Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
L-48006
July 8, 1942
FAUSTO BARREDO vs. SEVERINO GARCIA and TIMOTEA ALMARIO
FACTS:
1. At about half past one in the morning of May 3, 1936, on the road between Malabon and Navotas,
Province of Rizal, there was a head-on collision between a taxi of the Malate Taxicab driven by
Pedro Fontanilla and a carretela guided by Pedro Dimapalis. The carretela was overturned, and
one of its passengers, 16-year-old boy Faustino Garcia, suffered injuries from which he died two
days later.
2. A criminal action was filed against Fontanilla in CFI of Rizal, and he was convicted and sentenced
to an indeterminate sentence of one year and one day to two years of prision correccional. The
court in the criminal case granted the petition that the right to bring a separate civil action be
reserved. The Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence of the lower court in the criminal case.
3. Severino Garcia and Timotea Almario, parents of the deceased brought an action in the CFI of
Manila against Fausto Barredo as the sole proprietor of the Malate Taxicab and employer of
Pedro Fontanilla. The CFI of Manila awarded damages in favor of the plaintiffs for P2,000 plus
legal interest from the date of the complaint. This decision was modified by the CA by reducing
the damages to P1,000 with legal interest from the time the action was instituted.
4. It is undisputed that Fontanilla 's negligence was the cause of the mishap, as he was driving on
the wrong side of the road, and at high speed. The main theory of the defense is that the liability
of Fausto Barredo is governed by the Revised Penal Code; hence, his liability is only subsidiary,
and as there has been no civil action against Pedro Fontanilla, the person criminally liable,
Barredo cannot be held responsible in the case.
ISSUE: W/N the employer may be held principally liable for the damages caused by the criminal act of his
driver.
HELD: YES.
First, the driver was not sued in this civil action. Second, the owner has 2 kinds of liabilities: (1) Subsidiary
as to his civil liability arising from crime; and (2) Primary, as to his presumed negligence in the quasidelict. Lastly, since the taxi driver was found to be criminally liable, with greater reason that the taxi owner
be held liable for damages.
While the terms of articles 1902 of the Civil Code seem to be broad enough to cover the driver's
negligence in the instant case, nevertheless article 1093 limits cuasi-delitos to acts or omissions "not
punishable by law." But inasmuch as article 365 of the Revised Penal Code punishes not only reckless
but even simple imprudence or negligence, the fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code
has apparently been crowded out. It is this overlapping that makes the "confusion worse confounded."
However, a closer study shows that such a concurrence of scope in regard to negligent acts does not
destroy the distinction between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for cuasi-delitos
or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligent act causing damages may produce civil liability arising
from a crime under article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, or create an action for cuasi-delito or culpa
extra-contractual under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code.
In the present case, the taxi driver was found guilty of criminal negligence, so that if he had even sued for
his civil responsibility arising from the crime, he would have been held primarily liable for civil damages,
and Barredo would have been held subsidiarily liable for the same. But the plaintiffs are directly suing
Barredo, on his primary responsibility because of his own presumed negligence which he did not
overcome under article 1903. Thus, there were two liabilities of Barredo: first, the subsidiary one
because of the civil liability of the taxi driver arising from the latter's criminal negligence; and, second,
Barredo's primary liability as an employer under article 1903. The plaintiffs were free to choose which
course to take, and they preferred the second remedy. In so doing, they were acting within their rights. It
might be observed in passing, that the plaintiff choose the more expeditious and effective method of
relief, because Fontanilla was either in prison, or had just been released, and besides, he was probably
without property which might be seized in enforcing any judgment against him for damages.
Elcano v Hill
FACTS: Reginald Hill killed Agapito Elcano. In the criminal case, Reginald was acquitted on the ground
that his act was not criminal for lack of intent to kill.
The parents of Agapito now files this civil case for complaint for damages against Reginald.
ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of the civil case for complaint for damages against Reginald is barred by
his acquittal in the criminal case.
