CARINO V CARINO

In 1969 SPO4 Santiago Carino married Susan Nicdao Carino. He had 2 children with her. In 1992, SPO4contracted a
second marriage, this time with Susan Yee Carino. In 1988, prior to his second marriage, SPO4 is already bedridden and he
was under the care of Yee. In 1992, he died 13 days after his marriage with Yee. Thereafter, the spouses went on to claim
the benefits of SPO4. Nicdao was able to claim a total of P140,000.00 while Yee was able to collect a total of P21,000.00. In
1993, Yee filed an action for collection of sum of money against Nicdao. She wanted to have half of the P140k. Yee admitted
that her marriage with SPO4 was solemnized during the subsistence of the marriage b/n SPO4 and Nicdao but the said
marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due to the absence of a valid marriage license as certified by the local
civil registrar. Yee also claimed that she only found out about the previous marriage on SPO4s funeral.
ISSUE: Whether or not the absolute nullity of marriage may be invoked to claim presumptive legitimes.
HELD: The marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due the absence of a valid marriage license. The marriage
between Yee and SPO4 is likewise null and void for the same has been solemnized without the judicial declaration of the
nullity of the marriage between Nicdao and SPO4. Under Article 40 of the FC, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage
may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second
marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment
declaring the previous marriage void. However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to
declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship,
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the
court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly
instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. In such
instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a
previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such
previous marriage void.
The SC ruled that Yee has no right to the benefits earned by SPO4 as a policeman for their marriage is void due to bigamy;
she is only entitled to properties, money etc owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions.
Wages and salaries earned by each party shall belong to him or her exclusively (Art. 148 of FC). Nicdao is entitled to the full
benefits earned by SPO4 as a cop even if their marriage is likewise void. This is because the two were capacitated to marry
each other for there were no impediments but their marriage was void due to the lack of a marriage license; in their
situation, their property relations is governed by Art 147 of the FC which provides that everything they earned during their
cohabitation is presumed to have been equally contributed by each party this includes salaries and wages earned by each
party notwithstanding the fact that the other may not have contributed at all.

REPUBLIC VS CA AND CASTRO

REPUBLIC VS. CA AND CASTRO
GR NO. 103047, SEPTEMBER 12, 1994

FACTS:
Angelina Castro, with her parents unaware, contracted a civil marriage with Edwin Cardenas. They did not immediately live
together and it was only upon Castro found out that she was pregnant that they decided to live together wherein the said
cohabitation lasted for only 4 months. Thereafter, they parted ways and Castro gave birth that was adopted by her brother
with the consent of Cardenas.

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The baby was brought in the US and in Castros earnest desire to follow her daughter wanted to put in order her marital
status before leaving for US. She filed a petition seeking a declaration for the nullity of her marriage. Her lawyer then found
out that there was no marriage license issued prior to the celebration of their marriage proven by the certification issued by
the Civil Registrar of Pasig.
ISSUE: Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence resorted to by Castro is sufficient to establish that no
marriage license was issued to the parties prior to the solemnization of their marriage.
HELD:
The court affirmed the decision of CA that the certification issued by the Civil Registrar unaccompanied by any
circumstances of suspicion sufficiently prove that the office did not issue a marriage license to the contracting parties. Albeit
the fact that the testimony of Castro is not supported by any other witnesses is not a ground to deny her petition because of
the peculiar circumstances of her case. Furthermore, Cardenas was duly served with notice of the proceedings, which he
chose to ignore.
Under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private respondent Castro
sufficiently established the absence of the subject marriage license.
NINAL VS BAYADOG
NINAL VS. BAYADOG
328 SCRA 122
FACTS:
Pepito Ninal was married with Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. They had 3 children namely Babyline, Ingrid and
Archie, petitioners. Due to the shot inflicted by Pepito to Teodulfa, the latter died on April 24, 1985 leaving the children
under the guardianship of Engrace Ninal. 1 year and 8 months later, Pepito and Norma Badayog got married without any
marriage license. They instituted an affidavit stating that they had lived together for at least 5 years exempting from
securing the marriage license. Pepito died in a car accident on February 19, 1977. After his death, petitioners filed a
petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that said marriage was void for lack of
marriage license.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito was void?
2. Whether or not the heirs of the deceased may file for the declaration of the nullity of Pepitos marriage after his death?
HELD:
The marriage of Pepito and Norma is void for absence of the marriage license. They cannot be exempted even though they
instituted an affidavit and claimed that they cohabit for at least 5 years because from the time of Pepitos first marriage was
dissolved to the time of his marriage with Norma, only about 20 months had elapsed. Albeit, Pepito and his first wife had
separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and Norma had started living with each other that has already lasted for five
years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. Hence, his
marriage to Norma is still void.
Void marriages are deemed to have not taken place and cannot be the source of rights. It can be questioned even after the
death of one of the parties and any proper interested party may attack a void marriage.

VAN DORN VS ROMILLO JR

Petitioner Alice Reyes is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen of the United States; they were
married in Hongkong. Thereafter, they established their residence in the Philippines and begot two children. Subsequently,

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they were divorced in Nevada, United States, and that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van
Dorn.
Private respondent filed suit against petitioner, stating that petitioners business in Manila is their conjugal property; that
petitioner he ordered to render accounting of the business and that private respondent be declared to manage the conjugal
property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case contending that the cause of action is barred by the judgment in the divorce
proceedings before the Nevada Court. The denial now is the subject of the certiorari proceeding.
ISSUE: Whether or not the divorce obtained by the parties is binding only to the alien spouse.
HELD: Is it true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are
covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and
morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the
standards of American Law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband petitioner. He would have no standing to sue
in the case below as petitioners husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the decision of
his own countrys court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is
stopped by his own representation before said court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

FACTS:
Petitioner Alice Reyes (Filipino) and private respondent Richard Upton (American) were married in Hong Kong. After they
divorced in Nevada USA, private respondent filed a suit against petitioner stating that petitioners business in Ermita, Manila
is conjugal property and the he be declared to have management over the conjugal partnership.
Petitioner moved for the dismissal because the cause of action is barred by a previous judgment in the divorce proceedings
before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had no community
property.Respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of
the Philippines and its declared national policy.
ISSUE:
Is respondent estopped from laying claim on the alleged conjugal property because of the representation he made in the
divorce proceedings that they had no community property.
HELD:
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered
by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality.
However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according
to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standard of
American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.
Pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to use in
the case below as petitioners husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of
his own countrys Court, which validly exercises jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is
estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

