Introduction to History of Philosophy

Introduction to Modern Philosophy

Spring 2015
Patterson

Week 7: Shaftesbury on the sense of right and wrong

Thus the several motions, inclinations, passions, dispositions, and consequent carriage
and behaviour of creatures in the various parts of life, being in several views or
perspectives represented to the mind, which readily discerns the good or ill towards the
species or public; there arises a new trial or exercise of the heart: which must either
rightly and soundly affect what is just and right, and disaffect what is contrary; or,
corruptly affect what is ill, and disaffect what is worthy and goodSo that if a creature
be generous, kind, constant, compassionate; yet if he cannot reflect on what he himself
does, or sees others do, so as to take notice of what is worthy or honest; and make that
notice or conception of worth or honesty be an object of his affection; he has not the
character of being virtuous: for thus, and no otherwise, he is capable of having a sense
of right or wrong; a sentiment or judgement of what is done, through just, equal, and
good affection, or the contrary. (Shaftesbury, An Inquiry concerning Virtue, or Merit,
I.ii 3)
Anthony Ashley Cooper, Third Earl of Shaftesbury (1671-1713) was tutored by the
philosopher John Locke (1632-1704). An unauthorised version of his Inquiry concerning
Virtue, or Merit (IVM) was published in 1699; he subsequently published a revised version
as part of his collection entitled Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times (1711).
Goodness and Teleology
to what end in nature many things, even whole species of creatures, refer; or to what
purpose they serve; will be hard for any one justly to determine: but to what end the
many proportions and various shapes of parts in many creatures actually serve; we are
able, by the help of study and observation, to demonstrate, with great exactness. (IVM,
I.ii 1)
Shaftesbury does not doubt that various species of creatures serve a purpose in the system
of the whole of nature, but as we do not have a competent knowledge of that whole, it is
hard for us to tell what these purposes are. In cases where we do have a knowledge of the
whole, as in the case where we can observe a living creature, he thinks it is obvious that its
parts serve a function and have a purpose. He also thinks it is plain that
there is in reality a right and a wrong state of every creature; and that the right one is
by nature forwarded, and by himself affectionately sought. There being therefore in
every creature a certain interest or good; there must also be a certain END to which
every thing in his constitution must naturally refer. To this END if any thing, either in
his appetites, passions, or affections, be not conducing, but the contrary; we must of
necessity own it ill to him. (IVM, I.ii 1)
If a creatures appetites or passions do not conduce to his good (that is, to his achieving his
natural end), he is ill (i.e. bad, injurious) to himself; if they do not conduce to the good of
others of his kind, he is ill (bad, injurious) to them. If his appetites or affections do serve his
interest, he is good to himself; if they also serve the interests of others of his kind, he is
good to them. Thus, Shaftesbury claims, virtue and interest may be found at last to agree
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(IVM, I.ii 1). He therefore rejects the Hobbesian view that the interest of the private
nature is directly opposite to that of the common one (IVM II.i 1). For Hobbes, the
passions naturally lead human beings into conflict, as each pursues private interest at the
expense of the common good. Shaftesbury aims to show that to be well affected towards
the public interest and ones own, is not only consistent, but inseparable: and that moral
rectitude, or virtue, must accordingly be the advantage, and vice the injury and
disadvantage of every creature (IVM II.i ).
Goodness and Virtue
Shaftesbury argues that a person is not judged bad for causing harm to others involuntarily
(because he has the plague-spots upon him), nor good for refraining from causing harm
for fear of retribution. The first person causes harm but does not wish to do so, and so is not
bad; the second wishes harm, and so is bad, despite not causing harm. Shaftesbury
concludes that it isby affection merely that a creature is esteemed good or ill, natural or
unnatural; a creature only is supposed good, when the good or ill of the system to which
he has relation, is the immediate object of some passion or affection moving him (IVM, I.ii
1). To be esteemed good, a creature must seek the good of others of its kind; it must have
good or natural affections (passions, motives).
But goodness is not the same as virtue. Animals can be good, but only humans,
rational creatures, can be virtuous. Rational creatures are capable of reflection on actions
and affections:
the very actions themselves, and the affections of pity, kindness, gratitude, and their
contraries, being brought into the mind by reflection, become objects. So that, by
means of this reflected sense, there arises another kind of affection towards those very
affections themselves, which have already been felt, and are now become the subject of
a new liking or dislike. (IVM, I.ii 3)
In other words, a reflective creature not only likes or dislikes (affects or disaffects) various
goals or courses of action, but also likes or dislikes various affections and disaffections
themselves. A virtuous creature is one that admires or approves pity, kindness, gratitude and
the other good affections (that is, affections directed towards the good of others).
Shaftesbury compares this sentiment or judgement, this sense of right and wrong, to a sense
of beauty, an aesthetic response:
The MINDfeels the soft and harsh, the agreeable and disagreeable, in the affections;
and finds a foul and fair, a harmonious and a dissonant, as really and truly here, as in
any musical numbers, or in the outward forms or representations of sensible things.
Nor can it withhold its admiration and ecstasy, its aversion and scorn, any more in
what relates to one than to the other of these subjects. So that to deny the common and
natural sense of a SUBLIME and BEAUTIFUL in things, will appear an affectation
merely, to any one who considers duly of this affair. (IVM, I.ii 3)
Shaftesbury thinks it impossible to suppose that a rational creature should be originally so
ill-constituted, and unnatural as to feel no liking for representations of justice, generosity
and gratitude. A rational soul must needs find a beauty and a deformity as well in actions,
minds, and tempers, as in figures, sounds, or colours (IVM I.iii 1). He continues:

