Philosophical Review

Aristotle on Predication
Author(s): J. M. E. Moravcsik
Source: The Philosophical Review, Vol. 76, No. 1 (Jan., 1967), pp. 80-96
Published by: Duke University Press on behalf of Philosophical Review
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ARISTOTLE ON PREDICATION
IN

THE

Topics,Categories,and De Interpretatione,
Aristotle is struggling

with a variety of problems that span the fields of metaphysics and

philosophy of language. Both the problems and the attempted solutions have much relevance to some of the main issues in contemporary
British and American philosophy. Thus it is unfortunate that though
there is a large number of ancient commentaries on these texts, little
has been written on these matters in modern times that is of genuine
philosophical significance. Professor Ackrill's new translation and
notes' make a fine contribution toward remedying this deficiency.
This volume is the first in a series of translations and notes dealing
with portions of some of Aristotle's major works. Subsequent volumes
of this series, initiated by the late Professor J. L. Austin and now under
Professor Ackrill's editorship, will have to meet the high standard of
excellence set by the first volume. Given the provisional list of future
contributors, there is every reason to believe that the high standard
will be maintained, and thus the series will make an invaluable contribution to the historian of philosophy as well as to the practicing
philosophers of today.
It is impossible to write a complete review of Ackrill's book, for, not
being able to assume familiarity with Aristotle's theories, the reviewer
would have to cover simultaneously Aristotle's views, the quality of the
new translation, and the quality of Ackrill's notes. As an alternative,
the reviewer hopes to introduce the reader to this volume by selecting
one of the key nest of problems that Aristotle discusses in these works
and discussing Aristotle's views, the translation, and Ackrill's views in
this limited context. Unfortunately, even this limited task is too large
for the size of a paper to be expected under these circumstances.
Nevertheless, this sketchy introduction might be of some value to those
interested in the problems at hand.
One of the reasons for selecting predication as the nest of problems
to be discussed is that though much has been written on this during
the past sixty years, we seem far from any adequate solution. The
inadequacy of current views can be seen from a brief survey of some
1

Aristotle's "Categories" and "De Interpretatione," trans. with notes by J. L.

Ackrill (Oxford, i963), pp. vi,

i62.

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ARISTO TLE ON PREDICATION

of the recent literature. The simple suggestion that predicates, unlike
subject expressions, must be applicable to more than one entity is by
now widely recognized as unacceptable, since definite descriptions as
the ordinary sense-as
subjects
predicates and proper names-in
violate the alleged rule. Other attempts have made reference either to
the allegedly unique function of predicates or to their ontological
counterparts. For example, H. W. B. Joseph writes: "When I judged,
I distinguished in the subject I judged about a character which I
predicated of it."2 Kneale is quoted by G. E. Moore as having stated
that to be a predicate in the logical sense is to be an attribute. The
difficulty with these characterizations is that we know no more about
what it is to be a character or an attribute than we know about what it
is to be a predicate. A slightly different problem arises in connection
with Strawson's attempted explication, which connects predication
with the descriptive and classifying role of certain expressions. He
writes:

"We describe

something

. by applying

to it words

that we

are also prepared to apply to other things. But not to all other things."4
The main difficulty of this description is that the notion of "other
things" remains obscure. For example, we can apply "white" truly to
all the white things, and significantly but falsely to all of these things
that have a different color. Can we ascribe it significantly to things
that could not have color-for example, numbers? If the answer is
negative, then this explanation of predication presupposes a theory of
semantic categories, and this notion in turn has not been explained
except by assuming that we understand what a predicate is. In this
connection we might cast a brief glance at Professor Ryle's attempt to
explicate predication in the course of discussing what a semantic
category is. He writes: "Collect a range of simple singular propositions,
all similar in being about the same particular or particulars, then the
respects in which these propositions differ from one another will be
their predicates."5 According to this thesis the difference between
(i) "Tully is an orator" and (ii) "Tully is a philosopher" is their
we run
predicates. But, we must add, the relevantdifference-otherwise
into trouble with an example like (iii) "Cicero is an orator." (i) and

H. W. B. Joseph, Introductionto Logic (Oxford, I 9 I 6), p. 14.

3G. E. Moore, "Is Existence a Predicate?" in Logic and Language(2d ser.)
ed. by A. Flew (Oxford, 1955), p. 83.
4 P. F. Strawson, Introduction
to Logical Theory(London, 1952), pp. 5, 146.
5 G. Ryle, "Categories," in Logic and Language (2d ser.) ed. by A. Flew
(Oxford, 1955), p. 66.
2

