KOSOVAKOSOVO.

COM
Albanian-Serb Information Exchange Forum
Forumi Shqiptaro-Serb pr Kmbimin e Informatave
Albansko-srpski forum za razmenu miljenja

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM
Albanian-Serb Information Exchange Forum
Forumi Shqiptaro-Serb pr Kmbimin e Informatave
Albansko-srpski forum za razmenu miljenja

BETA Media Center

Ljubica Markovic
Chair
Srpskih Vladara 4
11000 Beograd
Serbia and Montenegro
CDRSEE
Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast Europe
Nenad Sebek
Executive Director
9 Krispou St.
54634 Thessaloniki
Greece
KosovaLive News Agency
Kelmend Hapciu
Manager/Editor-in-chief
Media House Annex, Top Floor
Prishtina, Kosovo/UNMIK

The project partners, the CDRSEE, BETA Media Centar, and KosovaLive, would like to thank Media-Im-Pakt, part of the German Institute for Foreign Cultural Relations, in cooperation with the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, for the financial support that made this publication possible.

ISBN 86-905421-2-4 (NA Beta)

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

Contents

Introduction
Statements
Statement for kosovakosovo.com ................................................................................. 17
Javier Solana, European Union High Representative
Kosovo Must Not Be Europe 's Black Hole .................................................................. 19
Erhard Busek, Special Coordinator of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe
Pluralistic, unbiased information is key to the public debate on Kosovo ........................22
by Sren Jessen-Petersen Special Representative of the Secretary-General
for Kosovo
Statement for kosovakosovo.com ................................................................................... 26
Franois Stamm is the ICRC's Head of Operations for South-Eastern
Europe and chairs the Working Group on Persons unaccounted for in
connection with events in Kosovo
People Displaced from Kosovo Must Be Offered a Choice ........................................... 30
Gottfried Koefner, Chair UNHCR Representative in Austria,
Direct Dialogue Working Group on Returns of Displaced to Kosovo

Forum
Politicizing the Fate of Missing Persons Is Itself a Crime ............................................. 40
Verica Tomanovic represents Belgrade in a working group tasked with discovering
what became of people who went missing in Kosovo and chairs the Association of
Families of Abducted and Missing Individuals from Kosovo and Metohija.
Missing persons - Kosovo's open wound ....................................................................... 41
Author: Nesrete Kumnova, Head of the Mothers Appeal Association
Problems of people who stopped receiving pensions and of redundant workers
from Kosovo and Metohija should be solved simultaneously ........................................ 50
Slobodan Lalovic, Serbian Minister for Labor, Employment and Welfare
Policy
Issue of Kosovar Pension and Invalid Fund misappropriated by Serbia
must be resolved ............................................................................................................ 51
By Ibrahim Selmanaj, Kosovar Minister of Labor and Social Welfare
Political position of Roma in Kosovo ............................................................................. 60
By Luan Koka, political scientist, journalist and Chairman of the Executive Committee
of the National Council of the Roma Ethnic Minority in Serbia-Montenegro
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Position of Romas in Kosovo needs to be improved ...................................................... 61

By Kujtim Paaku, Editor of Roma service of Radio Yeni Donem in Prizren,
publicist and writer
Handball clubs from Kosovo prematurely admitted into EHF ....................................... 76
By Bozidar Djurkovic, the General Secretary of the Handball Association of
Serbia and a member of the Arbitration Commission of the European Handball
Federation (EHF)
Kosovos sport can only breathe as much as politics allows it ...................................... 77
Belul Beqaj, Secretary General of Kosovos Olympic Association (AOK)
To Whom Does Kosovo Belong?.................................................................................... 86
By Dusan T. Batakovic, Ambassador and Advisor to the Serbian President
Kosovo and the historical right in the light of medieval sources and studies ................. 87
Dr. Sc. Selim Daci, professor at Pristina University
Ahead of Kosovo Status Negotiations: Independent Kosovo 2006
- A Fateful Mistake ........................................................................................................ 100
By Slobodan Antonic, Senior Lecturer at the School of Philosophy in Belgrade
The imposed unity......................................................................................................... 101
Author: Shkelzen Maliqi
More than Autonomy, Less than Independence - A Fair Offer ..................................... 118
By Sanda Raskovic-Ivic, President of the Serbian government's
Coordinating Center for Kosovo and Metohija
Why Kosova needs independence ................................................................................ 119
Author: Veton Surroi, member of the Kosovar delegation for status talks
and the Chairman of ORA
Kosovo is the only region in Europe where international standards
are not respected ........................................................................................................... 130
By Jelena Markovic, Assistant Minister of Human and Minority Rights of
Serbia-Montenegro
Situation of human rights and of minorities ................................................................ 131
By Nazmi Fejza, the Deputy Minister for Communities and Return
Negotiations on Kosovo's Future - A New Security Challenge .................................... 146
By Zoran Dragisic, Military Analyst and a Professor at the School of Civil
Defense in Belgrade
Current security situation in Kosovo ............................................................................ 147
Ramadan Qehaja, Political Advisor for Security Affairs of Kosovos Prime Minister
Debts for Serbia - property for Kosovo ....................................................................... 164
By Prof. Ljubodrag Savic, Ph.D.Econ., Faculty of Economics in Belgrade
Who owes whom? ......................................................................................................... 165
By Nuri Bashota, a Lecturer at the Faculty of Economy at the University of
Pristina
What can International Law do to help resolve the Kosovo Issue? .............................. 178
By Prof. Vojin Dimitrijevic
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To what extent can international law have an impact on the resolution

of the Kosovo issue? ..................................................................................................... 179
By Prof. Dr. Enver Hasani, Professor of International Law and International
Relations
Combating Hate Speech and Supporting Tolerance ..................................................... 198
By Bojan Toncic, Belgrade newspaper Danas
Let us not lie to one another! ........................................................................................ 199
by Bahri Cani, political scientist and correspondent of Deutsche Welle

Research
KOSOVO - KOSOVA
Coming to Terms with the Problem of Kosovo: The Peoples Views from
Kosovo and Serbia ........................................................................................................ 219
About the Project .......................................................................................................... 220
Executive Summary ...................................................................................................... 223
Part 1 Problems ............................................................................................................. 227
1. The range of problems ......................................................................................... 227
2. Kosovos final status ............................................................................................ 235
3. Serb and Albanian relations ................................................................................. 244
4. Security ................................................................................................................ 253
5. A future without agreement .................................................................................. 262
Part 2 Solutions ............................................................................................................. 266
Part 2: Question design and interpreting results ........................................................... 266
6. Serb and Albanian relations ................................................................................. 267
7. Security ................................................................................................................ 277
8. Negotiations on the final status of Kosovo .......................................................... 286
9. Guiding principles for the final status of Kosovo ................................................ 296
10. A constitutional package for the final status of Kosovo ....................................... 306
11. Displaced persons ................................................................................................ 311
Appendix ....................................................................................................................... 313
KOSOVA KOSOVO
T kuptuarit e problemit t Kosovs Pikpamjet e qytetarve
t Kosovs dhe Serbis ................................................................................................. 335
KOSOVO-KOSOVA
Reavanje problema Kosova: ta misle ljudi sa Kosova i iz Srbije .............................. 364

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

Introduction

Introduction

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

Introduction

In January 2005, the Beta Media Center, the Center for Democracy and Reconciliation
in Southeast Europe (CDRSEE) and KosovaLive embarked on a groundbreaking project,
complex enough to have a name that doesnt say much: The Albanian-Serb Information
Exchange Forum (www.kosovakosovo.com). The goal was to create an independent, accurate, balanced and impartial website which would offer cost free and bias free news and
opinions on Kosovo and all the related problems by bringing together two teams of highly
skilled professional journalists from Belgrade and Pristina. The website is trilingual: Albanian, English and Serbian. Next in line was our ambition to create a window for establishing a culture of the dialogue, something that both Albanians and Serbs have sorely lacked
in dealing with each other in the past two decades. We also wanted to provide some serious,
in depth research on what the attitudes were amongst the population at large, to hear and
publicise how the ordinary man on the street Albanian and Serb alike sees the other,
and how he/she views the past and, more importantly, the future. Finally, we had the ambition to go beyond cyberspace, to get as many reprints and broadcasts of our published material as possible in Albanian and Serbian media, to organise meetings and bring together
the journalists from two sides. To work together towards to achieve what any dedicated
journalist sees as his greatest duty writing for the truth, not one side or the other.
One year later where are we? How successful have we been, what are the highlights
and where have we stumbled and gone only half way? Well, the website has been going
strong, registering more and more hits by the month. It carries high quality news and photographs, albeit not at the pace we desired. Due to the lack of funding, what we initially
envisaged as a news site with two or even three editions/updates a day, has so far had only
one daily edition, coming out around 2 PM.
Our greatest success has been in the editorial field. The website is co-edited by
KosovaLive in Pristina and by Beta in Belgrade and every day, both teams produce news
following this shared editorial decision. Being aware of the sensitivity of the issues we will
be dealing with, we set up a mechanism whereby the CDRSEE would jump in and arbitrate
in the case of an editorial disagreement. It gives us great pride to say that in 12 months,
such arbitration was not sought even once. Furthermore, there have been occasions when
the two teams signed news items together. We have also built up a friendly working atmosphere of mutual respect in both news agencies, not a small feat in these days. The
overall result has been the creation of a news resource website which is not necessarily to
everyones liking, but is a site with everyones respect. Maybe a grudging one, but respect
nevertheless. From other media colleagues, news organisations and political institutions.
Another success was to contribute to a better knowledge of the attitudes of the man on
the street in Kosovo and Serbia. The research which was led by Dr Colin Irwin has resulted
in a comprehensive report which brings to the fore the full complexity of the problems
that Albanians, Serbs and the international mediators will have to deal with in the coming
months and years. It is a serious piece of sociological research which is very worrying with
the data and conclusions it came up with. But it is also very useful as a realistic platform
of where things stand. We believe there is no use building a peace based on false premises.
This research is rife with realistic ones.
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KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

Where have we floundered? Well, our fundraising efforts have been a disappointment
to ourselves and as a result, we have neither gone far enough nor deep enough. Despite
our best efforts, we have not managed to galvanise enough financial support from the
international community, nor to engage the two governments as much as we would have
liked. Of particular regret is the lack of engagement and financial support by the EU and its
institutions. This project stands for everything that the EU stands for: Multiethnic cooperation, tolerance, common vision and goals yet we have failed to find a responsive niche
in EU funding. All this has resulted in a more modest project than is needed at this crucial
time. However, we feel grateful for those donors, UNESCO, FES, IFA, Soros, OSCE, US
democracy commissions, the Balkan Trust for Democracy who believe in this action and
help us carry it forward.
The Forum, the place where we were hoping to establish the culture of the dialogue,
has in real life been more a place for conflicting monologues. This, we always knew, would
be the most difficult part of our endeavours. By definition, a dialogue comprises an understanding of the others views and feelings. In and around Kosovo as it is today, that
is extremely difficult to accomplish. We see that in the recently started, UN sponsored
negotiations. We see a repetition of the two entrenched monologues, not an understanding of the other sides fears, concerns and deeply rooted sentiments. This is something we
were hoping to address and while we happily note that we have made some inroads, we
are far from claiming a success. For us, this is a reason to double our efforts, not to fold.
We hope that those donors and partners who have supported our efforts will have the same
approach.
Last but not least, due to lack of funding we have not fully mutated from cyberspace
into the real world and held necessary and crucial meetings and dialogue conferences between journalists first and stakeholders later. We hope to accomplish that in 2006. Whatever
the political solution to the status issue Albanians and Serbs were, are and will continue
to be neighbours. Its time to have a cup of coffee together. The very fact of drinking that
first cup might lead to actually enjoying it.
Kelmend Hapciu
Ljubica Markovic
Nenad Sebek

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Hyrje

N janar t vitit 2005, Qendra Mediale Beta, Qendra pr Demokraci dhe Pajtim n Evropn Juglindore (CDRSEE) dhe KosovaLive iu prveshn puns n nj projekt nismtar,
aq t ndrlikuar sa pr t mos NNKUPTUAR SHUM. Forumi Informativ Shqiptaro-Serb
(www.kosovakosovo.com). Qllimi i projektit ishte t krijohej nj faqe interneti e pavarur,
e sakt, e baraspeshuar dhe e paanshme, q do t ofronte pa pages lajme pr Kosovn dhe
t gjitha shtjet q ndrlidhen me t, duke bashkuar kshtu dy ekipe gazetarsh shum
profesional nga Prishtina dhe Beogradi.

Introduction

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

Faqja e internetit botohet n tri gjuh: shqip, anglisht dhe serbisht. Pas ksaj, n rend
ishte edhe ambicia jon pr t hapur nj dritare pr krijimin e nj kulture dialogu, dika q
u ka munguar shum edhe shqiptarve, edhe serbve, gjat prballjes s tyre n dy dekadat
e fundit. Ne gjithashtu kemi dashur t ofrojm edhe nj hulumtim serioz dhe t hollsishm
rreth qndrimeve t popullats, pr t dgjuar dhe paraqitur se si njeriu i thjesht n rrug
shqiptari dhe serbi - e shohin ann tjetr, dhe mnyrn se si e shohin ata t kaluarn
dhe ka sht m e rndsishme, si e shohin ata t ardhmen. N fund, ambicia jon ishte t
shkohet edhe prtej komunikimit elektronik, q t kemi sa m shum ribotime dhe transmetime t materialit ton n mediat shqiptare dhe serbe, t organizonim mbledhje dhe t
sillnim bashk gazetart nga t dyja ant. T punonim s bashku drejt arritjes s asaj q
secili gazetar i prkushtuar e sheh si detyr t tij parsore t shkruarit pr t vrtetn, e jo
pr njrn ose tjetrn pal.
Ku jemi... nj vit m pas? Sa t suksesshm ishim, cilat jan t arriturat, si dhe ku kemi
ngecur dhe kemi arritur vetm gjer n gjysm t rrugs? Faqja e internetit po ecn fuqimisht, duke shnuar gjithnj e m tepr suksese prej muajit n muaj. Ajo sjell lajme dhe
fotografi t cilsis s lart, ndonse jo me ritmin e dshiruar. Pr shkak t mungess s
fondeve, ajo q fillimisht sht menduar si faqe lajmesh me dy madje edhe tri edicione n
dit, deri tani ka pasur vetm nj edicion, q publikohet nga ora 14.00.
Suksesi yn m i madh ishte ai n fushn editoriale. Faqja e internetit bashkredaktohet
nga KosovaLive n Prishtin dhe Beta n Beograd, dhe do dit t dy ekipet prodhojn
lajme n baz t ktij vendimi t prbashkt redaktorial. T vetdijshm pr ndjeshmrin
e shtjeve me t cilat do t prballemi, ne kemi caktuar nj mekanizm prmes t cilit
CDRSEE do t ndrhynte dhe luante rolin e arbitrit n rast t ndonj mospajtimi redaktorial. Jemi shum krenar pr faktin q gjat 12 muajve asnjher nuk ka pasur nevoj pr
ndonj arbitrim t till. Aq m tepr, ka pasur raste kur artikujt e lajmeve jan nnshkruar
nga t dy ekipet bashkrisht. Ne gjithashtu kemi ndrtuar nj atmosfer miqsore t puns,
t respektit t ndrsjell n t dyja agjencit e lajmeve, nj akt jo i vogl n kt koh.
Rezultati i prgjithshm ishte krijimi i nj faqeje interneti - burim i lajmeve, q nuk do t
thot se plqehet nga t gjith, por q gzon respektin e t gjithve. Ndoshta pa qejfin e t
tjerve, sidoqoft respekti nuk ka munguar asnjher nga kolegt e mediave tjera, organizatave mediale dhe institucioneve politike.
Nj sukses tjetr ishte kontributi pr nj njohje m t madhe t qndrimeve t njerzve
t zakonshm n Kosov dhe n Serbi. Hulumtimi i kryer nga dr. Colin Irwin ka rezultuar
me nj raport gjithprfshirs, i cili v n pah ndrlikueshmrin e problemeve me t cilat
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KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

do t prballen shqiptart, serbt si dhe ndrmjetsuesit ndrkombtar gjat muajve dhe

viteve t ardhshme. sht nj dokument serioz i hulumtimit sociologjik, q sht mjaft
brengoss pr shkak t dhnave dhe konkluzave q dalin nga ai. Por n t njjtn koh
sht dokument shum i dobishm si nj platform reale rreth asaj se si qndrojn aktualisht gjrat. Ne besojm se paqja nuk mund t ndrtohet duke u mbshtetur n premisa t
rreme. Ky hulumtim bie n grupin e hulumtimeve reale.
Ku kemi ngecur? Prpjekjet tona pr gjetjen e fondeve kan qen zhgnjyese, dhe si
rezultat i ksaj ne as q kemi mundur t shkojm m larg e as m thell. Prkundr prpjekjeve tona, ne nuk kemi mundur t nxisim nj mbshtetje t duhur financiare nga bashksia ndrkombtare, apo t angazhojm t dy qeverit, ashtu si do t kishim dshiruar.
sht sidomos pr keqardhje, mungesa e angazhimit dhe mbshtetjes financiare nga BE-ja
dhe institucionet e saj. Ky projekt mbshtet t gjitha ato pr t cilat angazhohet BE-ja:
Bashkpunimi shumetnik, toleranca, vizioni dhe qllimet e prbashkta... megjithat, nuk
kemi arritur t gjejm ndonj prkrahje financiare nga BE-ja. E tr kjo ka rezultuar me nj
projekt m modest, prej atij q nevojitet n kt koh t rndsishme. Sidoqoft, ne u jemi
mirnjohs atyre donatorve, UNESCO-s, FES-it, IFA-s, Soros, OSBE-s, Komisioneve
t SHBA-ve pr Demokraci, Trustit Ballkanik pr Demokraci, t cilt besojn n kt veprim dhe na ndihmojn q t ajm prpara.
Forumi, vendi ku ne kemi shpresuar t themelojm kulturn e dialogut, n fakt m
tepr ka qen vend pr monologje konfliktuoze. Gjithmon, e kemi ditur se kjo do t jet
pjesa m e vshtir e prpjekjeve tona. Sipas prkufizimit, dialogu prfshin t kuptuarit
e pikpamjeve dhe ndjenjave t t tjerve. Brenda dhe prreth Kosovs, sot pr sot kjo
sht e vshtir pr tu arritur. N bisedimet e fundit t sponsorizuara nga KB, po shohim
nj prsritje t dy monologjeve t ngulitura, e jo t kuptuarit e friks, brengave dhe mendimeve thellsisht t rrnjosura t t tjerve. Kto jan shtje q kemi shpresuar se do
ti adresojm dhe prderisa t gzuar vrejm se kemi br disa hapa, ende jemi larg sa t
themi se kemi korrur sukses. Kjo sht nj arsye q ne ti dyfishojm e jo ti ndalim prpjekjet tona. Shpresojm se ata donator dhe partner, t cilt i kan mbshtetur prpjekjet
tona, do t ken t njjtn qasje.
E fundit por jo m pak e rndsishmja, pr shkak t mungess s fondeve, nuk kemi
arritur nj mutacion t plot nga sajbrhapsira n nj bot reale, duke mbajtur mbledhjet e domosdoshme dhe t rndsishme, si dhe konferencat e dialogut fillimisht ndrmjet
gazetarve, e m von edhe ndrmjet palve t prfshira. Ne shpresojm ta arrijm kt
n vitin 2006. Pa marr parasysh zgjidhjen politike pr shtjen e statusit... shqiptart dhe
serbt ishin, jan dhe do t mbesin fqinj. sht koha t pim nga nj kafe s bashku. Vet
fakti i pirjes s filxhanit t par mund t jet knaqsi.
Kelmend Hapiu
Ljubica Markovic
Nenad Sebek

12

Uvod

U januaru 2005, Medijski centar Beta, Centar za demokratiju i pomirenje u jugoistonoj

Evropi (CDRSEE) i Kosovalajv (KosovaLive) pokrenuli su pionirski, a dovoljno sloen
projekat da nosi ime koje ne otkriva previe: Albansko-srpski forum za razmenu informacija (www.kosovakosovo.com). Cilj je bio stvaranje nezavisnog, pouzdanog, uravnoteenog i nepristrasnog internet sajta koji bi nudio vesti i komentare o Kosovu i svim
problemima vezanim za njega, besplatno i bez predrasuda, tako to bi okupio dve ekipe
umenih profesionalnih novinara iz Beograda i Pritine. Sajt koristi tri jezika: albanski,
engleski i srpski. Druga ambicija bila nam je da otvorimo prozor za uspostavljanje kulture
dijaloga, neega to je i Albancima i Srbima bolno nedostajalo u meusobnim odnosima
protekle dve decenije. eleli smo da uradimo i ozbiljno, temeljno istraivanje o tome kakvi
su opti stavovi u drutvu, da ujemo i objavimo kako obian svet - i Albanci i Srbi - vidi
one druge, kako gleda na prolost i, to je jo vanije, budunost. Konano, imali smo
elju da odemo dalje od kibernetikog prostora, da materijal koji smo objavili preuzme to
vie albanskih i srpskih medija, da organizujemo sastanke i okupimo novinare obe strane.
Da radimo zajedno kako bismo ostvarili ono to svaki predani novinar smatra svojom
najveom dunou - da pie za istinu, a ne za jednu ili za drugu stranu.

Introduction

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

Gde smo sada, godinu dana kasnije? Koliko smo uspeni bili, ta je bilo najbolje, a gde
smo se spotakli i prevalili samo deo puta? Sajt napreduje, registrujui sve vie poseta svakog meseca. Objavljuje kvalitetne vesti i fotografije, mada ne onoliko uestalo koliko smo
eleli. Zbog manjka sredstava, ono to smo u poetku zamiljali kao informativni sajt koji
objavljuje vesti dva ili tri puta dnevno, za sada ih emituje samo jednom, svakog dana oko
dva popodne.
Najvie uspeha imali smo u oblasti komentara. Sajt zajedniki ureuju Kosovalajv iz
Pritine i Beta iz Beograda i svakog dana, oba tima proizvode vesti na osnovu zajednike
ureivake odluke. Poto smo svesni osetljivosti pitanja kojim emo se baviti, uspostavili
smo mehanizam da CDRSEE uskoi i arbitrira u sluaju neslaganja u ureivanju sadraja.
Veoma smo ponosni to za 12 meseci takva arbitraa nijednom nije bila potrebna. ta vie,
bilo je prilika da su dva tima zajedniki sainjavala jednu vest. Izgradili smo i prijateljsku
radnu atmosferu uzajamnog potovanja u obe agencije, to u ovo vreme nije malo dostignue. Kao rezultat, stvorili smo informativni internet sajt koji se ne mora svideti svakome, ali koji svako potuje. Moda nevoljno, ali ga potuju. Kako nae kolege iz medija i
novinarske organizacije, tako i politike institucije.
Jo jedan uspeh bio je doprinos boljem razumevanju stavova obinih ljudi na Kosovu i
u Srbiji. Na osnovu istraivanja koje je sproveo doktor Kolin Ervin sainjen je sveobuhvatan izvetaj koji istie svu sloenost problema sa kojima e Albanci, Srbi i meunarodni
posrednici biti suoeni narednih meseci i godina. To je veoma ozbiljno socioloko istraivanje koje je dalo veoma zabrinjavajue podatke i zakljuke. Ono je, meutim, bilo veoma
korisno kao realistini pokazatelj stanja stvari. Verujemo da nema koristi od gradnje mira
na lanim procenama, dok ovo istraivanje nudi one realistine.
Kad nam je bilo teko? Razoarani smo naporima da pronaemo sredstva za projekat i
posledica toga je to to nismo otili ni dovoljno daleko ni dovoljno duboko. Uprkos svim
13

Introduction

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

naporima, nismo uspeli da podstaknemo meunarodnu zajednicu da nam prui dovoljnu

finansijsku podrku, niti da ukljuimo dve vlade onoliko koliko smo eleli. Posebno alimo
zbog nedovoljnog ukljuivanja i finansijske podrke EU i njenih institucija. Ovaj projekat
se zalae za iste ciljeve za koje i EU: za multietniku saradnju, toleranciju, zajedniku
viziju i ciljeve - a ipak nismo uspeli da pronaemo odgovarajue mesto u budetu EU.
Posledica toga je mnogo skromniji projekat nego to je potreban u ovo odsudno vreme.
Ipak, zahvalni smo onim donatorima, Unesku (UNESCO), FES-u, IFA-i, Sorosu, OEBS-u,
Demokratskoj komisiji SAD i Balkanskom poverenitvu za demokratiju, koji veruju u ovaj
poduhvat i pomau nam da nastavimo.
Forum, mesto gde smo eleli da uspostavimo kulturu dijaloga, zapravo je vie bio
mesto za suprotstavljene monologe. Znali smo da e to biti najtei deo naih napora. Po
definiciji, dijalog podrazumeva razumevanje za stavove i oseanja onog drugog. Na
Kosovu i oko njega, onakvog kakvo je danas, to je izuzetno teko postii. To se moe videti u nedavno zapoetim pregovorima pod pokroviteljstvom UN. Ponovo vidimo dva
uanena monologa, a ne razumevanje za strahove, brige i duboko usaena oseanja druge
strane. Nadali smo se da emo upravo takvim stvarima moi da se pozabavimo i, iako smo
zadovoljni to primeujemo odreene pomake, od uspeha smo jo daleko. Za nas je to razlog da udvostruimo napore, a ne da posustanemo. Nadamo se da e donatori i partneri koji
su podrali nae napore imati isti pristup.
Na kraju, ali ne manje vano, zbog nedostatka sredstava jo nismo u potpunosti mutirali iz kibernetikog prostora u stvarni svet, niti smo odrali neophodne i izuzetno vane
sastanke ni konferencije sa ciljem uspostavljanja dijaloga, najpre meu novinarima, a zatim meu kljunim igraima. Nadamo se da emo to uspeti u 2006. Kakvo god bilo politiko
reenje za pitanje statusa, Albanci i Srbi su bili, jesu i ostae - susedi. Vreme je da zajedno
popiju kafu. Sama injenica da e popiti tu prvu oljicu mogla bi dovesti do toga da u njoj
i uivaju.
Keljmend Hapdiju
Ljubica Markovi
Nenad ebek

14

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

Statements

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

Statement for kosovakosovo.com

Javier Solana, European Union High Representative

Statements

All initiatives, like those started by the agencies BETA

from Belgrade and the KosovaLive from Pristina, are undoubtedly contributing to dialogue and understanding
among people in Kosovo and Serbia . Such ventures are not
only welcome, but also needed badly. This is why the European Union believes that such initiatives are opening very
important possibilities, for which we are certain and hope
very much to succeed. Such action is welcome, directed towards mutual understanding and overcoming of difficulties
from the past, and is paving the way for the future which has
to be built on mutual respect, life and peace.
It is extremely important that "bridges", like the one established between the two agencies, and Belgrade and
Kosovo journalists, mean that dialogue between the two
civic societies, intellectuals and citizens is being developed. Javier Solana
Therefore, that dialogue does not exist only between politicians, but between factors of civic society, which have an extremely important role, especially between the media. The foundation of the European Union is dialogue, understanding, agreement - for arguments of the other side to be heard and seriously considered
without prejudice. This means to understand each others' words and always follow the wish
for living in peace.
March 30, 2005

Deklarata e Prfaqsuesit t Lart t BE-s Javier Solana pr kosovakosovo.com

T gjitha nismat sikur kjo q e kan filluar Agjencia e Lajmeve Beta nga Beogradi dhe
KosovaLive nga Prishtina, padyshim q i kontribuojn dialogut dhe mirkuptimit n mes
njerzve n Kosov dhe Serbi.
Dhe jo vetm q ndrmarrje t tilla jan t mirseardhura, por ato jan m se t domosdoshme. Prandaj BE-ja konsideron se mu kto nisma, pr t cilat jemi t bindur dhe
shpresojm se do t ken sukses, hapin shum mundsi. Nisma t tilla iniciohen dhe drejtohen pr mirkuptim dhe tejkalim t ndrsjell t vshtirsive t s kaluars, dhe i hapin
udh ardhmris, e cila duhet t bazohet n respekt t ndrsjell dhe paqe.
sht jashtzakonisht me rndsi q urat, e ngjashme, sikur kjo e themeluar n mes dy
Agjencive, do t thot se po ndrtohet nj dialog n mes dy shoqrive civile, intelektuale,
e qytetare. Pra, t vendoset dialogu i cili nuk ekziston vetm n mes politikanve por edhe
n mes bartsve t shoqris civile, t cilt kan dhe mund t luajn nj rol jashtzakonisht
17

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

t rndsishm, si jan n veanti mjetet e informimit. Themeli i Bashksis Evropiane

sht dialogu, mirkuptimi, marrveshja q t dgjohen si dhe pa paragjykime t shqyrtohen argumentet e pals tjetr. Kjo do t thot t kuptohemi me fjal dhe q gjithmon t
udhhiqemi nga dshira q t jetohet n paqe.

Statements

30 mars 2005

Izjava za kosovakosovo.com
visokog predstavnika Evropske unije Havijera Solane
Sve inicijative, poput ove koje su pokrenule agencije Beta iz Beograda i Kosovalajv
(KosovaLive) iz Pritine, bez sumnje doprinose dijalogu i razumevanju ljudi na Kosovu i u
Srbiji. I ne samo da su takvi poduhvati dobrodoli, ve su i preko potrebni. Otud Evropska
unija smatra da upravo takve inicijative otvaraju veoma znaajne mogunosti, za koje smo
uvereni i jako se nadamo da e imati uspeha. Takve akcije su pozvane, usmerene na uzajamno razumevanje i prevazilaenje tekoa iz prolosti, a utiru put budunosti koja mora
biti sazdana na uzajamnom uvaavanju i ivotu u miru.
Izuzetno je vano da mostovi, poput ovog uspostavljenog izmeu dve agencije i beogradskih i kosovskih novinara, znai da se gradi dijalog dva civilna drutva, intelektualaca,
graana. Dakle, da se uspostavlja i da ne postoji samo dijalog politiara s politiarima,
ve i nosilaca civilnog drutva, koji imaju i mogu odigrati izuzetno vanu ulogu, kao to
su to posebno sredstva informisanja. Temelj Evropske unije i jeste dijalog, razumevanje,
dogovor - da se sasluaju i bez predrasuda ozbiljno razmotre argumenti druge strane. To
znai razumeti se reima i uvek se rukovoditi eljom da se ivi u miru.
30. mart 2005.

18

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

Kosovo Must Not Be Europe 's Black Hole

This forum symbolises in the clearest way what the relations between the Albanian and the Serb community should be
- they should be talking to each other. Clear and open dialogue
is required to address the common problems on the table and
it appears that this is the aim of this forum.
It is my true hope that communicating via the Internet will
also improve personal dialogue. This is of paramount importance, in particular in 2005, a year I would call a very testing
one. Furthermore, when looking to Kosovo, we have to take
all necessary steps to ensure that violence does not re-emerge.
This would be to the detriment of all involved, the Kosovars
from all ethnic communities, as well as the international community. However, with events unfolding in Southern Serbia
over the past few weeks we can see that willingness from both
sides to engage in a dialogue could pave the way towards a
Erhard Busek
solution.
Over the past five years the Stability Pact has been doing
precisely this - we have a been a forum for dialogue on a regional level, bringing together not
only government representatives but also business leaders and non-governmental organisations for example. I am pleased to say that a conviction that common problems of the region
are ought to be addressed jointly is growing.
Dialogue among parties who in the past barely spoke to each other has produced stability in the region, with economic development continuing to be high on the agenda of the EU
policy-makers.
In this area the Stability Pact has been able to get the region to agree that the network of
28 bilateral free trade agreements which are all in force now - will stimulate intra-regional
trade and attract direct foreign investment. There is also discussion on moving toward a South
East European Free Trade Area, which would create an advanced multi-lateral free trade area
of great benefit to Kosovo too.
But 2005 holds many other challenges. The fate of the Serbia and Montenegro union is
still undecided, while Belgrade and Pristina are unfortunately still reluctant to discuss with
each other. It seems as if only the international community that can bring them to a negotiating table. This attitude must change - the two sides must realise themselves that they can only
achieve sustainable solutions through dialogue and compromise among themselves.
In order to avoid Kosovo becoming a black hole on Europe 's map, the EU needs to
produce a consistent policy towards Kosovo, and we need to make sure that all members of
the Contact Group and beyond are on board. Whatever solution is found, it will have serious
ramifications for the rest of the region as issues like fight against organised crime and migration stretch way beyond national borders.
In this regard, the political debate in Europe on Kosovo's future status and its place a European Balkans strategy has yet to intensify. This is necessary if we want to be able to play a
crucial role in defining Kosovo's future in Europe.

Statements

Erhard Busek, Special Coordinator of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe

January 18, 2005

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KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

Kosova nuk duhet t jet vrim e zez e Evrops

Statements

Erhardt Busek, Koordinator Special i Paktit t Stabilitetit pr Evropn Juglindore

Ky forum n mnyrn m t qart simbolizon si duhet t jen marrdhniet ndrmjet
shqiptarve dhe serbve - ata duhet t flasin me njri tjetrin. Nevojitet nj dialog i qart dhe
i hapur pr t?iu qasur problemeve t prbashkta q shtrohen n tavolin, dhe duket se ky
sht edhe qllimi i ktij Forumi.
Shpresoj q komunikimi prmes internetit do t prmirsoj edhe dialogun personal.
Kjo sht e nj rndsie madhore, veanrisht n vitin 2005, t ciln un e quaj si vit i
sprovs s madhe. Pr m tepr kur kemi t bjm me Kosovn, ne duhet t ndrmarrim
gjith hapat e nevojshm q t mos lejojm rishfaqjen e dhuns. Kjo do t ishte e dmshme
pr t gjith kosovart e t gjitha komuniteteve etnike, si dhe pr bashksin ndrkombtare. Megjithat, nga ngjarjet q po zhvillohen n javt e fundit n Serbin Jugore, mund
t shihet gatishmria e t dyja palve q t angazhohen n nj dialog, i cili do ta trasonte
rrugn drejt gjetjes s nj zgjidhjeje.
Pakti i Stabilitetit sht duke br mu kt n kto pes vitet e fundit. Ne kemi qen nj
forum i dialogut n nivel rajonal, duke i ulur n nj tavolin jo vetm zyrtart qeveritar, por
edhe prfaqsuesit e biznesit dhe ata t organizatave joqeveritare. Bindja se problemet e
prbashkta t rajonit duhet t trajtohen bashkrisht po thellohet, dhe kt e pohoj me
knaqsi.
Dialogu n mes t palve, t cilt nuk kan folur ndrmjet vete n t kaluarn, ka rezultuar me stabilitet n rajon, me zhvillimin ekonomik q vazhdon t qndroj lart n agjendn e politikanve t BE-s.
Pakti i Stabilitetit ia ka dalur q ti bind vendet e rajonit se 28 marrveshjet e nnshkruara dypalshe pr tregti t lir - t gjitha n fuqi - do t stimulojn tregtin rajonale dhe
trheqin investime drejprdrejt nga jasht. Poashtu jan duke u zhvilluar bisedime pr t
lvizur n drejtim t krijimit t nj zone pr tregti t lir n Evropn Juglindore, e cila do
t krijonte nj zon t avancuar shumpalshe t tregtis s lir dhe do ishte me interes t
madh edhe pr Kosovn.
Mirpo 2005 prmban edhe shum sfida t tjera. Fati i bashksis Serbi-Mali i Zi ende
nuk sht vendosur, ndrsa Prishtina dhe Beogradi fatkeqsisht ngurrojn t bisedojn me
njri tjetrin. Duket se vetm bashksia ndrkombtare mund ti sjell ata n tavolinn e
bisedimeve. Ky qndrim duhet ndryshuar t dyja palt duhet ta kuptojn se ata mund t
gjejn vet zgjidhje t qndrueshme prmes dialogut dhe kompromiseve.
Me qllim q t shmanget q Kosova t bhet vrim e zez e rajonit, Bashkimi Evropian duhet t krijoj nj politik konsistente ndaj Kosovs, dhe pr kt sht i nevojshm
edhe angazhimi i shteteve antare t Grupit t Kontaktit dhe m gjer. fardo zgjidhje q
t gjindet, ajo do t ket implikime serioze pr pjesn tjetr t rajonit, pasi q shtjet si
lufta kundr krimit t organizuar dhe migrimit shtrihen prtej kufijve kombtar.
N kt pikpamje debati politik n Evrop pr statusin e ardhshm t Kosovs dhe
strategjia pr vendin e saj n nj Ballkan evropian duhet t intensifikohet edhe m shum.
Kjo sht e nevojshme nse duam t jemi n gjendje t luajm nj rol vendimtar n definimin e s ardhmes s Kosovs n Evrop.
18 janar 2005
20

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

Kosovo ne sme biti crna rupa Evrope

Erhard Busek, Specialni Kordinator Pakta za stabilnost jugoistone Evrope

Duboko se nadam da e komunikacija preko interneta poboljati i komunikaciju meu

pojedincima. To je od izuzetnog znaaja, posebno u 2005. godini, koju bih opisao kao
kljunu. Osim toga, kada je u pitanju Kosovo, moramo preduzeti sve korake da se nasilje
ne dogodi ponovo. Ono bi bilo tetno i za pripadnike svih etnikih grupa na Kosovu i za
meunarodnu zajednicu. Imajui u vidu dogaaje iz poslednjih nekoliko nedelja na jugu
Srbije moemo, meutim, da vidimo da spremnost na dijalog moe pripremiti teren za
reenje.

