Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
160762
FIRST DIVISION
May 3, 2006
"In their Answer filed on December 10, 1984, [petitioners] denied the
material allegations of the complaint and interposed the following
special affirmative defenses: that the cause of action was barred by
prior judgment; that [respondent] has not pursued any lawful remedy to
annul the execution proceeding; that there is no flaw or irregularity in
the auction sale; and that since the execution sale was made in
accordance with Section 21, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, it
is deemed final and any irregularity committed in the course thereof will
not vitiate its validity.
"On December 28, 1984, Muriel likewise lodged a Complaint for
Damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 505-R, against [petitioners] and
Atty. Guillermo De Guzman alleging, in gist, fraud, misrepresentation,
manipulation and unlawful acts of the defendants in causing the levy of
the subject property with an estimated commercial value of P200,000
as against a charging lien in the amount of P10,000.
"In its May 27, 1985 Order, the trial court ordered the joint hearing of
Civil Cases Nos. 417-R and 505-R. On August 30, 1985, Muriel was
declared non-suited for failure to appear in the hearing despite due
notice. As a consequence, Civil Case No. 505-R was dismissed on
October 15, 1985."5
In its Decision6 dated March 25, 1998, the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Baguio City, Branch 4, held that the subject parcel of land was the
paraphernal property of the late Muriel Pucay Yamane -- spouse of
respondent -- and was not their conjugal property. The appearance of
his name on the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) was deemed to be
merely descriptive of the civil status of the registered owner, his late
wife. Hence, finding that he had no legal standing to question the
auction sale or to pray for its annulment or cancellation, the RTC
dismissed the case for lack of merit.
Upon receipt of the RTC Decision on April 8, 1998, respondent filed a
Motion,7 in which he prayed that he be allowed to file his Motion for
Reconsideration of the Decision, on or before May 30, 1998. The trial
court granted8 his Motion; received the Motion for Reconsideration, 9
which was filed on May 28, 1998; and eventually denied it in its Order
dated June 5, 1998.10 He then elevated the matter to the CA on June
15, 1998.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA reversed the RTC's Decision. The Sheriff's Certificate of Sale
dated August 12, 1981, and the Final Sheriff's Certificate of Sale dated
August 26, 1982, were declared null and void.
According to the appellate court, property acquired during marriage is
presumed to be conjugal, unless the exclusive funds of one spouse are
shown to have been used for the purpose. That the land was acquired
during the spouses' coverture was sufficiently established by the TCT
and the Deed of Absolute Sale, both indicating that Muriel Pucay
Yamane was "married to Leonardo Yamane"; and by the undisputed
testimony of the previous owner, Eugene Pucay. Because of
petitioners' failure to establish that the land in question had been
acquired by Muriel using her exclusive funds, the CA concluded that
the contested land was conjugal property.
Procedural Issue:
Substantive Issue:
Whether Respondent's Appeal Should Be Given Due Course
Paraphernal or Conjugal?
Petitioners contend that the CA erred in giving due course to the
appeal filed by respondent beyond the 15-day reglementary period.
Concededly, he received a copy of the RTC Decision on April 8, 1998.
He had, therefore, until April 23, 1998, within which to file an appeal.
Prior to the latter date, however, he moved that his new counsel be
allowed to file a motion for reconsideration on May 30, 1998. It was
eventually filed on May 28, 1998, but was denied. Respondent
the
the
the
the
Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that "all property of the
marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it
be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife." 21
As a conditio sine qua non for the operation of this article in favor of
the conjugal partnership,22 the party who invokes the presumption must
first prove that the property was acquired during the marriage.23
Under the New Civil Code, a wife may bind the conjugal partnership
only when she purchases things necessary for the support of the
family, or when she borrows money for that purpose upon her
husband's failure to deliver the needed sum;51 when administration of
the conjugal partnership is transferred to the wife by the courts 52 or by
the husband;53 or when the wife gives moderate donations for charity.54
Failure to establish any of these circumstances in the present case
means that the conjugal asset may not be bound to answer for Muriel's
personal obligation.
JUSTICE AQUINO:
ATTY. CALIMAG:
Your Honor please, at that time, Your Honor, it is already
known to them.
xxx
xxx
previous case of Dolores Vda. De Gil vs. Agustin Cancio (14 SCRA
797) wherein We emphasized that it is within the jurisdiction of a
probate court to approve the sale of properties of a deceased
person by his prospective heirs before final adjudication. x x x
It being settled that property under administration needs the
approval of the probate court before it can be disposed of, any
unauthorized disposition does not bind the estate and is null and
void. As early as 1921 in the case of Godoy vs. Orellano (42 Phil
347), We laid down the rule that a sale by an administrator of
property of the deceased, which is not authorized by the probate
court is null and void and title does not pass to the purchaser.
