Record: 9

Title:
Understanding Groupthink From a Self-Regulatory Perspective.
Subject(s):
SMALL groups; JANIS, Irving
Source: Small Group Research, Apr99, Vol. 30 Issue 2, p139, 27p
Author(s):
Flippen, Annette R.
Abstract:
Discusses how differing initial motivations on the part
of group members combined with other antecedent factors can result in
various processes that lead to groupthink. Information on groupthink
proposed by Irving L. Janis; Effect of promotional leadership;
Self-regulation; Self-regulatory view of groupthink; Reexamination of
the case studies used by Janis; Conclusions; Interventions.
AN:
1743105
ISSN:
1046-4964
Full Text Word Count:
9665
Database:
Psychology and Behavioral Sciences Collection
UNDERSTANDING GROUPTHINK FROM A SELF-REGULATORY PERSPECTIVE
Contents
SELF-REGULATION
A SELF-REGULATORY VIEW OF GROUPTHINK
THE BAY OF PIGS
CONCLUSIONS AND POSSIBLE INTERVENTIONS
REFERENCES
NOTE
In the years since Janis first identified the group pathology he termed
groupthink, researchers have attempted to discover why groupthink occurs
and what can be done to prevent it. Although most researchers have
worked within Janis's original framework, the finding of McCauley that
there seems to be two different social influence processes at work
indicates that there may be a more complicated process at work. This
article uses a self-regulatory model of motivation as a unifying
framework to show how differing initial motivations on the part of group
members combined with other antecedent factors can result in various
processes that lead to groupthink. Based on this motivational approach,
interventions were suggested.
Groupthink has frequently been defined as premature consensus thinking,
that is, consensus seeking that occurs before all alternatives have been
realistically appraised (Gordon, 1987; Janis, 1982; McCauley, 1989;
Shaw, 1981). There is nothing wrong with group consensus on a decision,
indeed the task of a decision-making group is to produce a group
position from the initial preferences of its members' arguments (Whyte,
1989). The problem occurs when consensus seeking occurs before the
optimal solution to a problem has been identified, and when consensus is
reached without fully evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of the
proposed solution. Groupthink is a process, not an outcome and does not
always result in a bad decision.
The original theory of groupthink was first proposed by Irving L. Janis
in 1972 and further expanded by him in 1982. Janis used the term
groupthink to refer to a type of dysfunctional group decision making
that he believed was the cause of several foreign policy fiascoes such
as the Bay of Pigs and the escalation of the Vietnam War. Janis's theory
was based primarily on his analysis of the historical data pertaining to
those events, and although not based on empirical evidence, the theory
has appeal and has often been cited in the social sciences literature
(McCauley, 1989; Moorhead & Montanari, 1986) and textbooks (Gordon,
1987; Sabini, 1995; Shaw, 1981). The eight symptoms of groupthink that
Janis identifies are a belief in the invulnerability of the group,
rationalization of behavior, belief in the morality of the group,

stereotyping of out-group members, pressure for conformity,

self-censorship of doubts, perception of unanimity, and the existence of
self-appointed mindguards (Janis, 1982). Janis believed that a crucial
determinant of groupthink occurrence is high group cohesiveness, which
then combines with several other antecedent conditions to cause a
situation where "group members' striving for unanimity override their
motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action"
(Janis, 1982, p. 9).
Janis (1982) identifies several antecedent conditions along with group
cohesiveness that he believes facilitate the occurrence of groupthink,
including lack of impartial leadership, lack of methodological norms for
decision making, insulation of the group, homogeneity of group members'
backgrounds and values, external threat, low self-efficacy of individual
group members (what Janis terms "low hope of a better solution than the
leaders"), and low self-esteem caused by recent failure. Although there
has been surprisingly little empirical research investigating
groupthink, there have been a few studies that attempted to manipulate
some of the antecedent conditions in the laboratory. The results of
these studies did not show any clear results for the effect of group
cohesiveness, with several studies finding no effect at all (Flowers,
1977; Fodor & Smith, 1982) and another showing effects in the opposite
direction as predicted (described in McCauley, 1989). More recently, a
meta-analysis by Mullen, Anthony, Salas, and Driskell (1994), as well as
an analysis of historical data by Tetlock, Peterson, McGuire, Chang, and
Feld (1992), found that cohesiveness alone was not an independent
predictor of groupthink. As Park (1990) concluded, "Group cohesiveness,
either alone or in interaction with other variables does not affect
groupthink in most cases" (p. 236). Bernthal and Insko (1993) found that
the type of cohesion being considered may be important because they
found that social-emotional cohesion was more likely to contribute to
groupthink symptoms than task-oriented cohesion and that the combination
of low social-emotional cohesion and high task-oriented cohesion
resulted in the lowest levels of groupthink symptoms as perceived by
participants.
The effect of promotional leadership (where the leader actively promotes
one idea very early on instead of encouraging the generation of many
different ideas), was also investigated in several studies. The results
showed that promotional leadership is, as predicted, positively related
to the occurrence of groupthink (Flowers, 1977; described in McCauley,
1989). In addition, the meta-analysis by Mullen et al. (1994) found that
poorer quality decisions were made by cohesive groups only when
directive leadership was also present. A recent study by Peterson (1997)
investigated the role of two different types of directive leadership on
group decision making and found that process directiveness (the degree
to which a leader regulates group process) was much more likely to
result in negative outcomes than was outcome directiveness (the degree
to which a leader advocates a particular position), although both types
could have negative impact. Callaway, Mariott, and Esser (1985) measured
the effects of priming some groups with procedures for decision making
(similar to Janis's concept of methodological norms). Results indicated
no effect of priming of decision-making procedures on the occurrence of
groupthink symptoms.
The existence of external threat has not been actively investigated but
was present in one form or another in every study. As McCauley (1989)
noted, "External threat may be necessary but not sufficient for
groupthink, but this prediction is not tested in the examples cited" (p.
258). Research by Flippen, Homstein, Siegal, and Weitzman (1996) has
shown external threat to be a direct cause of in-group bias, which is
one of the symptoms Janis identified, suggesting that the perception of
threat may indeed be a contributing factor, although not necessarily a
primary one. The effects of the other antecedent conditions that Janis

proposes have apparently not yet been systematically examined.

SELF-REGULATION
One way to understand the behavior of members of a group that is
undergoing groupthink is to use a self-regulatory model of motivation.
Self-regulatory models examine behavior in terms of the goals the
behavior is trying to achieve and the feedback the individual is
receiving about the progress toward that goal. Before attempting to
analyze groupthink from a self-regulatory model of motivation, a brief
discussion of self-regulation in general is in order. Self-regulatory
models of human behavior have been formulated by theorists from both
control theory and social cognitive perspectives. However, despite the
differing backgrounds, the more recent versions generated from each
school are practically the same, with no major substantive differences
(Bandura, 1986, 1991; Carver & Scheier, 1990; Karoly, 1993; Klein,
1989). The basic concept in self-regulation is a discrepancy reducing
feedback loop in which the individual decides on a goal, acts toward
that goal, and then seeks performance feedback that is used as the basis
for adjusting their behavior in continuing attempts to reduce the
discrepancy between their goal and their present state (Carver &
Scheier, 1990).
In the self-regulatory model, goals refer to the desired state of the
individual, which may come from many sources, such as personal values,
organizational standards, and past experience. There must be goal
acceptance or it will not be seen as a desired state (Campion & Lord,
1982). The goals in this model are not necessarily static end states; it
is possible to have goals relating to qualities of behavior. For
example, Carver and Scheier (1990) have proposed the existence of a
"meta-loop," in which the goal is the rate of change of the discrepancy.
In this case, the rate of progress is the main goal rather than the end
product of the behavior sequence. Discrepancies between actual and
desired states may result in both affective and behavioral reactions
(Carver & Scheier, 1990; Higgins, 1987). Obviously, people can be
self-regulating in relationship to several different goals at any one
time, and when there are competing goals the one that takes precedence
attentionally is the one that is most salient (Karoly, 1993). Salience
is determined by situational cues, goal valence, and the magnitude of
perceived discrepancies (Karoly, 1993; Klein, 1989). Several researchers
have found that conflict between goals leads to behavioral and emotional
consequences (see Karoly, 1993, for a review).
Self-regulatory models have most often been used to understand behavior
in an individual context, but they have also proved useful for
understanding the behavior of individuals in groups (Abrams & Brown,
1989; Diener, 1980; Mullen, 1983; Prentice-Dunn & Rogers, 1989). The
primary goal of these studies focused on the role of self-attention.
Self-attention, which is also referred to as self-focus, has been shown
to be one of the most important moderators of the self-regulatory
process (Carver & Scheier, 1981, 1983; Diener, 1979). Group phenomena
that these theorists have attempted to explain by examining the
self-regulation of individuals include social facilitation,
deindividuation, diffusion of responsibility, and social loafing. In
contrast to the previous approaches, which relied solely on the role of
self-attention, the present approach that applies self-regulatory models
of motivation to groupthink entails focusing on the combined effects of
several different factors on the self-regulatory systems of the
individual group members.
A SELF-REGULATORY VIEW OF GROUPTHINK

According to self-regulatory models, the key to understanding an

individual's behavior is understanding what is the goal toward which
they are striving and the feedback they are receiving about their
progress. This raises the question of what motivates the individuals in
a group that is engaging in groupthink? Are they ignoring their own
beliefs because they are concerned with violating a group norm, or are
they striving for a quality decision but have been convinced of the
validity of the group's position? Janis's formulation would suggest that
members of such a group are indeed convinced of the validity of the
group's position, but work by McCauley (1989) suggests that this might
not always be the case.
McCauley (1989) analyzed the groupthink case studies used by Janis in
terms of Kelman's (1958) attitude change processes of internalization
and identification. In Kelman's (1958) framework, compliance occurs when
the individual privately retains their previous opinion but publicly
espouses an attitude change to "achieve a favorable reaction from
another person or group" (p. 218). Internalization occurs when the
individual is really convinced, both privately and publicly. Although
Janis seems to downplay the occurrence of compliance and concentrates
mostly on internalization, McCauley (1989) found examples of both
compliance and internalization in the actions and words of the group
members in the Janis case studies. McCauley concludes, "Groupthink is
properly understood as premature consensus that includes both
internalized consensus and compliance without private acceptance" (p.
260). An important implication of McCauley's work is that although the
outward behaviors of group members in a group undergoing groupthink may
appear to be similar, the underlying causes may be quite different.
By examining both the goals of group members and the feedback they are
receiving regarding the discrepancy between the groups' goals and its
performance, it is possible to understand how factors of the situation
and group process can combine with differing initial motivations of
group members to cause both the compliance and internalization that
result in groupthink. These effects combine at each stage of the group's
decision-making process with the ultimate result being a group that
exhibits the characteristically apparent consensus of groupthink.
There are two occurrences that must happen for groupthink to occur. The
first is that a solution must be selected prematurely without adequate
consideration of the other possible alternatives. The second event is
that this solution must be accepted by the group without adequate
evaluation of its advantages and disadvantages. Both of these events can
be seen to be the result of the antecedents of groupthink acting on the
individual group member's self-regulatory systems.
The specified goal of a problem-solving group is to find the best
possible solution to the problem they are considering. During the early
stages of group problem solving, an initial subgoal of the group is
usually to generate all of the possible alternative solutions prior to
selecting the best one. For the group as a whole to generate a large
number of solutions, each individual member must think of and suggest
solutions different from those already proposed. Several of Janis's
antecedent factors can combine to decrease the likelihood of many
solutions being generated by the individual members and examined by the
group as a whole.
Insulation of the group may limit the amount of information available to
group members and therefore limit the number of different solutions they
can generate. In self-regulatory terms, this would be a system
constraint (Wood & Bandura, 1989). Homogeneity of group members'
backgrounds would also limit the pool of information and past experience

