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in locke's exposition law combined with the public good is repeatedly placed in opposition to
coercive force and to private will or appetite [4]. locke emphasises that tyranny includes any
violation of right, but that there are some violations of the law that are not necessarily
tyrannical. his thesis is that no positive law is valid unless it accords with the natural law.
when legislative actions are taken to advance or enhance private interests, at the expense of
the public good, then such action is referred to not as 'tyrannical law', but as an act of war [5].
a prerogative act, in accordance with this standard, can be seen to be lawful and rightful and
can then be accorded equivalence. it is in this sense that prerogative powers are seen by locke
to be rightful or legitimate insofar as they derive from the natural law and depend upon the
consent of the people [6]. locke creates the impression that tyranny is most usually an
executive phenomenon, and that it can be recognized as such due to its violation of the corpus
of the positive or standing law. it is that law alone which authorises the use of government
power, and at the same time defines the scope and extent of that power [7]. therefore, tyranny
can be equated with illegality to the extent that the laws of society may be equated with the
public good, and to that extent only.
for locke tyranny and usurpation comprise all examples of the exercise of unlawful power,
where the principles of legitimacy are grounded in preservation and consent, and where each
principle if connected to a fundamental law [8]. but this is an over simplification, because the
correspondence between usurpation and breaches of consent and the fundamental positive
law, on one hand, and tyranny and breaches of preservation and the fundamental natural law,
on the other, cannot be set out in such simple terms. we are able to recognize that, first,
usurpation is not the only violation of fundamental law and, second, violations of the positive
law are essentially violations of natural law as well [9].
no one person has the right to change the forms and the rules of government, established by
the fundamental positive law, because to do so is an illegitimate expression of power which
transcends right and is, therefore, by definition a form of tyranny, despite the fact that such a
change might, in the most advantageous circumstances, prove to be conducive to good
government, and in all other respects be similarly beneficial. it can be seen, therefore, that
despite locke's distinction between usurpation, and alteration to or interference with the
constitution of government, the latter implies the former as well. it is possible that a usurper
might not try to change the constitution of a government and, therefore, he could not be
described, accurately, as a usurper. however, a successful attempt to modify a constitution
could be classified correctly as usurpation, because to alter the forms, rules or conventions of
a constitution is in effect to relocate this power in others, or in a single person, when it should
be rightfully located in the laws of the community [10]. therefore, unauthorised and unlawful
change to the constitution of government appears to have the effect of combining tyranny
with usurpation described as a double evil.
other forms of usurpation or tyranny have the same effect, because they effectively change or
modify the constitutive forms and rules of government. when the tyrant superimposes his will
on the established laws of the community, or replaces them in part or in whole, then he
intervenes illegitimately through laying claim, himself, to be the authorised legislator. in
reality there is nothing, in this context, to differentiate the role of the tyrant from that of the
usurper [11]. such action is illegitimate because the legislative is 'sacred and unalterable in the
hands where the community have once placed it [12]. indeed, the forms and rules of an
established government may not be changed either by society or by the approved governors
[13].
when a society establishes a government through mutual agreement, then all of members of
society are bound by duty to obey the authorized governors, because an agreement is not an
agreement if its terms and conditions are fluid, and therefore subject to change at any time.
the constitution of government may not be changed by the will of society and, for the same
reason, the allegiance of the individual may not be dissolved at will, because that allegiance is
based on the principle that consent, once freely given, is binding and cannot be retracted.
the legislators may not of their own volition change or amend the nature of the legislative
power, because that power is a trust. the legislators do not own that power they are not its
proprietors and therefore it is not theirs to give away. the legislators have been entrusted
and authorized to make laws but they are not given the authority to create lawmaker's [14].
the authority of lawmaking is solely dependent on the consent of the people, and without that
consent, and the authority that it entails, any laws enacted [illegitimately] cannot be binding.
