On Plato's "Philebus" 15B1-8

Author(s): Robert Hahn

Source: Phronesis, Vol. 23, No. 2 (1978), pp. 158-172
Published by: BRILL
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4182039
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On Plato's Philebus15B1-8
ROBERTHAHN

The meaningof the questionswhich Socratessets forthat Philebus15B1-8

has been a matterof heateddebatein the last two centuries.It seems to me
that the translationsand explicationsof the text have been unsatisfactory,
and I shall try to show where scholars have gone astray and why. The
problemconcernsthe natureof Unity, Being,and the relationbetweenthe
One and Many.Let us now considerthe passage.
B1
pV ?'; TLVOS 6 TOLMaTag eTvLaLov&Vts
29. Hp&,rov
&XOCosoiv'as. etTa i;s axvTavOTas,piacv
vUToXaXo4XvELv
ixOTI1v ovyav

x;LT?T
&ELTr'v ovTiivX4XL

iTpoa8UXoRuEvYsv, OIws EIVXL i3eIa3cLOTca

8e

TOVT 'EV TOLS YLYVOILEVOLS

aUv

yEVEOLV I1TE

RiaLVTOXVTqV; iET&

Xvi 'aELpOLS E'LTE8LEaaVXV

XaL'roXXayeyovvtav rTtOV,E'CO'
8X'qVa&vrTv
XxWPLS0

6XEipOV

OvrTis

xOa'
&V, TaLVToV
'IiXVT)v x&BVVaxaTr.oV pOaLVOLT'

L Xa;%o0XXOLS
yy?VEa&XL.
Ev&,uaEv vre

2
3
4
5
6

7
8

"Thefirstquestionis whetherit is necessaryto affirmthatsuch unitiestruly

exist, then again [sc. secondly],how these unities,each one althoughexisting eternally[and]alwaysself-identical,admittingneithera coming-intobeing nor a passing-out-of-being,neverthelesscan be establishedwith the
greatestcertaintyto be this one unity;and finally [sc. thirdly],in respectto
the thingswhich come-into-being,that is to say, in respectto the infinite,
whether it must be assumed that it [sc. unity] has been dispersed [or
dispersing itself] and come-to-be many, or whether it can come-to-be a

whole [and yet] entirely separate from itself and one, in one and many
things at the same time - which indeed would appear to be the most
impossibleview?"
We have here three questions.Beforeexaminingtheir structureand content,a few commentson my translationare in order.I have takenthe &ELin
line 3 as partof a "squintingconstruction"and have translatedthe phrases on eitherside of it with its adverbialforce. I have treatedthe bX'v in
line 6 likewise,takingit in the firstsense as a predicateadjectiveand in the
second as an adverbmodifyingaV'irv avrTrisXwpCs;and I have treatedthe
two occurrencesof xaL,in lines 3 and 5, epexegetically.
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Therehas been much disputeas to what Platois sayingin this passageand

it will be valuable to examine the argumentssupporting the different
interpretations.The commentatorsfall into two groups,those contending
thattwo questionsarebeing raised,and thosewho arguefor three.Thereis
often disagreement,however,among membersof each groupover the two
or three questions which they believe emerge. I shall first examine the
argumentsby the proponents of "two" questions, and then proceed to
considerthe othergroup.
Two-Question group

A. 15B2-8reducedto a single question:

Badham,in his firstof two editionsof Plato'sPhilebus, believes that two
questions are raised; he emends 6Xwsfor ows in line 4 and reads: "(1)
whetherthe monadshave a real being; and (2) how we can conceive that
theysubsistunchangeablyas monads,and yet in the worldof sense mustbe
regardedas eitherdistributedinto as manypartsas thereare individualsto
partakeof them, or remainingas wholes in each individual,so that each
monadis at once in each, and againone in many."'Postefollows Badham,
but, unlike Dies, Cherniss,and Ross, he explicitlytakes "rrpw'rov
(or ,uv)
Ideasa realexistence?and (2) How arewe to reconciletheirunitywith their
apparentdivisionor multiplicationin the world of sense."But Poste reinstates the 8,uxswhich refers,in his opinion, only to the succeedingclause
which in turn gives jiIEr&
8?
'rOVTO the force of "and yet."2Jackson also
accepts only two, but understands them to be: "(1) Are there these
monads?(2) How are we to suppose these monads - if they are each of
them eternally,immutably,one, neithercoming into being nor ceasing to
be - severallyto retain this their unity and yet, either by division or by
multiplication,to be distributed amongst a plurality of particulars?"3
Jackson takes the participial clause ,Liav &x&airv wrXto describe the
monads as essentiallyunits and he believes this view is supportedby the
words 0 vsExvat xT\, which contrastthese units with a process of "pluralization" which they must somehow undergo in particular things.4
Wilamowitz5 follows in this same tradition; supposing a lacuna before
o,uos he attemptsto insertafteripoa8FXoj'vv the words?v 8i 'o'rOl`ofXXO!S
waLVO 'vqv which he believes to have dropped out, and therebydestroys
the distinctionbetweenthe second and thirdquestion.Natorp6succeedsat
the same reduction by rearrangingthe clauses. Schleiermacher'stranslationaccomplishesthe same thing.7Hackforth8adoptsa verycomplicated
reading which was originally put forth by J. Bury9giving at 15B4 Pr159