available to the group, again acting as a system constraint on the

ability of group members to generate many different solutions. A
solution heavily promoted by a leader will usually have greater weight
to the group than one equally heavily promoted by a group member of
lesser status (Hackman & Morris, 1975; Shaw, 1981).
Status characteristics theory is concerned with the dynamics surrounding
perceived status and interpersonal influence in groups. Status
characteristics theory maintains that an individual's expectations about
the quality of another group member's future performance on the task at
hand may depend on the status characteristics of that person (Foschi,
1997). According to Foschi, "A status characteristic is any valued
attribute implying task competence" (p. 539), and higher status
individuals are less likely to accept influence from lower status
individuals. In addition, as Biernat and Kobrynowicz (1997) describe,
status characteristics theory also predicts that the standards of
ability are such that low status members may be required to show more
evidence of ability than high status members to be perceived as
influential. In a group undergoing groupthink, if the leader of the
group has high perceived competence, he or she will accordingly be very
influential.
Promotional leadership was found to be an antecedent of groupthink
(Flowers, 1977; Mullen et al., 1994). Furthermore, it is possible that
having one solution gain early weight might inhibit group members from
generating and then proposing their own solutions unless they have
enough self-efficacy to believe that theirs is a better solution and the
expectancy that even if it is, that they could convince the group to
listen to it. Adequate self-efficacy and sufficiently high expectancies
are important moderators of self-regulation and not having them may lead
to goal abandonment, due to the individual's failure to believe he or
she has any chance of achieving the goal (Bandura & Cervone, 1986;
Bandura & Jourden, 1991; Carver & Scheier, 1982a). In addition, for some
group members, currying favor from the leader may be a more important
goal than the goal of reaching the best decision, and once the leader
has promoted one solution, these members may refrain from further
suggestions due to a reluctance to have their own suggestion gain more
acceptance or attention than the leader's.
Of course, a question that arises at this point is why the leader would
heavily promote a solution given that it may be detrimental to the
group. There are at least two possibilities. The first is that the
leader indeed has the goal of effective group decision making in mind
and mistakenly believes that taking a firm stance is exhibiting good
leadership. The other, perhaps more sinister, explanation is that the
leader has an agenda that includes having his or her idea selected and
that this goal has higher precedence for this leader than does the goal
of effective group performance. In either case, the behavior of the
leader would appear the same but the ultimate motivation of that
behavior would be different.
Fodor and Smith (1982), in their discussion of the relationship between
power and groupthink, argue that one of the factors underlying directive
leadership behaviors may be a high need for power on the part of the
leader. They assert that "from all that is known about need for power,
probably persons who score high and are assigned to the authority role
would have a strong desire to see their point of view prevail in group
discussion" (p. 180). Fodor and Smith (1982) also cite the results of
Winter's 1973 study, which found that the presidents involved in the Bay
of Pigs and the escalation of the Korean and Vietnam wars all had a high
need for power, possibly indicating the role this may have played in
several of the Janis cases. Although this is an interesting speculation,
it must be cautioned that Winter's study involved a content analysis of
the inaugural addresses of the presidents in question and should not be

viewed as a definitive assessment of their need for power. An important

point to consider is that as several theorists, including Arrow
(1951,described in Edney, 1980) and Vroom and Yetton (1973), point out,
there may be times, such as Vroom and Yetton's conditions of high need
for decision quality and low need for decision acceptance, when a
solution imposed by a dictatorial or authoritarian leader may be the one
with the best chance for a satisfactory solution. One characteristic of
groupthink, however, is that the group has at least the appearance of
supporting such a solution wholeheartedly rather than agreeing to it
under protest, which may have different implications and consequences.
Once one solution has gained enough weight over the others, the goal of
the group then switches from idea generation to idea evaluation. The
group now begins consensus seeking and tries to obtain agreement from
the individual group members (Whyte, 1989). At this stage, although the
idea under consideration may not be optimal, each individual still has
the ability to realize this and try to convince the group to reject it.
In groupthink, however, the members agree on a position quickly, with
little discussion of its merit. The ideal group goal at this stage is
thorough evaluation of the proposed solution. This should also be the
goal of the individual members. Based on the information available to
them, each member must seek information about the quality of the
solution and formulate an opinion. The group then begins to seek
consensus from the individual members about whether the solution is
suitable or not.
At the stage when the group begins to seek consensus, there are three
possible opinions that group members may hold, although the degree of
commitment to their opinion may vary. These positions are in favor,
opposed, and undecided. It does not seem likely that every member of a
group would initially hold the same favorable opinion. What happens
during the group discussions to convince all members, even those
initially opposed or undecided, to accept the proposed solution without
a thorough evaluation?
Conformity to group norms is often blamed as the cause of groupthink,
but conformity is a result, not a cause. As Shaw (1981) points out about
the study of conformity, most investigators of social influence "have
simply ignored the person's reasons for the behavior" (p. 280). Knowing
why a person is conforming is important, for without that knowledge it
would be impossible to effectively intervene. There are several factors
influencing when people will conform to a group, but the two most
powerful are when people feel a need to maintain a good relationship
with others and when there is uncertainty about the correct response
(Whyte, 1989). These two factors correspond to two types of group
influence: normative and informational (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955).
Normative social influence is influence to conform with the positive
expectations of another, whereas informational social influence is
influence to accept information obtained from another as information
about reality.
Some group members who have doubts about the group's proposal may give
the appearance of conformity by refraining from raising those doubts
publicly due to low self-efficacy about their ability to effectively
participate in group discussions. A study by Callaway et al. (1985)
found that groups composed of people high in the trait of dominance,
defined as "the predisposition to argue, persuade, and influence others
to one's position and to lead, direct others, and make group decisions,"
had significantly fewer instances of groupthink than did control groups.
This shows that ability to participate actively in group discussions is
related to reduced groupthink. Perhaps some people may doubt their
ability to affect the group and may feel that voicing a contradictory
opinion would serve no purpose as no one would listen to them. In this
case, low expectancy of having any impact on the group due to low

self-efficacy about the needed skills could cause withdrawal from the
effort of achieving the group goal.
A related factor, which might inhibit some group members from
confidently criticizing a proposal, is lack of confidence in their
knowledge of the subject matter, especially if the group comprises more
and less knowledgeable members. In this case, it is not lack of
confidence in their persuasive abilities that inhibits them but lack of
confidence in the validity of their doubts. This lack of confidence
could only be exacerbated by witnessing a respected leader confidently
supporting a proposal. One implication of status characteristics theory
is the effects that an individual's self-perceptions of their status may
have on their behavior. It may be that group members who believe that
their own status (or competence) is perceived by others to be low, due
to their perceived lack of competence in the subject area, have little
expectation of having any influence over higher status individuals
although they might have confidence in their opinions and their ability
to influence others in other group situations.
Another factor that may play into the compliance scenario is the role of
perceptions of power. Typologies of power usually identify five major
sources of power: reward, coercive, legitimate, expert, and referent
(Muchinsky, 1997). According to Muchinsky (1997), of those five types,
three (reward, coercive, and legitimate) are likely to lead to
compliance. Shaw (1981) also illustrates the existence of reward and
coercive power in groups when he states that powerful group members are
often seen as having the capacity to either help or hinder others with
respect to their goals. As previously stated, some group members may
have a large stake in maintaining a good relationship with the group and
its leader thus giving the leader a great deal of power over them. Those
group members may have serious doubts about the position of the leader
and his supporters but publicly accept that position because they either
would like rewards from them or fear sanctions. This is an example of
the normative influence of the group, and what has occurred is simply
that these people have decided that the valence of the group goal of
thoroughly evaluating the proposed solution is less important to them
than the conflicting individual goal of maintaining a good relationship
with the leader and other group members by publicly conforming to the
leader's position. Status characteristics theory maintains that
individuals whose perceived competence (status) is high will be more
influential but only under certain conditions, such as being motivated
to do well on the task (Foschi, 1997). Presumed knowledge and competence
may be the basis for expert power (Muchinsky, 1997), but some
individuals may be more influenced by reward or coercive power
especially if success at this particular task is not their primary goal.
In addition, Turner, Pratkanis, Probasco, and Leve (1992) found that
inducing groups to believe that there was a high likelihood they would
exhibit dysfunctional process contributed to the appearance of
groupthink. It is possible, although not addressed by the authors, that
this may have inhibited group members from actively disagreeing with
other members due to a fear of appearing to contribute to dysfunctional
conditions within the group and thus incurring the displeasure of the
group. In the self-regulatory model, insufficient goal valence will
often lead to goal abandonment, especially when there are conflicting
goals (Carver & Scheier, 1982b, 1990). The highly dominant participants
in the Callaway et al. (1985) study may have been less concerned with
gaining approval from others and more concerned with influencing others
to their own point of view, thus being more likely to contribute to
group discussions.
In each of these examples of possible compliance scenarios, individual
group members have abandoned working on the group goal of thoroughly

evaluating the proposal. Some members have withdrawn due to low

self-efficacy, whereas others have decided that the conflicting goal of
gaining approval from others is more important. Judging by McCauley's
(1989) analysis, however, compliance does not appear to be the only
process of attitude change that is occurring. There also seem to be many
instances of people who have really become convinced of the validity of
the group's position even in the face of contradictory information.
Group members who have not abandoned the group goal are still working
toward their subgoal of evaluating the proposed solution by attempting
to compare the group's performance (the solution generated) to the ideal
performance (solution). To do this, they must gather feedback about the
group's performance. This feedback may come from several sources. Group
members often try look to other group members for information, both by
directly soliciting their opinion and by "observing other group members
in action" (Hackman, 1976, p. 1480). However, due to the aforementioned
effects of compliance, some group members who could possibly provide
contradictory information will not say anything. People who are
undecided may therefore only be hearing from those group members who
fully support the proposal. If those group members are also of high
perceived competence, in accordance with status characteristics theory
they will be that much more influential.
Due to a phenomenon that Shaw (1981) refers to as "pluralistic
ignorance," there is a tendency to equate silence with agreement. If a
group member fails to voice any dissent, then the other members will
assume that he or she agrees. Although many of the group members could
be unsure about the quality of the solution, due to the silence of the
compliant members the group will have the appearance of unanimity. Each
member may then feel as if they are the only ones feeling doubts, which
may cause them to believe their opinions are mistaken, as they succumb
to the informational influence of the group. As demonstrated in the
classic conformity paradigms of Asch and Sherif (described in Hackman,
1976) in a situation with ambiguous stimuli, people will often accept
the group's judgment as information about reality.
In most of the decisions being made by groups vulnerable to groupthink,
knowing which is the best solution to a problem will of necessity have a
large subjective component, causing individuals to both look to other
group members for information and to have doubts about the certainty of
their own positions. The feedback that individuals are receiving from
the group in this case, however, does not reflect the reality of
uncertainty among the group; rather, it indicates that the rest of the
group is in agreement about the value of the proposed solution. Based on
the information available to them, individual group members have no
reason to believe the proposed solution is not an ideal one as the
available feedback indicates that no one else in the group has found any
problems with it. At this point, the individuals are receiving feedback
that the discrepancy between the group's performance and the group's
goal is small instead of large. They have no reason to try to convince
the group to look for another solution.
Even if there does not appear to be any contradictory feedback from
sources within the group, there may be information from sources outside
of the group that could indicate problems with the solution the group is
considering. When groups are undergoing groupthink, this information is
often ignored. Why does this happen? There are several factors that
might contribute to this phenomenon. One relevant factor is that
feedback that is not from a source close to the individual is usually
given less attention, as is feedback that contradicts the person's
position (Ilgen, Fisher, & Taylor, 1979). Based on the feedback people
have already received from the group, they may have formed a hypotheses
that the solution under consideration is indeed good and will therefore
tend to ignore contradictory feedback. However, these factors are not

