibits "H" and "J"); (11) The stained or dirty white shirt found in the crime scene was found to be positive with blood;
(12) DNA of slide, Exhibits "J" and "H", compared with the DNA profile of the appellant are identical; and (13) Appellant
escaped two days after he was detained but was subsequently apprehended, such flight being indicative of
guilt.188 [emphasis supplied.]
Indeed, in other jurisdictions it has been recognized that DNA test results are not always exculpatory.
Postconviction test results are not always exculpatory. In addition, exculpatory test results will not necessarily free the
convicted individual. If the evidence does exclude the petitioner, the court must weigh the significance of the exclusion in
relation to all the other evidence. Convicted offenders often believe that if crime scene evidence does not contain their
DNA they will automatically be exonerated. Not finding the petitioners DNA does not automatically indicate the case
should be overturned, however. In a rape case, for example, the perpetrator may have worn a condom, or not ejaculated.
In some cases, the absence of evidence is not necessarily evidence of the defendants absence or lack of involvement in
the crime.189
We hold that the source of the semen extracted from the vaginal cavity of the deceased victim is immaterial in determining
Webbs guilt. From the totality of the evidence presented by both the prosecution and the defense, Webb was positively
identified as Carmelas rapist.
As the records bear out, the positive identification of appellant Webb as Carmelas rapist satisfied the test of moral
certainty, and the prosecution had equally established beyond reasonable doubt the fact of rape and the unlawful killing of
Carmela, Estrellita and Jennifer on the occasion thereof. Even assuming that the DNA analysis of the semen specimen
taken from Carmelas body hours after her death excludes Webb as the source thereof, it will not exonerate him from the
crime charged. Alfaro did not testify that Webb had ejaculated or did not use a condom while raping Carmela. She
testified that she saw Webb rape Carmela and it was only him she had witnessed to have committed the rape inside the
Vizconde residence between late evening of June 29, 1991 and early morning of June 30, 1991. Moreover, she did not
testify that Carmela had no sexual relations with any other man at least 24 hours prior to that time. On the other hand, a
positive result of DNA examination of the semen specimen extracted by Dr. Cabanayan from Carmelas cadaver would
merely serve as corroborative evidence.
As to the loss of the semen specimen in the custody of the NBI, appellant Webbs contention that this would entitle him to
an acquittal on the basis of Brady v. Maryland is misplaced.
In Arizona v. Youngblood,190 a 10-year old boy was molested and sodomized by the accused, a middle-aged man, for 1
hours. After the assault, the boy was examined in a hospital where the physician used swab to collect specimen from the
boys rectum and mouth, but did not examine them at anytime. These samples were refrigerated but the boys clothing
was not. Accused was identified by the victim in a photographic lineup and was convicted of child molestation, sexual
assault and kidnapping. During the trial, expert witnesses had testified that timely performance of tests with properly
preserved semen samples could have produced results that might have completely exonerated the accused. The Court
held:
There is no question but that the State complied with Brady and Agurs here. The State disclosed relevant police reports to
respondent, which contained information about the existence of the swab and the clothing, and the boys examination at
the hospital. The State provided respondents expert with the laboratory reports and notes prepared by the police
criminologist, and respondents expert had access to the swab and to the clothing.
xxxx
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as interpreted in Brady, makes the good or bad faith of the State
irrelevant when the State fails to disclose to the defendant material exculpatory evidence. But we think the Due Process
Clause requires a different result when we deal with the failure of the State to preserve evidentiary material of which no
more can be said than that it could have been subjected to tests, the results of which might have exonerated the
defendant. x x x We think that requiring a defendant to show bad faith on the part of the police both limits the extent of the
polices obligation to preserve evidence to reasonable bounds and confines it to that class of cases where the interests of
justice most clearly require it, i.e., those cases in which the police themselves by their conduct indicate that the evidence

could form a basis for exonerating the defendant. We therefore hold that unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith
on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law.
In this case, the police collected the rectal swab and clothing on the night of the crime: respondent was not taken into
custody until six weeks later. The failure of the police to refrigerate the clothing and to perform tests on the semen
samples can at worst be described as negligent. None of this information was concealed from respondent at trial, and the
evidence such as it was was made available to respondents expert who declined to perform any tests on the
samples. The Arizona Court of Appeals noted in its opinion and we agreethat there was no suggestion of bad faith on
the part of the police. It follows, therefore, from what we have said, that there was no violation of the Due Process Clause.
[emphasis supplied.]
In this case, there is no showing of bad faith on the part of the police investigators, specifically the NBI, for the nonproduction of the vaginal swab and glass slide containing the semen specimen, during the trial and upon our recent order
for DNA testing. The prosecution did not conceal at anytime the existence of those vaginal swab and glass slide
containing the vaginal smear. Curiously, despite Dr. Cabanayans admission during the hearing that it was still possible to
subject the semen specimen to DNA analysis, the defense never raised the issue thereafter and resurrected the matter
only in October 1997 when Webbs counsel filed his motion.
It bears to stress that the vaginal smear itself was not formally offered by the prosecution, but only the photographs of the
glass slide containing the semen specimen for the purpose only of proving that Carmela was in fact raped and not that
Webb was the source of the sperm/semen. As noted by the RTC when it denied Webbs motion for DNA on November 25,
1997, prevailing jurisprudence stated that DNA being a relatively new science then, has not yet been accorded official
recognition by our courts. The RTC also considered the more than six (6) years that have elapsed since the commission
of the crime in June 1991, thus the possibility of the specimen having been tampered with or contaminated. Acting on
reasonable belief that the proposed DNA examination will not serve the ends of justice but instead lead to complication
and confusion of the issues of the case, the trial court properly denied Webbs request for DNA testing.
We thus reiterate that the vaginal smear confirming the presence of spermatozoa merely corroborated Alfaros testimony
that Carmela was raped before she was killed. Indeed, the presence or absence of spermatozoa is immaterial in a
prosecution for rape. The important consideration in rape cases is not the emission of semen but the unlawful penetration
of the female genitalia by the male organ.191 On the other hand, a negative result of DNA examination of the semen
specimen could not have exonerated Webb of the crime charged as his identity as a principal in the rape-slay of Carmela
was satisfactorily established by the totality of the evidence. A finding that the semen specimen did not match Webbs
DNA does not necessarily negate his presence at the locus criminis.
Civil Liability of Appellants
The Court sustains the award of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, pursuant to current jurisprudence that in cases of rape
with homicide, civil indemnity in the amount of P100,000.00 should be awarded to the heirs of the victim. 192 Civil indemnity
is mandatory and granted to the heirs of the victims without need of proof other than the commission of the crime. For the
deaths of Estrellita and Jennifer, the award of civil indemnity ex delicto to their heirs, was likewise in order, in the amount
ofP50,000.00 each.193 Following People v. Dela Cruz,194 P75,000.00 civil indemnity and P75,000 moral damages in rape
cases are awarded only if they are classified as heinous. 195 As the rape-slay of Carmela took place in 1991, R.A. No. 7659
entitled "AN ACT TO IMPOSE DEATH PENALTY ON CERTAIN HEINOUS CRIMES, AMENDING FOR THAT PURPOSE
THE REVISED PENAL LAWS, AS AMENDED, OTHER SPECIAL PENAL LAWS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," which
was approved on December 13, 1993 and was to become effective fifteen (15) days after its publication in two national
newspapers of general circulation, was not yet effective.196
As to moral damages, recent jurisprudence allows the amount of P75,000.00 to be awarded in cases of rape with
homicide.197 We find the amount of P2,000,000.00 as moral damages awarded by the RTC as affirmed by the CA, rather
excessive. While courts have a wide latitude in ascertaining the proper award for moral damages, the award should not be
to such an extent that it inflicts injustice on the accused. 198 The award of P2,000,000.00 as moral damages to the heir of
the victims should accordingly be reduced to P500,000.00. The rest of the awards given by the trial court are affirmed.
In view of the foregoing, I respectfully vote that the appeals in the above-entitled cases be DISMISSED and the Decision
dated December 15, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR H.C. No. 00336 be AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONonly as to the award of damages.
MARTIN
Associate Justice

