# 121

SPOUSES MINIANO B. DELA CRUZ & LETA L. DELA CRUZ, petitioner

VS. ANA MARIE CONCEPCION, respondent
GR NO. 172825 (11 OCTOBER 2012)

FACTS:

Petitioner sold a house and lot to respondent on the condition that it would
be paid on installment with interest of 18% per annum and penalties if
payment is delayed. It amounted to P 2,000,000.00, and by July 1997 it was
fully paid excluding the penalties and interest. Respondent remaining
obligation was P 200,000.00, both parties agreed that it was the right
computation of respondents remaining obligation.

The title to the property was then transferred to respondents name even
though the remaining balance is not yet paid. Months passed, no payment
was received from respondent as petitioner claimed. But respondent said it
was already paid and proof of that is the receipt showed by respondent as
evidence. The payment was given to Adoracion Losloso, who is allegedly
authorized by petitioner to receive payment on their behalf.

ISSUES:

Whether or not another person aside from the creditor is allowed to collect
and receive payment from the debtor.

HELD:

Yes. Art. 1240 of the Civil Code. Payment shall be made to the person
whose favor the delegation has been constituted, or his successor in interest,
or any person authorized to receive it.

The court explained, payment made by the debtor to the person of the
creditor or to one authorized by him or by the law to receive it extinguishes
the obligation.

Loslosos authority to receive payment was embodied in petitioners letter

addressed to respondent, dated August 7, 1997, where they informed
respondent of the amount they advanced for the payment of the 1997 real
estate taxes. Thus, as shown and pursuant to the authority granted by
petitioners to Losloso, payment made to the latter is deemed payment to
petitioners.

#122

HEIRS OF THE LATE SPOUSES LAURA YADNO & PUGSONG MATAN, petitioners VS. HEIRS OF THE LATE SPOUSES MAURO & ELISA
ANCHALES, respondents
GR NO. 174582 (11 OCTOBER 1012)

FACTS:

Respondents predecessors filed to Urdaneta RTC a complaint for

ownership, delivery of possession damages with preliminary injunction and
attachment against petitioners predecessors, on the year 1982 December 1st.
RTCs decision was in favor of the Anchales and made the absolute owner of
the land.

October 10, 1988, the Urdaneta Sheriff issued a notice of levy on the
property of Orani Tacay, one of the defendants in the above case. November
14, 1988, public auction was executed and Mauro Anchales was the highest
bidder, making him the new owner.

February 10, 1989, the Mat-an spouses filed a complaint to Baguio RTC,
saying that the sheriff indiscriminately levied and conducted a public auction
on the property of Tacay, who died on December 1986. They further
contended that the decision of the Urdaneta RTC was made on September
1987 after Tacay died, therefore the property was made the estate to his legal
heirs and cannot be levied. Thus, it was illegal and the decision of the
Urdaneta RTC was null and void. The Baguio RTC denied their complaint
for lack of jurisdiction. They then appealed the decision to the CA which
was dismissed.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the CA committed a reversible error when it affirmed the

Baguio RTCs dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.

HELD:

No. The Baguio RTC had no jurisdiction over the nature of action. It cant
sought the nullification of a final & executor decision rendered by the
Urdaneta RTC and its subsequent orders issued pursuant thereto for the
satisfaction of the said judgment.
No court has the power to interfere by injunction with the judgments or
decrees of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction. The carious trial
courts of a province or city. The same or equal authority, should not, cannot,
and are not permitted to interfere with their respective cases, much less with
their orders or judgments. A contrary rule would obviously lead to confusion
and seriously hamper the administration of justice.

#123

FILINVEST LAND, INC., EFREN C, GUTIERRE & LINA DE GUZMANFERRER, petitioners VS. ABDUL BACKY, ABEHERA BAIYA, EDRIS,
HADJI GULAM, JAMELLA, KIRAM, LUCAYA, MONER, OMAR,
RAMIR, ROBAYCA, SATAR, TAYBA ALL SURNAMED NGILAY,
EDMER ANDONG, UNOS BANTANGAN & NADJER ESQUIVEL,
respondents
GR NO. 174715 (11 OCTOBER 2012)

FACTS:

Respondents were grantees of agricultural public land in Tambler, General

Santos City through Homestead and Free Patents sometimes in 1986 and
1991.

In 1995, petitioners entered a Deed of Conditional Sale with the

respondents. A downpayment was then given to respondents on October 28,
1995. Few days after, respondent learned that the sale was null and void
because it was done within the year that it was not allowed and prohibited as
conditions given for the free patent. Respondents then filed a petition to
nullify the Deed. The RTC was in favor to the FILINVEST Land, Inc. and
upheld the Deed. It was then elevated to the CA. Judgments were modified,
the patent obtained on 1986 was allowed to be sold, while the patent
obtained on 1991 was null and void.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the CA.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the Deed of Conditional Sale on the 1991 patent violated any
rights therein in the Public Land Act.