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(O=
IaLO3TXTaa

,uivOTaVTrv. This
rrpTov) EyVTavTIV instead of BEPaL6'TaLa

leads him to reduce B2-8 to a single question, hence: (1) do the monads
really exist?and (2) how can these eternaland immutablebeings 'cometo-be' in a pluralityof particulars?
Among more recent commentators,this version of the "two-question"
interpretation has also found support. Gadamer explicitly endorses
Schleiermacherand believes that Natorp's transposition("Umstellung")
achieves the same result.10Dies, in the Bude edition of the Philebus,
removes Burnet's mark of interrogation after TavT'Tv(line 4) which appears

in the Oxford text, and replacesit with a comma; he follows Badhamin

emendingoXwsfor 6otwsand therebyreducesthe so-calledquestionstwo
and threeto a singlequestion." ChernissfollowsDies but acceptsthe o[S,
whose position he explains as hyperbaton,and believes that no punctuation at all is needed after Trv'TNIV.The expressione'&TE
. . .
8LeTLeiVqV
&av
is
merely
parenthetical;
E'LVcL
in
line
4
and
in
line
8
yLyveahaL
p;vovT'
form a parallel construction,revealing that lines 2-8 constitutea single
question.12Ross followsChernissby arguingthatthe two questionsare:(1)
whether one must maintain the existence of such completelyindivisible
units, and (2) how, if each is one and the same foreverand admitsneither
becoming nor perishing,it can be most surelyone and yet relatedto the
infinity of things that come into being.13Albrittonfollows Chernissand
Ross.14CrombiefollowsDies in puttinga commaafter-rct(v in line 4, and
believes that two questions emerge even though the MS text gives three;
but, unlike Dies, Cherniss, and Ross, he explicitly takes "ErrpI
Tov(or yv)
for R'Lav";
otherwise,he claimsthe firsttwo problemsare the same.'5More

recently,Strikerand Shinerjoined the supportersof this version of the

"two-question"interpretation.As Strikerput it, "Wennman den Satz so
versteht, erscheint es besser, die Worte Lvr&
oe TOrTO (15B5) nicht als
Fortsetzungder mit 'rpC4Tov(B2) und ELTa (B3) begonnenenAufzdhlung
zu
aufzufassen, sondern sie auf den Inhalt des vorangehenden CLTOt-Satzes

beziehen."'16
Shiner subscribesto the view that the difficultiesare two in
number:(I)"... as to the 'existence'of the monads,. .. (B1-2)and then,(2)
given that they exist, how can each exist as a unity" (B2-8).'7In 1975,
Goslingbecamethe newestmemberof thisgroup,althoughintroducingan
alternativeinterpretationof the first question: "(1) The first is either
whethersuch monadsreallyexist or whetherwe can posit genuineunitsof
the sort in question;and (2) The second is how are we to reconcilecalling
them units without attributingto them the plurality(of form) thatafflicts
them as a resultof involvementwith changingparticulars."'18

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B. 15BI-4reducedto a single question:

Stenzelreducesthe firstand second partsto one question;he does so by
taking eLTa
QrrCxsav as clarifying the clause introduced by rp&rov[Ev.
Furthermore,Stenzel believes the iopwsis doubtful and thereforesuspects
the whole clause which it introduces;he uses this argumentto further
supporthis view. He claims the two questions are: (I) whether there are
theseunities,and (2) how the unityof the Formis relatedto the multiplicity
of appearance.19Vanhoutte apparentlyalso subscribesto this view when
he comparesthe Philebuspassage with the discussionin the Parmenides.
He believes that there are two problems:the firsthe thinksis presentedin
lines 1-4concerningthe separateexistenceof the Forms-"Ici,de mdme,on
s'interrogesurl'existencer6elleet immutabilit6de ces formesou, comme il
est dit, de telles unites ou monades";the second, in lines 5-7, concerning
participation- "Cetteparticipation,disait-on,ne peut etreparticipationni
A la partie ni au tout de la forme, car si c'est A la partie, la forme est
morcelke,et si c'est au tout, elle est s6par6ed'elle-meme.20
Three-Question Group21

Payley, in 1873, understoodPlato to be raisingthree questions:(1) Is an

abstractunity a real existence?(2) In what way can it remaineternallythe
same existing as it does in things changeable?(3) Is it separableor selfcontained?22Badham,in his second edition, reversedhis earlierposition
and turned to advocate three questions; the second question, obscured
from his vision when he wrote the firstedition, became apparentwith the
insertionof n before Ivca, whichhe believedwas omittedin the text.Thus
the three questions are: (1) Do the monads have real being? (2) Are the
monads to be pluralized in yLyvo6uavoa,
and (3) If so, how is the pluralization

to be understood?23
Burymaintainedthatthreequestionsare put forth,but
emphasizedthat the second was primarilyconcernedwith the relationof
unity to being and not a problemof unityitself:"(1) the veritableexistence
of monadsof the kind described,"(2) the eternalnatureof the monads,and
"(3) how such a monad can be present either in whole or in part in the
objectswhich come and go, while retainingthat singlenessand self-identity."24 Bury arguesthat it is the properunderstandingof the word 0[s,
hence the purportedsecond question, which caused the real difficulty of
understandingwhat it is that is at stake in the passage.Buryadmits three
questions, but follows Stallbaumin understandingthe second question,
whom he quotes, "deinde quomodo unaquaeque ab ortu et interitu immunis
esse intelligatur."25 The basis for this rendition Stallbaum believed he
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was corrupt;Burybracketsthe Bjuos

found in the hypothesisthat the B`.wxs
ratherthan excising it from the text, declares that Stallbaum has given
us the right sense, and suggests that it is probably v-rwswhich should
appear.26Archer-Hindalso understandsthree questions,but with a very
differentemphasisfrom his predecessors:"(I) Are there Ideas at all? (2)
How are the ai 'rroXXoti
18cLcomprehendedin the universalRovas?and (3)
How is pLatxa'ni BE'opluralized in the yLyvo%tva xai &UrELpa?"This
interpretationis particularlynovel in so far as Archer-Hindsuggeststhat
the second question (line 2-4) is "How can it be that these monads,each
being individuallyself-identicaland eternal,are yet one single unity?,in
otherwordswhat is the relationof the specialIdeasto the SupremeIdea in the language of the Republicof the avTo8 Ea7rV ExacTovto the avor 8
to the av&or6
gwTlV &ya06v,
or in that of the Timaeus,of the voqr&Cbxa
8 r
tCOov.927