unique to groups that undergo groupthink. Although they might contribute

to the tendency to ignore contradictory feedback, it seems likely that
there is another factor at work in the groupthink situations.
An antecedent condition that was present in all of the groupthink cases
and studies reviewed here was external threat. This threat was social in
that it was caused by other human beings. Research by Flippen et al.
(1996) found perceptions of social threat to be a direct cause of
in-group bias. Once an in-group has formed, in-group bias, in which
in-group members derogate and stereotype out-group members, often
occurs. Indeed, one of the symptoms of groupthink identified by Janis is
stereotyping of out-groups (Janis, 1982, p. 174). Because of this bias,
information not emanating from within the group may be seen as coming
from unreliable sources and therefore not taken seriously by the group
members in their assessment of the situation. Mackie, Worth, and
Asuncion (1990) found in their research that messages from out-group
members are indeed seen as less persuasive than messages from in-group
members.
Because any feedback from an out-group source that indicates a problem
with the solution they are looking at will be ignored, the individual is
still perceiving a small discrepancy between the group's performance
(the solution it has generated) and the group's goal (the optimal
solution), regardless of the reality. In the same manner, it is even
possible that a single group member who dissents could be characterized
as sympathizing with the out-group and his or her opinion could thus be
devalued. Indeed, groups undergoing groupthink often pressure deviant
members of their group to conform in order to be loyal group members
(Janis, 1982). In addition, a recent study by Flippen (1998) found that
when participants believed that a member of their own group had
motivations in sympathy with a threatening out-group, participants
treated that in-group member equivalently to how they treated members of
the out-group, further supporting the idea that a "deviant" group
member's opinion would probably not carry much weight.
One factor that may determine whether nongroup members will be
classified as in-group or out-group may be the behavior of the group
leader. Although there was social threat present in all of the cases
described by Janis, whether groupthink was present or not, in the
non-groupthink cases the leader actively encouraged seeking expert
advice from outside the group. This active endorsement from the leader
may have prevented these outsiders from being perceived as out-group
members by giving group members the impression that these were credible
experts who were somehow affiliated with the group. In the Flippen
(1998) study, out-group members who were known to have motives that
sympathized with the in-group were indeed treated as in-group members.
It can be seen then that through in-group bias, external sources of
contradictory information will be discounted, and due to the conformity
of some group members and the low self-efficacy of others internal
sources of contradictory information will be inhibited. Compounding this
lack of contradictory information is pluralistic ignorance, which
provides overestimates of supporting information. These factors combine
to convince people that all of the available information indicates that
the solution proposed by the leader is indeed a good solution because
they are either not hearing or are discounting contradictory
information.
People who internalize have not abandoned the goal of evaluating the
proposed solution, but due to inadequate and inaccurate feedback they
believe the group has indeed considered all of the available information
when in fact it has not. In self-regulatory terms, they have failed to
perceive an existing discrepancy. Believing the group has achieved its
goal, the members have no reason to continue searching for a better

solution.
THE BAY OF PIGS
A reexamination of the case studies used by Janis in formulating his
original theory can illustrate how the present approach can provide a
new understanding of the events that led to the negative outcomes he
described.( n1) Although a historical reanalysis can by no means be used
to "prove" the correctness of this or any approach, it can certainly
illustrate how the processes described above may have played out in an
actual group setting. Perhaps the most interesting case Janis examined
was the ill-fated decision by the Kennedy administration to sanction the
CIA-sponsored invasion of Cuba by Cuban exiles. The invasion failed, and
it was obvious in hindsight that it was doomed from the start. This
fiasco became known as the Bay of Pigs.
The first step in applying a self-regulatory model to the events
surrounding the Bay of Pigs is to examine the initial goals of the group
members. The nominal leader of the group was President John F. Kennedy.
Kennedy had taken office just two days before the initial meeting of the
policy group, and the proposal to invade Cuba using dissidents had
already been formulated by the previous administration (Janis, 1972).
Although Kennedy's primary goal was to make a decision that was in the
best interests of the United States, an additional desire of Kennedy's
was to avoid appearing "softer" on communism than his Republican
opponents (Janis, 1972).
Two other influential members of the committee were Allen Dulles and
Richard Bissell, the director and deputy director of the CIA. Dulles and
Bissell were the ones who advocated the plan to Kennedy and the others,
having been instructed to prepare it by outgoing President Eisenhower
(Janis, 1972). Although they ostensibly had the best interests of the
country at heart, there were other factors that may have played into
their advocacy of the project. They had been working on this project for
quite some time--the brigade of Cuban exiles had already begun training
(Janis, 1972)--and the CIA had already invested time and resources into
the project, which may have increased commitment to the project.
Although not directly addressed by Janis, it can be assumed that with a
new president, it was important to the CIA leadership that the agency be
viewed as competent and valuable, so that it would not risk losing any
of the influence, power, and resources that were then available to it.
Admitting that the plan Dulles and Bissell had developed and begun to
implement could fail would be tantamount to admitting that they and the
agency they controlled were incompetent. In addition, as Janis (1972)
discusses, Bissell may have had the additional desire to impress Kennedy
with his competence and leadership so that when Dulles retired, Kennedy
would appoint Bissell as his successor.
Although less information is available about the motivations of the
other members of the committee, one member, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.,
viewed the main job of the White House staff as "protecting the
President," whereas he saw the job of the representatives of the State
Department being to "defend the diplomatic interests of the nation"
(Janis, 1972, p. 31). It can also be assumed that all of these men were
additionally concerned to some degree with their professional
reputations among their peers and colleagues. It can be seen then that
there were multiple goals at work in the minds of the committee members,
some of which had the potential to become incompatible.
Rather than considering what should be done about Cuba in a general
sense, this policy group was formed in response to a single proposal.
The nature of the group's formation certainly explains much of why the

group only evaluated one idea, but it can still be questioned why the
group members did not decide that perhaps other plans should be
formulated and compared with the present one. One answer seems to lie
with the leadership of the committee. Although Kennedy was the nominal
leader, from the descriptions of the group members it seems as if he
ceded leadership to Dulles and Bissel at least to some degree; as Janis
describes, "at each meeting, instead of opening up the agenda to permit
a full airing of the opposing considerations, he allowed the CIA
representatives to dominate the entire discussion" (Janis, 1972, p. 43).
Janis (1972) goes on to describe how "the President permitted [the CIA
representatives] to refute immediately each tentative doubt that the
others might express, instead of asking whether anyone else had the same
doubt" (p. 43). As previously discussed, Dulles and Bissell had strong
reasons for promoting the proposal and for discouraging criticism of it.
Indeed, Janis (1972) describes Bissell as "the most active advocate of
the CIA plan; his eloquent presentations did the main job of convincing
the conferees to accept it" (p. 19).
Kennedy probably ceded control to Dulles and Bissell for fairly benign
reasons. He had just become president and did not know the strengths and
weaknesses of his people and had misplaced confidence in the abilities
of his advisors, believing "that the military and intelligence people
have some secret skill not available to ordinary mortals" (Janis, 1972,
p. 32). In status characteristics theory terms, they had high perceived
status. Although Kennedy's actions were grounded in good intentions,
they almost certainly had a strong impact on the rest of the committee
members, who still saw Kennedy as the leader. Group members who did
indeed have doubts about the proposal may have been uncomfortable
criticizing it because of the perception that Kennedy supported it. It
is one thing to criticize the director of the CIA but yet another to
criticize the president of the United States, even if in reality Kennedy
might have welcomed the input. This fear of losing face could only have
been enhanced by the esteem in which Kennedy was held.
There were other pressures toward compliance as well, which may have
caused some group members to abandon attempts to critically evaluate the
proposal. Dulles and Bissell shrewdly framed the proposal so that
opposition to it would appear to support communism (Janis, 1972),
something that every member of the committee would wish to avoid. This
would be particularly true for Kennedy, who would be vulnerable to being
seen as weaker on the issue than his Republican opponents who had
formulated the proposal. The CIA representatives, along with the
military representatives on the committee, also used what Schlesinger
later referred to as "virile poses" when discussing the plan (Janis,
1972, p. 41). Because of this, raising opposition to the plan would have
the effect of making participants seem soft and weak, again threatening
them with loss of face and reputation. These factors placed the
participants' goals of doing a good job in direct opposition to the goal
of maintaining their personal and professional reputations. In addition,
because of the way the situation was framed, any group member who
dissented ran the risk of being ostracized from the group. Schlesinger
later reported feeling that although he should have raised his
objections at the time, it would probably have had little effect other
than "to gain me a name as a nuisance" (Janis, 1972, p. 40).
Kennedy's election was surrounded by feelings of optimism and
confidence, and there was a perception within the group that anything he
took on would be successful (Janis, 1972). Group members who did not
have a particular opinion or perhaps only mild doubts about the proposal
and who saw Kennedy supporting Dulles and Bissell may have been
receiving the feedback that the proposal Kennedy apparently supported
would indeed be as successful as the rest of the "Camelot" endeavors.
What had happened at this point is that group members who were initially
undecided have heard the arguments in favor of the proposal, seen that

the president seemed to support the idea, and they have not heard the
doubts and criticisms of the members who were afraid to speak up.
Potential useful information from people outside the group was not
requested or received due to the bureaucratic requirements of secrecy
(Janis, 1972), which had been formulated in response to the threat of
treachery from disloyal forces. This had the effect of both excluding
relevant information from other groups in the government and allowing
the proposal's supporters to frame any opposition in terms of communist
betrayal. As previously discussed, perceptions of external threat can
act as a trigger toward in-group bias and a consequent fear of outsiders
(Flippen et al., 1996). Schlesinger discusses the situation as "idiotic"
in that the same people were both planning and evaluating the proposal
excluding "much of the expertise of government" (Janis, 1972, p. 33). As
a result, the information available to the group seemed to indicate that
the proposal was acceptable and had little chance of failure rather than
dangerous and misadvised as in reality.
In summary, members of the committee that approved the Bay of Pigs
fiasco started out with multiple competing goals, including both the
good of the nation and the protection of their own reputations. Because
of Kennedy's support of Dulles and Bissell (who had their own reasons
for supporting the proposal other than the good of the nation), as well
as the framing of opposition to the proposal as communist and weak, some
members who had doubts about the viability of the proposal abandoned the
group's goal of thorough evaluation in favor of the goal of protecting
their own reputations. The failure of each of these members to speak up,
along with the exclusion of relevant information that could have come
from other government experts caused members who were undecided to feel
that not only did all of the available information support the proposal
but so did the rest of the group. These members did not abandon their
goal; they thought they had reached it. This is a different
interpretation of the same events than that of Janis, who believed that
the single most important cause of the observed groupthink was the
striving for consensus of a highly cohesive group.
CONCLUSIONS AND POSSIBLE INTERVENTIONS
Groupthink is not limited to high-level foreign policy committees, such
as the ones Janis (1972) discussed, but can occur in almost any type of
group, from therapy groups (Janis, 1982) to organizational work teams
(Manz & Sims, 1982). Understanding what factors can lead to groupthink,
along with the specific effects of those factors, provides the
opportunity for interventions designed to prevent this syndrome and
improve group functioning. Typical interventions that have been
suggested include ensuring the group has access to all of the necessary
information, training group leaders to avoid promoting their ideas early
on and to encourage discussion and dissent, and training group members
to be better able to express their views to the group (Steers & Black,
1994).
The factor these interventions have in common is the assumption that the
group and its leader are indeed motivated to find the best solution to
the problem and are just having trouble doing so. The present
conceptualization would suggest, however, that this is not always the
case. Promotional leadership has been shown to be one of the strongest
contributing factors to groupthink (Mullen et al., 1994; Park, 1990),
but the motives of these leaders have not been investigated. Do they act
in this manner because they believe that this is the best way of leading
the group or are they trying to promote their own agenda? If they do
have the best interests of the group in mind, then training them not to
promote their own ideas too early may indeed be effective, but if their

