Why The 2016 Campaigners' Cliff's Notes Should Include ISIS, Ukraine, and The Middle East

13/3/2015
Whythe2016CampaignersCliffsNotesShouldIncludeISIS,Ukraine,andtheMiddleEast
I Changed My Mind
The piece about Bill Clinton I wish I could take back, and nine other things about which I
no longer hold the same opinion.
BY STEPHEN M. WALT
MARCH 13, 2015
In most countries, politicians try to impress the citizenry with their command of the issues and their deep
insight into important political problems. In the United States, for example, Americans will spend the next
two years watching a passel of Republicans and at least one Democrat try to convince voters that they
know a whole bunch about foreign policy, the economy, education, the Constitution, climate change,
terrorism, and a zillion other topics, as each tries to persuade the electorate to make him or her president.
What you probably wont hear, however, is a candidate saying, Heres an issue where I was dead wrong,
and heres how I eventually figured out that what I had previously believed was a lot of hokum. Aspiring
leaders rarely admit past errors because to do so might make voters doubt their present judgment, and it
leaves a candidate vulnerable to accusations of pandering or flip-flopping.
Instead, most aspiring candidates try to portray themselves as having consistently held the right views
since early childhood. That tendency is unfortunate, however, because the ability to learn from experience
and revise ones views over time is a more desirable quality in a leader than rigid and blinkered certainty.
As John Maynard Keynes allegedly responded to a charge of inconsistency: When the facts change, I
change my mind. What do you do?
Im not a politician or likely to become one (cue the audible sigh of relief from most readers). Instead, Ive
been trying to understand international politics for more than three decades. And over time Ive changed
my mind about a fair number of academic, historical, and contemporary issues. I used to believe a number
of things that turned out not to be correct, and there are others where at a minimum I know have
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considerable doubts. And guess what? Changing my mind isnt all that painful a process; in fact, it can be
both liberating and enjoyable to realize that earlier beliefs were mistaken.
To inspire a bit more reflection and self-criticism by both academics and maybe even a few politicos, I
offer here the Top 10 Things About Which I Changed My Mind.
No. 1: The origins of World War I
Ive been reading and teaching about the causes of World War I since I got my first academic job, but my
account of how and why the war broke out has changed significantly over the years. When I first started
teaching in the mid-1980s, I was heavily influenced by Richard Ned Lebows Between Peace and War,
which portrays the July Crisis as a series of misperceptions and tragic accidents, driven by both
organizational and psychological pathologies. I also embraced the cult of the offensive explanation
offered by Jack Snyder and Stephen Van Evera, which links the war to widespread European beliefs that
conquest was easy and that the war would be very short and cheap. I also read key works from the Fischer
school (which emphasizes German responsibility), but I saw that as a background condition rather than
the primary cause.
But over the years, I began to rethink this interpretation, and my understanding was greatly influenced by
my former student Dale Copelands detailed analysis in his book, The Origins of Major War. He pins the
blame almost entirely on Germany and especially Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg and I
have yet to see any account that does a better job of uncovering the central cause of the war. But given how
historiographical traditions keep evolving, and given the ability of new theories to shape how we view the
past, I could always change my mind again in the future.
No. 2: The transformative power of social science
When I was in graduate school, I believed social science provided powerful analytic tools that could
resolve any number of political issues at home and abroad. Like a good Progressive Era reformer, I
believed a well-trained army of policy-relevant academics could ask the right questions, collect the right
evidence, perform careful and objective analysis, debate and refine their findings, and then announce
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their solutions to a grateful world. Policymakers would embrace the scholars enlightened wisdom and
quickly proceed to implement the prescribed reforms. Dont laugh at my naivet: I was young, ignorant,
and filled with youthful zeal.