Burnet followed in the traditionof Stallbaumand Bury by taking the

second question to be primarilyconcernedwith the relationof 'unity'to
'being'.He arguedthat threequestionsare put forthin lines 1-8whichare:
(1) do the units spoken of, which are, in fact, the Formsor Ideas,exist in
rerum natura, (2) if they do, is not 'being' or 'existence' a character of each

of them, and is this consistentwith theirsupposedcharacterof being strict

units, and (3) how is each of them relatedto the temporaryand mutable
thingscalled by the same name?28Taylor'sinterpretationis in close accord
with Burnet's.He thought the three questions were: (1) whether there
reallyare such non-phenomenalunities, (2) how are we to reconciletheir
unitywith theirrealityor being, and (3) how can we thinkof such units as
being at once one and many?29And Hardie,followingBurnetand Taylor,
assessed:"(1) Ought we to assumesuch 'monads'as reallyexisting,(2) If
each is 'one' and the same and liable to change can we say that it 'is' this
one?, and (3) Are we to suppose that the monad is 'torn asunder'and
becomesmany when it is in the thingsthat come to be, or is it presentas a
whole in each?"30The "three-question"interpretationhas not foundmuch
support among more recent commentators, but G. E. Anscombe
championed this position in 1966. According to Anscombe, the three
questions are: (1) "The first is whether these monads must be judged to
exist,"(2) "how each monad can be a monad,"and (3) "the third is how
they are relatedto the infinitudeof becoming."31
Friedlanderalone believes that lines 2-4 raise both the problem of
relating'unity'to 'being'and the problemof unitingor gatheringtogether
these unities. He thinks the three questions are: (1) Are these unities, or
monads,reallypositedas being?(2) how can we envisagethesetrueunities,
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eternaland unchangeableas they are,as partsof the one (or unity)itself;or

put differently,how are unity and pluralitycompatiblewith each otherin
the realmof pure being?and (3) How is the unity of the monad,or Form,
compatiblewith the pluralityof things in the world of appearance,since
the Form cannot be divided and cannot separatefrom itself to enter into
plurality?32

The translationwhich I have providedshowsinto whichgroupI fall. There

are clearly three questions,each of which is complex.The greatdifficulty
which the passageposes is that it raisestwo distinctbut interrelatedproblems simultaneouslyin each of the three questions,and in each succeeding question the natureof these problemsis developed. The problems,in
the broadestsense, are: (1) the natureof these "unities"as unities,and (2)
the relationof "unity"to "being".The generalcriticismof the "two-question" interpretersmust be that this position is inadequate both to the
passageat hand and the issues which are raisedlater in the Philebus.The
centralissue which ensues is one of "gradualtransition,"and here I think
Archer-Hindand Friedlanderare perfectly correct. The issue revolves
around,not the suddenleap fromFormsto a worldof becoming,but rather
a transitionwhich requiresa precisedeterminationof relatingForm and
phenomena. Furthermore,all the attemptsto emend the text have come
about as a direct consequenceof the fact that both of these problemsare
raisedin each of the questions.These scholarseitherdid not see or did not
understandthat both of these problemsand their consequencesmust be
thought throughtogether.Hackforth'sconjectureis not merely "improbable," as Klibansky notes,33 but artificial as well. Wilamowitz's proposed

insertionstrainsthe text ratherthan improvesit; it purposefullyobscures

the difficulty that the problemof multiplicityis alreadya problemposed
for the "unities" even before we consider the problem of how the multiplicityof phenomenaare unified.For this reason,Natorp'srearrangement
of the clausesis equallyunconvincing.The attemptto emend o6utsto 6oXs,
or even worse to try to discreditthe clause introducedby 'o,us as Stenzel
does, arisesfromthe same kind of short-sightedness.Apelt, Badham,Bury,
Susemihl, and Dies all assail the 'oiluswithout foundation.34Badham
originallysuggested'oXwsat 15B4,which he himself later rejectedin his
second edition of the text.35Clearly, the adversativeo`ixs picks up the
concessive force of the preceding participle oivoovin line 3. The 6`ixs
contraststhe Tav'aSwith the ,iuavravxirvon the one hand,36and the Ru'av
&x&a'r-v
with the [u'avrrVnTaqvon the other.Acceptingthe genuinessof 0.ws,
though,is not enough. There are those like Ross, for example,who accept
Badham'salteredpositionwhich reinstatesthe 56iwsand yet still fail to see
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what is at issue.37 And moreover, explaining the position of 'ox's as

hyperbatononly underscoresthe two issuesraisedby lines 24 ratherthan,

as Chernisswould have us believe, undercutsthe problemof the unity of
the unities.Finally, Badham'scorrectionof the text whichrequiresthatwe
read a [u' before eLvtLis also problematic. I agree with Archer-Hind, who is