HELD: NO. Fault or negligence under Art 2176 covers not only acts not punishable by law but also acts
criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action
lie against the offender in the criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or
acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover
damages on both scores, and will be entitled to such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two,
assuming the awards made in the two cases vary.
The extinction of civil liability referred in Rule 111 Sec 2 refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article
100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as quasi-delict only
and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act
charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Culpa aquiliana included voluntary
and negligent acts which may be punishable by law.
The civil action referred to in Secs. 3(a) and 3(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, which should be
suspended after the criminal action has been instituted is that arising from the criminal offense not the
civil action based on quasi-delict
Article 31 of the Civil Code then clearly assumes relevance when it provides:
Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or
omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of
the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
For obviously, the jural concept of a quasi-delict is that of an independent source of obligation "not
arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony." Article 1157 of the Civil Code bolsters this
conclusion when it specifically recognizes that:
Art. 1157. Obligations arise from:
(1) Law;
(2) Contracts;
(3) Quasi-contracts;
(4) Acts or omissions punished by law; and
(5) Quasi-delicts. (1089a)
(Emphasis supplied)
It bears emphasizing that petitioner's cause of action is based on quasi-delict. The concept of
quasidelica as enunciated in Article 2176 of the Civil Code (supra), is so broad that it includes not only
injuries to persons but also damage to property. 7 It makes no distinction between "damage to persons"
on the one hand and "damage to property" on the other. Indeed, the word "damage" is used in two concepts:
the "harm" done and "reparation" for the harm done. And with respect to harm it is plain that it includes both
injuries to person and property since "harm" is not limited to personal but also to property injuries. In fact,
examples of quasi-delict in the law itself include damage to property. An instance is Article 2191(2) of the
Civil Code which holds proprietors responsible for damages caused by excessive smoke which may be
harmful to persons or property."
Contrary to the theory of private respondents, there is no justification for limiting the scope of Article 2176
of the Civil Code to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. Well-entrenched is the doctrine that
article 2176 covers not only acts committed with negligence, but also acts which are voluntary and
intentional
Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code when an injury is caused by the negligence of the employee,
there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or
employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after selection or
both. The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon
prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such employee.
Therefore, it is incumbent upon the private respondents to prove that they exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employee.
Since Article 2176 covers not only acts of negligence but also acts which are intentional and voluntary, it
was therefore erroneous on the part of the trial court to dismiss petitioner's complaint simply because it
failed to make allegations of attendant negligence attributable to private respondents.
case, provided said party has reserved his right to institute it separately, but it should be noted, however,
that neither Section 1 nor Section 2 of Rule 111 fixes a time limit when such reservation shall be made.
In the case at bar, there is no question that petitioners never intervened in the criminal action instituted by
the Chief of Police against respondent Pedro Tumala, much less has the said criminal action been
terminated either by conviction or acquittal of said accused.
It is, therefore, evident that by the institution of the present civil action for damages, petitioners have in
effect abandoned their right to press recovery for damages in the criminal case, and have opted instead to
recover them in the present civil case.
As a result of this action of petitioners the civil liability of private respondents to the former has ceased to
be involved in the criminal action. Undoubtedly an offended party loses his right to intervene in the
prosecution of a criminal case, not only when he has waived the civil action or expressly reserved his right
to institute, but also when he has actually instituted the civil action. For by either of such actions his interest
in the criminal case has disappeared.
As we have stated at the outset, the same negligent act causing damages may produce a civil liability
arising from crime or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual. The former is a violation
of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and independent negligence, having always had its own
foundation and individuality.
Some legal writers are of the view that in accordance with Article 31, the civil action based upon quasidelict may proceed independently of the criminal proceeding for criminal negligence and regardless of the
result of the latter. Hence, "the proviso in Section 2 of Rule 111 with reference to ... Articles 32, 33 and 34
of the Civil Code is contrary to the letter and spirit of the said articles, for these articles were drafted ... and
are intended to constitute as exceptions to the general rule stated in what is now Section 1 of Rule 111.