Since those early days, Ive acquired a healthier respect for the vagaries of politics and a greater humility
about what social science can do. In international relations, at least, none of our theories are all that
powerful, the data are often poor, and coming up with good solutions to many thorny problems is difficult.
Unintended consequences and second-order effects abound, and policymakers often reject good advice
for their own selfish reasons. Dont get me wrong: I still think systematic historical and social science
inquiry is essential to better policymaking; I just dont think its the magic bullet that I once hoped it could
be.
No. 3: The power of quantitative analysis
I originally intended to pursue a career in biochemistry, and I was initially enamored with quantitative
approaches to international relations because they seemed more scientific. I still believe statistical tools,
formal models, and other mathematical techniques are valuable parts of the social science tool kit, but Ive
become more sensitive to the limits of all extant methods and increasingly skeptical of anyone who claims
to have discovered the one true way to analyze international politics. As Ive argued elsewhere,
maintaining a diverse intellectual ecosystem is essential in the study of politics because none of our tools
or methods is useful for all subjects and we never know in advance what sort of problems will demand our
attention. Better a well-stocked tool kit than one big hammer.
No. 4: The importance of ideology
I was drawn to realism from the very beginning because I thought it explained the historical record more
persuasively than other intellectual traditions. Not surprisingly, therefore, I believed ideology had only
limited effects on state behavior and that the competitive pressures that operate in an anarchic system
inevitably pressure states to compromise or abandon hard-core ideological beliefs. I still think power
politics dominates, but Id concede more causal weight to ideology today than I would have back in the
early 1980s. Insights from the Kremlins archives suggest that Marxism-Leninism shaped how Soviet
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early 1980s. Insights from the Kremlins archives suggest that Marxism-Leninism shaped how Soviet
leaders viewed the world in sometimes powerful ways, and the ideology of American exceptionalism has
had an enduring impact on U.S. behavior as well. All of this is another way of saying that mono-causal
explanations rarely suffice and that scholars need to be open to rethinking their initial theoretical
commitments.
No. 5: The role of culture
Similarly, I used to have a certain contempt for cultural explanations of political phenomena. Whenever
somebody invoked culture to explain some aspect of political behavior, I thought it was a lazy catchall
category one could invoke to account for something one didnt really understand. I now regard my
youthful dismissal of culture as mostly just plain dumb, and I have become more sympathetic to
explanations that employ well-specified definitions of culture. This shift began after I had worked at
several different universities and had noticed how much their intellectual cultures differed despite their
other similarities. Stanford is not Berkeley is not Harvard is not Princeton is not the University of Chicago,
just as New Orleans is not New England and Sweden is not Vietnam or Brazil. A further implication:
Trying to shape the politics and society of an alien culture is a fools errand because even well-intentioned
actions generate side effects that foreign actors wont have anticipated.
No. 6: U.S. nuclear strategy
I used to be dead wrong about U.S. nuclear weapons policy. After reading the early nuclear strategists and
books like Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smiths How Much Is Enough?, I assumed that the United
States was firmly committed to a policy of nuclear deterrence via mutual assured destruction. But the
work of Desmond Ball, David Alan Rosenberg, Robert Jervis, Fred Kaplan, Bruce Blair, and many others
revolutionized my understanding of U.S. nuclear weapons policy. We now know that the United States was
never content with mutual assured destruction and that the Pentagon has always devoted vast sums to
developing counterforce capabilities and wanted to be able to fight and win a nuclear war if it had to. This
is not to say that the United States wants or intends to ever fight a nuclear war, but it sought nuclear
superiority over any and all rivals since the very beginning of the nuclear age and continues to pursue that
goal today.
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No. 7: Reconstructing Afghanistan