main goal is the acceptance of their ideas and the increase of their
power then all the training in the world may not change their behavior.
In this situation, it would perhaps be better to focus on making them
accountable both for the end product of the group and for the amount of
participation on the part of group members. In other words, create a
system that sets a goal of encouraging group participation and rewards
the group if the group members reach the goal so that effective group
process becomes the primary goal that directs the members'
self-regulation. Although as previously mentioned there are formal
models of decision making (e.g., Arrow's impossibility theorem, Vroom
and Yetton's normative decision theory) that maintain that under certain
conditions a solution imposed by an autocratic leader may be the most
satisfactory solution, in most of the groupthink situations cited in the
literature it seems that there were reasons for specifically choosing
groups and thus every effort should be made to ensure that the decisions
made by these groups should be a product of the group's collective
effort.
Similarly, training group members how to speak up will not be effective
if they are self-regulating in terms of whether they have the approval
of the leader or other members, rather than in terms of whether the
group has arrived at a quality solution. In this case, they are not
speaking up because they do not wish to, not because they do not know
how to. If this is the case, a twofold approach may be in order. First,
to the extent that it is possible, groups should be constructed so that
all participants are relatively independent of each other and are not
likely to be in future situations where favors might be needed or
retaliatory power exercised, although this is realistically quite
difficult in most situations. If this is impossible, as it would be in
many organizations, the use of "virtual meeting" technology, which
allows for anonymous contributions of group members, may be of some use
because it would provide protection from retribution and inhibit
attempts to curry favor. This approach might also counteract some of the
effects of status characteristics because contributions would have to be
judged on their own merits and not according to the perceived status of
the contributor.
In addition, making group members individually accountable for the final
group product may be of some use in attaching more importance to goals
relating to group performance. Kroon, Kreveld, and Rabbie (1992) discuss
the idea that although the effects of accountability on decision making
are generally beneficial, there are some limitations. If the group knows
what the people they are accountable to prefer, then the safest strategy
is to conform to that position regardless of its quality (Kroon et al.,
1992). This suggests that the group leader should not be the one
determining group rewards or sanctions because that gives group members
an incentive to conform to the leader's position. In addition, when the
group feels a low hope of finding a better solution than that proposed
by the leader, accountability may cause members to withdraw from the
decision-making process as a means of disassociating themselves from the
final product (Kroon et al., 1992). This makes it that much more
imperative that the leader refrain from suggesting solutions too early
or too strongly. Kroon et al. speculate that being accountable only for
group participation, rather than for group product may cause members to
work toward enhancing status within the group rather than working toward
achieving the best group outcome, making it important that members be
held accountable for the final product and not just for their part in
it.
In summary, this approach to understanding and preventing groupthink
suggests that prevention must begin with motivation and then be
supported by skills. Leaders must be made accountable for the
functioning of their group. Rewards and sanctions for leaders should be
based on group process. To support the goal of good process, leaders

should be given training in such topics as facilitation skills and how

to maintain a nondirective approach. Group members need to have as their
primary motivation the quality of the group product. Factors that could
interfere with that goal, such as a future dependence on the approval of
the leader or other members, should be minimized if not eliminated.
Group members should also be made directly accountable for the end
product so that rewards and or sanctions are dependent on how well the
group does. To supplement this, formal processes could be implemented
such as appointing a devil's advocate and training group members in how
to voice opinions and listen to others. The important point here is that
these processes will not work if the group members are not motivated to
use them.
If the leader and all group members are properly motivated toward
effective group performance, then the factors that contribute to
groupthink should be lessened or eliminated. With all group members
speaking up regarding the pros and cons of suggested solutions, members
who are undecided will have the opportunity to consider all points of
view in forming their opinion rather than relying on spoken support and
interpreting silence as agreement rather than concealed criticism.
This conceptualization of groupthink would be difficult to
experimentally test because it would require being able to control and
manipulate many different variables at once. In addition, the present
conceptualization, as is consistent with the view Mohamed and Wiebe
present in their 1996 article, is a process model of groupthink that
focuses "on the necessary but not sufficient states or events which lead
to the development of the phenomenon" (p. 420). In other words,
according to this view of groupthink, all of the necessary motivational
and situational components must be present for groupthink to occur, but
they do not guarantee it. One way to address this issue is by
considering the role of scope conditions (Foschi, 1997), which are
"circumstances under which the relationship expressed by the hypothesis
is expected to hold true" (p. 537). Any attempt to experimentally assess
this conceptualization would have to operationalize and manipulate each
of the conditions described in this article to determine which
conditions or combinations of conditions are more or less likely to lead
to symptoms of groupthink.
Despite the difficulty, possible ways of investigating this view of
groupthink include manipulating the motivational states of members and
leaders combined with the situational factors and seeing which groups
would be more or less likely to develop problems. In addition, group
meetings could be videotaped and the amount and content of members'
contributions could be analyzed to see if they matched the predictions
of the model. Survey research of actual participants in groups that fell
victim to groupthink could be used to assess motivational states,
perceptions of the amount of support/ disagreement of other members, and
the amount of in-group bias showed by group members. Although these
techniques would not be able to definitively prove whether this view of
groupthink is correct, they would certainly shed some light on this
fascinating but underinvestigated topic.
NOTE
(n1.) Although Tetlock, Peterson, McGuire, Chang, and Feld (1992) did
not find support for the causal assertions of Janis's model, they did
conclude that there was a strong agreement between Janis's work and
other historical texts, indicating the acceptability for the purposes of
this article of relying solely on Janis's reports as to the events that
occurred in each of the case studies.

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~~~~~~~~
By Annette R. Flippen, New York University
Annette R. Flippen received a Ph.D. in organizational psychology in 1996
from Teachers College, Columbia University, and is currently on the
faculty of the industrial/organizational psychology program at New York
University. Her research interests include self-regulation in social
settings and the study of social cognitions relating to in-group
formation and bias.
_____
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Source: Small Group Research, Apr99, Vol. 30 Issue 2, p139, 27p
Item: 1743105
Top of Page
_____
Record: 10
Title:
Relating Cohesion to Stress, Strain, Disintegration, and
Performance: An Organizing Framework.
Subject(s):
UNIT cohesion (Military science); PSYCHOLOGY, Military;
SOCIAL psychology -- United States
Source: Military Psychology, 1999, Vol. 11 Issue 1, p27, 29p, 2 charts,
2 diagrams
Author(s):
Griffith, James; Vaitkus, Mark
Abstract:
Proposes directions for group cohesion research for
military psychology and social psychology in the United States.
Parallelism between cohesion and social support; Information on the
applicability of social support models; Components of the proposed
framework; Reaction of human groups to external threats by internal
coherence.
AN:
3357001
ISSN:
0899-5605
Full Text Word Count:
12075
Database:
Psychology and Behavioral Sciences Collection
RELATING COHESION TO STRESS, STRAIN, DISINTEGRATION, AND PERFORMANCE: AN
ORGANIZING FRAMEWORK
Contents
EARLY MILITARY SOCIOLOGICAL DESCRIPTIONS OF COHESION
CONCEPTUAL PARALLELS BETWEEN COHESION AND SOCIAL SUPPORT
THE APPLICABILITY OF SOCIAL SUPPORT MODELS TO THE STUDY OF COHESION
CONCEPTUAL COMPONENTS OF THE PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR RESEARCH
FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS
CONCLUSIONS
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
TABLE 1 Variables Often Related to Cohesion in Military Studies
TABLE 2 Parallels Between the Concepts of Cohesion and Social Support
REFERENCES
Stress
Cohesion
Strain

Disintegration
Performance
Specific Research Questions and Hypotheses
Level of Analysis
Need for Longitudinal Studies
The purpose of this article is to propose new directions for group
cohesion research, specifically for military psychology, and more
broadly, for social psychology. In addition to group members' provision
of mutual support, military studies of cohesion often include
descriptions of stressful events, individual experiences of stress or
strain, group members' departure from the group, and individual and
group performance of assigned tasks or mission. Yet, conspicuously
absent is an organizing framework that ties together these variables,
indicates their interrelations, and specifies hypotheses to be tested.
By drawing on early sociological definitions of cohesion and by linking
evidence regarding the parallel relation of social support to both
stress and individual functioning, we propose a conceptual framework
incorporating stress, strain, group disintegration, and performance as
important and relevant concepts in studying cohesion. The framework
offers specific directions for theory, analysis, and practice in future
cohesion studies.
Military leaders, policymakers, and social scientists have considered
cohesion to be an important ingredient for combat effectiveness and
performance (Henderson, 1985; Kellett, 1982; Little, 1964; Marshall,
1966). As a result, many military studies of cohesion have focused on
the relation of cohesion to both individual and group performance (see
Oliver, Harman, Hoover, Hayes, & Pandhi, 1999/this issue). Military
studies of cohesion have also frequently included various stressors,
group members' provision of mutual support, group members' choice about
remaining in the group, measures of individual adjustment, and
perceptions regarding how well soldiers would perform under stressful
conditions. Table 1 provides a summary of such variables examined in
several military studies.
Most of these studies have examined one variable in relation to another,
for example, the relation of cohesion to performance (Mael & Alderks,
1993; Oliver et al., 1999/this issue; Siebold, 1993) and the relation of
cohesion to personal adjustment and psychiatric symptoms (or strain;
Solomon, Mikulincer, & Hobfoll, 1986; Steiner & Neumann, 1978). Few
studies have examined the effects of specific combat stressors on either
the cohesion-performance relation or the cohesion-strain relation (for a
recent notable exception, see Wolfe, Brown, & Kelley, 1993). Many
examples of "proxy" measures of stress experienced by combat soldiers
are found in the traditional neuropsychiatric literature, such as
duration and intensity of combat exposure (Beebe & Apple, 1951; Glass,
1973; Noy, 1987). Despite this literature, few studies examining group
cohesion have used any measure of combat stress, and those studies that
have employed such measures usually center on postcombat adjustment and
clinical treatment (Foy, Sipprelle, Rueger, & Carroll, 1984; Solomon et
al., 1986; Steiner & Neumann, 1978). In addition, few studies, if any,
have examined disintegration as a consequence of stress and the relation
of group cohesion to disintegration, even though historical analyses
draw clear linkages among stress, cohesion, and group disintegration
(Savage & Gabriel, 1976; Shils & Janowitz, 1948; Watson 1997).
In sum, the situation calls for a framework to organize these variables
in a context of causal ordering. Such a framework, by specifying
interrelations among concepts, would offer a better understanding of how
cohesion operates and, in particular, under what conditions and on what
outcomes. Drawing on early descriptions of cohesion and structural
parallels in the social support literature, we propose an organizing
framework that incorporates stress, strain, and group disintegration as