8i
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J. M. E. MORAVCSIK
(iii) are singular propositions about the same particular and they
differ in meaning; they cannot be substituted salva veritate in all
contexts. Yet the difference in meaning does not lie in their having
different predicates unless one attempts to reinterpret the pair by the
use of the theory of definite descriptions. Not even this bit of logical
surgery is available when contrasting (i) with (iv) "Tully is Cicero,"
and if one objects that (iv) is the wrong kind of proposition since it is
not of subject-predicate form, then this shows only that Ryle's attempted explanation at the very least presupposes the clarity of the notion
of subject-predicate form as a grammatical notion.
Growing partly out of Ryle's work and expanded by "speech-act
theorists," one finds the attempt to specify predicates as elements
having a unique role in responses to the activity of questioning. The
problem here is similar to the one found in Ryle's attempt quoted
above. Since not all questions require predicates as their answers
("What do you want?" "What is your name?") one would have to
delineate the relevant class of questions and it seems impossible to do
this without presupposing the adequacy of the notion of predication.
Turning from these informal accounts to the work of formal logicians
is equally fruitless. No explanations of predication are given in this
field; at most one might say that in some cases the symbolism is
designed to exhibit, but not to explain, the difference between predicate and referring expression.
The point of this review is not to show that Aristotle succeeded in
answering the general question that contemporary philosophers failed
to answer. Aristotle did not attempt to answer that general question.
He discusses in the Categories-to which we shall limit our attentionseveral interesting features of predication, and then distinguishes
between at least two different types of configuration that underlie
predication. The suggestion of this review is that paying attention to
these less sweeping problems of predication might be a useful way of
adopting a fresh approach to this topic.
The following four claims will be discussed. (a) Ackrill interprets
Aristotle as holding that general terms and the correlated abstract
singular terms, whether in subject or predicate position, introduce the
same entity. (b) Aristotle seems to be committed to the view that
general terms have meaning both inside and outside of sentences. (c)
Aristotle distinguishes at least two different ontological configurations
underlying predication. (d) Aristotle takes predication to be showing
the ontological dependence of the entity denoted by the predicate on
the entity denoted by the subject.
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ARISTOTLE ON PREDICATION
I. PREDICATION

AND THE INTRODUCTION

OF ENTITIES

The phrase "introducing an entity" is not Aristotelian. Ackrill

borrows it from P. F. Strawson's Individuals.The reason for this importation is that Ackrill construes Aristotle as holding that the predicate
in a sentence of subject-predicate form introduces an entity, in particular that entity which is also introduced by the grammatically
correlated abstract singular term. What considerations lead Ackrill to
this conclusion? One of these considerations is that Aristotle specifies
items falling into the several categories in a variety of ways, using
different grammatical forms.6 The beginning of Chapter 4 of the
Categoriesshows that what falls under the categories are things, not
expressions; they are what "expressions in no way combined" designate.7 Given this fact, and the heterogeneous way in which the examples are specified, one must conclude that for Aristotle general terms
and the related abstract singular terms introduce the same entities.
The other consideration relies on the way in which Aristotle explains
inherence.8 Inherence for Aristotle is one of the configurations that
underlie predication, and he gives as one of its distinguishing marks
that while the name of what inheres cannot be predicated of the
subject, the general term correlated to what inheres can be so predicated. This characterization makes sense only if one assumes that underlying a sentence like "Socrates is patient" is a configuration of patience
inherent in Socrates, and what inheres can be introduced by either
''patient" or "patience." These considerations show that the claim
that general terms introduce entities and the claim that they introduce
the same entities as the correlated abstract singular terms are interrelated. It seems that Aristotle was strongly impressed by the fact that
what we use to describe and characterize in one context is that which
we specify as the subject in another context. Indeed, he might have
thought that unless an expression introduces an entity that can be
designated also by a subject expression, it cannot be a genuine predicate. This, of course, could only be a necessary condition, since it holds
also of other expressions which Aristotle recognizes as not being
6 J. L. Ackrill, oP. cit., pp. 73, 78.
7 This is brought out very clearly in Ackrill's translation. Not so in the Loeb
translation which has "means" in the beginning of Ch. 4, inserted arbitrarily,
and subsequently has in single quotes items which are not expressions but
things designated. The misuse of single quotes also plagues the Oxford translation.
8
J. L. Ackrill, op. cit., p. 82.

