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Open Secrets Questionably

Arrived At: The Impact of
Wikileaks on Diplomacy
Mark Page & J. E. Spence
Published online: 01 Aug 2011.

To cite this article: Mark Page & J. E. Spence (2011) Open Secrets Questionably
Arrived At: The Impact of Wikileaks on Diplomacy, Defence Studies, 11:2, 234-243,
DOI: 10.1080/14702436.2011.590046
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ARTICLE

Open Secrets Questionably Arrived

At: The Impact of Wikileaks on
Diplomacy
Downloaded by [Mr Sarwar Minar] at 06:26 07 March 2015

MARK PAGE* AND J.E. SPENCE

Diplomacy is the application of intelligence and tact to the conduct of

official relations between governments of independent states..1 It has a
long history, dating back to the heralds of Greece and Rome, and has
over the centuries evolved distinct sets of practices; these are called the
diplomatic method. In a series of lectures at the University of Oxford in
November 1953, Sir Harold Nicolson2 suggested four distinct phases in
the history of diplomacy, these were Ancient, Italian, French and New
or American, each characterised by different sets of practices. The lectures were given after a period of supposed transition, from the French
(old) to the New system, whose architect was President Woodrow Wilson. The transition began on 8 January 1918, when Wilson made his
famous Fourteen Points speech to a joint session of Congress, and called,
in point one, for open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which
there shall be no private international understandings of any kind but
diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.3 This
proved unworkable, because while the finished covenants could be made
open, they could not be openly arrived at. The process of negotiation, a
pillar of diplomacy, had to be carried out in secret, and not in the public
view. Nicolson4 knew this, as did most practitioners; as Berridge
explains, the question of whether to go secretly or openly5 in diplomacy
has never really been in question. Diplomacy must always be confidential if it seeks to be successful. Secrecy in diplomacy is a necessity.
Mark Page is a Masters Student in International Relations, Kings College London. J. E.
Spence is Professor in the Department of War Studies, Kings College London.
*Corresponding author Email: mark.page@kcl.ac.uk

Defence Studies, Vol. 11, No. 2, (June 2011), pp. 234243

ISSN 1470-2436
http://www.informaworld.com
DOI: 10.1080/14702436.2011.590046 2011 Taylor & Francis

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THE IMPACT OF WIKILEAKS ON DIPLOMACY

235

Yet secrecy also presents risks, not least that of uncontrolled leakage.6
The Wikileaks Diplomatic Cables demonstrate this point well. This
essay will address Wikileaks in the context of secrecy and diplomacy, to
assess what these leaks mean for modern diplomacy in practice. It will
argue that they are not the threat to US National Security that some
would make them out to be, but also, that their impact will be felt
beyond simple embarrassment. It seems likely that at least in the short
term, conversations with diplomats and their reports home, may be less
frequent, less candid, and more cautious, as participants worry that what
they say in confidence might shortly be very public. In the longer term
however, diplomacy seems unlikely to change. Scandals come and scandals go, but the diplomatic method will endure.
Wilsons Fourteen Points came while World War I was still being
fought, and was in many ways a reaction to its horror. He was a prototypical liberal, and like many others felt that the war had been exacerbated by private international understandings,7 or secret alliances made
by diplomats, that required signatory states to rush to the aid of their
threatened allies, widening participation in the conflict and increasing
the slaughter. This view was informed by liberal peace theory, which
suggested that had the populations been aware of the alliances into
which their leaders were entering; they would not have allowed them,
as their potential impact on society was simply too great.8 These theorists thus implicated diplomats in the horror of the Great War. Wilson
used this animosity against secrecy to attempt to change the diplomatic
method, so that never again could binding agreements be made in
secret, without the knowledge of the nation. Hence open covenants. . .openly arrived at.9
However, there are several problems combining diplomacy with
democratic control,10 because while Wilson called for diplomacy to
proceed always frankly and in the public view11 in reality even he
could not achieve this. According to Nicolson,12 at Versailles he often
shut himself away with two or three others in a locked and guarded
room to hammer out difficult solutions during the negotiation. Nicolson13 suggests that Wilson had fallen prey to his definitions, by using
Diplomacy to mean the practice of negotiation, the result (Foreign Policy), and its implementation. He [had] bec[o]me mesmerised by the
strength and neatness of the phrases he devised14 and failed to recognise that in practice there was all the difference in the world between
open covenants and openly arrived at.15 Eventually, this became
clear, even to Wilson. The final covenants (Foreign Policy) should be
made open, but the processes by which they were achieved could not.