The proviso which is procedural, may also be regarded as an unauthorized amendment of substantive law,
Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code, which do not provide for the reservation required in
the proviso." 4 But in whatever way We view the institution of the civil action for recovery of damages under
quasi-delict by petitioners, whether as one that should be governed by the provisions of Section 2 of Rule
111 of the Rules which require reservation by the injured party considering that by the institution of the civil
action even before the commencement of the trial of the criminal case, petitioners have thereby foreclosed
their right to intervene therein, or one where reservation to file the civil action need not be made, for the
reason that the law itself (Article 33 of the Civil Code) already makes the reservation and the failure of the
offended party to do so does not bar him from bringing the action, under the peculiar circumstances of the
case, We find no legal justification for respondent court's order of dismissal.
Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence", covers not only acts "not punishable by
law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a
separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted
and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually
charged also criminally), to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only
to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary.
The distinctness of quasi-delicta is shown in Article 2177 of the Civil Code, which states:
Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code.
But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant.
According to the Report of the Code Commission "the foregoing provision though at first sight
startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence.
The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and independent negligence, which
is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and
individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction between criminal negligence and "culpa
extra-contractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been sustained by decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain ...
to exercise due care in its performance. That is to say, its liability is direct and immediate, differing essentially, in legal
viewpoint from that presumptive responsibility for the negligence of its servants, imposed by article 1903 of the Civil
Code, which can be rebutted by proof of the exercise of due care in their selection and supervision.
Article 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to obligations arising ex contractu, but only to extra-contractual
obligations or to use the technical form of expression, that article relates only to culpa aquiliana and not to culpa
contractual.
Every legal obligation must of necessity be extra-contractual or contractual. The fundamental distinction between
extra contractual obligations and those which arise from contract, rests upon the fact that in cases of non-contractual
obligation it is the wrongful or negligent act or omission itself which creates the vinculum juris, whereas in contractual
relations the vinculum exists independently of the breach of the voluntary duty assumed by the parties when entering
into the contractual relation.
With respect to extra-contractual obligation arising from negligence, whether of act or omission.. The legislature which
adopted our Civil Code has elected to limit extra-contractual liability with certain well-defined exceptions to
cases in which moral culpability can be directly imputed to the persons to be charged. This moral responsibility may
consist in having failed to exercise due care in the selection and control of one's agents or servants, or in the control
of persons who, by reason of their status, occupy a position of dependency with respect to the person made liable
for their conduct.
When the facts averred show a contractual undertaking by defendant for the benefit of plaintiff, and it is alleged that
plaintiff has failed or refused to perform the contract, it is not necessary for plaintiff to specify in his pleadings whether
the breach of the contract is due to willful fault or to negligence on the part of the defendant, or of his servants or
agents. Proof of the contract and of its nonperformance is sufficient prima facie to warrant a recovery.Thus, proof on
the part of defendant that the negligence or omission of his servants or agents caused the breach of the contract
would not constitute a defense to the action.
As to the contributory negligence of Cangco himself..
Under the doctrine of comparative negligence - if the accident was caused by plaintiff's own negligence, no liability
is imposed upon defendant's negligence and plaintiff's negligence merely contributed to his injury, the damages
should be apportioned. It is, therefore, important to ascertain if defendant was in fact guilty of negligence.