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J. M. E. MORAVCSIK
predicate expressions-indeed, as not designating anything at all
(Poetics, I456b 38 ff.). A major difficulty of interpreting Aristotle's
views in this area is that he does not give an explicit account of the
conditions jointly neccessary and sufficient for an expression to be a
designator or for an expression to be a predicate. Thus as we have it,
Aristotle's view is fragmentary. It recognizes the differences between
name and general term and between subject and predicate position,
but it does not regard these differences as sufficient grounds for assigning dissimilar ontological correlates, thus contradicting such recent
views as those of Frege and Quine. It seems that the attempt to
elaborate further the Aristotelian view is a rewarding task. For such
attempts, however, we must keep in mind that the Aristotelian notion
of designation is not the same as the notion of reference as used by
recent analytic philosophers.
Concluding these brief remarks on this topic, let us note a possible
difficulty concerning Ackrill's interpretation. As we saw, Ackrill
analyzes some of what Aristotle says about inherence as entailing that
in sentences of subject-predicate form "wise" introduces the same
entity as "wisdom" does. But, as we shall see, Ackrill interprets
inherence in such a way that corresponding to "Socrates is wise" we
have the inherence exhibited by the complex made up of Socrates and
his specific wisdom. Thus it seems that in sentences expressing inherence, according to Ackrill, we have predicates that introduce
entities other than the one introduced by "wisdom" without any
qualification; indeed, apparently many different entities-nonsubstantial particulars-are introduced by the same predicate in the
various contexts of different sentences. A way out could perhaps be
found by suggesting that in "Socrates is wise" the predicate introduces
more than one entity, only one of which is identical with the one
introduced by "wisdom." In view of these remarks we should allow
for the possibility of having to interpret Aristotle as holding that
predicates introduce more than one entity (with abstract singular
terms having possibly a parallel multiple designative role).
From this discussion, showing general terms as introducing entities
and as specifying items falling into the several categories, one tends to
get the impression that for Aristotle general terms have significance
inside as well as outside the context of a sentence. This suggestion is
reinforced by Aristotle's account of sentence in De Interpretatione
(i6b 26 ff.) where reference is made to the significance of parts of
sentences "in separation, as expressions." Various passages in Rhetoric
III supplement this account. Thus we see that for Aristotle certain
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ARISTOTLE ON PREDICATION

predicate expressions are atomic parts of language; their significance

and what they designate are specifiable in isolation. He is not committed to the conception of a sentence as a molecular construction out
of these atoms. Nor is he committed to the view that in any context
whatever the expression "man" serves to designate some man. But he
is committed to the view that the function of a predicate as describing
a range of entities is prior to its function as a sentential element.
This part of Aristotle's views on predication has consequences for a
large number of issues in the philosophy of logic and language. We
should note here only that it underlies his theory of categories and his
view on predication and inherence.9
II.

PREDICATION

AND INHERENCE

Much of the evidence for the interpretation of what-according to

Aristotle-underlies predication comes from Chapters 2 and 3 of the
Categories.In Chapter 2 Aristotle draws a dichotomy of linguistic
elements and a tetrachotomy of nonlinguistic elements. The division
of the linguistic elements into combined and uncombined ones is of
great significance for the theory of categories.10 The nonlinguistic
items are divided according to whether they inhere in or are predicated
of ("said of" in Ackrill's translation) certain entities. Thus we must
either adhere to a terminology like Ackrill's or distinguish two senses
of "predication" in the Categories."1
Predication' is a relation between
the linguistic parts of subject and predicate while predication" is one
of the two ontological configurations that underlie predication'.
Predication" contrasts with inherence and the two jointly form the
ontological counterpart of predication'. For example, "man" is
predicated of "Socrates," but man or manhood is predicated" of
Socrates; "white" is to be predicated' but white or whiteness inheres
in men. In view of these circumstances, "said of" may not be a very
felicitous translation of predication" since it might suggest to some a
linguistic relation. But this is a minute issue in comparison to the ways
in which both the Oxford and the Loeb translations distort Chapter 2.12
9 See J. M. E. Moravcsik, "Aristotle's Theory of Categories," in Modern
Commentatorson Aristotle (New York, i966).
10 See J. M. E. Moravcsik, op. cit.
11 Aristotle uses two expressions ("legein" and "kategorein") for "predication"
but the uses do not keep distinct the relevant two senses.
12 The
Oxford translation has "man" instead of man predicated" of
Socrates while the Loeb version introduces arbitrarily "things that are meant"
in place of "things that are."