willing to accept Badham'sinterpretationif ,ui were in the MSS, but it is

not; "althoughthe second of Badham'squestionsis quite reasonable,it is
hardlynecessary,for it is impliedin the third."38Archer-Hind'sassessment
is certainlythe most insightful, but still unsatisfactory.While I am convinced that there is implicit in the questionsthe inquiryof the relationof
Forms or Ideas to the Form of the Good, I understandthe problem
differently.The problemof "the Good" is to understandthe Good as that
unaccountable,non-hypotheticalfirstprinciplewhich accountsfor everythingaccountable,and thereforethe requiredaccountis one whichreveals
the relatednessbetween "being"and "unity,"among unities(sc. the unity
of unities), and between the unities and the multiplicityof phenomena.
This relatednessmust be viewed together from an epistemologicaland
ontologicalperspective.So what we have here, in general,is a problemof
understandinghow the unitiesaregatheredtogether,how we can showthat
they are genuinely unities, but it is also the problemof showingthat and
how the unitiescan be and yet be relatedto phenomena.
Question 1, Philebus 15B1-2,raisesthe problemof determiningthe ontootcaas
logical status of the Forms as unities. The phrase here is &XOq&s
"trulybeing,"or "trulyreal,"or "trulyexisting,"which remindsus of the
6rvos at
ov at Republic 477A, "completely being"; rov EIXLXpLVioS
mTavvrX5s

Republic477A, 478D, 479D (cf. also Symposium211E) "purelybeing";

in respect
oivSous
7reX.s 0v at Republic597A, "perfectlybeing";xXtvilsOvTws
to the Form, Bed, Republic597D, "reallybeing";and especiallythe later
referencein the Philebus59D, To ov o6v's "reallybeing."We do not have
here what we find at Timaeus28A, T6o8v'rs oiV'Uso'e OSv"notreallybeing"
(sc. the world of becoming).The first question,then, asks whetheror not
the Formsas unitiesshouldbe ontologicallycharacterizedas "truebeing."
Sincethe inquiryis whetheror not the Formsare non-phenomenalentities,
ontologicallyindependentfrom those constitutingthe worldof becoming,
and maintainthe
this first question asks if we are to retain the XwpLaUOs
structureimplied by the Divided Line at Republic509D-51IE. Implicitin
the question,therefore,is the problemof whetheror not we shallcontinue
to make the distinction between k-rtoLIvL1and bo6a, for if we can "know"

oivaoswe cannot have knowledgeof To

only the &XqOCs

oVTAs OV0S0iTE OV

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characterizedby 8ot. But thereis somethingmore at stake which we can

see foreshadowedeven in this first question and explicatedmore fully in
the second; we can see this by the word pLov'&6s.
We may ask, why not
Why the pluraland not the singular?The pluralmakesit clearthatit
p,ov&s?
is Forms (and not Form, nor the Form of the Good) which are the subject-matter.But why, we may inquire further,does Plato use the unusual
termRuovabes?
It is likely that Platoemploysthe term11ova8es
becauseof the
predominatingconcern of the dialogue with the mathematicalprecision
requisite for expressing the determinate relation between two distinct
ontologicaltypesof entities.The word[Lov&ies,
therefore,not only suggests
the sense of unity, but also "unity"as denoting a mathematicalclass and
the mostbasicone at that.To speakof Rova8Es
as &XqCos
oivcasis to suggest
a mathematicalcharacterof the Forms.This "mathematical"characterof
the Forms

viewed from this dianoetic perspective

provides an insight

into how we may profitablyproceed to investigatethe nature of Forms

(aWXii%s
oSacs) as "unities."The mathematicalperspectiveof Forms as
unitiesestablishesthe contextin which the dialogueproceeds.39The plural
form(jiov&Lrs),however,tells us somethingelse which must be reconciled
with the sense of ,uovasas a unity, and this matter is focused on in the
secondquestion.But here it shouldbe noted thatwe alreadyhave plurality
on the highest ontological level, and this, no doubt, stands in the backgroundas Plato'sreasonfor choosing the plural.The problemof the One
and Many is alreadya problem for the intelligibleworld which requires
considerationeven beforewe move to the contrastwhichthe sensibleworld
provides.But, as Gosling pointed out,40to speakof the ,uov&8esas &XqaCos
oiaas is also to give riseto anotherinterpretation;it could also be taken to
ask if the [tov&8rsare really unities, if we can properlyspeak of many
unitiesas "unities"at all. Thuslines 1-2raisetwo problemstogether;do the
unitiestrulyexist, and are the unitiesgenuinelyunities?
Question2, 15B2-4,raisesthese two problemsin a more developedway,
and like question 1,requiresus to raisethemboth togetherin the contextof
the connection of epistemologyand ontology. The two problems at this
stageof developmentare:(a) how arewe to understandthe natureof these
unitiesas unities,and (b) whethera unitycan be said to be and yet remain
a single unity. Just as the first question (15BI-2), asking whether the
'8Es are Wq&ois oioas could be interpretedas inquiringwhether the
unitiesare trulyunitiesor whetherthe unitiestrulyexist,so (a) follows the
sense of the formerand (b) the latter.
Historicallyspeaking,the interpretationof the expressionE'tra'rwS . . .
pixv TOavT3'v
has been overwhelminglyfavored to concern itself with the
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problem:In what sense are these unitiesgenuinelyunities;how shouldwe