We may say that the test is this; Was there anything in the circumstances surrounding the plaintiff at the time he
alighted from the train which would have admonished a person of average prudence that to get off the train under
the conditions then existing was dangerous? If so, the plaintiff should have desisted from alighting; and his failure so
to desist was contributory negligence.1a
The only fact from which a conclusion can be drawn to the effect that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence is
that he stepped off the car without being able to discern clearly the condition of the platform and while the train was
yet slowly moving. In considering the situation thus presented, it should not be overlooked that the plaintiff was, as
we find, ignorant of the fact that the obstruction which was caused by the sacks of melons piled on the platform
existed; and as the defendant was bound by reason of its duty as a public carrier to afford to its passengers facilities
for safe egress from its trains, the plaintiff had a right to assume, in the absence of some circumstance to warn him
to the contrary, that the platform was clear. The place, as we have already stated, was dark, or dimly lighted, and this
also is proof of a failure upon the part of the defendant in the performance of a duty owing by it to the plaintiff; for if it
were by any possibility concede that it had right to pile these sacks in the path of alighting passengers, the placing of
them adequately so that their presence would be revealed.
ISSUE:
13.
PHILIPPINE
SCHOOL
ADMINISTRATION (PSBA) vs. CA
OF
BUSINESS
ISSUE:
HELD:
ISSUE:
Whether the doctrine of proximate cause finds
application since petitioners complaint arose from a
contract.
FACTS:
Pursuant to a Deed of Sale and Interment Order
executed between plaintiff and defendant, the
former, father of deceased Vicente Juan J. Syquia
authorized and instructed defendant-appellee to inter
the remains of deceased in the Manila Memorial Park
Cemetery conformably and in accordance with
defendants interment procedures. Preparatory to
transferring the said remains to a newly purchased
family plot also at the Manila Memorial Park
Cemetery, the concrete vault encasing the coffin of
the deceased was removed from its niche
underground with the assistance of certain employees
of defendant. As the concrete vault was being raised
to the surface, plaintiffs discovered that the concrete
vault had a hole approximately three (3) inches in
diameter near the bottom of one of the walls closing
out the width of the vault on one end and that for a
certain length of time (one hour, more or less), water
drained out of the hole, because of the aforesaid
discovery, plaintiffs became agitated and upset with
concern that the water which had collected inside the
vault might have risen as it in fact did rise, to the level
of the coffin and flooded the same as well as the
remains of the deceased with ill effects thereto;
Upon opening of the concrete vault, it showed
evidence of total flooding and the coffin was entirely
damaged by water, filth and silt causing the wooden
parts to warp and separate and to crack the viewing
glass panel located directly above the head and torso
of the deceased; The entire lining of the coffin, the
clothing of the deceased, and the exposed parts of the
deceased's remains were damaged and soiled by the
action of the water and silt and were also coated with
filth.
Due to the breach by the defendant of its obligation
to deliver a defect-free concrete vault and because of
defendant's gross negligence conformably in failing to
seal the concrete vault, the complaint prayed that
judgment be rendered ordering defendant-appellee to
pay plaintiffs-appellants actual damages, moral
damages, exemplary damages.
CFI dismissed the complaint and held that the
contract between the parties did not guarantee that
the cement vault would be waterproof; that there
could be no quasi-delict because the defendant was
not guilty of any fault or negligence, and because
there was a pre-existing contractual relation between
apart
and
UE vs. Jader
G.R. 132344 February 17, 2000
Romeo Jader was enrolled in UE College of Law. He failed to take the regular final examination in
Practice Court 1 for which he was given an incomplete grade. He took the examination later. When the
grades were submitted, it was given a grade of five.
During the deliberations on who among the students should be allowed to graduate, Jaders name
appeared in the Tentative List of Candidates for Graduation.
Jader attended the investiture ceremonies. He went up the stage when his name was called, and
he received a rolled white sheet of paper symbolical of the Law Diploma.
He prepared for the bar examination and took a leave of absence without pay from his job. Having
learned of the deficiency he dropped his review class and was not able to take the bar examination.
Jader sued petitioner for damages, alleging he suffered moral shock, mental anguish, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and sleepless nights when he was not able to take the
1988 bar examinations arising from petitioners negligence. He prayed for an award of moral and
exemplary damages, unrealized income, attorneys fees and cost of suits.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is liable for damages
HELD: Yes, but not moral damages
It is the contractual obligation of the school to timely inform and furnish sufficient notice and
information to each and every student as to whether he or she had already complied with all the
requirements for the conferment of a degree or whether they would be included among those who will
graduate.