Statements

Ovaj forum vrlo jasno simbolizuje kakvi treba da budu odnosi albanske i srpske zajednice - one treba da razgovaraju. Potreban je jasan i otvoren dijalog o zajednikim problemima i to je nesumnjivo svrha ovog foruma.

U poslednjih pet godina Pakt za stabilnost inio je upravo to mi smo bili forum za
dijalog na regionalnom nivou, okupljajui ne samo predstavnike vlada, ve i poslovne
ljude i nevladine organizacije. Drago mi je to mogu da kaem da raste uverenje da se
zajedniki problemi u regionu moraju reavati zajedniki.
Dijalog izmeu strana koje u prolosti jedva da su razgovarale doveo je do stabilizacije
u regionu, dok je ekonomski razvoj i dalje jedan od osnovnih ciljeva Evropske unije.
Zahvaljujui Paktu stabilinosti, region je shvatio da e mrea 28 bilateralnih sporazuma
o slobodnoj trgovini, koliko ih sada ima, podstai trgovinu u regionu i privui direktne
strane investicije. U toku je i debata o stvaranju podruja slobodne trgovine za celu
jugoistonu Evropu, koje bi omoguilo jo bolju trgovinsku razmenu i od koje bi i Kosovo
imalo koristi.
No, 2005. godina donosi i mnoge izazove. Sudbina dravne zajednice Srbije i Crne
Gore jo nije odluena, dok su Beograd i Pritina, naalost, i dalje nevoljni da razgovaraju.
ini se da ih jedino meunarodna zajednica moe ubediti da sednu za pregovaraki sto.
Takav stav mora se promeniti - dve strane moraju shvatiti da samo sopstvenim naporom i
jedino putem dijaloga i kompromisa mogu doi do trajnih reenja.
Da Kosovo ne bi postalo crna rupa na mapi Evrope, Evropska unija mora utvrditi doslednu politiku prema Kosovu, a u tome moraju svakako uestvovati svi lanovi Kontakt
grupe, kao i druge zemlje. Kakvo god reenje da se nae, ono e imati ozbiljne implikacije
za ceo region, poto pitanja poput borbe protiv organizovanog kriminala i migracija ne
priznaju nacionalne granice.
U tom smislu, politika debata u Evropi o buduem statusu i mestu Kosova treba tek da
se intenzivira u okviru evropske balkanske strategije. To je neophodno ukoliko elimo da
odigramo kljunu ulogu u definisanju budunosti Kosova u Evropi.
18. januar 2005.

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Pluralistic, unbiased information is key to the public debate on Kosovo

Statements

by Sren Jessen-Petersen Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Kosovo

Sren Jessen-Petersen

I was in Kamenic/Kamenica in Gjilan/Gnjilane region

recently where I was treated to a delightful cultural performance by groups of Kosovo Albanian, Kosovo Serb and
Roma children. I also visited a brick factory where the
workforce is 50% Kosovo Albanian and 50% Kosovo Serb.
The children go to school together, the employees at the factory work together and socialise without any problems. Yet
we find that some of the media are constantly feeding us
perceptions of insecurity, of lack of freedom of movement,
of animosity between communities. It is true that there are
problems and a lot more progress is needed in a number of
areas but it is also true that these perceptions do not reflect a
true picture. People, especially in places like Kamenic/Kamenica, are living side by side and participating together in
the life of their community.

This is why I was very pleased when I was approached by

KosovaLive to contribute an article to the Albanian-Serb Information Exchange Forum. All
over the world the media have considerable influence in shaping public opinion and behaviour and here in Kosovo is no different. By fostering the exchange of information between
Albanian and Serb journalists, by dispelling the inaccurate or partisan reporting that we often
see and providing the public instead with high quality information that is not tainted or compromised by political or other interests, this website can play a leading role in informing the
debate in both societies.
2005 is going to be a crucial year for Kosovo. We have a clear way forward and are
moving determinedly ahead. The PISG and UNMIK have been focusing on a set of Standards relating to the kind of society - open, tolerant, multi-ethnic, democratic and stable
that we all want to see in Kosovo. They include freedom of movement, rule of law, return
of displaced people, functioning democratic institutions and local self-government. There
will be a comprehensive review of Standards implementation in the summer and if there is
sufficient progress, we may then move into talks on the status of Kosovo.
This is clearly of great importance not only to all communities in Kosovo, but to all
those who have a stake in Kosovo. It is important to Serbia and Montenegro , because it
would allow SCG to focus on other issues, including its full integration into European and
transatlantic structures. And it is important too to the wider region because I believe that
settling the status of Kosovo is key to the stabilisation of the Western Balkans.
It is for this reason that participation of the Kosovo Serbs in the Kosovo government and
in the processes that have been set in motion, especially the reform of local self-government,
is of the essence. It is equally vital that Belgrade engages fully and constructively in the
wider debate, looking forward and focusing on durable solutions within a European context.
The media both in Kosovo and in Belgrade can, and should, be partners in fostering
the dialogue within and between societies. We need reporting that focuses not only on the
22

problems and the areas of disagreement but also on the progress that is being made, on the
success stories that are not hard to find if one is prepared to go out in the field without preconceived ideas and without a political or sensationalist agenda. They can offer different perspectives on the issues and highlight common concerns and interests. They can
provide factual reporting that offers a counterpoint to often politicised, at times plainly
inflammatory comment by those who want to manipulate public opinion according to their
own narrow agenda. I believe that this Forum is uniquely placed to contribute to this effort.
I congratulate KosovaLive, the Beta Media Center and the Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast Europe for their initiative in launching this innovative and much
needed project, and wish the Albanian-Serb Information Exchange Forum every success.
March 24, 2005

Statements

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

Informimi pluralist dhe i paanshm els pr debatin publik pr

Kosovn
Shkruan: Soren Jessen-Petersen, Prfaqsues Special i Sekretarit t Prgjithshm t
Kombeve t Bashkuara n Kosov
Ktyre ditve isha n komunn e Kamenics ku grupe fmijsh shqiptar, serb dhe
rom kishin shfaqur pr mua nj program t plqyeshm kulturor. Un poashtu vizitova nj
fabrik tjegullash, ku gjysma e puntorve jan shqiptar, ndrsa gjysma tjetr serb. Fmijt shkojn bashk n shkoll, puntort e fabriks punojn s bashku, dhe shoqrohen me
njri-tjetrin pa ndonj problem. Por, ne ende shohim te disa media se si n mnyr t vazhdueshme na ushqejn me perceptime pr pasigurin, mungesn e liris s lvizjes, si dhe
me ndjenjn e armiqsis ndrmjet bashksive etnike. sht e vrtet se ka probleme dhe
se ende nevojitet prparim n nj numr fushash, mirpo sht e vrtet se kto perceptime
nuk reflektojn realitetin. Njerzit, sidomos n vendet si Kamenica jetojn prkrah njritjetrit duke marr pjes n jetn e bashksive t tyre.
Kjo sht arsyeja prse mua m erdhi shum mir kur KosovaLive m ofroi q t kontriboj me nj artikull pr Forumin Informativ Shqiptaro-Serb. N gjith botn, sikundr
edhe n Kosov, mediat kan ndikim t konsiderueshm n formsimin dhe sjelljen e opinionit publik. Duke forcuar kmbimin e informatave n mes gazetarve shqiptar dhe serb,
duke eliminuar informatat e pasakta dhe anuese q i shohim shpesh, dhe duke i ofruar publikut n vend t tyre informata cilsore q nuk jan t lidhura apo t kompremituara nga
interesat politike apo interesa tjera, kjo faqe interneti mund t luaj nj rol prijs n informinin e debatit n t dy shoqrit.
2005 do te jete nj vit vendimtar pr Kosovn. Para nesh kemi nj rrug t qart, dhe
me vendosmri po ecim n at drejtim. Institucionet e Prkohshme Vetqeverisse (IPVQ)
dhe UNMIK jan prqendruar n nj pako standardesh q lidhen me aso shoqrie q t
gjith ne duam ta shohim n Kosov t hapur, multietnike, demokratike dhe stabile. Standardet prfshijn lvizjen e lir, sundimin e ligjit, kthomin e t zhvendosurve, funksionimin e institucioneve demokratike dhe vetqeverisjen lokale. Do t ket nj shqyrtim t
gjithanshm sa i prket prmbushjes s standardeve kt ver, dhe nse konstatohet prparim i mjaftueshm, ather mund t ecim drejt bisedave pr statusin.
23

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

Statements

Kjo nuk sht me rndsi vetm pr bashksit etnike q jetojn n Kosov, por edhe
pr t gjith vendet q e rrethojn Kosovn. sht me rndsi pr Serbin dhe Malin e Zi,
ngase kjo do ti mundsonte SMZ-s t prqendrohet n shtjet tjera, prfshir integrimin
e tij t plot n strukturat europiane dhe transatlantike. Dhe, besoj se zgjidhja e shtjes s
Kosovs sht els pr stabilizimin e Ballkanit Perndimor.
Pr kt arsye pjesmarrja e serbve n qeverin e Kosovs dhe n proceset q jan
vn n lvizje, sidomos n reformimin e vetqeverisjes lokale, sht me rndsi thelbsore. sht po aq me rndsi q Beogradi t inkuadrohet plotsisht dhe n mnyr konstruktive n debatin m t gjer, duke shikuar prpara dhe duke u prqenduar n zgjidhje t
qndrueshme brenda kontekstit europian.
Mediat si n Beograd ashtu edhe n Kosov munden dhe duhet t jen partner n
forcimin e dialogut brenda dhe midis shoqrive. Neve na duhet nj informim q prqendrohet jo vetm n problemet n fushat e mospajtimeve, por poashtu dhe n prparimet q po
bhen, pr rrfimet e sukseseve q mund t gjinden nse jeni t gatshm t dilni n terren
pa paragjykime dhe pa ndonj agjend politike ose senzacionale. Ato mund t ofrojn
kndvshtrime t ndryshme pr shtje dhe t theksojn interesat dhe brengat e prbashkta.
Ato mund t ofrojn informim t sakt n kundrvnie t komenteve shpesh t politizuara,
nganjher thjesht nxitse nga ata q duan ta manipulojn opinionin publik sipas agjends
s tyre t ngusht. Besoj se ky Forum sht i sajuar ekskluzivisht q ti kontribuohet ksaj
prpjekjeje.
Prgzoj agjencin e lajmeve KosovaLive, Qendrn Mediale Beta dhe Qendrn pr
Demokraci dhe Pajtim n Evropn Juglindore pr nismn e tyre n lansimin e ktij projekti inovativ dhe shum t nevojshm, dhe i dshiroj suksese Forumit Informativ Shqiptaro-Serb.
24 mars 2005

Pluralistiko, nepristrasno informisanje je kljuno za javnu debatu o

Kosovu
lanak specijalnog predstavnika generalnog sekretara UN na Kosovu Sorena JesenPetersena (Jesen-Petersen)
Nedavno sam bio u Kamenici, u oblasti Gnjilana, gde sam bio poaen divnim kulturnim programom koji su izvele grupe albanske, srpske i romske dece na Kosovu. Posetio
sam, takoe, ciglanu u kojoj polovinu radne snage ine kosovski Albanci, a polovinu Srbi.
Deca zajedno pohaaju kolu i drue se bez ikakvih problema. Ipak, nalazimo da neki
mediji neprekidno pothranjuju u nama sliku nesigurnosti, nedostatka slobode kretanja,
animoziteta meu zajednicama. Istina je da ima problema i da je potrebno postii napredak
u brojnim oblastima, ali je, takoe, istina da na doivljaj stvari ne odraava pravu sliku.
Ljudi, posebno u mestima poput Kamenice, ive jedni pored drugih i zajedno uestvuju u
ivotu svoje zajednice.
24

Zato sam bio vrlo zadovoljan kada me je agencija Kosovalajv (KosovaLive) zamolila
da napiem lanak za albansko-srpski forum za razmenu informacija. Svuda u svetu, mediji imaju znaajan uticaj u oblikovanju javnog mnjenja i ponaanja i ovde, na Kosovu, nije
drugaije. Razmenom informacija izmeu albanskih i srpskih novinara, suzbijanjem
netanog ili pristrasnog izvetavanja, kojeg smo esto svedoci, i, umesto toga, pruanjem
kvalitetnih informacija javnosti, koje nisu obojene i kompromitovane politikim ili drugim
interesima, ovaj internet sajt moe imati vodeu ulogu u obezbeivanju informacija za
debatu u oba drutva.
Ova godina e biti kljuna za Kosovo. Imamo jasan plan za napredak i odluno se
kreemo napred. Kosovske institucije i UNMIK usredsredli su panju na niz standarda koji
se odnose na to kakvo drutvo - otvoreno, tolerantno, multietniko, demokratsko i stabilno,
elimo da vidimo. Oni (standardi) ukljuuju slobodu kretanja, vladavinu zakona, povratak
raseljenih osoba, funkcionalne demokratske institucije i lokalnu samoupravu. Na leto e
primena standarda biti sveobuhvatno razmotrena i, ako se utvrdi da je postignut dovoljan
napredak, mogli bismo da krenemo u razgovore o statusu Kosova.

Statements

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

To je oigledno od velikog znaaja ne samo za sve zajednice na Kosovu, ve i za sve

koji imaju udela na Kosovu. Vano je i za Srbiju i Crnu Goru, poto e joj omoguiti da se
posveti drugim pitanjima, ukljuujui punu integraciju u evropske i evroatlantske strukture. Vano je, takoe, i za ire podruje regiona, poto smatram da je reavanje statusa
Kosova klju za stabilizaciju zapadnog Balkana.
To je razlog zbog koga je uee kosovskih Srba u kosovskim institucijama i procesu
koji je pokrenut, posebno u reformi lokalne samouprave, od sutinskog znaaja. Jednako je
vano i da se Beograd potpuno i konstruktivno ukljui u iru debatu, usresreujui se na
budunost i trajno reenje u evropskom kontekstu.
Mediji, i oni na Kosovu i oni u Beogradu, mogu i moraju da budu partneri u jaanju
dijaloga dvaju drutava. Potrebno nam je izvetavanje koje e se usredsrediti ne samo na
probleme i oblasti neslaganja, ve i na napredak koji je nainjen, na prie o uspehu koje
nije teko nai, ako je neko spreman da izae na teren bez prethodno zaetih ideja i bez
politikih ili senzacionalistikih ciljeva. Oni (mediji) mogu pruiti razliite perspektive
pitanja i istaknuti u prvi plan zajednike brige i interese. Oni mogu da obezbede izvetavanje
zasnovano na injenicama, kao protivteu esto politizovanim, katkad prosto podstrekivakim komentarima onih koji ele da manipuliu javnim mnjenjem shodno svojim uskogrudim planovima. Verujem da je ovaj forum tu da pre svega doprinese ovom naporu.
estitam Kosovalajvu, agenciji Beta i Centru za demokratiju i pomirenje u jugoistonoj
Evropi na njihovoj inicijativi za pokretanje ovog inovativnog i vrlo potrebnog projekta i
elim uspeh albansko-srpskom forumu za razmenu informacija.
24. mart 2005.

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KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

Statement for kosovakosovo.com

Franois Stamm is the ICRC's Head of Operations for South-Eastern Europe and chairs
the Working Group on Persons unaccounted for in connection with events in Kosovo

Statements

The unresolved fate of the missing and the suffering of

their families is one of the most pernicious long-term consequences of the conflict in Kosovo. According to information
provided by the families to the ICRC, more than 2,600 persons on both sides remain unaccounted for in relation with
the events in Kosovo between January 1998 and December
2000.

Franois Stamm

The fact that these missing persons are almost certainly

dead takes nothing away from the suffering their families
are experiencing every day. Not knowing what happened to
a husband, father or brother (almost all the missing persons
are men), not being able to give them a dignified burial, to
mourn their passing at a gravesite continues to place an intolerable burden on these families.

Under international humanitarian law, these families have a right to know what happened to their relatives. The law stipulates that the concerned authorities must do everything in their power to clarify the fate of those unaccounted for. The Working Group on
persons unaccounted for in relation to the events in Kosovo between January 1998 and
December 2000 was set up to create a framework for authorities on both sides to provide
answers to the questions posed by the families of the missing. The ICRC chairs the group
as a neutral intermediary. Since its first meeting in March 2004, the Working Group has
been functioning under the auspices of the special representative of the United Nations
secretary-general in Kosovo, Soren Jessen-Petersen.
The working group mechanism was initially set up as part of the dialogue between the
authorities in Belgrade and Pristina on Kosovo's future. However, all participants soon realised that the fate of the missing is essentially a humanitarian issue that needs to be treated
separately from political questions linked to Kosovo's future. The ICRC is therefore determined to ensure that the working group continues to meet irrespective of developments in
the political process. The authorities in Belgrade and Pristina have formally committed
themselves to the working group and the ICRC expects them to honour their promise.
The specifically humanitarian mandate of the Working Group aims to ensure that families of the missing finally receive answers on the fate of their loved ones. The Working
Group does not have the job of identifying parties or individuals responsible for disappearances or to gather evidence for such identification. The question of any judicial proceedings is to be dealt with entirely separately from the Working Group proceedings.
There has been some progress recently. Between March and June of this year more than
200 cases of missing persons were cleared up and their human remains handed back to the
families. At the most recent working group meeting in June, both sides promised further
progress soon. However, much more needs to be done and at the end of the day the families
of the missing will be the judge of whether the two sides have lived up to their promises.
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KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

The fate of the missing and the tragedy affecting their families is a priority. The resolution of this problem cannot be postponed because the families have had to wait for far too
long already. Let's give them to chance to gain closure on the tragedies of the past and
move on with their lives.

Deklarat e Franois Stamm pr kosovakosovo.com

Stamm sht shef i Operacioneve t KNKK-s pr Evropn Juglindore si dhe ndrmjetsues i Grupit Punues pr Personat e Zhdukur n bisedimet midis Prishtins dhe
Beogradit

Statements

June 20, 2005

Fati i pandriuar i personave t zhdukur dhe vuajtjet e familjarve t tyre sht njra nga
pasojat m t rnda afatgjate t konfliktit n Kosov. Mbshtetur n informacionet q familjet
i kan ofruar KNKK-s, m shum se 2.600 persona nga t dyja palt llogariten si t zhdukur,
si pasoj e ngjarjeve q kan ndodhur n Kosov nga janari 1998 deri n dhjetor 2000.
Fakti q kta persona t zhdukur jan me siguri t vdekur, nuk e lehtson vuajtjen e prditshme t familjarve t tyre. Duke mos ditur se ka u ka ndodhur bashkshortit, babait ose
vllait (shumica e t zhdukurve jan burra), pamundsia q t`u ofrohet atyre nj varrim i
merituar apo nj vend ku mund t vajtoheshin pran varrit t tyre, paraqet nj barr t padurueshme pr kto familje.
Sipas ligjeve humanitare ndrkombtare, kto familje kan t drejt t din se ka u ka
ndodhur t afrmve t tyre. Ligji prcakton se autoritetet prkatse duhet t bjn mos brenda mundsive s tyre, pr t zgjidhur fatin e t zhdukurve. Grupi Punues pr Personat e Zhdukur n Kosov gjat periudhs janar 1998 dhjetor 2000 sht caktuar t hartoj nj kornize pr autoritetet e t dyja palve q t`u prgjigjen pyetjeve t familjarve t personave t
zhdukur. KNKK sht kryesues i ktij grupi, n rolin e nj ndrmjetsuesi neutral. Q prej
mbledhjes s par n mars t vitit 2004, Grupi Punues ka funksionuar nn mbikqyrjen e
Prfaqsuesit Special t Sekretarit t Prgjithshm pr Kosovn, Soren Jessen-Petersen.
Mekanizmi i Grupit Punues fillimisht sht caktuar si pjes e dialogut ndrmjet autoriteteve n Beograd dhe atyre n Prishtin rreth t ardhmes s Kosovs, por shum shpejt
pjesmarrsit e kuptuan se fati i t pagjeturve sht shtje humanitare q duhet t trajtohet
ndaras nga shtjet politike t lidhura me t ardhmen e Kosovs. Pr kt arsye KNKK sht
i prcaktuar t siguroj q Grupi Punues t vazhdoj t ket rol t pavarur nga zhvillimet
politike. Autoritetet n Beograd dhe n Prishtin kan dhn prkushtimin e tyre formal rreth
grupit punues, dhe KNKK pret nga ta q t respektojn premtimin e dhn.
Mandati specifik humanitar i Grupit Punues ka pr qllim t siguroj q familjart e personave t zhdukur t marrin prgjigje rreth fatit t m t dashurve t tyre. Grupi Punues nuk
ka pr detyr t identifikoj palt a individt prgjegjs pr zhdukjen ose grumbullimin e
provave pr nj identifikim t till. Veprimet juridike duhet t ndrmerren ndaras prej aktiviteteve t Grupit Punues.
Kohve t fundit ka pasur nj prparim. Gjat periudhs ndrmjet marsit dhe qershorit t
ktij viti, jan zgjidhur m shum se 200 raste t personave t zhdukur, ndrsa eshtrat e tyre
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KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

Statements

u jan dorzuar familjarve. N takimin e fundit t Grupit Punues t mbajtur n qershor, t

dyja palt premtuan prparim t mtutjeshm. Sidoqoft, ende mbetet shum pr t`u br. Do
t jen vet familjart e t zhdukurve ata t cilt do t gjykojn nse palt i kan mbajtur
premtimet e tyre.
Fati i t pagjeturve dhe tragjedia q ka prekur familjart e tyre sht prioritet. Zgjidhja e
ktij problemi nuk mund t shtyhet sepse familjarve vese u sht dashur q t presin pr nj
koh tepr t gjat. Le t`ju japim rastin q ti prmbyllin tragjedit e s kaluars dhe t jetojn
jetn e tyre.
20 qershor 2005

Izjava za kosovakosovo.com
Fransoa Stam (Francois Stamm) je ef operacija Meunarodnog komiteta Crvenog
krsta (MKCK) u jugoistonoj Evropi i predsedava Radnom grupom za nestale osobe u
vezi sa dogaajima na Kosovu
Nereena sudbina nestalih i patnje njihovih porodica, jedna je od najteih dugoronih
posledica sukoba na Kosovu. Prema informacijama koje je MKCK dobio od porodica, i
dalje se ne zna sudbina preko 2.600 osoba sa obe strane, povezanih sa dogaajima na Kosovu od januara 1998. do decembra 2000.
injenica da su te nestale osobe skoro sigurno mrtve ne oduzima nita od patnje koju
njihove porodice proivljavaju svakog dana. Ne znati ta vam se dogodilo s muem, ocem
ili bratom (skoro svi nestali su mukarci), ne moi da ih dostojanstveno sahranite, niti da
na grobu alite zbog njihovog odlaska, i dalje je nepodnoljiv teret za te porodice.
Po meunarodnom humanitarnom pravu, te porodice imaju pravo da znaju ta se dogodilo s njihovim roacima. Zakon predvia da nadlene vlasti moraju uiniti sve to je u
njihovoj moi da razjasne sudbine osoba koje su nestale. Radna grupa za nestale osobe u
vezi sa dogadajima na Kosovu od januara 1998. do decembra 2000. uspostavljena je da
stvori radni okvir kako bi vlasti sa obe strane mogle da daju odgovore na pitanja koja postavljaju porodice nestalih. MKCK predsedava grupom kao neutralni posrednik. Od prvog
sastanka, odranog u martu 2004, radna grupa je funkcionisala pod okriljem specijalnog
predstavnika generalnog sekretara UN na Kosovu, Sorena Jesen-Petersena.
Mehanizam radne grupe je prvobitno uspostavljen kao deo dijaloga vlasti u Beogradu i
Pritini o budunosti Kosova. Meutim, svi uesnici su ubrzo shvatili da je sudbina nestalih sutinski humanitarno pitanje koje treba reavati odvojeno od politikih pitanja vezanih
za budunost Kosova. MKCK je stoga odluan da se postara da radna grupa nastavi da se
sastaje, bez obzira na razvoje u politikom procesu. Vlasti u Beogradu i Pritini su se
zvanino obavezale da uestvuju u radnoj grupi i MKCK oekuje da e one ispuniti svoje
obeanje.
Specifino humanitarni mandat radne grupe ima za cilj da se postara da porodice nestalih osoba konano dobiju odgovore na pitanja o sudbini njihovih voljenih. Zadatak radne
grupe nije da identifikuje strane ili pojedince odgovorne za nestanke, niti da prikuplja do28

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

U poslednje vreme, uinjen je odreeni napredak. Od marta do juna ove godine, reeno
je preko 200 sluajeva nestalih osoba i njihovi posmrtni ostaci predati su njihovim porodicama. Na poslednjem sastanku radne grupe odranom u junu, obe strane su obeale da e
se uskoro uiniti i dodatni napredak. Ipak, ostalo je jo mnogo posla i, na koncu, porodice
nestalih e dati sud o tome da li su dve strane ispunile obeanja koja su dale.
Sudbina nestalih osoba i tragedija koja pogaa njihove porodice je prioritet. Reavanje
tog problema ne moe biti odloeno, zato to porodice ve predugo ekaju. Pruimo im
priliku da se tragedije njihove prolosti konano zavre i da nastave sa svojim ivotima.
20. jun 2005.

Statements

kaze za takvo identifikovanje. Pitanje bilo kakvih sudskih postupaka e biti reavano potpuno odvojeno od angaovanja radne grupe.

29

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People Displaced from Kosovo Must Be Offered a Choice

Statements

Gottfried Koefner, Chair UNHCR Representative in Austria, Direct Dialogue Working

Group on Returns of Displaced to Kosovo
In 2005 the massive displacement of various communities from Kosovo still remains an unresolved problem. This
continued human suffering requires the full attention of the
local governmental authorities, but also the continued commitment of the international community. The Working
Group on Returns was established under the auspices the
Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) for
the Kosovo in the framework of the Direct Dialogue ('Vienna Process') between Belgrade and Pristina.
Upon request of the SRSG UNHCR has accepted the
role as impartial facilitator and Chair of this Working Group.
UNHCR has an international mandate experience in dealing
with displacement and in finding solutions for displaced
people. We have accepted the task upon assurance of the
Chair's independent role in accordance with the UNHCR
Gottfried Koefner
mandate. The impartiality of UNHCR derives from our
global humanitarian mandate. It obligates us to keep the access of the displaced to basic
human rights during displacement, during and after return at the centre of our considerations at all times. This also needs to be the guiding principle of this Working Group which
has been tasked to address and not to perpetuate actual and real obstacles to the return of
the displaced of whatever ethnic origin.
We are dealing here with a thematic and technical Working Group. But, its establishment is the expression of the political will of the Parties to the direct dialogue to cooperate,
to jointly find effective solutions to the humanitarian predicament of the displaced individuals and families. This basic political consensus having been found the Working Group
itself deals with technical and concrete issues, with real and assumed obstacles and constraints to voluntary return. The Working Group is primarily about the real problems of
people, families, about perpetuated displacement, loss of home and right to return and
those who actually want to return. It is about the urgent need to find solutions to their often
dramatic situation
The group did not start completely from the beginning. Efforts had been made and
some processes established before, but with so far modest, in fact unsatisfactory, results. A
major new effort needs to be made to find solutions for the displaced individuals and their
families soon, in fact now. That certainly is the expectation of the displaced themselves
who have suffered for far too long.
The idea is not to replace existing operational mechanisms on return. Those need to
continue, to go ahead with full, or rather with added force. The Working Group is a complementary effort. It is to re-energize, but also review existing approaches and go beyond
them. The very purpose of the Working Group is to inject a new impetus and momentum
into return. It is necessary to aim at existing obstacles to voluntary return, to come up with
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The Working Group brings the return issue home to the real stakeholders, the Parties of
this dialogue and the governments and communities they represent. Insofar the dialogue
offers a unique and new opportunity to achieve significant progress through constructive,
direct cooperation on practical issues. It is an opportunity that must not be missed and
needs to be explored and used as to its full potential in the interest of the displaced.
Displaced people need to be given a possibility of choice. Having no other option, but
to remain displaced does not constitute a choice. The displaced need a perspective for a
dignified life in the future. Return needs to be voluntary. Exerting the right of return must
include the possibility not merely of physical return and mere physical safety under any
conditions, but the possibility of sustainable return which includes at least freedom of
movement, use of one's property, access to basic public services, education and the potential realistic possibility to support oneself - these are all basic rights of any member of any
community.

Statements

new ideas, concepts, proposals and methods through which they can be removed make
sustainable voluntary return of many more possible soon. Creativity, strong and persistent
will to co-operate is a pre-condition to achieve the common goal to end the human tragedy
of so many.

Besides security which is directly linked to the freedom of movement there are also
issues of property rights in many facets, law enforcement, resources, reconstruction issues
etc. A better understanding of the needs and vulnerabilities of IDPs is necessary. Correct
and adequate information under which conditions return is possible needs to reach the
displaced to allow them to make a choice and to return.
The Working Group held its first meeting in mid May followed by another one in mid
June and headed off to a good start with a lot of work being done between the formal meetings. Amongst the numerous issues to be addressed the issue of illegally occupied properties was immediately identified as a priority subject to be discussed. Another was the need
to review existing and aim for more efficient procedures. In that context the idea of a Protocol on Voluntary and Sustainable return was born. Work on a draft started immediately,
but proves complex considering that numerous actors need to be involved. Intensive consultations are ongoing between the Parties with the help of the Chair with the aim to finalise
the draft Protocol soon. It will state, besides basic principles the agreed on key modalities
of cooperation and responsibilities with regard to return. It is to give the potential returnee
a perspective of what he or she can expect in case of return.
Agreement was also found that joint Ad Hoc Task Forces between the Parties should be
established, if jointly considered useful to facilitate the implementation of concrete organised return projects. The establishment of one such Task Force and concrete cooperation
was launched still in June. In recognition of the multifaceted nature of the property issues
the Working Group decided to initially focus on the issue of residential properties and to
deal with the issue agricultural and commercial property issues in a further step. One aim
is to work out a joint action plan. But, even residential property as such though much preparatory work has been done remains a complex issue requiring a series of responses and
the close cooperation of various entities. The Parties believe that lessons can be drawn
from the experience of Bosnia and Herzegovina. A joint study trip has been planned, initially for early July, but for technical reasons had to be postponed.
31

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Statements

In a separate, but related move the PM of the PISG and the Minister of Local Administration as well as the Municipal Presidents of Kosovo issued a joint official statement on
the rule of law and the return of properties. It requests the return of illegally occupied properties to its rightful owners and invites displaced people, regardless of their ethnicity to
return to their homes and properties and to be part of building the future of Kosovo.
The members of the Working Group are very active between the formal meetings with
the regard to the follow-up. They have agreed to make every effort to try to find practical
answers to the numerous challenges to make lasting return possible, but while it is easy to
agree on the problems at hand, the answers to them seem to be more complex. This, however, is one of the very challenges of the participants to this direct dialogue Working Group
to find a consensus on the important practical issues and to map out the common way forward to overcome obstacles of return in concrete terms - irrespective of, rather despite of,
the complex political, social and economic environment and related developments. This is
what the displaced deserve and rightfully expect after all those years.
August 4, 2005

T zhvendosurve duhet tu ofrohet nj zgjidhje

Shkruan: Gottfried Koefner, Prfaqsues i UNHCR-it dhe kryesues i Grupit Punues pr
Kthimin e t Zhvendosurve n Kosov
Edhe tani n vitin 2005, shtja e nj numri shum t madh t kosovarve t zhvendosur
prej t gjitha bashksive etnike mbetet ende nj problem i pazgjidhur. Kjo vuajtje e vazhdueshme e njerzve krkon vmendje t plot t qeveris n Prishtin, mirpo edhe nj
prkushtim t madh t bashksis ndrkombtare. Grupi i Puns pr Kthim sht themeluar nn prkujdesjen e PSSP-s n kuadr t dialogut t drejtprdrejt ndrmjet Prishtins
dhe Beogradit (Procesi i Vjens).
Me krkes t PSSP-s, UNHCR-i ka pranuar rolin e ndrmjetsuesit t paanshm dhe
t kryesuesit t ktij Grupi Punues. UNHCR-i ka nj mandat dhe prvoj ndrkombtare
n shtjet e t zhvendosurve dhe n gjetjen e zgjidhjeve pr personat e zhvendosur. Ne
kemi pranuar detyrn q t sigurojn rolin e nj ndrmjetsuesi t pavarur n pajtim me
mandatin e UNHCR-it. Paanshmria e UNHCR-it rrjedh nga mandati yn global humanitar. Ajo na obligon t mbajm n qendr t vmendjes son gjat gjith kohs qasjen e
personave t zhvendosur n t drejtat themelore t njeriut gjat zhvendosjes, si dhe gjat
dhe pas kthimit. Kjo duhet t jet edhe nj parim udhzues i ktij grupi punues, i cili sht
ngarkuar q ti zgjidh e jo t lejoj vazhdimin e pengesave reale pr kthimin e t zhvendosurve t fardo prkatsie etnike.
Ne kemi t bjm me nj grup punues tematik dhe teknik. Mirpo themelimi i tij sht
shprehje e vullnetit politik t palve pr dialog t drejtprdrejt pr t bashkpunuar, pr t
gjetur bashkrisht zgjidhje t efektshme pr problemet e individve t zhvendosur dhe
familjeve t tyre. Ky konsensus themelor politik i arritur brenda Grupit Punues ka t bj
me adresimin e shtjeve teknike dhe konkrete, t pengesave reale dhe t pritshme, si dhe
t kufizimeve pr nj kthim vullnetar. Grupi Punues para se gjithash merret me problemet
reale t njerzve, familjeve, humbjes s shtpive dhe t drejts pr tu kthyer dhe pr ata q
32

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

Grupi nuk ka filluar trsisht q nga fillimi. Prpjekje jan br dhe disa procese kan
nisur m par, mirpo me rezultate modeste, nse mund t them edhe t paknaqshme gjer
m tani. Nj prpjekje e madhe duhet t bhet pr gjetjen e zgjidhjeve pr individt e zhvendosur dhe pr familjet e tyre sa m par. Kjo sigurisht e presin edhe t zhvendosurit, t
cilt kan pritur shum gjat pr kt.
Ideja sht t mos ndrrohet mekanizmat e tanishm operacional pr kthim. Ato duhet
t vazhdojn, t shkojn prpara me forca t shtuara. Grupi Punues sht vetm nj prpjekje plotsuese. Ajo ka pr qllim t jap nj puls t ri, mirpo edhe t shqyrtoj qasjet e
tanishme si dhe t shkoj prtej tyre.