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DEFENCE STUDIES

The reasons for this still hold true today, requiring contemporary diplomatic practice to be carried out in confidence: apart from the obvious
security issues of all diplomacy being public, for example the publication of troop movements, or the timing of surprise state visits.
But it is also true that at any one time, there are dozens of mundane
negotiations taking place around the world, the processes of which are
likely to be of interest to few apart from specialists. Consider the examples of International Air Transport Association (IATA) or the Universal
Postal Union (UPU), whose officials negotiate tirelessly to ensure that
their services are properly provided. The general public are unlikely
however to be interested in the actual negotiation as long as the service
(the result of the covenant) is effective.
Secret negotiation also has other benefits, decreasing the risk of disruption, allowing talks with, for example pariah states or terrorists/insurgent groups, and perhaps most importantly the benefit of secret
concessions and rapprochement. All negotiations involve stages and outcomes; if the concessions at each stage become publicly known before
the counter-concessions, the party making the first concessions risks losing support at home, and appearing weak on the international stage,
jeopardising that partys eventual acceptance of the terms. Secret negotiations also do not arouse public expectations, only to have them dashed
later.16 Satow says that if negotiation is undertaken in public it quickly
turns into a travesty . . . and runs the risk of betraying any constructive
purpose for which it may have been conceived.17 Consider, for example, the back channel discussions that led to the release of Nelson Mandela, where British and American diplomats acted as go-betweens to
help hammer out a deal for his release. Whether this could have been
achieved in full public view seems doubtful. Similarly the discussions
held between the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the British government in the long prelude to the negotiation of the Good Friday Agreement could not have been undertaken openly. They are both excellent
examples of open covenants, secretly arrived at. For Nicolson it [was]
regrettable that the bad things they [diplomats] did should have dishonoured the excellent manner in which they did them [secret diplomacy].18
Yet while negotiation often grabs the limelight when discussing
diplomacy, as Hedley Bull argues, it is only one of diplomacys key
functions. Other similarly important functions are facilitating communication between countries, intelligence/information gathering for the
home government, and minimising the effects of friction within and
symbolising the existence of an international society.19 These tie well

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237

with Satows and Nicolsons definitions of the roles of a diplomat.20

For the benefit of this essay the idea of the diplomat as observer/reporter is important, because as Nicolson states an ambassador must always
be the main source, and above all the interpreter, regarding the political
conditions, trends and opinions in the country in which he resides.21 It
is to his reports that his government must look for information, and
informed analysis on events within his host country. These reports are
protected by diplomatic privilege, ensuring that ambassadors can communicate freely with their own governments, without fear of reprisal.22
Satow calls these reports, Notes Verbale,23 and many contain information
gathered during confidential conversations, which the source knew
would be shared with the diplomats home government, but could
safely assume would not go further. The confidentiality of diplomatic
communications allows states to communicate with each other in open
and candid ways, and also for important figures to say things they think
true, but too politically damaging or physically dangerous for publication.
This important function of diplomacy24 has been severely challenged
by the Wikileaks Diplomatic Cable releases in the Guardian, New York
Times, and other foreign language newspapers such as Der Spiegel. The
first cables began to appear on 29 November 2010, but with over
250,000 cables, nearly two months on, the story is far from over. Thus
the glee with which these leaks have been received in some quarters is
misplaced; the virtues of diplomacy are not to be despised: rationality,
that is seeking to balance costs and benefits for both parties in a complex negotiation; Satows intelligence and tact; civility; confidentiality;
and finally most important of all restraint. After all, in private life
we are rightly constrained from letting it all hang out in our personal
relationships; we may harbour strong reservations about the personalities
and behaviour of friends and family, but there is a case for concealment
and prevarication in the interests of continued fraternity. So, too, in
diplomacy: confidentiality and secrecy in dealing with matters not simply of high security (where lives may be put at risk by adverse publicity), but also with respect to the details of complex negotiations the
tone, substance, and outcomes of which might be prejudiced by public
revelation of negotiating tactics, objectives and candid estimates of ones
negotiating partner.
Wikileaks has released a cache of stolen communiques, comprising
reports from diplomats in American stations around the world. Their
release will often be very politically and personally damaging, for example to Rahul Gandhi (a possible Indian heir apparent), who told the