if the established legislative were to be displaced, and replaced by a new and unauthorized
legislative power, then this is synonymous with the unauthorized use of force, and hence a
state of war would obtain, because such an act would effectively remove the only arbitrator
the people are obligated to and are bound to obey. therefore, the first and fundamental positive
law is equivalent to the natural law whose imperative demand is that society is to be
preserved. the authority or legitimacy of the legislative is not merely dependent upon good
government, because a competent or benevolent usurper who produces or establishes good
government is not, on that account, a legitimate ruler. he is not a ruler who can thereby rightly
demand the allegiance and obedience of those who are his temporary or permanent subjects.
locke is insistent that a judge with executive power is not sufficient to establish legitimate
government, because the source of the authority of the judge is to be found only in the consent
of men who are by nature free.
the bonds of obligation, firmly established through consent within political communities, can
only be dissolved as a direct result of the various forms of illegitimate action discussed in this
essay. we do not owe an obligation to those who seek to rule either without the consent of the
people, or contrary to the public good. but this does not mean that action which lacks
authority leads immediately and inevitable to the dissolution of the bonds of government,
because locke is not seeking to express perfection, or even excellence. he recognizes that a
government that is less than perfectly just can be tolerated to a degree, and that trivial and
inconsequential infringements of the constitution of government, or the positive law, should
not lead to revolution and hence to immediate anarchy. those who violate the standards of
legitimacy conquerors, usurpers, and tyrants can, as a consequence of their actions, be
justifiably resisted. but a practical theory of resistance needs to be constructed on firmer and
more secure foundations than this thesis implies.
a theory of legitimate resistance is seen to necessitate the recognition of an essential
difference between the dissolution of government and the dissolution of society. also, and
importantly, nothing distinguishes the partial dissolution of government from its total
dissolution, because government cannot be fragmented. both of these elements, it is argued,
are encapsulated by locke's theory; a theory especially applicable to those conflicts that were
clearly evident in 17th century england, under a mixed constitution. locke's constitutional
theory embraces a mixed government in which the executive and legislative share power on
an equal basis [15] , but neither the executive nor legislative is authorised to change the
constitution from which they jointly derive their power and authority.
hence, parliament is not supreme and has no authority to implement constitutional change or
reform, in response to abuses of executive power. instead, the partial dissolution of the
authority of government results in its complete dissolution, and thus the people are released or
freed from their obligation under the existing constitution. the people may then act to establish
society [20]. according to locke, both entail the dissolution of government, but it is only the
first, and not the second, which entails the dissolution of society [21].
the government is effectively dissolved and society is also destroyed when the executive fails
to discharge its duties to execute the law then the failure of government is plain and
visible , were there is no longer a functioning legislative, and no one person who commands
obedience [22]. the dissolution of society becomes self-evident when it loses its solidity and
solidarity, when it ceases to function as an entity, and therefore fails to preserve the life and
property of its members. in the absence of an established legislative, acting as the collective
will of society, its authority to punish breaches of the peace also disappears [23].
the effective right of resistance cannot be guaranteed unless the people take pre-emptive
action to dissolve the government, because the people are not permitted to alter the legislative
within the constitution of government, because it is only when the government is dissolved
that they are free to form another. dissolution of the government must, therefore, be a matter
of right when usurpation, or tyranny, or subversion of the legislative are anticipated or
predicted, or seen to be intended or designed, but not in fact actually implemented or achieved
[24].
a society is dissolved when, as a result of alteration to the legislative it is unable to preserve
its solidity and solidarity, as a distinct political entity; when it loses its ability to protect its
members from violence against the depredations of the tyrant who has succeeded in
establishing and consolidating his power; and the authority and legitimacy of government has
been completely lost; if society is incapable of maintaining peace and order and therefore a
state of war exists, then this is equivalent to conquest where the fact of defeat dissolves the
obligations normally owed to society [25].