Whether or not the petitioners are entitled with a refund of their

downpayment on the 1991 patent land if ever the Deed of Conditional Sale
be nullified.

HELD:

Yes. Section 118 of the Commonwealth Act no. 141. No alienation, transfer,
or conveyance of any homestead after 5 years and before 25 years after
issuance of title shall be valid without the approval of the secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce, which approval shall not be denied except on
constitutional and legal grounds.

Any act which would have the effect of removing the property of subject of
the patent from the hands of the grantee will be struck down for being
violative of the law.

The rule is settled that the declaration of nullity of a contract which is void
ab initio operates to restore things to the state and condition in which they
were found before the execution thereof. Thus, the sale which created the
obligation of petitioners to pay the agreed amount having been declared
void, respondent have the duty to return the downpayment as they no longer
have the right to keep it.

#124

LUCIA O. MAGTIBAY, complainant VS. JUDGE CADER P. INDAR, AL

HAJ, respondent
AM NO. RTJ 11 2271 (24 SEPTEMBER 2012)

FACTS:

Complainant filed a complaint against Atty. Dumlao, claiming that Atty

Dumlao collected a huge amount of money through forging, manufacturing,
falsifying documents and even fraudulently misrepresenting a non-existing
person. Along the course of the case, complainant and her counsel
experienced undue delay on the part of the respondent judge. She further
added that the respondent seemed to be lawyering to Dumlao. Respondent
judge, as claimed by complainant, was rude and treated her representatives
boorishly and scurrilously and even said to file a complaint against him in
administration of the SC which the complainant did. Respondent judge
didnt deny the allegations that were filed against him.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the respondent judge is guilty of Undue Delay in rendering

an order.

Whether or not respondent judge is guilty of conduct unbecoming to a judge.

HELD:

Yes. Respondent judge admitted that he did not act on the motion pending
before his court, albeit, he justified this by saying that his silence or inaction
should be construed as denial.

Even if the motion is unmeritorious, he could have simply acted on the said
motions and indicated the supposed defects in his resolutions instead of just
leaving them unresolved. Undue delay in the disposition of cases and

motions erodes the faith and confidence of the people in the judiciary and
unnecessarily blemishes its stature.

Respondent judge exhibited rude behavior in dealing with the public.

Whether the complainant or her counsel were entitled to the requested
documents is not the issue, but the manner of how he declined the request.
This we will not tolerate.

#125

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee VS. DINA DULAY y

PASCUAL, appellant
GR NO. 193854 (24 SEPTEMBER 2012)

FACTS:

Appellant was a friend of AAAs sister, whom introduced them to each other.
AAA was 12 years old at that time, a minor, according to her testimony,
appellant invited AAA to attend a wake. Along their way, appellant said to
AAA that she has to meet up with her boyfriend first, which they did at the
Fish Port. They went to the Kubuhan, located at the back of the Fish Port,
where the appellant drag her inside and gave her to a man called Speed
who paid the appellant and said to her to bring a younger girl. After that, the
appellant went out and speed raped her using intimidation and threat. AAA
asked for help but appellant ignored her plea. When the deed was done, both
speed and appellant threatened her that if she told anyone about what
happened to her, they will get back at her. She went home and told her sister
who told their mother and filed a complaint. Appellant then denied the
allegation filed against her and made a different testimony that she didnt
deliver her to the man called Speed.

Appellant was found guilty of the crime of rape as co-principal. She then
filed a petition to the CA which affirmed the previous ruling with
modification.

ISSUES:

Whether or not appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape as coprincipal.

HELD:

No. Under the Revised Penal Code, an accused may be considered a

principal by direct participation, by inducement, or by indispensable
cooperation. To be a principal by indispensable cooperation, one must

participate in the criminal resolution. Nothing in the evidence presented by

the prosecution does it show that the acts committed by appellant are
indispensable in the commission of the crime of rape.