Statements

me t vrtet duan t kthehen. Kjo ka t bj me nevojn urgjente pr t gjetur zgjidhje pr

gjendjet e tyre jo rrall-her dramatike.

Qllimi i ktij grupi punues sht q t nxis nj kthim m t vrullshm. Ide, koncepte,
propozime, dhe metoda t ndryshme jan t nevojshme pr ti kaprcyer pengesat e tanishme pr nj kthim t shpejt vullnetar e t qndrueshm t sa m shum personave t zhvendosur. Kreativiteti dhe vullneti i fuqishm dhe i vendosur pr t bashkpunuar jan
parakushte pr arritjen e qllimit t prbashkt - pr ti dhn fund tragjedis njerzore t
shum personave.
Ky grup punues e kthen shtjen e kthimit tek palt e prfshira n kt dialog dhe tek
qeveria dhe komunitetet q ato prfaqsojn. Dialogu ofron nj shans unik dhe t ri q t
arrihet nj prparim domethns prmes nj bashkpunimi konstruktiv dhe t drejtprdrejt
n shtjet praktike. Kjo sht nj shans q nuk bn t lshohet, dhe duhet t hulumtohet
dhe t shfrytzohet deri n maksimum n interes t personave t zhvendosur.
T zhvendosurit duhet t kan mundsin e zgjedhjes. Mungesa e ndonj opsioni tjetr,
prve se t mbesin t zhvendosur, nuk sht zgjedhje.
T zhvendosurit duhet t kan perspektiv pr nj jet dinjitoze n t ardhmen. Kthimi
duhet t jet vullnetar. E drejta e kthimit duhet t prfshij jo vetm kthimin fizik dhe sigurin fizike nn fardo rrethane, por edhe mundsin q kthimi t jet i qndrueshm, gj
q nnkupton s paku lirin e lvizjes, shfrytzimin e prons, qasjen n shrbimet themelore
publike, arsimimin dhe mundsin reale pr ta mbajtur veten ekonomikisht-kto jan t
gjitha t drejtat themelore t t gjith antarve t cilsdo bashksi etnike.
Prve siguris, e cila sht drejtprdrejt e lidhur me lirin e lvizjes, shtje tjera jan
e drejta pr shfrytzimin e prons n shum aspekte, zbatimi i ligjit, burimet, shtja e
rindrtimit, etj. Nj mirkuptim m i gjer pr nevojat dhe pozitn e vshtir t Personave
t Zhvendosur sht i domosdoshm. Informata korrekte dhe adekuate q prshkruajn
kushtet nn t cilat kthimi sht i mundshm duhet t ju drgohen t zhvendosurve n
mnyr q t jepet rasti q t kan zgjedhje, dhe t kthehen.
Grupi Punues mbajti mbledhjen e par kah mesi i majit i prcjell nga nj mbledhje
tjetr kah mesi i qershorit i nisur me nj pun t madhe t br gjat mbledhjeve formale.
N mesin e shtjeve t shumta t adresuara, si shtje e rndsishme pr tu diskutuar
ishte edhe shtja e pronave t uzurpuara. Nj tjetr shtje ishte nevoja e shqyrtimit t
qllimit pr procedura m efikase. N kt kontekst, lindi ideja pr krijimin e Protokollit
pr Kthim Vullnetar dhe t Qndrueshm. Puna rreth draftit filloi menjher, por rezultoi si
komplekse, duke pasur parasysh se shum aktor duhet t prfshihen.
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Statements

Konsultimet intensive jan duke vazhduar ndrmjet palve me ndihmn e kryesuesit,

me qllim t prfundimit sa m t shpejt t Protokollit. Prve principeve themelore, ai do
t prmbaj edhe marrveshjen rreth modaliteteve kye t bashkpunimit dhe prgjegjsive q lidhen me kthimin. Kjo paraqet nj perspektiv t asaj se far mund t pres nj i
kthyer i mundshm.
Marrveshja gjithashtu parashihte krijimin e Task Forcave Ad Hoc ndrmjet palve,
nse bashkrisht konsiderohen si t nevojshme pr lehtsimin e implementimit t projekteve konkrete dhe t organizuara pr kthim.
Themelimi i nj Task Force t till dhe nj operacion konkret sht shpallur n qershor.
Pr t njohur natyrn komplekse t shtjeve pronsore, Grupi Punues vendosi q fillimisht
t prqendrohej n shtjen e pronave banesore ndrsa gjat hapit t mtutjeshm t merret
me shtjet e pronave bujqsore dhe komerciale. Njri qllim sht prpilimi i planit t
prbashkt t veprimit, Por, edhe pse sht br pun e madhe prgatitore rreth pronave t
banimit, ajo mbetet nj shtje e ndrlikuar q krkon prgjigje t shumta dhe bashkpunim t ngusht ndrmjet palve t ndryshme.
Palt besojn q msimet mund t nxirren nga prvoja n Bosnje dhe Hercegovin, ku
ishte planifikuar nj udhtim i prbashkt hulumtues pr n fillim t korrikut, por pr
shkaqe teknike sht shtyr.
N nj hap t ndar por t ndrlidhur, Kryeministri i Kosovs dhe Ministri i Qeverisjes
Lokale, si dhe kryetart e komunave t Kosovs kan dal me nj deklarat t prbashkt
mbi sundimin e ligjit dhe kthimin e pronave. Ajo krkon kthimin e pronave t uzurpuara
tek pronart e tyre t ligjshm, si dhe fton personat e zhvendosur nga t gjitha komuniteteve
etnike q t kthehen npr shtpit dhe pronat e tyre dhe t bhen pjes e ndrtimit t s
ardhmes t Kosovs.
Antart e Grupit Punues jan pajtuar q t bjn gjithka q munden pr gjetjen e
prgjigjeve praktike pr sfidat e shumta pr nj kthim t qndrueshm, por megjithse
duket e leht q t arrihen marrveshjet pr problemet e tanishme, zgjidhjet pr to duket t
jen goxha t ndrlikuara.
Kjo sidoqoft sht njra prej sfidave t shumta pr pjesmarrsit e ktij dialogu t
drejtprdrejt n Grupit Punues pr t gjetur nj konsensus n shtjet e rndsishme praktike dhe pr t planifikuar rrugn e prbashkt n tejkalimin e pengesave pr kthim, pavarsisht nga ambienti i paprshtatshm politik, social dhe ekonomik si dhe zhvillimet e tjera.
Kjo sht ajo q t zhvendosurit meritojn dhe presin me t drejt pas tr ktyre viteve.
04 qusht 2005

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Raseljenim ljudima sa Kosova mora biti ponuen izbor

I u ovoj, 2005. godini, veliki broj raseljenih pripadnika razliitih zajednica sa Kosova i
dalje predstavlja problem. Njihovim nevoljama koje ve dugo traju i lokalne vlasti i
meunarodna zajednica treba da posvete punu panju. Radna grupa za povratak osnovana
je pod okriljem specijalnog predstavnika generalnog sekretara Ujedinjenih nacija za Kosovo u okviru Direktnog dijaloga (Beki proces) Beograda i Pritine.
Na zahtev specijalnog predstavnika, UNHCR je prihvatio ulogu nepristrasnog posrednika i efa Radne grupe. UNHCR je organizacija koja ima iskustva u bavljenju pitanjima
raseljenjih i nalaenju reenja za njihove probleme. Mi smo prihvatili ovaj zadatak, uvereni da e predsedavajui imati nezavisnu ulogu, u skladu sa mandatom UNHCR. Nepristrasnost UNHCR-a proistie iz naeg globalnog humanitarnog mandata. Ona nas obavezuje da
potovanje osnovnih ljudskih prava raseljenih tokom njihovog boravka van mesta iz kojih
su raseljeni, kao i za vreme njihovog povratka i posle toga, bude u svakom trenutku na
najvaniji zadatak. To treba da bude i osnovni princip kojim se rukovodi Radna grupa, iji
je zadatak da se pozabavi stvarnim preprekama za povratak raseljenih, bez obzira na njihovo etniko poreklo, a ne da te prepreke uveava i produava.

Statements

Pie Gotfrid Kefner (Gottfried Koefner), ef radne grupe za povratak raseljenih na

Kosovo i predstavnik UNHCR u Austriji

Ovde je re o tematskoj i tehnikoj radnoj grupi. No, njeno uspostavljanje je izraz

politike volje dveju strana da vode dijalog, sarauju i zajedniki nau efikasna reenja za
humanitarne nevolje raseljenih pojedinaca i porodica. Poto je taj osnovni politiki konsenzus uspostavljen, radna grupa se posvetila tehnikim i konkretnim pitanjima, stvarnim i
moguim preprekama i ogranienjima za dobrovoljni povratak. U nadlenosti Radne grupe
su, pre svega, stvarni problemi pojedinaca i njihovih porodica, njihovo produeno raseljenje, gubitak doma i njihovo pravo na povratak, kao i pitanje raseljenih koji doista ele da
se vrate. Ona postoji zbog neodlone potrebe da se nau reenja za esto dramatian poloaj
raseljenih.
Grupa nije poela da radi bez nekih poetnih rezultata. Neto je ve bilo uraeno, ali ti
rezultati su bili vie nego skromni, bolje reeno bili su nezadovoljavajui. Mora biti uinjen
novi veliki napor da se brzo, ako je mogue odmah, nau reenja za raseljene osobe i njihove porodice. To je svakako ono to raseljeni oekuju posle svih njihovih muka, koje
traju ve suvie dugo.
Rad ove grupe nee zameniti postojee mehanizme za povratak. Oni e i dalje obavljati
svoje zadatke, ako ne punom, a ono pojaanom snagom. Radna grupa predstavlja u tom
smislu dodatni napor. Ona treba da osnai postojea reenja, ali i da ih ponovo razmotri i
ode korak dalje. Osnovna svrha Radne grupe je da da novi podsticaj reavanju ovih pitanja.
Potrebno je usmeriti se na prepreke dobrovoljnom povratku, dati nove ideje, koncepte,
predloge i pronai metode koje e ukloniti te prepreke i omoguiti da uskoro doe do
odrivog dobrovoljnog povratka veeg broja raseljenih. Kreativnost i jaka i uporna elja za
saradnjom, preduslov su za postizanje zajednikog cilja - okonanja brojnih ljudskih
tragedija.
Radna grupa vraa pitanje raseljenih onima koji su za njega zainteresovani - stranama
u ovom dijalogu i vladama i zajednicama koje one predstavljaju. U tom smislu, dijalog
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Statements

nudi jedinstvenu i novu priliku da se uini znaajan napredak kroz konstruktivnu i direktnu
saradnju oko praktinih pitanja. To je prilika koja ne sme biti proputena i koja mora biti
prouena i u potpunosti iskoriena u interesu raseljenih.
Raseljenim ljudima mora biti ponuen izbor. Nemati alternativu i ostati raseljeno lice
nije nikakav izbor. Raseljenima je potrebna perspektiva dostojanstvenog ivota u budunosti. Povratak mora biti dobrovoljan. Ostvarivanje prava na povratak mora ukljuivati ne
samo mogunost fizikog povratka i obezbeivanja fizike sigurnosti, ve i mogunost
odrivog povratka koji ukljuuje barem slobodu kretanja, korienje sopstvene imovine,
pristup osnovnim javnim slubama i obrazovanju, kao i mogunost da se zarauje za ivot
- sve to su osnovna prava pripadnika bilo koje zajednice.
Osim sigurnosti, koja je direktno vezana za slobodu kretanja, postoje i pitanja vezana
za imovinska prava koja se dotiu i primene zakona, resursa, obnove, itd. Potrebno je bolje
razumevanje potreba i tekog poloaja raseljenih lica. Tane i odgovarajue informacije o
uslovima pod kojima je povratak mogu moraju stii do raseljenih, da bi oni mogli doneti
odluku o tome ta da ine i da li e se vratiti.
Radna grupa odrala je svoj prvi sastanak sredinom maja, a potom jo jedan, sredinom
juna, i poela je dobro, s tim to je dosta posla obavljeno i izmeu sastanaka. Od brojnih
pitanja koja su se nala na dnevnom redu, pitanje nelegalno zauzete imovine odmah je
identifikovano kao prioritetna tema za razgovor. Sledea je bila preispitivanje postojee i
osmiljanje efikasnije procedure. U tom kontekstu, stvorena je ideja o usvajanju Protokola
o dobrovoljnom i odrivom povratku. Rad na nacrtu ovog dokumenta poeo je odmah, ali
e biti sloen, jer u njemu treba da uestvuju brojni akteri. Izmeu strana u dijalogu vode
se intenzivne konsultacije uz pomo predsedavajueg sa ciljem da nacrt Protokola bude to
pre zavren. On e, osim osnovnih principa, sadrati i dogovorene kljune modalitete
saradnje, kao i odgovornost za povratak. Protokol bi trebalo da predoi potencijalnom
povratniku ta moe oekivati u sluaju povratka.
Takoe je dogovoreno da strane uspostave zajednike ad hoc operativne grupe, ako obe
strane smatraju da je korisno, da se olaka primena konkretnih, organizovanih projekata
povratka. Jedna takva operativna grupa i konkretna saradnja uspostavljeni su jo u junu.
Prihvatajui da je priroda imovinskih pitanja vrlo raznovrsna, radna grupa je odluila da se
najpre usredsredi na pitanje stanova, a da sledei korak bude razmatranje seoskih imanja i
komercijalnih objekata. Jedan cilj je izrada zajednikog akcionog plana. No, i pitanje
stanova, uprkos tome to je dosta uinjeno, i dalje je vrlo sloeno i zahteva odgovore i
saradnju brojnih tela. Strane u dijalogu veruju da se moe iskoristiti iskustvo iz Bosne i
Hercegovine. Pripremljeno je zajedniko studijsko putovanje, koje je trebalo da se organizuje poetkom jula, ali je odloeno iz tehnikih razloga.
Nezavisno od ovih napora, ali u bliskoj vezi sa njima, predsednik vlade privremenih
institucija samouprave i ministar za lokalnu samoupravu, kao i predsednici optina na
Kosovu, izdali su zajedniku zvaninu izjavu o ponaanju u skladu sa zakonom i vraanju
imovine. Ona zahteva povraaj ilegalno okupirane imovine njihovim pravim vlasnicima i
poziva raseljene, bez obzira na njihovo etniko poreklo, da se vrate svojim kuama i da
uestvuju u izgradnji budunosti Kosova.
lanovi radne grupe aktivno rade i izmeu formalnih sastanaka, proveravajui kako
napreduje ono to su se dogovorili. Oni su se saglasili da ne tede napore kako bi nali
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04. avgust, 2005.

Statements

praktine odgovore na brojne izazove i omoguili trajni povratak, ali, sloiti se oko toga
kakvi problemi postoje nije toliko teko, koliko je kompleksno pronalaenje pravih odgovora. A to je jedan od velikih izazova za uesnike u ovoj radnoj grupi direktnog dijaloga
- da se postigne puna saglasnost oko vanih praktinih pitanja i da se utvrdi zajedniki put
kojim e se ii ka otklanjanju prepreka za povratak u konkretnom smislu, bez obzira na
sloene politike, drutvene i ekonomske uslove i njihov razvoj, ak i uprkos njima. To je
ono to raseljeni zasluuju i s pravom oekuju posle toliko godina.

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Forum

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Politicizing the Fate of Missing Persons Is Itself a Crime

Forum

Verica Tomanovic represents Belgrade in a working group tasked with discovering what
became of people who went missing in Kosovo and chairs the Association of Families of
Abducted and Missing Individuals from Kosovo and Metohija.

Verica Tomanovic

There has been a great deal of discussion of missing and

abducted persons with the Serbian authorities, those of Serbia-Montenegro, and representatives of the international
community. However, aside from well-phrased replies, we
have not been told the truth. We are aware of the facts and
the outcome of the policies that have led to the unfortunate
events because of which we are today wondering what become of many innocent people. The cause and effect of
these crimes is inexcusable, no matter which side committed them. How is it possible that nobody is reacting to these
terrible crimes that were committed here as the world
watched, a step away from the 21st century, amid the process of European integration that is eliminating national
borders?

The people we are searching for did not disappear by

themselves. They were victims of violence committed by organized groups that flagrantly
transgressed the Geneva conventions and ignored the most basic of rights: the right to life
and freedom. Our search for our family members began in May 1998 and continued into
1999 and 2000, when a vast number of people were abducted in the wake of U.N. Security
Council Resolution 1244. The resolution was supposed to guarantee the safety of all citizens of Kosovo and Metohija. Modern society condemns terrorism and violence. However,
our relations with international organizations have not always worked both ways. We are
convinced that negotiations between the working groups will provide these families with
the truth, and ask the following:

40

the unconditional release of all innocent imprisoned Serbs and non- Albanians.

acceleration of the process of exhuming and identifying bodies, as well as the transfer
of mortal remains.

the return of all documentation on crimes gathered by representatives of KFOR, especially the contingents deployed in the first six months which they subsequently took
home with them, as well as that collected by the Hague tribunal and other organizations, with special stress on the 1999-2000 period.

free access for the families of missing persons to files compiled by organizations dealing with the problem of missing persons as their contribution to the solving of every
individual case.

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

Missing persons - Kosovo's open wound

Author: Nesrete Kumnova, Head of the Mothers Appeal Association

The Serbian-Yugoslav terror of 1998-1999 left Kosovo

almost entirely destroyed and with thousands of killed and
missing persons. The majority of Kosovars were forced out
of their homes. Some of them were arrested and sent to Serbian prisons. The lucky were released after two years. But
the fate of 2.549 persons continues to be a great enigma for
Kosovo, and especially for surviving family members.
Nesrete Kumnova
Immediately after the arrival of KFOR troops in Kosovo, family members of the missing persons organized themselves and conducted their
daily protests in more organized ways. They wanted to raise their voice of protest for international awareness on the issue of war hostages, and they accomplished their goal.

Forum

Six years after the war, the unresolved fate of missing

persons continues to be the biggest wound for all surviving
family members.

We organized massive protests and hunger strikes. We presented the International Red
Cross Committee (ICRC) with records containing information about our loved ones, including personal details of the perpetrators of these crimes. These records were also handed over to the War Crimes Tribunal at The Hague. Unfortunately, the records have disappeared and no one is being held responsible.
We have organized many meetings and conferences with the Mothers of Srebrenica in
Bosnia. We have also established associations in various municipalities of Kosovo, all of
them with the same purpose: to resolve the issue of missing persons.
These associations continue to play a positive role and are supported by international
and local institutions. We met with UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, representatives of
the Security Council, all chief administrators of UNMIK, and many others.
As Head of the Mothers Appeal Association, I went with a delegation from Kosovo to
the United States, where we met with many important leaders and raised this issue with
dignity.
We demanded the Security Council in New York to
-

Make an urgent call on Belgrade to open all files and archives and to explain what happened to our kidnapped loved ones

Set this issue as a priority for Kosovo and especially for family members who still live
in anxiety.

I also had the opportunity to visit Brussels, where I met with Doris Pack and many
European MPs. We compiled a resolution that was discussed in the European Parliament.
On this occasion, I handed over the records of all missing persons as well as a CD containing the petition WE ALL MISS THEM, which was signed by 236.000 Kosovars. This was
41

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

a response from the UNMIK police investigation unit regarding the fate of camp 144,
whose existence was confirmed at a meeting with the families in Zvecan in November
2003.

Given that our problem started and ended with politics, we consider any attempt to
politicize this issue to be a crime in its own right. This problem has the dimensions of a
humanitarian catastrophe and that is the only point from which it can be viewed and measured. I am therefore addressing everybody on behalf of families that have lost a family
member, who are without a home and homeland, who have been living in a hellish uncertainty for six years. Not knowing what happened to a loved one is worse than any truth.
The time has come to extend a hand of reconciliation because we belong to the same
region, where we were born, grew up, made friends and spent our best years. We must not
allow the language of hate to destroy our lives.

Forum

Once more I beseech you:

-

release all prisoners

return all mortal remains to the families

let us do everything in our power so that our families can find peace and to make sure
that this tragedy does not happen ever again
June 23, 2005

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KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

organized by the family associations of Kosovo KKAF and Kosova Action Network
(KAN).
Through the joint efforts of family members and Kosovar institutions, we have achieved
the return of the mortal remains of only 413 people. The fate of some 2.549 people is still
unresolved.
As family associations and now as a Government Commission for War Hostages, we
cooperate with the Office on Missing Persons and Forensics (OMPF), the international
organization that deals with identification, and the International Commission on Missing
Persons (ICMP), which deals with DNA analysis. We also work with the IRCC, an intermediary for Pristina-Belgrade dialogue that works to facilitate an exchange of information
and to find out the truth about all missing persons, regardless of their ethnicity.

We are committed to resolving the fate of every missing person in Kosovo. We do not
make distinctions based on ethnic, religious or racial background. These are all missing
persons, and their families live in anxiety until their fate is discovered.

Forum

The question of missing persons is a humanitarian issue; any other approach would
represent a violation of feelings and international norms.

We cannot understand how it is possible that, many years after being exhumed from
mass graves in Serbia, only some 485 dead bodies have been returned [to Kosovo]. Mortal
remains continue to be held for political and other interests of Belgrade's government. The
argument that mortal remains cannot be identified is unacceptable to us. Do not allow [Belgrade] to play again with family members who already suffer so much.
The message of Mothers Appeal is "We are telling the world." Do not play with the
feelings of traumatized family members, do not provoke the patience of mothers, and do
not hurt our wounds further. Please work urgently to solve this serious problem. Do not
allow families who want truth, freedom, peace and stability to suffer any more. End this
silence; return our sons.
June 23, 2005

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Politizimi i zbardhjes s fatit t personave t zhdukur i barabart me

krimin

Forum

Shkruan: Verica Tomanoviq, antare e delegacionit t Beogradit n Grupin Punues pr

bisedime me Prishtinn pr Personat e Zhdukur n Kosov, si dhe kryetare e Asociacionit t Familjeve t t Kidnapuarve dhe Personave t Zhdukur n Kosov

sht biseduar shum pr t zhdukurit dhe t kidnapuarit qoft me organet shtetrore t

Serbis, dhe prfaqsuesit e Unionit Serbi- Mali i Zi, qoft edhe me bashksin ndrkombtare. Mirpo prve prgjigjeve t menduara mir, asnjher nuk kemi msuar t vrtetn. Jemi t vetdijshm pr faktet dhe pasojat e politiks, q kan uar deri tek ngjarjet
e pakndshme, pr shkak t cilave edhe sot kemi mbetur me shum pikpyetje mbi jetn
e njerzve t pafajshm. Pr shkakun dhe pasojat e ktyre krimeve nuk ka justifikim, pa
marr parasysh se cila pal i ka kryer ato. A sht e mundur q askush t mos reagoj pr
kto krime t tmerrshme q kan ndodhur n hapsirn ton n sy t tr bots, dhe at n
shekullin 21, n kohn e procesit t integrimeve evropiane, kur kufijt n mes shteteve po
fshihen dhe bota po bashkohet.
Njerzit q po i krkojm nuk jan zhdukur vetvetiu. Ata kan qen objekt i dhuns s
grupeve t organizuara, me ka n mnyr flagrante sht thyer Konventa e Gjenevs pr t
drejtat e njeriut, dhe at e drejta themelore - e drejta pr t jetuar t lir. Tragjedia e familjeve
tona prfshin periudhn nga maj 1998 e m pas vitet 1999 dhe 2000 kur m s shumti persona jan marr, dhe at pas nnshkrimit t Rezoluts 1244 n Kumanov, ku sht garantuar siguria e t gjith qytetarve t Kosovs. Gjith bota gjykon dhunn dhe terrorizmin.
Bashkpunimi me organizatat ndrkombtare nuk ka qen gjithmon reciprok. T bindur se bisedat e grupeve punuese do t shpijn t vrtetn te familjet pr secilin person nga
lista jon, krkojm:

44

Lirim t pakusht t t gjith serbve dhe joshqiptarve tjer t internuar

Prshpejtim t procesit t zhvarrimit dhe identifikimit, si dhe dorzimit t eshtrave

Kthimi i tr dokumentacionit n lidhje me kriminelt, t cilin e kan mbledhur prfaqsuesit e KFOR-it (posarisht kontingjentet e vendosura n territorin e Kosovs
gjat gjasht muajve t par) e m pas e kan marr me vete n vendet e tyre. Po ashtu
krkojm nga Tribunali i Hags dhe organizatave tjera joqeveritare, t cilat jan marr
me kto probleme, posarisht gjat viteve 1999-2000.

T gjitha organizatat q merren me problemin e personave t zhdukur t hapin dosjet e

tyre, dhe ti hapin pr familjet e t zhdukurve, dhe n kt mnyr t japin kontributin
e tyre pr zbardhjen e secilit rast.

Njsiti i hetuesis qendrore t policis s UNMIK-ut t jap prgjigje pr fatin e njerzve

nga 144 llogoret, ekzistimi i t cilve sht konfirmuar n takimin me familjet n vitin
2003 n Zvean.

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

T pagjeturit varr e hapur pr Kosovn

Shkruan: Nesrete Kumnova, kryetare e Shoqats Thirrjet e Nnave nga Gjakova
Gjasht vjet pas prfundimit t lufts varra m e madhe me t ciln ballafaqohen sot
familjart e t pagjeturve sht fati i tyre.

Menjher pas ardhjes se trupave te KFOR-it n Kosov, familjart e t pagjeturve u

organizuan dhe filluan me protestat e tyre t prditshme n forma m t organizuara, me
qllim t ngritjes s zrit t protests, pr ta sensibilizuar shtjen e pengjeve t lufts n
prmasa ndrkombtare, gj q edhe u arrit.

Forum

Terrori serbo-jugosllav i viteve 1998-1999 e la Kosovn gati trsisht t djegur dhe me

mijra t vrar e t zhdukur. Pjesa drmuese e popullats s Kosovs u dbuan me dhun
nga shtpit e tyre, nj pjes u morn dhe u drguan npr burgjet e Serbis, por fatbardhsisht u liruan pas 2 viteve. Mirpo, fati i edhe 2 549 personave edhe m tej mbetet enigm
dhe dhembje e madhe pr Kosovn, e sidomos pr familjart.

U organizuan protesta gjithpopullore dhe greva urie. Kryqit t Kuq Ndrkombtar i

kemi dhn te gjitha shnimet pr m t dashurit ton, me detaje se kur dhe kush na i ka
rrmbyer, me emr dhe mbiemr. Kto shnime i jan dorzuar edhe Tribunalit t Hags,
mirpo pr fat t keq kto shnime jan fshehur dhe askush nuk mban prgjegjsi rreth
tyre.
Ne bashkpunim me Bosnjn, me nnat e Srebrenics, kemi mbajtur takime, si dhe
konferenca. Po ashtu kemi arritur q t themelojm shoqata npr komuna.
Kto shoqata vazhdojn t ken funksion pozitiv, ato u prkrahn nga shum faktor
ndrkombtar dhe vendor. Mbajtm takim me sekretarin e prgjithshm t KB z. Kofi Annan, me prfaqsuesit e Kshillin e Sigurimit, me t gjith kryeadministratort e Kosovs,
e shum t tjer.
Edhe mua, si kryetare e Shoqats Thirrjet e Nnave nga Gjakova me nj delegacion
nga Kosova na u mundsua t shkojm n SHBA dhe e shtruam kt shtje n takimet me
personalitete t rndsishme. N Nju Jork, n Kshillin e Sigurimit krkuam me urgjence
t krkohet nga Beogradi q t hap dosjet dhe arkivat dhe t tregohet se ka ndodhur me
fatin e m t dashurve tan t kidnapuar - q kjo shtje sht shtje prioritare pr Kosovn,
e sidomos pr familjet q po vazhdojn te jetojn n ankth dhe n pritje. Un gjithashtu
kam pasur rastin t shkoj edhe n Bruksel, ku jam takuar me znj. Doris Pack dhe shum
eurodeputet, me rast kemi prpiluar nj rezolut, e cila u parashtrua n Parlamentin
Evropian. Me kt rast dorzova t gjitha shnimet e bijve dhe bijave t cilt na mungojn.
Po ashtu kam dorzuar edhe CD-n me mbi 236 mij nnshkrime t qytetarve t Kosovs,
t cilt nnshkruan peticionin: TE GJITHEVE NA MUNGOJNE
Nnshkrimi i peticionit u organizua s bashku me shoqatat e familjarve t t zhdukurve dhe me aktivistt e rrjetit KAN. Dhe prkundr mundit dhe peripecive tona, t institucioneve t Kosovs dhe t Administrats Ndrkombtare, deri tash na jan kthyer vetm
413 kufoma, ndrsa akoma nuk dihet fati i mbi 2 549 personave.
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Duke pasur parasysh se burimi i problemeve tona fillon dhe prfundon me fjaln politik, konsiderojm se politizimi i problemit ton sht i barabart me krimin.
Kjo shtje mund t matet me katastrof humanitare dhe ky sht aspekti i vetm, kah
ky problem mund t qaset dhe mund t matet. U drejtohem t gjithve n emr t familjeve
fatkeqe, t cilat kan mbetur pa m t dashurit e tyre, pa shtpi, dhe pa siguri, e cila zgjat
tash e gjasht vite.
Pasiguria n lidhje me fatin e m t dashurve sht m e rnd se cilado e vrtet tjetr.
sht koha q t ofrojm dorn e pajtimit, sepse i takojm nnqiellit t njjt, ku jemi lindur s bashku, rritur, shoqruar, dhe kaluar vitet m t bukura t jets. Mos lejoni q gjuha
e urrejtjes t shkatrroj jett tona:

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Edhe nj her apeloj:

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LIRONI T GJITH T BURGOSURIT

DORZONI ESHTRAT

T BJM MOS N MNYR Q FAMILJET TONA T GJEJN PAQEN DHE

Q KJO TRAGJEDI T MOS PRSRITET M KURR DHE ASNJRIT

Nga grupi punues, me n krye zotin Francois Stamm, presim q t angazhohet maksimalisht n ndriimin e fatit t familjarve tan.
23 gershor 2005

Politizacija rasvetljavanja sudbine nestalih osoba je ravna zloinu

Pie: Verica Tomanovi, lan beogradske delegacije u Radnoj grupi za rasvetljavanje
sudbine nestalih lica na Kosovu i predsednik Udruenja porodica kidnapovanih i nestalih lica na Kosovu i Metohiji
Mnogo je razgovora bilo o nestalim i kidnapovanim i sa dravnim organima Srbije,
dravne zajednice Srbije i Crne Gore i sa meunarodnom zajednicom, ali osim dobro
smiljenih odgovora, nikada nismo saznali istinu. Svesni smo injenica i posledica politike,
koje su dovele do nemilih dogaaja zbog kojih i danas stojimo sa znakom pitanja nad
nedunim ljudskim ivotima. Za uzrok i posledice ovih zloina nema opravdanja, bez obzira koja strana ih je poinila. Da li je mogue da niko ne reaguje na te stravine zloine na
naim prostorima, na oigled itavog sveta i to u 21. veku, u procesu evropskih integracija,
kada se meu dravama briu granice, a svet ujedinjuje.
Ljudi koje traimo nisu nestali sami od sebe, oni su bili predmet nasilja organizovanih
grupa, ime je flagrantno prekrena enevska konvencija o ljudskim pravima i ono osnovno pravo - pravo na ivot i slobodu. Tragedija naih porodica obuhvata period od maja
1998. godine, a zatim 1999. i 2000. godinu, kada je najvie lica oteto, i to nakon potpisiva46

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Edhe si shoqata t familjarve, por edhe tash q veprojm si Komision Qeveritar Pr

Pengjet e Lufts bashkpunojm me organizatat ndrkombtare q merren me identifikimin dhe analizat e ADN-s, OMPF, ICMP, dhe me KNKK, e cila sht edhe ndrmjetsues
n bisedimet Prishtin Beograd, ku shpresojm q do t shkmbejm informacione dhe
t kuptojm t vrtetn e t gjitha pengjeve pa dallim etnie.

Ne angazhohemi q t zbardhet fati i donjrit, i cili n Kosov konsiderohet i pagjetur.

Ne ata nuk i ndajm sipas prkatsis s ty fetare, racore, apo kombtare. Pr ne t gjith
ata jan t pagjetur, familjet e tyre jan familje q prjetojn ankthin e pritjes q t msojn
pr fatin e tyre. Nuk mund t kuptojm se si vite me radh pas zhvarrimit t trupave t
pajet t shqiptarve t vrar n varrezat masive n Serbi, jan kthyer vetm 485 trupa t
pajet, ndrsa trupa tjer mbahen peng i interesave politike dhe t tjera t qeveris s Beogradit. Arsyetimi se nuk po mund t bhet identifikimi i tyre pr ne sht i papranueshm.
Mos lejoni q kjo t jet edhe nj loj me familjart t cilt edhe ashtu kan shum dhembje dhe net pa gjum.
Porosia e Nenave sht Ne po i themi bots: mos luani me emocionet familjarve t traumatizuar, mos provokoni durimin e ktyre nnave, mos lndoni akoma plagt tona q kullojn gjak, por ju lutem ta zgjidhni me urgjence kt problem madhor. Mjaft m! Mos i leni
familjet t vuajn, prandaj mos luani me nj popull t tr t traumatizuar q krkon t dij
t vrtetn, q krkon liri, paqe, qetsi e zhvillim. Jepni fund heshtjes! Ktheni djemt tan!

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shtja e t pagjeturve sht shtje humanitare, far do trajtimi tjetr i ksaj shtje
do t ishte shkelje e ndjenjave dhe normave ndrkombtare.

23 gershor 2005

Nestali - kosovska nezaceljena rana

Pie: Nesrete Kumnova, predsednica udruenja Pozivi majki
Srpsko-jugoslovenski teror iz 1998-1999. godine gotovo je u potpunosti unitio Kosovo, a hiljade ljudi je ubijeno i nestalo. Veina stanovnika Kosova isterana je iz svojih
domova. Neki su pohapeni i poslati u srpske zatvore. Oni koji su imali sree, puteni su
posle dve godine. Ali sudbina 2.549 osoba i dalje je velika nepoznanica za Kosovo, a pogotovo za lanove njihovih porodica.
Neposredno po dolasku trupa Kfora na Kosovo, lanovi porodica nestalih su se organizovali i uspenije odravali svoje svakodnevne proteste. eleli su da glas njihovog protesta dopre do meunarodne javnosti i da ona sazna za pitanje ratnih talaca, i u tome su bili upesni.
Organizovale smo masovne proteste i trajkove glau. Dostavljale smo Meunarodnom
komitetu Crvenog krsta spiskove sa podacima o naim voljenim, kao i podatke o poiniocima
zloina. Ti podaci dostavljeni su i Hakom sudu. Naalost, podaci su nestali, a za to niko
nije odgovarao.
Organizovale smo sastanke i konferencije sa organizacijom Majke Srebrenice u Bosni. Osnovale smo udruenja u mnogim optinama na Kosovu, a sve sa samo jednim ciljem:
da se utvrdi sudbina nestalih.
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nja Rezolucije 1244 u Kumanovu, kojom je garantovana bezbednost i sigurnost svim graanima Kosova i Metohije. Savremeno globalno drutvo osuuje nasilje i terorizam. Meutim,
saradnja sa meunarodnim organizacijama nije uvek bila dvosmerna. Ubeeni da e razgovori radnih grupa doneti porodicama istinu o svakom pojedincu sa naeg spiska, traimo:
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bezuslovno oslobaanje svih nevino zatoenih Srba i nealbanaca,

ubrzanje procesa ekshumacija i identifikacija i primopredaje posmrtnih ostataka,

povraaj kompletne izvorne dokumentacije o zloinima, koju su prikupili predstavnici

Kfora (posebno kontigenti rasporeeni na teritoriji Kosova i Metohije prvih est meseci), a zatim istu odneli sa sobom u matine zemlje, od Hakog tribunala i drugih nevladinih organizacija koje su se bavile ovim problemima, naroito tokom 1999-2000. godine

da sve organizacije koje se bave problematikom nestalih lica otvore svoje fajlove,
dostave ih na uvid porodicama i na taj nain daju svoj doprinos u razreenju svakog
pojedinanog sluaja,

da Centralna istrana jedinica UNMIK Policije da odgovor o sudbini ljudi iz 144 logora
ije je postojanje potvreno na sastanku sa porodicama nestalih u Zveanu u novembru
2003. godine.