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To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private
respondent and still subject to a wifes obligation under Article 109 of the Civil Code cannot be justified. Petitioner should not
be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not
continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own
country if the ends of justice are to be served.
PILAPIL VS IBAY-SOMERA
TITLE: IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL V HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA
CITATION: GR NO. 80116, JUNE 30, 1989| 174 SCRA 653
FACTS:
Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married with private respondent, Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national before
the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler, Federal Republic of Germany. They have a child who was
born on April 20, 1980 and named Isabella Pilapil Geiling. Conjugal disharmony eventuated in private respondent and he
initiated a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January 1983. The
petitioner then filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the RTC Manila on January 23,
1983.
The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The
custody of the child was granted to the petitioner.
On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed 2 complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that while still
married to Imelda, latter had an affair with William Chia as early as 1982 and another man named Jesus Chua sometime in
1983.

ISSUE: Whether private respondent can prosecute petitioner on the ground of adultery even though they are no longer
husband and wife as decree of divorce was already issued.

HELD:
The law specifically provided that in prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the person who can legally file the complaint
should be the offended spouse and nobody else. Though in this case, it appeared that private respondent is the offended
spouse, the latter obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, and said divorce and its legal
effects may be recognized in the Philippines in so far as he is concerned. Thus, under the same consideration and
rationale, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner and has no legal standing to commence the adultery
case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
REPUBLIC VS ORBECIDO
REPUBLIC VS. ORBECIDO
GR NO. 154380, OCTOBER 5, 2005
FACTS:
Cipriano Orbecido III was married with Lady Myros Villanueva on May 24, 1981 at the United Church of Christ in the
Philippines in Ozamis City. They had a son and a daughter named Kristoffer and Kimberly, respectively. In 1986, the wife
left for US bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Orbecido discovered that his wife had been naturalized as
an American citizen and learned from his son that his wife sometime in 2000 had obtained a divorce decree and married a
certain Stanley. He thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of
the Family Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code.

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HELD:
The court ruled that taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, Article 26 Par.2 should be
interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but
later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should
likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage.
Hence, the courts unanimous decision in holding Article 26 Par 2 be interpreted as allowing a Filipino citizen who has been
divorced by a spouse who had acquired a citizenship and remarried, also to remarry under Philippine law.

LLORENTE VS CA

Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente was married before a parish priest. Before the outbreak of war, Lorenzo departed for
the United States and Paula was left at the conjugal home. Lorenzo was naturalized by the United State. After
the liberation of the Philippines he went home and visited his wife to which he discovered that his wife was pregnant and
was having an adulterous relationship. Lorenzo returned to the US and filed for divorce. Lorenzo married Alicia LLorente;
they lived together for 25 years and begot 3 children. Lorenzo on his last will and testament bequeathed all his property to
Alicia and their 3 children. Paula filed a petition for letters administration over Lorenzos estate. The RTC ruled in favor of
Paula. On appeal, the decision was modified declaring Alicia as co-owner of whatever properties they have acquired.
Hence, this petition to the Supreme Court.
ISSUES: Whether or not the divorce obtained by Lorenzo capacitated him to remarry. Who are entitled to inherit from the
late Lorenzo Llorente?
HELD: In Van Dorn vs Ramillo Jr. the Supreme Court held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of
the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorce. In the same case, the Court
ruled that aliens may obtain divorce abroad provided that they are valid according to their national law. The Supreme Court
held that divorce obtained by Lorenzo from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of
comity.
The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court of origin for the determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzos will
and determine the successional rights allowing proof of foreign law. The deceased is not covered by our laws on family
rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity since he was a foreigner.

REPUBLIC VS IYOY (G.R. NO. 152577)

POSTED: AUGUST 8, 2011 IN CIVIL LAW
TAGS: DIVORCE, MARRIAGE
0
Facts:
The case is a petition for review by the RP represented by the Office of the Solicitor General on certiorari praying for
thereversal of the decision of the CA dated July 30, 2001 affirming the judgment of the RTC declaring the marriage of
Crasus L. Iyoy(respondent) and Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and void based on Article 36.

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On December 16, 1961 Crasus Iyoy and Ada Rosal-Iyoy married each other, they had 5 children. In 1984, Fely went to the
US, inthe same year she sent letters to Crasus asking him to sign divorce papers. In 1985, Crasus learned that Fely married
an Americanand had a child. Fely went back to the Philippines on several occasions, during one she attended the marriage
of one of her children inwhich she used her husbands last name as hers in the invitation.
March 25, 1997, Crasus filed a complaint for declaration of nullity alleging that Felys acts brought danger and dishonor to
the family and were manifestations of her psychological incapacity. Crasus submitted his testimony, the certification of the
recording of their marriage contract, and the invitation where Fely used her newhusbands last name as evidences.
Fely denied the claims and asserted that Crasus was a drunkard, womanizer, had no job, and thatsince 1988 she was
already an American citizen and not covered by our laws. The RTC found the evidences sufficient and granted thedecree; it
was affirmed in the CA.
Issue:
Does abandonment and sexual infidelity per se constitute psychological incapacity?
Held:
The evidences presented by the respondent fail to establish psychological incapacity.
Furthermore, Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic
marital obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. Irreconcilable
differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual
infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under
the said Article.
Finally, Article 36 is not to be confused with a divorce law thatcuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore
manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting aparty even before the celebration of marriage. It is
a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial
bond one is about to assume.
MANUEL ALMELOR VS RTC
Manuel married Leonida in 1989. They are both medical practitioners. They begot 3 children. 11 years later, Leonida sought
to annul her marriage with Manuel claiming that Manuel is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital
obligations. Leonida testified that Manuel is a harsh disciplinarian and that his policy towards their children are often
unconventional and was the cause of their frequent fight. Manuel has an unreasonable way of imposing discipline towards
their children but is remarkably so gentle towards his mom. He is more affectionate towards his mom and this is a factor
which is unreasonable for Leonida. Further, Leonida also testified that Manuel is a homosexual as evidenced by his unusual
closeness to his male companions and that he concealed his homosexuality from Leonida prior to their marriage. She once
caught Manuel talking to a man affectionately over the phone and she confirmed all her fear when she saw Manuel kiss a
man. The RTC ruled that their marriage is null and void not because of PI but rather due to fraud by reason of Manuels
concealment of his homosexuality (Art 45 of the FC). The CA affirmed the RTCs decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between the two can be declared as null and void due to fraud by reason of Manuels
concealment of his homosexuality.