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J. M. E. MORAVCSIK
Unfortunately, as Ackrill remarks, the evidence for the interpretation of inherence is very meager. Any attempt at a full explication
must draw on the few examples, partial characterizations, and employments that Aristotle provides. According to Ackrill13 Aristotle
means by "A is in B" (a) one could naturally say in ordinary language
that A is in B or that A is of B or that A belongs to B or that B has A;
(b) A is not part of B; (c) A is inseparable from B. In connection with
this account Ackrill claims that condition (c) leaves only nonsubstantial,
nonrecurrent particulars as candidates for what inheres in primary
substances.
Before considering objections to this view it is worth while, especially
in view of recent sharp criticism,14to show its sensibleness and plausibility. In an attempt to secure preliminary agreement ProfessorOwen
launches his criticism by writing:
Set aside the question whether Aristotle thinks of a predicate primarily as an
expression, or as what an expression stands for, or as both indifferently: let us
for grammatical convenience have predicates in quotation marks and reserve
the right to shift on occasion into the material mode. Then it is generally
agreed that for "X" to be predicable of Y, in the sense required by the Categories, it must be proper to say "r is X" (or "is an X" or "is a kind of X"). If
Socrates is a man, what is predicable of him is "man" and not "manhood";
it would be absurd, or a stretch of language, to say that Socrates is (or is a kind
of) manhood.'5

As we saw above, one cannot set aside how Aristotle viewed predication, especially since none of Owen's three alternatives seem to fit the
case. Predication' is solely a linguistic relation, and predication" is
solely an ontological tie. Keeping this in mind as well as what was
said about the introduction of entities, we can agree that "man" is
predicated', not "manhood," but what is predicated" can be referred
to either as man or as manhood. Close attention to this matter seems to
render some of Owen's objections to Ackrill's account harmless. For
example, Owen claims that anyone holding a view like Ackrill's saddles
Aristotle with denying that a particular shade of color or a bit of
linguistic knowledge can be found in more than one subject.'6 What
Ackrill actually claims is that what he calls an individual-that is, a
nonrecurrent particular-cannot be present in more than one subject;
13

J. L.

Ackrill, op. cit., pp- 74-75.

G. E. L. Owen, "Inherence," Phronesis,X (I965),

15 Ibid., p. 97.
16
Ibid., p. 99.
14

97-105.

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ARISTOTLE ON PREDICATION

what Owen describes as an individual, a specific shade or bit of

knowledge-which, as we shall see, turn out to be "atomic" universals-can indeed be found in more than one subject. Ackrill's account
of inherence requires only the recognition that while any predicate'
can be applied to more than one entity, what underlies a predicate'
within any specific context of predication' need not be found in more
than one entity. The overlooking of this consideration seems to account
also for another one of Owen's objections. According to this objection,
Ackrill is committed to claiming that general attributes are not in
individuals and particular attributes are not in more than one individual.17 Again, it is not Ackrill's view that what Owencalls "particular
attribute" is not in more than one individual, and one could hold this
consistently with Ackrill's view that general attributes are indirectly
inherent in particular substances. Finally, we must defend Ackrill's
account against what Owen calls "the paradox of implication"that is, the charge that Ackrill's view does not allow the unqualified
predication of what inheres of the subject in which it is found.'8 If the
charge were well founded, then on Ackrill's view one could never
predicate "white" of any man except with qualification. But no such
consequence is entailed by Ackrill's interpretation of inherence. What
the interpretation does entail is that "Socrates is white," "Plato is
white," and so forth; in short, various instances of predication'will have
underlying them different ontological configurations in which a
number of nonsubstantial particulars are related to substances.
Thus far we have seen that Ackrill's reference to nonsubstantial
particulars, and his assigning a role to these in the configurations of
inherence can be defended against the charge of nonsensicality. This,
however, should not keep us from noticing philosophical difficulties
that Ackrill's view as a whole faces. One of these is that, of his three
conditions, the first bears most of the burden of analysis; without the
first condition inherence would not differ significantly from predication". Yet the first condition is a purely linguistic one, relying on
locutions permissible in ordinary Greek and English but possibly not
permissible in some other natural language. It is unlikely that Aristotle
would have based a distinction invoked in explicating predication and
in claiming the priority of substances on grounds that leave open the
door for possible linguistic relativism. Even as it stands, the condition
seems too wide; "sound has pitch," "body has mass," and "this
17
18

Ibid., p.
Ibid., p.

I00.
IOI.