S obzirom da geneza naih problema poinje i zavrava sa reju politika, smatramo

da je politizacija naeg problema ravna samom zloinu. Ovo pitanje moe se meriti sa humanitarnom katastrofom i to je jedini aspekt sa koga se moe posmatrati i meriti. Obraam
se svima u ime unesreenih porodica, koje su ostale bez voljenog lana porodice, bez doma
i zaviaja, sa ivotom u paklu i neizvesnou koja traje est godina. Neizvesnost o sudbini
voljenih gora je od svake istine. Vreme je da pruimo ruke pomirenja, jer pripadamo istom
podneblju, gde smo zajedno roeni, odrastali, druili se i proveli najlepe godine ivota. Ne
dozvolite da jezik mrnje uniti nae ivote.
Jo jednom apelujem:
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OSLOBODITE SVE ZAROBLJENIKE,

PREDAJTE ZEMNE OSTATKE PORODICAMA,

UINIMO SVE DA NAE PORODICE NAU MIR I DA SE OVA TRAGEDIJA

VIE NIKADA I NIKOME NE PONOVI.

Od Radne grupe na elu sa gospodinom Fransoa Stamom oekujemo da se maksimalno

angauje u prioritetnom razreavanju sudbine lanova naih porodica.
23. jun 2005.

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Te organizacije nastavljaju da igraju pozitivnu ulogu i uivaju podrku meunarodnih i

lokalnih institucija. Sastale smo se sa generalnim sekretarom Ujedinjenih nacija Kofijem
Ananom, predstavnicima Saveta bezbednosti, svim efovima UNMIK-a, kao i sa mnogim
drugima.
Kao predsednica udruenja Pozivi majki putovala sam sa delegacijom Kosova u
Sjedinjene Amerike Drave, gde smo imale susrete sa mnogim visokim zvaninicima i
otvarale ovo pitanje na dostojanstven nain.
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hitno pozove Beograd da otvori sve dosijee i arhive i objasni ta se desilo sa naim
kidnapovanim roacima;

da ovo pitanje postavi kao prioritetno za Kosovo, a pogotovo za porodice nestalih koje
i dalje ive u strepnji i neizvesnosti.

Imala sam priliku da posetim i Brisel, gde sam se susrela sa Doris Pak i mnogim lanovima Evropskog parlamenta. Pripremili smo rezoluciju o kojoj se raspravljalo u Evropskom parlamentu. Tom prilikom, podnela sam spiskove sa imenima svih nestalih, kao i CD
sa peticijom naslovljenom SVIMA NAM NEDOSTAJU, sa potpisima 236.000 stanovnika Kosova. Potpisivanje peticije organizovala su udruenja porodica KKAF (Koordinaciono telo porodica nestalih) i Kosovska mrea akcije (KAN).

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Zahtevale smo da Savet bezbednosti u Njujorku uini sledee:

Zajednikim naporima kosovskih institucija, postigli smo da nam se predaju posmrtni

ostaci 485 ljudi. Sudbina preostalih 2.549 ljudi jo nije razjanjena.
Kao udruenja lanova porodica nestalih, a sada i kao Vladina komisija za ratne taoce,
saraujemo sa Kancelarijom za nestale osobe i sudsku medicinu (OMPF), meunarodnom
organizacijom koja se bavi identifikacijom, i sa Meunarodnom komisijom za nestale osobe (ICMP), koja se bavi DNK analizama. Saraujemo i sa Meunarodnim komitetom
Crvenog krsta (MKCK), koji posreduje u dijalogu Pritine i Beograda, a koji treba da
olaka razmenu informacija i omogui utvrivanje istine o nestalim osobama, bez obzira
na njihovo etniko poreklo.
Pitanje nestalih je humanitarno pitanje; svaki drugi pristup predstavljao bi vreanje
oseanja i krenje meunarodnih normi.
Mi elimo da se rasvetli sudbina svake nestale osobe na Kosovu. Ne pravimo nikakvu
razliku na etnikoj, verskoj ili rasnoj osnovi. Sve to su nestali, i njihove porodice ivee u
strepnji i neizvesnosti dok se ne utvrdi njihova sudbina.
Ne moemo da shvatimo kako je mogue da je posle toliko godina od ekshumacije iz
masovnih grobnica u Srbiji samo 485 tela vraeno [na Kosovo]. Posmrtni ostaci zadravaju
se zbog politikih i drugih interesa vlade u Beogradu. Argument da oni ne mogu biti identifikovani za nas je neprihvatljiv. Ne dopustite [Beogradu] da se igra sa porodicama koje su
ve toliko propatile.
Poruka organizacije Poziva majki glasi: Govorimo svetu. Ne igrajte se sa oseanjima
traumatizovanih lanova porodica, ne kuajte strpljenje majki, ne ozleujte iznova nae
rane. Molim vas, uinite sve da se ovaj ozbiljni problem hitno rei. Ne dopustite da porodice koje ele istinu, slobodu, mir i stabilnost, i dalje pate. Okonajte ovo utanje; vratite
nam sinove.
23. jun 2005.
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Problems of people who stopped receiving pensions and of redundant

workers from Kosovo and Metohija should be solved simultaneously

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Slobodan Lalovic, Serbian Minister for Labor, Employment and Welfare Policy

There are many pensioners in Kosovo and Metohija who

have not received any pensions since 1999, and this is no
small amount of money. The payment of pensions to users
in Kosovo and Metohija stopped after the end of the bombing of then FR Yugoslavia, a campaign that was launched
because of the crisis in the province. For me and for the
ministry I am running, this is the inherited situation, which,
I hope, would be solved in the forthcoming period. However, contacts are needed in order for the solving of the problems of pensioners in Kosovo and Metohija to begin, and
these contacts between Belgrade and Pristina at this time do
Slobodan Lalovic
not exist. Without talks there can be no solution and the pensioners who do not receive any money are only a part of the inherited problem. But there
are other problems as well. Between 70,000 and 80,000 people were left without jobs in
June 1999. They worked in Kosovo and Metohija and they have been without work for six
years now. I expect that these problems, and other problems which arose as a result of that,
would be solved in the forthcoming period through a normal process of communication
because, in essence, these are joint problems.
During my time in office -- about a year and a half -- I only received two letters regarding the Kosovo pensioners' problem from the international ombudsman in the province,
Mr. Marek Nowicki, to which I replied. But such a massive problem cannot be solved by
writing letters. Essentially, communication is what is missing. One must take a look at the
issue as a whole. We can ask a question on why the payment of contributions from Kosovo
and Metohija to the Serbian Pension and Disability Insurance Fund stopped in 1999. We
will not solve the situation with one or two letters. In his letters, Mr. Nowicki pointed out
the problems of pensioners who have not received any money since 1999. In my reply, I
proposed that we meet and discuss it. We have not yet managed to do this. Nobody in Belgrade is disputing the existence of the problem, but it must be viewed in the context of a
whole, because the pensions are not the only problem. A number of Albanians from Kosovo and Metohija came to central Serbia, reported a place of residence, and they are exercising their right to a pension. The break of communication is the basic problem.
In Pristina, they have a black-and-white view of the pension problem, and this is not the
way to solve it. Many other issues are arising. Besides the above mentioned non-payment
of contributions, the privatization of companies in Kosovo and Metohija in which the pensioners and workers who are now without jobs have worked, there are many problems that
can only be solved in the context of a whole. This is not the first time that problems have

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Issue of Kosovar Pension and Invalid Fund misappropriated by Serbia

must be resolved
By Ibrahim Selmanaj, Kosovar Minister of Labor and Social Welfare
Since the war, Kosova unlike other republics in the
former Yugoslavia has not continued with the previous
Pension and Invalid Fund scheme.

The Pension and Invalid Fund, which had been in place

in Kosova until June 1999, was empty: its assets had been
transferred to Belgrade at the beginning of the 1990s.

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Immediately after the war, Kosova was without administration: UNMIK and the local government were just being
established, the banking system was not functioning, and
therefore workers received their salaries in cash.

For these reasons, it is impossible to re-implement the

previous Pension and Invalid Fund scheme.

Ibrahim Selmanaj
In order to resolve the situation, UNMIK drafted Regulation 2001/35, which defines and describes the forms of pension savings in Kosova.
Taking into account this Regulation in particular Article 4.2 on the methodology for
setting the amount of basic pensions the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare has drafted a bill on [this same issue] and the date when pension distribution will begin. The bill was
approved by the Parliament of Kosova on July 4, 2002 (Law No. 2002/1/) and promulgated
by the SRSG on July 26, 2002.
All Kosovar citizens aged 65 and older are included in the plan. So far, 122.057 persons
have benefited from the Fund, receiving a pension salary of 40 per month. Every month,
the Ministry allocates 4.900.000 [for this purpose].
In 2003, during its initial phase, the scheme set pension salaries at 28 per month. In
2004 the amount was increased to 35 and then finally to 40. [Funds allocated] for the [...]
payment of basic pensions [...] according to this scheme have nothing to do with the savings funds to which Kosovars had contributed. This is an entirely new scheme, and all
Kosovar citizens aged 65 and older are eligible for it.
The Ministry has also drafted a bill on [pensions for] disabled persons. It was approved
by the Parliament on November 6, 2003 (Law No. 2003/23/) and promulgated by the SRSG
on December 17, 2003.
From the time when the law entered into effect until June 2005, 18.072 disabled Kosovar citizens benefited from this Fund.
From the beginning, the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare has insisted that UNMIK
pressure Belgrade to return Kosovas Pension and Invalid Fund. Some 100,000 Kosovar
retirees contributed to the Fund, and Belgrade has misappropriated [their contributions].
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appeared with pensions and the rights of workers who had to abandon their jobs because of
wars or other reasons. This happened before, during the breakup of the former Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Experience is welcome in this context, but the case of
Kosovo and Metohija is specific. The already signed inter-state agreements between Serbia-Montenegro, Croatia and Slovenia, are one story. A different story altogether is how
this would be solved in Kosovo and Metohija. The quality of the situation and of relations
is simply different here, and experience from one case cannot be applied to the other. A
reasonable solution must be found here, which would be in connection with the setting of
the final status of Kosovo and Metohija, in accordance with U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244. It is imminent that, in the context of the solving of the pensioners' problems, the
problems of the people who have illegally lost their jobs and who, after having been expelled from the province, are now living in central Serbia, should be solved, too. What
about their rights to salaries in the past six, seven years?
The problem of pensioners in Kosovo and Metohija and of workers who have been
forced to leave the province and have thus been left without jobs and means of livelihood,
has not yet been addressed by any of the active working groups within the dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina. This is odd to a certain extent, as is the fact that the issue of
property in the province has also not been tackled at all. I believe that a special working
group should be formed to deal with pensioners, the people who have lost their jobs and
with property issues. This would be the right approach to these matters. I am therefore using this opportunity to call on Pristina to sit with us so that we could discuss all these
problems together.
July 28, 2005

shtjet e pensionistve pa t ardhura dhe e puntorve t mbetur pa

pun n Kosov duhet zgjidhur paralelisht
Shkruan: Sllobodan Llalloviq, ministr i Puns, Punsimit dhe Politiks Sociale n Qeverin e Serbis
sht i konsiderueshm numri i pensionistve n Kosov, t cilt q nga viti 1999 nuk
kan marr pensione, e t konsiderueshme jan edhe mjetet financiare pr t cilat bhet
fjal. Pagesa e pensioneve n Kosov sht ndrprer pas prfundimit t bombardimeve
kundr RFJ-s s athershme, t nisura pr shkak t krizs n krahin. Pr mua dhe resorin
t cilin e drejtoj, kjo sht nj situat e trashguar q shpresoj se n t ardhmen do t ket
epilogun dhe zgjidhjen e vet.
Sidoqoft, pr t nisur zgjidhjen e problemit t pensionistve n Kosov, nevojiten
kontaktet ndrmjet Prishtins dhe Beogradit, t cilat pr momentin nuk ekzistojn. Pa
bisedime nuk ka zgjidhje, ndrsa problemi i pensionistve sht vetm nj prej problemeve
t shumta t trashguara. Ka edhe nj varg t tjerash.
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We have insisted that the Fund be returned as soon as possible so that it can be managed
by the Government of Kosova. It belongs to Kosovar citizens, who contributed to it for
years. The way in which the [money] will be returned should be discussed with Belgrade.
We know how the Fund functioned, with one generation providing for another. We also
know that the Serbian Government in Belgrade currently provides pensions to certain Kosovar citizens, in particular to members of the Serb ethnic community. And, at the same
time, there are many Kosovar citizens who worked for many years in Serbia, contributed
to Serbias pension fund, retired there, and still do not receive their pensions.
There is no need to politicize this issue. We should sit down together to resolve this
problem.

The Ministry has already set up groups that, in consultation with social partners and
international experts, will draft the early retirement bill. This bill will recognize the employment of Kosovars who were dismissed from their jobs during the 1990s.

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During a regular meeting with social partners in the Tripartite Consultative Council, the
Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare received recommendations to begin preparing a legal
initiative for the classification of retirees so that those who contributed to the savings fund
receive higher pensions.

The Parliament recently authorized the Government namely, the Ministry of Finance
and Economy to look into the allocation of 6 million this year, which would be used to
raise pension salaries in Kosova. The issue of returning the Pension and Invalid Fund to
Kosova remains an issue that must be resolved.
July 28, 2005

Serbia duhet ti kthej mjetet q i ka marr nga Fondi Pensional i

Kosovs
Shkruan: Ibrahim Selmanaj, ministr i Puns dhe Mirqenies Sociale n Qeverin e
Kosovs

N Kosov, pr dallim nga republikat tjera t ish-Jugosllavis, pas lufts nuk sht vazhduar me skemat e mparshme t sigurimit pensional dhe invalidor.
Menjher pas lufts Kosova kishte mbetur pa administrat, administrata e UNMIK-ut
por edhe ajo vendore ishin n themelim e sipr, nuk funksiononte sistemi bankar prandaj
edhe pagat e atyre puntorve q punonin merreshin cash n dor.
Kurse, n ann tjetr, fondi i sigurimit pensional dhe invalidor q kishte funksionuar n
Kosov deri n qershor t vitit 1999, tani ishte i zbrazt, sepse ishte bartur n Beograd q
n fillim t viteve 90-ta.
Kto jan shkaqet kryesore q n Kosov e kan pamundsuar funksionimin e skems
s mparshme.
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Mes 70 000 dhe 80000 njerz kan mbetur pa pun n vitin 1999. Ata kan punuar n
Kosov dhe ata kan mbetur pa pun tash e gjasht vjet. Edhe problemi i pensionistve, i
njerzve q kan mbetur pa pun, por edhe t tjera q shkojn me t, jan probleme q pres
se do t zgjidhen n t ardhmen prmes nj komunikimi normal, meqense n thelb kto
jan probleme t prbashkta.

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Pr kohn sa jam ministr, e kjo sht nj vit e gjysm, lidhur me pensionet e papaguara
pr pensionistt kosova, kam marr vetm dy letra nga Ombudspersoni i Kosovs, z.
Marek Antoni Novicki, t cilave edhe u jam prgjigjur. Por nj problem i till madhor nuk
mund t zgjidhet prmes letrave, ngase n thelb mungon komunikimi.
Duhet t shikohet trsia. Shtrohet pyetja: pse sht ndrprer pagesa e kontributit t
pensioneve n vitin 1999 n Fondin Republikan pr Pensione dhe Sigurim Invalidor. Situatn nuk do t mund t zgjidhim me nj ose dy letra. N letrat e tij, Novicki ka trhequr
vrejtjen n ekzistimin e problemit t pensionistve, se ata nuk marrin pensione q nga viti
1999, me ka edhe e ka hapur shtjen.
N prgjigjen time i kam sugjeruar q t ulemi dhe t bisedojm. Kt nuk e kemi arritur deri m sot. Askush n Beograd nuk e mohon q problemi ekziston, por ai duhet t
analizohet n mnyr t trsishme, sepse mospagimi i pensioneve nuk sht i vetmi problem. N ann tjetr, nj numr i shqiptarve nga Kosova vijn n Serbin Qendrore,
lajmrohen n ndonj adres dhe realizojn t drejtn e tyre pr pension. Ndrprerja e komunikimit sht problemi themelor.
N Prishtin, ky problem shihet bardh e zi, por kjo nuk sht mnyra se si duhet t
vshtrohet kjo shtje. Sepse, hapen edhe shtje t tjera. Prve mospagimit t kontributit
t prmendur, privatizimit n Kosov , prons s ndrmarrjeve ku kan punuar pensionistt
dhe puntort t cilt tash gjasht vjet jan pa pun, ka nj varg shtjesh q mund t zgjidhen dhe shqyrtohen vetm n trsi.
Problemet me pensione apo t drejtat e puntorve t cilat pr shkak t ngjarjeve t
lufts apo arsye t tjera sht dashur t largohen nga ndrmarrjet e tyre, nuk hasen pr her
t par vetm n Kosov. Ka pasur edhe m hert, ndrmjet Republikave t ish-RSFJ-s.
N kt aspekt t gjitha prvojat jan t mirseardhura, por Kosova paraqet nj rast
specifik.
Jan di tjetr marrveshjet ndrshtetrore t nnshkruara midis Serbis e Malit t Zi
me Sllovenin apo Kroacin, kurse tjetr se si do t zgjidhet kjo me Kosovn. Thjesht,
lloji i situats dhe raporteve sht tjetr, pr kt arsye ktu nuk mund t zbatohen njlloj
prvojat e njrit rast n tjetrin.
Ktu duhet gjetur nj zgjidhje t arsyeshme e cila do t lidhej edhe me vendosjen e
statusit prfundimtar t Kosovs n prputhshmri me Rezolutn 1244 t Kshillit t Sigurimit t OKB-s. N kontekstin e zgjidhjes t problemit t pensionistve domosdo do t
duhej njkohsisht t zgjidhej edhe problemi i njerzve q kan mbetur pa pun pr shkak
se jan przn n mnyr kundrligjore nga Kosova ndrsa aktualisht gjenden n Serbin
qendrore. ka u b me t drejtat e tyre n paga gjat gjasht-shtat viteve t fundit?
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Pr t dal nga kjo situat, administrata e UNMIK-ut ka hartuar nj rregullore q njihet

me emrin Rregullorja 2001/35 q prcakton dhe prshkruan format e sigurimit pensional
n Kosov.
Duke marr parasysh kt Rregullore, n veanti nenin 4.2 mbi metodologjin e caktimit t lartsis s pensioneve baz, Ministria e Puns dhe Mirqenies Sociale ka hartuar
Projektligjin mbi Metodologjin e caktimit t lartsis s pensionit baz n Kosov dhe
caktimin e dats pr sigurimin e pensioneve baz /Ligji nr.2002/1/, i cili sht miratuar nga
Kuvendi i Kosovs m 4 korrik t vitit 2002, dhe sht nnshkruar nga PSSP-ja me 26 korrik t po atij viti.

Si dihet vlera e pensionit n vitin 2002 ka qen 28 euro, n vitin 2003 vlera e pensionit ishte ngritur n 35 euro, ndrkaq n vitin 2004 pensioni ishte ngritur n 40 euro, sa
sht edhe tani n vitin 2005. Pensioni themelor q paguhet n Kosov, n baz t ksaj
skeme pensionale, nuk ka lidhje me kontributet e mparshme. Kjo sht nj skem e re q
vlen pr t gjith qytetart e Kosovs q i kan mbushur 65 vjet.

Forum

Prfitues t ksaj skeme t pensioneve jan t gjith qytetart e Kosovs, t cilt kan
mbushur 65 vjet. Deri m tani numri i atyre q e kan t drejtn e ktij pensioni sht 122
057 pensionist, t cilt marrin nga 40 euro n muaj. do muaj pr kt skem t pensioneve MPMS-ja ndan shumn prej rreth 4,900,000.00 .

Me qllim q t sigurohet rrjeti i siguris sociale n kuadr t mbrojtjes sociale dhe

lehtsimit t varfris, Ministria e Puns dhe e Mirqenies Sociale ka hartuar Projektligjin
pr Pensionet e Personave me Aftsi t Kufizuara, i cili sht miratuar n Kuvendin e
Kosovs me 6 Nntor 2003 /Ligji nr.2003/23/, dhe i nnshkruar nga PSSP-ja me 17 dhjetor
2003. 18 072 qytetar t Kosovs jan prfitues t ktij pensioni deri n fund t muajit
qershor 2005.
Ministria e Puns dhe Mirqenies Sociale q nga themelimi i saj ka insistuar tek organet
e UNMIK-ut q t bj trysni mbi Beogradin pr rikthimin e fondit t grabitur t pensionistve kosovar. N fondin e pensionistve kan kontribuar afro 100 000 pensionist dhe ai
fond sht grabitur, apo thn m but, sht bartur n Beograd.
Insistimi yn i vazhdueshm sht se ai fond duhet t kthehet sa m par n Kosov dhe
m t menaxhoj Qeveria e Kosovs, sepse ai fond u takon pensionistve kosovar, t cilt
me vite t tra kan kontribuar n fondin e tyre. Ne nuk do t heqim dor pr asnj moment
nga e drejta pr t rikthyer n Kosov fondin e pensionistve kosovar, ndrkaq pr
mnyrn se si duhet t zgjidhet kjo shtje duhet t bisedohet me paln serbe.
Ne e dim se si ka funksionuar ai fond ku ka paguar gjenerata pr gjeneratn, ne po
ashtu e dijm se Qeveria e Beogradit u paguan edhe sot pensionet nj pjese t qytetarve t
Kosovs, sidomos qytetarve t nacionalitetit serb, kurse n ann tjetr ka shum qytetar
t Kosovs q kan punuar me vite t tra npr ndrmarrjet e ndryshme n Serbi, atje i
kan derdhur kontributet e tyre, kurse sot nuk marrin fare pensione edhe pse madje edhe
jan pensionuar n Serbi.
Ne mendojm se shtja nuk duhet t politizohet por duhet t ulemi dhe t bisedojm,
n mnyr q ta zgjidhim kt problem, sepse n Serbi ende funksionon e njjta skem e
sigurimit pensional dhe invalidor.
Pavarsisht ksaj, Ministria e Puns dhe e Mirqenies Sociale, gjat takimit t rregullt
me partnert social n kuadr t Kshillit Konsultativ Trepalsh, ka marr rekomandime
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Problemi i pensionistve n Kosov dhe i puntorve q jan detyruar t lshojn

provincn dhe kshtu kan mbetur pa pun dhe pa ekzistenc, nuk sht trajtuar n asnjrin
Grup Punues t aktivizuar deri m tash. Kjo deri diku sht e uditshme, ashtu sikur q nuk
vrej se ndokund t jet ngritur shtja e prons n Kosov. Konsideroj se sht e domosdoshme q t formohet nj Grup Punues i posam, i cili do t merrej me pensionistt, t
papunt, dhe me shtjet pronsore. Kjo do t ishte qasja q t fillohet me zgjidhjen e ktyre shtjeve. Shi pr kt, shfrytzoj rastin q ti bj thirrje Prishtins q t ulemi dhe t
bisedojm lidhur me t gjitha problemet e renditura.

Forum

28 korrik 2005

Na Kosovu i Metohiji uporedo reavati probleme penzionera

bez primanja i radnika koji su ostali bez posla
Pie: Slobodan Lalovi, ministar za rad, zapoljavanje i socijalnu politiku u Vladi Srbije

Znaajan je broj penzionera na Kosovu i Metohiji koji od 1999. godine ne primaju

penzije, a znaajna su i finansijka sredstava o kojima se u tom sluaju radi. Isplata penzija
penzionerima na Kosovu i Metohiji prekinuta je nakon obustave bombardovanja tadanje
SRJ, pokrenutog zbog krize u pokrajini. To je za mene i resor koji vodim nasleena situacija koja e, nadam se, u naredno vreme dobiti svoj epilog i reenje.
Meutim, da bi se krenulo ka reavanju problema penzionera na Kosovu i Metohiji
potrebni su kontakti, kojih u ovom trenutku izmeu Beograda i Pritine nema. Bez razgovora nema reenja, a penzioneri koji su ostali bez primanja, samo su jedan od nasleenih
problema. Ima i niz drugih.
Izmeu 70 i 80 hiljada ljudi je u junu 1999. godine ostalo bez posla. Oni su radili na
Kosovu i Metohiji, i oni su bez posla ve est godina. I problem penzionera i ljudi koji su
izgubili posao i ostalo to uz to ide, jesu problemi za koje ja oekujem da e u naredno
vreme biti reavani kroz jednu normalnu komunikaciju, jer su to u sutini zajedniki problemi.
Za vreme dok sam ministar, a to je oko godinu i po dana, u vezi neisplaivanja penzija
kosovskim penzionerima, dobio sam jedino dva pisma meunarodnog ombudsmana na Kosovu i Metohiji, gospodina Mareka Antonija Novickog, na koja sam odgovorio. Ali, pisma
nisu nain da se reava tako krupan problem. Znai, u sutini, nedostaje komunikacija.
Mora se posmatrati celina. Moemo da postavimo pitanje: zato je prestala uplata doprinosa za uplatu penzija 1999. godine u republiki Fond za penzijsko i invalidsko osigu56

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nga partnert social, pr t filluar prgatitjet e nj nisme ligjore pr kategorizimin e pensionistve, n mnyr q t gjith pensionistt q kan kontribuar n t kaluarn, t marrin
pensione m t mdha.
MPMS tashm ka formuar grupet punuese q do t punojn n kt nism legjislative,
n kuadr t Projektligjit pr Pensionimin e Parakohshm dhe njohjen e stazhit t puns
1989-1999, gjithmon n konsultime dhe pun t prbashkt edhe me partnert social dhe
ekspert ndrkombtar.
Koh m par edhe Kuvendi i Kosovs ka marr nj vendim ku autorizohet qeveria,
prkatsisht ministria e Ekonomis dhe Financave q t gjej modalitetet pr ndarjen e 6
milion eurove gjat vitit 2005 pr t themeluar nj fond pensional n Kosov. Kurse shtja e kthimit t fondit t mparshm pr ne mbetet shtje e hapur, e cila duhet rregulluar.

Neophodno je reiti problem sredstava penzijskog fonda Kosova koja

je otela Srbija

Forum

28 korrik 2005

Pie: Ibrahim Seljmanaj, ministar za rad i socijalnu zatitu u Vladi Kosova

Na Kosovu, za razliku od drugih republika bive Jugoslavije, posle rata nisu nastavljene ranije eme penzijskog i invalidskog osiguranja. Odmah posle rata na Kosovu nije
bilo administracije, UNMIK-ova, ali i lokalna uprava bile su u osnivanju, nije funkcionisao
ni bankarski sistem, pa su i plate onih radnika koji su bili zaposleni isplaivane u keu,
na ruke.
S druge strane, fond penzijskog i invalidskog osiguranja, koji je na Kosovu funkcionisao do juna 1999. godine, bio je prazan, jer je poetkom devedesetih godina premeten u
Beograd. To su glavni razlozi koji su na Kosovu onemoguili funkcionisanje ranije eme.
Da bi se izalo iz ove situacije, administracija UNMIK-a je izradila jedan dokumenat,
poznat kao Uredba 2001/35, koji odreuje i opisuje oblike penzijskog osiguranja na Kosovu.
Imajui u vidu ovu Uredbu, naroito njen lan 4.2. o metodologiji odreivanja visine
osnovnih penzija, Ministarstvo za rad i socijalnu zatitu je izradilo nacrt zakona o metodologiji odreivanja visine osnovnih penzija na Kosovu i o odreivanju datuma za
obezbeenje osnovnih penzija (Zakon br. 2002/1.), koji je usvojen na sednici Skuptine
Kosova 4. jula 2002. godine i koji je potpisao specijalni predstavnik generalnog sekretara
UN 26. jula 2002. godine.
Korisnici ove penzijske eme su svi graani Kosova koji su navrili 65 godina ivota.
Do sada je pravo na penziju po tom osnovu steklo 122.057. graana, koji primaju po 40
evra meseno. Na osnovu ove eme, Ministarstvo za rad i socijalnu zatitu svakog meseca
izdvaja za penzije iznos od 4.900.000 evra.
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ranje? Sa jednim ili dva pisma, neemo reiti situaciju. Novicki je u pismima ukazivao na
postojanje problema penzionera, da ne dobijaju primanja posle 1999. godine, ime je otvorio problem.
Predloio sam mu u odgovoru da sednemo i o tome razgovaramo. Do danas u tome
nismo uspeli. Niko u Beogradu ne spori da problem postoji, ali se on mora posmatrati
kompletno, jer nije samo neisplaivanje penzija problem. Sa druge strane, jedan broj Albanaca sa Kosova i Metohije dolazi u centralnu Srbiju, prijavljuju se na nekoj adresi i ostvaruju pravo na penziju. Prekid komunikacije je osnovni problem.

Forum

U Pritini, na neisplaivanje penzija gledaju crno-belo, a tako se taj problem ne moe

posmatrati. Jer, otvaraju se druga pitanja. Osim pomenutog neuplaivanja doprinosa, privatizacije na Kosovu i Metohiji, imovine preduzea u kojima su radili penzioneri i radnici
koji su est godina bez posla, ima niz problema koji se mogu samo u celini reavati i razmatrati.
Probleme sa penzijama i pravima radnika koji su zbog ratnih zbivanja ili zbog drugih
razloga morali da napuste svoja preduzea ne sreemo prvi put na Kosovu i Metohiji. Bilo
ih je i ranije, izmeu republika bive SFRJ. U tom smislu, sva iskustva su dobrodola, ali
je Kosovo i Metohija specifian sluaj. Jedna su pria ve potpisani meudravni sporazumi Srbije i Crne Gore sa Slovenijiom ili Hrvatskom, a druga je stvar kako e to biti
reeno sa Kosovom i Metohijom. Jednostavno, kvalitet situacije i odnosa je drugaciji, pa se
tu konkretno iskustva iz jednog ne mogu doslovno primeniti na drugi sluaj.
Ovde moramo nai neko razumno reenje koje e biti povezano i sa ustanovljenjem
konanog statusa Kosova i Metohije, u skladu sa Rezolucijom Saveta bezbednosti UN
1244. Neminovno e u kontekstu reavanja problema penzionera biti potrebno istovremeno
reavati probleme ljudi koji su proterivanjem sa Kosova i Metohije ostali bez posla nezakonito, a trenutno se nalaze u centralnoj Srbiji. ta je sa njihovim pravima na plate u poslednjih est, sedam godina?
Problem penzionera na Kosovu i Metohiji i radnika koji su bili primorani da napuste
pokrajinu i time ostali bez posla i egzistencije, nije obuhvaen nijednom od do sada aktiviranih radnih grupa u okviru dijaloga Beograda i Pritine. To je donekle i udno, kao to ne
primeujem da je igde pokrenuto imovinsko pitanje na Kosovu i Metohiji. Smatram da je
neophodno oformiti posebnu Radnu grupu koja bi se bavila penzionerima, licima ostalim
bez posla, imovinskim pitanjima. To bi bio pristup da se krene u reavanje tih pitanja.
Stoga koristim ovu priliku da uputim poziv Pritini da sednemo i o svim nabrojanim problemima razgovaramo.
28. jul 2005.

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Kao to je poznato, iznos penzije u 2002. godini je bio 28 evra, u 2003. ovaj iznos je
povean na 35 evra, dok su 2004. godine penzije poveane na 40 evra meseno, koliko
iznose i sada, u 2005. godini. Osnovna penzija koja se na Kosovu isplauje po ovoj penzijskoj emi nema nikakve veze sa ranijim doprinosima. To je nova ema koja vai za sve
graane Kosova koji su navrili 65 godina ivota.

Ministarstvo za rad i socijalnu zatitu je od osnivanja insistiralo kod organa UNMIK-a

da vre pritisak na Beograd da vrati oteti fond kosovskih penzionera. U taj fond svoj diprinos je ulagalo oko 100.000 kosovskih penzionera, i on je ugrabljen ili, blae reeno, kao
to smo ranije naveli, premeten je u Beograd.
Nae je stalno insistiranje da taj fond treba to pre vratiti na Kosovo, da bi njime upravljala Vlada Kosova, jer on pripada kosovskim penzionerima, koji su u njega godinama
ulagali svoja sredstva u vidu doprinosa. Nijednog trenutka neemo odustati od prava i
zahteva da se na Kosovo vrati fond kosovskih penzionera, a o nainu na koji e se ovaj
problem reiti treba razgovarati sa srpskom stranom.

Forum

U cilju obezbeenja mree socijalne zatite u sklopu socijalne bezbednosti i sa ciljem

da se ublai siromatvo, Ministarstvo za rad i socijalnu zatitu je izradilo nacrt zakona o
penzijama osoba sa ogranienim sposobnostima, koji je usvojila Skuptina Kosova na sednici 6. novembra 2003. godine (Zakon br. 2003/23.) i kojeg je specijalni predstavnik generalnog sekretara UN potpisao 17. decembra 2003. godine. Do kraja juna 2005, ovaj vid
penzije je uivalo 18.072 graana Kosova.

Poznato nam je kako je funkcionisao taj fond, u koji su doprinose ulagale generacija za
generacijom, a znamo i to da vlada u Beogradu i dan-danas isplauje penzije delu graana
Kosova, posebno onima srpske nacionalnosti, dok, s druge strane, veliki broj graana
Kosova koji su godinama radili u raznim preduzeima irom Srbije, gde su uplaivali doprinos u penzijski fond, danas ne uiva penziju, mada su ak penzionisani u Srbiji.
Smatramo da ovo pitanje ne treba politizovati, ali je nuno sesti i razgovarati da bi se
problem reio, s obzirom da u Srbiji jo uvek funkcionie ista ema penzijskog i invalidskog osiguranja. Nezavisno od toga, Ministarstvo za rad i socijalnu zatitu, tokom redovnih
susreta sa socijalnim partnerima u okviru konsultativnog tripartitnog odbora, dobilo je preporuke da pone pripreme za kategorizaciju penzionera, kako bi svi oni koji su u prolosti
uplaivali doprinose dobili vei iznos penzije.
Ministarstvo za rad i socijalnu zatitu ve je formiralo radne grupe koje e raditi na ovoj
zakonskoj inicijativi, u okviru predloga zakona o prevremenom penzionisanju i priznavanju radnog staa za period od l989. do 1999. godine, uz stalne konsultacije i zajedniki
rad sa socijalnim partnerima i meunarodnim strunjacima.
Pre izvesnog vremena i Skuptina Kosova je usvojila odluku kojom je ovlastila vladu,
odnosno Ministarstvo za privredu i finansije, da pronae modalitete za raspodelu est miliona evra koji su za 2005. godinu odreeni za osnivanje penzijskog fonda Kosova. Meutim,
vraanje ranijeg fonda ostaje za nas otvoreno pitanje, koje treba reavati.
28. jul 2005.