There is hardly any doubt that the probate court can declare null
and void the disposition of the property under administration, made
by private respondent, the same having been effected without
authority from said court. It is the probate court that has the power
to authorize and/or approve the sale (Section 4 and 7, Rule 89),
hence, a fortiori, it is said court that can declare it null and void for
as long as the proceedings had not been closed or terminated. To
uphold petitioners contention that the probate court cannot annul
the unauthorized sale, would render meaningless the power
pertaining to the said court. (Bonga vs. Soler, 2 SCRA 755).
(emphasis ours)
Our jurisprudence is therefore clear that (1) any disposition of
estate property by an administrator or prospective heir pending
final adjudication requires court approval and (2) any unauthorized
disposition of estate property can be annulled by the probate court,
there being no need for a separate action to annul the
unauthorized disposition.
The question now is: can the intestate or probate court execute its
order nullifying the invalid sale?
We see no reason why it cannot. The intestate court has the power
to execute its order with regard to the nullity of an unauthorized
sale of estate property, otherwise its power to annul the
unauthorized or fraudulent disposition of estate property would be
meaningless. In other words, enforcement is a necessary adjunct
of the intestate or probate courts power to annul unauthorized or
fraudulent transactions to prevent the dissipation of estate property
before final adjudication.
Moreover, in this case, the order of the intestate court nullifying the
sale was affirmed by the appellate courts (the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 46342 dated June 23, 1998 and subsequently by
the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 135177 dated October 9, 1998).
The finality of the decision of the Supreme Court was entered in
the book of entry of judgments on February 23, 1999. Considering
the finality of the order of the intestate court nullifying the sale, as
affirmed by the appellate courts, it was correct for private
respondent-Special Administratrix Enderes to thereafter move for a
writ of execution and for the intestate court to grant it.
xxx
xxx
vs.
SAMUEL RABANILLO, Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This petition for review seeks the reversal of the decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) dated October 29, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No.
60069, the dispositive portion of which read:
WHEREFORE, the decision rendered in Civil Case No. Q-9626270 on February 27, 1998 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. As prayed for in the answer, Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 56210 over the 240 square-meter lot located at 92 (now 102)
K-5th Street, Kamuning, Quezon City issued in the name of
Eusebio Pigaos children is hereby ordered CANCELLED and the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City is hereby ordered to ISSUE a
new one in lieu thereof in the names of both Eusebio Pigaos
children and Samuel Rabanillo, with the front half portion of the lot
pertaining to the latter and the back half portion pertaining to the
former.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City for proper action.
SO ORDERED.2
The antecedent facts follow.
May 2, 2006
In 1970, Eusebio executed a deed of mortgage over the same halfportion of the property in favor of respondent. After the
amortizations on the subject lot were fully paid in 1973, the PHHC
issued a deed of sale over the entire lot in favor of Eusebio.
Consequently, TCT No. 197941 was issued in Eusebios name. In
1978, respondent executed an affidavit of adverse claim over the
front half portion of the lot registered in Eusebios name. This
affidavit was duly annotated on TCT No. 197941. On June 17,
1979, Eusebio died and was survived by his children, herein
petitioners.
In 1988, after the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City
was gutted by fire, petitioner Estrella Pigao applied for the
reconstitution of the original of TCT No. 197941 that was burned.
This was approved in 1990 and TCT No. RT-11374 was issued,
have been the intention of the parties in the circumstances that the
person to whom the land was conveyed holds it as trustee for the
person who supplied the purchase money.
To give rise to a purchase money resulting trust, it is essential that
there be:
1. an actual payment of money, property or services, or
an equivalent, constituting valuable consideration;
2. and such consideration must be furnished by the
alleged beneficiary of a resulting trust.
There are recognized exceptions to the establishment of an
implied resulting trust. The first is stated in the last part of Article
1448 itself. Thus, where A pays the purchase money and title is
conveyed by absolute deed to A's child or to a person to whom A
stands in loco parentis and who makes no express promise, a trust
does not result, the presumption being that a gift was intended.
Another exception is, of course, that in which an actual contrary
intention is proved. Also where the purchase is made in violation of
an existing statute and in evasion of its express provision, no trust
can result in favor of the party who is guilty of the fraud. 28
Another exception to the establishment of an implied resulting trust
under Article 1448 is when its enforcement contravenes public
policy. We have already ruled that the transfer of rights by Eusebio
to respondent was null and void ab initio for being contrary to
public policy. As we held in Ramos v. Court of Appeals:29
Otherwise stated, as an exception to the law on trusts, "[a]
trust or a provision in the terms of a trust is invalid if the
enforcement of the trust or provision would be against public
policy, even though its performance does not involve the
commission of a criminal or tortious act by the trustee." The parties
must necessarily be subject to the same limitations on allowable
stipulations in ordinary contracts, i.e., their stipulations must not be
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public
policy. What the parties then cannot expressly provide in their
contracts for being contrary to law and public policy, they cannot
impliedly or implicitly do so in the guise of a resulting trust. 30
(emphasis supplied)
Admittedly, respondent shouldered half of the amortizations which
were received by Eusebios wife31 and paid to the PHHC for the
purchase of the lot. He also paid for the realty taxes for the said
portion.32 However, this was not an implied trust wherein
petitioners held the title over the front half portion in trust for
respondent. Otherwise, it would again run against public policy.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The
Court of Appeals decision dated October 29, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV
No. 60069 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 95 in Civil Case No.