important and relevant concepts in studying the relation of cohesion to

performance. Our framework offers specific directions for theory,
analysis, and practice in future cohesion studies.
EARLY MILITARY SOCIOLOGICAL DESCRIPTIONS OF COHESION
Shils and Janowitz (1948), in their classic study of the German
Wehrmacht, concluded that the army' s continued resistance in the face
of overwhelming odds was attributable primarily to the solidarity among
members of small groups of soldiers:
When the individual's immediate group, and its supporting formations,
met his basic organic needs, offered him affection and esteem from both
officers and comrades, supplied him with a sense of power and adequately
regulated his relations with authority, the element of self-concern in
battle, which would lead to disruption of the effective functioning of
his primary group, was minimized. (p. 281)
Shils (1950) made similar observations for the American Army in World
War II in which he reported that the cohesive primary group "served two
principle functions in combat motivation: it set and emphasized group
standards of behavior and it supported and sustained the individual in
stresses he would otherwise not have been able to withstand" (p. 25).
For Shils and Janowitz, therefore, cohesion was related to the
integrative quality of relationships within the primary group that
functioned to buffer the negative effects of stress, to keep the group
intact, and to enable the group to carry on its assigned tasks and
mission.
Similar descriptions of the relation of cohesion to stress,
disintegration, and performance are found in mainstream sociology and in
more recent military training documents. For example, by defining
cohesion as "the resistance of a group to disruptive forces," Gross and
Martin (1952,p. 553) emphasized the strength of relationships or bonds
among members during periods of crisis. Likewise, Coser (1956) stressed
how conflicts increased group members' social integration. External
threats were conceived as "leading to the mobilization of the energies
of the members of the group" (Stein, 1976, p. 145), thus intensifying
solidarity among group members. Marlowe (1979) argued that cohesion can
be best seen during stressful times (e.g., battle), and he
differentiated cohesion, performance, and group maintenance: "While
cohesion and morale do not correlate with technical performance ... they
do correlate with military performance by maintaining the organized
group at its tasks even in the face of severe stresses of battle" (p.
47). This perspective is repeated in Army guidance to unit leaders and
soldiers:
One of the most significant contributions of World War II and modem
warfare was the recognition of the sustaining influence of the small
combat unit on the individual member.... Interpersonal relationships
develop among soldiers and between them and their leaders.... It is
these relationships which, during times of stress, provide a spirit or
force which sustains the members as individuals and the individuals as a
working, effective unit. (Department of the Army, 1982, p. 1-1)
In summary, although it certainly may be more noticeable in times of
stress, group resistance to disintegration and individual resistance to
strain must be part of any complete framework of how cohesion functions
in group life.
CONCEPTUAL PARALLELS BETWEEN COHESION AND SOCIAL SUPPORT

In many ways, social support research in health psychology not only

captures the meaning of early sociological descriptions of cohesion but
provides a basis for developing an organizing framework for cohesion and
related constructs, such as stress, strain, and disintegration.
Theoretical commonalties are evident in discussions of the constructs of
cohesion and social support. Table 2 organizes these commonalties in six
broad categories: content, function, commonly emphasized antecedents,
consequences, type of effects investigated (i.e., main or direct,
moderating, and mediating or indirect effects), and level of analysis.
Both cohesion and social support are typically conceived of as
multidimensional, and the dimensions of each construct overlap
considerably. The construct of cohesion, for example, often includes the
characteristic of "commitment to task" (Mullen & Cooper, 1994) or "task
cohesion" (Cota, Dion, Evans, Kilik, & Longman, 1995) and an "action
component" seen in terms of communication, teamwork, and collective
action (Siebold, 1993). Each describes the extent to which group members
provide instrumental support to one another so that group members
maintain individual task roles and work toward achieving group tasks and
goals. Similarly, social support involves significant others giving
tangible support in the form of material assistance or information,
advice, and guidance that help the individual function effectively in
daily life (Cutrona, 1990).
Both cohesion and social support also incorporate expressive aspects of
a social group. Cohesion dimensions include not only group-task cohesion
but group-social cohesion (Cota et al., 1995), attraction to the group
(Widmeyer, Brawley, & Carron, 1985), and an "emotional component"
indicated by degree of trusting, caring, and liking or interpersonal
support (cf. Siebold, 1993). In the same way, social support includes
characteristics emphasizing the individual in the context of a broader
social group, namely, "social integration" (Cutrona, 1990), "social
companionship" (Flannery, 1990), and "interpersonal connectedness"
(Sarason, Sarason, & Pierce, 1990). Furthermore, the functions of
cohesion and social support are comparable, albeit at different levels
of analysis. Cohesion facilitates the productivity of the group member
and successful interaction within the group as a whole. In a similar
way, social support enables individual adjustment and effective
interpersonal relationships.
Important antecedents to group cohesiveness have been group composition
and structure (see Table 2). In contrast, social support studies have
primarily investigated stressful conditions as the antecedents to social
support. This difference in focus is largely explained by differences in
the presumed consequences of each construct. Typically, social support
is conceived as helping the individual cope with stressful life
circumstances (as a moderating or buffering effect), whereas cohesion is
seen as improving group performance (as a main or direct effect).
Nevertheless, cohesion researchers have been occasionally interested in
the effects of stress on group structure and functioning as well as on
group member adjustment (Shils & Janowitz, 1948; Torrance, 1954, 1957).
These researchers have usually studied military populations that have
experienced traumatic stress and generally have found that cohesion
helps maintain group and individual adjustment and performance (Savage &
Gabriel, 1976; Shils, 1950; Shils & Janowitz, 1948; Solomon et al.,
1986; Steiner & Neumann, 1978; Stouffer et al., 1949). Social support in
itself has also been associated with positive personal adjustment and
physical health (as a main or direct effect; Cohen & Wills, 1985). Thus,
the consequence of successful social support is similar to that in
cohesion studies, namely, effective and productive functioning.
Finally, both cohesion and social support assessments almost always rely

on measurements obtained from individuals. Although the level of

analysis for cohesion is the group, individual measurements are usually
merely aggregated at the particular group level of interest,
notwithstanding methodological problems associated with data aggregation
(see Gully, Devine, & Whitney, 1995). Interestingly, there has been more
recent attention paid to the broader social context of social supports.
For example, a conceptual improvement for social support studies has
been the introduction of "social connectedness" or social networks of
individuals, requiring a group-level measurement and analysis through
sociometric analysis of networks (Sarason et al., 1990).
To sum up, parallels between studies of cohesion and social support make
conceptual and analytic approaches used in social support research
logical and appropriate choices for studying the broader context of
cohesion's relation to performance. Social support research includes
analytic approaches to the study of the effects of stressful life events
and social support on individual strain or well-being. These analytic
approaches can be adopted by cohesion researchers to study the relation
of stress and cohesion on individual functioning as well as on group
functioning. Thus, the social support literature provides an organizing
framework for understanding the effects of cohesion on the relation of
stress to performance, group maintenance, and individual well-being.
THE APPLICABILITY OF SOCIAL SUPPORT MODELS TO THE STUDY OF COHESION
The relation of social support to individual strain is captured by two
prevailing models (described in Cohen & Wills, 1985). The first model
proposes that social resources benefit the individual, regardless of
whether the individual is under stress. This model is labeled additive
because it is tested by the main or direct effects in a regression
equation. The second model proposes that support is beneficial primarily
for individuals who are under stress. Because support is presumed to
primarily protect the individual from the negative effects of stressful
events, the model is called a buffering one. The buffering effect of
social support on the relation between stress and individual strain is
often analyzed as a moderating effect. Statistically, this effect is
tested by the interaction term of Stress x Social Support, hence, the
term multiplicative model (Cohen & Wills, 1985).
Analytically, it is useful to distinguish between moderating and
mediating effects of variables. A moderating effect of a variable refers
to differences in the relation between two variables, such as stress and
strain, when considering a third variable, such as social support. For
example, the effects of stress on strain might be expected to be more
debilitating when social support is lacking than when social support is
present. Interaction terms in regression analyses are used to test for
these moderating effects. A mediating effect refers to an intervening
variable or a variable that contributes an indirect effect to some
outcome. Stress, for example, may contribute directly to experienced
strain and, at the same time, may contribute indirectly through the
group's experience and interpretation of the stress depending on a group
property, such as group norms, group cognitive schema, and so forth (see
Gal & Jones, 1995). Path coefficients are used to test for mediating
effects. It would appear that both effects are important considerations
for future military studies of group cohesion as well (discussed in more
detail later in this article). As an example, Solomon et al. (1986)
observed both direct effects and indirect effects (through leadership)
of stress and lack of interpersonal support on combat stress reactions
in two groups of combatants. More recently, Spink (1998) reported the
mediational effects of social cohesion on the relation between the
perceived quality of leadership and the intent of group members to
rejoin their groups.

If cohesion indeed functions structurally like social support, then we

may speculate on interrelations among stress, strain, cohesion,
disintegration, and performance as shown in Figure 1. There are several
noteworthy characteristics of the figure. The first implies a distinct
sequence of events. Events to the left occur earlier than events to the
right. Second, the figure implies main or direct effects, moderating
effects, and mediating or indirect effects. For example, strain or the
amount of psychological distress and psychosomatic symptoms experienced
by the individual is dependent on both the intensity of stressful events
and on the amount of cohesion (social support) available to the
individual. Third, a distinction is made between strain and
disintegration and their presumed effects on individual and group
performance. Strain represents the experience of stress at the
individual level, whereas disintegration represents group-level
experience of stress. Intense stress in combination with low levels of
cohesion and, hence, theoretically high strain results in diminished
individual performance. That is, because of psychological distress and
psychosomatic symptoms (too much strain), the person is unable to
perform individual daily tasks. Similarly, intense stress in combination
with low levels of cohesion results in diminished group performance.
That is, lack of emotional support combined with hypothesized
preoccupation with psychological distress and psychosomatic symptoms
disrupt group structure and integration (too much disintegration), and
group members become unable to perform their group tasks. Thus, stress
as moderated and mediated by cohesion, strain, and disintegration
affects individual and group performance. The next section describes in
greater detail each concept represented in Figure 1.
CONCEPTUAL COMPONENTS OF THE PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
The five components that should comprise a minimally complete model of
the function of cohesion in group life are as follows: (a) degree or
type of stress, (b) group cohesion itself, (c) individual strain, (d)
group disintegration, and (e) individual and group performance. The
fundamental importance of these elements is slowly becoming recognized
in reviews of cohesion research (e.g., Cota et al., 1995; Hogg, 1992),
some highlights of which, along with key theoretical and
operationalization issues, are discussed later.
Stress
One of the assumptions of our framework is that the primary function of
cohesion is to help sustain individuals and groups when they are under
stress (cf. Cota et al., 1995; Gross & Martin, 1952; Shils & Janowitz,
1948). Stress can be defined as physical and psychosocial threats to the
group that occur outside and inside the group. This definition is
similar to that of Lazarus (1969), in which he included both
physiological and psychological elements of stress. However, we wish to
limit ourselves to the notion of stress as stimuli with the potential to
harm recipients, rather than as reactions to such stimuli, which we
instead label as strain at the individual level and as disintegration at
the group level. In this perspective, cohesion is a kind of coping
resource that enables groups and individuals to handle actual or
impending stressful events.
The degree or severity of stress is obviously important
its potential impact on strain and disintegration. With
cohesion, it is also critical to differentiate the type
particular, external versus internal sources of threat.