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Political position of Roma in Kosovo

By Luan Koka, political scientist, journalist and Chairman of the Executive Committee
of the National Council of the Roma Ethnic Minority in Serbia-Montenegro

Forum

The Roma are definitely the biggest collateral damage of

the conflict in Kosovo and Metohija. Their present position
and the problems they are facing are so difficult and complex that no reliable data can be found in any segment of
their life and existence, which one could start from in describing the problems, even in a simple list, and in setting a
strategy for solving them.

Luan Koka

The Roma are nowadays jeopardized in political, welfare, social and economic terms, and even as an entity so,
when one speaks about their political position in Kosovo
and Metohija, one must explain the problem of their participation in the political life of the province even before laying
it out.

Therefore, the Roma in Kosovo are presently divided

into Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians. In their reports, international organizations are more
frequently using the abbreviation RAE when referring to them, which could have various
social, welfare and political implications on the body of the nation that is called the Roma.
Thus, presently there are three communities in Kosovo which are, maybe, confronted and
which exist in Kosovo's political life as nothing but political folklore. Namely, when needed, this national body is called Roma. On the other hand, when certain political interest
groups in Kosovo want it to be divided, various political and national bootlickers emerge
as representatives of different ethnic communities. It is clear that the Ashkali and Egyptians
are subgroups of the Roma people. The people should be permitted to declare their ethnicity freely. The problem of the Romas' ethnic identity is the one that the international organizations do not want to deal with at this moment. It remains to be seen whether this would
further widen the gap between these ethnic communities in Kosovo. The Ashkali do not
recognize the Egyptians, the Egyptians do not recognize the Ashkali. In the final instance,
the Ashkali are recognized as a subgroup of the Roma.
The problem of the Roma in southeastern Europe is such that they are identified with
the majority population, and there is a division into Albanian Roma, Serb, Romanian, Hungarian, Turkish Roma, etc. The Ashkali and the Egyptians speak the Albanian, mainly nonliterary language. They speak the Roma language badly or not at all, and very little Serbian.
Therefore, such a group is interesting for utilization in the political life in Kosovo and
Metohija. Although at least 100,000 Roma have lived in Kosovo, they now have the same
number of representatives as other, much smaller ethnic communities in the province.
The temporary authorities in Kosovo are rushing to return the Roma to the position of
before 1999. There are Roma TV and radio broadcasts, there are some representatives in
the highest bodies, but we all know that this is not only insufficient, but also no guarantee
that the Roma in Kosovo and Metohija would live freely and safely. Let alone in equality
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Position of Romas in Kosovo needs to be improved

Unfortunately Romas in Kosovo and elsewhere have

been facing the same problems for a long time, which are
negatively reflected in terms of their integration into a healthy and civil society. No political, social or cultural institution, had dealt seriously with their problems. In fact there
were some attempts, but without any significant result. Romas continue to be marginalized in the society. First of all
they lack education, because they had no economic conditions for that. In addition to the Roma community itself, the
majority is to be blamed as well, because stereotypes about
the Roma population in general have been created. How- Kujtim Paaku
ever, the positive side should also be emphasized here.
Thanks to the work of local and international institutions, great progress has been achieved
in Kosovo in terms of security and freedom of movement. Prizren is the best example,
where the security, freedom of movement, multi-ethnicity, the freedom of speech even in
the Roma language is at good level and the people from different communities socialize
with each other. This example should be followed in other municipalities, as well.

Forum

By Kujtim Paaku, Editor of Roma service of Radio Yeni Donem in Prizren, publicist
and writer

One of the problems that Roma community is facing, is the issue of their return to their
properties. When speaking about it, we cannot bypass the collective shelters in Plemetin
village, Obilic municipality, and those in Zitkoc and Qeshmin Llug in Northern Kosovo, as
well as those in central and southeastern Serbia, where Romas live in extremely difficult
conditions-not commensurate with an adequate quality of life.
Currently 122 families with 500 members live in the collective shelter in Plemetin, alone. During a visit to this shelter, one of the residents angrily told us: Why you do not gather
us all and put in a trailer and dump us wherever?! We cannot live like this any longer. There
can be no worse thing, when I see my six-years-old daughter sick and I cannot help her!
The state of Romas displaced in north Mitrovica is even worse. E.B. one of the residents there says: Many people here are sick from high concentration of lead in the blood.
Three children have died. Some international doctors have concluded that the residents
there are at high risk from the infectious disease.
Romas have a long tradition in many areas of arts and culture. They recognize Kosovos
reality. But Kosovo on the other hand should also accept them as a part of itself. The majority in Kosovo should ensure a positive discrimination for them, so that they can access
primary, secondary, and higher education, which will be an asset for their integration into
municipal and central institutions.
Employment is one of the preconditions for further improvement in the quality of life
for Romas, because the current difficult economic situation that Kosovo is facing, affects
Romas the most, as most of them do not own much property and are struggling to survive.
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with the others. According to the internal population count in the province in 1997, 98,770
people said they were Roma. Nowadays, there are 18,727 of them in Kosovo.

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Other figures can be added to these grim numbers. Until June 1999, 22,000 Roma lived
in Pristina and now there are 2,750, in Pec 20,000 and now 2,500. In Gnjilane, the number
of the Roma has dropped from 7,000 to only 850. Of 22 municipalities in Kosovo and
Metohija, the Roma lived in 21. Although they were not listed in the municipality of Dragas, the Roma used to live there, too, primarily in the village of Mljike. In Kosovska Mitrovica, there was a Roma quarter - Rasadnik - which used to be one of the biggest Roma
settlements in Europe. It does not exist anymore. A similar fate was that of the Moravska
quarter in Pristina.
There are three camps built for the Roma around Kosovska Mitrovica - in Zitkovac,
Cesmeluk and Kablar - in an area poisoned with lead. The people living there are poisoned
with this metal. There are 63 children living in these settlements, in whose blood the concentration of lead of 650 micrograms per liter was found, which, according to the figures
of the World Health Organization, is a unique case in the world. Physicians recommend
that patients with 100 micrograms should be removed from the contaminated area. And yet,
they are still living there.
Therefore, only around 10 percent of the Roma have remained or returned to their centuries-old homes. During the first couple of years of international management in the province, the so-called political representatives of the Roma have been trying to explain that the
Roma enjoy all the rights in Kosovo and Metohija. Life has proven them wrong. These
representatives have emerged in a situation burdened by a serious war psychosis and fear,
dictated by the Albanian extremists, and they not only failed to present the problems of the
Roma on the political scene, but have skillfully hidden them and deceived the international
public.
In the period from 1998 to 2000, Albanian extremists and gangs have murdered and
kidnapped at least 150 Roma. According to some information, this number is much higher.
The problem is that nobody has managed to record and identify the victims and the missing
Roma. The fate of some is not known even now.
Presently, there are around 60,000 Roma refugees and displaced from Kosovo and
Metohija in Serbia, around 12,000 in Montenegro, several thousand in Macedonia, and
many have sought refuge in other countries. Only in Germany, according to the figures of
the relevant ministry there, there are around 50,000 Roma from Kosovo and Metohija.
Germany recently signed a contract with UNMIK about the return of the refugees from
Kosovo and Metohija, primarily Ashkali and Egyptians this year, and the Roma next year.
The return of 10,000 refugees from Kosovo and Metohija who are presently staying in
Germany is planned. While not commenting on the legal and ethical context of this contract (which divides people into nations and assumes that it is safe for one and not safe for
the other), I only wish to reiterate the claim mentioned at the beginning of the text - that the
Roma ethnic body is deteriorating and is being divided or united whenever there are certain
social and political pressures against them. With this contract, the Ashkali and the Egyptians are now forced to return to Kosovo and Metohija. They are now claiming that they are
Roma, creating great difficulties to the German authorities in their plan to return the refugees to Kosovo and Metohija.
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At the moment, the majority of Romas do not enjoy a right to social aid, equal to that
of other communities. In recent years, the number of Romas receiving social assistance has
declined significantly. A reason for this should be sought within the International Administration, because it has approved a Regulation, which outlines: All unemployed Kosovars
shall enjoy a right to social assistance. But one of the criteria to gain this right (to receive
40 to 50 euros a month) is to have at least one family member younger than 5 years old (this
is to encourage a growth in the birthrate). This affects Romas the most, most of whom do
not enjoy social assistance, because they rarely have children younger than 5 years. We
should think about designing a genuine plan, which would put solving the problems of the
Roma on the right track. One step forward would be to establishing a central Kosova institution, which would deal with Roma issues. This would include many initiatives, oversee
all achievements and identify the stagnation of Roma community, in particular in the area
of culture and education. To this end, the contacts and cooperation with experts from Inalco University, France, should continue. Romas should be ensured access to preschool
education, secondary schools, as well as higher and further education. Furthermore, scholarships for their education and schoolbooks should be provided; this would be of great
benefit to the capacity-building of Romas in the area of education. Media should play its
role as well in promoting Roma identity, but currently there is no newspaper in the Roma
language, not even a weekly one. We also need magazines dedicated to women, children,
and so on. However, there are some TV shows in the Roma language, broadcast mainly on
local television stations. Among these TV shows are some that last one hour, while the one
broadcast by the public broadcaster, Radio Television of Kosovo (RTK), lasts 20 minutes.

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The establishment of an institution that will deal with the problems of the Roma would
also be in charge of organizing different seminars and lectures on the human rights, childrens rights, small loans, journalism, health, womens rights, risks from drugs, tobacco,
and from alcohol.
It will also deal with the publication of textbooks, books, poetry, folk songs, and the
protection of the cultural heritage, organization of cultural festivals etc.
Romas should also be included in various commissions of Kosovos Ministries, in
which Roma-related issues are discussed, not only for the purposes of democratization, but
also to root out prejudice.
A further reason for this inclusion is the fact that in many cases, the right to employment for Romas in Ministries or other institutions is not respected, and the participation of
Roma in the commissions has not been implemented until now.
I think that the projects funded by different donors for the employment of the Roma
community should be reviewed, because current donors grants have not been sufficient or
effective. The majority of the projects for Romas were implemented in cooperation with
the majority population. Failures may also be a result of fund misuse for personal gain. A
one -hour concert or cocktail, funded by a donor cannot be called a success.
The current position of the Romas is very difficult in all aspects, including the political,
social, economic and cultural ones. In order to achieve progress in improving Romas position, it is now a good opportunity for the local and international institutions in cooperation
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The displaced Roma from Kosovo and Metohija are living a hard life in Serbia. More
than half of them had to leave the country and are now staying in western European countries. The majority of them had to sell their property, houses and apartments in Kosovo and
Metohija below the market price, and leave to third countries with this money. The Roma
who remained in Serbia are living in very difficult economic, social and health conditions.
A vast number of the displaced do not have even the basic identity documents, and thus
cannot exercise their right to health and welfare protection as refugees. Their basic human
rights are also often in jeopardy.
Therefore, any discussion about the political position of the Roma, about the missing,
the return of the Roma to Kosovo and Metohija, the return of their property, about their
safety, economic strengthening, employment and the damaging contracts signed, can only
begin after the forming of a delegation of Roma representatives, who would conduct talks
with the temporary government of Kosovo in the presence of international organizations.
These representatives must be those who are living with the majority of their people as
refugees, and who have represented their people in Kosovo and Metohija. Only a delegation formed in such a way would have legitimacy to talk about the political and other issues
of the Roma in Kosovo and Metohija.
August 18, 2005

Gjendja politike e romve n Kosov

Shkruan: Luan Koka, politikolog, gazetar dhe kryetar i Komitetit Ekzekutiv t Kshillit
Nacional t Pakics Rome n SMZ
Ska dyshim se romt jan m t dmtuarit gjat konfliktit n Kosov dhe Metohi.
Gjendja e tanishme dhe problemet me t cilat prballen romt jan aq t vshtira dhe t
ndrlikuara, ashtu q n asnj segment t jets dhe ekzistencs s tyre nuk mund t gjenden
t dhna dhe fakte t sakta n baz t t cilave do t mund t bhej, madje edhe n vija t
thjeshta, paraqitja e problemeve t romve n Kosov dhe Metohi, si dhe strategjia pr
zgjidhjen e tyre.
Romt jan gjithnj e m t rrezikuar si n aspektin politik ashtu edhe n at shoqror
e ekonomik, ashtu q kur bisedojm pr pozitn e tyre politike, menjher duhet ta sqarojm at para se t merremi me problemin e pjesmarrjes s tyre n jetn politike t Kosovs
dhe Metohis.
Romt n Kosov sot jan t ndar n rom, ashkalinj dhe egjiptian. Organizatat
ndrkombtare gjithnj e m tepr n raportet e tyre po prdorin shkurtesn RAE, e cila
mund t ket implikime t ndryshme socio-politike n korpusin e popujve q quhen rom.
Pra sot n Kosov nga kjo ekzistojn tri bashksi, t cilat ndoshta edhe e kundrshtojn
njra tjetrn, dhe ekzistojn n jetn politike t Kosovs si nj folklor i thjesht politik. N
ann tjetr kta popuj e quajn vetn rom ather kur u vijn prshtati rastet shoqrore dhe
politike.
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with the intellectual forces of the Roma community to seek ways to sign the Romas Decade Document. The projects outlined in this document for improving the Romas position,
are funded by the SOROS Foundation and the World Bank. It is signed by the countries of
Southeastern Europe, but not by Kosovo, due to its transitional stage at the moment.

At the end I also want to emphasize that it is a great misfortune that Roma community
has not enjoyed good luck for centuries, but it is a great fortune that Kosovo can finally
build its own destiny, including that of the Romas and other communities in Kosovo. What
can Romas offer to Kosovo? Of course, they do not possess any financial capital, but they
can offer a lot in the intellectual, spiritual and cultural aspects. In one word Kosovo will be
even richer with Romas.
August 18, 2005

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After many post war endeavors, Kosovo is in its consolidation stage. The culture is the
most needed element, especially for the Roma community, because it represents a fundamental step towards coexistence, which is a condition for a democratic and a multi-ethnic
Kosovo. This can be done through a joint effort by many communities, and by different
projects, including Romas as well. Because Romas are human as well, with equal rights as
all the others.

Pozita e romve n Kosov duhet prmirsuar

Shkruan: Kujtim Paaku, Redaktor i Radio Yeni Donem n gjuhn rome n Prizren,
publicist dhe shkrimtar

Romt n Kosov por edhe m gjer, pr fat t keq nj koh t gjat kan qen dhe jan t
ballafaquar me probleme t njjta, t cilat po reflektohen negativisht n integrimin e tyre n
nj shoqri t shndosh e t civilizuar. Asnj institucion, qoft politik, social, apo kulturor,
nuk sht marr seriozisht me kto probleme. Jan br disa tentime, por ato kan ngelur
pa ndonj rezultat t dshirueshm.
Romt n Kosov ngelin edhe m tutje n nj rreth t margjinalizuar t shoqris.
Atyre, n rend t par u mungon arsimimi dhe edukimi shkollor, pr shkak t mungess s
kushteve ekonomike. Fajsia pr kt, prve n romt, bie edhe mbi popullatn shumic,
ngase sht krijuar nj botkuptim stereotip ndaj popullats rome n prgjithsi.
Me kt rast duhet t prmendet edhe ana pozitive. N Kosov, fal angazhimit t institucioneve vendore dhe ndrkombtare, sht arritur nj progres n aspektin e gjendjes s
siguris dhe liris s lvizjes. Pr kt, si shembull konkret mund t prmendet Prizreni, ku
siguria, lvizja e lir, fjala e lir edhe n gjuhn rome, si dhe multietniciteti, e shoqrimi
midis pjestarve t komuniteteve t ndryshme sht i mir. Kt shembull do t duhej ta
ndiqnin edhe komunat tjera t Kosovs.
Komuna e Prizrenit, duke hartuar nj strategji pr kthimin e t zhvendosurve, hasi edhe
n problemin e kthimit t disa familjeve nga kampet prbrenda Kosovs.
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N momentin kur interesa t caktuara politike krkojn ndarjen e ktij korpusi, ather
paraqiten frikacak t llojllojshm politik dhe kombtar, si prfaqsues t bashksive t
ndryshme etnike.

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Esht shum e qart se ashkalinjt dhe egjiptiant jan nngrupe t popullit rom.
Gjithashtu duhet tu lejohet njerzve q t quhen ashtu si u plqen atyre. Problemi i cili
ekziston n lidhje me identitetin kombtar t romve, sht problem pr t cilin organizatat
ndrkombtare nuk dshirojn t diskutojn pr momentin. Mbetet t shihet nse kjo do t
shkaktoj edhe m tepr pengesa ndrmjet ktyre grupeve etnike n proceset politike t
Kosovs. Ashkalinjt nuk i pranojn egjiptiant, egjiptiant nuk i pranojn ashkalinjt.
Ashkalinjt pranojn se deri n nj mas t caktuar jan nngrup i romve.
Problemi i romve n Evropn Juglindore sht i till q ata identifikohen me popullin
shumic, pr kt arsye ekziston ndarja n rom shqiptar, rom serb, rom rumun, rom
hungarez, rom turq etj. Ashkalinjt dhe egjiptiant n Kosov flasin shqip, kryesisht
gjuhn jo-letrare. Ata nuk e njohin gjuhn rome ose e flasin shum pak, ndrsa shum dobt
flasin serbishten. Pra sht interesante q nj grup i till t favorizohet n jetn politike t
Kosovs dhe Metohis. Edhe pse n Kosov kan jetuar m s paku 100 000 rom, ata kan
numr t njjt t prfaqsuesve, sikur edhe t gjitha bashksit shum m t vogla n
Kosov.
Autoritetet e prkohshme t Kosovs dshirojn q pozitn e romve ta kthejn n
pozitn q e kan pasur para vitit 1999. Dhe me t vrtet ekzistojn redaksi, radio televizive dhe me t vrtet ekziston ndonj prfaqsues npr organet e larta, por t gjith e
dim se kjo jo vetm q nuk mjafton por as nuk paraqet kurrfar garancie se romt n
Kosov jetojn t lir dhe t sigurt. E aq m pak se jan t barabart me t tjert. Bazuar n
regjistrimin e brendshm t mbajtur n Kosov m 1997, rreth 98 770 jan deklaruar si
rom. Ndrsa sot n Kosov jetojn 18 727.
Ktyre shifrave t zymta mund tu shtojm edhe disa t tjera, dhe at se n Prishtin
deri n qershor t vitit 1999 kan jetuar 22 000 rom ndrsa sot jan 2 750, n Pej kan
qen 20.000 ndrsa sot jan 2500. N Gjilan nga 7 000 sa kan qen, numri sht zvogluar n 850. Nga 22 komuna t Kosovs dhe Metohis, n 21 prej tyre kan jetuar romt.
Madje edhe pse nuk kan qen t evidentuar, romt kan jetuar edhe n komunn e
Dragashit, para s gjithash n fshatin Mlike. N Mitrovic ka ekzistuar lagjja Rasadnik, e
cila ka qen njra prej lagjeve m t mdha t romve n Evrop. Ajo sot m nuk ekziston.
T njjtin fat e ka psuar edhe lagjja Moravska n Prishtin.
Sot ekzistojn tri kampe t romve n rrethinn e Mitrovics, n Zhitkoc, eshmeluk
dhe Kabllar, vende t ndotura me plumb. Q do t thot se edhe njerzit q jetojn atje jan
t kontaminuar me kt metal. Tek 63 fmij, prej 6 muaj deri n 8 vjet, sht vrtetuar
prania e plumbit n m shum se 650 mikrogram pr nj litr gjak, q sipas t dhnave t
Organizats Botrore t Shndetsis, paraqet nj rast t rrall n bot. Mjekt rekomandojn q pacientt me vetm 100 mikrogram t plumbit n gjak duhet t dislokohen nga
hapsira e kontaminuar. Ata ende jetojn atje.
Vetm rreth 10 % e romve kan mbetur ose jan kthyer pr t jetuar n trojet e tyre
shekullore. T ashtuquajturit prfaqsuesit politik t romve, n vitet e para t vendosjes s
administrats ndrkombtare jan munduar t sqarojn se si romt i gzojn t gjitha t
drejtat n Kosov.
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Kur bhet fjal pr romt nuk mund t mos prmenden kampet n Plemetin afr Kastriotit, si dhe ato n veri t Mitrovics ( Zhitkovc e Qeshmin Llug), si dhe kampet n
Serbin jugore e qendrore. Jeta e atyre q jetojn n ato kampe sht nn do nivel t jets
normale. N Plemetin, aktualisht jetojn 122 familje rome me afro 500 antar. Me rastin
e vizits ktij kampi, nj banor i tij (H.B.), i mllefosur nga gjendja e rnd, thoshte: Na
tuboni bre vlla t gjithve, na vendosni n nj rimorkio t kamionit, dhe na hidhni kudo
nuk mund t jetojm m kshtu. Kam vajzn gjasht vjeare, e shoh t smur, dhe nuk
kam si ti ndihmoj

Marr n prgjithsi, niveli intelektual i romve n Kosov deri diku sht i knaqshm.
Romt kan nj tradit t gjat t kulturs n shum fusha t artit, t muziks, t artit skenik
dhe atij t shkruar. Ata e pranojn realitetin kosovar. Por, edhe Kosova duhet ti pranoj ata,
duke i prkrahur prmes nj diskriminimi pozitiv, pr tu siguruar atyre shkollimin fillor,
t mesm, t lart dhe superior. Me kt do t siguroheshin parakushtet pr prfshirjen e
tyre n institucione t sistemit lokal dhe qendror.

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Edhe m e keqe sht situata e romve t zhvendosur n veri t Mitrovics. E.B., i vendosur n njrin nga kampet e atjeshme thot: shum ka t smur nga hekuri i teprt n
gjak. Tre fmij kan vdekur. Disa mjek ndrkombtar kan konstatuar se gjendja ktu n
kamp sht alarmante. Rreziku nga smundjet infektive sht i madh, por askush nuk
ndrmerr masa pr t na shruar.

Punsimi sht nj nga parakushtet pr ekzistenc t mtejshme t komunitetit rom. N

rrethanat aktuale, kur Kosova po ballafaqohet me nj situat t vshtir ekonomike, kjo m
s pari dhe m s teprmi reflektohet negativisht tek popullata rome, ngase shumica e tyre
nuk merren me ndonj biznes privat dhe nuk kan kushte pr t mbijetuar.
Sot, pjesa drmuese e romve si edhe t tjerve, nuk e gzojn t drejtn e ndihms
sociale. Gjat viteve t fundit, numri i romve q gzojn ndihma sociale po bie dukshm.
Pr kt prgjigjen duhet krkuar nga institucionet ndrkombtare, sepse, prmes nj
rregulloreje t miratuar nga ato sht prcaktuar se: T drejtn e ndihmave sociale e gzojn t gjith kosovart e papun. Por njra nga kushtet tjera pr t prfituar kt t drejt
(pr t marr 40-50 euro n muaj), sht q n familje duhet t ket fmij nn moshn pes
vjeare Kjo rregullore famoze si shihet, stimulon natalitetin, gj q m s teprmi e
prek popullatn rome, sepse shum nga ata ende nuk i gzojn ndihmat sociale, sepse nuk
kan fmij nn moshn pes vjeare.
Nga t gjitha kto del se duhet menduar pr krijimin e nj platforme reale, e cila do t
vendoste problemet e popullats rome n binart e duhur. Duke formuar nj institucion
qendror kosovar, q do t merrej me problemet e romve, e i cili do t inicionte, prmes
pushtetit lokal dhe atij qendror, shum ide, projekte e propozime dhe do ti verifikonte t
gjitha t arriturat apo ngecjet e romve, si jan veprimtarit e OJQ-ve rome, shkollimi n
gjuhn amtare, aty ku ka interesim pr t msuar gjuhn, kulturn, traditat rome etj. Kur
flitet pr kt, duhet theksuar se duhet vazhduar kontaktet dhe bashkpunimin e filluar me
ekspertt nga Universiteti Inalco n Franc. Edukimi parashkollor, tekstet shkollore,
shkollimi i mesm, ai i lart dhe superior, si dhe sigurimi i bursave pr shkollim duhet t
jen impuls pozitiv pr ngritjen e kapaciteteve edukative. Edhe mediat duhet t luajn rolin
e tyre, por aktualisht nuk ka asnj gazet n gjuhn rome, madje as javore. Ndihet edhe
mungesa e ndonj gazete pr femra, pr fmij, etj. Ndrkaq, jan disa emisione n gjuhn
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Jeta i ka demantuar m s miri n kt shtje. Ata prfaqsues kan dal nga nj situat
e cila ka qen e prkeqsuar nga psikoza e rnd e paslufts dhe frikn e diktuar nga ekstremistt shqiptar dhe ata jo q kan arritur ta parashtrojn problemin e romve n skenn
politike, por e kan fshehur at si dhe e kan mashtruar komunitetin ndrkombtar.

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N periudhn 1998-2000 n Kosov...rreth 150 rom jan vrar dhe kidnapuar nga
ekstremistt dhe bandat shqiptare. Sipas disa informatave ky numr sht shum m i lart.
Problemi qndron n at se askush nuk ka mundur t regjistroj dhe identifikoj viktimat
dhe romt e zhdukur. Disave prej tyre as sot e ksaj dite nuk u dihet fati.
Sot n Serbi jetojn rreth 60 000 rom t shprngulur nga Kosova dhe Metohia, n Mal
t Zi jetojn rreth 12 000, n Maqedoni jetojn disa mijra ndrsa shum kan ikur npr
vendet e tjera. Sipas t dhnave t ministris relevante t Gjermanis, atje jetojn rreth 50
000 rom nga Kosova dhe Metohia. Gjermania ka nnshkruar marrveshjen me UNMIKun pr kthimin e refugjatve nga Kosova dhe Metohija, duke filluar kt vit me ashkalinjt
dhe egjiptiant, ndrsa vitin tjetr edhe me romt. Planifikohet kthimi i 10 000 personave
t shprngulur nga Kosova t cilt momentalisht jetojn n Gjermani. Duke mos dashur t
komentoj rreth kontekstit etik t ksaj marrveshje (e cila i ndan njerzit n kombsi dhe
vlerson se pr disa sht sigurt q t kthehen ndrsa pr t tjert jo) dshiroj t vrtetoj
pohimin nga fillimi i tekstit se korpusi etnik rom shprndahet, ndahet ose bashkohet varsisht prej presioneve t caktua politike dhe shoqrore ndaj tyre.
N baz t ksaj marrveshje, ashkalinjt dhe egjiptiant jan t detyruar t kthehen n
Kosov dhe Metohi. Tani shumica prej tyre po deklarohen si rom dhe kjo krijon vshtirsi t shumta n mesin e autoriteteve gjermane pr planifikimin e kthimit t t shprngulurve
n Kosov dhe Metohi.
T shprngulurit rom nga Kosova dhe Metohia jetojn n kushte shum t vshtira n
Serbi. M shum se gjysma e tyre kan arritur t largohen nga vendi dhe t vendosen n
shtetet e Evrops Perndimore. Numri m i madh i tyre sht dashur q ti shesin pronat e
tyre n Kosov, nn do lloj mimi t tregut dhe me ato para t shkojn n vendet e treta.
Ata rom q kan mbetur n Serbi, jetojn n kushte shum t vshtira ekonomike, sociale
dhe shndetsore. Shumica e t shprngulurve nuk kan as dokumentet themelore personale dhe n kt mnyr nuk mund t realizojn t drejtat e tyre n mbrojtjen shndetsore
dhe sociale si persona t zhvendosur. Shum shpesh u rrezikohen edhe t drejtat themelore
t njeriut.
Pra, pr fardo lloj diskutimi pr pozitn politike t romve, pr t zhdukurit, pr kthimin e romve n Kosov dhe Metohi, pr kthimin e prons s tyre, pr sigurin e tyre,
forcimin e tyre ekonomik, punsimin dhe marrveshjet dmtuese q u jan shkaktuar, duhet
t formohet delegacioni i prfaqsuesve t popullit rom, t cilt n prani t organizatave
ndrkombtare do t mbajn bisedime me Qeverin e prkohshme t Kosovs.
Ata prfaqsues duhet t jen njerzit t ciln gjenden me shumicn e popullit t tyre t
shprngulur dhe t cilt e kan prfaqsuar popullin e tyre n Kosov dhe Metohi. Asnjri
prej ktyre prfaqsuesve nuk sht i gjykuar apo i prndjekur penalisht nga ana e pushtetit
kosovar. Vetm nj delegacion i till i formuar ka legjitimitet politik t bisedoj pr shtjet
politike dhe pr shtjet e tjera t romve n Kosov dhe Metohi.
18 gusht 2005
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Kur sht fjala pr formimin e nj institucioni q do t merrej me t gjitha problemet e

komunitetit rom, qofshin ato politike, ekonomike apo kulturore, duhet thn se ai, do t
mund t organizonte edhe seminare t ndryshme si dhe ligjrata mbi t drejtat e njeriut, t
drejtat e fmijve, pr tematik nga ekomonia e vogl, gazetaria, shndetsia, pastaj mbi t
drejtat e gruas, si dhe pr rrezikun nga droga, duhani, alkooli, etj. Gjithashtu, ai do t organizonte botimin e teksteve shkollore, librave, poezive, kngve popullore, e do t merrej
edhe me ruajtjen e trashgimis kulturore, organizimin e festivaleve kulturore etj. Po ashtu,
edhe n ministrit e Kosovs, kur jan n rend t dits shtjet e punsimit t romve, n
komisione do t duhej t ket edhe pjestar t ktij komuniteti, jo vetm pr shkak t demokratizimit, por edhe pr thyerjen e paragjykimeve. Kjo edhe pr arsye se shum her
romt nuk gzojn t drejtn e punsimit n Ministrit apo institucionet tjera, kurse pjesmarrja n komisione e pjestarve t ktij komuniteti nuk sht praktikuar deri m tash.
Mendoj se projektet e financuara nga donatort pr punsimin e prestarve t komunitetit
rom duhet t verifikohen, sepse deri m tash edhe pse jan dhn mjete t konsiderueshme,
nuk jan arritur rezultate t knaqshme. Shumica e projekteve pr romt jan realizuar n
bashkpunim me popullatn shumic. Ndoshta, pr mossukses mund t fajsohen edhe
synimet pr prfitime materiale. Nuk mund t konsiderohet sukses nj shum e aprovuar
mjetesh ngas donatort pr nj koncert njorsh, apo pr ndonj koktej. do projekt i financuar duhet ta ket parasysh efektin dhe suksesin e arritur.

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rome q emetohen n disa radiostacione lokale, nga t cilat ka edhe njorshe, kurse n
RTK sht nj emision televiziv prej 20 minutash.

Pozita momentale e romve sht shum e rnd, si n aspektin politik, social, ekomomik, kulturor, etj. Pr t arritur nj prparim n kt drejtim tani sht rasti i mir q institucionet vendore dhe ndrkombtare, n bashkpunim me forcat intelektuale t bashksis
rome, t rishikojn mundsin e nnshkrimit t Dokumentit Dekada e Romve, t cilin
Dokument Kosova nuk e ka nnshkruar, pr shkak t situats kalimtare q po kalon. Dokumentin n fjal e kan nnshkruar vendet e Evrops Juglindore, dhe ai program financohet
nga Banka Botrore dhe Fondacioni Soros. T gjithat shtetet fqinje tashm kan filluar
implementimin e projekteve t tyre, kurse romt e Kosovs ende jo.
Duhet menduar seriozisht edhe pr kthimin e romve npr vendet e puns, ku kan
punuar m par.
Pas peripecive t mdha t paslufts, tani Kosova sht n fazn e konsolidimit. Kultura sht element i cili tani sht m se i nevojshm, sidomos pr komunitetin rom, sepse
me kt bhet hapi i par drejt bashkjetess, e cila sht kusht pr nj Kosov shumetnike
e demokratike. Kt e bjn bashkrisht shum komunitete, prmes projekteve t ndryshme, e pse mos ta bjn kt edhe romt, sepse edhe ata jan qytetar t Kosovs me t
drejta t barabarta, sikur gjith t tjert.
N fund, t ceki edhe kt se sht fatkeqsi q komunitet rom ishte me shekuj i pafat.
Por sht fat i madh q Kosova po ndrton fatin e saj, e njkohsisht besoj edhe fatin e
romve dhe t pjestarve t komuniteteve tjera q jetojn n Kosov. Konkretisht, ka
mund ti ofrojn romt Kosovs? Natyrisht, ata nuk disponojn ndonj kapital financiar,
por mund t japin nj ndihmes me punn e tyre intelektuale, shpirtrore e kulturore. Me
romt Kosova do t jet edhe m e pasur.
18 gusht 2005
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Politiki poloaj Roma na Kosovu

Pie: Ljuan Koka, politikolog, novinar i predsednik Izvrnog odbora Nacionalnog saveta
romske nacionalne manjine SCG

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Romi su definitivno najvea kolateralna teta sukoba na Kosovu i Metohiji. Dananji

poloaj i problemi sa kojima se suoavaju Romi toliko su teki i kompleksni da se ni u
jednom segmentu njihovog ivota i bivstvovanja ne mogu nai pouzdani podaci i pouzdane
injenice od kojih bi se krenulo u postavljanju, makar i u najosnovnijim crtama, problema
Roma sa Kosova i Metohije i strategija njihovog reavanja.
Romi su danas ugroeni i politiki i drutveno i ekonomski i sve vie kao entitet, tako
da kada govorimo o njihovom politikom poloaju na Kosovu i Metohiji, odmah moramo
da objanjavamo, i pre nego to postavimo problem njihove participacije u politikom
ivotu Kosova i Metohije.
Dakle, Romi su danas na Kosovu razbijeni na Rome, Akalije i Egipane. Meunarodne
organizacije sve vie u svojim raportima koriste skraenicu RAE, koja moe da ima
razne drutvene i politike implikacije po korpus naroda koji se zove Romi. Dakle, na
Kosovu danas postoje tri zajednice koje su, moda, i suprotstavljene i koje bivstvuju u politikom ivotu Kosova kao najobiniji politiki folklor. Naime, kada drutvene i politike
prilike odgovaraju, taj korpus naroda se izjanjava kao Romi. Kada odreene politike interesne sfere na Kosovu trae podelu tog korupusa, onda se pojavljuju raznorazni politiki i
nacionalni poltroni, kao predstavnici raznih etnikih zajednica. Jasno je da su Akalije i
Egipani podgrupe romskog naroda. Isto tako, treba da se dozvoli ljudima da se izjanjavaju
onako kako se oni oseaju. Problem koji postoji sa etnikim identitetom kod Roma je problem koji meunarodne organizacije ne ele u ovom momentu da razmatraju. Da li e to u
politikim procesima na Kosovu jo vie produbiti jaz izmeu ovih etnikih zajednica,
ostaje da se vidi. Akalije ne priznaju Egipane, Egipani ne priznaju Akalije. Akalije
priznaju u krajnjoj instanci da su podgrupa Roma.
Problem Roma u jugoistonoj Evropi je takav da se oni identifikuju sa veinskim narodom, pa postoji podela na albanske Rome, srpske Rome, rumunske Rome, maarske Rome,
turske Rome itd. Akalije i Egipani na Kosovu govore albanskim, uglavnom neknjievnim,
jezikom. Romski jezik ne znaju, ili ga vrlo malo govore, a veoma slabo koriste i srpski
jezik. Dakle, takva grupacija je interesantna za favorizovanje u politikom ivotu Kosova
i Metohije. Iako je na Kosovu ivelo najmanje 100.000 Roma, oni imaju isti broj predstavnika kao i sve druge mnogo manje zajednice na Kosovu i Metohiji.
Privremene vlasti na Kosovu hitaju da poloaj Roma vrate na poziciju kakvu su imali
pre 1999. godine. I stvarno postoje televizijske i radijske redakcije, i zaista ima nekog
predstavnika u najviem predstavnikom telu, ali svi znamo da to ne samo to nije dovoljno, nego to nije nikakva garancija da Romi na Kosovu i Metohiji ive slobodno i bezbedno.
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Poboljati poloaj Roma na Kosovu

Pie: Kujtim Paaku, urednik romske redakcije Radio Yeni Donem u Prizrenu,
publicista i knjievnik.