In the first article I wrote after the 9/11 attacks, I endorsed the invasion of Afghanistan and called for a
major U.S. and international effort to rebuild the country once the Taliban was ousted. Its possible that
such an effort would have succeeded had George W. Bush and the neoconservatives not galloped off to
invade Iraq in 2003, but Im no longer convinced that this would have been the case. The problem, I now
believe, is that trying to construct a Western-style state in Afghanistan was a vast project and was virtually
certain to trigger all sorts of resistance and unintended consequences. This would require the work of
several generations, and there are a zillion ways the work could get derailed even if outside forces had the
best of intentions, patience, resources, and lots of smart people doing the work. Perhaps a more limited set
of goals would have succeeded, but even that is not certain. I still agree with a lot of what I wrote back in
2001, but I was too sanguine about our ability to do more than just topple the Taliban and capture Osama
bin Laden.
No. 8: Israel
As is the case with a lot of Americans, my early views on Israel were shaped by writers like Leon Uris, by
reading about the horrific experience of the Holocaust, and by the influence of Israeli and Zionist friends.
The strongly pro-Zionist coverage of Middle East issues in the U.S. media undoubtedly reinforced that
view. When I began researching my dissertation and first book, however, I become aware that there was an
alternative view of these events, though I did not explore the tension between these perspectives at the
time. By the mid-1990s, however, the work of Israels new historians (e.g., Tom Segev, Avi Shlaim, Benny
Morris, etc.) and a number of other writers had provided a more complicated and nuanced picture of
Israels founding and subsequent conduct. While still supportive of Israels creation, over time I became
more critical of its actions and more concerned about the costs of the special relationship for the United
States. The consequences of that policy became increasingly clear after 9/11, of course, and eventually led
to my book with John Mearsheimer on the Israel lobby. Nothing that has happened since that book was
published has undermined its basic thesis, but subsequent events have made me more pessimistic about
the prospects for peace in the near-to-medium term.
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No. 9: Can democracies conduct an effective foreign policy?