S.

VILLARAMA,

JR.

G.R. No. 72883 December 20, 1989

THE
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AURELIO ESPINOSA @ "ROLLY" and JESUS FLORO y JUNDOY, accused. JESUS FLORO y
JUNDOY, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Raul Austria Bo for accused-appellant Jesus Floro.

CRUZ, J.:
Ariel Mamucod got a black eye and his father wanted to know why. But he never did find out. On his way to the
barangay chairman, he was accosted by two persons, who hit him in the head and stabbed him in the chest and
back. The following day, Jaime Mamucod was dead.
The incident happened on May 6, 1981 but an information for murder was filed only on July 19, 1983. 1 Accused were
Aurelio Espinosa and Jesus Floro. Espinosa was never tried and remains at large. Only Floro is appealing the decision of
the trial court sentencing him to reclusion perpetua and payment of P 30,000.00 civil indemnity to the victim's heirs. 2
The chief witnesses for the prosecution were the victim's two sons, Arnold and Ariel. Both of them were with their father
when the jeep he was driving was blocked by the killers at Almeda Street, in Santa Cruz, Manila, at about 9 o'clock in the
evening. The brothers identified the culprits as Espinosa and Floro. It was Floro who first attacked Jaime, hitting him in the
head with a hard object about a foot long and wrapped in a newspaper. When the victim fell off the jeep as a result of the
blow, Espinosa stabbed him repeatedly in the back with a fan knife. Floro, using an ice pick, stabbed Jaime several times
in the chest. Jaime ran for his life but his attackers pursued and continued stabbing him until the latter fell into a ditch. The
two assailants then walked away fast. Ariel boarded his dying father on a tricycle and brought him to the Jose Reyes
Memorial Hospital, where he expired from his wounds the next day. 3
The testimonies of the brothers were corroborated by Manuel Buenaventura, who said he saw the stabbing while he was
on a tricycle waiting to cross Abad Santos Street. He also identified Jaime's killers as the two accused. 4 The necropsy
report submitted by Dr. Luis Larion, medico-legal officer of the Western Police District, (which was admitted by the
defense without his testimony) declared that Jaime Mamucod died as a result of "profuse hemorrhage and shock due to
multiple stab wounds penetrating the chest and piercing the right lung and branches of the right pulmonary artery and
vein."5 Another witness for the prosecution, Sgt. Juanita Yang of the Western Police District, testified that it was he who
investigated the killing and took the statements of the victim's two sons implicating Espinosa and Floro. 6
The defense invoked alibi. Testifying for himself, Floro admitted that he was at the basketball court earlier in the evening
of May 6, 1981, as he was coaching one of the competing teams. But he left later because the games had been called off
and at the time of the stabbing he was in his house on Almeda Street. On cross examination, he declared that his house
was only about two hundred meters or two or three minutes walk from the scene of the crime. 7
A prosecution witness, Lilia Silva, was also asked to testify for the defense because she said she saw Espinosa chasing
and stabbing Jaime when the latter stumbled but made no mention of Floro. When asked by defense counsel if she saw
Floro stabbing the victim, she said she did not. 8

The appellant's brief faulted the trial court for accepting the testimonies of the Mamucod brothers despite their
inconsistencies and contradictions. The defense stressed that whereas Arnold said Floro hit Jaime in the nape of
the neck, Ariel said it was on the top of the head, and that while Arnold said Jaime was stabbed while lying on the
ground, Ariel said it was while his father was standing. It was also unbelievable that after the stabbing Ariel should
say, "Tatay, let us go home," when the natural thing to do was to rush the dying man to the nearest hospital for
immediate treatment.

Noting that the necropsy report spoke only of stab wounds and not punctured wounds, the defense also stressed
that this proved the brothers were lying when they swore that their father had been stabbed by Floro with an ice
pick.
The Court has examined the evidence of the parties and sees no reason for overturning the findings of Judge
Rosalio A. de Leon, who had the opportunity to observe the witnesses on the stand and assess their credibility by
the various indicia available to the trial court but not reflected in the record. The demeanor of the person on the
stand can draw the line between fact and fancy. The forthright answer or the hesitant pause, the quivering voice or
the angry tone, the flustered look or the sincere gaze, the modest blush or the guilty blanch-these can reveal if the
witness is telling the truth or lying in his teeth. Absent then a showing that the conclusions of the trial court are
arbitrary or without basis, they must be regarded with respect and accepted as conclusive on appeal.
The discrepancies in the declarations of Arnold and Ariel are not unnatural or evidence of perjury. When their father was
attacked, Arnold was seated at the front of the jeep beside Jaime and Ariel was sitting behind them. 9 The two brothers
had therefore different vantage points that gave each of them a separate view of the incident. Moreover, it should also be
considered that the man being stabbed before their very eyes was their father. Under this traumatizing and shocking
circumstance, the two sons, who were then only sixteen and fifteeen respectively, can hardly be expected to remember
the grisly stabbing in perfect detail.