Romi i nadalje ostaju marginalizovani krug drutva. Njima nedostaje u prvom redu
obrazovanje i kolsko vaspitanje, usled nedostatka uslova za kolovanje. Krivicu za to,
pored samih pripadnika romske zajednice, snosi i veinska nacionalna zajednica na Kosovu, zbog toga to je stvoreno stereotipno shvatanje romske zajednice uopte, jer se polazi
od negativnih predubeenja, na osnovu kojih se Romima prilazi sa filozofskog naela
imati, a ne postojati, umesto da je suprotno, postojati, a zatim imati.

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Ve due vreme, Romi na Kosovu, ali i ire, suoavaju se, naalost, sa istim problemima koji se negativno odraavaju na njihovo integrisanje u zdravo civilizovano drutvo.
Nijedna institucija, bilo politika, socijalna ili kulturna, nije se ozbiljno bavila prevazilaenjem ovih problema. Uinjeno je nekoliko pokuaja, ali bez krajnjih rezultata.

Ovom prilikom treba pomenuti i afirmativnu stranu da je na Kosovu, zahvaljujui

angaovanju domaih i meunarodnih institucija, postignut znaajan napredak u pogledu
bezbednosti i slobode kretanja. U tom pravcu kao primer moe posluiti Prizren, gde su
bezbednost, sloboda kretanja, sloboda izraavanja na romskom jeziku, multietninost i
druenje meu pripadnicima razliitih nacionalnosti - na viem nivou. Ovaj primer bi trebalo da slede i druge optine na Kosovu.
Optina Prizren je tokom izrade strategije za povratak raseljenih naila i na problem
povratka nekih porodica iz kampova na Kosovu. Kada je re o Romima, ne moe se izbei
pominjanje kampova u Plemetini kod Obilia, onih na severu Mitrovice (itkovac i esmin
Lug) kao i kampova u junoj i centralnoj Srbiji. ivot Roma koji borave u tim kampovima
je ispod svakog nivoa normalnog ivljenja. U Plemetini trenutno boravi 122 romske porodice sa oko 500 lanova. Prilikom posete tom kampu, jedan njegov stanovnik, ozlojeen
zbog teke situacije, rekao je: sakupite sve nas, brate, tovarite nas u kamion ili prikolicu i
bacite nas bilo gde, ne moemo vie iveti ovako. Imam estogodinju kerku, gledam je
bolesnu, a nemam mogunosti da joj pomognem. Jo je gora situacija iseljenih Roma na
severu Mitrovice. E.B, koji je smeten u jednom od tamonjih kampova, kae: Ima mnogo
bolesnih od vika gvoa u krvi. Troje dece nam je umrlo. Neki meunarodni lekari su
konstatovali da je stanje u ovim kampovima alarmantno, preti nam opasnost od irenja
zaraznih bolesti, a niko ne preduzima nita da to sprei ili da izlei bolesne.
Uopte uzev, intelektualni nivo Roma na Kosovu je donekle zadovoljavajui. Romi
imaju duu kulturnu tradiciju u mnogim oblastima umetnosti, kao to su muzika, scenska,
a i pisana umetnost. Oni su prihvatili kosovsku realnost, ali i Kosovo treba da prihavti njih
i da obezbedi pozitivnu deskriminaciju da bi se obezbedilo njihovo kolovanje u osnovnom, srednjem, viem i visokom obrazovanju. Time bi se obezbedili preduslovi za
njihovo ukljuivanje u institucije sistema, kako na lokalnom, tako i na centralnom nivou.
Zapoljavanje je jedan od osnovnih preduslova za dalji opstanak romske zajednice, jer
se teka ekonomska situacija sa kojom je suoeno Kosovo, najpre i najvie negativno
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A jo manje jednako sa drugima. Na Kosovu i Metohiji 1997. godine, prema internom

popisu koji je raen na podruju ove june pokrajine, kao Romi su se izjasnili 98.770 osoba. Danas ih na Kosovu ima 18.727.

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Ovim sumornim brojkama moemo samo da dodamo jo neke, a to da je u Pritini do

juna 1999. godine ivelo 22.000 Roma, a sada ih je 2.750, u Pei je bilo 20.000, dok ih je
sada 2.500. U Gnjilanu se od 7.000, broj Roma sveo na 850. Od 22 optine na Kosovu i
Metohiji, u 21 optini su iveli Romi. Iako ih u optini Draga nije bilo u evidenciji, Romi
su i tamo iveli, pre svega u selu Mljike. U Kosovoskoj Mitrovici postojalo je romsko
naselje Rasadnik, koje je bilo jedno od najveih naselja Roma u Evropi. Ono danas ne
postoji. Slina sudbina zadesila je i naselje Moravska u Pritini.
Danas postoje tri kampa sagraena za Rome u okolini Kosovske Mitrovice - u itkovcu,
esminom Lugu i Kablaru, na prostoru koji je zatrovan olovom. Ljudi koji tamo ive zatrovani su tim metalom. Kod 63 dece, starih od est meseci do osam godina, utvrena
koncentracija olova vea od 650 mikrograma po litru krvi, to je, prema podacima Svetske
zdravstvene organizacije, jedinstven sluaj u svetu. Lekari preporuuju da ve sa 100
mikrograma olova u krvi, pacijenti budu raseljeni iz kontaminiranog podruja. Oni tamo
jo uvek ive.
Dakle, danas je oko 10 odsto Roma je ostalo ili se vratilo na svoja vekovna ognjita.
Samozvani politiki predstavnici Roma su pokuali da u prvim godinama meunarodne
uprave nad Kosovom i Metohijom objasne kako Romi imaju sva prava na Kosovu i Metohiji. ivot ih je u tome najbolje demantovao. Ti predstavnici su proizali iz jedne situacije
koja je bila optereena tekom ratnom psihozom i strahom koji su diktirali albanski ekstremisti i oni ne samo da nisu uspeli da na politikoj sceni iznesu problem Roma, nego su
ga veto skrivali i meunarodnu javnost teko obmanjivali.
U periodu od 1998. do 2000. godine, na Kosovu i Metohiji su albanski ekstremisti i
bande ubili i kidnapovali najmanje 150 Roma. Prema nekim informacijama, taj broj je
mnogo vei. Problem je to niko nije uspeo da zabelei i identifikuje rtve i nestale Rome.
Nekima se i ni danas ne zna sudbina.
Danas u Srbiji ima oko 60.000 Roma izbeglih i raseljenih sa Kosova i Metohije, u Crnoj
Gori ih je 12.000, u Makedoniji nekoliko hiljada, a mnogi su izbegli u druge zemlje. Samo
u Nemakoj, prema podacima tamonjeg resornog ministarstva, nalazi se oko 50.000 Roma
sa Kosova i Metohije. Nemaka je nedavno potpisala ugovor sa UNMIK-om o vraanju
izbeglica sa Kosova i Metohije, u ovoj godini pre svega Akalija i Egipana, a u narednoj
i Roma. Planira se povratak 10.000 izbeglih sa Kosova koji se trenutno nalaze u Nemakoj.
Ne raspravljajui u ovom tekstu o pravnom i etikom kontekstu ovog ugovora (koji ljude
deli na nacije i smatra da je za jedne bezbedno, a za druge nije), elim samo da potvrdim
konstataciju sa poetka teksta da se romski etniki korpus raspada i deli ili se ujedinjuje
kada postoje odreeni drutveni i politiki pritisci na njega. Akalije i Egipani su primorani ovim ugovorom da budu vraeni na Kosovo i Metohiju. Oni se sada u Nemakoj
masovno izjanjavaju kao Romi da ne bi bili vraeni i to ini izuzetne tekoe nemakim
vlastima u njihovom planiranju vraanja izbeglih na Kosovo i Metohiju.
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odraava na romsko stanovnitvo, s obzirom da njegov najvei deo nema uslova da se bavi
nekim privatnim biznisom, pa su zato i njihovi ivotni uslovi veoma teki.

Iz ovoga proizilazi da treba razmiljati o stvaranju realne platforme koja bi smestila u

normalni kolosek nagomilane probleme romske zajednice. Formiranjem jedne centralne
kosovske institucije koja bi se bavila problemima Roma i koja bi u saradnji sa lokalnim i
centralnim organima samouprave inicirala reavanje problema i lansirala nove ideje, predloge i projekte, obezbedilo bi se utvrivanje dostignua, ali i zastoja u ivotu ove zajednice,
od delovanja nevladinih organizacija do obrazovanja na romskom jeziku, izuavanja jezika, tamo gde postoje uslovi, ouvanja romske kulture, tradicije itd. Kada je o tome re,
treba istai potrebu da se nastavi zapoeta saradnja sa strunjacima Univerziteta Inalko
(Inalco) u Francuskoj.

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Danas najvei deo Roma, kao uostalom i drugih, ne uiva pravo na socijalnu pomo.
Poslednjih godina ak opada broj romskih porodica koje primaju takvu nadoknadu. Zato
je tako, odgovor treba traiti od meunarodne administracije, jer je jednom njenom uredbom odreeno da pravo na socijalnu pomo uivaju svi nezaposleni graani Kosova, ali
je jedan od uslova za sticanje tog prava (za naknadu u visini od 40-50 evra) da porodica ima
decu mlau od 5 godina. Ta famozna uredba, kao to se moe videti, stimulie natalitet,
a to najvie pogaa romsku zajednicu, koja ionako ima visoki prirodni prirataj, s obzirom
da je jo uvek broj porodica koja ne uivaju ovu pomo veliki.

Predkolsko vaspitanje, obezbeenje kolskih udbenika, srednje, vie i visoko obrazovanje, kao i obezbeivanje stipendija za obrazovanje, treba da budu pozitivni impulsi za
podizanje vaspitnih kapaciteta. Ogromnu ulogu u tom pogledu imaju sredstva informisanja, ali trenutno nema nijednog lista na romskom jeziku, ak ni nedeljnika. Osea se potreba
i za izdavanjem nekog lista ili asopisa za ene, za decu itd. U lokalnim radio stanicama
ima nekih emisija na romskom jeziku, od kojih su neke jednoasovne, a Radiotelevizija
Kosova emituje dvadesetominutnu nedeljnu emisiju na romskom jeziku.
Kada je re o formiranju pomenute institucije koja bi se bavila svim problemima pripadnika romske zajednice, bilo da su oni politiki, ekonomski ili kulturni, treba istai da bi
ona mogla da organizuje razne seminare i predavanja o pravima oveka, dejim pravima,
o problemima male privrede, novinarstva, zdravstva, pravima ena, zatim o opasnosti od
upotrebe droge, duvana i aklohola itd. Isto tako, ova institucija bi organizovala tampanje
kolskih udbenika, knjiga, poezije, narodnih pesama, a bavila bi se i ouvanjem kulturnog
naslea, organizovanjem raznih kulturnih i sportskih manifestacija.
Kada je re o zapoljavanju Roma, naroito u ministarstvima i drugim institucijama
Kosova, u komisijama za prijem bi trebalo da budu predstavljeni i Romi, ne samo zbog
demokratinosti, ve i zbog ruenja predrasuda, jer su oni do sada vrlo retko imali prilike
da se zaposle u nekom ministarstvu ili u drugim vladinim institucijama, a ni u komisijama
za prijem nije bilo predstavnika romske zajednice. Smatram da bi trebalo proveriti i realizaciju projekata za zapoljavanje Roma, koji su finansirani od stranih donatora, jer su dosada u ovom pogledu postignuti mali rezultati. Vei deo projekata za Rome ostvaren je u
saradnji sa veinskim stanovnitvom, ali razloge za neuspeh moda treba traiti i u tenjama
pojedinaca za materijalnom dobiti. Ne moe se smatrati uspehom ako su sredstva donatora
koriena za organizovanje nekog jednoasovnog koncerta, ili koktela. Svaki projekat koji
se finansira treba da ima za cilj efekat i uspeh.
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Raseljeni Romi sa Kosova i Metohije ive veoma teko u Srbiji. Vie od polovine raseljenih je uspelo da napusti zemlju i sada se nalazi u zemljama zapadne Evrope. Najvei
broj njih je morao ispod svake trisne cene da proda svoja imanja, kue i stanove na Kosovu i Metohiji i sa tim novcem ode u tree zemlje. Ti Romi koji su ostali u Srbiji, ive u
vrlo tekim ekonomskim, socijalnim i zdravstvenim uslovima. Veliki broj raseljenih nema
ni osnovna lina dokumenta i na taj nain ne mogu da ostvaruju svoja prava na zdravstvenu
i socijalnu zatitu kao raseljena lica. esto su im ugroena i najosnovnija ljudska prava.
Dakle, za bilo kakvu raspravu o politikom poloaju Roma, o nestalima, o povratku
Roma na Kosovo i Metohiju, o vraanju njihove imovine, o njihovoj bezbednosti, ekonomskom osnaivanju, zapoljavanju i tetnim ugovorima koji su sklapani, potrebno je da se
saini delegacija predstavnika romskog naroda koji e uz prisustvo meunarodnih organizacija voditi razgovore sa privremenom Vladom Kosova. Ti predstavnici moraju biti
ljudi koji se nalaze sa veinom svog naroda u izbeglitvu i koji su svoj narod predstavljali
na Kosovu i Metohiji. Nijedan od tih predstavnika nije osuivan, niti su ih krivino gonile
kosovske vlasti. Jedino tako formirana delegacija ima politiki legitimitet da razgovara o
politikom poloaju i o drugim pitanjima Roma na Kosovu i Metohiji.
18. avgust 2005.

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Trenutni poloaj Roma na Kosovu je veoma teak, kako u politikom, tako i u ekonomskom, socijalnom i kulturnom pogledu. Da bi se postigao napredak u tom pravcu,
meunarodne i domae institucije imaju dobru priliku da, u saradnji sa intelektualnim snagama iz romske zajednice, preispitaju mogunost potpisivanja dokumenta Decenija
Roma, koji Kosovo nije potpisalo zbog situacije u kojoj se nalazi. Pomenuti dokumenat
su ve potpisale zemlje jugoistone Evrope i taj projekat finansiraju Svetska banka i Fondacija Soros. Sve susedne zemlje su ve poele realizaciju svojih projekata na osnovu tog
dokumenta, ali Romi Kosova jo nisu nita preduzeli u tom pravcu.

Nakon velikih posleratnih peripetija, Kosovo se sada nalazi u fazi konsolidacije. Kultura je sada jedan od vanijih inilaca, naroito za romsku zajednicu, jer se njome ini prvi
korak ka zajednikom ivljenju, koje je vaan uslov za stvaranje multietnikog i demokratskog Kosova, a ono e se stvoriti samo zajednikim radom i projektima predstavnika svih etnikih zajednica, pa samim tim i kosovskih Roma, jer su i oni graani Kosova sa
jednakim pravima kao i svi drugi.

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Trebalo bi ozbiljnije razmiljati i o povratku Roma na njihova stara radna mesta. Ali, i
ako im bude ponueno neko radno mesto sa veom odgovornou, oni bi trebalo da vode
rauna da se ne deavaju greke, kao ranije, pa da se za mesto novinara, na primer, odredi
elektriar, jer njegov neuspeh na poslu ima posledice ne samo po Rome, ve i ire po
drutvo.

Na kraju bih istakao i ovo: nesrea je da je romska zajednica vekovima bila nesrena,
ali je velika srea to Kosovo gradi svoju sudbinu, koja e biti i sudbina Roma, kao to je i
sudbina svih drugih nacionalnih zajednica koje ive na Kosovu.
ta konkretno Romi mogu ponuditi Kosovu? Poto ne raspolau nekim znaajnim
privrednim i finansijskim kapitalom, oni mogu dati svoj doprinos intelektualnim, duhovnim
i kulturnim angaovanjem. Tako e Kosovo i sa Romima biti bogatije.
18. avgust 2005.

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Handball clubs from Kosovo prematurely admitted into EHF

By Bozidar Djurkovic, the General Secretary of the Handball Association of Serbia and
a member of the Arbitration Commission of the European Handball Federation (EHF)
Politics can have a great influence in sports, although it
is inappropriate and undesirable. This was recently proven
once more, by the admission of Kosovo into the European
Handball Federation (EHF) as an associate member.

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I must say that this did not take place suddenly, out of
the blue. Kosovo submitted an application at the EHF Congress held in April 2004 in Cyprus. At that time, upon my
insisting, this application was taken off the agenda. However, at an extraordinary EHF congress in December Kosovo was granted the status of associate member.

Bozidar Djurkovic

This means that they do not have a "chair" in the EHF -they cannot vote, they have no national team, they have no
right to the national flag or anthem, etc. However, this associate member status enables their teams to compete in European cups under the name Kosovo - Serbia-Montenegro.

It is true that their clubs have not competed, either in Serbia or in Europe, for ten
years.
I asked the heads of the EHF to explain to me how Kosovo could have been admitted.
This was in violation of the Statute of the European Handball Federation, which says that
only national sports associations can be admitted, which was not the case with Kosovo
then, nor it is now.
I was told that the handball clubs from Kosovo have been left out for a long time, that
they are practically under sanctions, that they have no training for referees, controllers,
delegates or coaches, and that this was why the EHF decided to help them.
It is the stand of the Handball Association of Serbia-Montenegro, and especially of the
Handball Association of Serbia, of which I am general secretary, that Kosovo's admission
is absolutely unacceptable.
I believe it is too early to speak about possible matches of Serbia-Montenegro teams
with teams from Kosovo. I would like us never to meet, for many reasons. We once met
with handball officials from Kosovo when we were in Vienna, and offered that their teams
join the competitions in Serbia. They rejected, saying that they would thus recognize the
state of Serbia.
It is my personal opinion that our teams should not play clubs from Kosovo. I believe
we would thus recognize Kosovo as a separate state.
Naturally, I cannot say at this moment what would be the consequences. The EHF is
very strict in these matters, but I personally hope that we would not play them.
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Kosovos sport can only breathe as much as politics allows it

Belul Beqaj, Secretary General of Kosovos Olympic Association (AOK)

On the one hand, Kosovo political parties want to use

the increase of interest among young people in sports for
Belul Beqaj
their political gains. They are trying to gain votes, even at
the cost of violating the autonomy of AOK, of federations, associations, clubs and sports
facilities, instead of fully respecting their independence.

Forum

In many countries of the world, politics is in service of

sport, whereas it is the opposite in Kosovos case. Therefore
the slogan that the politics should not interfere in sport is
being turned into the most serious obstacle for the affirmation and improvement of the quality of sport in Kosovo.
Consequently, as a result of this approach, sport in Kosovo
is suffering doubly.

Initially, the politicians had seized the opportunity from the lack of a Law on Sport,
whereas recently (in particular in Football) the Law is being misinterpreted and misused,
according to the demands and motives of the political parties. Therefore, the political parties in Kosovo directly link the interest in sport, with the possibility of extending their political influence and gaining voters; not with the social, cultural, human, and health mission
that the sport should carry.
In fact, the resolution of Kosovos political status would have been accelerated, if
Kosovos political groups had taken a just and principled stand towards sport, and resolving the status of Kosovos federations in their respective international families. This could
have speeded up matters on the political front, because resolving the status of the federations, as it was the case with the Kosovo Federations of Ping-Pong and Handball, could
stand as an example and a way forward on the political front.
But Kosovos politicians are more interested in gaining votes than in resolving of status
of the federations. If they had understood the role of sport properly, they would have understood the need for resolving the status of Kosovar federations and Kosovos status as well.
If they had understood the role of sport properly, as they are obliged to do, according to the
Regulation on The Establishment a Department of Sport, which among others outlines: The
Department can make political reformations to the Interim Administrative Council through
the DSRSG, Kosovo politicians would have been aware that the boxer of Kosovan
origin, Luan Krasniqi, has reconciled more Kosovars and Albanians than any Minister of
sport or any head of any community. Whereas, the Kosovo President, whom the others told
about the European Champion in boxing, wrapped up Luans success with his flag.
Secondly, although we had hoped that better days for sport in Kosovo would come,
Kosovo sportspeople continue to be discriminated against by internationals. By isolating
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This season, Kosovo has six teams in European cups, and it is not competing only in the
Champions' League. I know the teams they will be playing and I think the teams from
Kosovo will not pass into the second round.
Still, if we are speaking in hypothetical terms, one should also raise the issue of security during these matches.
I am certain that we could guarantee security at matches played on our territory. However, how could teams from Serbia have normal match conditions in a region where international forces have been unable to guarantee basic safety?

Forum

I know the EHF cannot have influence on whether teams from Serbia-Montenegro and
from Kosovo would meet or not. The procedure is such that the opponents are chosen in a
draw and, theoretically, it is very possible. Our teams were not coupled in this first draw.
I believe Kosovo obtained the status of associate member in the EHF prematurely. The
EHF has rushed it and I told this to their heads. This decision should have been postponed
until after the final status of Kosovo has been determined. No other European sports federation, except that for table tennis, has brought a similar decision.
But there have been developments in other sports. The so-called Kosovo national team
played at certain basketball tournaments, for example.
Still, what happened in handball was premature. They could have waited for a while
longer, and this is why I believe that the European Handball Federation has crossed from
the sports to the political sphere in an very inappropriate way.
August 24, 2005

Ekipet kosovare t hendbollit u pranuan shum hert n EHF

Shkruan: Bozhidar Gjurkoviq, sekretar i prgjithshm i Federats s Hendbollit t Serbis, dhe antar i Komisionit t Arbitrazhit t EHF-s
Politika mund t ket ndikim t madh n sport, edhe pse nuk do t duhej dhe nuk do t
ishte e dshirueshme. Nj gj e till edhe ka ndodhur para pak kohe, n rastin konkret t
pranimit t Kosovs si antar i bashkngjitur i Federats Evropiane t Hendbollit (EHF).
Por m duhet t them se nj ngjarje e till nuk ka qen e papritur, respektivisht se nuk
ka rn prej qiellit. Kosova ka drguar krkes pr pranim n kongresin e EHF-s t mbajtur n prill t vitit 2004 n Qipro. Me insistimin tim, ajo krkes sht hequr nga rendi i
dits. Sidoqoft, pas ksaj pasoi kongresi i jashtzakonshm n dhjetor dhe Kosova fitoi
statusin e antarit t bashkngjitur.
Kjo do t thot se ata nuk kan t drejt t ken karrige n EHF, nuk mund t votojn,
nuk kan t drejt t ken ekip kombtar, ngritje t flamurit, himn etj. Megjithat ky status
u mundson ekipeve t tyre t marrin pjes n kupat evropiane me emrin Kosova Serbia
dhe Mali i Zi.
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Kosovars from participation in the international arena (except in ping-pong and partially in
handball), they are doing the same as what the Serb regime did - prohibiting them to exercise sport independently.
De facto and de jure, the international officials have fallen completely under the influence of politics power over sport, due to the fact that the non-allowance of Kosovar sportspeople to participate in the international arena is linked directly to non resolution of Kosovos status. The most clear-cut case is with FIBA, whose rules allow for membership by
autonomous federations, such as Palestine, Gibraltar and Singapore. However FIBA refused the lawful request by the Kosovo Federation of Basketball, because of political motivations. The application of double standards there indicates that the decisions of this Association are politically influenced.

The slogan that politics should not interfere with sport has taken on the opposite meaning. From the concept elaborated above, it would result in Luan Krasniqi being stripped of
the European championship if he were to box officially for Kosovo. In the end Kosovo
sports can breathe only as much as politics allows it. The more popular sport becomes, the
more the aspirations for political control over it, will increase.

Forum

This is the reason that Kosovo Federation of Basketball has submitted an appeal to
KAS Court in Louisiana.

August 24, 2005

Sporti i Kosovs mund t frymoj vetm aq sa ka interes politika

Shkruan: Belul Beqaj, sekretar i prgjithshm i Asociacionit Olimpik t Kosovs
N shum vende t bots politika sht n shrbim t sportit, ndrsa n Kosov ndodh
e kundrta. Prandaj, sllogani shum i prfolur se politika nuk duhet t przihet n sport
aktualisht po shndrrohet n pengesn m serioze pr afirmimin, masivizimin dhe ngritjen e
kualitetit t sporteve n Kosov. Si pasoj e ksaj qasje, mbase, sporti kosovar po pson n
mnyr t dyfisht.
N njrn an, subjektet politike kosovare dshirojn q shtimin e interesimit t rinis
pr sport pr ta instrumentalizuar pr nevoja t veta partiake, duke prfituar votuesit dhe
simpatizantt potencial, edhe me mim t cenimit t autonomis s AOK-ut, federatave,
shoqatave, klubeve dhe objekteve sportive, duke ndrhyr n mnyr arbitrare ose duke instaluar kuadrot partiake n udhheqsi t subjekteve dhe objekteve sportive, n vend se t
respektohet plotsisht pacenueshmria e ksaj sfere t shoqris civile.
Fillimisht, politikant e kan shfrytzuar mosekzistimin e Ligjit pr Sport, ndrsa n
rastet e fundit ky Ligj po keqinterpretohet dhe keqprdoret (si sht rasti n futboll), n
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sht e vrtet se klubet e tyre pr m se 10 vite nuk kan marr pjes n asnj gar
sportive, as n Serbi e as n Evrop.
Kam krkuar nga zyrtart e EHF-s q t sqarojn se si ka mundur t vie deri te pranimi
i Kosovs. Kjo ka qen n kundrshtim me statusin e EHF-s, n t cilin theksohet se
vetm federatat kombtare sportive mund t pranohen, ndrsa Kosova n at moment nuk
ka qen e till, e nuk sht as tani.
Shpjegimi q m sht dhn ishte se klubet e hendbollit t Kosovs kan qen pr nj
koh t gjat t mbyllura, se praktikisht jan nn sanksione, se nuk kan trajnim t gjyqtarve, kontrollorve, delegatve, trajnerve dhe se pr kt arsye u kan dal n ndihm.

Forum

Qndrimi i Federats s Hendbollit t Serbis dhe Malit t Zi, e sidomos i Federats s

Hendbollit t Serbis, ku un jam sekretar i prgjithshm, sht se absolutisht jemi kundr
pranimit t till.
Mendoj se n kt moment sht e teprt t flitet pr ndeshje eventuale me ekipet e
Kosovs, sepse kjo do t mund t paragjykonte shum gjra.
Do t doja q kurr t mos takohemi dhe kjo pr shum arsye. Ne e kemi pasur nj
bised me punonjsit e hendbollit, me shqiptart e Kosovs kur kemi qen n Vjen dhe u
kemi ofruar q ekipet e tyre t kyen n garat e territorit t Serbis. Ata e kan refuzuar
kt, duke thn se me kt ata do ta njihnin shtetin e Serbis.
Mendimi im personal sht q n rast se vjen deri te takimet e tilla, ather ekipet tona
nuk do t duhej t luajn me ekipet e Kosovs. Sepse n at mnyr edhe ne do ta pranonim Kosovn si shtet t veant.
Sigurisht, se pr momentin nuk mund t them se cilat do t ishin pasojat e ksaj.
Federata e Hendbollit sht shum rigoroze kur jan n pyetje gjra t tilla, dhe personalisht shpresoj se nuk do t luajn.
Kt sezon, Kosova ka gjasht prfaqsues n kupat evropiane dhe nuk merr pjes
vetm n lign e kampionve. Un i njoh ekipet kundrshtare t tyre dhe e di se ekipet nga
Kosova nuk do t mund t kalojn n rrethin e dyt.
Nse flasim n mnyr hipotetike, duhet t shtrohet edhe shtja e siguris s ndeshjeve.
Jam i sigurt se n territorin ton, n Republikn e Serbis, mund t garantojm siguri. Por,
atje ku as forcat ndrkombtare nuk jan n gjendje t ofrojn siguri maksimale, nuk jam i
sigurt se ekipet e Serbis do t mund t kishin kushte normale pr loj, duke pasur parasysh
ngjarjet e ktyre viteve t fundit.
E di se Federata Evropiane e Hendbollit nuk do t ndikoj n at nse ekipet nga SMZja dhe Kosova do t takohen ose jo. Thjesht, procedura sht e till q iftet caktohen me
trheqjen e shortit dhe teorikisht kjo sht e mundur. Sidoqoft, n trheqjen e par t
shortit, ekipet tona dhe t atyre nuk jan takuar.
Mendoj se Kosova e ka marr statusin e antarit t bashkngjitur t EHF-s, m hert
se q sht dashur. Federata Evropiane e Hendbollit sht ngutur dhe un ia kam sqaruar
kt zyrtarve t EHF-s. S pari sht dashur t pritet zgjidhja e statusit final t Kosovs.
Asnj federat tjetr evropiane nuk e ka br nj veprim t till, pos asaj t pingpongut.
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N fakt, sikur faktori politik kosovar t kishte qndrim t drejt dhe parimor ndaj sportit,
n kuptim t mbshtetjes s fuqishme t sportit dhe zgjidhjes s statusit t federatave n
familjet homonime ndrkombtare, shum do ta prshpejtonte edhe zgjidhjen e statusit politik t Kosovs, meq m leht zgjidhet statusi i federatave sportive, si ka br Federata e
Ping-Pongut dhe ajo e Hendbollit, sesa statusi politik i Kosovs. Por, politikanve kosovar
m shum u interesojn prfitimi i votuesit se sa zgjidhja e statusit t federatave apo Kosovs!
Sikur ta kishin kuptuar si duhet rolin e sportit dhe nevojn pr zgjidhjen e statusit t sportit
kosovar ata s paku do t vepronin ashtu si kan obligim sipas Rregullores mbi themelimin
e Departamentit t Sportit, ku pos tjerash thuhet se Departamenti mund ti bj rekomandime politike Kshillit t Prkohshm Administrativ prmes zvendsit t Prfaqsuesit
Special t Sekretarit t Prgjithshm Politikant kosovar nuk jan t vetdijshm se m
shum e ka afirmuar kombin shqiptar dhe Kosovn boksieri me shtetsi gjermane Luan
Krasniqi se sa akcili ministr i sportit apo dikasteri tjetr. Ndrsa kryetari i Kosovs, t
cilit ia kan transmetuar rndsin e kampionit t Evrops, suksesin e Luanit pas fitores, e
mbshtolli me stemn, prkatsisht flamurin e vet!

Forum

baz t krkesave dhe motiveve partiake. Pra, interesimi pr sport nga faktori kosovar politik sht drejtprdrejt i lidhur m mundsin e shtrirjes s ndikimit partiak dhe prfitimit t
votuesve, e jo me misionin shoqror, human, kulturor e shndetsor q e ka sporti.

S dyti, edhe pse shpresuam se pas lufts do t vijn dit m t mira pr sportin kosovar,
sportistt kosovar vazhdojn t diskriminohen edhe nga zyrtart ndrkombtar edhe nga
asociacionet ndrkombtare. Ato veprime q i bnte regjimi serb para lufts ndaj sportistve
kosovar, duke i privuar nga e drejta pr tu marr n mnyr t pavarur me sport, sot po i
bn administrata ndrkombtare duke ia mohuar t drejtn qytetare sportistve kosovar t
garojn zyrtarisht n arenn ndrkombtare, pos n ping-pong dhe pjesrisht n hendboll .
De facto dhe de jure zyrtart ndrkombtar kan rn nn ndikimin total t politiks ndaj
sportit, me faktin se moslejimin e pjesmarrjes s sportit kosovar n arenn ndrkombtare
e ndrlidhin drejtprdrejt me moszgjidhjen e statusit politik t Kosovs.
Rasti me ilustrativ ka t bj me FIBA-n, e cila n Statutin e vet parasheh antarsimin
e Federatave autonome q vijn nga vendet ose territoret si jan; Palestina Gjibraltari,
Taipehu, Singapuri por refuzon krkesn legale t FBK-s, me motivacion politik ! Zbatimi i kriterit t standardit t dyfisht realisht tregon se ky asociacion sht nn ndikimin e
plot politik prandaj FBK-ja ka parashtruar ankes n KAS-s t Llozans pr zgjidhje juridike.
Slogani aq i prfolur se politikn nuk duhet przier n sport n fakt ka marr kuptim t
kundrt . Nga koncepti i shtjelluar m lart del konkludimi se Luan Krasniqi do t privohej
nga titulli i kampionit Evropian sikur t boksonte zyrtarisht pr Kosovn.
Prfundimisht, sportistt kosovar, pr dallim nga sportistt e bots, jan nn senduiin e
shtypjes s dyfisht, n njrn an dshirojn ti instrumentalizojn politikant kosovar pr
motivet e veta partiake, ndrsa n ann tjetr, i kan izoluar zyrtart ndrkombtar nga
angazhimi ndrkombtar pr shkak se ndikimi politik pr ta sht m i rndsishm se interesi sportit. Sa i prket sportit kosovar n testin e olimpizmit, kan rn edhe politikant
kosovar dhe zyrtart sportiv ndrkombtar, t cilt po i viktimizojn sportistt kosovar q
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E di se gjrat gradualisht po lvizin edhe n sportet e tjera. I ashtuquajturi reprezentacion i Kosovs ka luajtur edhe n disa turne ndrkombtare...
Sidoqoft, kjo q ka ndodhur n hendboll ka qen veprim i ngutur. Kan mundur t
presin edhe pak. Pr kt arsye mendoj se Federata Evropiane e Hendbollit, n mnyr t
pashembullt, nga fusha e sportit ka kaluar n at t politiks.
24 gusht 2005

Rukometni klubovi sa Kosova prerano primljeni u EHF

Forum

Pie: Boidar urkovi, generalni sekretar Rukometnog saveza Srbije i lan Arbitrane
komisije Evropske rukometne federacije (EHF)
Politika moe da ima veliki uticaj na sport, mada ne bi trebalo i ne bi bilo poeljno. To
se nedavno pokazalo i u konkretnom sluaju, u vezi sa prijemom Kosova kao pridruenog
lana Evropske rukometne federacije (EHF).
Moram da kaem da se to, ipak, nije dogodilo iznenada, odnosno nije palo sa neba.
Kosovo je uputilo zahtev za prijem na Kongresu EHF-a koji je odran u aprilu 2004. godine na Kipru. Tada je, na moje insistiranje, taj zahtev skinut sa dnevnog reda. Meutim,
posle toga usledio je vanredni Kongres u decembru i Kosovo je dobilo pridrueni status.
To znai da oni nemaju pravo na stolicu u Evropskoj rukometnoj federaciji - ne mogu
da glasaju, nemaju pravo na nacionalni tim, na isticanje zastave, na himnu, itd. Meutim,
taj pridrueni status omoguava njihovim klubovima da uestvuju u evropskim kupovima
pod imenom Kosovo - Srbija i Crna Gora.
Nije sporno da njihovi klubovi vie od 10 godina nisu uestvovali ni u jednom
takmienju, ni u Srbiji ni u Evropi.
Traio sam da mi elnici EHF-a objasne kako je moglo da doe do prijema Kosova. To
je bilo u suprotnosti sa Statutom Evropske rukometne federacije, u kome se naglaava da
samo nacionalni sportski savezi mogu da budu primljeni, a Kosovo u tom momentu to nije
bilo, niti sada jeste.
Objanjeno mi je da su rukometni klubovi sa Kosova dugo bili zatvoreni, da su praktino
pod sankcijama, da nemaju obuku sudija, kontrolora, delegata, trenera i da su im iz tih razloga izali u susret.
Stav Rukometne zajednice Srbije i Crne Gore, a posebno Rukometnog saveza Srbije,
gde sam ja generalni sekretar, jeste da smo apsolutno protiv takvog prijema.
Mislim da je u ovom trenutku izlino govoriti o eventualnim utakmicama sa ekipama
sa Kosova, jer bi to moglo da prejudicira stvar. Voleo bih da se nikada ne sastanemo i to iz
mnogo razloga. Mi smo imali jedan razgovor sa rukometnim radnicima, sa Albancima sa
Kosova, kada smo bili u Beu i ponudili smo im da se njihove ekipe ukljue u takmienje
na teritoriji Srbije. Oni su to odbili, govorei da bi time priznali dravu Srbiju.
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dshirojn jet t shndetshme dhe pretendojn pr t ndrtuar ura miqsie mes sportistve,
kombeve dhe shteteve.
Sporti i Kosovs mund t frymoj vetm aq sa ka interes politika. Sa m i afirmuar t jet
sporti, sa m shum q t ket rezultate aq m tepr rriten pretendimet pr kontroll politik.
24 gusht 2005

Kosovski sport moe da preivi samo onoliko koliko je zainteresovana

politika

U mnogim zemljama sveta politika je u slubi sporta, ali je na Kosovu situacija obrnuta.
Zbog toga se poznati slogan da politika ne treba da se mea u sport momentalno pretvara
u ozbiljnu smetnju za afirmisanje, masovnost i podizanje kvaliteta sporta na Kosovu. Kao
posledica takvog prilaza, kosovski sport ima dvojake tete. Sa jedne strane, kosovski
politiki subjekti pokuavaju da poveano interesovanje mladih za sport instrumentalizuju
za sopstvene partijske potrebe - da pridobiju birae i potencijalne simpatizere, i po cenu
slabljenja autonomije Kosovske olimpijske asocijacije (KOA), federacija, drutava, klubova i sportskih objekata, jednostranim meanjem ili instaliranjem partijskih kadrova u rukovodstva sportskih subjekata i objekata, umesto da u potpunosti potuju nepovredivost ove
oblasti civilnog drutva.