understandtheir nature as unities?This interpretationcould look in two
directions,however,eitheraskingabout the way in which theseunitiesare
relatedto multifariousphenomena,or askinghow the variousunitiescan
be gatheredtogetherwithina singlesystematicunity.Thisview,in its many
modifications,has gotten the supportof "two-question"and "three-question" interpretersalike - Badham (in both editions), Poste, Jackson,
Schleiermacher,Archer-Hind, Natorp, Wilamowitz, Hackforth, Dies,
Cherniss,Ross, Albritton,Anscombe,Shiner,Gosling and others.On the
other hand, Stallbaum, Bury, Burnet, Taylor, Hardie and others have
supportedsome versionof the interpretationthat thesewordsmean:How
can theseunitiesbe said to be andyet be unities?The problem,on thisview,
primarilyconcerns the relation of "unity"to "being."Friedlanderalone
has seen that both questions are raised by lines 2-4, but even he has not
gone far enough to explain the text and philosophicalproblemssatisfactorily.I will try,then, to show how the text supportsa positionclose to that
of Friedlander's.But the philosophicaljustificationfor raisingboth questions together - the epistemological one which insists that a proper
understandingof unity requires a knowledge which affords us precise
determinationin relating different kinds of entities; the ontologicalone
which insists that the nature of unity must always be seen within the
contextof being - comes in the formthatPlatoinsistsuponthroughoutthe
laterdialogues,namely that the questionsof "whatthereis" and "howwe
know what there is" must always be understoodas inseparable;or stated
differently, the faculty or mode of apprehension and the object apprehendedthroughthe employmentof a particularfacultyaretiedtogether
inextricably.
Interpretation(a), how are we to understandthe natureof these unities
as unities, presents itself in the words eWma?T7OaV TaVTas. . . 8Rws EIvaL
O43aL6Ta'ra picav rotv3'rv;How is it that these unities (rav'Tas picks up

in line 1) - this field of unity alreadythoughtas plurality- are

,uovaBas
united or gathered together to be distinguishedfrom every other ontologicallevel. To ask the questionin this way is to ask how these unitiesare
unitiesat all; but it is also to askhow unitiesareso unifiedto be revealedas
unities, to ask how the unities are gathered together into a systematic
whole, a systematicwhole which revealshow they are gatheredtogetherto
be of the same ontological order and how they serve as the gathering
together or for the gatheringtogetherof multifariousphenomena.This
v
interpretationfinds the essentialcontrastin cvfras(line 2) and t'av rTmr'T
(line 4) and treats the phrase juiov ixiaarqv . . . 1Tpoa8EXo,uCvqvas
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parenthetical.Furthermore,I take it that the attempts of several comwere compelled by the convictionthat
mentatorsto emend o,4wsto 5oXws
interpretation(a) was preciselythe point of lines 2-4, a point which seems
to me to requireno emendationof the text.
Interpretation(b), whether a unity can be said to be and yet remaina
exaor-nv
single unity, requires a different emphasis, reading otvrts ,uioav
. . . oRs ELViat IEao6TaTa pieaVTeavT.qV. How is it that each one of these
eternallyexisting and always self-identicalunities which neitherundergo
genesis nor destructioncan neverthelessbe maintainedwith the greatest
certaintyto be this one unity. Here the emphasisis placed on the parallel
constructionbetween ,u;avbx&arv and icav Tav'TriV,both of which are
contrastedwith 6o,us
ELSetvxL EPo't'TraT. But the question at lines 2-4 (as
as "truebeing";even if we
opposed to 1-2) takes for grantedthe ,uov&8es
acceptthat, howcan it be definitivelyestablishedthat each of these unities
exists (sc. is) and is a single unity? The o'ws (line 4), whose force is
adversative,intensifies the concessive force of the preceding participle
ovaiv (line 3), therebysetting up the contrastbetween the hypothesisthat
the unities are each eternal and self-identicaland the problem of establishing with the greatestprecisionhow they are of such a sort. In this case,
ovToavshould be rendered "although eternally existing."The xaitwhich
follows,taken epexegetically,togetherwith the clause it introduces,tells us
how we should understandwhat it means for somethingto be ov'oav&L':
"that is to say, admitting neither a coming-into-beingnor a passing-outof-being." The 0,uxsdrives home the purpose of the concessive force of
ovootv;nevertheless(these Forms as unities) can be establishedwith the
greatestcertaintyto be this one unity."The question is, then, how can a
unity be affirmed to be? If each of these unities exists eternallyand immutably,how can each be affirmedto be without denying their natureas
unity?This question presses the problem in the Parmenides(129Bf.) and
Sophist(241Df.). How is the unity of a Form compatiblewith the being of
that same Form? Can we say that a unity (sc. Form) exists?Does predicatingexistence,or anythingelse for the matter,of a unitycease to make it
a unity?
Thus lines 2-4 develop the two questionsraisedat lines 1-2.Now we ask,
how arewe to understandthe unityof these unitiesin such a way so thatwe
can precisely determine the unifying function which they perform,and
how is it that these unities can be withoutdenyingtheirunity?
Question 3, 15B4-8,makes it unambiguouslyclear that these two problems - the epistemologicalwhich asks us to understandthe unity of the
unities in such a way that we can expressthe unifyingfunctionwhich they
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serve in termsof precisedeterminations;the ontologicalwhich asksabout

the relationof "unity"to "being"- must be raisedtogetherbecausethey
are interwovenwith each other.They mustbe raisedtogetherbecausethey
must be answeredtogetherif we are to have a completeunderstandingof
this "systematic"philosophy.
is
The problemof understandingthe relationof unity to tLvaL-yiyveahat
the problemof unifyingdifferentontologicalordersof entities.But specifying this relation rests on a precise mathematicalformulation;and the
preciseformulationin turnpresupposesa certainontologicalstructure.In
line 5, we move on to consider the things which come-into-being(yLyv6ova); the xa;, taken epexegetically, explains the nature of yLYv6oievaas
&1TELpa.That which comes-into-being is indefinite and indeterminate