As for Lilia Silva, her testimony is less than conclusive of Floro's innocence. The mere fact that she did not see Floro
at the scene of the crime does not prove he was not there as she obviously was narrating only the latter part of the
incident. Besides, she added that there were many people around, which could be the reason she did not notice
Floro. At any rate, her testimony cannot cancel the sworn declarations of Arnold and Ariel that they actually saw
Espinosa and Floro killing Jaime Mamucod.
The two sons could hardly have made a mistake regarding this matter. Indeed, the memory of these men is not
easily blurred and must have been indelibly imprinted in their young and impressionable minds. They had no motive
for falsely Identifying Espinosa and the accused-appellant. The only reason for naming them is the logical one: that
Espinosa and Floro were the men who killed their father.
The contention that the necropsy report did not mention any punctured wounds must be rejected. The phrase "stab
wounds" is used generically to include all wounds that may be caused "by weapons such as knives, scissors, threecornered files, or ice picks with a circular shaft all possessing a sharp point but having blades of different
shapes." 10Stabbing may be done with an ice pick and the puncture is correctly called a stab wound.
The appellant's brief did not dispute the finding of the trial judge that Floro was in hiding for more than two years, 11 which
may explain why the information against him could not be filed in 1981, when Jaime Mamucod was killed. It would also
suggest that the accused-appellant is not innocent as he claims, for as we have repeatedly observed, unexplained flight is
an indication of guilt. 12 "The guilty flee when no man pursueth but the innocent are as bold as a lion."

Finally, there is the question of conspiracy. Floro would distance himself from Espinosa and impute the whole blame
to his absent co-accused for the killing of Jaime Mamucod. The evidence shows, however, that they acted in concert
in pursuit of a common design. Floro and Espinosa together blocked Jaime's jeep and told him not to disturb the
basketball game (although there was none in progress). Floro first hit Jaime with the foot-long stick or pipe earlier
concealed in a newspaper. Then Espinosa drew his fan-knife and stabbed Jaime in the back. Then Floro drew his
ice pick and stabbed Jaime in the chest. When Jaime ran away from them, they pursued him and continued
stabbing him. Finally, with their victim dying in the ditch, both assailants fled together and disappeared. It is clear
from their acts that the two had come to an agreement concerning the attack on Jaime and decided to commit it.
There was thus a conspiracy that made each conspirator liable for the other's acts.
We agree that the killing of Jaime Mamucod was attended with treachery, qualifying the crime to murder. The victim
was totally defenseless. He was caught by surprise when Espinosa and Floro, whom he considered his friends,
suddenly attacked him. Without warning, he was hit in the head, then stabbed in the back. Thus disabled, he was
stabbed in the chest. And even as he ran for his life, he was pursued and stabbed some more when he stumbled.
He never had a chance to save his life.
What prompted the vicious attack must remain a mystery to this Court. Proof of motive is, of course, not necessary
for the conviction of the accused-appellant in view of his positive identification as one of the killers. Even so, one

may well wonder why a human life was taken for no apparent reason and another life must now be needlessly spent
in the shadow of the prison bars.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is AFFIRMED in toto with costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 129807 December 9, 2005

DAVAO
LIGHT
&
POWER
vs.
CRISTINA OPEA and TEOFILO RAMOS, JR., Respondents.

CO.,

INC., Petitioner,

DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 35114 dated 29 May
1997 affirming, with modification, the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 17, Davao City, in Civil Case No.
19,648-89 declaring as null and void the documents presented by petitioner with regard to respondents unbilled
consumption.
The records establish the following facts:
In their complaint filed on 19 July 1989 before the RTC of Davao City, respondents, as plaintiffs below, alleged that
petitioner Davao Light and Power Co., Inc. (DLPC), defendant below, is a franchise holder authorized to operate an
electric and power plant in Davao City. Respondents, on the other hand, are petitioners customers as electric meter nos.
47019 and 1587 were attached to respondent Teofilo Ramos, Jr.s (respondent Ramos, Jr.) office and residence,
respectively. Under the agreement between respondents, respondent Ramos, Jr. was supposed to pay the electric bills to
petitioner although both electric meters were under the account name of his mother-in-law, respondent Cristina Opea
(respondent Opea).
Sometime in 1988, petitioner, through its fieldmen or inspection team, examined the electric meter in respondent Ramos,
Jr.s office allegedly in response to a report of an alleged "broken Davao Light seal." As a consequence of said inspection,
both electric meters were removed and eventually replaced. Respondents purportedly observed that their electric
consumption a few months after the installation of the replacement meters were relatively similar with their usage as
recorded by the previous electric meters. Thus, they were taken aback when petitioner charged them the amount
of P7,894.99 for one billing month. After they complained about this excessive amount, petitioner made an adjustment
and subsequently reduced said electric bill to P5,625.55 which respondents paid under protest.
On 17 May 1989, petitioner wrote respondent Opea charging her P84,398.76 for the alleged unbilled electric
consumption of respondent Ramos, Jr.s office from September 1983 to September 1988. 3 The amount was allegedly
arrived at based on the highest recorded consumption from 1983 to 1988.
On 17 June 1989, petitioner sent another letter4 to respondent Opea reiterating its demand for the payment of the
unbilled electric consumption. This time, the letter contained a threat that respondents failure to settle their obligation
within ten days would compel petitioner to take the necessary legal action before the proper court and would result in the
immediate disconnection of the electric supply to respondents.
On 23 June 1989, petitioner again wrote respondent Opea demanding the amount of P49,512.63 allegedly representing
the amount of unbilled electric consumption of respondent Ramos, Jr.s residence. 5 As was stated in the 17 May 1989
letter, petitioner claimed that this amount was computed based on the highest recorded consumption from 1983 to 1988.
Respondents asserted in their complaint that these demands by petitioner were without proper and correct basis as they
had paid all their electric bills for the period 1983 to 1988. They also stated that the charges for unbilled electric
consumption could have emanated from fraudulent manipulations executed by petitioner itself.
Respondents, therefore, prayed for the following reliefs from the trial court:
a) Forthwith issue a temporary restraining order before notice and a writ of preliminary injunction, directing the defendants
or any person acting for and in its behalf to desist and refrain from doing any act that would disconnect the electrical light
connection at plaintiffs house and office, and also desist in enforcing the so-called "Computations" referred to.
b) Order the defendants to adjust correctly or calibrate the electric meters by competent men or persons.