Forum

Pie: Beljulj Beaj, generalni sekretar Kosovske olimpijske asocijacije

Na poetku, politiari su koristili nepostojanje zakona o sportu, dok se u poslednjim

sluajevima (primer fudbala) pogreno interpretira i zloupotrebljava Zakon o sportu, na
osnovu partijskih zahteva i motiva.
Dakle, interesovanje kosovskog politikog faktora za sport neposredno je povezano sa
mogunou vrenja partijskog uticaja i pridobijanja biraa, a ne sa drutvenom, humanitarnom, kulturnom i zdravstvenom misijom, koju ima sport.
U stvari, ako bi kosovski politiki faktor imao ispravan i naelan stav prema sportu, u
smislu snane podrke i sa ciljem reavanja statusa federacija u istoimenim meunarodnim
porodicama, to bi u mnogome ubrzalo i reavanje politikog statusa Kosova, poto se lake
reava status sportskih saveza, kao to je sluaj sa stonoteniskom i rukometnom federacijom, nego to se reava politiki status Kosova. Ali, kosovske politiare vie interesuje
pridobijanje biraa, nego reavanje statusa sportskih saveza, ali i statusa Kosova! Ako bi
oni ispravno shvatili ulogu sporta i potrebu reavanja statusa kosovskog sporta, onda bi, u
najmanju ruku, delovali onako kako im nalae Uredba o osnivanju Odeljenja za sport, u
kojoj se izmeu ostalog kae da Odeljenje moe dati politike preporuke Privremenom
administrativnom veu, preko zamenika specijalnog predstavnika Generalnog sekretara.
Kosovski politiari nisu svesni da je albansku nacionalnost i Kosovo vie afirmisao
Ljuan Krasnii, sa nemakim drzavljanstvom, nego bilo koji ministar sporta ili druge
oblasti, dok je predsednik Kosova, kome su preneli znaaj evropskog ampiona, Ljuanov
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Moje lino miljenje je, moram da se ogradim, da, ukoliko bi dolo do takvih susreta,
nae ekipe ne bi trebalo da igraju sa klubovima sa Kosova. Mislim da bi na taj nain i mi
priznali Kosovo kao posebnu dravu.
Naravno, kakve bi bile posledice, to u ovom trenutku ne mogu da kaem. Evropska
rukometna federacija veoma je rigorozna kada su u pitanju takve stvari, ali kaem, lino se
nadam da nee igrati.
Ove sezone Kosovo ima est predstavnika u evropskim kupovima i ne uestvuje samo
u Ligi ampiona. Znam parove, odnosno znam ekipe koji su im protivnici i mislim da
timovi sa Kosova nee proi u drugo kolo.

Forum

Ako ve govorimo hipotetiki, moralo bi da se postavi i pitanje bezbednosti meeva.

Siguran sam da bismo na naoj teritoriji, u Republici Srbiji, mogli da garantujemo bezbednost. Meutim, tamo gde ni meunarodne snage nisu u stanju da sprovedu maksimalnu
bezbednost, nisam siguran da bi ekipe iz Srbije, pogotovo zbog svih ovih prethodnih godina, mogle da imaju normalne uslove za igru.
Znam da Evropska rukometna federacija nee uticati na to da li e se ekipe iz SCG i sa
Kosova sresti ili ne. Jednostavno, procedura je takva da se parovi odreuju rebom i teorijski to je vrlo mogue. U ovom prvom izvlaenju, nae i njihove ekipe se nisu srele.
Mislim da je Kosovo dobilo status pridruenog clana EHF-a pre nego to je trebalo.
Evropska rukometna federacija je prenaglila i ja sam to elnicima EHF-a i rekao. Trebalo
je prvo saekati konano reenje statusa Kosova. EHF je to uradio iako to, osim u stonom
tenisu, nijedna druga evropska sportska federacija nije uinila.
Znam da se stvari polako pomeraju i u drugim sportovima. Takozvana reprezentacija
Kosova igrala je na nekim koarkaskim turnirima...
Ipak, ovo to se dogodilo u rukometu bilo je preuranjeno. Mogli su jo malo da saekaju
i zato smatram da je Evropska rukomenta federacija na jedan neprimeren nain prela iz
sfere sporta u sferu politike.
24. avgust 2005.

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uspeh posle pobede zavio grbom, odnosno svojom zastavom! Drugo, iako smo se nadali
da e posle rata doi bolji dani za kosovski sport, i meunarodne asocijacije i zvaninici
nastavljaju diskriminaciju kosovskih sportista. Iste postupke koje je pre rata sprovodio
srpski reim prema kosovskim sportistima, sada sprovodi i meunarodna administracija,
negirajui graansko pravo kosovskim sportistima da se zvanino takmie u meunarodnoj
areni, izuzev u stonom tenisu i delimino u rukometu.

Najilustrativniji primer je sa FIBA-om, koja u svom statutu predvia ulanjivanje autonomnih federacija koje dolaze iz zemalja ili teritorija kao to su Palestina, Gibraltar,
Tajpeh, Singapur, ali odbija legitimni zahtev KFK-a, uz politiki motivisano obrazloenje.
Primena dvostrukih standarda realno pokazuje da je ova asocijacija pod potpunim uticajem
politike, pa je zbog toga KFK podneo albu u KAS u Lozani, traei pravedno i pravno
reenje.
Toliko esto izgovarani slogan da politika ne treba da se mea u sport dobija, u stvari,
sasvim suprotni smisao. Iz napred obrazloenog koncepta proizilazi zakljuak da bi Ljuan
Krasnii bio lien titule evropskog ampiona ukoliko bi zvanino boksovao za Kosovo!

Forum

De facto i de iure, meunarodni zvaninici su pali pod totalni uticaj politike prema
sportu, samom injenicom da nedozvoljavanje uea kosovskih sportista u meunarodnim
takmienjima direktno povezuju sa nereenim politikim statusom Kosova!

Na kraju, kosovski sportisti, za razliku od svetskih, nalaze se u sendviu dvostrukog

pritiska - s jedne strane se suoavaju sa tenjama kosovskih politiara da budu instrumentalizovani za njihove politike motive, a sa druge strane su izolovani od meunarodnih
zvaninika u meunarodnom angaovanju, zbog toga to je za njih politiki uticaj vaniji
od sportskog interesa.
Dakle, to se tie kosovskog sporta, na ispitu olimpizma pali su i kosovski politiari i
meunarodni sportski zvaninici, koji rtvuju kosovske sportiste, kojima je na srcu zdrav
ivot i koji tee da grade mostove prijateljstva izmeu sportista, naroda i drava.
Kosovski sport, dakle, moe da preivi samo onoliko koliko je u interesu politike. to
je sport vie afirmisan, to vie bude rezultata, utoliko e vie porasti tenje za politikom
kontrolom sporta.
24. avgust 2005.

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To Whom Does Kosovo Belong?

Forum

By Dusan T. Batakovic, Ambassador and Advisor to the Serbian president

A low level of political culture was and remains the main

characteristic of the political tradition existing among the
two main ethnic communities in Kosovo and Metohija, the
Serbs and Albanians. Together with Albania and Macedonia, this region was under Ottoman rule the longest, up till
1912, isolating it from the dominant European traditions of
modern times, including the Reformation, the Enlightenment, and liberalism, for almost five centuries. The political
traditions that it inherited from the late Ottoman Empire,
which relied on religious and ethnic antagonism, continued
to develop in a vicious circle of mutual violence that were
only occasionally interrupted by periods of calm. Many of
these respites were the result of outside pressure from an
Dusan T. Batakovic
authoritarian regime and did not originate from a voluntary
and mutually accepted decision to live together in political, religious, and ethnic tolerance.
The ethnic conflict in Kosovo, as in other parts of the Balkans, was largely about fighting for territory, albeit in a much stronger former and contrary to the modern concepts of
coexistence and mixing, such as the model of multicultural society. Simultaneously, two
parallel views of the past and reality were nurtured creating parallel worlds where stereotypes and myths were combined into a volatile mixture featuring pronounced linguistic,
religious, and social barriers, laying the foundation of today's ethnic clash, which is both
difficult to understand and to resolve, and in the periods of crisis escalation was unavoidable.
Even the word "Kosovo" has opposite meanings to the ethnic communities. To the
Serbs, Kosovo denotes an area considered to be the Serb Jerusalem whose dazzling cultural and economic rise in Medieval times was brought to a halt by the Ottoman conquerors. The plight of Kosovo heralded by the battle that took place there between the Serb and
Turkish armies in 1389 became a reality in the mid 15th century. After centuries of Turkish
rule, the suffering of Kosovo had grown to legendary proportions thanks to Serb epic poetry. Then, in the wake the First Balkan War of 1912, Kosovo was again a part of the Kingdom of Serbia, but with a vastly different ethnic makeup since the Serb population had
been dropping and the Albanian population expanding from the end of the 17th century.
The Metohija region was a part of the Kingdom of Montenegro, the second Serb state of
the time. Finally, in 1918 Kosovo become a part of Yugoslavia.
To the average Serb, Kosovo, in the national ideology, represents a holy land from
which Serbs have been pushed out for centuries and continue to be pushed out even today.

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Kosovo and the historical right in the light of medieval sources and
studies
Dr. Sc. Selim Daci, Professor at Pristina University

Alongside with the development of the Albanian National Movement during 19th and 20th centuries with Albanian Dr. Sc. Selim Daci
territory of Kosovo at the heart, an expansionist policy was
observed among the neighboring countries, which aimed at creating greater states to the
disadvantage of suppressed people, especially to the disadvantage of Albanians.

Forum

The issue of shedding light on Kosovos history over

centuries, which is one of the most attractive scientific problems in Balkans and in Europe, has taken on a political dimension especially after 1981. However this was not the
first time it happened; Politicization of Kosovos history is
over 150 years old, and one can find it in the historiographies of the neighboring countries, and particularly in the
Serb historiography.

On this course, just before the second half of the 19th century, the neighboring countries, especially Serbia, intensified their diplomatic activities to detach some parts of the
Albanian territory. The Serb regime of that time also engaged the press, publications and
science to give a kind of science-historical backing to the Serbian invasive policy over the
Illyrian-Albanian territory of Kosovo.
These studies tried to show that this territory was the heart of the Serbian state in the
medieval times; that this territory was inhabited mainly by Serbs until the end of 17th century, when a part of the Serbian population has withdrawn to the north after the Austro Turks wars (1683-1699), whereas their place was occupied by the Albanians, coming
from the mountainous areas of Northern Albania.
This was an attempt by the Serbian state to justify occupation of Albanian lands in front
of the international political quarters and domestic public opinion, by claiming a historical
right over Kosovo and other Albanian territories. Distinguished authors, such as, A. Jovicevic, V. Djordjevic, J. Tomic, A. Urosevic, V. Cubrilovic, who had nothing to do with
science or scientific objectivity were included in this propagandist literature.
In contrast, the prominent historians, such as M. Shuflaj, K. Jirecek, M. Dinic, A. Handjic, A. Dyselie and Albanian distinguished historians proved the Illyrian-Albanian continuation and Illyrian-Albanian presence for centuries in Kosovo. These researchers emphasize
the presence of Albanians in Kosovos towns and villages, even during the Serbian rule in
13th and 14th centuries.
All those, who try to distort the historical facts and put history in service of politics,
must know that the arguments they use are not only unsubstantiated and short-lived, but
dangerous and carry catastrophic consequences not only for the people they target, but also
for their own people. There are numerous such examples from the past of world civilization
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This was the result of a collaborative and systematic effort primarily by the Muslim Albanians, legal and illegal immigrants who arrived in various times during the rule of the Ottomans, the Italian fascists, and Tito's communists.

Forum

Serbia's southern province, now under U.N. administration, contains 1300 churches,
monasteries, and former church sites. The area is officially known as Kosovo, since the
word Metohija was removed by a Kosovo Albanian administrative decision in 1968 and
slipped out of official and then everyday political use. Many researchers consider Kosovo
to be the word in the Serbian language that has the strongest symbolic importance. Kosovo,
after God and St. Sava, denotes the national and cultural identity of the entire Serb people
in its modern history.
Ethnic Albanians consider Kosovo to be a symbolic of an "ancient Albanian land" that
directly links the ancient Illyrian and modern Albanian community in the province, although today it symbolizes the expatriate type of nationalism that feeds on constant demographic expansion aimed at legitimizing pretensions to a certain region. The fact remains
that there is no tangible scientific evidence of any continuity between the Illyrians and the
Albanians of today, a vast and merciless void existing in historical sources existing from
the 6th to the 11th century. This, however, has not had a significant effect on the formation
of the Illyrian myth as a basis for the continuity of the Albanian national identity.
In an romantic historical project created by Albanian historians during the times of
Enver Hoxha, Kosovo has become a symbol of occupied ethnic territory to the modern day
Kosovo Albanians. The Serb monasteries, which were built in unusually large numbers
from the 13th to the 15th century, are, to them, only churches by the "occupying" Serb rulers of the Nemanjic Dynasty, often on the foundations of older, Illyrian churches, that were
in fact Byzantine.
That is why, in the peace created in KFOR-administrated Kosovo after NATO's 1999
bombing, there has been such an effort to as quickly and in as short a time as possible permanently destroy the Serb monasteries and churches, inconvenient witnesses and the most
striking examples of the former and current Serb presence, in a visible systematic campaign. This represents a kind of collective tribal vengeance which, instead of individuals
who are guilty of crimes, targets members of an entire ethnic community. The pattern of
extreme nationalism envisages the ultimate destruction of both Serb monuments and the
expulsion of the Serb community to justify a new political reality that Serbia considers
unacceptable: Kosovo as an exclusively Albanian land. Today, Kosovo belongs both to the
Serbs and the Albanians, and only through mutual agreement can a stable future be secured
for the province.
September 1, 2005

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and from the past of the Balkans, which is rightly called a gunpowder-barrel by those who
are familiar with the region and know its past.
The old Latin saying, Historia magistra vitae est [History is the master of life], has derived from the bitter experience of the concurring history of the Ancient Roman, Byzantine
and Ottoman Empires. Therefore this lesson should be learned, as it is the high time to start
with the demystification of history and to start using it in service of the future. Otherwise
things will get complicated, and dissonant relations between people will escalate to an
undesirable level, just as it happened few years ago in Croatia, Bosnia and most recently in
Kosovo. But in order for it to not happen, historians should be left to deal with history,
which should have an understanding and peace between the people at the core of its role.
Because it is unacceptable for history to be written by non professional historians.

First, todays territory of Kosovo in the ancient time was exclusively inhabited by Dardans. Dardans were situated in the south part of Illyrian territory, and had a relatively high
economic, social and cultural level. This territory inhabited today by Albanians was developed within the Illyrian diversity, with few special ethno lingual and cultural features in
comparison with other Illyrian territories. Whereas dissertations that Dardans do not belong to Illyrian community are not substantiated be it from an archeological or historical
point of view. Furthermore the Illyrian-Albanian population has managed to resist assimilation by the Romans and Byzantines during the ancient and early medieval time.

Forum

In order to prove what was said above and to disprove the historical exclusivity of one
people over the others, I will give several genuine scientific examples, which can in no way
be a function of politics:

Second, the invasion and coming of Serbs in the territory of Kosovo took place late in
XII, XIII, and XIV century. Therefore the two century rule of Nemanjics in Kosovo in this
medieval period, during which were actions to colonize Kosovo and during which orthodox sacral monuments were raised above Albanian-Illyrian ones, according to a genuine
science, cannot be called an exclusively Serb period. Because, according to this logic, the
Romans, Byzantines, Ottomans, will ask for their historical portion in the areas they ruled.
Therefore we consider that historical rights over Kosovo belong to those living in it.
Third, despite trumpetation about an exclusive priority of Serbs in Kosovo, the historical
sources say the opposite. Even during Nemanjics rule, the Serb population represented an
insignificant minority if compared to the authentic Albanian population. To this end, a question can be raised; why did the last Serb kings, including Tsar Dusan, call themselves emperor of Albanians, and finally why were Albanians found side by side with the other peoples
of Balkans in the war against the Ottoman invasion during the two battles in Kosovo (1389
and 1448)?
Four, in the course of the scientific argument some have raised the issue of the mass
immigration of Serbs headed by the Bishop Arsenije Crnojevic. The documents from the
Ottoman, Austrian, Venician and even Serb sources of that time indicate that the Albanians
hold the burden of the Austrian-Turkish wars (1682-1699). The immigration of a Serb minority, which took place after those wars, has been exaggerated and has been presented by
Serbs as a mass exodus resulting in radical changes of Kosovos ethnic structure, or with
de-Serbization of Kosovo, as they put it. But in fact it was a small-scale immigration of
Serb rebels headed by Peja/Pec Bishop Crnojevic.
September 1, 2005
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Kujt i takon Kosova?

Forum

Shkruan: Dushan T. Batakoviq, ambasador, kshilltar i kryetarit t Serbis

Niveli i ult i kulturs politike ka qen dhe vazhdon t jet karakteristik kryesore e
tradits politike t dy komuniteteve kryesore n Kosov dhe Metohi, serbve dhe shqiptarve. Kjo hapsir, me Shqiprin dhe Maqedonin, ka mbetur m s gjati nn sundimin
otoman, deri n vitin 1912, me ka izolimi i rrept nga traditat mbizotruese evropiane t
epoks moderne bashkkohore - prfshir reformimin, qytetrimin, dhe liberalizimin - ka
zgjatur gati plot 5 shekuj. Traditat politike t trashguara nga epoka e rnies s Perandoris
Otomane, t mbshtetura n antagonizmat fetare-kombtare, jan zhvilluar n nj rreth
vicioz t dhuns s ndrsjell, t cilat ndrpriteshin vetm pr koh t shkurtr nga periudha t qetsis t prkohshme. Ndrprerjet n vazhdn e konflikteve, m s shpeshti ishin
rezultat i detyrimit nga jasht, e jo ndonj rezultat i vullnetshm pranuar nga dy palt pr
t bashkjetuar n toleranc politike, fetare, e etnike.
Konflikti ndretnik n Kosov, ngjashm me konfliktet e tjera n Ballkan, vetm se n
nj form m t ashpr, ka natyrn e lufts pr territore, q sht n kundrshtim me konceptet bashkkohore t bashkjetess n nj model t shoqris multikulturore. Krahas
ksaj, jan krijuar dy pamje t krahasueshme t s kaluars dhe reales; dy bot paralele ku,
n nj przierje ndezse t tradits, stereotipeve dhe miteve, s bashku me pengesa t theksuara gjuhsore, fetare, dhe shoqrore, kan zn fill bazat e konfliktit t sotm ndretnik,
i cili n periudha t krizs domosdoshmrish on n prshkallzimin e dhuns.
Kshtu, edhe vet fjala Kosov ka kuptime t ndryshme pr bashksi t ndryshme etnike. Pr serbt, nocioni Kosov nnkupton hapsirn e Jerusalemit serb, zhvillimi i
shklqyeshm ekonomik dhe kulturor i t cilit sht ndrprer n mesjet nga ana e
pushtuesve otoman. Vuajtja e Kosovs, e shfaqur me rastin e betejs n mes t serbve dhe
turqve n vitin 1389, sht br realitet nga mesi i shekullit t XV. Pas shekujsh t sundimit otoman, kur vuajtja e Kosovs ka marr prmasa legjendare prmes poezis epike,
Kosova pas Lufts s Par Ballkanike m 1912- me struktur t ndryshuar etnike e cila deri
n fund t shekullit XVII deri te luftrat ballkanike ka shnuar zvoglim t popullats serbe
dhe rritje t asaj shqiptare - prap futet n prbrje t Mbretris t Serbis, prderisa
Metohia mbetet pjes prbrse e shtetit tjetr serb, Mbretris s Malit t Zi, ndrsa n
vitin 1918, bhet pjes e shtetit t Jugosllavis.
Pr nj serb t zakonshm, fjala Kosov, n ideologjin kombtare do t thot tok e
shenjt, nga e cila serbt gjat disa shekujve t fundit e deri n ditt tona, jan shtypur dhe
prndjekur sistematikisht me an t forcave t bashkuara, para s gjithash nga ana e shqiptarve mysliman-imigrant legal apo ilegal, t ardhur n periudha t ndryshme t sundimit
t otomanve, fashistve italian, apo komunistve t Titos.
Hapsira e krahins jugore t Serbis, tash nn administrimin e OKB-s, prfshin 1300
kisha, manastire, dhe varreza, me emrin zyrtar Kosov (me Metohin e cila q nga viti
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Kosova dhe e drejta historike n dritn e burimeve dhe studimeve

mesjetare
Shkruan: Dr.sci. Selim Daci, profesor n Universitetin Prishtins

Krahas zhvillimit t Lvizjes Kombtare Shqiptare gjat shek. XIX-XX, nj ndr vatrat
m t rndsishme e s cils ishte br edhe treva shqiptare e Kosovs, u vrejt n shtetet
fqinj nj politik ekspansioniste q kishte pr objektiv krijimin e shteteve t mdha n
kurriz t popujve t tjer t shtypur, sidomos t popullit shqiptar. Nga kt aspekt, pas
viteve 40 t shek. XIX u intensifikua veprimtaria diplomatike e tyre, sidomos e Serbis, pr
t shkputur pjes nga trojet shqiptare. N kt kuadr, shteti serb i shek. XIX-XX e angazhoi edhe shtypin, publikimet dhe shkencn q synonte ti vinte nj mbshtetje gjoja historike shkencore politiks grabitqare pushtuese serbe ndaj trevs iliro-shqiptare t Kosovs.
Kto studime prpiqeshin t provonin se treva n fjal kishte qen n mesjet qendr e
shtetit serb dhe trev e banuar nga serbt deri nga kaprcyelli i shekullit XVII kur pas
luftrave Austro-Turke (1683-1699), nj pjes e popullsis serbe q mori ann e Austris,
qenka trhequr pr n Veri dhe vendin e saj e paskan zn shqiptart e ardhur nga viset e
brendshme malore t Shqipris s Veriut. Me kt shteti serbomadh, prpiqej q brenda
vendit dhe n qarqe politike ndrkombtare t arsyetonte politikn e vet grabitqare ndaj
tokave dhe popullsis shqiptare duke sforcuar gjoja t drejtn historike pr Kosovn dhe
trojet t tjera shqiptare.

Forum

shtja e ndriimit t historis s Kosovs n shekuj, prvese sht nj ndr problemet

shkencore m trheqse t Ballkanit dhe Evrops, mori sidomos pas vitit 1981 edhe dimensionin politik. Por, duhet theksuar q n fillim se nj gj e till nuk ndodh pr her t par
n histori. N t vrtet, politizimi i shtjes s historis s Kosovs ka nj histori t gjat
m se 150 vjeare, veanrisht n historiografin e shteteve fqinj, dhe n mnyr t veant
n at serbe.

N kt letrsi t propagands q nuk kishte aspak lidhje me shkencn dhe objektivitetin shkencor u shquan autor si A.Jovieviq, V.Gjorgjeviq, J.Tomiq, J.Cvijiq, A.Urosheviq,
V.ubriloviq, etj. Ndryshe nga autor t lartprmendur, historiant e mirnjohur t huaj si,
M.Shufiaj, K Jireek, M.Diniq, A.Hanxhiq, A.Dyselie, , si dhe historiant e mirnjohur
shqiptar provojn kontinuitetin iliro-shqiptar dhe pranin iliro-shqiptare n shekuj n
Kosov. Gjithashtu, studiuesit e lartprmendur vn n dukje pranin e shqiptarve n
qytete dhe fshatra t Kosovs edhe gjat periudhs s sundimit serb gjat shekujve XIIIXIV.
Lidhur me at q u tha m sipr duhet thn qart e prerazi se t gjith ata q shtrembrojn historin dhe personalitetet e ndritshme t saj, pr t vn at n shrbim t politiks ditore, argumentet q i prdorin jo vetm q jan t paqndrueshme, pa mbshtetje t
domosdoshme, por edhe jetshkurtra, t dmshme, madje ndjellin pasoja katastrofale, jo
vetm pr popuj q i vn n shnjestr, por edhe pr vet popullin e vet. Pr kt mund t
na ndihmojn shembujt e panumrta nga e kaluara e qytetrimit njerzor, n rastin ton t
historis s popujve t Ballkanit, i cili mu pr kt arsye nga vrojtuesit dhe njohsit e mir
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1968, me vendim administrativ t shqiptarve t Kosovs sht hequr nga komunikimi

zyrtar, dhe m pas edhe nga komunikimi i prditshm politik), sipas shum studiuesish,
sht fjala m e rndsishme simbolike n gjuhn serbe. Me emrin Kosov, pas emrit t
Zotit, Shn Savs, nnkuptohet edhe identiteti kulturor i tr kombit serb n historin e tij
moderne.

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Pr shqiptart, fjala Kosov sht simbol i toks s lasht shqiptare e cila direkt e
lidh bashksin antike ilire me at bashkkohore shqiptare n krahin, prderisa sot sht
simbol i tipit t diaspors t nacionalizmit i cili ushqehet me zgjerimin demografik, pr hir
t legjitimimit etnik t mtimeve n hapsira t caktuara. Fakti se nuk ka dshmi t prekshme mbi lidhshmrin n mes t ilirve dhe shqiptarve t sotshm, me nj zbrazti t
madhe, me nj munges t pakalueshme n aspektin e burimeve historike nga shekulli VI
deri n at t XI, nuk ka ndikuar fare n themelimin e mitit ilir si element baz pr themelimin e identitetit kombtar shqiptar.
Kosova, n projektimin idealist t historis romantike shqiptare nga koha e Enver Hoxhs, pr shqiptart n shekullin e XX sht br simbol i territorit etnik t okupuar. Manastiret serbe t ndrtuara n nj numr jashtzakonisht t madh n periudhn n mes t
shekullit XII dhe atij XV, pr ta jan vetm kisha t cilat shpesh jan ndrtuar n themelet
e kishave ilire (n fakt ato jan themele bizantine) nga ana e sundimtarve okupues
serb n kohn e dinastis t Nemanjiqve.
Nga kjo del se n Kosov, nn kushte t paqes, nn administrim t plot t KFOR-it dhe
UNMIK-ut, t vendosura pas bombardimeve t NATO-s n vitin 1999, jan br aq shum
prpjekje q n nj afat sa m t shkurtr dhe at n nj numr sa m t madh, n nj aksion
sistematik, t shkatrrohen gjurmt e dshmive t pakndshme pra kishat dhe manastiret
serbe si gjurmt m bindse t prezencs t dikurshme t serbve. Fjala sht pr nj lloj
t hakmarrjes kolektive t tipit fisnor, e cila n vend se t drejtohet kundr individve fajtor po drejtohet kundr pjestarve t nj etnie t tr. Modeli i nacionalizmit ekstrem
parasheh shkatrrim prfundimtar t monumenteve serbe dhe prndjekje t bashksis
serbe n mnyr q t argumentohet nj realitet i ri politik pra Kosova si nj tok ekskluzivisht shqiptare i papranueshm pr Serbin. Kosova sot i takon edhe serbve edhe shqiptarve, dhe prcaktimi i ardhmris stabile t provincs sht i mundshm vetm prmes
nj marrveshje t ndrsjell.
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t s kaluars s tij konsiderohet me t drejt fuqi baroti, s cils her-her vetm q i mungon shkndija, pr tu shndrruar n luft me prmasa Evropiane dhe m gjer. Andaj, duke
u nisur nga urtia e njohur latine se historia sht msuese e jets, e nxjerr nga prvoja e
hidhur e historis pushtuese e skllavruese t Roms s lasht, Bizantit dhe Perandoris
Turke, ishte dashur t msohej domosdo nga dshtimet. Pra, sht koha e fundit pr fillimin
e demistifikimit t historis dhe pr vnien e saj n shrbim t ardhmris. Ndryshe, gjrat
do t ndrlikohen prdit e m shum dhe marrdhniet midis popujve t acarohen deri n
shkalln e padshirueshme si ndodhi koh m par n Kroaci, Bosnj dhe Kosov. Shkurt,
historia dhe e vrteta historike tu lihet vetm historianve, ndrkaq historia do t ket si
lajtmotiv t prhershm: mirkuptimin e paqen midis popujve.

E para, territori i sotm i Kosovs dhe m gjer, n antikitet ishte i banuar ekskluzivisht
nga dardant. Dardant i takonin trevs jugore ilire t karakterizuar nga nj nivel ekonomik, shoqror e kulturor relativisht t lart, ku u zhvilluan formacione politike si shteti
ilir. Kjo trev, e banuar sot nga shqiptart, u zhvillua brenda diversitetit ilir me disa tipare
etnogjuhsore e kulturore t veanta, n krahasim me trevat e tjera, dhe nga ana tjetr unitare. Nuk qndrojn as nga pikpamja arkeologjike as historike e gjuhsore tezat se gjoja
dardant nuk bjn pjes n bashksin e madhe ilire. N ann tjetr, popullsia iliro-shqiptare gjat antikitetit dhe mesjets s hershme arriti ti bnte ball asimilimit shumshekullor romak dhe bizantin.

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Pr t vrtetuar at q u tha m sipr, rrjedhimisht pr t par paqndrueshmrin e

ekskluzivitetit historik t nj populli mbi t tjert, do ti prmendim vetm disa shembuj t
mirfillt shkencor, q natyrisht nuk mund t jen n funksion t politiks ditore, si pretendohet:

E dyta. pushtimi dhe vendosja e serbve n trevn e Kosovs sht e vonshme (shek.
XII, XIII-XIV). Andaj, kolonizimi i Kosovs me an t mekanizmit shtetror nemanjid si
dhe ngritja, ndajndrtimi apo meremetimi i ndonj monumenti sakral t ritit ortodoks mbi
at iliro-shqiptar gjat periudhs s sundimit dyshekullor nemanjid, nuk mund ti japin t
drejt shkencs s mirfillt q kt periudh mesjetare t shtetit nemanjid n Kosov ta
quaj si ekskluzive serbe. Sipas ksaj logjike, hise historike do t krkonin nga viset q i
sundonin me shekuj romakt, bizantint, osmant, etj. Pra, konsiderojm se t drejt historike pr Kosovn kan t gjith ata q banojn sot.
E treta, me gjith trumbetimin q po i bhet prparsis ekskluzive t etnis serbe n
Kosov, burimet historike flasin ndryshe. N kt trev edhe gjat sundimit dy shekullor
nemanjid popullsia serbe paraqiste nj pakic t parndsishme prball popullats autoktone iliro-shqiptare. N kt kuadr, shtrohet nj pyetje tjetr: pse vall mbretrit e fundit
serb, pra edhe perandori Dushan e quajti vetn edhe perandor t shqiptarve? Dhe s
fundi, si shqiptart n dy beteja t Kosovs (1389,1448) u gjetn krah pr krahu me popujt
e tjer t Ballkanit n luft kundr nj rreziku t prbashkt-invadimit osman.
E katrta, n vazhdn e argumentit t fuqishm shkencor, shtrohet zhurmshm shtja e shprnguljes s madhe serbe n krye me patrikun Arsenie III Crnojeviq. N t vrtet
dokumentet nga burimet osmane, venedikase, austriake, madje dhe serbe t kohs, provojn se barrn e lufts gjat luftrave austro-turke (1683-1699) n trevn e Kosovs e bartnin shqiptart. Q ktej, shprngulja e serbve nga Kosova, q u krye pas luftrave n fjal,
sht fryr qllimisht duke e paraqitur si shprngulje me prmasa t mdha sa mund ti
ndrronin menjher prbrjen etnike nj territori aq t gjer, me qllim q t shpjegonin
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Forum

Kome pripada Kosovo?