in understanding
respect to
of stress, in
Within certain

limits, external stress may promote cohesion, whereas internal stress

related to group structure and role or task assignment often decreases
cohesion (Stein, 1976). Most military studies have focused on external
stress, whether related to actual combat (e.g., Belenky, Noy, & Solomon,
1987; Gal & Jones, 1995), deployment (e.g., Wright, Marlowe, & Gifford,
1996), or training (e.g., Krueger, 1991; Tyler & Gifford, 1991).
Especially for combat, there are many examples of stress measures in the
traditional neuropsychiatric literature, including duration of combat
exposure (e.g., the number of days in combat), intensity (e.g., amount
of fire), and chronicity (e.g., intermittent vs. continuous bombardment;
Beebe & Apple, 1951; Foy et al., 1984; Glass, Ryan, Lubin, Ramona, &
Tucker, 1957; Noy, 1978).
Recent studies (Adler, Vaitkus, & Martin, 1996; Wolfe et al., 1993) have
used questionnaires to measure combat exposure or stress experienced by
soldiers who participated in Operation Desert Storm. Wolfe et al. made a
good claim for developing standardized measures of such stress. They
adapted Gallops, Laufer, and Yager's (1981) combat stress scale, which
distinguishes three stress sources: (a) traditional wartime activities
(e.g., troop engagements), (b) nontraditional wartime activities (e.g.,
combat war-zone events specific to the war), and (c) non-war-zone,
deployment-related events (e.g., domestic problems). To measure specific
aspects of combat stress, Wolfe et al. employed Laufer's (1985) combat
exposure scale, which lists common combat events that the soldier
reports as applicable, along with the frequency and intensity of each
relevant event.
With respect to internal stress, military cohesion studies have
primarily examined the role of leadership (e.g., Kirkland, Bartone, &
Marlowe, 1993; Mael & Alderks, 1993; cf. Yukl, 1994). Less common is the
study of group members' roles (e.g., role conflict, ambiguity, etc.),
tasks to be performed (e.g., ambiguously defined, or lacking of variety
and feedback), organizational structure (e.g., centralized vs.
decentralized), and physical features of the immediate work environment
(Schuler, 1980; Worchel & Shackelford, 1991; cf. Ridgeway, 1983). For
example, in a series of related military studies, Torrance (1954,1961)
described several aspects of the intragroup environment or
"development," including both power and communications structures, that
contributed to higher levels of "group strain." Other researchers have
demonstrated the negative effects of "job-related stress" (i.e., hours
worked per week in garrison) on cohesion (Bliese & Halverson, 1996;
Griffith, 1997). On the basis of these studies, clearly stress must be
understood in terms of the interaction of forces both external and
internal to the unit.
Cohesion
Too many definitions of cohesion in military studies have confused the
social "bonding" or "solidarity" of unit members as a phenomenon in
itself with its antecedents or consequences. Examples here include
bonding "despite combat and mission stress" and bonding that is inferred
from "mission accomplishment" (ARCOST Action Team, 1980; Johns, 1984).
To keep cohesion a distinct construct in our framework, we define it
solely as an intersubjective dynamic characterized by the strength of
supportive ties among unit members. Thus defined, cohesion involves a
"moral proximity" or feelings of "responsibility for the welfare and
well-being" of fellow unit members (Bauman, 1990, p. 66). A similar
concept is what sociologists have called "social solidarity" or
"integration" at the societal level, a kind of collective antidote to
"egoism" (Durkheim, 1897/1951).
Recently, Hogg (1992) has gone beyond traditional social-psychological

formulations of"group cohesion" (e.g., Festinger, Schachter, & Back,

1950; Gross & Martin, 1952; Lott & Lott, 1965) and has drawn on social
identity and self-categorization theory to better understand how the
dynamic of group cohesion operates. Hogg proposed that cohesion
represents cognitive processes whereby members of a group define
themselves and other group members in terms of a group "prototype." As
individuals define themselves in relation to other group members (i.e.,
in-group vs. out-group), they become "depersonalized," and a group
social identity or representation emerges, called a "group prototype."
The group prototype is a cognitive representation of the group's
features that provide group member identity and can be operationalized
as a checklist of attributes of the idealized group member but that more
likely is the "reified image of the 'most prototypical member of the
group'" (Hogg, 1992, p. 94).
Group members also assign these perceived attributes to themselves,
which leads to their developing more normative behavior and a more
salient group prototype for their social identity. Thus conceived,
cohesion has shown its conceptual usefulness in understanding the
cognitive processes involved in group development and, in particular,
with respect to the regulation of individual and group behavior,
including social influence, conformity, social attraction, groupthink,
performance, and social loafing (Hogg, 1992). This understanding,
however, does not immediately shift our focus from our previous
definition of cohesion as group members' shared perceptions regarding
the strength of supportive ties in their group. Indeed, in our
framework, such ties would seem to be the most critical aspect of the
group prototype.
Although different elaborations of the dimensions of cohesion abound,
there are, at a minimum, two conceptual distinctions that should be
made: (a) horizontal or peer bonding versus vertical or
leader-subordinate bonding, and (b) instrumental or task support versus
affective or emotional support (Cota et al., 1995; Griffith, 1988;
Gully, Whitney, & Devine, 1993; Mullen & Cooper, 1994; Siebold, 1993;
cf. Wills, 1985). This gives four interrelated types of cohesion, all of
which must be positive to have a cohesive unit: horizontal-instrumental,
horizontal-affective, vertical-instrumental, and vertical-affective.
Such distinctions have proven critical to the understanding of the
relation of cohesion to performance (Gully et al., 1995; Zaccaro & Lowe,
1988; Zaccaro & McCoy, 1988). Although there are those who would like to
add some notion of commitment to the larger organization and its mission
(Department of the Army, 1982; Henderson, 1985; Siebold & Kelly, 1988),
this is probably adding too much to the basic concept of group cohesion
and would be better treated as a separate construct. To illustrate, it
is possible to have strong unit cohesion within an army experiencing
objective defeat with only distant thoughts of fighting for one' s
country or for one' s political affiliation. This, of course, was a
central finding in Shils and Janowitz's (1948) study (cf. Grinker &
Spiegel, 1945).
Researchers have their choice of a wide array of instruments and scales
for measuring cohesion, most of which take into account the
aforementioned factors. For example, Griffith (1988) combined and
refined cohesion items from the Army Research Branch's Field Forces
Questionnaire (Army Research Branch, 1943; Stouffer et al., 1949), the
Israeli Defence Forces Combat Readiness Morale Questionnaire (Gal, 1986;
Gal & Manning, 1987), and the Company and Squad/Platoon Perceptions
Questionnaire (Manning & Ingraham, 1987) to construct an instrument for
measuring cohesion in combat arms companies. A factor analysis of
responses from 8,869 soldiers in 93 companies found that the item pool
could be best described in terms of seven scales, including vertical and
horizontal cohesion, as well as instrumental and expressive aspects of
interpersonal relations. Siebold and Kelly (1988) developed a similarly

useful instrument, the 79-item Combat Platoon Cohesion Questionnaire,

for measuring cohesion at the platoon level and, subsequently, for
making correlations with performance. Military researchers would also do
well to examine operational measures of cohesion used in other social
settings (Widmeyer et al., 1985).
To obtain a more complete measurement and understanding of the cohesion
construct, both objective measures (e.g., density of friendships and
sociometric ties) and subjective perceptions of group cohesion are
desirable (Bollen & Hoyle, 1990). Having such objective measures can
respond to the argument that individuals' subjective perceptions alone
cannot be used to establish an intersubjective or group reality (James,
Joyce, & Slocum, 1988; cf. A. Schutz, 1962). We defer the general
problem of using aggregated measures of individual perceptions to
estimate group cohesion to a later discussion in this article.
Strain
Our framework proposes that intense and prolonged stress has negative
effects both on the individual and on the group. We label such negative
effects on the individual as strain and on the group as disintegration
(resulting from the associated breakdown in unit cohesion). Strain,
therefore, constitutes the psychological and psychosomatic consequences
for individuals attempting to adapt to the environmental stress.
Following Selye (1956), we view this adaptation as a dynamic process
that includes both the individual's attempt to resist or cope with the
stress and any resulting pathology or individual breakdown (cf.
Horowitz, 1976). Our model focuses on the role of cohesion as a coping
mechanism at the social-psychological level for mitigating the effects
of stress. Thus, group cohesion, when combined with the individual' s
own coping resources, can help reduce the pathological manifestations of
strain (cf. Lin, Dean, & Ensel, 1986; Solomon & Mikulincer, 1990). A
lack of strain may also be conceived, especially in the military, as
"individual morale" or "satisfaction," and cohesion should have an
equally positive effect here (Gal, 1986; Gal & Manning, 1987; Griffith,
1988).
Although our model does not preclude measuring strain in terms of
stress-related diseases, such as those affecting the heart or nervous
system (e.g., House, 1974), we anticipate that most studies of the
socially supportive role of cohesion in reducing strain will focus on
psychiatric symptomatology (cf. Cohen & Wills, 1985; Wills, 1985). In
this context, cohesion would be examined as a "social network" strategy
for preventing psychiatric pathology or breakdown (Hough, 1982). With
respect to combat or other stressful deployments, such mental disorders
might be characterized and measured as combat stress reactions, battle
fatigue or exhaustion, combat neurosis, stress disorders, or
posttraumatic stress disorders (Armfield, 1994; Figley, 1978; Glass
1957, 1973; Mareth, 1985; Solomon, 1989; Swank & Marchand, 1946;
Yitzhaki, Kotler, & Solomon, 1991). These diagnostic measures often
include standardized instruments, such as the Impact of Events Scale or
the Mississippi Post Traumatic Stress Disorder Scale (Horowitz, Wilner,
& Alvarez, 1979; Keane, Caddell, & Taylor, 1988; Schwarzwald, Solomon,
Weisenberg, & Mikulincer, 1987).
There are any number of symptom checklists that may be used to detect
psychological strain, either in general or with respect to pathologies
of interest, in studies involving nontraumatic stressors. Such symptom
checklists include the General Well-Being Scale (Dupuy, 1978), the
Langner Symptoms Checklist (Langner & Michael, 1963), the Brief Symptom
Inventory (Derogatis, 1975), and the Center for Epidemiologic Studies
Depression Scale (Radloff, 1977). In using such checklists, care must be

taken to avoid equating cut-off scores with actual clinical diagnoses

(Goldberg, 1972). More appropriate use of scores obtained from such
measures is correlation of their variable values or scores with variable
values or scores obtained from other, pertinent measures.
Disintegration
Too many studies of stress in the military focus on its relation to
individual breakdown or strain alone without considering group breakdown
or disintegration. Disintegration represents a collective giving up on
the group, either by mutually failing to resist disruptive forces
(stress) on the group or by actually abandoning or dissolving the group.
Theoretically, cohesive groups are better able to resist disruptive
forces and, thus, avoid disintegration (Olmsted & Hare, 1978). Likewise,
it takes more force to disrupt or pull a cohesive group apart (Ridgeway,
1983; cf. Shils, 1950). In part, this is because there is more
deindividuation in cohesive groups. The extent stress is identified by
members as a group problem, the more group members are more willing to
sacrifice themselves for the survival of the group, especially when
threatened by conflict with another group (cf. Coser, 1956; Durkheim,
1897/1951; Snyder & Fromkin, 1980; Zimbardo, 1970). In situations in
which stress does not produce group identification, individual group
members will pursue their own independent goals, leading to group
disintegration. Thus, cohesion should be seen as the major, although not
the only, predictor of group resistance to disruption or disintegration.
In addition, the process of group identification with stress and group
resistance should be viewed as mediating the relations between stress
and strain, stress and performance, and strain and performance.
Military history is abundant with examples of unit disintegration and
subsequent chaos, often as a result of a weakness in primary group
structures in the face of poor leadership and stressful missions
(Watson, 1997). However, there have been very few military studies that
have attempted to operationalize group disintegration as a concept or
variable. One notable exception is Manning and Ingraham' s (1987) study
in which cohesion measures were correlated with unit counts of
reenlistment and absences without official leave (AWOLs). In another
study, Savage and Gabriel (1976) used an analysis of desertions,
fraggings (attempts to mutilate or kill unit leaders), mutiny, and use
of illicit drugs to demonstrate disintegration among U.S. Army units in
Vietnam. Savage and Gabriel's analysis, however, relied on aggregating
isolated incidents, rather than unit-level associations. They also did
not incorporate in their analysis explicit definitions of group cohesion
or disintegration.
Operational definitions that better assess the construct of group
disintegration are clearly needed. Shils and Janowitz's (1948) work
provided a preliminary basis for developing such measures. Interviews of
German soldiers after World War II showed several modes of group
disintegration for combat units that lacked cohesion under highly
stressful conditions: desertion, active surrender, passive surrender (no
or token resistance), routine resistance (rote or mechanistic), and
last-ditch suicidal resistance. The infrequency of these forms of
disintegration, however, in addition to practical and ethical problems
of investigating group disintegration experimentally, may warrant
development of proxy or intermediate measures of group disintegration,
such as having soldiers rate how close they might be to deserting.
In the sports psychology literature, Brawley, Carron, and Widmeyer
(1988) have taken a first step toward developing such proxy measures of
group resistance to disruption and disintegration. Their measures
involve group members' subjective perceptions of how well they believe