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HELD: The SC emphasized that homosexuality per se is not a ground to nullify a marriage. It is the concealment of
homosexuality that would. In the case at bar however, it is not proven that Manuel is a homosexual. The lower court should
not have taken the publics perception against Manuels sexuality. His peculiarities must not be ruled by the lower court as
an indication of his homosexuality for those are not conclusive and are not sufficient enough to prove so. Even granting that
Manuel is indeed a homosexual, there was nothing in the complaint or anywhere in the case was it alleged and proven that
Manuel hid such sexuality from Leonida and that Leonidas consent had been vitiated by such.

WIEGEL VS SEMPIO-DY
WIEGEL VS. SEMPIO-DY
143 SCRA 449
FACTS:
Karl Wiegel was married to Lilia Wiegel on July 1978. Lilia was married with a certain Eduardo Maxion in 1972. Karl then
filed a petition in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lilia on the
ground of latters former marriage. Having been allegedly force to enter into a marital union, she contents that the first
marriage is null and void. Lilia likewise alleged that Karl was married to another woman before their marriage.
ISSUE: Whether Karls marriage with Lilia is void.
HELD:
It was not necessary for Lilia to prove that her first marriage was vitiated with force because it will not be void but merely
voidable. Such marriage is valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she married
Karl, she is still validly married to her first husband. Consequently, her marriage to Karl is void. Likewise, there is no need
of introducing evidence on the prior marriage of Karl for then such marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration
before he can remarry. Accordingly, Karl and Lilias marriage are regarded void under the law.
A.M. No. 58 June 2, 1977
PEDRO ODAYAT, COMPLAINANT,
VS.
DEMETRIO AMANTE, RESPONDENT.

ANTONIO, J.:
In a verified amended letter-complaint dated March 10, 1973, 1 Pedro Odayat charged Atty. Demetrio Z. Amante, Clerk of
Court, Court of First Instance, Branch IX, Basey, Samar, with oppression, immorality and falsification of a public document. 2
Briefly stated, complainant's basic allegations are: (1) that respondent grabbed a portion of complainant's land, and, when
this latter resented, the former arrogantly challenged the complainant to bring the matter to court; (2) that respondent is
cohabiting with one Beatriz Jornada, with whom he begot many children, even while his spouse Filomena Abella is still alive;
and (3) that respondent, although married, falsely represented his status as single in the information sheet be submitted in
connection with his appointment to his present position as Clerk of Court.
After respondent Demetrio Amante had submitted his letter-comment dated April 24, 1973, 3 which was considered as his
answer to the amended complaint, this Court, in its minute resolution of July 16, 1974, 4 referred this Administrative Matter
No. P-58 to the Executive Judge of the Court of First Instance, Branch I, Catbalogan, Samar, for investigation, report and
recommendation, and the matter was docketed therein as Administrative Case No. 264. The charges were investigated by

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District Judge Segundo M. Zosa of said Court. After appropriate proceedings, Judge Zosa submitted to this Court his Report
and Recommendation dated December 3,1974. 5
1. Oppression. In the course of formal investigation on August 26, 1974 before Judge Zosa, complainant acquiesced to
the dropping of this charge of oppression against respondent, inasmuch as the issue involved therein refers to a boundary
dispute between the complainant and the respondent and admittedly being more properly a cause for a civil action. 6 Hence,
the scope of the investigation by Judge Zosa is limited to the other two charges.
2. Immorality. To prove this charge of immorality against respondent, complainant Pedro Odayat testified and presented
Exhibits "A" to "E", to the effect that respondent and Filomena Abella were married in Tacloban City on October 16, 1948
before Judge Eugenio Brillo (then Justice of the Peace of Tacloban, Leyte; 7 ) that they had one son, who was born on
August 23, 1949 and baptized on October 1, 1949 by the name of Romeo Amante, in the Sto. Nino Church, Tacloban City,
by Rev. Fr. Magdaleno Agnes;8 that he came to know Filomena Abella, who is a native of Sta. Rita, Samar, only after her
marriage to the respondent when they took up their residence for five years in Basey, Samar; that he did not know if
Filomena Abella was still single when she married the respondent; that long before he filed his complaint against respondent
on March 10, 1973, he came to know that the respondent and one Beatriz Jornado were living as husband and wife in
Basey, Samar; that they had several children, two of whom are Maria Felisa J. Amante, who was born on April 12, 1967, as
per certified true copy of the Certificate of Birth of said child, 9 duly signed and issued on May 7, 1973 by Perfecto Cabuquit,
the Local Civil Registrar, 10 and Alma Amante y Jornada, who was born on April 8, 1965 and baptized on July 5, 1965, as per
Certificate of Baptism, duly signed and issued on March 6, 1973 by the Parish Priest, Rev. Fr. Jose M. Lentejas; 11 and that
one of the reasons why he filed his complaint against the respondent was because of their land dispute.
On the other hand, respondent Demetrio Amante testified, in his behalf, and presented Atty. Demosthenes Duquilla, as well
as Exhibits "1" and "2". Respondent admits his marriage with Filomena Abella on October 16, 1948. 12 He also admits that he
has been living with Beatriz Jornada, whom he married on April 4, 1964 during a religious revival in Almagro, Samar, before
Rev. Fr. John Belly, a Franciscan Missionary, 13 and with whom he begot six (6) children.14Respondent, however, claims he
was coerced into marrying Filomena Abella, unaware that she was already married to another man, and they separated in
1949 after Filomena Abella told him of her previous marriage; that from 1949 to 1964, the respondent did not hear or
received any communication from Filomena Abella, much less knew of her whereabouts.
To rebut the charge of immorality, respondent presented in evidence the certification dated September 12, 1974 of David C.
Jacobe, the Local Civil Registrar of Pateros, Rizal 15 attesting that, in accordance with the Register of Marriages in his office,
Filomena Abella was married to one Eliseo Portales on February 16, 1948. Respondent's contention is that his marriage
with Filomena Abella was void ab initio, because of her previous marriage with said Eliseo Portales.
The Investigator finds for the respondent and recommends his exoneration from this charge. Indeed, there is no question
that Filomena Abella's marriage with the respondent was void ab initio under Article 80 [4] of the New Civil code, and no
judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of void marriages. 16
3. Falsification of a This document. The Investigator found that the complainant failed to prove this charge. Contrary to
the allegation of the complainant, the document in question, 17 shows that the respondent actually placed in "Item 6. Civil
Status" therein the word "Married". 18
In view of the foregoing, We find that the recommendation of the Investigator is in accordance with law and the evidence on
record.
WHEREFORE, respondent Demetrio Amante is hereby exonerated from the charges filed against him by complainant. Let a
copy of this decision be attached to his personal record,