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American ambassador in 2008 that he thought Hindu extremist groups

could pose a greater threat to India than Muslim militants.25 They may
also cause physical endangerment, for example, to the well connected
Iranian businessman26 who helped the US by providing the names of
firms breaking the arms embargo on Iran. The report does not give his
name, but gives a detailed enough account of his hometown, education,
family connections and sporting history to make him easily identifiable
by the Iranian government. Wikileaks violated the confidentiality of
these communications, something which could have serious and deleterious consequences. Sound diplomatic practice is dependent on mutual
confidence27 which is built on the integrity, discretion, moderation,
intelligence and tact of both the diplomat and home government.28 The
publication of confidential material violates that trust and decreases the
other partys confidence in the individual official and home government
generally, to keep things secret. This could reduce the chance of sources
personally providing information again, but could also decrease the general level of confidence in the leaking party by any others who might
have been tempted to provide information in the future. Would for
example, our Iranian businessman be as happy to share his expert and
well informed opinions with the US again after the leaks, and would
others, if some kind of accident were to befall him? The Economist
describes this as casual damage to bystanders,29 with very serious
implications for US diplomacy. As John Negroponte says it is likely in
the short term at least [to cause a] reluctance on the part of some to talk
[confidently and] confidentially with our [US] diplomats.30
Arguably the leaks should inspire caution in the minds of Americas
sources. The system is clearly flawed and requires change. To have 2.5
million servicemen and officials able to access the report from a oneon-one conversation between the King of Jordan and the US Ambassador challenges the principle that this information is secret on the basis
of need to know.31 The roots of this system lie in the failure of the
previous system to predict the 9/11 attacks, although all of the pieces of
information were available, but not shared by the various US departments. Clearly the solution to that problem has created another:32 it
sowed the seeds of the jungle of chaos that today impedes [us].33
Arguably it is only through these sorts of scandals that change is
brought about. But it is likely that it will not create greater openness in
the US; rather it will probably cause information to be more closely
guarded and more secret, with fewer who need to know, and with
access to it34. This could have a positive impact, reducing leaks, but
runs the risk of 9/11 style failures. This is a treacherous path to tread,

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239

and would render Wikileaks attempt at openness totally counterproductive.

Much has been made of the Wikileaks revelations, with some claiming that they are an attack on the international community35 but really
much of the information is trivial, and already public knowledge.
Indeed if it were not for the source, much of it would be barely newsworthy.36 That Russia is a virtual mafia state37 run by Vladimir Putin
and the security forces will come as no surprise to anyone who has travelled there. Similarly, the colourful pen portraits of world leaders tell
the public little they do not already know, for example that Silvio Berlusconi is sexual vanity personified, or that the Afghan government is
corrupt. These and many other such assessments have been the stuff of
media commentary for years. Although this material is embarrassing, it
is unlikely to affect a countrys relationship with America. Politicians
after all, have thick skins when it comes to juvenile name-calling and
media bashing.
However, occasionally the leaks have provided gobbets of information that are new and interesting, such as that China is increasingly losing its patience with North Korea, and might not be opposed to
eventual peninsular reunification. This gives us insights into a taboo
topic in China, but again, it is the release of this kind of useful information which might be deleterious. China will now likely have to retrench
its support for North Korea to mollify the spoiled [little] child next
door.38 Clearly Chinese support for a peaceful settlement to the conflict
in the Korean Peninsula would go a long way to help minimise friction
in international society one of diplomacys most important functions.39 These leaks may put that cause back somewhat.
Similarly damaging are the revelations that US diplomats were
encouraged to spy by their government, taking biometric, creditcard and
frequent-flier information on key United Nations (UN) officials. Violating the sanctity of the UN and blurring the line between diplomacy
and espionage, might seriously damage US integrity.40 Wikileaks have,
therefore, hit on a rather mixed bag, with lots of trivial information
already known and now substantiated, and only some new information
coming to light. Most of what has been published has been more
embarrassing than anything else. But as Nicolson states breaches of
confidence are always news,41, as from a journalistic point of view, the
content is often less important than the source.
What Wikileaks reveals about the US diplomatic corps is as interesting as anything else. It shows up assuredly the most common and the
most disadvantageous42 of diplomatic faults vanity. Nicolson suggests