When I first got seriously interested in foreign affairs, reading about statesmen like Dean Acheson, George
Marshall, George Kennan, or Henry Kissinger was inspiring and probably gave me an unwarranted faith in
the maturity and gravitas of the U.S. foreign-policy establishment. I used to be very comfortable with the
rational actor assumption, for example, but that faith is harder to maintain when one sees how much
domestic politics and other pathologies intrude on the policy process. I used to have a lot of faith in the
marketplace of ideas i.e., the idea that democratic debate can weed out bad ideas and allow mistaken
initiatives to be corrected but the Iraq War and some other events showed me that the marketplace is
usually warped by secrecy, strategic leaking, interest group politics, media bias, and other forms of
opportunism and corruption. Add to this the enduring alliance between Democratic liberal
interventionists and Republican neoconservatives, and its easy to see why a relative outsider like Barack
Obama could become president and end up repeating many of the same mistakes as his predecessors. The
silver lining: The United States is in such a favorable position that it may not need to have a very effective
foreign policy. Good thing.
No. 10: The Clinton administration
Back in 2000, Foreign Affairs published my article Two Cheers for Clintons Foreign Policy. It was a
limited defense of Bill Clintons foreign-policy record, and I argued that his performance was better than
many believed (and much better than his Republican critics maintained). Over time, however, Ive
concluded that my assessment was too lenient. In particular, several of Clintons decisions most notably
dual containment in the Persian Gulf and NATO expansion helped sow the seeds of much future
trouble. Similarly, there were important missed opportunities during Clintons tenure most notably the
failed Oslo peace process in the Middle East and the consequences of that failure have loomed ever
larger with the passage of time. If there is one article on my CV that Id like to go back and rewrite, it would
be that one.
Theres my list, and Im sure I could add more items with a bit more thought. Whether you are a student, a
scholar, an aspiring policy wonk, or a would-be public official, I encourage you to perform a similar
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scholar, an aspiring policy wonk, or a would-be public official, I encourage you to perform a similar
exercise from time to time. You dont necessarily have to air your errors in public, but being aware of how
each of us changes our views over time is good protection against the arrogant overconfidence that often
contains the seeds of foreign-policy disaster.
John Moore/Getty Images
Why the 2016 Campaigners Cliffs Notes