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FRANCISCO HERMOSISIMA VS COURT OF APPEALS

In 1950, Soledad Cagigas, 33 years old (then a school teacher, later she became an insurance underwriter), and Francisco
Hermosisima, 23 years old (apprentice ship pilot), fell in love with each other. Since 1953, both had a refular intimate and
sexual affair with each other. In 1954, Soledad got pregnant. Francisco then promised to marry Soledad. In June 1954,
Soledad gave birth to a baby girl. The next month, Francisco got married but with a different woman named Romanita
Perez.
Subsequently, Soledad filed an action against Francisco for the latter to recognize his daughter with Soledad and for
damages due to Franciscos breach of his promise to marry Soledad. The trial court ruled in favor of Soledad. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court and even increased the award of damages. TheCourt of Appeals reasoned
that Francisco is liable for damages because he seduced Soledad. He exploited the love of Soledad for him in order to
satisfy his sexual desires that being, the award of moral damages is proper.
ISSUE: Whether or not moral damages are recoverable under our laws for breach of promise to marry.
HELD: No. Breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong per se. The Court of Appeals based its award of damages
on Article 2219 of the Civil Code which says in part that Moral damages may be recovered from (3) Seduction, xxx
However, it must be noted that the Seduction being contemplated in the said Civil Code provision is the same Seduction
being contemplated in Article 337 and 338 of the Revised Penal Code. Such seduction is not present in this case.
Further, it cannot be said that Francisco morally seduced (in lieu of criminal seduction) Soledad given the circumstances of
this case. Soledad was 10 years older than Francisco. Soledad had a better job experience and a better job overall than
Francisco who was a mere apprentice. Further still, it was admitted by Soledad herself that she surrendered herself to
Francisco and that she wanted to bind by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy.

BEATRIZ WASSMER VS FRANCISCO VELEZ

In 1954, Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer planned their marriage. They decided to schedule it on September 4, 1954.
And so Wassmer made preparations such as: making and sending wedding invitations, bought her wedding dress and other
apparels, and other wedding necessities. But 2 days before the scheduled day of wedding, Velez sent a letter to Wassmer
advising her that he will not be able to attend the wedding because his mom was opposed to said wedding. And one day
before the wedding, he sent another message to Wassmer advising her that nothing has changed and that he will be
returning soon. However, he never returned.
This prompted Wassmer to file a civil case against Velez. Velez never filed an answer and eventually judgment was made in
favor of Wassmer. The court awarded exemplary and moral damages in favor of Wassmer.
On appeal, Velez argued that his failure to attend the scheduled wedding was because of fortuitous events. He further
argued that he cannot be held civilly liable for breaching his promise to marry Wassmer because there is no law upon which
such an action may be grounded. He also contested the award of exemplary and moral damages against him.
ISSUE: Whether or not the award of damages is proper.
HELD: Yes. The defense of fortuitous events raised by Velez is not tenable and also unsubstantiated. It is true that a breach
of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. However, in this case, it was not a simple breach of promise to marry.

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because of such promise, Wassmer made preparations for the wedding. Velezs unreasonable withdrawal from the wedding
is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. Wassmers cause of action is supported under Article 21 of the Civil
Code which provides in part any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
And under the law, any violation of Article 21 entitles the injured party to receive an award for moral damages as properly
awarded by the lower court in this case. Further, the award of exemplary damages is also proper. Here, the circumstances
of this case show that Velez, in breaching his promise to Wassmer, acted in wanton, reckless, and oppressive manner this
warrants the imposition of exemplary damages against him.
FACTS:
Francisco Velez and Beatriz, following their promise to love, decided to get married. Two days before their marriage
Francisco wrote Beatriz telling her that their marriage had to be postponed as his mother opposes it. A day before his
marriage he sent a telegram informing her nothing changed rest assured returning soon. Francisco was never heard from
again. Beatriz sued for damages for breach of promise to marry.
ISSUE:
Is breach of promise to marry an actionable wrong?
HELD:
The extent to which acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of the Civil Code
provides that any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damages.
This is not a case of mere breach to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to
formally set a wedding and go through all the preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to
be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be
held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 of the Civil Code.
When a breach to marry is actionable under Article 21 of the Civil Code, moral damages may be awarded under Article
2219(10) of the said Code. Exemplary damages may also be awarded under Article 2232 of said Code where it is proven
that the defendant clearly acted in a wanton, reckless and oppressive manner.
Navarro vs Domagtoy
Navarro vs. Domagtoy
AM No. MTJ 96-1088, July 19, 1996
FACTS:
Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro filed a complaint on two specific acts committed by
respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy on the grounds of gross misconduct, ineffiency in offce
and ignorance of the law.
It was alleged that Domagtoy solemnized marriage of Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borja on September 27, 1994 despite the
knowledge that the groom has a subsisting marriage with Ida Penaranda and that they are merely separated. It was told that
Ida left their conjugal home in Bukidnon and has not returned and been heard for almost seven years. The said judge
likewise solemnize marriage of Floriano Dadoy Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his courts jurisdiction on
October 27, 1994. The judge holds his office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta Monica-Burgos,
Surigao del Norte but he solemnized the said wedding at his residence in the municipality of Dapa located 40 to 50 km
away.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriages solemnized were void.