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that vain/amateur diplomats may seek rather to display [their] own acumen and literary brilliance than provide [their] government with a careful and sensible balance-sheet of the facts.43 They seek to show
intelligence with humour, but do so at the expense of the other key
diplomatic trait, tact. Satow says that in practice . . . [a diplomat] . . .
will ensure that his correspondence is drafted in a manner which he
judges most fitting . . . [that it is] . . . a matter of discretion. Attention to
detail must be scrupulous . . . [while] any impression of casualness . . . is
to be avoided. 44Both authors would be disappointed by the misuse of
diplomatic language within the Wikileak cables, in so far as they fail to
show the restraint and respect that is expected of them, and could be
considered rude and potentially damaging. This is clearly damaging
because civility is an essential element of a sound diplomatic relationship, if an ambassador . . . allowed his dislike of foreign personalities or
conditions to become apparent [he] would not . . . be serving the purpose for which he had been appointed.45
Diplomats are in countries to create amicable relations, facilitate
open and candid communication, and gather information for their
home state. If they become unpopular because of words said behind
others backs they will be severely hampered in these tasks. It could be
argued that a diplomat must give his honest opinion to his government,
and that he should feel able to do so freely, but clearly the diplomats
intelligent and informed opinions on the conditions or personalities46
within the host country must be qualified by the use of tact. You never
know who might be listening, or leaking. What, of course, has always
been difficult for diplomats and, more particularly, their political masters and mistresses is to publicly acknowledge that decision making
whether, on domestic or foreign issues often involves a more sympathetic comprehension of the contradictions, compromises and contrasting goals with which governments must juggle:47 that policy-makers
must often choose between evils, the trick being to choose the lesser
one. A diplomat might certainly acknowledge this realist proposition in
the way he/she negotiates and more important the topics required
for negotiation in defence and assertion of the national interest. But
such an admission if made public would damage a government in the
eyes of its electorate- especially in the West where media coverage on
these matters tends to be Liberal and implicitly (and at times explicitly)
hostile to policies based on time honoured principles of realist statecraft.
Whether or not the cables should have been leaked is a difficult
question to answer. The support for leakers perhaps represents a

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241

decline in the credibility of power48 as the amount of secrecy that a

society will allow depends on the moral authority of that government.
We live in a time of diminished moral authority, as public scepticism is
high, after issues such as the failure to find weapons of mass destruction
in Iraq, and MPs expenses. Wikileaks demonstrates that diplomacy in
the US, but probably elsewhere too, has developed a habit of secretiveness49, undoubtedly abusing its right to decide what is secret and what
the public have a right to know. The framers of the US constitution
foresaw this abuse and bestowed upon the press the responsibility to act
as watchers. It is the duty of their rulers and experts to provide the
electorate with the essential facts in digestible forms50, but they also
decide what is essential, hence the press must watch, to avoid things
being swept under the rug. The government has a responsibility to its
people, but so does the press, it must simultaneously pry and act intelligently about what it prints. The issue is that the media are unlikely to
be the best judges of what is in the national interest51 as they are seeking stories that will increase their ratings. The question is who watches
the watchers. Todays credibility gap52 or popular scepticism about
what we are told by the government, has left an opening for the venal
press to exploit the peoples right to know as an excuse to publish.
Whether the information released in the diplomatic cables by Wikileaks was really in the national/public interest is debatable. Much of what
it has published is trivial and superficial, but sensational and so, popular,
and though little will actually endanger the USA, some releases may
endanger the sources. The right to know, versus the need for discretion
is a balance that has yet to be found. Perhaps Wikileaks would have
more legitimacy if their whistle blowers were more accountable, and
more selective in what they choose to disclose, with particular reference
to gross abuses of power, which do not merit in any way, being kept
secret from the electorate. In this context Daniel Ellsberg (who released
the Pentagon Papers during the Vietnam War) is generally regarded as
carrying out an act of public service. Those documents showed that the
Johnson administration had repeatedly lied to the public and the Congress about the state of the war. He also leaked confidentially, but when
he was disclosed, Ellsberg acted openly, knowing he would face judicial
penalties.
Arguably it will only be by long processes of trial and error that we
can hope to adjust the infinitely delicate piano [of government/diplomatic secrecy] to the sturdy fingers of the popular electorate.53 For
diplomacy Wikileaks is just such a trial. It clearly shows up a catalogue
of errors, both in the amount and nature of the information classed as