Q-96-26270 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Subsequently, all the heirs of the Aying siblings executed an ExtraJudicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale dated
March 3, 1964, conveying the subject parcel of land to herein
petitioner Aznar Brothers Realty Company. Said deed was
registered with the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City on March
6, 1964 under Act No. 3344 (the law governing registration for
unregistered land), and since then, petitioner had been religiously
paying real property taxes on said property.
In 1988, herein petitioner filed a Petition for Reconstitution of the
Original Title as the original title over the subject property had been
lost during the war. On April 12, 1988, the court granted said
petition, thereby directing the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City
to issue a reconstituted title in the name of the abovementioned
Aying siblings. Thus, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. RO2856 was issued.
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO
APPLY THE RULE THAT AN HEIR OF THE ORIGINAL
REGISTERED OWNER MAY LOSE HIS RIGHT TO
RECOVER A TITLED PROPERTY BY REASON OF
LACHES;
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO
APPLY THE RULE THAT THE ACT OF REGISTRATION
OF THE DEED OF PARTITION WITH SALE MAY BE
CONSIDERED AN UNEQUIVOCAL REPUDIATION OF
THE TRUST GIVING RISE TO PRESCRIPTION;
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO
APPLY THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 1104 OF THE
CIVIL CODE TO THE EFFECT THAT IN THE ABSENCE
OF BAD FAITH OR FRAUD, THE PARTITION WITH
PRETERITION OF ANY COMPULSORY HEIR SHALL
NOT BE RESCINDED.7
In their Comment, respondents argue that this case is an action to
declare as null and void the Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate
with Deed of Absolute Sale, hence, under Article 1410 of the Civil
Code, an action for declaration of an inexistent contract does not
prescribe. Respondents further posit that the principle of laches
should be applied against petitioner and not against them, as they
(respondents) had been in actual possession of the subject
property, while petitioner merely brought action to eject them more
than 29 years after the alleged execution of the Extra-Judicial
Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale. They also
refuted petitioners arguments regarding the application of the
principles of implied and constructive trusts in this case.
At the outset, it should be stressed that not all the plaintiffs who
filed the amended complaint before the trial court had been
impleaded as respondents in the present petition. The only parties
impleaded are the heirs of Emiliano, Simeon and Roberta Aying,
whom the CA adjudged as owners of a 3/8 portion of the land in
dispute for not having participated in the execution of the ExtraJudicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale.
It is significant to note that herein petitioner does not question the
CA conclusion that respondents are heirs of the aforementioned
three Aying siblings. Hence, the trial court and appellate courts
findings that the Extra- Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed
of Absolute Sale was not forged nor simulated and that the heirs of
Emiliano, Simeon and Roberta Aying did not participate in the
execution thereof, are now beyond cavil.
The issues raised by petitioner for the Courts resolution are (1)
whether or not respondents cause of action is imprescriptible; and
(2) if their right to bring action is indeed imprescriptible, may the
principle of laches apply.
Respondents alleged in their amended complaint that not all the
co-owners of the land in question signed or executed the
The question then arises as to the date from which the ten-year
period should be reckoned, considering that the Extra-Judicial
Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale was registered
under Act No. 3344 and not under Act No. 496 (Land Registration
Act), despite the fact the land in dispute was already titled under
Act No. 496 in the names of the Aying siblings at the time the
subject document was executed.
xxx
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May 6, 2005
xxx
By the trial courts citation of Article 41 of the Family Code, it is
gathered that the petition of Apolinaria Jomoc to have her absent
spouse declared presumptively dead had for its purpose her desire
new title, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-17071, was issued in
the name of the spouses Delfin.3
Meanwhile, on 26 March 1965, an Extra-Judicial Partition and Absolute
Deed of Sale4 involving Lot No. 3414 then covered by TCT No. T16804 was made between Teresa Daos, Trinidad Degala, Leopoldo
Degala, Presentacion Degala, Rosario Degala and Pedro
Degala, on one part, and the spouses Delfin, on the other. The deed,
bearing either the thumb marks or the signatures of the sellers, was
likewise notarized. Said document was registered by the spouses
Delfin on 24 June 1980. Thus, TCT No. T-16804 covering Lot No. 3414
was cancelled and a new one, TCT No. T-16805, was issued in the
names of the spouses Delfin on 24 June 1980.5
The spouses Delfin then consolidated Lots No. 213 and No. 3414 and
subdivided the resulting lot into six (6) smaller lots. 6 Lot No. 1, covered
by TCT No. T-19618, was sold to Roberto Delfin on 21 October 1989;
Lot No. 2 covered by TCT No. T-19619 to Recio Daos on 25 April
1985; Lot No. 3 covered by TCT No. T-19620 to Gina Maalat on 14
June 1989, and; Lot No. 4 covered by TCT No. T-19621 to Shirley
Tamayo on 11 August 1989. Lot No. 5 remained with the spouses
Delfin, while Lot No. 6 was used as an access road.7
On 12 April 1994, herein respondents, claiming to be the heirs of the
former owners of Lots No. 213 and No. 3414, filed an action for
annulment, reconveyance, recovery of ownership and possession and
damages.8 According to them, it was only in 19899 when they
discovered that Teresa Daos, sick and in dire need of money, was
constrained to mortgage the one-half (1/2) portion of Lot No. 3414 to
the spouses Delfin for P300.00 sometime in 1965.10 Taking advantage
of her condition, the spouses Delfin made her sign a document
purporting to be a mortgage, but which turned out to be an extrajudicial
partition with deed of absolute sale. As to Lot No. 213, respondents
averred that the Deed of Sale covering the property was fictitious and
the signatures and thumb marks contained therein were all forged
because three (3) of the signatories therein died before the alleged
sale in 1960, namely: Estrella Daradar, who died in 1934, and
Esperanza Daradar and Cipriano Degala, who both died in 1946. 11 As
proof thereof, respondents presented certifications 12 on the deaths of
Esperanza Daradar and Cipriano Degala by the Local Civil Registrar of
Panitan, Capiz.