a government is effectively dissolved through breach of trust and, therefore, there is no
obligation to obey the commands of those who have assumed power illegitimately. the laws or
commands the government seek to put into effect, following the breach of trust, are by
definition illegitimate, and can therefore be ignored with justification. but those legitimate
laws, still extant, command obedience, and those who are duly authorised to enforce those
laws rightly command respect. there is no justification or excuse for ignoring or breaking laws
that were legitimately enacted prior to the breach of trust. those laws enacted by an accepted
and authorised procedure continue to operate, while resistance to those in breach of trust is
mounted and pursued. hence, society remains in existence even though the government has
dissolved.
conclusion
We have seen that when the individual joins a political community or society, by his own
freewill, then he enters into a form of contract which is a calculated risk, because he enters the
contract with the expectation that it will prove to be to his benefit. If at a later date he finds
that it is not to his benefit, then he is not free to change his mind as the contract is irrevocable,
and keeping to the bargain he has made is seen as a moral obligation. It is clear that if one
wishes to enjoy the benefits of the social life of the community, then one must be willing to
make the necessary sacrifices, because combined with the concepts of reciprocity and equity
there is also the notion that duties and obligations arise from the privileges and enjoyments of
the common social life. When one chooses to accept the benefits, one is also obliged to accept
the conditions associated with those benefits, because it is in exchange for the benefits of
society that the individual surrenders a part of his natural liberty, to the extent that it is
necessary to ensure the preservation of society.
Locke's theory of resistance does not depend on the 'legal fiction, of direct majority rule;
indeed the theory of resistance derives from the right of society to institute a government
which is authorised by the consent of the majority, which places legitimate obligations on all
members of society, and which operates or functions for public good.
The principal purpose of this essay has been to identify and understand what the possibilities
are for justifiable and successful resistance, and to determine the circumstances in which
government and society dissolve. It is appropriate to emphasise here that there is no legitimate
authority without consent, and that has been emphasised in the text of this essay.
The greatest threat to peace and harmony in society leading to its disaggregation is an
illegitimate alteration of its legislative that leaves no recognizable authority. Resistance to
illegitimate government action is meant to forestall this possibility. Where this resistance is
too little or too late we need to determine the circumstances in which it is still justified,
despite a lack of erstwhile vigilance, although we must expect that late and limited action may
prove to be unsuccessful. It is the default of government that justifies resistance and, hence,
Notes
[1] An excellent historical and contextual analysis is to be found in John Marshall's John
Locke, Resistance, Religion and Responsibility, Cambridge 1994. The present essay
principally draws on the text of Ruth W. Grant's John Locke's Liberalism, Chicago 1987,
Chapter 3 Legitimate and Illegitimate Power: Practical Tests for the Normative Theory, pp. 99
to 155.
[2] Singer, 1978, pp. 328, 329, 338 & 347
[3] There is a conditional identification of tyranny with the violation of law: 'Where-ever Law
ends Tyranny begins, if Law be transgressed to another's harm.' Locke recognizes the
possibility of tyrannical laws IIT. 201, 202 221, 221, 222, but he also justifies prerogative
power in recognition of its tendency to promote the public good.
[4] IIT. 206, 209, 226, 232
[5] IIT. 220
[6] IIT.159, 163, 164
[7] IIT.200,202
[8] 'The first and fundamental positive law of all Commonwealths, is the establishing of
Legislative Power; as the first fundamental natural Law, which is to govern even the
Legislative itself, is the preservation of the Society, and [as far as will consist with the publick
good] of every person in it.' IIT. 134
[9] 'Usurpation is a change only of Persons, but not of Forms or Rules of Government: For if
the Usurper extended his Power beyond what of Right belonged to the lawful Princes, or
Governors of the Common-wealth, It is Tyranny added to Usurpation.' IIT. 197
[10] IIT. 212 223
[26] 'For being in a new State, wherein he is to enjoy many Conveniences, from the labour,
assistance and society of others of the same Community, as well as protection from its whole
strength; he is to part also with as much of his natural liberty in providing for himself, as the
good, prosperity, and safety of the Society shall require: which is not only necessary, but just;
since the other Members of the Society do the like.' (IIT. 130)