#126

BELLE CORPORATION, petitioner VS. ERLINDA DE LEON-BANKS,

RHODORA DE LEON-TIATCO, BETTY DE LEON-TORRES,
GREGORIA DE LEON, ALBERTO DE LEON, EUFRONIO DE LEON, &
MARIA ELIZA DE LEON-DE GRANO, respondents
GR NO. 174669 (19 SEPTEMBER 2012)

FACTS:

On September 23, 1997, BELLE Corp and NELFRED Property Corp

entered a Deed of Sale covering 13.29 hectares, a property of the late
Eufronio and Josefa De Leon. A Deed of absolute sale was executed on 1998
(1998 Deed) and BELLE Corp was made new owner of the property. Before
the 1998 Deed was executed, respondents (herein) filed a complaint for
annulment of the Deed of Sale on the ground that it was simulated. The
disputed property was entrusted to Nelia De Leon-Alleje, principal
stockholder of NELFRED, by the late spouses Eufronio and Josefa De Leon
on the conditions that the profit gained from it will be divided equally to
their children (Nelia included) and in case the property will be sold, all 8
children must give their consent and the profit will be divided among them.
Respondents were not aware of Deed of Sale executed between BELLE and
their sister Nelia. They were only notified when Nelia collected
P10,400,000.00 in cash, representing a portion of the proceed. They inquired
about Sale which was ignored. A complaint was then filed to the RTC but
was dismissed in favor of BELLE. The case was then raised to the CA,
whom revised the decision and set it aside. BELLE filed a motion for
reconsideration which was dismissed.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the CA was correct in reversing the order of the RTC whom
dismissed respondents annulment complaint on the ground of failure to state
a cause of action.

HELD:

Yes. Section 2, rule 2 of the rules of court defines cause of action as the acts
or omission by which a party violates a right of another.

BELLE Corp knew that the vendors were not the true owner of the land and
yet continued to purchase it. They didnt inquire further to whoever the true
owner is. Assuming that the allegation is true, respondents can, therefore,
validly seek nullification of the sale of the subject property to petitioner
because the same effectively denied them their rights to give or withhold
their consent if and when the subject property is intended to be sold, which
right was alleged by respondents to have been provided for in the trust
agreement between their parents and their sister, Nelia Alleje. The court
thus, finds no error on the part of the CAs ruling.

#127

JOSE MIGUEL T. ARROYO, BENJAMIN S. ABALLOS, SR., & GLORIA

MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, petitioners VS. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE;
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; HON. LEILA DE LIMA, in her capacity
as Secretary of the DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; HON. SIXTO S.
BRILLANTES, JR., in his capacity as chairperson of the COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS; SEN. AQUILLINO M. PIMENTEL, III & THE JOINT
DOJ-COMELEC PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION TEAM, respondents
GR NOs. 199082, 199085, 199118 (18 SEPTEMBER 2012)

FACTS:

August 2, 2011, new evidences and surfacing of witnesses about the massive
electoral fraud and manipulation of election results on 2004 and 2007
National Elections were found. Thus, COMELEC issued resolution No.
9266 approving the creation of joint committee with the DOJ to conduct
preliminary investigations during the 2004 and 2007 elections.

August 15, 2011, COMELEC and the DOJ issued Joint Order No. 001-2011
creating and constituting a joint committee and Fact Finding Team on the
2004 and 2007 elections, whose purpose of the latter is to gather real
documentary and testimonial evidences which will be utilized in the
preliminary investigation.

October 17, 2011, Sen. Pimentel III filed a complaint affidavit for electoral
sabotage against petitioners and 12 others. November 3, 2011, petitioners,
through counsel, appeared before the Joint Committee. Respondents were
likewise ordered to submit counter-affidavit on November 14, 2011.
Thereafter, petitioners filed before the court separate petitions.

ISSUES:

Whether or not Joint Order No. 001-2011 creating and constituting a joint
DOJ-COMELEC Preliminary Investigation Committee and Fact Finding
Team on the 2004 and 2007 National Elections electoral fraud and
manipulation case is constitutional.

Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction under the law to conduct
preliminary investigation jointly with the DOJ.

HELD:

Yes. The general rule is that this court shall exercise only appellate
jurisdiction over case involving the constitutionality of a statute, treaty or
regulation. However, such rule is subject to exception that is in the
circumstances where the court believes that resolving the issue of
constitutionality of a law or regulation at the first instance is paramount
importance and immediately affects the several, economic and normal wellbeing of the people.

Section 265 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 Omnibus Election Code:

Prosecution. The commission shall through its duly authorized legal officers,
have the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election
offenses punishable under this code, and to prosecute the same. The
commission may avail the assistance of other prosecutory arms of the
government. Provided, however, that in the event that the commission fails
to act on any complaint may file the complaint with the office of the fiscal or
with the ministry of justice for proper investigation and prosecution, if
warranted.