c) To declare null and void the documents (Annexes "C" to "C-*" and "G" to "G-*") denoted as "Computation of Tampered
Meter".
d) Order the payment of moral and exemplary damages in the amounts of P 200,000.00 and P 50,000.00 respectively.
e) Direct defendants to reimburse plaintiffs the amount of P 2,000.00 as initial expenses in the preparation and filing of the
complaint; and to further pay the amount of P 33,477.86 in concept of attorneys fee.
f) To make the preliminary injunction final.
PLAINTIFFS further pray for such other relief that may be just and proper in the premises. 6
Traversing the allegations of the complaint, petitioner declared in its answer 7 that at the time of the institution of this suit,
petitioner continuously supplied electrical services to respondents pursuant to the service contracts it entered into with
respondent Opea. One of these service contracts was dated 30 May 1977 8 under account number 510-4019 with meter
number 47019. The other service contract was dated 07 November 19509 under account number 510-4020 with meter
number 1587.
On 16 September 1988, petitioners representatives, together with an energy regulation analyst of the Energy Regulatory
Board (ERB) and a photographer, went to respondents office building and residential house to examine and test the
electric meters installed thereat. The examination and testing of electric meter number 47019 was allegedly witnessed by
respondent Ramos, Jr.s employee named Myrna Galagar (Galagar). In the case of electric meter number 1587, Joy
Perucho (Perucho),10 another employee of respondent Ramos, Jr., purportedly observed the procedure.
According to petitioner, the examination of electric meter number 47019 showed that petitioners murray seal, otherwise
known as the outer seal, was already broken while the government seal or inner seal was deformed. In addition, the meter
testing conducted by the ERB regulation analyst Engr. Carlos V. Reyes (Engr. Reyes) revealed that electric meter number
47019 was not registering any electric consumption at light load and, when it was tested at full load, the same only
recorded a 27.57% consumption.
On the other hand, the examination of electric meter number 1587 indicated that its murray seal was no longer attached
thereto and had been substituted with an unauthorized lead seal and the government seal which should be attached to
said electric meter was already missing. The inspection team also noticed that said electric meters second and third dials
from the right were misaligned. Just like electric meter number 47019, Engr. Reyes also subjected electric meter number
1587 to a test which revealed that it was not registering any electric consumption at light load and recorded only 33.53%
of electricity utilized at full load.
As the two electric meters in question were already inaccurate, Engr. Reyes and petitioner decided to remove them and
had them individually wrapped, sealed, and brought to petitioners office for safekeeping.
Pursuant to the procedure adopted by petitioner in cases of meter tampering, respondents were required to make a
deposit for the repair and replacement of the two electric meters. The amount of deposit required in this case was pegged
at P4,000.00 for each account which was paid by respondent Ramos, Jr. on 19 September 1988. With this payment,
petitioner immediately installed "good meters" at respondents residence and office.
Everything seemed back to normal following the replacement of the allegedly tampered electric meters on 19 September
1988. Problem, however, arose anew when in January 1989, respondents received from petitioner an electric bill charging
them with the amount of P7,894.99 for account number 510-4019 prompting respondents to file a complaint with
petitioner. On verification, it was discovered that electric meter number 7168 which replaced electric meter number 47019
erroneously recorded respondents electric consumption beginning November 1989. Accordingly, respondents January
electric bill was revised to only P5,625.55 and credit memorandum no. 38711 dated 07 February 1989 11 was issued in
favor of respondents.
On or about 17 March 1989, petitioners customer relations department received a letter-complaint from Konsumo
Dabawregarding respondents recomputed electric bill for account number 510-4019. Petitioner thereafter conducted
another verification of electric meter number 7168 and it was then discovered that said meter was running backwards, and
that no error was committed by petitioner in respondents meter reading on 14 January 1989. Accordingly, petitioner sent
a letter12to Konsumo Dabaw explaining this matter and on 30 March 1989, petitioner replaced electric meter number 7168
with electric meter number 24305.

In the third week of June 1989, petitioner adjusted respondents December 1988 to May 1989 electric bills based on the
latters monthly consumption as registered by electric meter number 24305 and taking into consideration credit
memorandum no. 3887.
Petitioner likewise claimed in its answer that respondents unbilled consumption amounting to P84,398.76 relative to
account number 510-401913 and P49,512.63 for account number 510-402014 covered the period September 1983 to
September 1988 and was based on the highest registration of the electric meter for each account - 1,047 kilowatthours for
account number 510-401915 and 963 kilowatthours in the case of account number 510-4020.16 The amounts claimed as
unbilled consumption, however, merely represented petitioners initial bargaining position with respondents in the hope
that the latter would come clean and submit proof as to when they had the electric meters tampered and made additions
to their connected load.
Also, petitioner asserted in its answer that its letter dated 16 June 1989 17 giving respondents the period of ten days within
which to settle the matter with petitioner was designed to bring respondents to the bargaining table for a fair and just
settlement of petitioners claim and that the threatened actions contained in said letter were never implemented by
petitioner.
Furthermore, based on the summaries of respondents monthly electric consumption from September 1983 to June
198918 it would appear that the tampering of electric meter number 47019 occurred between late December 1983 or early
January 1984 when said meter registered only 302 kilowatthours a drastic drop in consumption considering its recording
of 708 kilowatthours for the previous billing period. As regards electric meter number 1587, its tampering allegedly
occurred sometime in late July or early August 1985 when this electric meter registered only 170 kilowatthours which was
way below its previous recording of 663 kilowatthours for the previous billing period.
In its answer, petitioner moreover presented another method of computing respondents unbilled consumption which was
arrived at using respondents daily average consumption registered by the new electric meters and multiplying this by
thirty days. Thus, for account number 510-4019, petitioner charged respondents the amount of P65,918.13 as of
September 1988 plus 2% monthly surcharge from October 1988 to July 1989 totalling P8,636.12. In addition, this amount
was supposed to carry the 2% monthly surcharge until fully paid. With respect to account number 510-4020, petitioner
claimed the amount of P28,328.45 for the period August 1985 to September 1988, plus P4,028.74 representing 2%
monthly surcharge from October 1988 to July 1989. Similarly, this amount would carry the 2% surcharge until fully settled
by respondents.
Ultimately, petitioner prayed that judgment in its favor be given ordering respondents to jointly and severally pay:
(1) The sum of P74,554.25 as unbilled consumption under Account No. 510-4019 inclusive of 2% monthly surcharge up to
July, 1989, plus 2% monthly surcharge thereon from August, 1989 until fully paid.
(2) The sum of P32,357.19 as unbilled consumption under Account No. 510-4020 inclusive of 2% monthly surcharge up to
July, 1989, plus 2% monthly surcharge thereon from August, 1989 until fully paid.
(3) The sum of P50,000.00 as damages for attorneys fee and expenses of litigation, plus an additional P30,000.00 should
there be an appeal or petition for certiorari.
(4) The sums of P20,000.00 and P10,000.00 as moral damages and exemplary damages.19
On 20 July 1989, Presiding Judge Renato A. Fuentes, considering the nature of the complaint and the urgency of the
provisional remedy prayed for, ordered petitioner from doing any act complained of within twenty days from receipt of said
order and scheduled the hearing for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction on 01 August 1989. 20
After the pre-trial, the continuous trial of the case proceeded in reverse order as agreed upon by the parties in order for
petitioner, as defendant below, to prove its allegation of meter tampering.
JOSE ROBERTO A. SARDINIA (Sardinia) testified that at the time material to this case, he was the legal assistant in
petitioners Legal Affairs and Public Relation Department. On 16 September 1988, petitioners system department ordered
the conduct of inspection and examination of alleged tampered electric meters. Relative to said directive, two teams were
formed, one of which was headed by Sardinia himself. The other members of his team were an instrument technician from
petitioners laboratory department named Alfredo Lucero (Lucero); driver; lineman; photographer; a representative of the
city electrician office; and Engr. Reyes.