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J. M. E. MORAVCSIK
species belongs to that genus" will qualify by Ackrill's conditions,
though Aristotle would not regard them as expressing inherence. Thus
it seems clear that in any adequate explication of inherence Ackrill's
first condition will have to be replaced by an ontological condition.
With regard to what inheres in what, Owen has interesting textual
evidence to offer.'9 This shows that in all cases the language that
Aristotle uses in describing the inherent is at least ambiguous between
reference to particulars or universals, if not in some cases more naturally readable as referring to universals. It also shows that in some cases
that in which items inhere does not seem to be a primary substance.
Finally, Owen raises the question of how one is to apply Ackrill's
account to items from all of the categories.
The question of applicability across all categories brings us to Owen's
positive view. According to this interpretation,20 inherent in particular
substances are the most specific universals in each category (Owen
cites evidence that Aristotle did believe in the existence of such in the
case of colors). The inherence relation is analyzed as (a) A is in B not
as a part, (b) A cannot exist apart from some B's that contain it. As
Owen remarks, according to his view the conditions are not governed
by the same quantifier. This interpretation faces at least four objections. One of these is contained in the question that Owen raises about
Ackrill's view-that
is, how is one to extend this view to all of the
categories? Are there "atomic" universals in each category? What
would be examples of such in the categories of relation or place? What
is the most specific "having"-another
category-that
is in a substance? It seems that no intelligible answers can be given to these
questions. The second objection relates inherence to Aristotle's
priority claim. In claiming priority for substances, Aristotle says that
everything is either present in or predicable" of substances. Since this
claim is exhaustive of reality, and nonsubstantial particulars are not
predicable" of substances, they must be present in substances. Thus if
Aristotle acknowledges the existence of nonsubstantial particulars,
then they must be included in the network of inherence. Owen might,
of course, deny that Aristotle ever acknowledges the existence of such
entities. The passage to which Ackrill refers (4a Io f.) is not conclusive
evidence. Still, it is unlikely that Aristotle would not admit the existence of nonrecurrent particulars in such classes as actions, motions,
sounds, events, and places. Thus an adequate account of inherence
19 Ibid., pp. 100-IO2.
20 Ibid., pp. 98-99,
I04-Io5.
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ARISTOTLE 0N PREDICATION

must cover these. The third objection is also related to the priority
claim, for this claim entails that there is an asymmetrical dependency
between substances and items in other categories. It is difficult,
however, to reconstruct this asymmetrical relation if one accepts
Owen's account of the inseparability condition of inherence. For the
inseparability of universals in categories other than substance from
someprimary substances is surely reciprocated by the inseparability of
primary substances from the existence of someuniversals in categories
other than substance. Even if one claims that Aristotle's priority claim
is never proven successfully, it must be shown how such a priority
claim might have seemed plausible to Aristotle, given his analysis of
inherence and predicability". One of the virtues of Ackrill's interpretation is that the priority claim is compatible with his analysis of
inherence; for the primary substances that exist could exist even
without these nonsubstantial particulars that inhere in them, while
these nonsubstantial, nonrecurrent particulars could not exist without
inhering in those primary substances that in fact exist. Finally, it is
not clear how Owen's account succeeds in distinguishing inherence
from predication". For the conditions that A should not be part of B
and that A should be inseparable from some B's are also met by these
entities which, according to Aristotle, are predicated" of substances. Of
course, the predicables" are not in substances; but this is precisely what
an adequate interpretation should account for and not merely assert.
This survey of difficulties encountered by the interpretations of
Ackrill and Owen leads us to the conclusion that neither could all
categories other than substance contain nonrecurrent particulars (for
example, the category of relation), nor could one regard all of these as
containing only universals (for example, the category of place). Thus
an adequate account of inherence will have to allow for that which
inheres in primary substances as being in some cases particulars and in
others universals. Both Ackrill and Owen contribute much that is
interesting for the formulation of a definitive account, but such an
account itself is still to be formulated.
Apart from the question of the adequacy of any given interpretation,
there are some puzzles about inherence that Aristotle does not seem to
have resolved completely. One of these is whether only substances have
things inhere in them or whether nonsubstantial entities are also
suitable subjects for this relation. Aristotle seems to analyze the ontological correlates of predication' exhaustively into inherence and predication", but at the same time the evidence seems to indicate that
only substances have items inhering in them. How are we then to
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J. M. E. MORAVCSIK
interpret the predication of nonessential properties of nonsubstantial
particulars or, for that matter, of specific universals? Another puzzle
arises in connection with general attributes such as size and shape,2'
for though the specific size of Socrates is only an accident, the fact
that he has size and shape seems to be a necessary condition for his
being what he is-that is, a man. Do these general attributes inhere
in man? If so, this shows that necessary attributes can also be present
in their subjects; if not, what is the relation between such attributes
and their subjects? If Aristotle thinks along the lines suggested by
Ackrill and conceives of inherence as primarily the relation between
nonsubstantial particulars and substances-with
general attributes
of
?-then
it is easier to
possibly predicated"
nonsubstantial particulars
see why he is silent on this matter; but if he conceives of inherence as
Owen interprets it, then the silence is puzzling. Finally, how does the
relation between primary substances and what is called in later works
(secondary) matter fit into the dichotomy of inherence and predication"? It does not seem to satisfy the conditions of either; yet if
Aristotle had already conceived of the form-matter distinction, a
treatment of this relation in this context would be imperative. Thus it
does not help to say that the absence of the form-matter distinction
from the Categoriesmight be explained by seeing that it is irrelevant to
the subjects discussed here;22 the distinction is relevant to the explication of types of predication and the priority claim. The only plausible
explanation seems to be the supposition that this dichotomy had not
yet been formulated by Aristotle at the time he wrote this work.
The consideration of these problems helps us to see why still another
interpretation-held,
among others, by Trendelenburg23-is
also
inadequate. According to this interpretation the predicated"-inherent
dichotomy corresponds to the essential-accidental dichotomy. One
reservation that has to be registered initially is that in such early works
as the Topics Aristotle already uses the essential-accidental distinction;
thus it is strange that the correspondence-if
it were to hold-should
not be spelled out. There are, however, several reasons why the corre21 Ackrill briefly recognizes that this is a special problem for Aristotle. See
op. cit., p. 76.
22 As suggested in an otherwise superb book; H. Bonitz,
Oberdie Kategorien
des Aristoteles (Wien, i853).
23
A. Trendelenburg, Geschichteder Kategorienlehre
(Hildesheim Olms, i963
[i846]), ch. i. This book, together with H. Bonitz' volume referred to above