Petitioner, in belatedly informing respondent of the result of the removal examination,
particularly at a time when he had already commenced preparing for the bar exams, cannot be said to
have acted in good faith.
Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the students of their academic status and not
wait for the latter to inquire from the former. The conscious indifference of a person to the rights or
welfare of the person who may be affected by his act or omission can support a claim for damages.
Petitioner ought to have known that time was of the essence in the performance of its obligation to inform
respondent of his grade. It cannot feign ignorance that respondent will not prepare himself for the bar
exams since that is precisely the immediate concern after graduation of an LL.B. graduate.
However award of moral damages is unwarranted. It behooved on respondent to verify for
himself whether he has completed all necessary requirements to be eligible for the bar examinations. If
respondent was indeed humiliated by his failure to take the bar, he brought it upon himself by not
verifying if he has satisfied all the requirements including his school records, before preparing himself for
the bar examinations.
Saber vs. CA
G.R. 132981 August 31, 2004
President Ferdinand Marco appointed Dr. Mamitua Saber as Executive Vice-President of the
Philippine Amanah Bank (PAB). Saber took a year-long leave of absence from his work at the university
and assumed office at the PAB.
The PAB was designated to make appropriate preparations and arrangement for the annual
pilgrimage of Filipino Muslims to Mecca.
Saber decided to charter the M/V Sweet Homes, owned by Sweet Lines, INc. for the trip. Saber
executed a Uniform Time-Charter, in which the PAB chartered the vessel to transport the pilgrims to
Mecca and back to the Philippines.
Saber wrote to President Marcos that other parties not be allowed to charter any ship or aircraft
bringing pilgrims to Jeddah, to avoid unfair competition with PAB. However, President Marcos granted
some politicians permission to charter a plane to transport the pilgrims. Worse, Sacar Basman had
represented to the public that he was one of the Pilgrimage Directors, that he had been allotted 25
passenger for the voyage on board the M/V Sweet Lines.
The Marawi Branch Manager of PAB wrote Saber expressing disappointment over the turn of
events, that politicians chartering a private plane was in direct competition with PAB. Also, those who had
booked for the voyage on the M/V Sweet Lines had already withdrawn their reservations.
Rather than allow the vessel to leave for Mecca with many vacant cabins, Saber decided to sell
tickets to Basman on credit. Saber and the Arabian Gulf Export Agency Corporation (AGEAC) entered into
a Freight Contract, wherein AGEAC was allowed to load on the M/V Sweet Homes goods and cargoes to
Saudi Arabia.
The Board of Directors of PAB, after exhaustive deliberations, declared Saber liable for receivables
on the ground that the Board did not authorize him to sell tickets on credit and to execute a Freight
Contract with AGEAC. Saber was charged with violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Saber
filed a complaint for damages against PAB, alleging that he was authorized to make appropriate
arrangements for the pilgrimage and had the implied authority to enter into transactions, including the
authority to sell tickets on credit and to execute the Freight Contract. He claimed that the filing of charges,
and the nationwide publication thereof caused him dishonor, shame, discredit and contempt, shock,
besmirched reputation and wounded feelings, for which defendants were liable for moral, exemplary and
actual damages.
The Sandiganbayan acquitted Saber for the criminal charges due to his implied authority to make
contracts.
ISSUE: Whether or not Saber is entitled to payment of damages
HELD: No
Bad faith nor malice may not be imputed on the respondents on holding Saber liable for the
receivables. After an exhaustive discussion, the Board resolved that Saber had no authority to enter into
any agreement with Basman to sell tickets on credit, and to execute a Freight Contract with AGEAC. While
the Sandiganbayan ruled that Saber had the implied authority to do so, and was not criminally liable, it
cannot thereby conclude that the Board of PAB acted in bad faith or with malice.