Should Include ISIS, Ukraine, and the
Middle East
It might seem like the U.S. public doesnt care about foreign policy, but it would be a big
mistake for presidential hopefuls to ignore foreign policy. Huge.
BY AARON DAVID MILLER
MARCH 12, 2015
If we were to consider even some 20 months out how important foreign policy will be in the 2016 U.S.
elections, a smart take from inside the Beltway might sound something like this: Sure, foreign policy is
important, but most of the time just not to most Americans who vote.
Americans continue to be singularly uninterested in matters beyond their borders unless, of course, bad
things that are far away come much closer to home. (See large numbers of Americans dying in wars on
foreign soil, rising gas prices, and terrorist threats to the homeland.)
But even the latter and the dire predictions from our leaders of terrorist attacks often cant shake
Americans collective complacency. Despite Americans intense horror over the Islamic States beheadings
and a decrease in their satisfaction over the way the terrorist threat is being handled, a January 2015
Gallup poll found that only 2 percent of those surveyed identified terrorism as the most important
problem facing the United States. Clearly a single consequential terrorist attack directed from outside
would change that.
Still, aspiring presidential candidates of both parties, beware (particularly governors without much
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national security know-how): Foreign policy may well loom larger in the 2016 presidential campaign than
it has in the past. If you dont know what youre talking about, youre going to be vulnerable. President
Gerald Ford never really recovered from his gaffe in his 1976 debate with candidate Jimmy Carter in which
he said, There is no Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, even though thats not what the president
intended to say. And if you do know what youre talking about, well, you just might score a few points with
voters because experts or not when it comes to foreign policy, Americans, particularly in our crisis-driven
world, want their presidents to be confident and know what theyre talking about or at least make a
great case that they do. So foreign policy will matter. And heres why.
Handling 24/7 Crises
Todays world is hardly a more dangerous or explosive place than it was in the 1930s and 1940s, when
world war, genocide, depression, and expansionist totalitarian powers threatened global order and
stability. But it often feels that way now, a veritable world on fire.Maybe that sensation is a result of a 24/7
media that turns breaking news into an interminable nonstop cycle of breathlessly delivered catastrophes.
Combined with our seemingly willful determination to ignore or trivialize the past and handle these crises
with almost no sense of historical perspective, we focus more on the headlines than the trend lines.
Everything from Putin and Crimea to Ebola to the Islamic State is perceived as part of a new and
unprecedented world on fire and is constantly being presented as a veritable game-changer.
These are very real challenges. But our 24/7 relentless media and our tendency to focus on headlines
instead of trend lines with no sense of historical perspective turns everything into a collective gestalt that
the world is somehow coming apart.
And so Americans are bombarded by a seemingly uninterrupted parade of crises that mostly occur abroad.
Russias moves to annex Crimea and support separatist forces in Ukraine bring echoes of the Cold War; the
Middle East continues to melt down; and this regions newest horror the Islamic State demonstrates
its barbarity and savagery on an almost daily basis. Middle Eastern terrorism stalks Europe too. Worse,
there are no quick or easy solutions. All of these are long movies that will likely play on as America
struggles to come up with effective responses in a world of long shots and insoluble problems.
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And that virtually guarantees that presidential candidates whether in debates or during routine
campaigning will be pressed to make sense of it all.Its virtually unimaginable that at some point
during what is likely to be a year and a half campaign that some crisis, most likely in the Middle East, or
even an attack at home, wont present the candidates with the proverbial 3 a.m. phone call scenario as
in the candidates will have an opportunity to stump on how they wouldve responded in the hot seat. And
in our crisis-laden and media-driven world, particularly during election season, there may well be more
than one.
Leading From the Front or Behind
Indeed, the 3 a.m. phone call conceit for most Americans is less about the details and complexities of the
foreign-policy universe than who has the smarts and experience to lead. Hillary Clintons 2008 campaign
spot your children are sleeping; theres a phone call to the White House about some problem in the
world; whom do you want answering that phone? gets to that issue. Bottom line: Americans want to
know that their presidents are up to the job and that they possess the calm, smarts, and toughness to
handle the middle-of-the-night crisis
Sure foreign-policy facts are important here really important, if you fumble them. But in the end, what
makes or breaks a candidates chances in this scenario the real measuring stick in this hypothetical is
really about character. Voters are going to want to know: Which among these presidential candidates is