and H. Steinthal's Geschichteder Sprachenwissenschaft,contains some of the best

material on the Categories.

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ARISTOTLE ON PREDICATION
spondence could not hold. First, if all essential predication is to be
construed as predication", then the relation between differentia and
substance must also be one of predication"; but though Aristotle at
one point asserts just this, it is not clear how this relation is to avoid
satisfying the conditions for inherence.24 Second, while the inherencepredication" dichotomy seems to be designed as exhaustive, the
essence-accident distinction is clearly not so construed in the Topics
(for example, the mention of property in Topics, 9). Finally, and most
importantly, if the equivalence holds, then the priority claim on behalf
of substances becomes absurd. For nonsubstantial particulars also
have accidents, and some of these involve some of their relations to
substances (for example, such and such a color can be found in a given
animal species) and thus substances would have to inhere in nonsubstantial

items.

To complete this account, let us consider the relation referred to by

Ackrill as "said of" and named in this paper as predication". According
to Ackrill this is the relation between individuals in any category and
their species and genera.25 This claim is certainly supported by the
examples that Aristotle gives (ia 20 ff.). The only further evidence for
the interpretation of this relation is in ib Io ff. and 2a i9 ff., where we
are told that predication" is a transitive relation and that that which is
predicated" of a subject has both its name and its definition predicable'
of the subject. With regard to the second condition, it is said explicitly
that it distinguishes predication" from inherence, but surely there
would be no point in stating the first condition if it did not also perform
this function.26 Even from this meager evidence some important inferences can be drawn. First, it follows from this that Aristotle did not
think predication'-that
is, predication in its ordinary linguistic
sense-to
be transitive.27 For predication', as we noted earlier, corresponds to both predication" and inherence, and as we see now only
one of these is transitive. Needless to say, this consequence of Aristotle's
view is sound, for neither in English nor in Greek-nor in any other
24J. Ackrill, op. cit., pp. 85-86.
25 Ibid., p. 75.
26
The second condition as a contrast between inherence and predications
shows clearly that by "definition" Aristotle does not mean anything like
"giving synonym for synonym," else he could not say of the inherent that on
occasion its name but never its definition is predicable' of the subject.
27 Thus it is regrettable that when he quotes in translation a passage involving predication" Professor Owen writes "animal" instead of animal for that
which is to be predicated" (op. cit., pp. ioo-ioi).

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J. M. E. MORAVCSIK
natural language known to the writer-is predication transitive. Nor
do we get a transitive relation when we restrict ourselves to the consideration of essential predication. For example, from "Socrates is a
man" and "man is a species" it does not follow that "Socrates is a
species." Thus predication" cannot be simply equated with essential
predication. Second, predication" cannot be equated either with the
modern logical notion of class membership or with that of class inclusion. This becomes clearer when we consider Ackrill's misgivings about
the transitivity condition.28According to Ackrill, Aristotle "does not
distinguish between the relation of an individual to its species and that
of a species to its genus. It does not occur to him that 'man' functions
differently in 'Socrates is (a) man' and '(a) man is (an) animal' (there
is no indefinite article in the Greek)." The difficulty of this complaint
lies in the phrase "the relation." Surely there are several relations
between the terms at issue; Aristotle is interested in a relationthat holds
both between individual and species and also between species and
genus, and it is such that the alleged ambiguity of "man," in the
contexts referred to by Ackrill, is irrelevant to it.
On the positive side, it seems that at least part of this relation involves linking attributes with individuals through principles of individuation-or, as Professor Langford put it so elegantly, by the arithmetics of concepts. Thus, for example, animal and man carry the
same arithmetic, and this arithmetic is presupposed by our ability to
use proper names of substances, such as Socrates. Genera and species,
forAristotle, carry the same type of arithmetic, and without carrying an