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HELD:
The court held that the marriage between Tagadan and Borja was void and bigamous there being a subsisting marriage
between Tagadan and Penaranda. Albeit, the latter was gone for seven years and the spouse had a well-founded belief that
the absent spouse was dead, Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding as provided in the Civil Code for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
With regard to the marriage of Sumaylo and Del Rosario, the latter only made the written request where it should have been
both parties as stated in Article 8 of the Family Code. Their non-compliance did not invalidate their marriage however,
Domagtoy may be held administratively liable.
G.R. No. L-16925 July 24, 1962
FABIAN PUGEDA, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RAFAEL TRIAS, MIGUEL TRIAS, SOLEDAD TRIAS, assisted by her husband ANGEL SANCHEZ,
CLARA TRIAS, assisted by her husband VICTORIANO SALVADOR,
GABRIEL TRIAS, minors ROMULO VINIEGRA, GLORIA VINIEGRA and FERNANDO VINIEGRA, JR., assisted by
guardian-ad-litem,
RAFAEL TRIAS, TEOFILO PUGEDA, and VIRGINIA PUGEDA, assisted by her husband RAMON
PORTUGAL, defendants-appellants.
Placido C. Ramos and Fortunato Jose for plaintiff-appellee.
Ramon C. Aquino for defendants-appellants Teofilo Pugeda and Virginia Pugeda.
Jose T. Cajulis, Miguel F. Trias and Carlos T. Viniegra for all other defendants-appellants.
RESOLUTION
LABRADOR, J.:
This resolution concerns a motion for the reconsideration of the decision rendered by this Court. The main argument in
support of the motion is that the lots not fully paid for at the time of the death of Miguel Trias, which lots were, by provision of
the Friar Lands Act (Act No. 1120), subsequently transferred to the widow's name and later paid for by her out of the
proceeds of the fruits of the lands purchased, and for which titles were issued in the name of the widow, belong to the latter
as her exclusive paraphernal properties, and are not conjugal properties of her deceased husband and herself. In our
decision we laid down the rule that upon the issuance of a certificate of sale to the husband of a lot in a friar lands estate,
purchased by the Government from the friars, the land becomes the property of the husband and the wife, and the fact that
the certificate of sale is thereafter transferred to the wife does not change the status of the property so purchased as
conjugal property of the deceased husband and wife. The reason for this ruling is the provision of the Civil Code to the effect
that properties acquired by husband and wife are conjugal properties. (Art. 1401, Civil Code of Spain). The provision of the
Friar Lands Act to the effect that upon the death of the husband the certificate of sale is transferred to the name of the wife
is merely an administrative device designed to facilitate the documentation of the transaction and the collection of
installments; it does not produce the effect of destroying the character as conjugal property of the lands purchased. Hence,
the issuance of the title, after completion of the installments, in the name of the widow does not make the friar lands
purchased her own paraphernal property. The said lands, notwithstanding a certificate of sale, continue to be the conjugal
property of her deceased husband and herself.

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The case of Arayata vs. Joya, et al., 51 Phil. 654, cited by the movants, is not applicable to the case at bar because it refers
to the superior rights of the widow recognized in Section 16 of Act No. 1120 over transfers made by the husband which have
not been approved by the Director of Lands. As a matter of fact the syllabus in said case is as follows:
Widow's rights. The widow of a holder of a certificate of sale of friar lands acquired by the Government has an
exclusive right to said lands and their fruits from her husband's death, provided that the deceased has not conveyed
them to another during his lifetime and she fulfills the requirements prescribed by the law for the purchase of the
same.
A minor ground for the reconsideration is that the decision of Judge Lucero, having been set aside by the Court of Appeals,
could not be affirmed by Us. The setting aside of the said decision was due to the fact that newly discovered evidence was
found regarding the partition of the estate of the deceased. The setting aside of the decision was not aimed or directed at
the judge's ruling that the properties acquired by the husband during his lifetime from the friar lands estate were conjugal
properties of the husband and the wife..
The third ground raised is that the lots were never partitioned as conjugal assets of Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer. One
of the arguments adduced in favor of the claim of the movants that the properties in question, which were acquired during
the lifetime of Mariano Trias, were never partitioned is that, according to the records of the Register of Deeds and according
to the friar lands agents, the alleged partition of the said properties as conjugal properties of the deceased Mariano Trias
and Maria C. Ferrer had not been registered in said offices. The failure to make the registration is perhaps due to the
neglect the heirs. The fact, however, remains that the exhibits presented in Court, especially Exhibit "3-Trias" and Annex "E",
which are the project of partition and the approval thereof, cannot be ignored by this Court. The neglect of the parties in not
actually partitioning the properties do not argue in favor of the fact that partition was not a actually decreed. Adjudications
may be made pro indiviso without actual division or partition of the properties among the heirs.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby denied and the judgment rendered declared final. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-9005

June 20, 1958

ARSENIO DE LORIA and RICARDA DE LORIA, petitioners,

vs.
FELIPE APELAN FELIX, respondent.
Guido Advincula and Nicanor Lapuz for petitioners.
Nicodemus L. Dasig for respondent.
BENGZON, J.:
Review of a decision of the Court of Appeals, involving the central issue of the validity of the marriage in articulo
mortis between Matea de la Cruz and Felipe Apelan Felix.
It appears that long before, and during the War of the Pacific, these two persons lived together as wife and husband at
Cabrera Street, Pasay City. They acquired properties but had no children. In the early part of the liberation of Manila and
surrounding territory, Matea be came seriously ill. Knowing her critical condition, two young ladies of legal age dedicated to
the service of God, named Carmen Ordiales and Judith Vizcarra 1 visited and persuaded her to go to confession. They
fetched Father Gerardo Bautista, Catholic parish priest of Pasay. The latter, upon learning that the penitent had been living
with Felipe Apelan Felix without benefit of marriage, asked both parties to ratify their union according to the rites of his
Church. Both agreed. Whereupon the priest heard the confession of the bed-ridden old woman, gave her Holy Communion,