going to be wise enough and have the stature to stand up for American interests abroad with the
appropriate sense of caution and prudence to keep the United States out of reckless military ventures
abroad? And when the occasion does require action, will this person be able to command the force
necessary to protect U.S. interests?
Here the Republicans have a ready-made and well-rehearsed narrative to roll out, particularly during the
general election. Whatever the merits of the argument, the Republicans will continue to hammer home
the leading from behind narrative in order to cast doubt on anyone associated with Barack Obama and
to show that his policies are responsible for much of the current mess. And they will try to use the crisisridden Middle East to make it stick. The notion that an inexperienced Democratic president has abdicated
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Americas responsibilities abroad and is perceived as feckless by Americas allies and adversaries alike is
already a dominant Republican campaign staple.
Whether its Jeb Bush or Scott Walker who ends up as the Republican front-runner and eventual party
candidate, this theme will keep turning up. You might think that the former would be careful about
becoming too closely identified with his brothers unpopular Iraq War and the advisors who supported it.
By the looks of the foreign-policy team advising the former Florida governor 19 of the 21 names have
previously served in either his brothers or his fathers administration this doesnt seem to be the case. If
the candidate is Walker, the Wisconsin governor will have to bone up on his foreign-policy expertise and
not suggest so casually that taking on 100,000 protesters gives him the wherewithal to handle the worlds
problems. And its clear hes trying to take crash courses in how to do so.
Obamaisnt running again. But Republicans will run against the policies he has presided over, particularly
on terrorism, in an effort to tar his successor and create a frame for a more muscular foreign policy. They
will charge that too early an exit from Iraq and not enough muscle in Syria have enabled the Islamic State
to expand and have threatened U.S. interests. Should another terrorist attack directed from abroad occur
on U.S. soil, this argument may well sway voters, however unconcerned Americans say they are about
terrorism as a major problem forthe United States. And with the U.S. economy improving, Republicans
may see greater value in shifting the focus to foreign policy. According to a CNN/ORC poll, 57 percent of
the public is already unhappy with the way the president is handling the Islamic State and thinks the
approach is failing.
The Clinton Card
Whether the leading from behind trope will stick to Hillary Clintonis another matter. On the one hand,
she was Obamas secretary of state and supported and acquiesced in the presidents foreign policies. On
certain issues, particularly Syria and dealing with Russian President Vladimir Putin, she wanted to be
tougher. But on diplomacy with Iran and getting tough with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu,
she sided with the president. How she is going to walk that fine line? Conveying a tougher posture than her
president while not walking away from him and the policies she supported will be no easy task.
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It will be doubly difficult for her precisely because she touts her foreign-policy experience. So the bullseye on her campaign back will be bigger. Then there are those pesky other State Department distractions
email-gate, Benghazi, and trying to square her staunch defense of womens rights with the Clinton
Foundations taking money from some pretty anti-feminist Saudis and Gulfies.
One way is to change the channel and try to focus on her foreign-policy expertise. She is hands down the
most experienced of the field on foreign policy. For one thing, Clinton could be the first secretary of state
since James Buchanan to ascend to the presidency. And private email account or not, and Benghazi too,
she will argue that the cruel anddangerous world beyond Americas shores mandates that a president
know that world. Of course, Clintons Republican opponents will almost certainly want to focus on foreign
policy in an effort to show that Clinton doesnt know the world. Her rivals (and eventually ultimate rival)
will likely try to use issues such as the attack on the Benghazi diplomatic compound and her support for
Obamas Iran policy and criticism of Netanyahu to prove that she is weak and that she doesnt understand
how to deal with Americas enemies or allies.
In many elections, foreign policy doesnt count all that much. But in this one it just might. With the
economy improving and with the cruel and unpredictable world beyond Americas shores, in 2016 foreign
policy is going to assume a much bigger role in who Americans look to lead them. From possible terrorist
attacks at home, to what to do about an AUMF and the use of force, to dealing with Putins next move on
the Euro-chessboard, theres no running away from the world in this election, probably right up to
Election Day.
So candidates, dust off that atlas; start boning up now on which states border Ukraine, the differences
between Sunnis and Shiites, and what distinguishes the Islamic State from al-Nusra Front. A few months
from now you just might be called on to come up with the answers.
Photo credit: Sean Gardner/Getty Images
In the Supreme Leader We Trust