To counter respondents arguments, petitioners alleged that
respondents action was already barred by prescription and laches.
Further, they argued that the spouses Delfin, as well as the
subsequent owners of the subject properties, are innocent purchasers
for value and in good faith, whose titles to the lots at the time of the
purchase were all clean and free from liens and encumbrances.13 The
documents
evidencing the conveyance of the properties were personally and
unilaterally executed by the vendors-signatories therein without any
intervention from the spouses Delfin, and duly acknowledged before a
notary public, petitioners averred.14
Giving credence to the claims of petitioners, the trial court ruled that
respondents claim of ownership over the subject properties was not
established by a preponderance of evidence. Compared to
respondents verbal claims of ownership, the spouses Delfin were able
to prove that they bought the properties from the original owners, the
trial court added. The trial court held that the deeds of sale being duly
executed notarial and public documents, they enjoy the presumption of
regularity which can only be contradicted by clear and convincing
As plaintiffs in the action before the trial court, respondents have the
burden to establish their case by a preponderance of evidence, or
evidence which is of greater weight or more convincing than that which
is offered in opposition to it. Hence, parties who have the burden of
proof must produce such quantum of evidence, with plaintiffs having to
rely on the strength of their own evidence, not on the weakness of the
defendants.34
Fraud may be, and often is, proved by or inferred from circumstances,
and the circumstances proved may in some cases raise a presumption
of its existence. However, while fraud may be proved by circumstances
or presumed from them, it cannot be demonstrated by mere
construction, but must be proven in all cases. 42 Respondents indeed
failed to prove that fraud attended the execution of the Extra-Judicial
Partition and Deed of Absolute Sale. Their bare and unsupported
allegations are not enough to overthrow the presumption of the validity
of said agreement or to raise the presumption of fraud.
As for the Ciprianos thumb mark on the deed, suffice it to say that his
consent was not in fact needed to perfect the sale. Teresa Daos
Degalas share in Lot 213 was paraphernal property and, under the
provisions of the Civil Code applicable at the time of the sale, she
could alienate or dispose of the said property without the permission or
consent of her husband.55 Thus, with or without such thumb mark,
whether it was forged or not, the Deed of Absolute Sale remains valid
and effectual.
Under the circumstances, therefore, respondents were unable to
overthrow the presumption of validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale.
Said deed, as well as the titles derived as a result thereof must be
accorded respect and must remain undisturbed.
Anent the charge of bad faith on the part of petitioners, the Court takes
note of respondents statement in their Plaintiff-Appellants Brief, 56 to
wit:
From the facts and circumstances of this case, Lot 213 and 3414 both
of Panitan Cadastre which were consolidated, into one single lot, per
consolidated plan as appearing at the back of TCT No. T-17071, and
after the two lots were consolidated, and the same was subdivided,
into six smaller lots, Lots 1, 4 and 5 thereof still remained in the names
of appellees spouses Rodolfo Delfin and Felipa Belo, while Lots 2 and
3 thereof were transferred by the said spouses appellees to Recio
Daos and Gina Maalat, respectively. These two transferees are
innocent purchasers for value which appellants admit, and this appeal
is only an appeal by appellants against defendant-appellees spouses
Rodolfo Delfin and Felipa Belo, and not against Recio Daos and Gina
Maalat.57 (Emphasis supplied.)
In effect, contrary to the testimony of respondents witness Myrna
Degala-Distura that her mother warned petitioners against buying the
subject lots,58 respondents admitted that the only persons they
consider to be not innocent purchasers are the spouses Delfin.