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administered the Sacrament of Extreme Unction and then solemnized her marriage with Felipe Apelan Felix in articulo
mortis,2 Carmen Ordiales and Judith Vizcarra acting as sponsors or witnesses. It was then January 29 or 30, 1945.
After a few months, Matea recovered from her sickness; but death was not to be denied, and in January 1946, she was
interred in Pasay, the same Fr. Bautista performing the burial ceremonies.
On May 12, 1952, Arsenio de Loria and Ricarda de Loria filed this complaint to compel defendant to an accounting and to
deliver the properties left by the deceased. They are grandchildren of Adriana de la Cruz, sister of Matea, and claim to be
the only surviving forced heirs of the latter. Felipe Apelan Felix resisted the action, setting up his rights as widower. They
obtained favorable judgment in the court of first instance, but on appeal the Court of Appeals reversed and dismissed the
complaint.
Their request for review here was given due course principally to consider the legal question-which they amply discussed in
their petition and printed brief whether the events which took place in January 1945 constituted, in the eyes of the law, a
valid and binding marriage.
According to the Court of Appeals:
There is no doubt at all in the mind of this Court, that Fr. Gerardo Bautista, solemnized the marriage in articulo
mortis of Defendant Apelan Felix and Matea de la Cruz, on January 29 and 30, 1945, under the circumstances set
forth in the reverend's testimony in court. Fr. Bautista, a respectable old priest of Pasay City then, had no reason to
side one or the other. . . . Notwithstanding this positive evidence on the celebration or performance of the marriage
in question, Plaintiffs-Appellees contend that the same was not in articulo mortis, because Matea de la Cruz was not
then on the point of death. Fr. Bautista clearly testified, however, that her condition at the time was bad; she was
bed-ridden; and according to his observation, she might die at any moment (Exhibit 1), so apprehensive was he
about her condition that he decided in administering to her the sacrament of extreme unction, after hearing her
confession. . . . .The greatest objection of the Appellees and the trial court against the validity of the marriage under
consideration, is the admitted fact that it was not registered.
The applicable legal provisions are contained in the Marriage Law of 1929 (Act No. 3613) as amended by Commonwealth
Act No. 114 (Nov. 1936) specially sections 1, 3, 20 and 21.
There is no question about the officiating priest's authority to solemnize marriage. There is also no question that the parties
had legal capacity to contract marriage, and that both declared before Fr. Bautista and Carmen Ordiales and Judith Vizcarra
that "they took each other as husband and wife."
The appellants' contention of invalidity rests on these propositions:
(a) There was no "marriage contract" signed by the wedded couple the witnesses and the priest, as required by section 3 of
the Marriage Law; and
(b) The priest filed no affidavit, nor recorded the marriage with the local civil registry.
The factual basis of the first proposition no signing may seriously be doubted. The Court of Appeals made no finding
thereon. Indeed if anything, its decision impliedly held such marriage contract to have been executed, since it said "the
marriage in articulo mortis was a fact", and the only question at issue was whether "the failure of Fr. Bautista to send
copies of the certificate of marriage in question to the Local Civil Registrar and to register the said marriage in the Record of
Marriages of the Pasay Catholic Church . . . renders the said marriage invalid." And such was the only issue tendered in the
court of first instance. (See p. 14, 34, Record on Appeal.)

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However, we may as well face this second issue: Does the failure to sign the "marriage certificate or contract" constitute a
cause for nullity?
Marriage contract is the "instrument in triplicate" mentioned in sec. 3 of the Marriage Law which provides:
Sec. 3. Mutual Consent. No particular form for the ceremony of marriage is required, but the parties with legal
capacity to contract marriage must declare, in the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage and of two
witnesses of legal age, that they take each other as husband and wife. This declaration shall be set forth in an
instrument in triplicate, signed by signature or mark by the contracting parties and said two witnesses and attested
by the person solemnizing the marriage. . . . (Emphasis ours).
In the first place, the Marriage Law itself, in sections 28, 29 and 30 enumerates the causes for annulment of marriage.
Failure to sign the marriage contract is not one of them.
In the second place, bearing in mind that the "essential requisites for marriage are the legal capacity of the contracting
parties and their consent" (section 1), the latter being manifested by the declaration of "the parties" "in the presence of the
person solemnizing the marriage and of two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and wife" which
in this case actually occurred.3 We think the signing of the marriage contract or certificate was required by the statute simply
for the purpose of evidencing the act.4 No statutory provision or court ruling has been cited making it an essential requisite
not the formal requirement of evidentiary value, which we believe it is. The fact of marriage is one thing; the proof by
which it may be established is quite another.
Certificate and Record. Statutes relating to the solemnization of marriage usually provide for the issuance of a
certificate of marriage and for the registration or recording of marriage . . . Generally speaking, the registration or
recording of a marriage is not essential to its validity, the statute being addressed to the officials issuing the license,
certifying the marriage, and making the proper return and registration or recording. (Sec. 27 American
Jurisprudence "Marriage" p. 197-198.)
Formal Requisites. . . . The general rule, however, is that statutes which direct that a license must be issued and
procured, that only certain persons shall perform the ceremony, that a certain number of witnesses shall be
present, that a certificate of the marriage shall be signed, returned, and recorded, and that persons violating the
conditions shall be guilty of a criminal offense, are addressed to persons in authority to secure publicity and to
require a record to be made of the marriage contract. Such statutes do not voidcommon-law marriages unless they
do so expressly, even where such marriage are entered into without obtaining a license and are not recorded. It is
the purpose of these statutes to discourage deception and seduction, prevent illicit intercourse under the guise of
matrimony, and relieve from doubt the status of parties who live together as man and wife, by providing competent
evidence of the marriage. . . . (Section 15 American Jurisprudence "Marriage" pp. 188-189.) Emphasis Ours. (See
also Corpus Juris Secundum "Marriage" Sec. 33.)
And our law says, "no marriage shall be declared invalid because of the absence of one or several formal requirements of
this Act . . . ." (Section 27.)
In the third place, the law, imposing on the priest the duty to furnish to the parties copies of such marriage certificate (section
16) and punishing him for its omission (section 41) implies his obligation to see that such "certificate" is executed
accordingly. Hence, it would not be fair to visit upon the wedded couple in the form of annulment, Father Bautista's
omission, if any, which apparently had been caused by the prevailing disorder during the liberation of Manila and its
environs.