their team would hold up under various disruptive events. In the study
cited, three questions assessed disruptive forces. One question asked
individual group members to provide examples (events and actions) that
would disrupt the team if they were to happen. The second question asked
the degree to which team members perceived the events or actions would
be disruptive to the team if they were to occur using a 9-point scale
that ranged from 1 (not at all disruptive) to 9 (extremely disruptive).
The third question assessed the group's ability to resist disruption.
Members were asked how much resistance the team would put up if any of
the disruptive examples they listed actually were to happen. The 9-point
scale ranged from 1 (not at all resistant to these disruptions) to 9
(extremely resistant to these disruptions). As expected, results showed
that sports groups having high levels of cohesion, especially task
cohesion, rated their team as more resistant to disruption compared to
groups having low levels of cohesion. Although such measures clearly
suffer from their hypothetical nature, they reinforce the importance of
conceptually differentiating cohesion from resistance to disintegration
and the fact that the relation between these two variables may vary
depending on group type (e.g., elite, recreational, and fitness sports
teams), size, structure, social demographics, personality mix, and
leadership style (see also Cota et al., 1995; Hogg, 1992; Ridgeway,
1983; W. C. Schutz, 1958; Torrance, 1957).
Performance
The outcome variable of most interest in studies of cohesion has been
performance, either that of the group as a whole or that of the
individuals within the group. This is the most difficult component of
our model to specify because good performance, which is often equated
with productivity or effectiveness, is usually defined not by group
members themselves but either by the larger organization of which they
are a part or some other "outsider." Cohesive primary groups in the
military have been found to improve the chances of achieving formally
prescribed goals and missions (Berkowitz, 1954, 1956; Grinker & Spiegel,
1945; Mael & Alderks, 1993; Manning & Ingraham, 1987; Shils, 1950;
Siebold, 1993). By the same token, cohesiveness may have no correlation
or even a negative correlation with the achievement of such
organizational goals, in particular, if these goals are inconsistent
with those of the group itself (Berkowitz, 1978; Cartwright & Zander,
1968). Even when group and organizational goals are consistent, of
course, certain phenomena associated with cohesion, such as groupthink
(Janis, 1982), may intervene to prevent goal achievement.
Given these complexities, it is not surprising that recent meta-analyses
have shown only moderate-to-low positive correlations between cohesion
and performance. Oliver (1990) reviewed 14 military studies and reported
an average correlation of .32 between cohesion measures and group
performance. An updated effect implies identifying soldiers who report
higher levels of stress as well as soldiers who are expected to
experience stressful events and, then, bolstering variables known to
intervene in the relation of stress to individual strain, group
disintegration, and individual and group performance. Such intervening
variables are revealed as mediating effects. Mediating effects suggest
that the relation between an independent variable and a dependent
variable is affected by a third variable, or mediating variable, and
that the third variable represents important underlying processes
between the independent and dependent variables usually involving
properties of individuals (intrapsychic) or groups (intragroup; Baron &
Kenny, 1986). Mediating variables help clarify the relation between
independent and dependent variables by specifying processes leading to
changes in the dependent variable. For example, group schema or shared
perceptions of competence among group members related to cohesion may

result in perceptual consensus (groupthink; Janis, 1982) and commitment

to performance (Seashore, 1954) and, therefore, a less negative
assessment of external demands (Hogg, 1992). Group member agreement on
what, how, and when work is to be done may affect the cognitive
appraisal of the stressful events and enhance group performance
(Seashore, 1954). Successfully performing groups having higher levels of
cohesion may also seek out opportunities to be successful to maintain
their cohesiveness through their teamwork and cooperation. This is much
like a winning team striving to keep its momentum through seeking new
(often stressful) challenges for success, in terms of both performance
and intragroup cooperation and teamwork (Mullen & Cooper, 1994). The
distinctions between moderating and mediating effects indicate the
importance of examining group properties that may intervene in the
relation of stress to performance.
Specific Research Questions and Hypotheses
The proposed framework introduces several important questions for the
military and for the science of group behavior to help explicate the
functions of cohesion. How do stress, strain, and disintegration affect
the relation of cohesion to performance? To what extent do strain,
cohesion, and disintegration moderate the relation between stress and
performance? To what extent do strain, cohesion, and disintegration
mediate, or act as intervening variables, in the relation between stress
and performance? Our conceptual framework in combination with findings
in the social-psychological literature offers several hypotheses
regarding relations among stress, group cohesion, strain,
disintegration, and performance as depicted in Figure 2.
Whereas stress is positively related to strain (Dohrenwend & Dohrenwend,
1984), strain is associated with reduced performance (Cohen & Wills,
1985; Dohrenwend & Dohrenwend, 1984). Cohesion is related to increased
performance (Mullen & Cooper, 1994), decreased group disintegration
(Brawley et al., 1988; study by Oliver et al. (1999/this issue) finds a
correlation of .40 between cohesion and group performance and a
correlation of .20 between cohesion and individual performance across 39
samples. Evans and Dion (1991) reviewed 16 studies in the civilian
social-psychological literature and reported an average correlation of
36, very close to Oliver et al.'s. Most recently, in their
comprehensive review of civilian and military studies, Mullen and Cooper
(1994) reported a slightly lower correlation between cohesion and
performance, with an average correlation of .25 for 49 studies. They
noted that preexisting groups showed higher correlations and that
artificial groups had lower correlations (see also Brawley et al.,
1988). Among the in situ groups, sports teams had higher correlations
than military units. Mullen and Cooper observed that the relation
between cohesion and performance was strengthened when (a) cohesion was
assessed as member perceptions rather than assessed through experimental
inductions, (b) a high degree of interaction among group members was
necessary to complete the group task, and (c) the groups were in situ
groups and not experimentally contrived. They also provided evidence
that the cohesion subdimension labeled "commitment to task" was most
important to predicting performance, and the "quality of interpersonal
relationships" and "group pride" were of lesser importance. Their
meta-analysis also suggested that the cohesion-performance relation was
a reciprocal one (see also Gully et al., 1993).
The mixed findings regarding the relation of group cohesion to
performance may, in part, be attributable to a poor conceptual
understanding of these variables (see also Mudrack, 1989; Mullen &
Cooper, 1994). Most likely, however, it is the result of failing to
define successful performance from the viewpoint of the groups under

study. We suggest that researchers choose performance outcome measures

with this in mind. Furthermore, a model more conceptually complex than
the one presented here is clearly needed to help us understand the
circumstances under which groups become normatively committed to
organizational goals and definitions of success.
FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR RESEARCH
Our reformulation necessitates rethinking the relation of group cohesion
to outcomes of interest and better specifying the intervening variables
between group cohesion and such outcomes. Cohesion is conceived as
potentially moderating and mediating the effects of stress on strain,
disintegration, and performance. Although there has been much research
on the moderating effects of both cohesion and social support on the
stress-performance relation (see Cohen & Wills, 1985), there are few
empirical and conceptual studies of their mediating effects.
Conceptually, moderating effects suggest that the relation between two
variables holds in one setting but not in another or for one
subpopulation but not for another. The moderating Shils, 1950; Shils &
Janowitz, 1948), and decreased strain (Solomon et al., 1986; Steiner &
Neumann, 1978). Disintegration is associated with lower performance
(Brawley et al., 1988; Shils, 1950; Shils & Janowitz, 1948). The
relation of stress to cohesion remains problematic and may be
hypothesized to be positive, negative, or curvilinear, depending on the
nature of the stress, the environmental context, and group members'
shared perceptions of the stress condition and the available coping
resources (cf. Hogg, 1992; Schachter, 1959; Stein, 1976).
The framework also hypothesizes several moderating and mediating
effects. Cohesion can be conceived as moderating and mediating relations
between stress and strain (Cohen & Wills, 1985; Solomon et al., 1986;
Steiner & Neumann, 1978), between stress and disintegration (Brawley et
al., 1988; Shils, 1950; Shils & Janowitz, 1948), and between stress and
performance (Cohen & Wills, 1985; Shils, 1950; Shils & Janowitz, 1948).
Hogg (1992) interpreted cohesion as involving cognitive processes of
self-categorization and social identification in which the individual
experiences depersonalization and identifies himself or herself as a
member of a social category or group. The greater the depersonalization
and group identification, the greater the group's cohesiveness. This
process, in the context of the proposed framework, implies that the
extent to which stress is identified by members as a group problem, the
more group identification or cohesion will mediate the relations among
stress, strain, disintegration, and performance. For example, in
situations in which stress does not produce group identification,
individual group members will pursue their own independent goals,
leading to group disintegration and lower levels of group performance.
Strain can be viewed as moderating and mediating relations between
stress and disintegration (Brawley et al., 1988; Shils, 1950; Shils &
Janowitz, 1948) and between stress and performance (Cohen & Wills, 1985;
Solomon et al., 1986; Steiner & Neumann, 1978).
Level of Analysis
Concepts involving social cognitions of organizational attributes, such
as social climate and cohesion, imply group-level characteristics (James
et al., 1988; Kozlowski & Hattrup, 1992; Ostroff, 1992). If cohesion
involves group members' attributions about the group, then these
attributions should be described at the unit level (e.g., squad,
platoon, or company) as an aggregate statistic. However, statistical
approaches relying on aggregated data provided by individuals imply

fairly uniform perceptions of individuals in each aggregate and overlook

the fact that individuals, although in the same organizational unit
(e.g., company), may vary widely in their perceptions of cohesion or in
the way they use scales to report their perceptions. Individual
perceptions of cohesion may differ even more among larger and more
sociodemographically diverse units. Greater similarities in perceptions
might be found when data are examined within more homogeneous subunits,
such as platoons or squads, or by rank, racial or ethnic group, and so
on. Despite the implied assumptions of these statistical approaches,
cohesion studies rarely present logical or empirical justification for
their level of analysis. Thus, the problem remains regarding when to
aggregate data and when to make appropriate individual-level and
group-level inferences.
Recent applications of multilevel analyses (or hierarchical linear
modeling) in social science research underscore the importance of
conducting analyses on both individual responses and aggregated
responses in the study of organizational climate. Whereas some
multilevel analyses of group perceptions of organizational
social-psychological attributes have shown between-group effects
(Anderman, 1992), others have shown mainly within-group effects (Rowan,
Raudenbush, & Kang, 1991). More likely, there are both within-group and
between-group effects, as evidenced by several studies (Battistich,
Solomon, Kim, Watson, & Schaps, 1995; Goh, Young, & Fraser, 1995;
Nunnery, 1993; Rowan et al., 1991). Findings also suggest that
variations in perceptions, both in the same organizational unit and
across organizational units, are likely the result of different
experiences regarding physical features, tasks, and social structures of
the organization as well as demographic diversity among organizational
members. Hierarchical linear modeling applied to cohesion studies can
determine (a) the extent to which within-group variations compare to
between-group variations in perceptions, and (b) the extent to which
relations among variables (such as stress, cohesion, strain,
disintegration, and performance) vary across groups. Hierarchical linear
modeling can test main or direct effects as well as interaction or
moderating effects.
Kozlowski and Hattrup (1992) proposed using the statistic rwg to assess
the extent of agreement in perceptions among group members. In fact,
they have shown that this statistic more accurately assesses
within-group agreement than do standard deviations and standard errors
of the mean. In a recent study, Bliese and Halverson (1996) used the rwg
statistic to examine relations among cohesion, workload, and
psychological well-being in a sample of combat arms companies. Using
company-level statistics, they found correlations among the variables to
be highest when calculated from company means rather than from
individual scores. More important, within-group agreement scores (rwg)
added significant amounts of explained variance, beyond that contributed
by company mean scores, when predicting well-being of soldiers in the
companies. Recently, Lindell and Futch (1996) discussed how rwg displays
some irregularity regarding group consensus and suggested using maximum
dissensus as the reference distribution in the rwg calculation. In
Lindell and Futch's approach, distribution of responses in the extreme
response categories rather than evenly across all responses categories,
as suggested by Kozlowski and Hattrup, serves as the reference point for
deriving group consensus estimates.
Other commonly used statistical procedures to determine whether data
obtained from individuals show agreement at an organizational level are
intraclass correlation coefficients (ICCs; Bartko, 1976; for an
extensive discussion of the various ICC coefficients, see McGraw & Wong,
1996). Ostroff (1992) used ICCs to determine the appropriateness of
aggregating data to the work unit to study the relation of job
satisfaction to organizational performance. The ICC(1) assesses whether