If there be no real amiableness or deformity in moral acts, there is at least an

imaginary one of full force. Though perhaps the thing itself should not be allowed in
Nature, the imagination or fancy of it must be allowed to be from Nature alone. (IVM
I.iii 1)
Sense of right and wrong, he concludes, is as natural to us as natural affection itself
(IVM I.iii 1).
Virtue and Happiness
Having considered what virtue is, Shaftesbury seeks to show that virtue and interest agree
that far from being in opposition, private and public good coincide. Presenting the view
he opposes, he writes:
This we know for certain; That all social love, friendship, gratitude and, or whatever
else is of this generous kind, does by its nature take place of the self-interesting
passions, draws us out of ourselves, and makes us disregardful of our own convenience
and safety. So that according to a known way of reasoning on self-interest, that which
is of a social kind in us, should of right be abolished. Thusall natural affection
should be industriously suppressed, and, as mere folly, and weakness of nature, be
resisted and overcome; that, by this means, there might be nothing remaining in us,
which was contrary to a direct self-end; nothing which might stand in opposition to a
steady and deliberate pursuit of the most narrowly confined self-interest. (IVM II.i 1)
Shaftesbury describes this as an extraordinary hypothesis, unlike to what we observe
anywhere else in nature,
As if in any vegetable or animal body, the part or member could be supposed to be in
a good and prosperous state as to itself, when in a contrary disposition, and in an
unnatural growth or habit as to its WHOLE. (IVM II.i 1)
In Shaftesburys eyes, this would run counter to the harmonious design and order of nature,
where the good of the parts serves the good of the whole. He aims to prove that
to have the NATURAL, KINDLY, or GENEROUS AFFECTIONS strong and powerful
towards the good of the public, is to have the chief means and power of self enjoyment and
to want them, is certain misery and ill;
to have the PRIVATE or SELF-AFFECTIONS too strongis also miserable; and
to have the UNNATURAL AFFECTIONS (viz., such as are neither founded on the
interest of the kind, or the public; nor of the private person, or creature himself) is to be
miserable in the highest degree. (IVM II.i 3)
He argues first that the satisfactions of the mind are superior to those of the body, since
people will suffer bodily pains for e.g. honour or revenge, while their enjoyment of outward
circumstances is spoiled by inner dissatisfaction (IVM II.ii 1). He then seeks to establish
that
the mental enjoyments are either [a] actually the very natural affections themselves in
their immediate operation; or [b] they wholly in a manner proceed from them, and are
no other than their effects (IVM II.ii 1).

In support of [a], he argues that the social pleasures are superior to any other (IVM II.ii
1). Those who are competent to judge prefer them to pleasures of the senses. And
The CHARM of kind affection isthe master-pleasure and conqueror of the rest (IVM
II.ii 1). So, the chief of mental enjoyments is natural affection itself in its immediate
operation.
In support of [b], he argues that love or kind affection has as an effect an enjoyment of
good by communication, a receiving it, as it were, by reflection, or by way of participation
in the good of others (IVM II.ii 1). This effect includes the consciousness of merited
kindness or esteemknowing that we merit the affection and good opinion of others. It
also includes taking pleasure in the happiness of those we love.
Vice and Misery
As far as the lack of natural affections bringing misery and ill, Shaftesbury argues that
every reasoning and reflecting creature is, by his nature, forcd to endure the review of his
own mind (IVM II.ii 1, emphasis added). Those who deliberately do ill, he claims, are
conscious that they deserve ill. And it must be horridly offensive and grievous to a rational
creature to be conscious of his or her unjust actions (IVM II.ii 1). We have a natural
conscience, he believes, which causes us discomfort and shame when we reflect on our
unjust actions. He writes:
There scarcely is, or can be any creature, whom consciousness of villainy, as such
merely, does not at all offendIf there be such a one; tis evident he must be absolutely
indifferent toward moral good or ill. If this indeed by his case; twill be allowed he can
be no-way capable of natural affection: If not of that, then neither of any social pleasure,
or mental enjoyment, as shewn above; but on the contrary, he must be subject to all
manner of horrid, unnatural, and ill affection. So that to want CONSCIENCE, or natural
sense of the odiousness of crime and injustice, is to be most of all miserable in life: but
where conscience, or sense of this sort, remains; there, consequently, whatever is
committed against it, must of necessity, by means of reflection, as we have shewn, be
continually shameful, grievous and offensive. (IVM II.ii 1, emphasis original)
We are so constituted by nature, then, that VIRTUE is the good, and VICE the ill of every
one.

Ref.
S. Darwall, The British Moralists and the Internal Ought 1640-1740 (CUP, 1995), ch. 7
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