However, in view of respondents failure to prove the fraud attributed to
the spouses Delfin, the Court has no choice but to declare all
petitioners to be purchasers for value and in good faith.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 13 October 2000 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
on November 29, 1997.3 The search was conducted on the said date;
articles were seized and the petitioner and Bueta were apprehended
and detained. Among the articles found in the possession of the
petitioner was U.S. Passport No. Z4613110 issued on June 2, 1983 by
the U.S. Embassy in Manila to and in the name of Raymond Michael
Jackson, born on October 17, 1951 in South Dakota; and U.S.
Passport No. 085238399 issued on August 15, 1996 by the New
Orleans Passport Agency, Louisiana to and under the name of Steven
Bernard Bator, born on August 20, 1949 in Detroit, Michigan.4
Another application for a search warrant was filed by SPO3 Pedro B.
Barsana, Jr. with the RTC of Makati City for violation of Article 176 of
the Revised Penal Code for the search of the premises at No. 5518
Second Floor, Macodyn Building, South Superhighway (corner Pasay
Road), Makati City under the contract of Raymond Jackson a.k.a. Allen
Miller and Bernard Bator and for the seizure of the articles described
therein. Acting on the application on November 28, 1997, Judge Pedro
N. Laggui of Branch 60 of the RTC issued Search Warrant No. 97029.5
On December 2, 1997, an Information docketed as Criminal Case No.
97-2078 was filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Angeles City against
the petitioner and Bueta for violation of Article 176 of the Revised
Penal Code.6
When apprised of the seizure of the aforementioned passports from
the petitioner, U.S. Vice Consul Raymond Greene of the United States
Embassy in the Philippines advised the Department of Justice on
December 10, 1997 that the said passports had been cancelled. 7
Summary deportation proceedings were initiated at the Commission of
Immigration and Deportation (CID) against the petitioner docketed as
SDO No. BOC 97-46. On December 11, 1997, the Board of
Commissioners (BOC) issued an Order ordering the summary
deportation of the petitioner to his country of origin and directing the
Chief of Civil Security Unit to implement the order within three days
from notice thereof, subject to compliance with the 1997 Deportation
Rules of Procedures - Office Memorandum No. ELM-97-013. 8 In the
meantime, the name of the petitioner was included in the blacklist of
the CID.9
Aside from the aforementioned criminal cases, other criminal cases
were filed against Jackson with the RTC as follows:
Criminal
Case No.
The Accused
1. 98-1155
Makati RTC
Branch 133
2. 98-903
Raymond Jackson
Makati RTC
Branch 135
SECOND DIVISION
3. 97-202
Raymond M. Jackson
a.k.a. Allen Miller and
Jaime Bueta
QC RTC
Branch 83
4. 98-1152
Raymond Jackson
tampered with; hence, cancelled were sufficient grounds for the arrest
and deportation of aliens from the Philippines:
SEC. 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of
the Commissioner of Immigration or of any other officer designated by
him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the
Commissioner of Immigration after a determination by the Board of
Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as
charged against the alien:
(9) Any alien who commits any of the acts described in Sections Fortyfive and Forty-six of this Act, independent of criminal action which may
be brought against him:
In Tung Chin Hui v. Rodriguez,32 this Court held that such documents
from a foreign embassy attesting to the cancellation of the passports
held by their national on the ground that the said passports were
The petitioner cannot feign ignorance of the charges against him in the
CID and insist on being deprived by the BOC of his right to due
process as prescribed for in Section 37(c) of the Philippine Immigration
Act of 1940, thus:
(c) No alien shall be deported without being informed of the specific
grounds for deportation nor without being given a hearing under rules
of procedure to be prescribed by the Commissioner of Immigration.
This is so because on October 1, 1998, the petitioner filed a motion
with the CID for the reconsideration of the December 11, 1997 Order of
the BOC. The petitioner did not allege therein that he was not informed
of the charges against him. In fact, the petitioner did not even rebut the
claim of the U.S. Vice Consul that the passport he was carrying was
tampered and had been already cancelled. Neither did he allege that
he requested for the reinstatement of his passport with the United
States Embassy. Despite the finality of the deportation order of the
BOC, it still entertained the petitioners motion for reconsideration but
denied the same on its findings that there were inconsistencies in his
sworn statement and the documents he presented in support of his
motion, thus:
After going over the motion, we find no valid reason to disturb the order
of 12 (sic) December 1997. Likewise, the same had long become final
and executory.
Furthermore, the grounds alleged in the motion have no merit and are
irrelevant. The alleged marriage of respondent to a Filipina, a certain
Lily Morales, with whom respondent allegedly begot two (2) children
named Cristina and Judaline both surnamed Jackson, and the
supposed conversion of respondents status to permanent resident on
30 September 1987 under Section 13(a) of the Immigration Act (CA
No. 613, as amended), does not change the fact that the two (2) US
passports purportedly issued to Raymond Michael Jackson and Steven
Bernard Bator which were used by respondent, were tampered and
subsequently cancelled by the U.S. Embassy. Respondent already lost
the privilege to remain in the country (Schonemann v. Comm.
Santiago, G.R. No. 86461, 30 May 1989).