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secret, and in the number of people with the ability to access it. It is an
attempt to usher into the system a new balance. However whether it
will achieve its aims isquestionable; what is not, is that in the fullness of
time, a different sort of trial, of those who leaked, may be instigated,
with the impact for those concerned being much more judicial. Wikileaks is a negative development and will have deleterious consequences,
in some cases setting back diplomatic efforts for peace, stability and
globally frank communication. It will be felt very seriously in US information gathering, at least in the short term, as sources are likely to be
less forthcoming if they fear publication. Americas inability to keep its
own secrets has damaged its reputation, and a price will be paid for that.
For some time to come diplomatic reports may be less candid, less well
informed, and thus inevitably less useful. However, perhaps more troubling is their disruptive impacts on peace and stability. As the ChinaKorea example shows, it may hamper important progressions towards
peace, making already difficult situations more so.
Though the American response to Wikileaks remains to be seen,
what is certain, is that the release will not achieve its goal of greater
transparency. More likely secrecy will increase. Wikileaks will not revolutionise the diplomatic method, and it is not the end of diplomacy as
we know it54. Secrecy remains necessary, as some processes will always
require quiet talks behind closed doors, as the IRA and Mandela examples demonstrate. If President Wilson could not remove secrecy from
the diplomatic method, Julian Assange certainly will not. Secret diplomacy will endure.
NOTES
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

9
10
11
12
13

E. Satow, Satows Guide to Diplomatic Practice, 5th ed. (1979), p.3.

H. Nicolson, The Evolution of the Diplomatic Method (1953).
W. Wilson The Fourteen Points Speech, 8 Jan. 1918, point 1.
Nicolson The Evolution of the Diplomatic Method (1953); H. Nicolson Diplomacy (1963).
G. Berridge Diplomacy: Theory and Practice (2010) p. 230.
Ibid.
Wilson (note 3).
C. Layne, Kant or Cant, International Security 19/2 (1994) pp.549; J. Owen, How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace. International Security 19/2 (1994) pp.97125; M.
Doyle, Liberalism and World Politics, American Political Science Review 80,4 (1986)
pp.115169; B. Tibi, Political Islam, World Politics and Europe: Democratic Peace and EuroIslam Versus Global Jihad (2008).
Wilson (note 3).
Nicolson, Diplomacy (note 4) p.14.
Wilson (note 3).
Nicolson, Diplomacy (note 4).
Ibid.

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14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54

243

Nicolson, Evolution (note 4) p.85.

Nicolson, Diplomacy (note 4) p.84.
Berridge (note 5); Nicolson, Evolution (note 2); Satow (note 1).
Satow (note 1) p.5.
Nicolson (note 2) p.73.
H. Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (1977).
Satow (note 1); Nicolson (notes 2 and 4).
Nicolson, Evolution (note 2) p.82.
Satow (note 1); K. Hamilton and R. Langhorne, The Practice of Diplomacy (2003); D. Nickles, Under the Wire: How the Telegraph Changed Diplomacy (2003); R. Cohen, Theater of
Power: The Art of Diplomatic Signaling (1987).
Satow (note 1).
Bull (note 19).
Rahul Gandhi in The Diplomatic Cables- Asia- Terrorism, Guardian, 17 Dec. 2010.
Economist, 4 Dec. 2010.
Satow (note 1); Nicolson, Evolution (note 2).
Nicolson, Diplomacy (note 4).
Briefing Wikileaks: Unpluggable, Economist, 4 Dec. 2010, p.31.
J. Negroponte on Hard Talk - Special Edition, Wikileaks, 3 Dec. 2010.
Sir Christopher Meyer on Question Time, BBC2, 2/Dec. 2010.
Economist, 4 Dec. 2010), Meyer (note 31).
Nicolson, Evolution (note 2) p.85.
Economist, 4 Dec. 2010.
Hillary Clinton quoted on Mediaite.com., <www.mediaite.com/online/secretary-ofstate-hillary-clinton-is-not-happy-with-wikileaks-release/>.
Economist, 4 Dec. 2010, p.31.
Ibid. p.34.
Wikileaks cables reveal China is ready to abandon North Korea, Guardian online at
(accessed 29 Nov. 2010): <www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/nov/29/wikileaks-cableschina-reunified-korea;Economist, 4 Dec. 2010, p.34.
Bull (note 19).
Economist, 4 Dec. 2010.
Nicolson, Diplomacy (note 4) p.246.
Ibid. p.120.
Ibid. p.7.7
Satow (note 1) pp.412.
Nicolson, Diplomacy (note 4) p.64.
Ibid. p.197.
Financial Times Online (2011) Secret Society by John Lloyd, accessed 28 Feb. 2011 at:
<www.ft.com/cms/s/2/8d8bbaea-3ae3-11e0-8d81-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1FBlNZHYG>.
M. Franck and E. Weisband (eds), Secrecy and Foreign Policy (1974) p.xiv.
Nicolson (note 2) p.77.
Nicolson (note 4) pp.912.
Franck and Weisband (note 48) p.50.
H. Johnson, in Franck and Weisband (note 48) p.172.
Nicolson (note 4) p.102.
Carne Ross, in Spence (in press).