which requires definite determination, which the unifying structures

are to be intelligible at all. So the yvyprovide, if the yLyv6RevVa-&isTLpa
vo6Eva, the ontological aspect, leads us right into the 6rreipa, the epistemological. Then, concerning these unities in respect to the yLyv6opEva
we are askedif they have been dispersed(LE(aao>vv'qV, line 5) and
&TrELpa,
line 6); again, the problemof understandingthe
becomemany (yeyovvuav,
natureof unity and its relationto being are broughtforth together.Then,
whether the unities are whole (oXiiv,line 6) so that eavuaand -yyvWa,KLmust

be viewedin a systematicand all inclusivecontext,or whethertheseunities

are separatefrom themselves,which again requiresthe precise determinations to show how this could be. Even Socrates'remark,8 8q iTav'rwv
&8vvaxrTaTov pVOfLT' &v, carefullycontinuesthe verydichotomywhich it
addresses.And this can be seen most clearlyby the expressionTav&rovxai
LyLyVw'xaLwhich follows.The xa' showsus thatyiYVWC&aL and not ?ELVaL
is the verb operating here, "that is to say" that each Form as a unity
comes-to-bethe same as itself and one, in one and many thingsat the same
time. The Formsdo not come-to-beanything- this is the very point taken
for granted in lines 24. In one sense, the whole last part of the third
8n
questionis wrong-headed,and this is why Socratesclaimsit is o Sirr&vlTOv
The problem of the One and Many, which engendered so
&8vva,XrWTaTOV.

much confusion in the Parmenides,falls prey to taking literally the

metaphorthat the Forms becomemany. In anothersense, however,8 8i1
suggestspreciselythe task which must be rendered
'n&av'rnv
&8vvax'1ra1'rov
thattheseunities
Svvar6v, it setsus the difficultywhichmustbe overcome,41
unify etvat and yiyVEGOL in such a way as to present the ontological
difference, but a difference unified into a single whole - a unity with
differences.The problem of "unity"is to show, then, how becoming is a
kindof being,thatbecomingand beingaretwo aspectsof one and the same
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world, that we can have a kind of knowledge of that which comes-andgoes. The occurrence of the optative qaXLVOVT'
av (line 7) I take as ironic, in
with
the
contrast
3efiLo',raTa(line 4) above and the a&vvaT'rTarov (line 7).

Again, the epistemological claims are contrasted:on the one hand, the
"claim with the greatest certainty,"and on the other a statement of
"seeming"and "appearance"- the optative gives the unspecifiedsense
which determines that "the most impossible thing" be made possible.
"Appearance"and "becoming"cannot be used to describethe Forms as
unities; they characterize the world as ytyvo'iEvovand not as lv. And yet,

"appearance"is of that which appears,and "becoming"is the cominginto-beingof what is.

The task which 15B4-8gives to us is a furtherdevelopmentof the same
problemsposed in lines 1-2 and 2-4. The task is to show how the Forms,
ontologicallydistinct from changing phenomena,are yet related to those
phenomena. The problem, it seems to me, is dealt with in a two-fold
manner:(1) to show how the field constitutedby yLyVo6jIEVais a kind of 6vto show the meaning of yL'yvEo0ttX
as xaT'a 'rrv TTis yevEuESx &vayxctav
ovatav (Politicus, 283D), O`vrWs
(Politicus, 283E), yeiVeLS eIs
yLYvo6Mvov

ovaCav(Philebus,26D), and yey i'vi ovot (Philebus,27B), the being of

becoming"- in the fourfoldclassificationof being laterin thatdialogue,42
and (2) to insist that the relationbetween Form and phenomenamust be
specified with a definite mathematical precision.43
Yale University
I

Charles Badham, The Philebusof Plato. London 1855,(first edition), p. 10n.

EdwardPoste, The Philebusof Plato. Oxford 1860,9-10.
3 Henry Jackson, "On Passages in Plato's Philebus."Journalof Philology25 (1897) 292.
Cf. also a different phrasing in "Plato's LaterTheory of Ideas."Journal of Philology 10
(1882) 262-63. In general agreement is Jowett, The Dialogues of Plato. Oxford 1892,vol.
IV. 580.
4 ibid.
5 Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf,Platon. 2 vols. Berlin 1920, vol. I, 631. Cf. also,
vol. 11,354.
6 Paul Natorp, Platos Ideenlehre.Leipzig 1903, 314, esp. n.l. "Ich weiss mich aus der
schwierigenPeriode(15B) nicht andersherauszuwinden,als indem ich annehme,dass die
Worte Bpws- araOrvnach xxpis zu setzen sind."
7 Friederich Schleiermacher, Platons Werke. Berlin 1826, vol. II, part III. 146, and
483-84.
8 R. Hackforth,Plato's Examinationof Pleasure.Cambridge 1945,20n.
9 ibid. Cf. also R. G. Bury, The Philebus of Plato. Cambridge 1897, 216, where he
mentions the view of J. B. Bury.
2