It is also significant to note the evident inconsistencies in the sworn
statement of respondent conducted by Special Prosecutor Henry B.
Tubban on 5 December 1997 with the documents attached in the
motion. Hereunder are the said inconsistencies:
1. Annex "A" of the Motion is an alleged Marriage Contract
between the respondent and one Lily H. Morales showing
Manila City Hall as the place of marriage and which was held
on 6 September 1984.
In the Sworn Statement, the respondent claimed to have
entered the country for the first time only in 1988 (p. 1 of
sworn statement), that he married a certain Lily Morales
sometime in 1989 in Angeles City (p. 2 of sworn statement).
2. The motion stated that out of the union of the respondent
with Ms. Morales, two (2) children named Cristina and
Judaline both surnamed Jackson, were born. In the sworn
statement of the respondent, he stated that they have five
(5) children.
In addition, in the marriage contract (Annex "A" of motion), it
was stated that Ms. Morales is 17 years of age, a minor.
However, below the personal circumstances of the
amount of P2,655,000.00 on its due date will force her to take the
corresponding action to consolidate title on the property in her name.
On November 23, 1989, petitioners counsel wrote respondents a
letter10 informing them that petitioner, acting on their request for
extension of a weeks time to repurchase the subject property,
consented to give them up to November 28, 1989. However,
respondent spouses failed to redeem the subject property from
petitioner within the period given them. Despite the expiration of the
period to repurchase, petitioner still granted respondent spouses
opportunity to repurchase the subject property in a letter dated April 14,
1990, where petitioners counsel demanded for the payment of the
amount of P2,655,000.00 plus all the interest due thereon within five
days from receipt otherwise, necessary legal action will be taken to
transfer ownership in petitioners name.11
In October 1990, petitioner filed a petition for consolidation of
ownership12 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, which
was raffled to Branch 39,13 docketed as Civil Case No. 90-54623.
Petitioner prayed for the cancellation of TCT No. 182956 and for the
issuance of a new title in her name, attorneys fees and cost of suit.
In their answer with compulsory counterclaim, 14 respondent spouses
alleged that the Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase did not reflect
the true intention of the parties because the document was actually an
equitable mortgage with illegal provision, i.e., pactum commissorium;
that petitioner has no cause of action against respondents; that there
was non-joinder of the real party-in-interest; that the Court has no
jurisdiction over the case; that relief sought will cause undue
enrichment on respondents as the subject property claimed was worth
P15 million.15 They prayed for the dismissal of the petition and asked
for damages, attorneys fees and costs of the suit as counterclaim.
On July 6, 1993, the RTC rendered its decision 16 in favor of petitioner,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered ordering the consolidation of title in the name of
petitioner Bernice Legaspi and the Register of Deeds of the
City of Manila is hereby ordered to cancel Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 182956, issued in the name of
Permanent Savings and Loan Bank, and in lieu thereof, a
new one be issued in the name of petitioner BERNICE
LEGASPI upon payment of the corresponding charges.
Respondents are hereby ordered to pay attorneys fees in
the sum of P25,000.00.
Respondents counterclaim is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit. With costs against respondents.17
In arriving at its decision, the trial court made the following disquisition:
respondent spouses, the original owners, who were given the first
option to buy it during PSLBs liquidation. Respondents were given up
to June 13, 1989 to buy back the property and since they had no
money, they had to approach petitioners father to help them in their
predicament. As respondents were able to redeem the subject property
with the use of petitioners money, a deed of sale was executed by the
Liquidator in favor of respondent spouses on June 13, 1989, the last
day given to respondents to buy back the property. Since the money
came from petitioner, respondent spouses, as owners, had executed a
document, which was denominated as a Deed of Sale with Right to
Repurchase, which was prepared by petitioners counsel and signed
by the parties also on June 13, 1989. It can be seen that the
transactions are intimately related and they were even embodied in the
deed of sale with right to repurchase, to wit:
The title to above-described property is presently held by the
Central Bank of the Philippines and the latter has given
VENDOR the privilege of getting back the title to the abovedescribed property by paying them the amount of TWO
MILLION SIX HUNDRED FIFTY FIVE THOUSAND
(P2,655,000.00) PESOS;
VENDOR has offered to sell this property to VENDEE on
condition she be allowed to repurchase this property subject
to the terms and conditions hereinafter recited:
1. VENDEE shall pay the Central Bank of the
Philippines the amount of TWO MILLION SIX
HUNDRED
FIFTY
FIVE
THOUSAND
(P2,655,000.00) PESOS for and in behalf of
VENDOR;
Clearly, the deed of sale with right to repurchase was precisely
executed by respondents to secure the money paid by petitioner for
and in behalf of respondents to PSLB Liquidator to buy back the
subject property, i.e., as equitable mortgage. Notably, respondent
spouses bought back the subject property in the amount of
P2,655,000.00 and sold the same to petitioner at exactly the same
amount they paid to PSLB Liquidator. If the intention of the respondent
spouses were to sell, they could have at least earned some profit or
interest on such sale, otherwise, they could have just allowed PSLB
Liquidator to sell it to anybody in a public bidding. Respondents wanted
to hold on to their property and not to part with it by selling the same.