In the afternoon of said date, his team proceeded to the place where the electric meters in question were installed. There,
they were met by respondent Ramos, Jr.s employees Perucho and Galagar. Perucho and Galagar informed Sardinia that
it was their employer, respondent Ramos, Jr., who actually paid the electric bills under the account name of respondent
Opea. In addition, Perucho and Galagar told the team that respondent Ramos, Jr., was in Manila during that time.
Despite this information, the inspection team proceeded with their planned examination of the two electric meters. Engr.
Reyes conducted the meter testing which was witnessed by Perucho and Galagar. The photographer who accompanied
the inspection team likewise took photos of the two electric meters while these were being examined. 21
As part of his duty as the team leader, Sardinia made written reports of the results of the meter testing. According to
Sardinia, the government seal (inner seal) of the electric meter bearing serial number 47019 was deformed and its DLPC
seal (outer seal) was broken.22 As for electric meter number 1587, the inspection revealed that its government seal was
missing while its DLPCs seal was substituted with a deformed lead seal which was not the type used by petitioner. 23
After the electric meters were tested by Engr. Reyes, Sardinia had them wrapped with manila paper. Sardinias name and
signature as well as those of Engr. Reyes and an employee of respondent Ramos, Jr. were written on the tape used for
sealing the wrapping paper. Thereafter, the electric meters were taken to petitioners office.
When asked by the court, Sardinia stated that the information regarding the existence of tampered electric meters was
relayed to petitioner by an informant whose identity he refused to divulge. Moreover, due to the alleged urgency of the
situation, his team could not afford to wait for respondent Ramos, Jr. to return from Manila; hence, they continued with the
inspection.
Petitioner next presented ENGR. REYES on the witness stand. Essentially, he testified that his work involved using
standard metering instrument and conducting inspections and investigations of alleged tampering of electric meters both
in residential and commercial buildings.
According to Engr. Reyes, on 16 September 1988, he inspected two electric meters as evidenced by the reports he
accomplished and marked as Exhibits "4" and "5" for petitioner. Using a standard equipment of his office, he discovered
that the two electric meters were not accurately registering the electricity consumed by respondent Ramos, Jr.
Particularly, electric meter number 47019 did not record electric consumption at light load and 27.57% consumption at full
load.24 Similarly, electric meter number 1587 did not register any rotation when tested at light load; at full load, it reflected
only a 33.53% accuracy.25
Further, Engr. Reyes corroborated Sardinias testimony that the government seal of electric meter number 47019 was
deformed or tampered with. In his report as regards electric meter number 1587, Engr. Reyes shared Sardinias
observation that its DLPCs seal was deformed while its government seal was missing.
Lucero testified that he was assigned in the laboratory section of petitioner. He maintained that it was the standard
procedure observed by petitioner that electric meters acquired by the latter are tested26 using a standard testing
instrument and thereafter, the meters are turned over to the representatives of the Board of Energy (BOE) 27 who subject
the meters to their own examination. After the BOE establishes the accuracy of an electric meter, it attaches thereto a
seal which is known as the BOE seal. This seal protects the meter from being opened such that one cannot get into the
internal component of an electric meter without breaking the BOE seal. Once an electric meter bearing the BOE seal is
installed, petitioner attaches to its bottom portion an outside seal which prevents the meter from being pulled out anytime.
In addition, Lucero averred that on 16 September 1988, he was a member of the inspection team which examined the
electric meters issued under the account name of respondent Opea. As part of the team, it was his task to make a load
inspection report28 for each electric meter listing therein the various electrical items connected to every meter.
Another witness for petitioner was ARSENIO SACAMOS, JR. (Sacamos, Jr.), head of petitioners billing and collection
department. Sacamos, Jr. stated in the witness stand that he was requested by Atty. Oscar Breva, petitioners counsel, to
prepare a summary of kilowatt consumption for account numbers 510-4019 and 510-4020. In the case of account number
510-4019, his department collated the material data from September 1983 to June 1989. His analysis of the data
established a drastic drop in electric consumption recorded by electric meter number 47019 commencing in January 1984
until September 1988 when the replacement meter registered a high consumption.
As regards account number 510-4020, Sacamos, Jr. averred that they gathered the pertinent information from September
1983 to June 1989 and data revealed a severe drop in electric consumption from July 1985 until September 1988 when
electric meter number 1587 was replaced.