arithmetic they could not be genera or species. This is one way in

which genera and species differ from other necessary attributes (for
example, having shape or having size) and also one reason why no
arbitrary definition will contain what Aristotle would count as genuine
genera or species. If differentiae are also predicated" of substances,
they too must contribute to the principle by which we count and
individuate the primary substances falling under the relevant species.29
This, then, seems to be at least one part of the explication of this
transitive relation that according to Aristotle holds between, for
example, animal, man, and Socrates. It could not be the whole of the
explication since even the attribute of being a creature with kidneys
J. Ackrill, op.cit., p. 76.
The fact that most differential are introduced in adjectival form is quite
irrelevant to their status with regard to the ontological relations of inherence
and predication". It turns out that considerable difficulties confront us whether
or not we construe differentiae as contributing to principles of individuation.
28

29

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ARISTOTLE ON PREDICATION

will qualify under this condition, and yet surely Aristotle would not
want to say that this is predicated" of man.
To sum up, Aristotle distinguishes these two different kinds of
configurations underlying predication in the ordinary, linguistic
sense. As many scholars have noted, in his later writings Aristotle
abandons the notion of inherence. A possible reason for this emerges
from our investigation, for it seems that when we construe inherence
and predication" in a fairly clear sense, these turn out not to be
exhaustive of all kinds of ties that underlie predication. Thus it remains
unclear how this dichotomy is related to the essence-accident distinction and the form-matter distinction. Perhaps the most fruitful way of
looking at the dichotomy worked out in the Categoriesis to construe it
as the beginning of Aristotle's realization that different ties and configurations underlie different types of predication. The Stagirite
continued to work on the illumination of these different configurations
throughout his philosophic career. He did not arrive at what could be
called a final list, but at least his work should show for contemporary
philosophers that the question "what is predication?"-apart from
answers by grammarians-admits only of a pluralistic answer.

III.

PREDICATION

AS DEPENDENCE

Aristotle claims (2a 34 ff.) that all other things are either inherent in
or predicated" of primary substances. He concludes that if primary
substances did not exist, then it would be impossible for any of the
other items to exist. This conclusion is pointless unless it is implied that
the dependency does not hold likewise the other way. Thus we encounter here one version of Aristotle's famous priority claim, and its

only explicit premise seems to be the statement about inherence and

predication" mentioned above. According to Ackrill, the dependency
claim is "not very well expressed" since the existence of some items
in categories other than substance are just as necessary for the existence
of substances as the existence of substances is necessary for the existence
of these other items.30Stated in these general terms, Ackrill's observation is sound. Nevertheless, it is clear that Aristotle does think of himself here as claiming some sort of a priority, and thus it is worth while
to explore what kind of dependecy might at least have seemed plausible
to him.
30J. Ackrill, op. cit., p. 83.
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J. M. E. MORAVCSIK
In viewing predication as somehow showing the dependency of the
various predicates on their subjects, Aristotle came to the opposite
conclusion from the one at which his teacher, Plato, arrived, having
presumably considered the same general facts about predication. It is
interesting historically to ask why predication should be viewed as
showing any kind of dependency at all, either for subject or for predicate.
We have seen above how the priority claim is relevant to the interpretation of inherence. Inherence, in the light of this claim, must be
shown to be some sort of asymmetrical dependency of the inherent on
that in which it inheres. (This seems to cause considerable difficulties
for Professor Owen's interpretation.) We have also seen that in respect
of their being dependencies, there must be some parallel between
inherence and predication". The clearest indication of this parallel is
at 2a 36-b 3: "Animal is predicated" of man and therefore also of the
individual man; for were it predicated of none of the individual men
it would not be predicated of man at all. Again, color is in body and
therefore also in an individual body; for were it not in some individual
body it would not be in body at all." Both Ackrill and Owen recognize
the significance of the parallel, but each of them gives it a different
interpretation. According to both interpreters, one of Aristotle's
points is that because color is in body, color is in an individual body.
Ackrill thinks that this is "compressed and careless"31 while Owen
thinks that it expresses Aristotle's thought accurately and supports
Owen's account of inherence.32 Under these circumstances it might
not be unprofitable to call into question what seems to be assumed by
both sides-that
is, that according to Aristotle color is in individual
body becauseit is in body. What the passage is clearly designed to show
is the dependency of the inherent and the predicable" on primary
substances, and this dependency is to be shown by drawing some
parallel between inherence and predication". Of course, the parallel
cannot be too close without obliterating the distinction between the
two relations. Thus the conclusion that without primary substances
there could be no inherence and predication" must be argued for on
differentgrounds with respect to each of the two relations. The first half
of the quotation can be reconstructed as a valid argument if we provide
one tacit premise. From the fact that animal is predicated" of man, it
does not follow that animal is also predicated" of individual men, but
31
32