Petitioner claims that respondents expressly recognized their intention
to sell the subject property to her when they executed a letter 36
requesting the bank Liquidator to release the Deed of Sale executed
between the bank and respondents as well as the duplicate copy of the
title to petitioner.
We are not impressed.
Respondent Francisco wrote Deputy Liquidator Leopoldo Ramos and
requested him to release the deed of sale and title to the subject
property to petitioner as his authorized representative. There was
nothing in the letter that would show that respondents acknowledged
petitioner as the new owner of the property.
Although, we do not agree with the CA that the price of the sale with
right to repurchase is grossly inadequate since the appraisal of the
property in the amount of more than P16 million was not made on or
before June 13, 1989, the date the contract was executed by the
parties, but only on July 24, 1992,37 we find in the transaction the
presence of some other circumstances enumerated in Art. 1602 of the
Civil Code which would establish that the transaction was an equitable
mortgage rather than sale.
Notably, in all the letters of petitioner and her lawyer, i.e., reminding
respondents that the period to repurchase was about to lapse and later
the extension of period to repurchase and demands for respondents to
repurchase the property in the amount of P2,655,000.00 plus interest
within a certain period, were sent to respondents address which is the
subject property, without registering any objection on respondents
continuous possession of the same. In effect, petitioner acknowledged
respondents right to retain possession of the subject property even
after the execution of the "pacto de retro sale." It was only on January
14, 1991 that petitioner made a demand for respondents to vacate the
subject property after respondents failed to "repurchase" the property.
Another circumstance is the fact that the period to repurchase the
subject property was extended by petitioner. In the letter dated
November 23, 198941 to respondents by petitioners counsel, Atty. Rillo,
he stated that petitioner had consented to respondents request for an
extension of time to repurchase the subject property by giving them up
to November 28, 1989. In fact, even in the petition for consolidation
itself, petitioner stated that despite the expiration of the right to
repurchase on November 28, 1989, petitioner still granted respondent
spouses opportunity to repurchase the subject property in a letter
dated April 14, 1990 by paying the amount due thereon. Moreover,
petitioner, on cross-examination, even admitted that more than one
extension was given for the respondents to repurchase. 42 It is well
settled that extension of the period of redemption is indicative of
equitable mortgage.43
Petitioner claims that there was no separate instrument extending the
period of redemption granting a new period executed between the
parties. Petitioner through her counsel wrote Exhibit "I" extending the
period of redemption. In Claravall vs. Court of Appeals,44 we held that a
note executed extending a period of redemption is indicative of
equitable mortgage.
Also, we find that there was no transmission of ownership to the
vendee. As stated in the deed, to wit:
8. Should VENDOR fail to comply with the foregoing terms
and conditions then the property shall by virtue thereof
become the property of VENDEE;
This stipulation is contrary to the nature of a true pacto de retro sale
since ownership of the property sold is immediately transferred to the
vendee a retro upon execution of the sale, subject only to the
repurchase of a vendor a retro within the stipulated period. Such
stipulation is considered a pactum commissorium enabling the
mortgagee to acquire ownership of the mortgaged properties without
need of foreclosure proceedings which is a nullity being contrary to the
provisions of Article 2088 of the Civil Code. The inclusion of such
otherwise." In this case, the child (Khriza) was only one year
and four months when taken away from the mother.
The Court of Appeals dismissed Edwins contentions by citing
as an additional ground the exception in Section 412 (b) (2) of
the Local Government Code ("LGC") on barangay conciliation,
which states:
(b) Where the parties may go directly to court. the
parties may go directly to court in the following
instances:
xxx
2) Where a person has otherwise been
deprived of personal liberty calling for
habeas corpus proceedings;
xxx.
Under Rule 102 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
a party may resort to a habeas corpus proceeding in
two instances. The first is when any person is
deprived of liberty either through illegal confinement
or through detention. The second instance is when
custody of any person is withheld from the person
entitled to such custody. The most common case
falling under the second instance involves children
who are taken away from a parent by another parent
or by a relative. The case filed by Lourdes falls under
this category.
The barangay conciliation requirement in Section 412 of the
LGC does not apply to habeas corpus proceedings where a
person is "deprived of personal liberty." In such a case, Section
412 expressly authorizes the parties "to go directly to court"
without need of any conciliation proceedings. There is
deprivation of personal liberty warranting a petition for habeas
corpus where the "rightful custody of any person is withheld
from the person entitled thereto."13 Thus, the Court of Appeals
did not err when it dismissed Edwins contentions on the
additional ground that Section 412 exempts petitions for
habeas corpus from the barangay conciliation requirement.