As the two electric meters were not accurately registering the amount of electricity used by respondent Ramos, Jr.,
petitioner demanded from the latter payments of unbilled consumption for the two accounts. For account number 5104019, he prepared a computation of unbilled consumption of respondents indicating that as of 19 September 1988, a total
unpaid consumption amounting to P65,918.13 for the period January 1984 to September 1988 inclusive of P22,737.49
cumulative surcharge.
In account number 510-4020, the unbilled consumption prepared by their department indicated a total unbilled
consumption to be P28,328.45 which includes P8,184.72 in surcharges.29
Over the vigorous objection by respondents counsel, the trial court received in evidence the updated summary of
kilowatthour consumption prepared by Sacamos, Jr.s department for the period July 1989 to March 1990 of account
number 510-4019 as recorded by electric meter number 24305.30 A similar summary was prepared for account number
510-4020 as registered by electric meter number 45908 which replaced electric meter number 1587. 31
In the course of his testimony, Sacamos, Jr. also explained the processes of computing a consumers actual electric
consumption. The first method simply involves computing the average consumption of electric power while the second
involves calculating the average monthly reading at a certain period of time after a defective electric meter was replaced.
Petitioner then presented as its witness the head of its customers relation department in 1983, JOSELITO ORTIZ. Ortiz
testified regarding a letter-complaint of respondent Ramos, Jr. coursed through Konsumo Dabaw complaining of the
abnormal reading of the replacement meter for account number 510-4019. In his response to said letter-complaint, Ortiz
wrote separate letters to Konsumo Dabaw32 and to respondent Ramos, Jr.33 explaining that the erroneous meter reading
was because the meter installed in lieu of the purported tampered one was registering electric consumption backwards.
Because of this finding, another electric meter was installed under account number 510-4019 and a credit adjustment was
made on the electric bills under the name of respondent Opea.
The last witness for petitioner was MANUEL ORIG, vice-president of petitioner who stated in his testimony that petitioner
suffered damages because of the filing of this case by respondents, to wit: moral damages in the amount of P20,000.00;
exemplary damages amounting to P10,000.00; attorneys fees of P40,000.00; and litigation expenses of P10,000.00.34
On the other hand, respondents presented for their first witness GALAGAR. Galagar testified that after the removal of the
two electric meters involved in this case, the inspection team requested her and her former fellow employee Perucho to
observe the meter testing and examination conducted by the team despite their lack of knowledge about the whole
procedure. After the testing, she and Perucho signed the inspection reports prepared by Sardinias team which were
marked during the trial as Exhibits "7" and "AA." In addition, Galagar stated that during the entire period of her
employment with respondent Ramos, Jr., she never saw anyone tinker with the subject electric meters.
The second witness presented by respondents was respondent RAMOS, JR. himself who declared that he learned about
the removal of the two electric meters upon his return from his trip to Manila. Soon thereafter, he went to petitioners office
to clarify what transpired in the afternoon of 16 September 1988 and was told by Atty. Braganza that the inspection team
removed the electric meters because they were defective. In addition, he was informed that the electric supply to his
residence and his office would be reconnected upon his payment of the P2,000.00 deposit for each electric meter.
Respondent Ramos, Jr. also declared in court that he had no participation in the alleged tampering of the electric meters
nor did he cause anyone else to tamper the same.
On cross-examination, respondent Ramos, Jr. admitted that at the time he paid the deposit to petitioner, he was made to
sign
a
letter
dated
19 September 198835 which, in part, reads:
September 19, 1988
The Manager
Davao Light & Power Co., Inc.
Davao City
Dear Sir:

This has reference to kilowatthour Meter No. 47019/1587 under Account Nos. 510-4019/-4020 connected to the electrical
installation in the name of my mother-in-law CRISTINA OPENA which I understand has been reported to you as having
been tampered.
...
Very truly yours,
(SGD)TEOFILO RAMOS, JR.
After the trial, the court a quo issued its decision dated 01 October 199036 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the evidence of plaintiff, sufficient by preponderance, to sustain relief in the enforcement of
defendants computation of alleged tampered meters, marked as plaintiffs [Annexes] "C," to "C-8" up to "G" and "G-8,"
finding the evidence of defendant in the reverse order of trial, not sufficient by preponderance of evidence, to warrant
enforcement of [defendants] so-called unbilled electrical consumption against plaintiff, the above-documents, are
declared null and void, without any effect, against plaintiff.
As a consequence of the filing of this case, on account of the trouble, worries, mental agony, suffered by plaintiff due to
defendants unreasonable imposition of the so-called unbilled consumption, without any factual and legal basis, defendant
is ordered to pay plaintiff the amount of P10,000.00 as moral damages, including exemplary damages, by way of example
to the public, in the amount of P5,000.00 and cost against defendant.
As a result of this decision, defendants counterclaim, is denied.37
The trial court dismissed as without basis petitioners claim that electric meter numbers 1587 and 47019 were tampered
with. The trial court pointed to the fact that petitioners evidence and testimonies given by Sardinia, Engr. Reyes, and
Lucero failed to bolster its position that the subject electric meters were indeed tampered particularly since the identity of
the purported perpetrator of the misdeed was never established by petitioner. Petitioners recalcitrance to reveal its
confidential source did not also escape the trial courts perceptiveness, thus:
Indeed, why defendant cannot reveal the identity of the source of its information, as to the defect of the subject meters,
when precisely, it was because of the said information, that prompted defendant to inspect and test the subject [meters]?
There is nothing urgently dangerous to protect the identity of said informant because anyway, he or she, can be safely
protected by defendant and that anyway everything was known, so that plaintiff or anybody else, cannot do anything to
run after the alleged informant. As it [turned-out], said information, could have provided sufficiently, a key to [plaintiffs]
involvement [to] the alleged "tampering," . . .38
Another point taken against petitioner was its insistence to conduct the examination of the electric meters in question
despite the absence of respondent Ramos, Jr. As the trial court observed, both Galagar and Perucho did not know
anything about electricity and the procedure undertaken by petitioners inspection team. Moreover, the presence of
respondent Ramos, Jr. could have presented petitioner with the opportunity to confront him on the matter of electric meter
tampering.
As for the amount of unbilled consumption, it was the trial courts finding that the procedure adopted by petitioner in
computing the amounts being claimed from respondents were "unreliable and highly speculative" 39 as the factors
considered such as average monthly consumption seemed to have been arbitrarily arrived at.
Aggrieved by the trial courts decision, petitioner elevated its case to the Court of Appeals which affirmed, with
modification, the findings of the court a quo, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, except for the deletion therefrom of the award of moral damages,
exemplary damages and attorneys fees, the appealed judgment is hereby AFFIRMED, in all other respects. 40
Petitioner is now before this Court, through the instant petition for review, relying upon the following arguments:
1. Passage of R.A. No. 783241 vindicates petitioner.
2. Broken, deformed, and missing seals are prima facie evidence of meter-tampering.

