拉岡講座244

THE SUBJECT AND THE OTHER: APHANISIS

主體與大它者：失蹤

Descartes' desire
笛卡爾的欲望
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Do I need to stress that we must understand Representanz here in the sense in which things happens at
the real level, where communication takes place in every human domain.

我需要強調，我們在此必須從發生在真實界的意義來了解「符號」嗎？因為每一個人的溝通其實
都發生在真實界那裡。

We mean by representatives what we understand when we use the phrase, for example, the
representative of France. What do diplomats do when they address one another? They simply exercise,
in relation to one another, that function of being pure representatives and, above all, their own
signification must not intervene. When diplomats are addressing one another, they are supposed to
represent something whose signification, while constantly changing, is, beyond their own persons,
France, Britain, etc. In the very exchange of views, each must record only what the other transmits in
his pure function as signifier, he must not take into account what the other is, qua presence, as a man
who is likable to a greater or lesser degree. Interpsychology is an impurity in this exchange.

我們所謂的「符號」，意思是指當我們使用一個詞語時，我們了解它的意思。例如，法國這個符
號代表什麼。當外交家彼此對談時，他們在做些什麼？他們僅僅是互相在運用純粹是語言符號
的功能，尤其是，他們是代表國家發言，個人情感務必不要介入。當外交家彼此對談時，他們
代表的不應該純屬個人意見，而是法國或英國等自己國家的意見，雖然觀點不斷地改變。在交
換彼此意見時，每位外交官都必須記錄，對方的語言所傳遞的訊息。他一定不能只是考慮到在
現場的對方，作為有情感的個人的想法。外交家交換意見時，彼此的內心感受在此不列入考慮。

The term Repro.sentanz is to be taken in this sense. The signifier has to be understood in this way, it is
at the opposite pole from signification. Signification, on the other hand, comes into play in the
Vorstellung.

「符號」這個用詞要用這層意義來理解。意符必需以這種方式來理解，它跟真實意義是背道而馳
的。在另一方面，真實意義是在觀念的領域運作。

It is with the Vorstellung that we are dealing in psychology, when the objects of the world are taken in
charge, in some way, under the parenthesis of a subject in which a whole series of a, a', a', etc., unfolds.

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在觀念領域，我們正在處理的是心理學。世界作為一個客體，被放置在在主體的括弧裡來處裡。
在那裡，一連串的意符展開運作。

Here is situated the subjectivity on which the theory of knowledge is suspended. Of course, every
representation requires a subject, but this subject is never a pure subject. If one believes that each
subject is sustained in the world with his original—in both senses of the word (originale ou originelle )
— Weltanschauung, then the path of truth passes—as a backward psychology or psycho-sociology is
still showing us —through the inquiry, the totalization, the statistics of different
Weltanschauung. And things might be thus, were there in the world subjects, each entrusted with the
task of representing certain conceptions of the world.

知識的理論建立在人的主觀性，這個主觀性的位置就在這裡。當然，每一個符號都要求有一個
人的主體。假如我們相信，每一個主體生存於這個世界，都有他自己原創的一套的世界觀，那
麼真理經過的道路，必然是穿梭於不同的世界觀之間的探索、整合、及累積。假如世界是由不同
的主體組成，事情的情況將是：每一個主體都被委任一個任務，那就代表某種的世界觀。

Indeed, this is the essential flaw in philosophical idealism which, in any case, cannot be sustained and
has never been radically sustained. There is no subject without, somewhere, aphanisis of the subject,
and it is in this alienation, in this fundamental division, that the dialectic of the subject is established.

的確，這是哲學的理念主義的基本瑕疵。無論如何，理念主義無法長久維持，也從來沒有風行
一時。每一個主體，總是在某個地方，會有主體的失蹤。就是這種疏離，這個基本的區隔，主體
被建立。

In order to answer the question I was asked last time concerning my adhesion to the Hegeian dialectic,
is it not enough that I should answer that, because of the vel, the sensitive point, point of balance, there
is an emergence of the subject at the level of meaning only from its aphanisis in the Other locus, which
is that of the unconscious?

為了回答我上一次被問道的問題，關於我一直堅持黑格爾正反合辯證法。我的回答是，因為欲
望驅力是一個敏感點與平衡點，只有從在大它者領域，也就是無意識的領域，主體自己失蹤的
時刻，主體才出現。我這樣回答夠清楚嗎？

Furthermore, this involves no mediation, and I promise, if I am provoked into doing so, to show that
the effective experience that has been established in the perspective of an absolute knowledge never
leads us to anything that may, in any way, illustrate the Hegeian vision of successive syntheses, nothing
that provides even so much as a hint of the moment that Hegel in some obscure way links to this stage,

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and which someone has been pleased to illustrate by the title of Dimanche de la vie—when no opening
remains in the heart of the subject.

而且，主體失蹤與主體出現，沒有仲介。假如你們硬要逼我作個仲介，我只能承諾表示，從絕
對知識的觀點，我們精神分析經驗的效用，從來沒有引導我們能像黑格爾正反合辯證法那樣運
作，沒有一樣暗示，可以提供我們得黑格爾那樣的精神現象學，像有些人喜歡提到「為國捐軀」
那樣的標題。在主體的核心，失蹤與消失沒有仲介。

I should indicate here where the Hegeian lure proceeds from. It is included in the approach of the
Cartesian I think, in which I designated the inaugural point that introduces, in history, in our
experience, in our necessity, the vel of alienation, which prevents us for ever from misunderstanding it.
It is in
the Cartesian approach that the vel was taken for the first time as the constituent of the dialectic of the
subject, which now cannot be eliminated in his radical foundation.

我在此應該指出，黑格爾的陷阱從哪裡推展。他的陷阱就潛藏在哲學家笛卡爾的「我思故我在」
。
我指明這個「我思」，就是導致疏離的驅力起始的地方，不論是歷史上的疏離，我們精神分析經
驗的疏離，或我們生命必然的疏離。因為這個疏離，我們永遠無法不誤解它。在笛卡爾的「我思
故我在」的方法，欲望驅力第一次被當著是主體辯證法的組成要素，無法從他的根本基礎上被
消除掉。

This reference will be useful to me in characterizing the experience of the transference, so I shall be
returning to it later in order to articulate certain of its features.

當我在表達移情的經驗的特性時，我們想到「我思」這一點是很有幫助的。以後，我還會回到這
一點，為了要清楚表達移情的某些特徵。