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Set aside D.C.s partisan follies and there are real questions both sides should be asking
about our Iran policy.
BY DAVID ROTHKOPF
MARCH 11, 2015
And we have a winner!
In a Congress full of partisan hacks, nitwits, and know-nothings, young Tom Cotton of Arkansas really had
to do something special to have his blunder considered more awful than the prior lows, missteps, and
gaffes that have come to symbolize this bleak era in the history of Americas legislative branch. But the
letter he authored to Irans supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, represents the worst single example
of partisan meddling in an ongoing international negotiation in modern American history.
The letter, co-signed by 46 other Republican senators, shows far more than a complete disregard for
Americas long-standing tradition of having partisanship stop at the waters edge. It represents a clear
effort to undermine the constitutionally mandated responsibility of the president of the United States to
conduct U.S. foreign policy. It also simultaneously damaged American credibility in the eyes of the other
nations with which we are involved in the negotiating process and in the eyes of the Iranians with whom
we were negotiating. Think of the precedent: If Congress simply sent out letters saying, We will overturn
whatever the president agrees to, who would negotiate with us after that? And not just on one issue, but
on anything?
Cotton and his colleagues are clearly not ready for prime time. If a young, inexperienced executive arrived
at a company and made such a blunder in his first 60 days, hed be out the door on his keister in
milliseconds. But not only did Cotton decide to make this grandly stupid gesture out of a stunning surfeit
of ignorance, but almost half the U.S. Senate had the bad judgment to go along with him. All of them
showed not only a disregard for the Constitution, but as Leslie Gelb rightly noted on the Daily Beast, also a
disregard for actually trying to make progress defanging Iran. Not secondarily, their move demonstrates a
deeply flawed understanding of international law. And in a telling show of irony, no one articulated that
quite so well as Irans canny foreign minister, Javad Zarif.
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Finally, the true test of the egregiousness of this move is illustrated by the fact that it so quickly
overshadowed the newly minted worst moment in the history of partisan foreign-policy meddling: the
invitation extended by House Speaker John Boehner to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu an
event that took place only the week before.
Were in new territory here, folks. There has always been partisanship in Washington. There never really
was a period of good old days despite what the old-timers say. After all, Aaron Burr shot and killed
Alexander Hamilton. But what were seeing here now is the scorched-earth nihilism of a bunch of partisan
yahoos who seem to quite literally believe that their purpose in life is to ensure nothing gets done in
Washington or around the world on behalf of the American people. They unblinkingly and without pang
of conscience have gone into the business of subordinating our national interests to their political agenda.
Not only is this ugly and by ugly I mean Roger Ailes ugly; lowest-common-denominator, epithethurling, all-heat, no-light, cable-TV ugly but it could not be more ill-timed. We have great challenges
facing us abroad, and this is really not the moment to blow up our foreign-policy apparatus.
Furthermore, I should add that in part, the reason it is the wrong moment is that the other party in this
food fight the president of the United States is not helping matters either with his own partisanship
(and that of his teams). And their own consistent foreign-policy bumbling isnt helping matters either.
This is a time of big challenges and complex issues that require the best in both parties to help each other
help the American people find decent solutions. And what were getting instead are political suicide
bombers who are blowing up initiatives that may have been shaky or ill-considered to begin with, but
happened to be the only initiatives on the table.
It will no doubt be seen as wildly inflammatory, but let me describe the consequences of this behavior in
the starkest possible language: Political dysfunction in Washington is a much greater threat to each and
every one of us than the Islamic State will ever be. It is time that a concerted effort by reasonable people of
both parties to restore something like a functioning bipartisan foreign policy be undertaken with the
same urgency we would require of any other effort to address a major immediate threat to our national
well-being. (And save yourself the effort in the comments section: Such an effort does not begin with
saying the problem is primarily the other partys fault. These recent incidents are more the fault of the
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saying the problem is primarily the other partys fault. These recent incidents are more the fault of the
GOP on Capitol Hill. But Democrats have done their own damage in this regard. So has the president. Time
to get over it and move on, or deal with more of the consequences.)
The Iran issue is a particularly good case in point because we need to strip away the partisan name-calling
and reflexive positioning to fully understand it. It is too important and it is far too complex. You literally
cannot see the truth of this situation through a partisan lens.
For example, I have seen smart, well-meaning defenders of the president argue that war is the only
alternative to achieving a deal with the Iranians.
This is just not true. First, it is hard to imagine any circumstances under which this president will go to
war with Iran. Its just goes against his every instinct as we have seen. He is also too invested in this deal to
let that happen. Frankly, that goes for circumstances in which Iran cuts a deal and then cheats. The White
House can swear all options are on the table all it likes. We have six years of evidence that suggests
otherwise, six years of the president being the one person on his own team most likely to block the use of
force or even strong or provocative action when it is proposed. Might a breakdown produce more tension
and more sanctions? Yes. But a war involving the United States? Very unlikely.
On the other hand, a deal does not guarantee that we dont have a war. If there were a deal but certain
other regional actors the Israelis, for example did not trust it, then they could take unilateral action.
Is that likely? No. More opportune moments for that kind of action have come and gone. (Further proof
that war is not a likely outcome.) But is it possible? Sure, especially if some in the region dont feel that the
deal in question really puts a nuclear Iran out of range, if they feel, as seems likely, that the deal leaves it a