#128

DANILO R. QUERIJERO, JOHNNY P. LILANF & IVENE D. REYES,

petitioners VS. LIMA PALMES-LIMITAR, ISAGANI G. PALMES & THE
COURT OF APPEALS, respondents
GR NO. 166467 (17 SEPTEMBER 2012)

FACTS:

Petitioners were charged of the violation of sec.3 of RA 3019, which they

collaborated, conspired and took advantage of their position as employees of
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office, where they gave
original certificates of titles to people that were not qualified resulting to
undue injuries to the heirs and family of Isidro R. Palmes. They filed a
petition to quash the information and that the case filed against them were
already been dismissed. It was denied on September 3, 2003. Petitioners
sought relief to the CA but were dismissed for lack of merit.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the appellate Court erred in denying petitioners motion to

quash.

HELD:

No. The established rule is that, when such an adverse interlocutory order is
rendered, the remedy is not to resort forth with to certiorari, but to continue
with the case in due course and when an unfavorable verdict is handed down
to take an appeal in the manner authorized by law. The appellate court did
not err in denying petitioners motion to quash.

#129

CRISPINO PANGILINAN, petitioner VS. JOCELYN N. BALATBAT

substituted by her heirs, namely, VICENTE BALATBAT, ANA LUCIA N.
BALATBAT, JOSE VICENTE N. BALATBAT, JOCELYN BEUNA B. DE
GUZMAN, GARVACIO ALFREDO N. BALATBAT, PIO ROMULO N.
BALATBAT & JUNIOPERO PEDRO N. BALATBAT, respondents
GR NO. 170787 (12 SEPTEMBER 2012)

FACTS:

Respondents have landholdings total of 25.2548 hectares, consisted of

9.8683 hectares of rice lands covered by Land Reform and 15.3864 hectares
of sugar land. The latter was subdivided into 4.8836 hectares subdivision lot
to support themselves and their family.

The 8.6402 hectares rice land was under PD 27 and EO 228. 2.9941 hectares
out of the 8.6402 hectares was transferred to petitioner which was on the
Register of Deeds for the province of Pampanga on May 30, 1997, pursuant
to emancipation patent issued by DAR on April 18, 1997. Respondent
sought to cancel emancipation paten hence they applied for Application for
Retention of their land holdings under PD 27 on December 23, 1975 but was
not acted upon. Thus they filed for re-application but was dismissed.

On October 1998, PARAD rendered decision in favor to petitioner and was

further affirmed by DARAB. May 2005 the CA rendered its decision in
favor to respondents. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the CA erred in reversing and setting aside the decision of
the DARAB and its resolution.

HELD:

Yes. Landowners covered by PD 27 are entitled to retain 7 hectares, except

those whose entire tenanted rice and corn lands are subject of acquisition
and distribution under Operation Land Transfer. An owner of tenanted rice
and corn lands may not retain their lands under the following cases:
By virtue of LOI 474, if he, as of October 21, 1976, owned less
than 24 hectares of tenanted rice or corn land, but additionally
owned the following:
o Lands used for residential, commercial, industrial, or
other urban purposes from which he derives adequate
income to support himself and his family.

By these policy, PARAD and DARAB found respondents are disqualified to

retain the parcel of lands, there was no ground to cancel emancipation patent
of petitioner.

#130

PARK HOTEL, Js PLAYHOUSE, BURGOS CORPORATION, INC.,

and/or GREGG HARBUTT, general manager; ATTY. ROBERTO
ENRIQUEZ, president & BILL PERCY, petitioners VS. MANOLO
SORIANO, LESTER GONZALES, & YOLANDA BADILLA, respondents
GR NO. 171118 (10 SEPTEMBER 2012)

FACTS:

Park Hotel is managed and owned by Harbutt and Percy, respectively. Percy,
Harbutt and Atty. Enriquez are also officer and stockholders of Burgos Corp,
Inc., sister company of Park Hotel.

On October 1997, respondents were dismissed of their work and was

accused of theft which respondent denied the allegation and said that the real
reason was because they were organizing a union for the companys
employees. September 1998, LA decided in favor of respondents. The case
was then raised to the NLRC who affirmed the latters decision with
modification. The case was further raised to the CA, ascribing grave abuse
of discretion mounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the decision of the
NLRC in holding Park Hotel, Harbutt and Percy jointly and severally liable
to respondents.

ISSUES:

Whether or not Park Hotel, Harbutt and Percy are jointly liable with Burgos
for the dismissal of respondents.

HELD:

Park Hotel and Burgos cannot be considered as one and the same entity and
Park Hotel cannot be held solidarity liable with Burgos.

Section 31 of the Corporation Code makes a director personally liable for

corporate debts if he willfully and knowingly votes for or assents to patently
unlawful acts of the corporation. It also makes a director personally liable if
he is guilty of gross negligence or bad faith in directing the affairs of the
corporation. Thus, both Harbutt and Percy held liable.