3. Consumption record of respondents show a significant drop in consumption.

4. Failure to disclose tipster does not destroy presumption.
5. Concern of the Court of Appeals over possible defect of electric meters or that the tipster was responsible for the
tampering is misplaced.
6. Manner of computation of the amount and period of the unbilled consumption (now called differential billing under R.A.
No. 7832) is legal and reasonable.42
Essentially, petitioner raises the issues of: (1) whether the Court of Appeals erred in not retroactively applying Republic
Act No. 7832 and (2) whether the appellate court erred in not finding respondents liable for unbilled consumption.
The petition is bereft of merit.
The law in force at the time of the institution of the present case was Presidential Decree No. 401 or the law Penalizing
the Unauthorized Installation of Water, Electrical or Telephone Connections, the Use of Tampered Water or Electrical
Meters, and Other Acts. The pertinent portion of this statute provides:
. . . [A]ny person who installs any water, electrical or telephone connection without previous authority from the
Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System, the Manila Electric Company or the Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company, as the case may be; tampers and/or uses tampered water or electrical meters or jumpers or other devices
whereby water or electricity is stolen; steals or pilfers water and/or electric meters or water, electric and/or telephone
wires; knowingly possesses stolen or pilfered water and/or electrical meters as well as stolen or pilfered water, electrical
and/or telephone wires, shall, upon conviction, be punished by prision correccional in its minimum period or a fine ranging
from two thousand to six thousand pesos, or both. . .
On 08 December 1994, Rep. Act No. 7832 otherwise known as the "Anti-electricity and Electric Transmission
Lines/Materials Pilferage Act of 1994" was approved. Section 2 of this law enumerates the acts constitutive of illegal use
of electricity, to wit:
SEC. 2. Illegal Use of Electricity. - . . .
...
(c) Tamper, install or use a tampered electrical meter, jumper, current reversing transformer, shorting or shunting wire,
loop connection or any other device which interferes with the proper or accurate registry or metering of electric current or
otherwise results in its diversion in a manner whereby electricity is stolen or wasted;
(d) Damage or destroy an electric meter, equipment, wire, or conduit or allow any of them to be so damaged or destroyed
as to interfere with the proper or accurate metering of electric current; and
(e) Knowingly use or receive the direct benefit of electric service obtained through any of the acts mentioned in
subsections (a), (b), (c), and (d) above.
On the other hand, Section 4 of the same law lists the circumstances which shall establish the prima facie evidence of
illegal use of electricity. Among these are:
(iii) The existence of any wiring connection which affects the normal operation or registration of the electric meter;
(iv) The presence of a tampered, broken, or fake seal on the meter, or mutilated, altered, or tampered meter recording
chart or graph, or computerized chart, graph or log;

(vi) The mutilation, alteration, reconnection, disconnection, bypassisng or tampering of instruments, transformers, and
accessories;

(vii) The destruction of, or attempt to destroy, any integral accessory of the metering device box which encases an electric
meter or its metering accessories; and. . .
Petitioner insists that the Court of Appeals erred when it did not apply the presumption of meter tampering in this case. It
argues that the broken, deformed, and missing seals are prima facie evidence of meter tampering and, when taken
together with the significant drop in the registered electric consumption of respondents, establishes that the latter clearly
benefited from the inaccuracy of electric meters 47019 and 1587. We do not agree.
In the case of United States v. Luling,43 this Court recognized "that no constitutional provision is violated by a statute
providing that proof by the state of some material fact or facts shall constitute prima facie evidence of guilt, and that then
the burden is shifted to the defendant for the purpose of showing that such act or acts are innocent and are committed
without unlawful intention."44
In Jison v. Court of Appeals,45 we declared
The foregoing discussion, however, must be situated within the general rules on evidence, in light of the burden of proof in
civil case, i.e., preponderance of evidence, and the shifting of the burden of evidence in such cases. Simply put, he who
alleges the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof, and upon the plaintiff in a civil case, the burden of proof never
parts. However, in the course of trial in a civil case, once plaintiff makes out a prima facie case in his favor, the duty or the
burden of evidence shifts to defendant to controvert plaintiffs prima facie case, otherwise, a verdict must be returned in
favor of plaintiff. Moreover, in civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must produce a preponderance of evidence
thereon, with plaintiff having to rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of the defendants.
The concept of "preponderance of evidence" refers to evidence which is of greater weight or more convincing, that which
is offered in opposition to it; at bottom, it means probability of truth.46
In other words, the proof of the existence of the prima facie evidence is still the burden of the plaintiff. Moreover, as will be
shown later, Rep. Act No. 7832 cannot apply because it was only approved on 08 December 1994; hence, the general
rules on evidence must be applied.
In this case, petitioner anchors its claim of meter tampering on the result of the examination conducted by its inspection
team. Its witnesses
Sardinia, Engr. Reyes, and Lucero - all testified that a plain view of the electric meters in question showed that the inner
and outer seals which were supposed to be attached thereto were either deformed, missing, or replaced with ordinary
lead wire. Furthermore, the meter testing conducted by Engr. Reyes revealed that the two electric meters were not
accurately recording the electric consumption of respondents.
We hold that petitioners evidence is insufficient for us to rule in its favor.
While it is true that respondent Ramos, Jr. merely offered a categorical denial of the accusation hurled against him and his
co-respondent Opea, nevertheless, the records of this case present other factors which should tilt the scale of evidence
in favor of respondents.
As established by petitioners witnesses Sardinia and Lucero, the allegedly tampered electric meters were installed in
conspicuous portions of respondent Ramos, Jr.s residence and office. In his cross-examination Sardinia testified in the
following manner:
ATTY. CADIENTE:
Q - You are familiar with the place of Cristina Opea and/or Teofilo Ramos?
A - I am not really that familiar, but I have seen the place when I inspected.
Q - It is located along Quezon Boulevard in this city, is that correct?
A - Yes, sir.
Q - The meter is located also in front of the building facing Quezon Boulevard?