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Identical remarks apply to the priest's failure to make and file the affidavit required by sections 20 and 21. It was the priest's
obligation; non-compliance with it, should bring no serious consequences to the married pair, specially where as in this
case, it was caused by the emergency.
The mere fact that the parish priest who married the plaintiff's natural father and mother, while the latter was in
articulo mortis, failed to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the municipal secretary, does not invalidate said
marriage, since it does not appear that in the celebration thereof all requisites for its validity were not present, the
forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate not being one of the requisites. (Jones vs. Hortiguela, 64 Phil. 179.)
See also Madridejo vs. De Leon, 55 Phil. 1.
The law permits in articulo mortis marriages, without marriage license; but it requires the priest to make the affidavit and file
it. Such affidavit contains the data usually required for the issuance of a marriage license. The firstpractically substitutes the
latter. Now then, if a marriage celebrated without the license is not voidable (under Act 3613), 5 this marriage should not also
be voidable for lack of such affidavit.
In line with the policy to encourage the legalization of the union of men and women who have lived publicly in a state of
concubinage6, (section 22), we must hold this marriage to be valid.
The widower, needless to add, has better rights to the estate of the deceased than the plaintiffs who are the grandchildren of
her sister Adriana. "In the absence of brothers or sisters and of nephews, children of the former, . . . the surviving
spouse . . . shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. (Art 952, Civil Code.)
Wherefore, the Court of Appeals' decision is affirmed, with costs. So ordered.
Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, Inc., et al, v. Feliciano
Full Text: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1965/mar1965/gr_l-24022_1965.html
Facts:
On December 26, 1964, Jose Y. Feliciano, Chairman and General Manager of the Rice and Corn Administration, wrote the
President of the Philippines urging the immediate importation of 595,400 metric tons of rice, thru a government agency
which the President may designate, pursuant to the recommendation of the National Economic Council. The President
submitted said letter to his cabinet for consideration and on December 28, 1964, the cabinet approved the needed
importation. On January 4, 1965, the President designated the Rice and Corn Administration as the government agency
authorized to undertake the importation. Considering that said importation, the Iloilo Palay and corn Planters Association
alleged that it is contrary to RA 3453 which prohibits the government from importing rice and tat there is no
law appropriating funds to finance the same. They said that it its illegal because it is prohibited by RA 3452 which in Section
10 provides that the importation of rice and corn is only left to private properties upon payment of the corresponding taxes.
They claim that RCA is prohibited from doing so. According to them, RA 2207 which provides that should there be
an existing or imminent shortage in the local supply of rice of suh gravity as to constitute a national emergency and certified
by the NEC, the president may authorize such importation thru any government agency he may designate - is repealed by
RA 3452.
Issue:
Whether or not RA 2207 which allows importation of rice by government agency during national emergency is repealed by
RA 3452
Held:
No, RA 2207 is not repealed by RA 3452.
Section 16 of RA 3452 contains a repealing clause which provides "All laws or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions
of this act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.". This repealing clause is not an express repealing clause because
it fails to identify or designate the act/s that are intended to be repealed. Rather, is is a clause which predicates the intended
repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior acts. Such being the case, the

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presumption against implied repeals and the rule against strict construction regarding implied repeals apply ex proprio vigre.
The failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law, unless on
irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and old laws. Here there is no inconsistency.
While the two laws are geared towards the same ultimate objective, their methods of approach are different; one is by a total
ban of rice importation and the other by a partial ban, the same being applicable only to the government during normal
period. Also, RA 3452 only authorizes importation during normal times, but when there is shortage in the local supply of
sucy gravity as to constitute a national emergency, we have to turn to RA 2207. These two laws are therefore not
inconsistent and so implied repeal does not ensue

LYNETTE GARVIDA VS FLORENCIO SALES, JR. |

1.
2.
3.
4.

In 1996, Lynette Garvida filed her candidacy to the position of Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) of a barangay
in Bangui, Ilocos Norte. Her candidacy was opposed by her rival Florencio Sales, Jr. on the ground that she is over 21 years
old (21 years old, 9 months at the time of the filing). Nevertheless, the trial court ordered that she be admitted as a
candidate and the SK elections went on. Sales, in the meantiume, filed a petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of
Garvida. When the elections results came in, Garvida won with a vote of 78, while Sales got 76. Garvida was eventually
proclaimed as winner but had to face the petition filed by Sales.
Garvida, in her defense, averred that Section 424 of the Local Government Code (LGC) provides that candidates for the SK
must be at least 15 years of age and a maximum age of 21 years. Garvida states that the LGC does not specify that the
maximum age requirement is exactly 21 years hence said provision must be construed as 21 years and a fraction of a year
but still less than 22 years so long as she does not exceed 22 she is still eligible because she is still, technically, 21 years
of age (although she exceeds it by 9 months).
ISSUE: Whether or not Garvida met the age requirement.
HELD: No. Section 424 of the Local Government Code provides that candidates for SK must be:
Filipino citizen;
an actual resident of the barangay for at least six months;
15 but not more than 21 years of age; and
duly registered in the list of the Sangguniang Kabataan or in the official barangay list.
The provision is clear. Must not be more than 21 years of age. The said phrase is not equivalent to less than 22 years old.
The law does not state that the candidate be less than 22 years on election day. If such was the intention of Congress in
framing the LGC, then they should have expressly provided such.
Sales claims that he obtained the second highest number of vote, hence he should be declared as the SK Chairman, is this
a valid contention?
No. Applying the ruling in Labo vs COMELEC, a defeated candidate, though obtaining the second highest number of vote, is
not deemed to have been elected by reason of the winners eventual disqualification/ineligibility. He cannot be declared as
successor simply because he did not get the majority or the plurality of votes the electorate did not choose him. It would
have been different if Sales was able to prove that the voters still voted for Garvida despite knowing her ineligibility, this
would have rendered her votes stray.
Under Section 435 of the LGC, the SK Chairman should be succeeded by the SK member who obtained the highest
number of votes, should the SK member obtaining such vote succeed Garvida?**
(**Not to be confused with Sales situation Sales was a candidate for SK chairmanship not SK membership.)
The above argument cant be considered in this case because Section 435 only applies when the SK Chairman refuses to
assume office, fails to qualify, is convicted of a felony, voluntarily resigns, dies, is permanently incapacitated, is removed
from office, or has been absent without leave for more than three (3) consecutive months. Garvidas case is not what
Section 435 contemplates. Her removal from office by reason of her age is a question of eligibility. Being eligible means
being legally qualified; capable of being legally chosen. Ineligibility, on the other hand, refers to the lack of the
qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes for holding public office. Ineligibility is not one of the grounds
enumerated in Section 435 for succession of the SK Chairman.
NATIONAL MARKETING CORPORATION VS TECSON GR NO. L-2013127 AUGUST 1969
Facts:
December 21, 1965, National Marketing Corporation filed a complaint, docketed as civil case no. 63701on the same
court, as successor of the Price Stabilization Corporation, against the same defendant from10 years ago. Defendant Miguel
Tecson moved to dismiss the said complaint upon the ground lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of that and

