Tanada vs.

Angara
272 SCRA 18
FACTS: The suit was filed to nullify the concurrence of the Philippines Senate to the Presidents Ratification of
the Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization. It was contended that the agreement places nationals
and products of member countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products in contravention of the
Filipino First Policy.
Petitioners maintained that this Agreement was an assault on the sovereign powers of the Philippines because it
meant that Congress could not pass legislation that would be good for national interest and general welfare if such
legislation would not conform to the WTO Agreement.
ISSUE: Whether the provisions of the WTO Agreement and its annexes limit, restrict, or impair the exercise of
legislative power by Congress.
HELD: While sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-encompassing on the domestic level, it
is however subject to limitations and restrictions voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines as a member of the family
of nations. One of the oldest and most fundamental rules in international law is pacta sunt servanda
international agreements must be performed in good faith. A treaty engagement is not a mere moral obligation but
creates a legally binding obligation on the parties xxx. A state which has contracted valid international obligations
is bound to make in its legislation such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the
obligations undertaken.
By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty. By their voluntary act,
nations may surrender some aspects of their state power in exchange for greater benefits granted by or derived
from a convention or pact. After all, states, like individuals live with coequals, and in pursuit of mutuality
covenanted objectives and benefits, they also commonly agree to limit the exercise of their otherwise absolute
rights.
The sovereignty of a state therefore cannot in fact and in reality be considered absolute. Certain restrictions enter
into the picture: (1) limitations imposed by the very nature of membership in the family of nations and (2)
limitations imposed by treaty stipulations.

KILOSBAYAN, et. al. vs. MANUEL L. MORATO, et. al.

(G. R. No. 118910)
FACTS:
This is a petition seeking to declare the ELA invalid on the ground that it is substantially the same as the Contract
of Lease nullified in G. R. No. 113373, 232 SCRA 110.
Petitioners contended that the amended ELA is inconsistent with and violative of PCSO's charter and the decision
of the Supreme Court of 5 May 1995, that it violated the law on public bidding of contracts as well as Section
2(2), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution in relation to the COA Circular No. 85-55-A.
Respondents questioned the petitioners' standing to bring this suit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners possess the legal standing to file the instant petition.

RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because some cases
are brought not by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of the law or by official action taken,
but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest. Petitioners do not in fact
show what particularized interest they have for bringing this suit. And they do not have present substantial interest
in the ELA as would entitle them to bring this suit.

Basco vs PAGCOR
Municipal Corporation Local Autonomy imperium in imperio
On July 11, 1983, PAGCOR was created under PD 1869 to enable the Government to regulate and centralize all
games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law. Basco and four others (all lawyers) assailed
the validity of the law creating PAGCOR on constitutional grounds among others particularly citing that the
PAGCORs charter is against the constitutional provision on local autonomy.
Basco et al contend that P.D. 1869 constitutes a waiver of the right of the City of Manila to impose taxes and legal
fees; that Section 13 par. (2) of P.D. 1869 which exempts PAGCOR, as the franchise holder from paying any tax
of any kind or form, income or otherwise, as well as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature, whether National
or Local is violative of the local autonomy principle.
ISSUE: Whether or not PAGCORs charter is violative of the principle of local autonomy.
HELD: NO. Section 5, Article 10 of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own source of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and
other charges subject to such guidelines and limitation as the congress may provide, consistent with the basic
policy on local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local government.
A close reading of the above provision does not violate local autonomy (particularly on taxing powers) as it was
clearly stated that the taxing power of LGUs are subject to such guidelines and limitation as Congress may
provide.
Further, the City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to impose taxes. The Charter
of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should be stressed that municipal corporations are mere
creatures of Congress which has the power to create and abolish municipal corporations due to its general
legislative powers. Congress, therefore, has the power of control over Local governments. And if Congress can
grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for exemptions or even take back the
power.
Further still, local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government. PAGCOR is a
government owned or controlled corporation with an original charter, PD 1869. All of its shares of stocks are
owned by the National Government. Otherwise, its operation might be burdened, impeded or subjected to control
by a mere Local government.
This doctrine emanates from the supremacy of the National Government over local governments.


MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS GSIS
267 SCRA 408
FACTS Petitioner Manila Prince Hotel, a Filipino corporation raised their case regarding the sale of the Manila
Hotel in a Special Civil Action of Prohibition and Mandamus. Petitioner argued that the sale of the hotel should be
awarded to them in pursuant to the Filipino First policy of the Constitution. The highest bidder during that time is
Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator. The 2 bid for the same number of
shares however it was the Malaysian firm who bid 2.42PHP higher than the petitioner at 44PHP. While the
declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder is still pending, the petitioner matched the bid at 44PHP per
share and sent a managers check issued by Philtrust Bank for 33 Million pesos. Respondent GSIS refused to
accept the petitioners offer. The respondents argued that sec 10, par 2 Art XII of the 1987 Constitution is not self
executing and requires an implementing legislation for its enforcement. Such paragraph states: in the grant of
rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to
qualified Filipinos.
ISSUE Whether or not sec 10, par 2 Art XII of the 1987 Constitution is self executing; and whether or not the
petitioner as a Filipino controlled corporation is also covered by the term qualified Filipinos of the Constitution.
RULING The court ruled that Art II of the Constitution is generally not self executing. However, if a provision is
complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation or that which
supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self executing. In case
of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self executing. Sec 10 par 2 Art XII of the Constitution is a
mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing
laws or rules for its enforcement. According to the 1986 Constitutional Commission proceedings, the term
qualified filipino also includes corporations at least 60% of which is owned by Filipinos. The court further
highlighted the exchange of views during the sessions of the Constitutional Commission when framers explicitly
provided that a qualified Filipino enterprise shall be given preference over a foreigner even if such foreigner is
more qualified in some aspects. The phrase preference to qualified Filipinos was explained thus
MR. FOZ. Madam President, I would like to request Commissioner Nolledo to please restate his amendment so
that I can ask a question. MR. NOLLEDO. "IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND
CONCESSIONS COVERING THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL
GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS." MR FOZ. In connection with that amendment, if a foreign
enterprise is qualified and a Filipino enterprise is also qualified, will the Filipino enterprise still be given a
preference? MR. NOLLEDO. Obviously. MR. FOZ. If the foreigner is more qualified in some aspects than the
Filipino enterprise, will the Filipino still be preferred? MR. NOLLEDO. The answer is "yes." MR. FOZ. Thank
you,
41
Expounding further on the Filipino First Policy provision Commissioner Nolledo continues MR. NOLLEDO.
Yes, Madam President. Instead of "MUST," it will be "SHALL THE STATE SHALL GlVE PREFERENCE
TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS. This embodies the so-called "Filipino First" policy. That means that Filipinos
should be given preference in the grant of concessions, privileges and rights covering the national patrimony. 42
The exchange of views in the sessions of the Constitutional Commission regarding the subject provision was still
further clarified by Commissioner Nolledo 43 Paragraph 2 of Section 10 explicitly mandates the "Pro-Filipino"
bias in all economic concerns. It is better known as the FILIPINO FIRST Policy . . . This provision was never
found in previous Constitutions . . . . The term "qualified Filipinos" simply means that preference shall be given to
those citizens who can make a viable contribution to the common good, because of credible competence and

efficiency. It certainly does NOT mandate the pampering and preferential treatment to Filipino citizens or
organizations that are incompetent or inefficient, since such an indiscriminate preference would be counter
productive and inimical to the common good. In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions,
when a choice has to be made between a "qualified foreigner" end a "qualified Filipino," the latter shall be chosen
over the former." Lastly, the word qualified is also determinable. Petitioner was so considered by respondent
GSIS and selected as one of the qualified bidders. It was pre-qualified by respondent GSIS in accordance with its
own guidelines so that the sole inference here is that petitioner has been found to be possessed of proven
management expertise in the hotel industry, or it has significant equity ownership in another hotel company, or it
has an overall management and marketing proficiency to successfully operate the Manila Hotel. 44 The Court
instructed GSIS to accept the bid offered by Manila Prince Hotel to purchase The Manila Hotel Corporation at
44PHP per share and to execute the necessary clearances and acts as may be necessary for the purpose of the sale.

G.R. No. 115455: Arturo Tolentino vs Secretary of Finance

Origination of Revenue Bills EVAT
Amendment by Substitution

Tolentino et al is questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise known as the EVAT Law. Tolentino
averred that this revenue bill did not exclusively originate from the HoR as required by Sec 24, Art 6 of the
CONST. Even though RA 7716 originated as HB 11197 and that it passed the 3 readings in the HoR, the same
did not complete the 3 readings in Senate for after the 1st reading it was referred to the SW&M Committee
thereafter Senate passed its own version known as SB 1630. Tolentino averred that what Senate could have done
is amend HB11197 by striking out its text and substituting it w/ the text of SB 1630 in that way the bill remains a
HB and the Senate version just becomes the text (only the text) of the HB. Tolentino and co-petitioner Roco even
signed the said SB.

ISSUE: Whether or not EVAT originated in the HoR.

HELD: By a 9-6 vote, the SC rejected the challenge, holding that such consolidation was consistent with the
power of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments to the version originated in the HoR. What the
Constitution simply means, according to the 9 justices, is that the initiative must come from the HoR. Note also
that there were several instances before where Senate passed its own version rather than having the HoR version
as far as revenue and other such bills are concerned. This practice of amendment by substitution has always been
accepted. The proposition of Tolentino concerns a mere matter of form. There is no showing that it would make a
significant difference if Senate were to adopt his over what has been done.

Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado

Facts: The main target of this petition is Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 as implemented by the Philippine Postal
Corporation through its Circular No. 92-28. These measures withdraw the franking privilege from the SC, CA,
RTC, MTC, MeTC and the Land Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain other

government offices. The petitioners are members of the lower courts who feel that their official functions as judges
will be prejudiced by the above-named measures. The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not its title embraces more than one subject and does not express its purpose
(2) Whether or not it did not pass the required readings in both Houses of Congress and printed copies of the bill
in its final form were not distributed among the members before its passage;
(3) Whether or not it is discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary
Held:
(1) Article VI, Sec. 26(l), of the Constitution providing that "Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only
one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof." The purposes of this rule are: (1) to prevent hodge-podge
or "log-rolling" legislation; (2) to prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature by means of provisions in bills of
which the title gives no intimation, and which might therefore be overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally
adopted; and (3) to fairly apprise the people, through such publication of legislative proceedings as is usually
made, of the subject of legislation that is being considered, in order that they may have opportunity of being heard
thereon, by petition or otherwise, if they shall so desire.
It is the submission of the petitioners that Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 which withdrew the franking privilege
from the Judiciary is not expressed in the title of the law, nor does it reflect its purposes. R.A. No. 7354 is entitled
"An Act Creating the Philippine Postal Corporation, Defining its Powers, Functions and Responsibilities,
Providing for Regulation of the Industry and for Other Purposes Connected Therewith." The petitioners'
contention is untenable. The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as
comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure. It has been held that if the title fairly indicates the
general subject, and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the legislature
or the people, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement. Furthermore, the repeal of a statute
on a given subject is properly connected with the subject matter of a new statute on the same subject; and therefore
a repealing section in the new statute is valid, notwithstanding that the title is silent on the subject. The reason is
that where a statute repeals a former law, such repeal is the effect and not the subject of the statute; and it is the
subject, not the effect of a law, which is required to be briefly expressed in its title. The withdrawal of the franking
privilege from some agencies is germane to the accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A. No. 7354,
which is the creation of a more efficient and effective postal service system.
(2) It is a matter of record that the conference Committee Report on the bill in question was returned to and duly
approved by both the Senate and the House of Representatives. Thereafter, the bill was enrolled with its
certification by Senate President Neptali A. Gonzales and Speaker Ramon V. Mitra of the House of
Representatives as having been duly passed by both Houses of Congress. It was then presented to and approved
by President Corazon C. Aquino on April 3, 1992. Under the doctrine of separation powers, the Court may not
inquire beyond the certification of the approval of a bill from the presiding officers of Congress. The enrolled bill
is conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in matters that have to be entered in the journals like the yeas and nays on
the final reading of the bill).
(3) It is alleged that R.A. No. 7354 is discriminatory because while withdrawing the franking privilege from the
Judiciary, it retains the same for the President of the Philippines, the Vice President of the Philippines; Senators
and Members of the House of Representatives, the Commission on Elections; former Presidents of the
Philippines; the National Census and Statistics Office; and the general public in the filing of complaints against
public offices and officers. The withdrawal of the franking privileges was indeed discriminatory. If the problem of
the respondents is the loss of revenues from the franking privilege, the remedy is to withdraw it altogether from all
agencies of government, including those who do not need it. The problem is not solved by retaining it for some
and withdrawing it from others, especially where there is no substantial distinction between those favored, which
may or may not need it at all, and the Judiciary, which definitely needs it. The problem is not solved by violating
the Constitution. The classification was not based on substantial distinctions.

G.R. No. L-11530: US vs Juan Pons

Journal Conclusiveness of the Journals
Pons and Gabino Beliso were trading partners. On 5 Apr 1914, the steamer Lopez y Lopez arrived at Manila from
Spain and it contained 25 barrels of wine. The said barrels of wine were delivered to Beliso. Beliso subsequently
delivered 5 barrels to Pons house. On the other hand, the customs authorities noticed that the said 25 barrels listed
as wine on record were not delivered to any listed merchant (Beliso not being one). And so the customs officers
conducted an investigation thereby discovering that the 25 barrels of wine actually contained tins of opium. Since
the ct of trading and dealing opium is against Act 2381, Pons and Beliso were charged for illegally and
fraudulently importing and introducing such contraband material to the Philippines. Pons appealed the sentence
arguing that Act 2381 was not approved while the Philippine Commission (Congress) was not in session. He said
that his witnesses claim that the said law was passed/approved on 01 March 1914 while the special session of the
Commission was adjourned at 12MN on 28 Feb 1914. Since this is the case, Act 2381 should be null and void.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must go beyond the recitals of the Journals to determine if Act 2381 was indeed
made a as law on 28 Feb 1914.

HELD: The SC looked into the Journals to ascertain the date of adjournment but the SC refused to go beyond the
recitals in the legislative Journals. The said Journals are conclusive on the Court and to inquire into the veracity of
the journals of the Philippine Legislature, when they are, as the SC have said, clear and explicit, would be to
violate both the letter and the spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into
existence, to invade a coordinate and independent department of the Government, and to interfere with the
legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature. Pons witnesses cannot be given due weight against the
conclusiveness of the Journals which is an act of the legislature. The journals say that the Legislature adjourned at
12 midnight on February 28, 1914. This settles the question, and the court did not err in declining to go behind
these journals. The SC passed upon the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill in this particular case.