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10 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Platos dialektische Ethik - PhdnomenologischeInterpretationen zum Philebos. Leipzig 1931, 93-4n. L. Robin, Platon. Paris 1938, 93ff. also
understandstwo questions, but does not furnishtextual details.
11 Auguste Di6s, Platon: Philebe. Bud&Series. Paris 1941, Cf. also, J. C. Kamerbeek,
"Notes sur quelques passagesdu Philebe."Mnemosyne.IV, 10 (1957), 229-230,where he
endorses Di6s' translationbut disagrees with his textual reading; he accepts bws and
Burnet'smarkof interrogationafter 'rna'v.
12 Harold Cherniss, "Some War-Time Publications Concerning Plato." (part II).
AmericanJournal of Philology 68 (1947). Cf. Philebus 12B5-6, and especially Phaedo
9IC8ff. and Theaetetus14D5-7.
13 Sir David Ross, Plato's Theoryof Ideas. Oxford 1951, 131, esp. n. 1.
14 RogersAlbritton,A Studyof Plato's Philebus.UniversityMicrofilms,No. 20,095. Ann
Arbor,Mich., 1955.
15 I. M. Crombie,An Examinationof Plato'sDoctrines.2 vols. N.Y. 1963,vol. II. 362 and
n. I.
16 G. Striker,Peras undApeiron.in Hypomnemata.Heft 30. Gbttingen. 1970, 14n1.
17 R. A. Shiner. Knowledgeand Reality in Plato's Philebus. Assen 1974, 38. Cf. also N.
Gulley, Plato's Theoryof Knowledge,London 1962,p. 114, who takes this position.
18 J. C. B. Gosling, Plato: Philebus.Oxford 1975, 147.Cf. pp. 5, 143-53.
19 Julius Stenzel, Plato's Methodof Diakctic. Trans. D. J. Allan. Oxford 1940, 140.
20 M. Vanhoutte. La MethodeOntologiquede Platon. Paris 1956, 139-40.
21 Damascius, head of the Academy at its close in 529 A.D., favored the three-question
reading(Damascius:Lectureson the Philebus.ed. L. G. Westerink.Amsterdam1959,24)
believing they were: "If they [monads] exist, if they are eternal and self-contained
transcendingall coming-to-be, and thirdly, in what way they are participatedin by the
thingsof the world." MarsilioFicino, founderof the FlorentineAcademy,in his fifteenth
century commentary on the Philebus also championed the "three-question"interpretation. According to him, the three questions are (Marsilio Ficino; The PhilebusCommentary,ed. and trans. Michael J. B. Allen. Berkeley and Los Angeles 1975, 176-79):
"Concerningthese unities three majorproblemspresent themselves.One, are the species
trueorjust conceptionsof our intelligence?Two, if they reallydo exist, is each speciesone
alone although in agreement with the many, and immutable although its the cause of
mutable things?Three, if each is one and immutable, how can it impart itself to many
things and things which are mutable in such a way that it is not made mutable in them,
nor they made mutable by the fact that it is there?Also, can it be divided through the
individual things, or can the whole of it be in them?" Later, in the eighteenth century,
within the context of the CambridgePlatonists,Floyer Sydenhampublisheda translation
of the Philebusalong with translationsof many other dialogues by Thomas Taylor, The
Works of Plato. London 1804, 5 vols.; vol. II p. 475. Sydenham understood three
questions, much as Damasciushad, but, believing the text faulty,proposedextensiveand
instead of E'vaL[line 4]; xai avrr-ivinsteadof
surelyunnecessaryemendations:"readEXFLv
ai(rrsxwp;s[lines 6-7]."
vrxi'qv[line 4]; and avTwivp,av1'TsxwpCsinstead of av&riv
22 F. A. Payley, The Philebusof Plato. London 1873,p. 10n2.Payley follows Grote (Plato
and the Other Companionsof Sokrates. 4 vols. London 1865, vol. II 558.) Cf. also, T.
Maguire("The Philkbusof Plato and Recent EnglishCritics"in Hermathena.vol. 1. 465)
who follows Payley.
23 Charles Badham, The Philebusof Plato. London. 1878.(second edition). pm 10n. Cf.
also his "Addenda ad Notas in PlatonisPhilebum"inPhilologus 1855,341.

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24

R. G. Bury, op. cit. 13n.5.

25

ibid. 14n.
ibid. Stallbaum's assessment (Platonis Opera Omnia. vol. IX, sect. II. Gothae. 1842,
115-16) that the second question asks, then how are we to understand each [of the
monads] to be exempt from creation (ortu)and destruction?is not unreasonable,but it is
blind to the sense which the adversativeforce of ilu.s conveys. Bury'sstronginclinationto
correctoJ.Is to 6vrws is unconvincingfor the same reason.This positionwas also endorsed
- with minor variations- by F. Susemihl (Die GenetischeEntwickelungderPlatonischen
Philosophie.Leipzig 1857, vol. II. 9, who follows both Stallbaumand Steinhart(Prologomena ad Platonis Philebum. Naumburg 1853, 4.S. 32 Anm. 134) in opposing oFs.
Susemihl criticizes Steinhart'sinterpretationby suggestingthat he read6vrwsor ioXcsto
catch the properorientation.
27 R. D. Archer-Hind,"Note on Plato's Philebus 15A,B."Journalof Philology27 (1901)
229ff., 231. G. E. Moore shares a similar sympathy, urging that three questions are
intended, the second of which should be rendered:"How (we are to suppose) that these
monads 'though' each one and always the same... ,are 'yet' most surely all of them one
(.r&ya6v)."[Bury.op. cit. p. 215.]The point is that the second clause raisesthe questionof
the connection of Forms with one another in addition to particulars.
28 John Burnet, Greek Philosophy. London 1914, 326-7. Burnet makes a particularly
interesting remark about the second question. "The sense of the question (15B2-4) has
been much disputed. I think that, if we read it with an emphasison the first ,iaxvand on
e1vat, we shall see that it refers to the difficulty that arises when we predicate"being"of
"one", that is, when we speak not merely of'rb EvEvbut of TO EV6V. When we do that the
One at once seems to become two. That is a chief crux of the Parmenides."(cf. especially
n. 3). The close connection with the Parmenidesis consideredlateron; cf. n. 36, 38-40. Cf.
also Classical Quarterly 15 (1921) 2, where Burnet argues against Wilamowitz' supposition.
29 A. E. Taylor, Plato: The Man and his Work.London. 1926,411-412.
30 W. F. R. Hardie, A Study in Plato.
Oxford 1936,p. 82.
31 G. E.
Anscombe, "The New Theory of Forms," Monist (50), (1966) 407 and n. 4. A
similar interpretationwas advanced several years before by H. J. M. Broos, "Plato and
Art: A New Analysis of the Philebus."MnemosyneIV.4. (1951) 114; and also by M. W.
Isenberg, "The Unity of Plato's Philebus".Classical Philology 35. (1940) 160-61. However, C. Ritter in his Kerngedankender Platonischen Philosophie. Munich. 1931 (in
English, The Essence of Plato's Philosophy.Trans. A. Alles. N.Y. 1933, 195.) takes the
second question to ask about the relation between the self-identical individual, and
eternalnatureof the unity and its special characteristicdeterminedin this or that manner.
Cf. also E. W. Schipper, Formsin Plato's LaterDialogues,The Hague, 1965,44, who is a
more recentsupporterof the three-questiongroup.
32 Paul Friedltinder,Plato. 3 vols. Trans. H. Meyerhoff. Princeton, 1969. vol. III. 53436n.27.
33 A. E. Taylor, Plato: Philebusand Epinomis.ed. R. Klibansky.London. 1956,257.