realistic possibility. So while engaging in an armed conflict is not likely, suggesting that a deal means the
issue is completely resolved is also unrealistic.
Other rhetoric around the Iran deal issue is also open to question by critics on both sides of the aisle. The
president and his team responded to Netanyahus critique by saying the Israeli prime minister wanted a
deal that was so strong that it would be impossible to achieve. The implication was that the only
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deal that was so strong that it would be impossible to achieve. The implication was that the only
alternative to what some see as a weak deal is an impossibly strong deal. This is ridiculous. Gradations
exist. It is possible to fairly critique this deal by admitting it is better than no deal and weaker than it ought
to be. Just not in Washington. Not in the overheated debate of today.
It is also not necessarily the case that no deal is better than a weak deal, as some of the Iran hawks suggest.
It is possible that a deal that is weak but is then well administered, carefully monitored, and assiduously
enforced would actually make the region considerably safer than it would be without such a deal.
But there are other levels of reasonable concerns that we ought to be debating. There is the concern of
important allies that such a deal represents a new tilt toward Iran. The White House can offer all the
rhetoric it wants to the contrary, but right now one of the very biggest worries about its Middle East policy
ought to center on the degree to which it depends on the goodwill of not just Iran but in particular of
Khamenei. He is the last word on Irans direction. And not only is he going to be key to whether Iran
honors any deal it strikes, but he is turning out to be Americas most important real partner in the battle
against the Islamic State. We can deny it, but the facts say otherwise. It was Iranian-backed Shiite militias
scoring the gains in Tikrit this past week. It is Irans Quds Force that is the pointy end of the Iraqi spear in
fighting the Islamic State. The Iranian government is really guiding the Baghdad regime. What if its
intentions are not simply to get rid of the Islamic State, but to assert greater power in Iraq or even to
effectively annex part of it? That is certainly the kind of fear of further Shiite overreach that led many
Sunnis to accept the Islamic States first moves as they grew more disenchanted with the last Shiitedominated Iraqi government. Have we really thought through the consequences of depending so heavily
on them?
And it is not just with the nuclear deal or the war against the Islamic State that Iran is the critical player. It
is key to the outcome in Yemen, where Shiite forces have taken control of vast parts of the country, and it
is the primary ally of President Bashar al-Assad in Syria. Iran is in fact the one making the big gains, taking
the best advantage of the Middle Easts unrest right now. And therefore the success or failure of most of
the Obama administrations efforts in the region currently depend far too heavily on Khamenei. This is a
man who views the United States as an enemy. Israel too. Many of our other allies in the region as well. He
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has openly supported terrorist groups like Hezbollah and has been a destabilizing force in the region as
long as he has been in office. Certainly it is reasonable to argue that depending on him to such a degree
should be viewed with concern, especially given his precarious health. Who knows who will replace him
and what that persons views will be?
In fact, critics of the pending deal who actually seek a safer Middle East and a safer world should really
focus on figuring out how to take the best deal the United States (and the other nations involved) can
strike and make the most of it. They should be asking: How do you offset concerns that it might be
violated? How do you offset concerns that it might make our allies uncomfortable? Clearly, a broader
regional strategy is required. Working with our traditional allies in the region all of which are wary of
Iran we should support the development of a tighter alliance and effective capabilities to deter any
aggression or mischief by the Iranians. We should work with the countries that helped strike the deal to
ensure that the United Nations and all appropriate agencies are tireless in their enforcement of the deal
and that very clear penalties for missteps are enforced. (This especially means that as sanctions are lifted,
it is clear to the most important players in places like Europe, Russia, and China that the sanctions can and
will be immediately reimposed with meaningful penalties added.
In fact, what should be clear to all is that just as the interim deal for which there is a March 24 deadline
looming is only a step toward a final deal this year, so too should any deal be seen as just a first step toward
a major Iranian policy reversal and the ramping-up of a broad array of measures to ensure that Iran is
honoring the terms of the agreement. Further, and not secondarily, it is important that we do not become
so mesmerized by the prospect of this deal that we ignore the consequences either of Irans active efforts
to gain influence in the region or of the countrys other problematic initiatives, such as its ongoing
cyberwar against us. We cannot reward Iran for an express intention to change its nuclear direction with a
carte blanche to destabilize the region, seek to change its character, or attack us. When Blanche DuBois
depended on the kindness of strangers, there was at least the possibility they might be people of goodwill.
In this instance, we are depending on the kindness of a known adversary, and that requires a special kind
of steely determination and constructive skepticism that only a bipartisan U.S. foreign-policy initiative
can really bring to bear. When the likes of Cotton and Boehner willfully abrogate their responsibilities in
that regard, they may think they are striking out at the president, but in reality they are putting their
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that regard, they may think they are striking out at the president, but in reality they are putting their
country at ever greater risk.
ATTA KENARE/AFP/Getty Images
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Why The 2016 Campaigners' Cliff's Notes Should Include ISIS, Ukraine, and The Middle East

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Why The 2016 Campaigners' Cliff's Notes Should Include ISIS, Ukraine, and The Middle East

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MARCH 13, 2015

No. 7: Reconstructing Afghanistan

No. 9: Can democracies conduct an effective foreign policy?

Why the 2016 Campaigners Cliffs Notes

MARCH 12, 2015

In the Supreme Leader We Trust

MARCH 11, 2015

And we have a winner!

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