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prescription of action. The court, then, issued an order of dismissal with regards the article 13 of the civil code. However,
National Marketing Corporation appealed to the court of appeals from such order. Looking at the fact that 1960 and 1964 is
a leap year, they insisted that a year means a calendar year and a leap year would still be counted as 1 year even if it
consists of 366 days. The case reached its conclusion with the appellants theory with regards to the article 13 of the civil
code.
Issues:
Whether or not the term year as used in the article 13 of the civil code is limited to 365 days.
HELD:
NO. "When the laws speak of years ... it shall be understood that years are of three hundred sixty-five days each"
according to Art. 13 of our Civil Code. 1960 and 1964 being leap years, the month of February in both had 29 days, so that
ten (10) years of 365 days each, or an aggregate of 3,650 days, from December 21, 1955, expired on December 19, 1965.
The term year as used in the article 13 of the civil code is limited to 365 days. However, it is said to be unrealistic
and if public interest demands a reversion to the policy embodied in the revised administrative code, this may be done
through legislative process and not by judicial decree.

TENCHAVEZ V ESCANO (1965)

TENCHAVEZ V ESCANO (1965)
Facts:
Pastor Tenchavez), 32, married Vicenta Escano, 27, on Feb. 24, 1948, in Cebu City. As of June 1948, the newly-weds were
already estranged. On June 24, 1950, Escano left for the US. On Agugust 22, 1950, she filed a verified complaint for divorce
against the plaintiff in the State of Nevada on the ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character."
On October 21, 1950, a decree of divorce was issued by the Nevada Court. On September 13, 1954, Escano married an
American Russel Leo Moran in Nevada. She now lives with him in California and by him, has begotten children. She
acquired American citizenship on August 8, 1958. On July 30, 1955, Tenchavez filed a complaint for legal separation and
damages against VE and her parents in the CFI-Cebu.
Tenchavez poses the novel theory that Mamerto and Mina Escao are undeserving of an award for damages because they
are guilty of contributory negligence in failing to take up proper and timely measures to dissuade their daughter Vicenta from
leaving her husband Tenchavez obtaining a foreign divorce and marrying another man (Moran). This theory cannot be
considered: first, because this was not raised in the court below; second, there is no evidence to support it; third, it
contradicts plaintiff's previous theory of alienation of affections in that contributory negligence involves an omission to
perform an act while alienation of affection involves the performance of a positive act.
Issues:
1. WON at the the time Escano was still a Filipino citizen when the divorce decree was issued.
2. WON the award of moral damages against Escao may be given to Tenchavez on the grounds of her refusal to perform
her wifely duties, her denial of consortium, and desertion of her husband.
Held:
1. YES
At the time the divorce decree was issued, Escano like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen. She was then subject to
Philippine law under Art. 15 of the NCC. Philippine law, under the NCC then now in force, does not admit absolute divorce
but only provides for legal separation.
For Phil. courts to recognize foreign divorce decrees bet. Filipino citizens would be a patentviolation of the declared policy of
the State, especially in view of the 3rd par. of Art. 17, NCC. Moreover, recognition would give rise to scandalous
discrimination in favor of wealthy citizens to the detriment of those members of our society whose means do not permit them
to sojourn abroad and obtain absolute divorce outside the Phils.
Therefore, a foreign divorce bet. Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity of the NCC, is not entitled to
recognition as valid in this jurisdiction.
2. YES

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The acts of Vicenta (up to and including her divorce, for grounds not countenanced by our law, which was hers at the time)
constitute a wilful infliction of injury upon plaintiff's feelings in a manner "contrary to morals, good customs or public policy"
(Civ. Code, Art. 21) for which Article 2219 (10) authorizes an award of moral damages.
It is also argued that, by the award of moral damages, an additional effect of legal separation has been added to Article 106.
It was plain in the decision that the damages attached to her wrongful acts under the codal article (Article 2176) expressly
cited.
But economic sanctions are not held in our law to be incompatible with the respect accorded to individual liberty in civil
cases. Thus, a consort who unjustifiably deserts the conjugal abode can be denied support (Art. 178, Civil Code of the
Phil.). And where the wealth of the deserting spouse renders this remedy illusory, there is no cogent reason why the court
may not award damage as it may in cases of breach of other obligations to do intuitu personae even if in private relations
physical coercion be barred under the old maxim "Nemo potest precise cogi and factum".
FACTS:
In February 1948, Tenchavez and Escao secretly married each other and of course without the knowledge ofEscaos
parents who were of prominent social status. The marriage was celebrated by a military chaplain. When Escaos parents
learned of this, they insisted a church wedding to be held but Escao withdrew from having a recelebration because she
heard that Tenchavez was having an affair with another woman. Eventually, their relationship went sour; 2 years later,
Escao went to the US where she acquired a decree of absolute divorce and she subsequently became an American citizen
and also married an American.
In 1955, Tenchavez initiated a case for legal separation and further alleged that Escaos parents dissuaded their daughter
to go abroad and causing her to be estranged from him hence hes asking for damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00.
The lower court did not grant the legal separation being sought for and at the same time awarded a P45,000.00 worth of
counter-claim by the Escaos.
ISSUE: Whether or not damages should be awarded to either party in the case at bar
HELD: Yes.
On the part of Tenchavez:
His marriage with Escao was a secret one and the failure of said marriage did not result to public humiliation; that they
never lived together and he even consented to annulling the marriage earlier (because Escao filed for annulment before
she left for the US but the same was dismissed due to her non-appearance in court); that he failed to prove that Escaos
parents dissuaded their daughter to leave Tenchavez and as such his P1,000,000.00 claim cannot be awarded. HOWEVER,
by reason of the fact that Escao left without the knowledge of Tenchavez and being able to acquire a divorce decree; and
Tenchavez being unable to remarry, the SC awarded P25,000.00 only by way of moral damages and attorneys fees to be
paid by Escao and not her parents.
On the part of Escaos parents:
It is true that the P1,000,000.00 for damages suit by Tenchavez against the Escaos is unfounded and the same must have
wounded their feelings and caused them anxiety, the same could in no way have seriously injured their reputation, or
otherwise prejudiced them, lawsuits having become a common occurrence in present society. What is important, and has
been correctly established in the decision of the lower court, is that they were not guilty of any improper conduct in the
whole deplorable affair. The SC reduced the damages awarded from P45,000.00 to P5,000.00 only.

18 | J o h a n
Persons and Human Relations