26

34
35

Friedlander, op. cit., 535.

Badham, op. cit., 10nff.

36 A point which G. Schneider (Die PlatonischeMetaphysik),as quoted by Ritter (Essence.op. cit. p. 51) failed to recognize;the same criticismis rightlyextended to A. Levi in
his Il Concettodel temponellafilosofia greca sino a Platone. Milan 1919,76.
37 Ross. loc. cit.

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38 Archer-Hind.loc. cii.
39 Here I have in mind, most especially,the projectof expressingthe relationbetween the
which Taylor
One and Many, Many and One, by workingout the 70V &pLiOtV . . .'n&rvra,
translates (op. cit. p. 110), "the whole numerical series" between them.
40
Gosling, op. cit. pp. 145-46.
41

I take this approachto be the same as the one employed in the Parmenides.Socrates
states over and over again that he would be amazed if it could be shown that absolute
unity is also many, or stated more generally,the one is many and the manyone (129B2-3,
B9-CI, C2-3, D7-8, E4-5, 7-8). The key point is: 'noXi REvTr&v6e jx&XXov,
ts \eyw,
ayca1nEL1V,

i' TLS EXOL T1V avuTIjv rarvv

&TopiaV

'TXOsavTO&alXTS
kV 01VTOLSToLs ELbEUL

'XE-

&AXieem, oiv"rrsxai Ev TOis XoyLwvwXa0avo4vos

?'TTL8EIE(129E9-130A3). It seems to me that the point of the Parmenides is to insist that

XOLVi1V,

&V TOSL 6peVOIS

LW,O1rEp

Forms and sensibles must be related. The Eleatic conception of Being taken to its
extreme, is simply untenable. If the Unity of Being is considered so absolutely as to be
absolutelyunrelatedto anythingelse, nothingwill follow from the hypothesisthat "it is"
or "is not".
if
Compare Parmenides129B2-E5,where Socrates states that it would be OavLxao-T6v
. .r6t'noXXix
one could show that the One is Many and the Many One: 'rbEviToXX&.
etvctLX,iL
Ev. . .ii tavFLaa0rv XiyfLv (129D5-6), with Philebus 14C8-9:(v -yapb&'r&iroXX&
TO ?v

ToTXX&
0avaar6Wov XEX1-V, where Socrates reiterates the same point.

Plato. Philebus.22C-3IA.
43 ibid. In a sense these three questions at 15BI-8 are already spoken of in the Parmenides.At Parmenides135B,Parmenidesremarksthat if someone denies the existence
Trvarvrv &leivetVL
of the Forms he will be quite at a loss because he denies that bc&Grov
and as a resultthe ability to carryon discoursewill be obliterated.This certainlyreminds
us of the Iaievix&oav o'voav'rv tavrTivat Philebus15B3,and concernsat least one sense of
both the firstand second questions,namely, the independentand eternal existenceof the
Forms. At Parmenides131A-E, some problems raised in question three (15B4-8) are
considered.Parmenidesasks, "Does it seem to you [Socrates]that either the whole Form
being one is in each of the many things [participating]or what?"(13 1A9-10,cf. Philebus
15B6-10). The phrases aVor6 av(roDxwpis 131B2, ovxiiv vrs -Xwpis131B6, remind us
distinctlyof the avxr4vavrs )(wpisat Philebus 15B8.The repeatedoccurrencesof 6Xovat
at 131B2, 5, 9, suggest that an
Parmenides131A5, 8, B2, Cl, 3, and instances of &pua
allusion is being made in the Philebus to this passage. There is yet another passage in
which the second question in the Philebus passage alludes to the Parmenides.At Parmenides142B,the relationbetween 'unity'and 'being' is called into question, though in a
particularlydifferent sense. Both Parmenides 142B and Philebus 15B5 hypothetically
suppose a 'unity'and ask if it can be said 'to be'; but Philebusasks if we can declare with
the utmostcertaintythat this unity trulyexists and exists as a true unity,while Parmenides
142Basks if this 'unity'participatesin 'being' if it is said to be. The hypotheses[especially
the Second Hypothesis]emphasize the asymmetricnature of the relation[note that the
question is asked whether'unity' participatesin 'being', but not the other way around].

42

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