A - Yes, sir.
Q - And it is located about 2-1/2 to 3 meters high?
A - I think, it is higher than that.
Q - And the place is surrounded by residential houses?
A - Yes, sir.
Q - It is also a busy street?
A - I think.
Q - We said busy, because several trucks, several jeepneys, several cars and even pedestrian passed the street?
A - Yes, sir.
Q - Would you agree with me, that if somebody opened or touched the meter, just facing the Quezon Boulevard street,
this is very visible to people around?
A - I dont think, I can agree with you, because the location of meter is quite higher, considering that this is beyond [reach
of] ordinary people.
Q - But it can be seen by people around or even by the pedestrian [passing] by?
A - Yes, sir.
Q - In fact, even the passing passengers inside the jeep, it can be seen?
A - It can be seen.
Q - In other words, if somebody touches or opens [tinkers] with that meter, it can be easily visible to the people around?
A - I think.47
On the other hand, Luceros cross-examination proceeded thus:
Q - On September 16, 1988, when you went to the place of plaintiff, you knew that the electric meter was installed outside
the residence?
A - The installation of the meter?
Q - The meter was outside the residence fronting Boulevard Avenue?
A - Yes, Sir.
Q - And it is elevated about three meters high from the ground?
A - I cannot remember.
Q - But it is above the ground?
A - It is above the ground.
Q - Can it be reached by a hand without stepping on a certain object or you have to step on a ladder?

A - I cannot remember.
Q - And you admit that Quezon Boulevard is a very busy street whereby trucks, jeeps and several pedestrians pass from
time to time?
A - Yes, Sir.48
As can be gleaned from the testimonies of petitioners witnesses, the electric meters were mounted in notable places
within the premises owned by respondent Opea. More than that, the building itself was situated along a busy street in
Davao City. This being the case, it becomes highly inconceivable that no one witnessed the alleged tampering of the
subject electric meters considering the surroundings where they were set up. Indeed, any person tinkering with the meters
could have easily attracted the attention and suspicion of neighbors and passers-by.
Even if this Court indulges petitioner in its claim that it received a confidential information from an unidentified source
regarding the claimed meter tampering, still, such allegation cannot support a finding against respondents. As aptly
observed by the Court of Appeals:
Appellants49 (petitioner herein) admit that they have no direct evidence to show that appellees (respondents herein)
caused the meter to be tampered, claiming that in cases such as this, it is well nigh impossible to secure such kind of
evidence because it is a clandestine operation.
However, appellants contradicted their own stand when they claim that they have their own source which furnished them
information regarding the alleged tampering. Appellants witness Jose R. Sardinia in answer to the courts query testified
Q - Did the Court understand from you Mr. Sardinia that the source of this alleged tampering were submitted to your [field]
office confidentially?
A - Yes, Your Honor.
Q - As Assistant Legal Officer of the Davao Light, this confidential matter is not even known to you?
A - It was given to me in confidentially (sic) and I am not going to divulge it.
Q - Meaning that confidential has something to do with the business of Davao Light or confidentially in the sources of
information itself?
A - Yes, I think, this is confidentially taken in order for the company to protect it safeguard also the person.
Q - Meaning you are safeguarding the identity of the informer?
A - Yes, Your Honor.
Notwithstanding the fact that appellants have the best or complete evidence entirely within their control, they refused to
produce or at least, refrained from producing the same. Thus appellants failed to prove their claim with the best evidence
obtainable their informer/source.
On this matter, it has been held that where a party fails to present a fact necessary to his case when it is within his power
to do so, it will be presumed that such fact does not exist. 50
On this point, petitioner relies heavily on this Courts holding in the case of People of the Philippines v. Lopez51 where we
ruled that the testimony of an informer is not indispensable in view of the testimony of the prosecution witnesses who
participated in the "buy-bust" operation. Such reliance is misplaced.
In the Lopez case, we held that there was no need for the prosecution to present the confidential informer as the poseurbuyer himself positively identified the accused as the one who sold to him one deck of methamphetamine hydrochloride or
"shabu." The trial court then properly relied on the testimonies of the police officers despite the prosecutions decision not
to present the informer.

In this case, as the testimonies of petitioners witnesses failed to directly link respondents to the alleged meter tampering,
it was essential for petitioner to present, as its witness, the supposed informer instead of simply relying on the testimonies
of some members of the inspection team. As the records show, the testimonies of Sardinia, Engr. Reyes, and Lucero
were bereft of any indication that respondents either tampered or caused the claimed tampering of the electric meters.
Anent the issue of unbilled consumption, petitioner contends that the amount to be charged to a consumer for unbilled
consumption cannot be calculated with exactitude. Thus, even Rep. No. 7832 itself provides for five different methods of
computing the sum of unbilled consumption and two modes of determining the period of back-billing 52 and that the two
methods it employed in determining respondents unbilled consumption in this case are now incorporated into the said
legislation. This, petitioner maintains, proves that there was nothing arbitrary in its determination of the unbilled
consumption it seeks from respondents. These techniques involve the use of the highest recorded monthly consumption
within the five-year billing period preceding the time of the discovery and employing the highest recorded monthly
consumption within four (4) months after the time of discovery.53
Petitioners argument fails to convince.
It is a basic rule in our jurisdiction that laws do not have retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. 54 In the present
case, Rep. Act No. 7832 is bereft of any indication that the legislature intended to give it a retroactive application. On the
contrary, Section 17 of said law clearly provides that it "shall take effect thirty (30) days after its publication in the Official
Gazette or in any two (2) national papers of general circulation." As the Rep. Act No. 7832 plainly states its prospective
application, we cannot give credence to petitioners argument that its passage validates the amounts it imposed on
respondents for unbilled consumption.55
Moreover, petitioner, as a public utility corporation, "has the imperative duty to make a reasonable and proper inspection
of its apparatus and equipment to ensure that they do not malfunction, and the due diligence to discover and repair the
defects therein."56
As claimed by petitioner, the sudden "drastic" drop in the registered electric consumption commenced sometime in
December 1983 or January 1984 for account number 510-4019 and July 1985 or August 1985 for account number 5104020.57 Inexplicably, petitioner allowed several years to lapse before deciding to conduct an inspection of the electric
meters involved in this case. Such failure on its part to detect the extended unusual pattern in the recorded electric
consumption clearly demonstrates gross negligence on its part and palpable violation of its duty "to make a reasonable
and proper inspection of its apparatus and equipment to ensure that they do not malfunction, and the due diligence to
discover and repair defects therein. Failure to perform such duties constitutes negligence." 58
Indeed, it is highly inequitable if we are to allow a public utility company to be continuously remiss in its duty and then later
on charge the consumer exorbitant amount for the alleged unbilled consumption or differential billing when such a
situation could have been easily averted. We simply cannot sanction petitioners utter neglect of its duty over a number of
years as this would undoubtedly be detrimental to the interest of the consuming public.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED, and the Court of Appeals decision dated 29 May 1997 in
CA-G.R. CV No. 35114, affirming with modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Davao City in Civil
Case No. 19,648-89, is hereby AFFIRMED. With costs.
SO ORDERED.