The petition for certiorari filed by Edwin questioning the RTCs
denial of his motion to dismiss merely states a blanket
allegation of "grave abuse of discretion." An order denying a
motion to dismiss is interlocutory and is not a proper subject of
a petition for certiorari.14 Even in the face of an error of
judgment on the part of a judge denying the motion to dismiss,
certiorari will not lie. Certiorari is not a remedy to correct errors
of procedure.15 The proper remedy against an order denying a
motion to dismiss is to file an answer and interpose as
affirmative defenses the objections raised in the motion to
dismiss. It is only in the presence of extraordinary
circumstances evincing a patent disregard of justice and fair
play where resort to a petition for certiorari is proper.16
records of birth on file with the office for the period January,
1940 to April, 1945 were all destroyed by WORLD WAR II
(Exhibit "L"). And going for the jugular, so to speak, the
signature of the person named Librada T. delos Santos in the
birth certificate (Exhibit "I") purporting to be that of the
petitioner wife and the signature of the latter appearing in the
verification of the petitioner (sic) (Exhibit "A-6") are so strikingly
dissimilar that they could not have but proceeded from two
different hands. For it does not require the trained eye of an
expert calligrapher to discern such discrepancy in the writing
style.
In fine, there being an abundance of evidence to support the
petitioners claim that the birth certificate is indeed a falsified
document, the Court is left with no other alternative but to grant
the relief prayed for in the petition. To let the birth certificate
reamin (sic) as it is would adversely affect the rights and
interests of the herein petitioners.12
On July 15, 1997, Rosilyn, represented by her legal guardian,
the DSWD, filed, with the CA, a petition for the annulment of
judgment in the petition for cancellation of entry of her birth
certificate.13 She claimed that she and her guardian were not
notified of the petition and the subsequent judgment and
learned about the same only from the news on May 16, 1997. 14
She argued that the RTC decision was issued without
jurisdiction and in violation of her right to due process; that the
Judge did not have authority to declare her to be illegitimate;
and that mere correction of entries, not cancellation of the
entire certificate, is the appropriate remedy.15
Rosilyn further argued that: granting, without admitting that
Librada is not her mother, still it was erroneous to cancel or
annul her entire birth certificate; Librada is not an interested
party concerning the issue of whether Simplicio is the father,
the date of actual birth, and the name of the physician who
attended to the birth;16 Libradas allegations are also
contradicted by (a) the "Records Based on Cord Dressing
Room Book dated April 13-May 29, 1985," issued by
Emelita H. Avinante, Head of the Medical Records Section and
Admitting Unit of the Fabella Hospital, which is attached to the
petition for annulment as Annex "E" and which states that
Maria Rosilyn Delantar was born on May 11, 1985 at the
Fabella Hospital and that her parents are Librada Telin and
Simplicio Delantar;17 and (b) the admission of Simplicio in his
Motion to Vacate Judgment18 in Sp. Proc. No. 96-41919
regarding the custody of Rosilyn, which is attached to the
petition to annul as Annex "F," where he stated that he, as the
rightful parent of Rosilyn, should not be deprived of his
parental authority.20
On June 10, 1999, the CA rendered the herein assailed
decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is
GRANTED.
said decision dated April 11, 1997 is considered null and void
for lack of due process there being no adversarial proceedings
(was) conducted by the public respondent Regional Trial Court.
SO ORDERED.21
And, even if the same judgment had already become final and
executory, and had in fact been executed, as in the instant
case, still the execution thereof produces no legal effects. 22
(1)
RES JUDICATA AND STABILITY OF THE JUDGMENT
APPOINTING THE PETITIONER HEREIN AS JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE IN QUESTION,
AND
(2)
DECIDING THE ISSUES INVOLVED IN A MANNER
CONTRARY TO THE RULES SET DOWN BY THE
SUPREME COURT ON THE MATTER.8
The main issues for resolution are: (1) whether the trial court acted
with grave abuse of discretion in appointing private respondent as
co-administrator to the estate of the deceased; and (2) whether the
Court of Appeals deprived petitioner of his constitutional right to
due process and his right to petition the government for redress of
grievances by not addressing the issues raised before it.
The petition is without merit.
Petitioner asserts that his appointment as a regular administrator is
already final, unassailable or res judicata; that the inferior court
has no authority to re-open the issue of the appointment of an
administrator without removing the incumbent administrator; that
private respondent is not only alien to the estate, but has a conflict
of interest with it; that the trial courts appointment of private
respondent as co-administrator constitutes grave abuse of
discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction.
There is no question that petitioner was appointed as regular
administrator of the estate of the deceased Jose K. C. Uy on June
9, 1998. However, private respondent in his motion to intervene
sought to be appointed as administrator as he is not only the
brother of the decedent but also a creditor who knows the extent of
the latters properties. Thus, the trial court, while retaining
petitioner as administrator, appointed private respondent as coadministrator of the estate.
The main function of a probate court is to settle and liquidate the
estates of deceased persons either summarily or through the
process of administration.9 In the case at bar, the trial court
granted letters of administration to petitioner and thereafter to
private respondent as co-administrator. Under Section 6, Rule 78
of the Rules of Court, the preference to whom letters of
administration may be granted are as follows: