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The five structural columns of risk analysis techniques

Essay
Antonio Fernando Navarro [1]

Presentation
In this essay aims to treat the topic related to risk analyses, these risks taken here not only as a result of
dangerous situations that bring or represent danger, as well as presenting, simultaneously, all the features
required for a risk to be considered insurable, employing himself, figuratively, the pillars as fundamentals on
which should be based on the risk analysis, to achieve the desired results.
Decision makers usually are based on facts and data, experiences good or unsuccessful, but hardly contemplate
the horizon at long term, prospecting the future risk. Thus, it is intended in this article present some
considerations on the theme and some proposals that may be useful in the search for the future success of the
enterprises or corporate continuity. It is worth mentioning that according to Hemard [2], the risk to become
"insurable" must present the following characteristics: be uncertain, future, possible, independent of the will of
the parties, capable of causing damage or loss and these are conditions they can be measured. In this way, the
definition of Hemard 1 already leads us to look to the future and realize that the multiple possibilities of
entanglement are possible and should always be considered. Its definition includes both a mixture of concepts,
adding uncertainty, i.e. the possibility of right or wrong, excluding perhaps the future State, or distant from the
present moment, the direct involvement of any of the parties to the emergence of the occurrence, the certainty
that the event will be able to cause loss or damage, since, to the contrary, only one study and register warrant,
and adds the fact that the consequences of these risks can be assessed, because unlike, he wouldn't have policies
to promote repairs and/or damages. It is necessary to emphasize the aspect of the affective value of an asset. One
person received a heritage well and very fond of this. Destroyed by various causes what would be the value of
the repair? No matter how much you seek to achieve the exact value still could not meet the wishes of whoever
lost, since for this that well lost no "had value" or was something immeasurable. Are important concepts for
anyone who wants to devote himself to the study of the risks and the analysis of consequences of same, with
views on the criteria for compensation or reparation.
Introduction
The technical analysis subsidiaries for the acceptance of risks and their rates must take into account the analysis
not only of the risks as well as associated losses. To this end, it is necessary to a better understanding of the
failure modes that generate claims, as well as the need to interrupt the process of spread of the losses, which can
be by means of suitable devices and equipment, as well as altering the characteristics of the buildings and the
adequacy of layout. There are several ways or procedures for analyzing a risk taken here as an enterprise,
installation, manufacturing or industrial unit, or something that is important and valuable to awaken interest in
insuring specific. There are from simple checks with simple notes and photographic reporting, use of forms
containing the minimum information required for the underwriter to accept and taxing the risk until the
employment of sophisticated computer programs.
It is suggested the use of risk analysis techniques based on five pillars as follows. Also understand that for every
situation there might be a more appropriate analysis. Over decades of activity we're used to talk more with those
of operate and perform maintenance on equipment and installations and in the perception of the climate in the

work environment. We understand that a considerable portion of claims could be avoided if there was a larger
attention to employees who operate the facility. Human participation in accidents is prepondervel and cannot be
left aside.

1st Pillar: motivation for the risk analysis


Firstly you have to have the motivation to undertake a risk assessment. The motivation may be the previous
evaluation, risk behavior along a well protection contract, or contract of insurance, and even at the end of this
contract.
The risks are assessed, firstly with the aim of identifying its causes, and, in a second moment, its consequences,
this important evaluation in order to obtain the information relating to the amount of losses. On the occasion of
the materialization of the risks the final results can be translated by:
property damage,
financial damage,
personal injury,
damage to the image of the companies,
civil liability damage
damages for loss of market, among others.
The risk analyses are structured as follows:
Analysis for evaluation of potential losses and/or damages;
Analysis for the identification of possible extensions of the losses and/or damages;
Analysis for the identification of probability of occurrence and manifestation of the risks claims.
The tests usually are initiated with:
understanding of the workplace and its surroundings, through actions of inspections, risk management or
implementation of methodologies like surveys;
carrying out technical surveys by reading specific bibliographies, addressing issues such as those existing in the
environment inspected. Often a specific analysis may be subject to specific, usually also study published in
scientific or technical articles;
conducting research on databases that indicate not only the amount of events in facilities similar to the
environment under study, as well as to provide data on the losses and additional information. These databases
may be disclosed by specialized companies or obtained with insurers.
If the statistics are appropriate and the information may be obtained through the teams of operators of facilities
and equipment, as well as the maintenance of these goods can move to the next step, in which can be associated
with the groups of information obtained at existing facilities. Two information are important for risk pricing:
frequency of accidents, or interval between occurrences of faults, and
severity or seriousness of losses.
Very simplified, the at-risk pure can be represented by the Association of these indicators.
tR = x S
Following a structured process adopted in the conceptual analysis of losses in the first phase are used computer
models to the reproduction of the damage. At this stage may be employed models available on the market. The
following are the values obtained are entered in spreadsheets and, with the use of appropriate methodologies
(there is almost a hundred methods of analysis that can be used or adapted), trace the curves that contain the
points regarding the frequency and severity of losses. The curve can be called risk rates curve.

One must be attentive to the choice of the worksheets so as not to have rates directly linked to the severity of the
losses or the frequency, in isolation. Frequency growth gives us an information, that the claims are frequent and
common or, due to a variety of possible causes, since the lack of maintenance to the misuse of the facility. The
severity of losses provides other information, of equipment or installations and have high value or are relevant to
the process, as well as those losses have the possibility to expand to other environments.
A risk analysis is not based solely on interpretation of the "vision" of a specialist during the recognition of risks
in field activities, but rather, supported or supported by technical analysis structured and recognized. Some of
the techniques and/or methodologies employed in the processes of analysis are presented below. It is worth
saying that the number of methods of analysis or interpretation or growing simulation, developed by specialized
companies in this area. That means that much of what you have today is the product of analyses and
interpretations of scholars, developers of software companies and institutions which cast products for the
development of the activities of inspection environments. These relations are established through the interference
of man (operator) with the system under study or foreseen safety systems, or in situations that may generate
different types of damage, according to the way in which the event occurs. Can be presented as examples of
analysis and methodologies or, in addition, as statistical support for simulation of computational or events:[3]
1. AAE (event Tree analysis technique for the analysis of the consequences of an unwanted event, describing the
temporal sequence of facts, which can be generated due to the occurrence of equipment failures, problems in a
given system or due to operational errors during the execution of a given activity, establishing a series of
relationships between the initial event and subsequent events [interference], which, when combined, result in the
aftermath of the accident);
2. AAF (fault tree analysis-method of analysis of products and processes that allows for a systematic and
standardized assessment of possible failures, establishing its consequences and guided the adoption of preventive
or corrective maintenance);
3. AHP (Analytic Hierarchy Process-rationally understandable procedure for structuring problem, representing
and quantifying the elements comprising it, relates them with the global targets and to evaluate alternative
solutions. It is widely used in the most varied situations and in the most varied segments);
4. Alpha of Cronbach's alpha (validation of measurements carried out through the use of Likert scales, widely
used methodology for assessing levels of process reliability);
5. AMD (Multi-criteria decision Aid method used as a tool of analysis for decision making support in conflict
resolution negotiated, in trouble with multiple criteria. Is based on Newtonian and Cartesian method of thinking
which seeks to treat complexity with decomposition and Division of the problem factors, which can be further
decomposed into new factors to the lowest level, establishing relationships that can then be synthesized);
6. Bayesian analysis (Bayesian Approach to statistical inference is proposed to combine data obtained from
observations with evaluations or subjective judgments);
7. Analysis of Clusters (a cluster is a collection of objects that are similar to each other (according to some fixed
similarity criterion) and objects belonging to other dissimilar clusters);
8. Process analysis and projects (analysis that takes into account the possible associations and their results in
processes and projects, aiming at the Elimination of failures);
9. Integrated analysis of scenarios (environments or scenarios are horizons that have high probability of
occurrence and that can be associated with other, randomly or not, change the expected results);
10. 6 Sigma (measurement of the performance of process-metric to check the amount of defects or
nonconformities from control methodologies that cause the amount of these defects remain below 3.4 defects per

million of services or goods manufactured. The methodology of control metric, is based in DMAIC and
DMADV methodologies);
11. Multi-Analysis scenarios (multi-cenrios analyses take into consideration that there are inferences between
those and that these can be evaluated, with a view to reducing impacts of occurrences);
12. Multivariate Analysis (statistical methods that analyze multiple measures simultaneously on each individual
or object under investigation);
13. Pre-task Analysis (risk analyses carried out prior to the start of tasks);
14. Cognitive Tests (cognitive design proposes a working explanation of the mind on three levels: to the physical
level, neurobiological; the symbolic level distinct and irreducible to physical; and the semantic or
representational level itself.);
15. ANOVA (analysis of variance -used when you want to decide whether sampling differences observed are real
(caused by significant differences in populations observed) or casual (arising from mere sampling variability).
Therefore, this analysis assumes that the chance only produces minor deviations, being the major differences
generated by actual causes);
16. AHP (Analytic Hierarchy Process-method to assist people in making complex decisions. More than
determining what the correct decision, the AHP helps people choose and justify your choice);
17. Bayesian analysis (describes uncertainties about invisible amounts of probabilistic form. Uncertainties are
modified periodically after observations of new data or results. The operation that calibrates the measurement
uncertainty is known as Bayesian operation employing Bayes);
18. Analysis of uncertainty or Normality of processes;
19. Integrated analysis of work (study and careful documentation of each step of the process of work, identifying
existing or potential dangerous situations and determining the most appropriate way to perform activities for the
reduction, elimination or mitigation of hazards);
20. Pre-task Analysis (methodology that associates employment of locks or barriers to existing risks protecting
workers and working environment);
21. APR-preliminary analysis of risks;
22. Fault tree;
23. Event Tree;
24. Behavioral Audit;
25. Barrier crashes;
26. BBS (Behaviour Based Safety-application that allows, with the file information brought by security
professionals in their field visits, and in workers ' behavioral analysis, identify the situations of risks and the
actions needed for the changes, aimed at reducing the rates of accidents);
27. BOM (Bill of Material-groups in just one location, all static data that describe the attributes of the items used
in company-identification number, name, number of engineering drawing, lead time, safety stock, among others);
28. Bowtie Analysis method (the method of analysis that represents the drawing of a bow tie, being employed to
analyze and demonstrate causal relationships in high-risk scenarios);
29. BSC (Balanced Scorecard);
30. COBIT (Control Objectives for Information and Related Technology);
31. Safety culture;
32. Organizational Culture;
33. DELPHI (programming language);

34. DMAIC (Define Measure Analyze Improve Control-structured methodology in five phases: the first defines
the problem under review from consumer feedback and the reassessment of the goals of the project; the second
one has the measurement and investigation of problems relating "causes-effects; in the third stage these are the
data and the map to identify the root causes, or root causes, tracing-if prognoses for the implantation of the
opportunities for improvement; in the fourth step the processes in place are improved and optimized, based on
usual techniques of redesigns of experiments, standardization of work processes, development of new processes;
in the fifth step control processes to ensure that the variances observed and analyzed do not happen again.
Stresses that such methodology pose be applied to any productive activity, including the operational activities of
insurance);
35. DMADV (Design for Six Sigma-methodology supplement, support or confirmation analysis, which,
following the example of the DMAIC suggests, in five stages: setting goals that are consistent and coherent with
the problems observed and/or the demands of customers, the company's strategies aligned; measurement and
identification of critical to quality characteristics, product capabilities, production process capability and risks;
and development of alternatives to existing design; project optimization and planning and control activities tests;
design review, additional production testing and analysis of results, all before the devices operate productive);
36. ECM (Engineering Change Management);
37. Electre Tri (troubleshooting ordered classification);
38. Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP-systems composed of a single data base and by modules that support
various activities of business processes of the companies);
39. Behavioural Factors;
40. Human Factors;
41. FDD (Feature Driven Development);
42. FINE (Mathematical Evaluations for Controlling Hazards);
43. Fuzzy (logic based on the theory of Fuzzy sets, differing from the traditional logic systems in their
characteristics and their details);
44. GUT (array of Severity, urgency and trend);
45. HAZARD (same as risk);
46. HAZID (Hazard Identification);
47. HAZOP (Hazard and Operability Studies);
48. HFACS (Human Factors Analysis and Classification System);
49. HP (Health Promotion);
50th. LCCA (Life Cycle Cost Analysis);
51. Likert scale type (psychometric response used in questionnaires, and is the most widely used scale in opinion
polls. To respond to a questionnaire based on this scale, the asked specify their level of agreement with a
statement);
52. MAGIC (Multi-Attribute Global Inference);
53. MAIM (The Merseyside Accident Information Model);
54. Mind maps (interpretatica and discussional analysis process where problems are laid out in diagrams for
study purposes);
55. Risk Maps;
56. MASP (Method of analysis and solution of problems);
57. MCDA (Multicriteria Decision Aid);

58. MCDM (Multi Criteria Decision Making);


59. MCR (classification matrix of risks);
60. MOC (Management of Change;
61. Monte Carlo (any method of a class of statistical methods based on random massive sampling to obtain
numerical results, that is, successive simulations for high repeat number of times, to calculate probabilities
heuristically, as if, in fact, if the actual results achieved);
62. MORT (The Management Oversight and Risk Tree analysis of the root causes of incidents and accidents,
through computational methodologies);
63. MRP (Material Resource Planning-computerized inventory control and production in support to the activities
of business management as a way to minimize costs while maintaining adequate material and levels required for
the production processes of the company);
64. Eight Senses (Seiri, Seiton, Seiso, Seiketsu, Shitsuke, Shiakari Yaro, Shido, Sestuyaku);
65. OLAP (Online Analytical Processing-system that uses simplified methods of navigation and search, through
which end users can quickly analyze numerous scenarios, generate reports "ad-hoc", and discover trends and
facts, as well as a source of business data);
66. PDCA (Plan-Do-Check-Action);
67. PDM (Product Data Management-Data Management Systems of the product);
68. Ranked impact and likelihood (PERIL);
69. PSP (process safety program);
70. QRAM (qualitative risk assessment method);
71. Swiss cheese (technique that uses the slice of Swiss cheese and her holes to exemplify the vulnerability of
any containment barriers risks);
72. RAM (Reliability, Availability and Maintainability);
73. Network of Petry (mathematical representation of discrete distributed systems);
74. IF (number of events);
75. SIAR (Integrated System of risk analysis);
76. SIL (system integrity level);
77. BPMS Systems (powerful management tool, to ensure that the processes are being effectively run as
modeled);
78. SR (number of risks);
79. Survey (methodology or process of obtaining data or information about a particular environment, through a
questionnaire drawn up by professionals who have experience in the subject and work out the issues. The greater
the expertise of professionals is the best search results. The results can be directed to the dangers, for example,
or the incidence of risk, and even as workers in that Environment Act on so-called abnormal situations);
80. SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats-matrix that evaluates potential internal and external
to the company, as strengths and weaknesses, opportunities and challenges);
81. Modularization techniques;
82. Random Techniques;
83. Queueing theory;
84. Chaos theory;
85. Domino theory;
86. Graph theory (branch of mathematics that studies the relationships between the objects of a given set);

87. TIC (Critical Incidents technique);


88. ALL (multi-criteria decision making-Multicriteria methods have long been used in solving decision-making
problems, since they seek to clarify the decision the possibilities of choices);
89. Triple Bottom Line (People, Planet, Profit corresponds to the results of an organization measured in terms of
social, environmental, and economic);
90. TRIPOD (methodology where the preliminary report of investigation, possible models Tripod Beta of
incident are produced to take further an investigation and seeking facts which in turn lead to the validation and
refinement of the model. This continues until all the relevant facts have been identified and the tree Tripod Beta
reflects exactly the incident);
91. Combined Variables;
92. Weibull (continuous probability distribution);
93. XFMEA (Software for analysis of FMEA (failure mode, effects, and analysis) and
94. FMECA (Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis).
Although the methodologies presented be big there are still numerous other, not mentioned here, applied to
specific cases, which are adapted or corrected for general application. It is also important to mention that there
will always be methodologies which employ computer programs for the mathematical treatment of the results.
Regardless of the chosen methodology must consider the fact that the studies be applied to analysis of future
risks, possible and capable of producing damage or loss and these can be priced.

2nd Pillar: Risk Inspections


In the second pillar of our analysis process emphasizes the realization of inspections as a key element in risk
analysis. The evaluations are conducted for qualitative and quantitative purposes. When you evaluate something
qualitatively is having the knowledge of type and risk characteristics, including its manifestation and spread. On
the other hand, if the evaluation is quantitative, not identified the type of problem risk but rather the
prejudice that this might mean, acting only on the final consequences. The fall of a worker during a repair
activity of building facade, the crash of a rocket shortly after its launch, the breaking of a dam, the failure of a
product launch among other examples, it means not only financial loss, but also the characteristics of which was
affected by the risk. It is interesting to reprise that in any situation exists in the first place, something, a situation
or a dangerous environment. Because of the "danger", can be caused by one or several risks. For risk manifests
itself differently, but have in common the fact of causing loss and or damage.
1) Qualitative Analyses
Are analyses which make it possible to note the outcome of the occurrence of a risk sinister. The risk is the
immediate moment to danger, assay said that the danger before the risk. Dangerous situations leading to risks
that can result in bad consequences. For example, a person comes into a bank branch to withdraw a sum of
money. This is a dangerous risk. Upon leaving the Bank the person is followed by thugs and robbed. We're
pricing the risk the first step would be to verify the amount of money taken by the Bandit. But, is that the pricing
of risk? How can insert personal injuries and losses due to the fact that the person won't be able to honor its
commitments by the lack of money?
In the definition of Danger on the sack of money was implied the risk of theft. The consequences can be not only
the loss of value drawn as well as the death of the person. This combination represents the worst-case scenario.
In the example introduces the question of the risk associated with the scenarios. These scenarios are creating
additional risks to the extent that intertwine. We could associate the set of scenarios the sack of money on a day

of little movement of people on the street, the scenario of this activity be at night, and there is no patrolling in
place.
The set of scenarios makes the risk virtually inevitable. The so-called "qualitative" analysis should be adjusted
so that over time should incorporate the impacts that future scenarios may cause risk assessed at any given time.

b) Quantitative Analysis
The technical analysis of risks, when dealing with the quantitative issue are focusing on impacts caused by the
materialization of risks. Quantification methodologies are varied, but present a convergence of definition of the
percentage of goods that can be affected by the accident. An event of civil liability leads to a prejudice that can
be estimated, not only on the basis of the activities developed by the company, as well as by the surrounding
environment. Other risks may be added such as: fire, explosions, wind storms, theft, destruction caused by
natural events, breakdown of machinery, design flaws, failures of execution of the projects, fatigue of materials,
absence or inadequate maintenance, human error, among so many other more.
When the risks are due to human behavior or having as the cause the man or his reactions in work environments,
NAVARRO (2011) presents the following table[4] :
Main Factors
Hunger
Disease
Drug addiction

Rush

Inattention

Stress

Community Contributes Factors


Poor diet
Lack of food
Ill be
Use of drugs that affect the balance or understanding
Use of drugs that affect the understanding or performance
End of the journey
Termination of service
Hunger
Ill be physical or emotional
Pressure by the end of the activity
Excessive journeys
Abnormal situations in the work environment (proximity of electrical
power cut, immediate need for adjustments or repairs of equipment,
momentary interruption of the company's industry, etc.
Disease
Hunger
Ill be physical or emotional
Possibility of the football team win or lose later
Expectation of receiving any calls
Family problems
Financial problems
Physical conditions of the work environment
Adverse environmental conditions
Excessive conversations around
Excessive journeys
Disease
Hunger
Layoffs, cutting people or reduction of activities
Work environment
Interpersonal relationships at work
Adverse environmental conditions
Excessive journeys
Dark, dimly lit or excessively illuminated
Pressure by the completion of the tasks
Pressure by supervisors or colleagues

Lack of training or
training
Lack of skill
Lack of knowledge
Psychological
problems
Family problems
Adverse
environmental
conditions

Ergonomic aspects

No training
Training poorly transmitted
Low capacity of assimilation
Understanding of training
Understanding of the activity
Lack of skill
Culture
School training
Diseases/disorders
Disorders caused by pressure
Motivational factors
Diseases in family
Financial pressures
Cold
Heat
Moisture
Vibration
Moving of machines and equipment
Workstation
Desktop
Noise
Cold or heat
Vibration
Excessive Insolation
Lack or excess lighting
Excessive Conversations around
Working conditions (salubrious, unhealthy, painful or dangerous)
Table drawn up by AFANP

Many factors community contributes end for repeating, at various times. The "hunger" which can lead to a rush
to the end of the activity also generates the "inattention". The discomfort of the workstation can lead to hurry or
inattention.
One should also consider that there are stressors in the work environment factors community contributes to the
occurrence of accidents, as the pressure exerted by the Head Office for the completion of activities, the pace of
work, mainly in shifts, long journeys to work, interpersonal relationships in the workplace, environmental
conditions, including lighting or painting the walls, operating with machinery and equipment that are not
familiar to workers and others.
Can be added to the list of main factors, others are related to psychological/psychiatric aspects, for which there
is no adequate attention on the achievement of the admission exams and periodicals, but which are extremely
important to pinpoint the causes of the occurrences of accidents. A stressor factor to a sane person will not have
the same impact if that person has some kind of disorder. Some of these are:

Anguish;
Anxiety;
Anti-social behaviour;
Compulsions;
Blame exaggerated or unreasonable by any situation or occurrence;
Cognitive deficits;
Attention deficits;
And other chemical dependencies;
Frequent distraction;
Cognitive disorders;
Diseases;

Environmental factors;
Genetic factors;
Traumatic factors;
Phobias are exaggerated;
Habits that are not consistent with the company's activities and the environment;
Hysteria;
Humor;
Manias;
Fears;
OCD;
Perceptions;
Trouble concentrating;
Problems of Memorization;
Excessive routines that cause stress;
Stress;
Behavioral disorders;
Panic disorders;
Personality disorders;
Obsessive compulsive disorders;
Emotional trauma;
Physical trauma;
Psychological trauma, among others;
Continuous use of medicines;
Use of drugs.
The amount of factors is very wide, and that the working environment and even the work routines can initiate or
trigger specific disorders or not, which are in suspended animation. When "explode", often without reason, the
accident has arisen. Inserting text part of the author vis--vis the employee contribution to the occurrence of
accidents provide greater understanding of the readers about the complexity of the task of evaluating
environments and define risks.
A risk is not necessarily a product of just cause, but rather a set of causes associated with negative scenarios,
how the ends results causing loss or damage. Deconstructing aphorisms, a loss can be greater than the value of
the own well involved, and this turns out to be more common than you think [5]. Risks involving civilian
responsibilities are difficult pricing and the amount of the loss will depend on a lot of legal interpretations. In
another example can cite the risk of fire. Imagining that the losses are material 100% covered, should be
consider as well that the affected facilities will no longer produce. Even though the company has hired specific
insurance coverage of loss of profits (profits), yet there will be losses as the replacement of the goods in
processing phase. If it still exists a set of insurance policies that cover all the damage, we will still have the
losses arising from the discontinuation of the workforce. We can exhaust the examples here, not to be redundant,
but the analysis can go and we will certainly prove deepening that will exist always non-reimbursable losses.
Taking as a reference the example from the previous topic, the worst-case scenario could be the total loss of the
money withdrawn from the Bank and the death of the person by the assailant. However, the customer at the Bank
could have cashed the money and made other financial transactions, which would reduce the amount of money
withdrawn. We can't say what the consequences would be "less bad", since there was still the risk of death,
compounded now by the frustration of the outlaw received amount smaller than expected. The identification of
risk and the probability of occurrence is possible, especially in these modern times. But, the correct
interpretation of the results is not always possible, since it may be associated with numerous risk factors.

In a second example, an industry has a whole apparatus of equipment and devices of fire prevention and fighting,
which together, allows 87% of fires are extinguished before these flies to other environments and become fire. In
this situation or scenario the expert calculates the amount of goods subject to risk and likely reduction of these
due to the full operation of the systems of protection. On a second visit to the site, it turns out that the system is
practically inoperative due to lack of maintenance, or the lack of electric power, or due to lack of water. So, what
represented a possibility of loss of 13% (100%-87%) and becomes a lot bigger. This greater exposure to risk will
mean an increase in insurance costs. On his first visit to the site Inspector hardly knew the existing systems
would work. But, the important thing is to assess risks with and without the activation of protection devices.
A quantitative analysis represents the result of the set of actions that may or may not be generated by special
methodologies and expressing particular percentage of probability of occurrences[6]. The fact that refer to
percentage, or probability intervals is, in some ways, an uncertainty, because we're dealing with future events
and possible. With this feature a future event is easily influenced by scenarios that can go if unveiling over given
time.
The scenario [7] Gale, here associated with the risk, is highly complex to be evaluated, because that would have
direct influence of minimally more than a dozen contributing factors and exerting influence each other. Keep-if
you're treating Gale event itself, but rather the consequences that this event causes in goods insured. This is not a
crapshoot where if you ask what is the probability of the face with a number appear more often than others after
a number of releases. Issues like this are resolved through the statistics and probabilistic calculations. There are
distinctions between the roll of the dice and the occurrence of natural phenomena.
When one quantifies a risk may exist disparate situations, as for example, the risk of not being influenced by
others. In a carpentry the fire hazard is greater than in a hardware frame. The main reason is that in carpentry for
more common fuels materials than in a frame. The fire risk in carpentry may be exacerbated, especially when not
taken preventive measures, such as cleaning, organization and control of energy sources or to produce sparks,
removal of wood waste that are close to equipment, among other actions. On the occasion of the visit of the risk
analyst carpentry is neat and organized surely the risk rate[8] will be less than if not so organized that way. This is
one of the major problems encountered in the activities of risk pricing. A general rule is if the database or the
history of occurrences in the same industry or in similar industries. These actions end up causing the periodic
inspections of risks are important.

Risk inspection
Those responsible for managing the technological risks, sometimes contesting and resist to consider how the
public perceives and understands the risk, because they are accustomed to decide through an approach
traditionally employed in the field of risk analysis, i.e. based on data resulting from experiments and
probabilistic analysis, the so-called "Risk" Goals, and do not consider the "Subjective Risks"[9] -lay risk
perception due to-because they could incur errors of estimation of the scale of the risksuch as, for example,
damaging a technology that has a greater magnitude of risk perception, even being technically safe.
Technical distinction itself in "Risk Objective" and "Subjective Risk" is controversial, because, in a complex
area and little explored as risk analysis, the "Risk" Goal, which should be reproducible (i.e. generate results the
same, regardless of who performs the analysis), not because its determination possesses subjectivity, since it
requires the exercise of judgment. Scientific trial, but, still, trial, as discussed by De MARTINI (2005)[10] .
The inspection of risk is defined as the mean for the knowledge of the risk, with a view to determining the rate to
be applied. The inspection of risk is not a prerequisite for the determination of the fee, so pure, as statistics or

commercial. It acts by setting technical shipments and stating the risk concerned may affect or be affected by
events raised at own risk or in contiguous risks. In studies of process Reliability it is customary to associate that
question the theory of Dominoes, to illustrate the point. From risk inspection and analyses which allow the
definition of fees for the risks. In a first moment arrive to at-risk or statistical rate.
The Statistical Rate is known as being the result of the Division of statistical award by the amount insured, or the
insured's own risk capital:
And

t = ((Pand ISr) x 100)%, where:

T e = rate statistics or Pure Risk rate.


P and = Statistical or Pure Prize Award without any technical or commercial shipment.
ISR = amount insured risk-specific default without any loading, taxes or fees.
The mathematical definition of Statistical Award (Pe) is the result of the product of the mathematical value of
risk (V m) by average cost verified by sinister (C m). The award is derived from statistical Statistical Rate.
Pe = [Vm x Cm] , where
Vm = n of accidents number of goods subject to risks (sample)
C m = total loss computed claims no.
In General, the Statistical Award is the relationship between total loss and computed the number of goods
subject to risks. After obtaining the Statistical Rate the Actuary began studying the Commercial Rate.
The Commercial Rate, in the same way that the Statistical Rate, is also the product of a division of the Business
Award (P c) by the amount insured risk (s r).
TC = ((Pc ISr) x 100)%
Commercial award is the result of the addition of Statistical Award with the technical/commercial Loading.
Pc = [Pe + Ct]
As Technical Load (Ct) can be understood the grouping of expenses that include:

administrative expenses of the insurer (taxes, rents, advertising, staff, etc.);

commissioning various;

financial costs charged;

forecast for catastrophic claims;

variations occurred with the characteristics of the risk, or diversion of MLR [a significant portion of
these deviations can be due to change in future scenarios of risk];

fees and charges;

accidents, etc.

For loading a percentage of own Commercial Prize, it is customary to represent your mathematical expression as:
PC = [(1 Pe)-Ct]
Shall be understood as "loads" the additions to pure rates or spreads, employees to compensate brokerage
commissioning administrative and operational expenses, financial expenses, costs for the transfer of surpluses of
the risks for cosseguradoras and reinsurers, absence of equipment or devices of protection from the risks,
companies with no experience required [11] or in the beginning of activities, among other causes.
As it turns out, we could tax a risk based on your past history and only the insured values today, without the
necessity of conducting inspections, since the risk was completely isolated from any other. Thus the occurrence
at that particular risk verified, sinister, restrict only one risk, not the sinister expansion to other areas. However,
everything is not always so. There are risks that the insured is more zealous with your assets[12], and others
where the possibility of them being hit by claims is much larger, reaching thinking that insured the grim search.

For the understanding of all of these facts is that uses risk inspection. She should always serve as a correct photo
of risk to be accepted, taken by a professional and with a good machine, so that if they have a position to apply
the fair rate. It is important to emphasize the aspect of which the insured must always be included with the rate
considered fair. What we call here as a photograph is nothing more than a report, well prepared, containing all
the information necessary for the comprehension and taxation of risk. There are several criteria and forms used
previously, but still very important for the inspection of risks, namely:
Method of points;
Fire risk assessment calculation by series of points;
Calculation of the degree of protection;
Gretner method;
M. Gretner: "Determination des mesures de protection d l ecoulant evaluation du danger potetiel d sets
fire"-S.P.I. Suiza.
Purt method;
G. Purt: "The evaluation of fire risk as for the planning of authomatical fire protection". Euralarm.
Messere method;
Cluzel and Eric Sarrat method;
Cluzel & Sarrat: ERIC (Evaluation du risque sets fire by le calculate).France.
Shibe method;
Nelson & Shibe: "The system for fire safety evaluation of health care facilitis" NBS-USA.This method evaluates
the fire safety in hospitals by comparison with "Life Safety Lode" paragraph NFPA 101A
Method of Aschoff;
Dow method;
Dow Method "Dow chemical hazzard classification and protection guide"
Method of Trabaud, among others.
Regardless of the method employed should not fail to take into consideration that the risks are fortuitous. May
take years to occur and sometimes in a short time can occur at various times. Therefore, reinforces the
Inspector's experience is important so that you can get as close as possible to the target, i.e. the correct rate. If
you are unsure of the accuracy of the data the Actuary may be obliged to apply technical higher shipments that
end by making the cost of insurance (the technical load in such cases ends being an alternative to compensate for
the uncertainty or the inaccuracy of the obtaining of the information). Some additional information about these
methodologies are passed on, summarized way, since the Test is not the focus of discussion of methodologies for
risk analysis, but rather to introduce an overview based on points or most relevant aspects for these analyses.
a) Points methods
In mathematics , Linear Programming problems (PL) are problems of Optimization in which the objective
function and the restrictions are all linear . Linear programming is an important area of the optimization for
various reasons. Many practical problems in operations research can be expressed as linear programming
problems. Several algorithms for other types of optimization problems work resolving issues of PL as subproblems. Historically, ideas of linear programming have inspired many of the central concepts of optimization
theory, such as duality, decomposition, and the importance of convexity and its generalizations. If we substitute
the parameters by other applied to insurance can obtain excellent results. For example, for a fire, sinister, it
becomes necessary to the correct Association of fuel, oxidizer and heat. The fire only occurs when that full

membership occurs, and in specific conditions. For example, benzene (fuel) in a normal atmosphere with varying
oxygen levels among 19% to 21% and an ambient temperature equal to or exceeding 33 C ignites. In this
particular case for more oxygen-rich atmospheres the power of inflammation becomes greater. If benzene which
is a gaseous liquid mixture is more soda, inflammation occurs more easily. If the temperature is above 33 C
ignition is faster. In another example, a deposit of soya beans, with carbon-rich dust with moisture content equal
to or exceeding 12% and close to equipment which form electrical arcs tend to explode. This phenomenon
occurs, with slight variations of the moisture content for all grains, whose percentages are not necessarily equal
to those of soybean lunge. This technique were derived from other forms of analysis, like that of the Polyhedra.
b) Fire risk assessment calculation by series of points
The offshore oil and gas Platforms are well known for their compact geometry, high degree of congestion,
limited ventilation and evacuation of the site usually difficult, and in the vicinity of dangerous equipment. A
minor setback in such conditions can change quickly in a disaster. Among all accidents involving processes that
occur at sea, fire is the most frequently reported. Although there are many models of consequence available to
predict the risk of fire ranging from models of point of origin and highly complex computational fluid dynamic
models only a few have been validated for unique conditions found offshore.
c) Calculation of the degree of protection
Evaluates the existing characteristics of the active and passive protections that exist and the time which allow
protection of equipment, facilities and people. The protections are arranged in levels or laundry. Through these
analyses you can evaluate how much losses will be involved and the amount of victims. The more sophisticated
and automated devices are the greater the degree of protection offered. It must also assess the characteristics of
the materials used, for being passive protections, especially the living quarters where they can have people parttime. Passive protections are arranged around the area to be protected. Are considered passive by protect carriers
from attacks of the risks. Active protections, by contrast, are designed to extinguish PEAR events, via fixed or
mobile devices.
d) Gretner method (also known as Gretener)
It is semi quantitative method for assessing or quantifying the risk of fire in buildings, and was based on the
need felt by the insurers, in uniform insurance premiums. The first of these methods emerged in 1965, proposed
by Switzerland society of engineers and architects SIA, and became known by the method of Gretner, having
been developed by Max Gretner. Is one of the most important semi-quantitative methods, given its recognition or
acceptance either by the authorities or political power, whether on the part of insurers. This method is used to
evaluate and compare the level of fire hazard, based on alternative concepts between different types of
construction of a building and its performance in the event of a fire. The factors are set to appeal to the opinion
of the scientific and technical means, based on statistical data tested by its wide practical application. The
calculated risk is compared with the acceptable risk, which is a function of the mobility of the people involved,
and of the existence and location of fire resistant vaulting.
The process starts from the explicit definition of the concept of risk, such as the expectation of losses that is
given by the product of the probability of the danger by the severity of the danger:
R = A x B, where:
R = Risk of fire
The = Probability of the fire-danger of activation occurs
(B) = Fire hazard, probability, severity-exposure to danger factor.

The method is based on these two probabilities and combines them according to the probability theory as: danger
of fire = potential danger/Protective MeasuresB = P M
The exposure factor of the danger of fire B, is defined as the product of all danger factors P, taking into
consideration all factors of protection M. The relationship is given by:
B = P/M, B = [P/(N x S x F)], in which
P = Potential Dangerobtained through weightings, which refer to the type of building and its contents, to
contribute or not to the ignition, or for the propagation of the fire.
M = obtained as a result of N (normal measures in accordance with the regulations);
S = special measures, such as automatic detection, and alarm transmission systems;
And = fire resistance of structural elements;
N = "normal measures", as portable fire-extinguishers, fire hydrants, and staff with training and specific training;
S = "active measures" such as fire detection and fire alarm, fire sprinkler type, smoke extraction vents and
temperature;
(F) = "passive measures" as supporting structures, such as walls, slabs and surrounding rooftops and size of fire
compartments.
P = "Potential danger" is a function of the type of building and its contents which as mentioned is a function of
the type of building and the influence of the same in contribute or not to the starter, or the spread of fire, and can
be written as follows:
P = q x c x f x k x i x e x g where,
Dangers inherent to the content:
q = fire load;
(c) = combustibility;
(f) = production of smoke;
k = smoke possessing corrosive agents;
Dangers inherent in the building:
(i) = load of real estate building fire;
and = ground level/basement etc., height of storage;
g = dimension and shape of fire compartment, and its relationship between length and width;
Like most of other indices, the values of these individual factors were obtained based on statistics, but
empirically, and resulting from the comparison of risks or of types of buildings, for which some protective
measures are common, or current use, or required by law. The fire risk acceptable for a particular building is
defined as:
= Ru/R, in that,
Ru = acceptable risk and
R = risk of building fire
The value of the risk acceptable or admissible is:
Ru = 1.3 x [pH, E], where the normal fire risk Rn = 1.30, and [pH, and] is the normal risk correction factor
depending on the number of people and the level of fire compartment, is the risk that the building represents for
the people, and that depends on the type of building, and ranging between 1 and 3. The risk is acceptable if >
1.0.

On the basis of methods still Gretner was defined by the insurance companies the method ERIC (fire risk
assessment Calculated), with databases and computerization. As in the method of Gretner risk is defined by Risk
= Danger/measures; the danger is divided with regard to goods P1 and P2 people.
P1 = q x e x g x f x k x where;
q = total fire load;
e = coefficient of level (relative to the ground);
g = amplitude;
(f) = smoke;
k = corrosion;
the = activity exercised
In turn, P2 = t x c x f x i x r where,
t = time of evacuation;
(c) = combustibility;
(f) = smoke opacity;
(i) = toxicity of smoke;
r = risk execution.
M protection measures are evaluated through:
M = S x T x E x D x RF
S = coefficient of situation (S1 = S2, water pressure water source);
T = time coefficient;
E = extinction coefficient;
(D) = coefficient of evacuation of smoke;
RF = fire resistance of the enclosure.
The methodology makes it possible to obtain an estimate of the global fire risk quite complete, with values of
losses, if such data is entered into the program, and allow the issue of the value of risk and if this is acceptable or
if on the contrary, you must redo the calculations with necessary protective measures to reduce the risk. Is based
on the comparison between the result of the calculation of the potential risk of fire hazard permissible effective.
Fire safety levels are sufficient, when the effective risk is not superior to the risk accepted.

e) Purt method
This method of evaluation was presented by Dr. Gustav Purt in sixth international seminar of automatic fire
detection IENS. This method can be considered a simplified derivation of the method of Max Gretner and the
calculation of their coefficients it is advisable to have the aforementioned method cotida on order of the City
Council of Zaragoza; Similarly it is advisable to have the catalog CEA, translated by Cepreven. If the purpose of
the method is to be deducted from risk assessment measures of protection against fire, so best suited is that of
Dr. Gustav Purt. Is a simplified derivation of Gretner. This method provides a medium risk assessment (not
applicable for the petrochemical industry).

Once calculated the values in several areas, the method provides, through the use of a graph, suggested
protective measures for the calculated risk.
f) Method of Messere
The method was developed for observation of heat exchanges that typically occur during the propagation of fire,
taking into account the consistency and characteristics of existing materials on the environment and the
characteristics of fires formed, with the maximum temperature of the flames.
The only method of fire risk assessment that calculates the thermal load is the method of intrinsic risk, moreover,
is based precisely on this evaluation of fire load corrected for a sector, building or establishment with its activity.

Note also that this is, in our opinion, a point of reference for the calculation of thermal load in other methods.
There are studies that associate the speed of spread of fire detection and alarm time of fire safety devices,
suggests the association with Thermo-main detectors.
Mesere is a simple, fast and agile method that leads to a global risk value in ventures and medium sizes. By
following this method orientative and limited serving solely for quick view of global fire risk, presenting results
are more restrictive than normal.
g) Method of Cluzel and Eric Sarrat
a. 1) evaluation of the fire risk by calculating (E.R.I.C.)
This method is based on the method of Gretner, given that combines the assessment of the safety of people with
heritage protection. This scheme distinguishes these two types of objectives providing a method for evaluating
the residual risk for each of the goals. The risk factors and the factors of safety are identified, assigned, and
combined with numeric values, whether for the protection of people, both for the protection of heritage,
separately in order to get the measure of the residual risk.
e = coefficient for the total time of evacuation
(f) = smoke density assessment in the occupied space
r = probability of occurrence or realization of the risk, for example, occurrence of an undesirable event.
(c) = risk coefficient associated with the existing fuel in the building
The evacuation time T ev is obtained from the equation:
T ev = {P/(Le x Cc)} + (Lh/V) seconds, where:
P = number of people to be evacuated
Le = number of evacuation paths and combination of the length of the stairs and corridors (m)
Cc = coefficient of movement (people per metre and per second)
Lh = total distance of the route until a safe place (m)
V = average speed of people (m/s)
The values of the coefficients are based on a simple scale of 0-5, where 0 represents no threat of danger and five
represents the immediate danger or intolerable conditions. The combination of the relative values (A) and (P)
allows you to obtain the relative value associated with the risk. The risk associated with the heritage is obtained
from the following expression:

P2 = (q) x (e) x (g) x (f) x (k) x (a) x (c) where:


(q) = coefficient related to the mobile fire load (kJ/m2)
(e) = coefficient related to the height of the building, location of spaces above and below ground and expected
losses.
(f) = coefficient associated with the dangers of smoke
(k) = coefficient that combines toxic and corrosive products from the combustion
(a) = coefficient related to the occupation of the building
(c) = coefficient that represents the combustibility of materials
(g) = coefficient that relates the geometry of spaces with expected losses
Similarly, tables etc. are used to obtain the value of P1.
P1 = risk for people is a pioneer in calculating the risks involving people and goods.

Five main factors are combined in order to obtain an estimate of its contribution to the prevention and protection
(M).
M1,2 = S1,2 x T 1,2 x E1,2 x DF 1,2 x F1,2
The index 1 refers to the value of the safety of persons and the index 2 refers to the values of the assets or
property, where:
S = coefficient that represents the availability of water to the fire service, the quality of the installation and
system capacity of pumping water at the facility.
T = coefficient that combines the time elapsed up to the detection and communication
And = coefficient that represents the various systems or extinction methods available
DF = coefficient related to the smoke control
(F) = coefficient that combines the fire resistance of the vaulting and its components
The relationship between the various factors is presented in the diagram below:
The measurement of residual risk R1.2 is obtained based on the reason of the risk factors (P 1.2) and safety factors
(M1.2).
R1,2 = P 1,2 M1,2
The method E.R.I.C. is empirical. However, it is considered separately the risk for the goods and the risk to
people. This approach provides a link between two concepts of security, personal goods which are not
divergent. Includes the concepts of effectiveness of security levels and assessment of equipment, such as the
principles of effectiveness of intervention is based on three fundamental aspects, detection, alarm and alert and
means of protection against the transmission or spread of risks.

h) F.R.A.M. E-Fire Risk Assessment Method for Engineering


The method published in Europe, F.R.A.M.E. is based on methods and E.R.I.C. Gretner. If something
characterized was that exceeds by precision results obtained by his predecessors. F.R.A.M.E. is a
comprehensive, transparent and practical method for calculating the risk of fire in buildings, developed from the
Gretner method, as well as others with similar approaches. The Gretner method was initially developed for
assessing the fire hazard of the goods or of the heritage. However, given the occurrence of small fires, but with a
high number of deaths, led to the need for a similar but distinct approach to people, and to quantify the levels of

fire safety for people. Consequently, material loss or interruption of business activities or is a third aspect of the
fire risk that is considered in this method, following the same principles, both for material security, both for the
safety of persons. Is a tool employed by the risk manager for defining an effective fire safety within a cost
effective concept, applicable to new or existing buildings. Many of the codes or regulations were designed to
ensure exits and safe paths[13] to occupants.
i) Shibe method
Nelson & Shibe : "The system for fire safety evaluation of health care facilitis" NBS-USA.This method
evaluates the fire safety in hospitals by comparison with "Life Safety Lode" paragraph NFPA 101A.
j) Method of Aschoff
Methodology for the identification of the means of protection on the basis of risks caused to the environment or
people.
k) Dow method
The basic concept of this method of analysis came out of the Factory Mutual tab "Chemical Occupancy
Classification", was first published in 1964 and subsequently revised on several occasions. The DOW Indexes
and MOND were respectively adopted and developed by the companies DOW CHEMICAL North American and
ICI-Imperial Chemical Industries, English (MOND Division) to evaluate the potential of fire, explosion and
toxicity in industrial installations. The DOW was regarded as one of the most important techniques for industrial
risk assessment of existing facilities and recommended by the American Institute of Chemical EngineeringAIChE ", in the form of a CEP technical manual. The DOW is widely used by insurers to assess the fire risk in
industrial units, since it is a targeted method to estimate the potential for fire or industrial establishments. It
also allows identifying areas with potential significant losses.
l) Trabaud method
Study of combustibility and flammability of materials exposed to heat, through comparative tables. What can you
conclude is that in a risk assessment process there are many factors that can contribute to the improved quality
of information, knowing that the best were the best information will be the results of prevention. There are
methods that evaluate the constructive characteristics, others that assess the loss of goods or the vulnerability of
people. There are also methods that match the buildings the protection devices against existing risks. In our
opinion the risk should be evaluated as a whole, because it is considered for insurance purposes.
m) Method XPS FIRE-Fire Insurance Risk Evaluation
This is a semi-quantitative method, with data input check list (Check list-Data-Input). Was developed by the
insurer Munich Re, in order to analyze and evaluate technically the quality of fire hazard in industrial units.
XPS FIRE is a computer program, which allows, in a simple way, from a check list, enter data characteristic of
risk, and so carry out analysis and evaluation. The check list enables people with specific training in
engineering, but who do not have relevant knowledge, analysis and evaluation of fire protection systems, collect
the necessary information and to obtain a rating, or at least such is possible in less complex cases.

3rd Pillar: loss prevention


The third pillar is prevention and protection or. Before you evolve with this reasoning it is important to mention
the word "vulnerability". Its simplest meaning leads us to what is vulnerable, most exposed or weakest.
We learn that the entire process that results in a grim beginning on an action, process or dangerous environment.
Thus, the "danger" is the our first warning sign. It may seem simple, but not always the danger is noticeable with
ease. Often engage in dangerous and acts as if there is no immediate consequences these same acts end up being

something incorporated to our cultures, knowledge and habits. When danger is manifested and cause loss and or
damage shall call us to attention. If these occur and losses or damage our interest back to no longer manifest.
In a survey that we conducted for five years, in the Decade of 90, against the backdrop of the construction sites
of construction of civil works, we identified some interesting issues as, namely:
v Comprehensiveness ': 46 builders;
v Services run ': construction of residential, commercial and industrial buildings;
v Qty of workers ': 3,170 people;
v Profile of respondents: 37 works managers and 9 production managers;
Characteristics and objectives of analysis
v Identify the degree of perception of workers to the risks;
v Evaluate employee adherence to work safety practices implemented by companies;
v Studying individual and collective behavior facing the same situations that present themselves;
Search features
v Type search Survey with submission of questionnaires were closed, with the possibility of the employee submit
your comments or considerations at the end of the interview;
v Maximum time of contact with employees of 20 minutes;
v Approaches in the workplace;
v Answers are induced;
v Prior Clarification questionnaires and guarantee of anonymity;
v Final results per company brought to the attention of management;
The responses were classified according Likert seven levels as:
v 7 (seven): the company prioritizes safety and productivity and the good atmosphere of the teams;
v 6 (six): the company prioritizes productivity and maintenance of teams until the end of the works;
v 5 (five): the company prioritizes delivery of works within;
v 4 (four): the company complies with the safety standards;
v 3 (three): The company's tax check the employment of safety devices;
v 2 (two): the company encourages employees to use of Ppe;
v 1 (a): the company dismisses employees not using PPE.

v Questionnaires and Responses


Questionnaire presented to workers (3,124 people):
Questions
In understanding how do you classify the company's
concern with respect to its security?
Would you change your job if a company offered him
a short-term perspective of wage developments and
services?
Would you change your job if a company were to offer
him a better working environment?
You had knowledge of their colleagues who were hurt
most?
Would you change your job if a company were to offer
you a bigger and better level of security?
Would you change your job if a company were to offer

% of respondents
1
2
06%

21%

11%

16%

15%

18%

13%

Yes

96%

No

4%

Yes

95%

No

5%

Yes

94%

No

6%

Yes

94%

No

6%

Yes

93%

No

7%

you a bigger paycheck?


You practice or practiced any unsafe Act?
Your colleagues share with you concerns with respect
to feel unsafe in the workplace?
You feel safe to perform their tasks?
You were forced to perform dangerous activities?
You meet the safety standards set forth by your
company?
You have suffered an accident at work?
You had prior knowledge of the risks to which would
be exposed?
Are you interested in lectures that the Guide on how to
work safely?
You witnessed changes for the better in the enterprise
after the occurrence of industrial accidents?
Have you ever witnessed the occurrence of an accident
at work?
Changes continued.

Yes

84%

No

16%

Yes

83%

No

17%

Yes
Yes

67%
61%

No
No

33%
39%

Yes

58%

No

42%

Yes

49%

No

51%

Yes

48%

No

52%

Yes

43%

No

57%

Yes

37%

No

63%

Yes

28%

No

72%

Yes

17%

No

83%

Questionnaire presented to Managers (46 people):


Questions

# Of respondents
1
2

3
4
In understanding how do you classify the company's
concern with respect to the safety of workers? (see [14]
2
3
7
13
note)
You complies with the safety regulations stipulated by
Yes 46
No
the company?
You seek to guide workers and cares for guidance
Yes 44
No
lectures for the improvement of security actions?
You witnessed changes for the better in the enterprise
Yes 43
No
after the occurrence of industrial accidents?
You had prior knowledge of the risks to which would
Yes 41
No
be exposed in their management activities?
Changes continued.
Yes 38
No
You feel safe to manage the activities?
Yes 33
No
Your colleagues share with you concerns about
Yes 10
No
insecurity of workplaces?
Would you change your job if a company offered him
a short-term perspective of wage developments and Yes 7
No
services?
You were obliged to determine hazardous activities?
Yes 4
No
Would you change your job if a company were to offer
Yes 2
No
you a bigger paycheck?
Would you change your job if a company were to offer
Yes 2
No
him a better working environment?
You had knowledge of their colleagues who were hurt
Yes 2
No
most?
Would you change your job if a company were to offer
Yes 1
No
you a bigger and better level of security?
You practice or practiced any unsafe Act?
Yes 1
No
Have you been the victim of an accident at work?
Yes 0
No
Have you ever witnessed the occurrence of an accident
Yes 0
No
at work?
Note: the sum greater than the number of respondents indicates that, as there was freedom

16

21

35

0
2
3
5
8
11
36
39
42
44
44
44
45
45
46
46
of information, some

subjects showed more than one classification, which is without prejudice to the overall assessment.
The analysis of the responses and interpretation of results or leave for a second chapter, because this comes
exclusively from important pillars on which must be supported the concepts and techniques of risk analysis.

Considering you're trying to "support" for the application of the techniques of risk analysis, it is important to
consider that prevention is unquestionably relevant in risk analysis. Assuming axiom where the risk is the
product of the frequency of occurrences versus the severity of losses, working separately, both as regards the
prevention of severity you can reduce the amount of the losses. Perhaps the main question is: how? Prevention
aimed at reducing frequency focuses on the use of methodologies that reduce these repeat offenders, acting on
the elements or aspects more vulnerable in terms of accidents, as for example, adequate maintenance plans.
Similarly, when focuses for the severity the object of attention is how they can be reduced the blow-ups of
claims or even the amount of losses. For some more critical equipment, or activities more studied these
evaluations are well known. For example, to reduce the expansion of destructive explosions generated areas
stand up physical barriers, resistant or encase the equipment. Anyway, both in a case frequency, as in other
severity of losses, it is important to know the results of the analyses of risks undertaken. In the absence of these,
reading from database helps a lot in the activity of risk acceptance. The question of "vulnerability" is the focal
point of the analysis, since the more vulnerability is a more brittle it becomes.

fourth Pillar: harmony of the work environment


The fourth pillar deals with the harmony in the environment. This harmony must flow across all levels or tracks
of "managerial pyramid", is from the top to the base and in return, the base for the whole. One of the features of
top-down processes that are not well accepted by the base of the pyramid, that understand them as mandatory.
All those who participate in the staffing structure of the company should be engaged in the process that will lead
to the success of the enterprise, should also feel part of the team. Companies like this are at levels where the
risks are low.
As regards the assessment criteria there are several that deal with the topic under different optics. Employing the
same previous research, and also adopting the same Likert scale in hierarchy of choices, we can evaluate,
together, the answers given by both the employees and the managers with regard to the degree of satisfaction of
the same. The analyses are as follows:
Responses given by employees
Would you change your job if a company offered him
a short-term perspective of wage developments and
services?
Would you change your job if a company were to offer
him a better working environment?
Would you change your job if a company were to offer
him a better working environment?
Would you change your job if a company were to offer
you a bigger and better level of security?
Would you change your job if a company were to offer
you a bigger paycheck?
Comments:

Yes

96%

No

4%

Yes

95%

No

5%

Yes

95%

No

5%

Yes

94%

No

6%

Yes

93%

No

7%

1. He was elevated the percentage of those respondents that have confirmed that they would change their job, for
a number of reasons.
2. Workers, in this research, value wage developments and services in the short term, and, as a last resort (das
presented) the option exclusively by the bigger paycheck. This means that the environment itself exerts a strong
influence for the workers.
3. About 1/3 of workers witnessed the occurrence of industrial accidents and 1/5 of the workers reported that
changes in the companies after the occurrence of accidents of work remained for a long time.

4. 13% of employees said that the company prioritizes safety and productivity and the good atmosphere of the
teams.
5. 61% of employees said they were forced to perform dangerous activities.
Answers given by managers
Would you change your job if a company offered him
a short-term perspective of wage developments and
services?
Would you change your job if a company were to offer
him a better working environment?
Would you change your job if a company were to offer
you a bigger paycheck?
Would you change your job if a company were to offer
you a bigger and better level of security?
Comments:

Yes

No

39

Yes

No

44

Yes

No

44

Yes

No

45

1. In the same way that workers, managers also chose, firstly, by the change of job for a company that associates
a better work environment to a wage developments. However, as a last resort, would change if the job applicant
company offered bigger and better levels of security, not wanting to say that where they worked there
appropriate security level.
2. Managers were unanimous in reporting that meets the safety standards and never witnessed the occurrence of
an accident at work.
3. 16% of managers said that the company prioritizes safety and productivity and the good atmosphere of the
teams.
4. About 2% of the managers said they forced the workers to perform dangerous activities.
Like any statistical analysis always false responses can occur, because respondents do not want to expose
themselves or because they are in a position to comply with notice or on completion of project.

5th Pillar: relevant aspects for maintaining safe working environments


The fifth pillar, not in the chronological order, is one of the main aspects that risk managers should take into
account when analyzing the risks of a company. Purposely, is the fifth pillar. Nothing the companies rules,
standards, procedures, if there is a vision of the future or a "vision of business continuity". Every company
should have its vision, mission, values and objectives to be pursued. When this thought and concepts permeate
the institution becomes clear to everyone involved that the company wants the whole team, how do you intend to
achieve these goals, what is the importance of the work of each and where all will follow.
On the analysis Tab: accident at work[15], edited by the Ministry of labour in 2010, adapting it to the test, has:
Reasons to Analyze adverse events
Identify what is wrong and to adopt control measures
In the workplace there are risks and control measures that should be adopted to eliminate or reduce them in
order to prevent accidents and illnesses. The occurrence of an adverse event indicates that risk control measures
were inadequate or insufficient.
3.1 Why Analyze work-related adverse events?
Accidents and work-related diseases cause suffering and problems for workers, their families, other people and
businesses.
Accidents and work-related diseases generate high costs for companies and for society.
Analysis of adverse events are important tools for the development and refinement of the risk management
system.

Adequate evaluation of the safety and health conditions provides knowledge of the risks associated with
industrial activities, contributing to the transformation of working conditions.
Risk control measures well planned, associated with proper supervision, monitoring and effective OSH
management can ensure activities at work are safe. In addition to the reasons above related, several LEGAL
REASONS justify the realization of analyses:
Regulatory Standards (NR) of MTE dictate that companies analyze and enable workers to perform analyses of
accidents at work;
Regulatory Standards require that employers plan, control and monitor the conditions of OSH, including
providing information to workers about hazards and control measures;
Social Security, by means of regressive actions, can claim the reimbursement of the benefits arising from
accidents and occupational diseases whose related factors include failure to observe the standards of safety and
health at work;
Pension legislation provides for the increase of the tax rates work Accident insurance-SAT according to the
incidence of accidents and work-related diseases in the company;
The Federal Constitution, in its article 7, subparagraph XXVIII, establishes compensation for damages arising
from work;
The Civil Code provides for compensation under certain circumstances, regardless of intent or fault on the part
of companies.
3.2 what you get with a good analysis?
The identification of ways in which people are exposed to risks that can affect your health and safety.
The understanding of what occurred, how the work was actually performed and how and why things went
wrong.
Recognition of deficiencies in the control of risks at work in order to make changes and improvements in the
management of OSH.
The possibility of exchanging information on the risk between companies, manufacturers and suppliers.
Work Accidents Analysis Guide
12 4. Analysis system of adverse events
The necessity of examining a specific adverse event has already been defined in this guide. However, it is
important to organize a system of analysis of adverse events in which is valued the knowledge of factors related
to several accidents, incidents and unwanted circumstances occurring in an enterprise, economic sector,
geographic region, etc. The information resulting from the analysis of various adverse events leverage the
ability to troubleshoot and extend the quality of management of OSH.
4.1 Benefits resulting from a system of analysis of adverse events
Prevention of other adverse events, similar or not, which may have the same factors generators.
Prevention of environmental damage and negative impacts on the company's image.
Avoid economic losses generated by the reduction of productive capacity resulting from repeated adverse
events and for damages.
Expansion of troubleshooting skills.
Negri and Hulse (2012)[16], in chapter A Prospecting Tool of scenarios in the decision-making process, present
in the introduction:
The speed of increase of knowledge, as well as its application as a form of organizational survival, involves and
results in rapid transformations in the environment, it is not always predictable, requiring different postures of

managers, placed in front of a lot more unstable environments that once (MORITZ, 2008, p. 69). Thus, to
improve the confrontation of such changes and lead to a qualitative leap in the development of the strategies of
organizations and in its decision-making process, the prospect of a significant resource represents scenarios to
view and formulate future situations. In fact, the prospect of scenarios is an effort of science in polling time,
through their actors and their variables, in the sense of revealing trends that must be observed and identified in
the constant effort of man seeking to understand and comprehend increasingly their future and their fate in this
universe of complexity that arises (MORITZ et al., 2010, p. 2). However, elaborate scenarios is not an exercise
in prediction, but rather an effort to make plausible and consistent descriptions of possible future situations,
showing conditions of the way between the current situation and each scenario future and highlighting the
factors relevant to decisions that need to be made (WRIGHT, 2010, p. 59).
Decision is the Act or fact of deciding. Deciding means choosing one among several alternatives of action
offered to achieve particular purpose and renounce all other. Every decision is therefore a process that involves
both choice and waiver (ABRAMCZUK, 2009, p. 27). The reflections and actions that extends between the
moment in which the perception of the need to act and the time when choosing a course of action is called
decision-making (ABRAMCZUK, 2009, p. 43). The technique of scenarios, which assists the administrator in the
decision-making process, is a set formed by coherent description of a future situation and for forwarding
imagined and created the events that allow passing of the rise to the future situation (GODET, 1993 apud
MORITZ; Pereira, 2005, p. 2).
Toni (2006 [17] ), presents: the use of scenarios if generalizes from the military theory and is gaining ground as a
tool for public and private management from the studies of the Rand Corporation, the Club of Rome since the
1950s and the Hudson Institute (Herman Kahn). Large corporations such as Shell or business consulting firms
as the Global Business Network (GBN, founded by Pierre Wack and Arie de Geus), spread and popularized
methodologies widely known today[2]. In Brazil the pioneer fit for at least 20 years, to large State-owned
companies like Petrobras, Eletrobrs or the former Telebras (CPqD), in prospecting of markets, prices or
projection of future demand[3]. Key variables for the strategic planning and competitive survival. In the
academic field few initiatives worth mentioning, the study of Jaguaribe (1989) and Rattner (1979) could be the
most important highlights. In the eighties and nineties several governmental organizations have developed
important regional development-related cenarizaes (SUDAM, Eletronorte), technology (CNPq), technological
(FINEP) financing, credit and promotion (BNDES) until the milestone represented by the project "Brazil 2020"
of the former Secretariat of Strategic Affairs of the Presidency of the Republic in 1998[4]. The prospecting work
within the federal Government is still currently in the project "Brazil 3 times: 2007, 2015 and 2022" based on
the Core of Strategic Affairs of the Presidency of the Republic. The method consists in generating prospective
scenarios promoting a Delphi consultation (structured questions about future events in successive rounds) sent
to 50 thousand people and an array of cross-Impacts (tier depending on your motor skills) with national
strategic themes (NAE, 2005).
These efforts particularly in the public sector, however, have not contributed to creating an organizational
culture and planning that incorporates permanently the elaboration of scenarios such as management practice,
even where human resources and information technology are more advanced. In the public sector the
discontinuity of projects, institutional instability and precariousness of available databases have contributed to
maintaining the hegemonic mentality of short-term and immediate improvisation.
To work with scenarios it takes a willingness to reject the temptation of deterministic views, be they religious
prophecies ("the future is in the hands of God"), whatever their inspiration rationalist (all human relations are

established by relations of causality known and defined). The future is not defined and there is no human
capacity and rational enough to predict social behaviors and natural, we can only work with the notion of risk
and probability, in many cases not even that ... We will never know dominate cognitively all relations of cause
and effect, even more modern theories in planning already admit that not all the unpredictability of our systemic
ignorance about reality itself, but because there is indeed complex, non-linear systems, whose instability and
changeability chaotic prevent any predictability or simply cannot be measured (Capra, 1996, Van Der Heijden,
1996). Social systems have this nature, are spaces of the imponderable, of freedom and human creativity, the
power and the will, to threats and opportunities. Draw scenarios implies assemble a plausible set of
combinations imaginable. The perception of future scenarios and the ability to anticipate might be the first step
of strategic analysis in planning, she follows and is completed with the problematization of the strategy to be
adopted and its network at the time, as well as the relationship of the agent that plans with the other actors and
their context.
Completed the scenarios in its three dimensions, we reviewed the expected results of each project and identify
existing vulnerabilities. These weaknesses will be inspiring sources to redraw actions or develop other projects
capable of maintaining the original result. Identify variables trajectories (bifurcation points) implies combine
rationality of models with the accumulated experience and collective learning, in this endeavour resides (or not)
the quality of the contingency plans. For example, a likely scenario of fragility of systems for controlling, should
suggest in advance the design of alternative strategies to ensure administrative probity, impersonality, etc. ..
Summary of methodological recommendations:
Having a vision of situational reality as social construction: admit and render the divergence of views,
opinions and reasoning standards as an opportunity to qualify and give more consistency to the scenarios. As
said Godet (op. cit.), the future depends on the ability of hegemonic social actors, they are central elements of
the scenarios.
The future is not just the extrapolation of behavioral patterns from the past : combine the systematic study of
the past (retrospection) with the identification of trends of discontinuity.
Distinguish short-term trends of those structural : X stability break from standard of conduct or behavior:
avoid the "Impressionism" derived from milestones in the short term, almost always the intensity of what is
currently visible immediately overshadows the freedom to think under different rules and standards.
Build alternative hypotheses with plausibility and feasibility: owning the notion of constraint, knowing the
limits of other actors and of himself.
Imagine the surprises as ruptures of the patterns observed: attention to focus details apparently "nonimportant". You must doubt the consensus and common sense, to cultivate the "laterality of thought", use the
brainstorming.
Never "freeze" the scenarios nor quantitative indicators: enable creative insights, stimulate the intuition and
imagination, think what is apparently unthinkable.
It is clear that it is the responsibility of the planning group to monitor the evolution of the scenarios and their
main variables to provide information for the Administration and implementation of the plan. If there is no
feasibility to track and monitor scenarios throughout the implementation of the plan, not worth spending energy
in their preparation for a almost always painful and costly internal planning process. This task can be assigned,
by delegation, to a "Management Committee" or any other instance responsible linked to direction. It is very
common to see, especially in the public sector, painful processes of evaluation and sophisticated methodologies

that simply ignore the quality of scenarios elaborated vis--vis products and results of the projects. Evaluate
products and results out of their circumstances.
The incorporation of these future scenarios beyond the realm of exceptionality or a digression in the usual
patterns of risk analysis to become a requirement for actuarial calculations, since the impact of the results or
anticipated future scenarios evaluable can generate relevant impacts risk rates. The idea that the past and present
results about the risks could be relevant to the definition of rates becomes questionable to the extent that also
should be inserted the future scenarios.

The ideations of scenarios


Killian Jr. (2015)[18] when the theme Approach: the essential tool for an effective strategy that is manifested:
The traditional strategic planning works with an image of future static in time, because he works with only one
scenario: the default, and may be one that just extrapolates the trends or one that involves the future desired by
the organisation, without considering aspects of the future and the uncertainties it considered. Soon, in the
dialectic of intelligences, which permeates any strategy, the resultant is wholly reactive and the difference
between deliberate strategy and the strategy performed constitutes a major hiatus.
Strategic planning based on scenarios appears to decrease this gap, as it copes well with unstructured problems
where uncertainty, the resulting complexity and changes are constant factors and, increasingly, intense and
accelerated.
The scenarios are nothing more than alternate futures possible derived from combinations of plausible and
consistent hypotheses based on settings that can be presented by the critical uncertainties in the future.
Its construction requires the simultaneous sharing of reason and intuition, as the operation of the two
hemispheres of the brain. To this end, it is necessary the use of systems thinking, based on interdependence and
in which they can relate the parts of the system; and divergent thinking, which does not conform to a single
explanation about the State of things. Thus, the complexity is reduced and the uncertainty is structured,
contributing to the construction of knowledge through the insights provided by the process of construction of the
scenarios.
In fact, the scenarios act as a simulator, which allows the subversion of the "chronological" time, unleashing
virtual realities that will enable experiences in "long lived". The Repertoire of experiences generated from the
scenarios, increases the amount of knowledge and therefore helps in better decision-making. The scenarios, in
addition, allow the extension of mental models and makers compete for organisational learning.
Planning involves the future; scenario-based planning, the Planner is preparing for the possible future and may
even intervene, working actively in the materialization of the future that you want.
The "scenarios" (construction of scenarios) involves the various alternatives for the future and behavior of
actors who can oppose and affect that future along the path of the time. This exercise to imagine the various
changes that may occur in the environment and the reactions of actors involved will add more capacity to the
planning and decision-making process. And, consequently, in a foreknowledge to face the changes of
environment.
The "background" answers the question "what may happen in the future?". The strategy should provide answers
to the following questions: "what can I do?", "what am I going to do?", "How do I do it?".
The preparation and evaluation of scenarios are bases available to the Planner to plot your strategy and achieve
the long-term goals set out by any institution.

In times of uncertainty and constant change, "view" before allows greater competitiveness and promotes a
proactive "behavior" of being considered by the capacity of anticipation of future events. Moreover, it offers the
possibility of mold them in his favor.
Without the systematization of building scenarios as a tool for decision support in strategic planning, the
formulation of strategy is mere fictional piece, as it is based only on a future, the desired future, without
considering the other possible paths, giving it rigidity and conditioning the Organization to behave only
"reactive", in reaction to what occurred.
The tool of "scenarios" can illuminate the choices and instrumentalize the construction of flexible strategies,
adaptive and robust, in the framework of the institutions, which justifies the pertinence and relevance of the
topic.
The "background" transforms the organization because it imposes the learning in all its scope, widen mental
models of decision makers and improves their performance, contributing to the improvement of the decisionmaking process.
The unexpected scenarios are plausible scenarios based on hypotheses that combine uncertainties or rare events
of probability of occurrence and impact (discontinuous, catalytic events). Can be understood as ruptures,
discontinuities or sudden and unique incidents constituting inflection points in the evolution of a trend.
Generally, decision-makers and managers do not consider or underestimate the likelihood of radical changes or
staple fibres that could be unlikely, but that significantly change the system (PORTER, 1989). The more
extraordinary or atypical for the event, the more he qualifies as a surprise scenario because it disrupts
expectations. This character of nonconformity is well illustrated by the Lebanese writer based in the USA,
Nassim Taleb, per your analogy to the "Black Swan", in book of the same name. Based on the classic perception
that "all swans are white," Taleb suggests that people get blocked in your peripheral vision by "Black Swans",
precisely because such an event goes against the norm and their mental models. In a way, it can be affirmed that
the scenarios-surprises are similar to the "Black Swans".
The unexpected scenarios happen quickly, and may or may not be announced beforehand by weak signals or
noise, constituting data incomplete and fragmented, with relevant information about the future can be inferred.
Generally, the point of convergence of a series of small noises (discontinuities) is a surprise scenario.
What makes it important a surprise scenario is the fact that the future he described produce disproportionate
effects. The combination of a low probability and unforeseen consequences leads to risks that validate the
concern and the resulting planning for such a possibility.
The specific purpose of these scenarios is to assist strategic planners to develop warning signs (or alert),
indicators that a hypothesis is being raped in order to generate actions that prevent or limit the unexpected
scenario and plan actions to prepare the Organization in case he goes through.
Therefore, it is necessary to work with the concept of surprise scenarios imagining them through the free thought
and the deconstruction of the perception of reality, pushing and expanding the limits of cognitive envelope. This
forces the mind to abandon all pre-packaged rationalities and expand the process so as to involve all the
opportunities and threats (BOON; PHUA, 2008).
The most important point is that the Organization must create scenarios-surprises to guide your environment
monitoring in order to realize weak signals, the noise of the environment that are in constant mutation and
accelerated. Therefore, it is advisable to have in an industry organization of strategic intelligence that allows
the Organization to interact continuously with the major issues and accompanying macroenvironmental related
to its activities, in order to understand the warning signs that may arise in future discontinuities.

The discontinuities can be detected by systematic Inquisition what could happen to a tendency if one or more of
the forces driving change quickly (HEIJDEN, 2005, p. 230).

Conclusion
The initial proposal and that permeated all the test was to demonstrate that in all the analyses of risks always
exist specific purposes. These should not be random since the possibility of reaching relevant findings are
statistically likely to be low. The current technical criteria for "country analyses" and even the technical analysis
not yet incorporate the future scenarios, except rare exceptions, as in studies involving social security systems.
Finally, the Act on past scenarios analysis, through statistics and records, and present scenarios. Agree with
some authors that a future scenario can be a complex thing to imagine, especially when the outcome of these
analyses may mean tenths per cent of additions, in a time where the competition still struggle for price
reductions. But when it comes to the financial security of the guaranteed companies the companies ' assets worth
this incorporation. There are specific areas that operate with success in this segment, such as the military, the
climate, the evaluation of stock exchanges or stock trading, among others. An appropriate planning is not done
with the look back to the past but to the future. Opening a parenthesis, there are cities where their urban plans
are designed for 50 years. This means that in the view of the paths have already been drawn and Planner must do
everything so that they are pinched. In nature, however, there are no ways to predict certain phenomena to long
term. There are reasonable uncertainty estimates. You never would imagine the occurrence of a tsunami in Asia
in December 2004, which, in addition to severe losses changed in tenths the axis of rotation of the Planet. Predict
if there will be rain or shine at intervals of 4 to 5 days is normal these days, this is because the satellites orbiting
the planet have trace the directions of the winds and assess the conditions of humidity. However, we still can't
predict in advance of 30 days if a volcanic eruption, an earthquake, or tsunami. What we read are not analysis of
scenarios and Yes predictions based on criteria of periodicities or cyclical, like the mega volcano eruption
forecasts of Yellowstone, with seismic activity estimated by scientists with 600,000 years cycles.

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[1]

Antonio Fernando Navarro holds a Bachelor's degree in physics and mathematics, Civil Engineer, security

engineer at work, a master's degree in health and environment, professor at the Universidade Federal Fluminense

UFF in Actuarial Sciences, having worked as a risk manager in industrial activities for over 30 years and in the
activities of QHSE- quality, health, safety and environment in industrial activities related to oil & Gas area.
[2]

Joseph HEMARD: Theorie et pratique des assurances terrestres, Paris, Recueil Sirey, 1924.

[3]

as the purpose of the test is not to define instruments or analytical tools and much less to compare results or

suggest the use of a particular methodology, in many of the names mentioned there is no add-on guidance, since
the own names induce the implementation of these tools. Also replicates that are quoted from mathematical
modelling methods, statistical analysis and analytical methodologies.
[4]

NAVARRO, A.F. et all.Broad prevention Protection Magazine, Rio de Janeiro, no. 232, a. XXIV, April 2011.

[5]

this aspect stands out because in many occasions there are calculations where there is a limit of losses,

equivalent to the value of the insured. If this practice is adopted we will have a limited insurance coverage, with
the insertion of the clause "stop off loss". In these terms the maximum indemnity is limited, whose value
fluctuates between the value of the franchise and the maximum insurable value.
[6]

the frequency with which events occur over a period of time "t".

[7]

Scenario is employed here and at various times as a "photo" futuristic, where they can be depreendidos the

risks exist.
[8]

When not made explicit is evaluating the rate of pure risk, based on analyses of frequency of occurrence and

the severity of the losses.


[9]

a fire can be set as an objective risk, in some studies and their results subjective risks, as the cases of electrical

damage and explosions. This definition that is not commonly applied, because that always requires further
analysis of the process and the chaining of the risks.
[10]

MARTINI, l. c. Jr., risk communication in emergency, Article published in the journal environmental

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the experience here mentioned is that of a company does not have the practice to ensure their goods for a time

interval of at least five years.


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the Zeal is the concern for the protection of goods, through the adoption of preventive practices, such as the

installation of fire detection equipment and fire-fighting equipment, the hiring of specific systems of property
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escape routes or eviction of homeowners.

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Here is deemed to be managers who gave more than one answer.

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