Ibid., p. 83.
G. E. L. Owen, op. cit., p. IOI.
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ARISTOTLE ON PREDICATION

if one supplies the (obvious) extra premise that man is predicated" of

some primary substances, and then adds the transitivity rule which is
part of the definition of predication", then the conclusion does indeed
follow. We should note, however, that according to this reconstruction
it is not becauseanimal is predicated" of man that it is predicated" of
individual men; the antecedent by itself does not provide an explanation for the conclusion. Thus we can expect that the argument with
regard to inherence is also compressed, and that the antecedent by
itself does not explain the conclusion. It is also clear that the transitivity
rule can have no bearing on the inference drawn with regard to
inherence. A suitable tacit premise would be that there can be no color
without instances in the sense of nonsubstantial particulars; and these,
of course, are by definition dependent in the relevant way on primary
substances. The sketch of this alternative does not show that Owen's
view is inadequate, but it shows that there are ways to account for the
parallel drawn in the passage under consideration without adopting
Owen's account of inherence.
In any case, the dependency boils down to the claims that without
things to be counted there are no count-attributes and that without
substances as the base there can be no attributes which depend on
having nonsubstantial instantiation. From these considerationsAristotle
infers an asymmetrical existential dependency. What formulation
would render such a claim at least plausible? Given the limitations of
space, it will be fruitful to restrict the question to the dependency of
items from other categories on substances. We must set aside here the
thorny question whether Aristotle really means to draw an asymmetrical dependency claim between secondary and primary substances and
to what extent, if any, such a dependency could be supported by, or
even merely shown consistent with, his other metaphysical writings.
We have seen already that in any unqualified version the dependency
can be shown to be mutual. It is more likely that Aristotle conceives
of the dependency as holding between the primary substances that
exist and the items in the other categories that in fact are actualized. If
we restrict our attention to the nonsubstantial particulars provided for
in Ackrill's analysis of inherence, then at least part of the dependency
seems clear. For though there is a mutual dependency between the
existence of some primary substances and the existence of some nonsubstantial particulars, the dependency is asymmetrical between the
primary substances that in fact exist and the nonsubstantial particulars
that are actualized. That is to say, there is a possible world in which
the same primary substances exist, but different nonsubstantial partic95

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J. M. E. MORAVCSIK
ulars inhere in them than the ones inhering in them in the actual
world. But there could be no possible world in which the same nonsubstantial individuals exist (on Ackrill's, not on Owen's interpretation)
as the ones that are in the actual world, and the primary substances
that exist are different from the ones in the actual world. Of course,
even if sound, this suggestion takes us only part of the way since it
remains to be shown how the universals in the other categories are
either directly dependent on primary substances or at least indirectly
dependent by being directly dependent on nonsubstantial particulars.
The positive contribution of this brief section on dependency is that
the interpretation of this relation will have to take into consideration
those entities that are actually in the universe, and not just the notions
of "some substance," "some particular," and so forth. Why should
Aristotle think of the dependency in that way? An answer to this
question will have to wait until we have a clearer and more adequate
account of Aristotle's conception of modalities.33 Thus this brief
suggestion does nothing more than show the direction in which we
have to move if Aristotle's conception of predication as dependency is
to be interpreted at least so as to show how it could have seemed
plausible to him.
These brief remarks can do no more than give a taste of Aristotle's
discussions of predication and of Ackrill's fine translation and sensitive
explanatory notes. To the knowledgeable reader the relevance of this
material to the views expressed in recent times by Frege, Russell,
Quine, Strawson, Geach, and others should be obvious. It is also

clear that Aristotle's way of parceling up the area of predication into

problems does not always coincide with those ways that have been
fashionable in recent times. Sometimes when philosophers are bogged
down with regard to a certain nest of problems, it is fruitful to reconsider the field from a similarly motivated but differently articulated
point of view. The problem of predication and Aristotle's treatment of
it might turn out to be an instance of this sort.

J. M.

E. MORAVCSIK

Universityof Michigan

33 Such work is being done today by Professor

J. Hintikka.For detailed
referredto above.
onAristotle,
bibliographysee ModernCommentators

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