individuals within groups reliably agree in their responses and

describes the percentage of variance in individual responses accounted
for by the organizational unit. The ICC(2) measures how reliably groups
or units in an organization can be differentiated based on attitudinal
items or scales. Specifically, if random samples of individuals were
taken from the organization, and the means calculated, the correlation
between the two sets of means approximates the ICC(2). Because the
framework includes both individual-level (e.g., strain) and group-level
(e.g., cohesion) variables, statistical coefficients should probably be
calculated under both aggregated and non-aggregated conditions. One's
policy focus, either on the unit level or on the individual soldier
level, will determine which set of results should be emphasized.
Need for Longitudinal Studies
The proposed framework depicts group cohesion and its relation to
outcomes as a dynamic process. The main, moderating, and mediating
effects of cohesion on strain, disintegration, and performance depend on
antecedent stressors and the nature of their interaction with cohesion.
Thus, the framework calls for studies of cohesion across several time
periods. To test the adequacy of the proposed framework, future cohesion
studies should incorporate longitudinal components. For example, a
longitudinal approach was used to conduct a study of a British Army unit
in which perceptions of stress, group cohesion, and individual
well-being were assessed before and after a training course designed to
enhance group cohesion (Martin & Davids, 1995). Results of the training
course appeared to improve not only group cohesion but also individual
well-being. Vaitkus and Griffith (1990) offered another example of the
importance of assessing cohesion over time to identify the long-term
effects of structural interventions, such as those related to the Army'
s common training and deployment personnel program of the 1980s, called
the Unit Manning System. Constant turnover in military units and influx
of new soldiers (either from other units or from basic training) make it
all the more necessary to adopt a group developmental or dynamic
(Ridgeway, 1983) versus a static approach to the analysis. A
longitudinal focus is equally crucial to capturing the variable effects
of stress over the course of a deployment (e.g., see Bartone & Adler,
1999/this issue). If studies are limited to cross-sectional designs,
then researchers should explore the use of alternative statistical
methods that provide inferences about causality, such as cross-lagged
panel techniques (Mullen & Cooper, 1994) and structural equation
modeling (Griffith, 1997).
FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS
The recasting of cohesion as an indicator of the strength of supportive
ties within a framework that takes into account its mediating and
moderating effects on the cohesion-performance relation has significant
implications for organizational leaders, particularly those in the
military. In fact, more recent approaches to the prevention of combat
stress casualties (summarized in Armfield, 1994) rely on increasing
solider supports to diminish the negative effects of stress on
individuals. Army training now includes exercises in which soldiers are
systematically exposed to simulated threats and helped to work together,
trust each other, develop problem-solving skills, and relax under
stressful conditions.
Understanding the role of cohesion in maintaining a positive unit
climate, for example, is currently a key component of the Army' s new
leadership doctrine (Department of the Army, 1998) and related to such

recent Army-wide initiatives as the mandatory yearly administration of

command climate surveys at the company level, "consideration for others"
training, and the introduction of the Ethical Climate Assessment Survey.
Furthermore, unit leaders have taken a more active role in helping
soldiers adapt to stressful military situations. One example is the
"critical incident stress debriefing" in which unit leaders help
soldiers explain and reexperience traumatic events (Armfield, 1994).
Another example is leadership training at the U.S. Military Academy,
which now includes a focus on the officer's role not only in socializing
individual soldiers to become contributing members of the unit but also
on developing the unit as a whole and understanding how groups grow and
change in terms of instrumental and affective cohesion. This focus is
all the more critical in an army of increasing cultural and gender
diversity.
The proposed framework invites the leader and researcher to carefully
examine the nature of stress as it affects units. In addition, the
framework clearly differentiates not just group (cohesion and
disintegration) from individual (strain) effects but such psychosocial
effects from performance and mission success as well. Policies,
structures, and leader behaviors that affect the former may do little to
enhance the latter -- and vice versa. Our model helps prevent the
tendency to lump conceptually distinct phenomena together, however
interrelated they may be. Admittedly, much work needs to be done to
explicate how this model operates under wartime versus peacetime stress,
especially when such stress includes death or injury to fellow unit
members. At the very least, however, this framework forces leaders and
researchers to consider groups as dynamic entities that grow, decline,
and recover in an open-systems context that includes stress as an
influence and psychological well-being, group resistance to disruption,
and performance as outputs.
CONCLUSIONS
As observed by Coser (1956) and by Stein (1976), human groups react to
external threats by internal coherence. Distinctly absent in previous
studies are the linkages between the external environment and group
outcomes that explain the functions of group cohesion. The strength of
our proposal is that we have arranged a heretofore disordered collection
of concepts into an organized framework: Stress, strain, and
performance, in addition to group disintegration, are included in one
context. The context implies specific interrelations among stress,
cohesion, strain, disintegration, and performance and, therefore, offers
a more complete understanding of the importance of cohesion to group
survival and performance.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
Mark Vaitkus is now at the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA.
Requests for reprints should be sent to James Griffith, 10956 Bellehaven
Boulevard, Damascuc, MD 20872.
TABLE 1 Variables Often Related to Cohesion in Military Studies
Variable Assessment Description and Study

Stressful events

Duration of combat exposure (Beebe &

Apple, 1951; Swank & Marchand, 1946)
Intensity of combat (Glass et al., 1957)
Indirect artillery fire and pinned down
by fire (Glass, 1957)
Day vs. night operations (Gal & Jones,
1995)
Surprise attack (Belenky et al., 1987)
Harsh or unfamiliar climates (Krueger,
1991)
Loss of fellow soldier (Tyler & Gifford,
1991)
Hours worked (Bliese & Halverson, 1996;
Griffith, 1997)

Individual adjustment Self-reports of individual morale, company

morale, individual well-being, and
personal satisfaction with the Army
(Gai, 1986; Gal & Manning, 1987;
Griffith, 1988)
Wartime and post-wartime individual
psychological adjustment and personal
well-being (Solomon et al., 1986;
Steiner & Neumann, 1978)
Group members'
provision of mutual
support

Reported more support providers in the

unit and greater reciprocity with
support providers (Griffith, 1989)

Leadership

Similarity between commanders' priorities

and perceptions regarding what
constitutes combat readiness and
characteristics of group cohesion
(Kirkland et al., 1993)
Cohesion among unit leaders (Mael &
Alderks, 1993)

Group integration
or lack of
disintegration

Group maintenance in the face of defeat

(Shils & Janowitz, 1948)
Reenlistments, administrative discharges,)
and disciplinary actions (Manning &
Ingraham, 1987)

Perceptions of
and group

Individual willingness to fight, perceptions

that soldier and unit were ready for
combat (Gal, 1986; Gal & Manning, 1987;
Griffith, 1988)

Individual and unit

performance

Annual Inspector General and operational

readiness results, and percentages of
soldiers who passed skill qualification
tests and physical fitness tests
(Manning & Ingraham, 1987)
Unit performance as rated by observers
(Siebold, 1993)
Unit performance (Mael & Alderks, 1993)

TABLE 2 Parallels Between the Concepts of Cohesion and Social Support

Legend for Chart:
A - Comparison Characteristic
B - Cohesion

C - Social Support
A

B
C

Content
Interpersonal attraction (Lott & Lott, 1965)
Resistances of a group to disruptive forces
(Gross & Martin, 1952)
Group members' embodiment of key features of group
(Hogg & Hains, 1996)
Multidimensional aspects:
Interpersonal attraction
Commitment to task
Group pride (Mullen & Cooper, 1994; Zaccaro & McCoy, 1988)
Task vs. social
Individual vs. group
Primary vs. secondary dimensions (Cota et al., 1995)
Individual attraction: Social and task
Group attraction: Social and task (Widmeyer et., 1995)
Caring for and valuing an individual
Network of mutual obligations (Cobb, 1976)
Multidimensional aspects:
Emotional, esteem, support
Information, advice, guidance
Social integration, companionship
Tangible, instrumental support (Cutrona, 1990; Flannery,
1990)
Interpersonal connectedness, density (e.g., no. of social
supports, frequency of interaction, reciprocal helping)
(Sarason et al., 1990)
Functions
Forces causing members to remain in the group (Festinger
et al., 1950; cf. Shils & Janowitz, 1948)
Facilitates social interaction or group interactions
(Gully et al., 1995; Mullen & Cooper, 1994)
Makes group norms salient (Mullen & Cooper, 1994)
Defines task role for each group member
Energizes the group, keeps group members on task
(Stodgill, 1972)
Provides self expression
Helps problem solving
Provides basis for social comparison
Provides information or material support
Provides esteem support (Cohen, 1992; Cohen & Wills, 1985)
Emphasized antecedents
Group members' characteristics (e.g., background, status,
values, attitudes)
Interaction among group members
Group size
External threats
Real or artificial groups
Amount of member interdependence (Hogg, 1992)
Sex
Socioeconomic status

Stressful life events: Severity, context, duration, timing

Chronic strains (e.g., poverty, marital conflict, work
overload, chronic illness)
Perceived stress (e.g., job satisfaction, role conflict,
inequity of pay) (Cohen & Wills, 1985)
Consequences
Improved group performance (Mullen & Cooper, 1994)
More uniformity
More communication (Hogg, 1992)
Emphasis on effects during high-stress conditions
(Shils & Janowitz, 1948; Torrance, 1954, 1957)
Less physical and psychological symptoms
More effective interpersonal functioning (Cohen & Wills,
1985; Flannery, 1990)
Type of effect
Primarily main or direct effects
Few studies that examine moderating and mediating effects
Both main or direct effects and moderating effects (Cohen &
Wills, 1985; Flannery, 1990)
Few studies that examine mediating effects
Level of analysis
Group
Individual (Cohen & Wills, 1985; Flannery, 1990)
Individual in the context of the group (e.g., social
connectedness, social networks) (Sarason et al., 1990)
DIAGRAM: FlGURE 1 The relation of cohesion to stress, strain,
disintegration, and performance. Reprinted with permission from the
Journal of Applied Social Psychology, Vol. 27, No. 17, 1489-1526, Figure
1. Copyright (C) 1997 by V. H. Winston & Son, Inc., 360 South Ocean
Boulevard, Palm Beach, FL 33480. All rights reserved.
DIAGRAM: FIGURE 2 Path diagram depicting cohesion's relation to stress,
strain, disintegration, and performance. A plus sign indicates an
expected positive relation between the concepts. A minus sign indicates
an expected negative relation between the concepts. A plus and minus
sign together indicates either a positive or negative relation,
depending on group members' shared perceptions of stress condition and
available coping resources.
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~~~~~~~~
By James Griffith, Headquarters, Maryland Army National Guard Baltimore,
Maryland and Mark Vaitkus, U.S. Military Academy West Point, New York
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