Pie: Duan T. Batakovi, ambasador, savetnik predsednika Srbije
Nizak nivo politike kulture bio je i jo uvek ostaje glavno obeleje politike tradicije
dveju glavnih etnikih zajednica na Kosovu i Metohiji, Srba i Albanaca. Ovaj prostor ostao
je, sa Albanijom i Makedonijom, najdue pod otomanskom vlau, sve do 1912, ime je
otra izolacija od dominantnih evropskih tradicija modernog i savremenog doba - ukljuujui reformaciju, prosveenost i liberalizam - trajala skoro punih pet stolea. Politike
tradicije nasleene iz doba opadanja Osmanske imperije, oslonjene na versko-etnike antagonizme, razvijale su se u zaaranom krugu uzajamnog nasilja, koje su, samo na kratko,
prekidali periodi zatija. Predah u spirali nasilja najee je bio rezultat prisile nekog autoritarnog reima, a ne proizvod voljne i uzajamno prihvaene kohabitacije, obeleene
politikom, verskom i etnikom tolerancijom.
Meuetniki sukob na Kosovu, slino kao i drugde na Balkanu, samo u zaotrenijoj
formi, uokviren je borbom za teritorije, suprotno savremenim koncepcijama o saivotu i
meusobnom proimanju kao modelu multikulturnog drutva. Uporedo s tim, stvarane su
dve uporedne slike prolosti i stvarnosti, dva paralelna sveta gde su, u jednoj zapaljivoj
meavini tradicije, sterotipa i mitova, uz otro naglaene jezike, verske i socijalne barijere,
nastajale osnove za danas teko premostivi meuetniki sukob koji je, u razdobljima kriza,
neumitno vodio u eskalaciju nasilja.
Tako i sama re Kosovo ima suprotna znaenja u razliitim etnikim zajednicama.
Kod Srba, pojam Kosovo oznacava prostor Srpskog Jerusalima iji je blistavi kulturni i
ekonomski uspon u srednjem veku bio zaustavljen pohodom osmanskih osvajaa. Kosovsko stradanje najavljeno bitkom izmeu Srba i Turaka iz 1389, postalo je realnost sredinom
XV veka. Posle stolea osmanske vladavine, kada je kosovsko stradanje kroz epsku poeziju dobilo legendarne razmere, Kosovo posle Prvog balkanskog rata 1912 - sa izmenjenom

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n kt mnyr deserbizimin e Kosovs. N t vrtet ajo ishte nj shprngulje me prmasa shum t vogla t kryengritsve nga pakica serbe t udhhequr nga patriku i Pejs.
S fundi sht e papranueshme shkruarja e historis nga jo ekspertt profesionist dhe
nuk mund t mbshteten institucionalizimi i historis dhe vnia e saj n shrbim t politiks s dits kur edhe disa nga njohsit e historis s Kosovs si A. Dyselie, N.Malkolm,
n studimet e tyre t shkruara pr shkencn e historis, pr Kosovn ndr t tjera, arrin n
prfundim se: Nga prvoja e historis dhe historiografis mund t nxjerrim nj sr pasojash t dobishme dhe t dmshme, t cilat paraqiten n raport me politikn dhe historiografin. Kto pasoja ecin prej nnshtrimit t historis politiks kur historia bhet shrbtore
e politiks. Pra, n lidhje me gjith at q u tha nuk do t duhej koment tjetr.
1 shtator 2005

Kosovo i istorijsko pravo u svetlu srednjovekovnih izvora i

istraivanja

Forum

Pie: Dr. Sc. Selim Daci, redovni profesor Univerziteta u Pritini

Pitanje rasvetljavanja istorije Kosova kroz vekove ne samo to je jedno od najprivlanijih
naunih pitanja na Balkanu i u Evropi, ve je, naroito posle 1981. godine, poprimilo i politiku dimenziju. Meutim, odmah na poetku treba naglasiti da se tako neto ne dogaa prvi
put u istoriji. U stvari, politizacija pitanja istorije Kosova potie odavno, pre skoro 150 godina, naroito kada je re o istoriografiji susednih zemalja, a posebno o srpskoj istoriografiji.
Uporedo sa razvojem albanskog nacionalnog pokreta tokom XIX i XX veka, gde su
najvea arista bila upravo na albanskim teritorijama na Kosovu, u susednim zemljama se
pojavila ekspanzionistika politika koja je imala za cilj stvaranje velikih drava, na raun
drugih, potlaenih naroda, a naroito na raun albanskog naroda. U tom pogledu, nakon
etrdesetih godina dvadesetog veka intenzivirana je njihova diplomatska delatnost, naroito
u Srbiji, u cilju otcepljenja i prisvajanja delova albanskih teritorija. U tu svrhu, srpska
drava je u XIX i XX veku angaovala i tampu, publicistiku i nauku, koja je nastojala da
podri navodnu istorijsku i naunu, ali u sutini osvajaku i grabeljivu srpsku politiku u
odnosu na ilirsko-albanske teritorije na Kosovu. Ta istraivanja su pokuavala da dokau
da su dotina podruja u srednjem veku bila centar srpske drave i predeo nastanjen Srbima do kraja XVII veka, kada je, nakon austro-turskih ratova (1683-1699), jedan deo srpskog stanovnitva koji je bio na strani Austrougarske, navodno bio primoran da se povue
na sever, a na njihovo mesto su navodno doli Albanci iz unutranjih planinskih predela
severne Albanije. Na taj nain, velikosrpska drava je pokuavala da u svojoj zemlji i u
meunarodnim politikim krugovima opravda svoju osvajaku politiku prema albanskim
podrujima i stanovnitvu, insistirajui na navodnom istorijskom pravu na Kosovo i na
druge albanske prostore.
U takvoj knjievnoj propagandi koja nije imala nikakve veze sa naukom i naunom
stvarnou, istakli su se autori A. Jovievi, V. orevi, J. Tomi, J. Cviji, A. Uroevi,
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etnikom strukturom koja je od kraja XVII do balkanskih ratova obeleena smanjivanjem

srpskog i rastom albanskog stanovnitva - ponovo ulazi u sastav Kraljevine Srbije, dok
Metohija postaje sastavni deo druge srpske drave, Kraljevine Crne Gore, a 1918. u sastav
jugoslovenske drave.

Forum

Za prosenog Srbina, re Kosovo, u nacionalnoj ideologiji, oznaava svetu zemlju iz

koje su Srbe, tokom poslednjih nekoliko vekova, pa sve do naih dana, udruenim snagama
sistematski potiskivali i uporno progonili, pre svih Albanci muslimanske vere - legalni ili
ilegalni imigranti doseljavani u raznim vremenskim talasima za vladavine Osmanlija, italijanskih faista ili Titovih komunista.
Prostor june pokrajine Srbije, sada pod administracijom UN, prekriven sa 1.300 crkava, manastira i crkvita pod zvaninim imenom Kosovo (s Metohijom, koja je od 1968,
administrativnom odlukom kosovskih Albanaca izbaena iz zvanine, a zatim i svakodnevne politike komunkacije) u srpskom jeziku je, po mnogim istraivaima, simboliki
najvanija re. Imenom Kosovo se posle imena Bojeg, imena Svetoga Save, oznaava i
nacionalni i kulturni identitet itavog srpskog naroda u njegovoj modernoj istoriji.
Za etnike Albance, re Kosovo simbol je drevne albanske zemlje koja direktno povezuje antiku ilirsku i savremenu albansku zajednicu u pokrajini, dok je danas simbol dijasporskog tipa nacionalizma koji se hrani stalnom demografskom ekspanzijom, radi etnike
legitimizacije pretenzija na odreeni prostor. injenica da nema opipljivih naunih dokaza
za kontinuitet izmeu Ilira i dananjih Albanaca, sa zjapeom, neumoljivom prazninom u
istorijskim izvorima od VI do XI veka, nije bitno uticala na uspostavljanje ilirskog mita
kao osnovnog konstituitivnog elementa albanskog nacionalnog identiteta.
Kosovo je, u ideolokoj projekciji romatniarske albanske istoriografije iz vremena E.
Hode, za kosovske Albance u XX veku postalo simbol okupirane etnike teritorije. Srpski
manastiri podignuti u neobino velikom broju u razdoblju od XIII do XV veka, za njih su
samo crkve koje su, esto na starijim temeljima ilirskih (a u stvari vizantijskih) crkava,
podigli okupatorski srpski vladari iz dinastije Nemanjia.
Otuda na Kosovu, u mirnodopskim uslovima, pod punom vladavinom Kfora i UNMIKa, uspostavljenoj posle NATO bombardovanja 1999, toliko nastojanja da se u to kraem
roku i u to veem broju, u jednoj vidljivo sistematinoj akciji, trajno unite tragovi neugodnih svedoka - srpskih manastira i crkava - kao najupeatljivijih tragova nekadanjeg i
sadanjeg srpskog prisustva. U pitanju je jedna vrsta kolektivne odmazde tribalnog tipa
koja se, umesto protiv pojedinaca krivih za zloine, sprovodi protiv pripadnika itave jedne
etnike zajednice. Obrazac ekstremnog nacionalizma predvia ultimativno unitenje i srpskih spomenika i progon srpske zajednice, kako bi se opravdala jedna nova, za Srbiju neprihvatljiva politika realnost - Kosovo kao iskljuivo albanska zemlja. Kosovo danas pripada i Srbima i Albancima, i samo u njihovom meusobnom dogovoru, mogue je odrediti
stabilnu budunost pokrajine.
01. septembar 2005.

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U vezi sa pomenutim injenicama, treba jasno i nedvosmisleno rei da su svi oni koji
krive istoriju i njene svetle linosti, u slubi dnevne politike i koriste nepostojee injenice,
bez naunog pokria, a koje su tetne i prouzrokuju katastrofalne posledice, ne samo za
narode koji su im na meti, ve i za njihov sopstveni narod. U tom pogledu mogu nam biti
od pomoi brojni primeri iz prolosti ljudske civilizacije, u naem sluaju iz istorije naroda
Balkana kojeg, upravo iz tih razloga, dobri istraivai i poznavaoci prolosti smatraju buretom baruta, kojem s vremena na vreme nedostaje samo varnica da bi se pretvorilo u rat
evropskih, pa i irih razmera. Stoga, imajui u vidu poznatu latinsku izreku da je istorija
uiteljica ivota, a koja je proizala iz gorkih istorijskih, osvajakih i robovlasnikih
iskustava starog Rima, Vizantije i Turske imperije, trebalo bi od neuspeha obavezno izvui
odgovarajue pouke.
Dakle, krajnje je vreme za poetak demistifikacije istorije i za njeno postavljanje u slubu budunosti. U suprotnom, stvari e se sve vie i vie uslonjavati i odnosi meu narodima e se zaotravati do neeljenih razmera, kao to se nedavno dogodilo u Hrvatskoj, Bosni i Hercegovini i na Kosovu. Ukratko, istoriju i istorijsku istinu treba prepustiti
istoriarima, a istorija bi kao stalni lajtmotiv trebalo da ima - razumevanje i mir meu narodima.

Forum

V. ubrilovi i drugi. Nasuprot navedenim autorima, poznati strani istoriari kao to je M.

Suflaj, K. Jireek, M. Dini, A. Handi, A. Dajsli i drugi, kao i poznati albanski istoriari,
dokazuju ilirsko-albanski kontinuitet i ilirsko-albansko vekovno prisustvo na Kosovu. Isto
tako, ti naunici potvruju da je albansko stanovnitvo ivelo i u gradovima i u selima na
Kosovu, kao i u periodu srpske vladavine, u vremenu od XIII do XV veka.

Da bi potvrdili ono to je napred izneto, odnosno da bi se uvidela neodrivost istorijskog ekskluziviteta jednog naroda nad drugim, pomenuu samo nekoliko dobro poznatih
naunih primera koji, naravno, ne mogu biti u funkciji dnevne politike, kao to neki
prieljkuju: Prvo, dananja teritorija Kosova, pa i ire, u antiko doba bila je nastanjena
iskljuivo Dardanima. Oni su bili stanovnici junih ilirskih podruja, karakteristinih po
relativno visokom privrednom, drutvenom i kulturnom nivou razvoja, gde su se razvijale
politike formacije, kao sto je ilirska drava. To podruje, danas nastanjeno Albancima,
razvijeno je unutar ilirskog diversiteta, uz neke posebne etno-jezike i kulturne osobenosti
u odnosu na druga podruja, ali s druge strane bilo je i unitarno. Ne stoje, ni sa arheolokog,
ni sa istorijskog, a niti sa jezikog pogleda, teze da Dardani, navodno, ne pripadaju velikoj
ilirskoj porodici. S druge strane, ilirsko-albansko stanovnitvo, tokom antikog doba i u
ranom srednjem veku, uspelo je da se sa uspehom suprotstavi vievekovnoj rimskoj i vizantijskoj asimilaciji.
Drugo, osvajanje i nastanjivanje Srba na podruju Kosova dogodilo se u kasnije doba
(XII, XIII-XIV vek). Zbog toga kolonizacija Kosova putem dravnog mehanizma
Nemanjia, kao i podizanje, izgradnja ili obnova nekih sakralnih pravoslavnih spomenika
na mestu ilirsko-albanskih u toku dvovekovnog perioda vladavine Nemanjia, ne moe
dati za pravo istinskoj nauci da ovaj srednjevekovni period drave Nemanjia na Kosovu
naziva iskljuivo srpskim. Inae bi, po toj logici, mogli da svoj istorijski deo podruja kojima su vekovima vladali trae i Rimljani, Vizantijci, Osmanlije i drugi.
Dakle, smatram da istorijsko pravo na Kosovo imaju samo oni koji danas ive na njegovoj teritoriji.
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etvrto, u okviru jakog naunog argumenta postavlja se buno i pitanje velike seobe
Srba na elu sa patrijarhom Arsenijem treim arnojeviem. Istina je da dokumenta iz osmanlijskih, venecijanskih, austrijskih, pa ak i iz savremenih srpskih izvora, potvruju da
su teret borbe tokom austrijsko-turskih ratova (1683-1699) na podruju Kosova poneli
Albanci. Od tada, seoba Srba sa Kosova, koja se dogodila posle tih ratova, namerno je
naduvana i predstavljana kao seoba velikih razmera, koja bi mogla odjednom promeniti
etniku strukturu tako iroke teritorije, sa ciljem da se na taj nain objasni desrbizacija
Kosova. U stvari, to je bila jedna seoba veoma malih razmera, uglavnom srpskih pobunjenika predvoenih pekim patrijarhom.
Na kraju, neprihvatljivo je da istoriju piu oni koji nisu strunjaci ni profesionalci, a ne
moe se pravdati ni institucionalizacija istorije i njeno zloupotrebljavanje u slubi dnevne
politike, jer su i neki od dobrih poznavalaca istorije Kosova, kao to su A. Dajsli, N. Malkolm i drugi, u svojim istorijskim studijama posveenim Kosovu, izmeu ostalog doli do
zakljuka da su iskustva iz istorije i istoriografije pokazala da moe biti mnogo korisnih,
ali i tetnih posledica, koje se javljaju u odnosu na politiku i istoriografiju. Te posledice
proistiu iz podlonosti istorije politici, kada istorija postaje sluga politike, napisali su
oni. Dakle, svemu ovome to je napred reeno, nije potreban komentar.

Forum

Tree, i pored velike buke koja se danas die oko navodno ekskluzivne prednosti srpskog etniteta na Kosovu, istorijski izvori govore suprotno. Na ovom podruju, u toku dvovekovne vladavine Nemanjia, srpsko stanovnitvo je predstavljalo beznaajnu manjinu u
odnosu na autohtono ilirsko-albansko stanovnitvo. U tom pogledu, postavlja se jedno
drugo pitanje: zato su onda poslednji srpski kraljevi, pa i car Duan, sebe smatrali i vladarima Albanaca? I najzad, kako su se Albanci u poslednje dve bitke na Kosovu (1389. i
1448) nali rame uz rame sa drugim narodima Balkana, u borbi protiv zajednike opasnosti od osmanlijske invazije.

01. septembar 2005.

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Ahead of Kosovo Status Negotiations: Independent Kosovo 2006 A Fateful Mistake

By Slobodan Antonic, Senior Lecturer at the School of Philosophy in Belgrade

Forum

Serbia is entering the negotiations on Kosovo like a convict awaiting the execution of a serious and, in his opinion,
undeserved punishment. The punishment being, of course,
independence of Kosovo.
It is clear to everyone in Serbia that the Great Powers are
preparing to grant independence to Kosovo. It is obvious
from numerous statements of Atlantic officials that they are
"not opposing" the independence of Kosovo (but, on the
other hand, they are greatly opposed to the division of Kosovo, or its returning under the sovereignty of Belgrade). It is
also obvious from statements of members of the social elite
here, who have always tried to guess the wishes of the WashSlobodan Antonic
ington or Brussels administrations, even before the officials
there have had any wishes. This part of the elite has been explaining to the Serbian public
for months now, through Sonja Biserko or Cedomir Jovanovic, that the independence of
Kosovo was an excellent thing.
Therefore, Kosovo is moving toward independence. The foundation of this independence is, undoubtedly, the unanimous desire of the Albanian population in Kosovo no
longer to live in Serbia. At the same time, the foundation of this independence is, undoubtedly, an act of violence. This act of violence was the military aggression against Serbia in
1999, and the occupation of a part of its territory. That Milosevic is to blame for much goes
without saying. It also goes without saying that military operations he had undertaken in
Kosovo had many elements of war crimes. All his violence, however, cannot serve as justification for the legalization of another kind of violence, the legalization of the severing of
a part of a country's territory by war. It is clear to everyone in the international community
that this would be a dangerous precedent, disastrous for world peace. After this, any country with a bit of "muscle" could snatch a part of territory from its weaker neighbor and
proclaim an independent state there. This is why the independence of Kosovo must be
made legitimate after the fact.
When NATO attacked Serbia in 1999, it did so without approval of the U.N. Security
Council. Subsequently, the entire matter was made more or less legal through Security
Council Resolution 1244. The resolution was brought after the Kumanovo agreement, of
which Serbia was a signatory. Therefore, Serbia's consent to the arrival of NATO troops in
Kosovo served as the subsequent legalization of the "Merciful Angel" - the codename for
NATO's attack against Serbia.
The same solution is obvious once again. Kosovo is practically already independent.
This is clear not only from statements of Atlantic officials, but from the way UNMIK is
running Kosovo. However, the independence of Kosovo will never be legitimate without
Serbia's consent. Without this consent, an independent Kosovo will become a dangerous
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The imposed unity

In what degree is Kosova prepared for status talks? Internal analyses are mainly pessimistic, emphasizing the lack
of unity, experience and expertise. The efforts for the establishment of a representative model that would satisfy aspirations of all political entities, have failed since spring. Kosumis Government, not so convincing and lacking the
authority Ramush Haradinajs Government had, wanted to
direct the talks on its own without the parties in opposition.
The opposition, on the other hand, had considered this to be
an inadequate and weak representation, not only because the Shkelzen Maliqi
current LDK-AAK governmental coalition is relatively
weak, with an unstable simple majority, but also due to the fact that it is comprised of some
of corrupted and incapable ministers are, who could not be trusted with the responsibility
for negotiations.

Forum

Author: Shkelzen Maliqi

The Head of UNMIK Soren Jessen-Petersen had, actually, anticipated the establishment of a Political Forum consisted of the governmental and the opposition leaders, which
would play a key role during the status talks. But the Forum convened only once at the end
of May, when many conceptual differences were identified on its mandate and work. Kosumis Government all along has made obstructions to this idea, limiting the mandate and
the competences of this Forum into an advisory body. On the other hand the opposition was
also dissatisfied with this fluid advisory concept of the Forum. It requested the Forum to be
a decision- making body and to carry the status talks. It even requested a leading role in
these talks, saying that this would increase confidence and unity among the Kosovars. The
second option of the opposition was a creation of a broad based governmental coalition.
The entire summer was characterized with these conceptual differences, with the idea
of a Political Forum lingering in the air, whereas mutual accusations and efforts to denigrate the Prime Minister and some of the ministers, had raised political tensions and nervousness. Playing with disunity was viewed as unnecessary and harmful, as Kosova is
entering the status talks.
Another concern has been raised after the President announced that he suffers from
lung cancer. The exact diagnosis on the stage and the risk of cancer was not made known,
what triggered speculations on his possible successor and crises of authority and disunity
among LDK members in case President would be incapable of carrying out his duty in the
upcoming period, when the status talks are expected to begin
The culmination of those speculations, when was it thought that that creation of a new
broad based Government is practically unavoidable, and when even an international draft
proposal for the composition of a technical government was made known, there was a
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precedent, a devil in a box that could jump out any moment and hit anyone in the face. With
this consent, however, the independent Kosovo will become the example of a mutually
agreed and peaceful solution of territorial problems, a role model to be shown to others ("If
the Serbs and the Albanians were able to agree, so will you!")

Forum

This is why strong pressure is being exerted on Serbia to "join the process of negotiations." It is also being told in advance that this process can practically have only one outcome -- an independent Kosovo. Still, the process is being presented to Serbia as very open
for various gains that would be brought by this fixed outcome. Serbia is being presented
with prospects for more financial aid, boost of investments from the West and, ultimately,
a quicker admission into the European Union. "Kosovo will certainly be independent," it is
being said. "However, it is up to Serbia to choose whether it would gain great and tangible
benefits from this independence, or only damage."
"Why don't you Serbs be rational just for once?" an American friend asked me recently.
"If the independent Kosovo is imminent, why don't you then draw the most you can out of
it?" "Because, my friend," I replied, "for the Serbs, Kosovo is not a matter of rationality. It
is a matter of identity."
True, the majority of the Serbs have never been to Kosovo. They neither have relatives,
nor acquaintances there. And most of them will tell you: "Who cares for Kosovo. Just let
our lives be better. Let there be more work and let our children not be hungry." Still, the
map of Serbia without Kosovo would horrify the majority of Serbs. At the first next wedding, or funeral, or a sports match, the Serbs will remember what they have lost. And, if
their wallets are thicker because of it - "My God, you have sold Kosovo. You have sold
Christ! You have sold your own child!" they will tell their elite. And there would come the
wrath of thousands of Serbs in the streets: "Judas! Traitors! Money lovers!"
"There can be no democratic Serbia with an independent Kosovo," Vojislav Kostunica
once said. And that is completely true. No Serbian government, democratically elected,
would sign the document on Kosovo's independence nowadays. One could imagine Cedomir Jovanovic signing that document. One could imagine Goran Svilanovic signing it.
One could also imagine Sonja Biserko signing it. But none of them could ever be voted to
power in Serbia at democratic elections. He who says otherwise, either knows nothing
about the Serbs, or has bad intentions, dangerous for all of us.
Thus, if the great powers want Serbia to consent to Kosovo's independence, they could
get it in four ways. The first would be to bring Jovanovic and the rest in power in Belgrade.
However, this would only be possible with American tanks, not with ballots. This way is
certainly the quickest and seems as the simplest solution. But, I am not sure that the expenses
it would bring would be acceptable for anyone. The other way of obtaining Serbia's consent
for the independent Kosovo would be for the Serbs to gain more than money in exchange for
Kosovo. If they were to keep even the smallest piece of its territory, or the least bit of sovereignty, even symbolic -- this would be enough for the Serbs. They would no longer have the
bitter feeling of having swapped their relic for cash. However, almost everyone in the international community are certain, for the time being, that they do not want this solution.
The third way would be for the Serbs to receive no money in exchange for Kosovo.
They would then be unable to blame themselves for selling it. And their consent would be
forced by new sanctions. That is not a bad option, either. Serbia is tired of wars and pres102

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The nomination of the Negotiations Team by Rugova, although undertaken without

prior consultations with the opposition or the Government, opened a new path for a broader representation and unity. This, however did not solve all the problems, because this was
not a detailed proposal. It lacked explanations on the mandate, authorities and procedures
of decision-making, and the opposition leaders, Hashim Thaci in particular regarded it as a
trap: In case they accepted the proposal, parties in opposition would be left without the role
and influence they aspired, whereas if they rejected it, the opposition would be seen as being against unity. Thaci had criticized especially the lack of a negotiation platform, which
would have fixed the threshold of any eventual concessions made during the talks. Therefore, Thaci called on the Parliament to approve a Resolution on independence, which would
have obliged the Negotiations Team to defend the idea that independence is nonnegotiable,
while other issues, such as decentralization and the position and the role of minorities in the
independent Kosova, could be subject to discussion.

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turned which temporarily annulled the idea of the Forum and of the reconstruction of the
Government.. On September 12, Ibrahim Rugova announced his proposal for the composition of the Negotiation Team, which would be led by him, and would include all relevant
political leaders as well as heads of main institutions. His nomination was strongly supported by diplomatic offices, especially by the US Office in Prishtina, which was believed
to have initiated and even drafted the proposal. Whereas Rugova was to play the role he
had in Spring 1998, when according to the testimonies of the participants, the Americans
have prepared the 15-member list.

It is very likely that Rugovas project, regardless of his health or his active participation
in the talks, will be applied as a model in the coming months when status talks are expected to start, initially in form of shuttle diplomacy. In fact, this would ensure a broad
coalition between main Albanian parties, and representatives of non-Serb minorities would
most likely be also included. While Serbs, most likely, do not see themselves as part of
Kosovar delegation, because they want to be part of Serbias delegation.
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sure. It has delivered Milosevic, it has delivered the generals, it will deliver Kosovo. Only,
one should be careful that Serbia does not deliver democracy together with Kosovo. "The
West is not against Serbia because it hates Milosevic. It is against Milosevic because it
hates Serbia," Milosevic explained to the nation just before his downfall. If the democratic
Serbia experiences sanctions too, like the one under Milosevic, the majority of the Serbs
would have no option but to believe that the old dictator was right, after all. And when they
do, they would no longer have confidence in the West or in democracy. If the West was to
make the democratic Serbia give up Kosovo, it would in many ways be similar to making
the democratic Czechoslovakia give up the Sudetes. Democracy in Czechoslovakia has
even survived for a while after that. In Serbia, it will certainly not survive that long.
Finally, there is the fourth option, the most complex and time-consuming. To change
the Serbian identity. No Serb would find this easy to say. This means to admit defeat. This
means one facing the fact that one's arm has been amputated. This means to learn to live
without Kosovo. This means to have a bloody hole in one's chest instead of a heart -- until
another heart is found. A new identity: how painful that is. A new identity: how difficult
that is. And how this is by no means just a Serbian problem. Serbia needs help, not only
from the West, but from Kosovo, as well. Serbia does not need money to buy a prosthetic
device or a wheelchair. Serbia needs understanding and time, time to renew the feeling of
self-respect and dignity.
Independent Kosovo 2006 -- that is a fateful mistake. This is a completely unnecessary
violence, which Serbia will simply not survive. And why so much rush, anyway? If you do
not want to give Serbia anything else, give it some time, at least. Time needed by its democratic forces to create some kind of identity. With this new identity, Serbia might just even
survive the independence of a democratic Kosovo -- in 20 or 30 years. But, before that,
Kosovo must be democratic. Serbia must be democratic, too. Unfortunately, neither Serbia,
nor Kosovo, can reach this democratic identity in 2006. In 2006, Kosovo can accomplish
independence. But, neither Kosovo, nor Serbia, nor the Balkans, would thus reach what all
of us have been longing for the most -- lasting peace. Much more time and patience is
needed for building its foundations.
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Kosova e pavarur n vitin 2006 Gabim fatal

Shkruan: Sllobodan Antoniq, docent i Fakultetit Filozofik n Beograd

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Serbia hyn n negociata pr Kosovn, si i akuzuari i cili pret shqiptimin e nj dnimi t

rnd, t cilin sipas mendimit t saj nuk e ka merituar. Ky dnim, natyrisht se sht pavarsia e Kosovs.
Fakti q fuqit e mdha, posarisht SHBA-t, po prgatiten q ti japin Kosovs pavarsin, sht i qart pr t gjith n Serbi. Kjo shihet n baz t deklaratave t shumta t
zyrtarve t NATO-s t cilt nuk e kundrshtojn pavarsin e Kosovs (por se pr kt
shum e kundrshtojn ndarjen e Kosovs, ose kthimin e saj nn sovranitetin e Beogradit).
Kjo shihet edhe n baz t fjalimeve t asaj pjes t shoqris elite t ktushme, e cila q
moti sht munduar q ti prshtatet dshirave t administrats s Uashingtonit apo Brukselit edhe para se zyrtart e atjeshm t dshirojn ndonj gj. Kjo pjes e elits, prmes
Sonja Biserkos dhe edomir Jovanoviqit, gjat muajve t fundit nuk ndalet s shpjeguari
opinionit serb se si pavarsia e Kosovs sht akt i kryer.
Pra, Kosova po shkon drejt pavarsis. Nuk ka dyshim se n themel t ksaj pavarsie
shtrihet vullneti unanim i popullats shqiptare n Kosov q m t mos jetoj n Serbi. Por,
njashtu nuk ka dyshim se n themel t ksaj pavarsie shtrihet edhe nj dhun. Kjo dhun
quhet agresioni ushtarak kundr Serbis n vitin 1999 dhe okupimi i nj pjese t territorit
t saj. Natyrisht se Millosheviqi sht fajtor pr shum gjra. Natyrisht se n operacionet
ushtarake q i ka ndrmarr n Kosov kan pasur shum elemente t krimeve t lufts.
Por, e gjith dhuna e tij nuk mund t jet arsyetim pr legalizimin e nj dhune tjetr. Apo
pr legalizimin e shkoqitjes t nj pjese t territorit t nj vendi prmes lufts. T gjithve
n bashksin ndrkombtare i sht e qart se nj gj e till do t krijonte nj presedan t
rrezikshm dhe t kobshm pr paqen botrore. Pas ktij presedani, secili vend me muskuj
t fuqishm do t mund t merrte pjes t territorit nga fqinji i tij m i dobt, dhe me kt
t shpallte shtet t pavarur. Prandaj, pavarsia e Kosovs duhet t ket legjitimitet t mtutjeshm.
Kur NATO ka sulmuar Serbin n vitin 1999, ajo nuk e ka pasur lejen e Kshillit t Sigurimit. M pas, si do q t jet, e tra sht legalizuar me Rezolutn 1244 t Kshillit t Sigurimit. Kjo Rezolut sht hartuar pas marrveshjes t Kumanovs, ku Serbia vet ka qen
nnshkruese. Pra, pajtimi i serbve pr ardhjen e trupave t NATO-s n Kosov ka shrbyer
si legalizim i mpastajshm i Engjllit t Mshirshm, prkatsisht NATO-n n Serbi.
Zgjidhje e njjt shihet edhe tash. Kosova tashm sht praktikisht e pavarur. Kjo sht
e qart jo vetm n baz t deklaratave t zyrtarve t NATO-s, por edhe n baz t
mnyrs se si UNMIKU e udhheq Kosovn. Por, pavarsia e Kosovs asnjher nuk do
t legalizohet pa pajtimin e Serbis. Pa kt pajtim, Kosova e pavarur bhet presedan i
rrezikshm, djall nga shishja, i cili n secilin moment mund t krcej dhe ti bie n fytyr
cilitdo. Por, me kt pajtim, pavarsia e Kosovs bhet shembull i marrveshjes me
mirkuptim dhe paqe pr problemet territoriale, nj shembull i cili do t ju tregohej edhe t
tjerve (kur serbt dhe shqiptart jan marr vesh, do t mundeni edhe ju!).
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Uniteti i imponuar

A sht Kosova e prgatitur pr bisedat pr zgjidhjen e statusit t Kosovs? Analizat e

brendshme jan kryesisht pesimiste. Theksojn mungesn e unitetit, t prvojs dhe t
ekspertizs. Q nga pranvera n Kosov dshtuan prpjekjet pr krijimin e nj modeli prfaqsues q do ti knaqte aspiratat e t gjith subjekteve politike. Qeveria e Bajram Kosumit, jo edhe aq e bindshme, dhe me autoritetin e qeveris s Ramush Haradinajt, pretendonte se ajo vet duhet t jet bartse e negociatave dhe nuk parashihte ndonj rol pr
opozitn. Ndrkaq, nga ana e opozits konsiderohej se ky do t ishte nj prfaqsim joadekuat dhe i dobt, jo vetm pse koalicioni i LDK-s me AAK-n sht relativisht i dobt,
me nj shumic jo edhe aq stabile, por edhe pr shkak se n prbrjen e saj ka disa ministra
t korruptuar dhe t paaft, kshtu q atyre nuk mund ti lihet prgjegjsia e negociatave.

Forum

Shkruan: Shklzen Maliqi, analist nga Kosova

Kryeadministratori i Kosovs, Jessen-Petersen, n t vrtet, kishte parapar krijimin e

Forumit politik t Kosovs ku do t ishin t prfshir t gjith lidert e pozits dhe opozits,
si dhe drejtuesit e institucioneve kryesore, i cili Forum do t kishte rolin kryesor n negociata. Por ky forum sht takuar vetm nj her nga fundi i majit, kur sht vrejtur se ka
dallime t mdha konceptuale rreth mandatit dhe mnyrs s puns s tij. Qeveria e Kosumit tr kohs bnte obstruksion ndaj ktij propozimi, duke ulur mandatin dhe kompetencat e forumit n ato t nj trupi kshilldhns, ndrkaq q as opozita nuk ishte e knaqur
me konceptin fluid t Forumit me funksione kshilldhnse. Opozita krkonte q Forumi
t jet organ vendimmarrs dhe barts i negociatave pr statusin, duke krkuar madje edhe
rolin udhheqs pr opozitn n kto negociata, sepse kshtu do t arrihej besimi dhe uniteti m i madh ndr kosovart. Opsioni i dyt i opozits ishte ai i krijimit t Qeveris s re n
baz t koalicionit t gjer.
Tr vera kishte kaluar me kto dallime konceptuale dhe iden e Forumit politik q
mbetej n hava, ndrkaq q akuzat e ndrsjella dhe prpjekjet pr komprometimin e kryeministrit Kosumi dhe t disa ministrave, krijuan atmosfern e tendosjeve dhe prishjes s
gjakrave, ka mendohej se sht nj rrethan e pafavorshme pr Kosovn, nse n negociata do t luhej me prarje.
Nj breng tjetr sht shfaqur pas smundjes s kryetarit Rugova, i cili tregoi edhe
publikisht se sht i smur nga kanceri i mushkrive. Edhe pse nuk u publikua diagnoza e
sakt pr fazn dhe rrezikun nga kanceri q kishte, kjo prhapi spekulimet dhe lvizjet e
shumta rreth trashgimtarit t tij dhe krizs s autoritetit dhe prarjeve edhe n partin m
t madhe, LDK-n, n rast se Rugova nuk do t mund t ushtronte m detyrn e tij n periudhn e afrt kur pritej se do t zhvillohen bisedimet pr statusin.
Por, n kulmin e ktyre spekulimeve, kur mendohej se krijimi i nj qeverie t re me
prbrje gjithprfshirse sht praktikisht e pashmangshme, madje u publikua edhe nj
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Kjo sht arsyeja pse bhet presion i madh n Serbin q t hyj n negociata. Serbis
i thuhet se n kt proces e ka vetm nj prfundim pavarsin e Kosovs. Por, ky proces
i paraqitet Serbis si shum i hapur, pr fitime t ndryshme q ofrohen nga prfundime t
pandryshueshme. Serbis i trhiqet vmendja n ndihma m t mdha financiare, nxitje t
investimeve t huaja, dhe s fundi, edhe me hyrje m t shpejt n Bashkimin Evropian.
Kosova sigurisht do t jet e pavarur. Por varet nga Serbia se a do t ket ajo vet prfitim
t madh t prekshm, apo vetm dm.

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Pse ju serbt nuk bheni racional s paku nj her? m ka pyetur tash s voni nj mik
amerikan. Nse pavarsia e Kosovs sht dika e pashmangshme, pse ather nuk nxirrni
nga kjo sa m shum q mundeni? Ndrsa un u prgjigja: Pr shkak se Kosova pr Serbin nuk sht shtje e nacionalitetit, por shtje e identitetit.
Dhe seriozisht, shumica e serbve kurr nuk ka qen n Kosov dhe as q e ka ndoknd
apo njeh dik atje. Dhe shumica do t thoshin: Kujt i intereson pr Kosovn tani? Vetm
t ket jet m t mir. Q t ket m shum pun dhe fmijt t mos jen t uritur. Por,
shumica e serbve do t tmerroheshin thell, sikur t shihnin hartn e Serbis pa Kosovn.
Dasma e par, varrimi i par, loja e par, dhe serbt do t shtisin pa at q kan mbetur.
Edhe nse kjo do t thot se xhepat e tyre do t jan m t mbushur. Por ju e keni shitur
Kosovn. E keni shitur Krishtin. E keni shitur fmijn tuaj, do ti thoshin ata elits s vet.
Dhe ja hidhrimi i serbve n rrug: Jud! Tradhtar! Lakmitar!
Nuk ka Serbi demokratike me Kosov t pavarur, pat thn Vojisllav Koshtunica.
Dhe kjo sht plotsisht e vrtet. As nj qeveri serbe, e zgjidhur n mnyr demokratike
sot nuk do t nnshkruante dokumentin pr pavarsin e Kosovs. Mund t imagjinohet se
si edomir Jovanoviq e nnshkruan kt dokument. Mund t imagjinohet se si Goran Svillanoviq e nnshkruan kt dokument. Mund t imagjinohet se si Sonja Biserko e nnshkruan kt dokument. Por askush nga kta dhe kurr nuk mund t zgjidhen n mnyr demokratike n zgjedhje demokratike. Kushdo q thot ndryshe, ose nuk di asgj pr serbt,
ose ka qllime t kqija dhe t kobshme pr t gjith ne.
Dhe kshtu, n rast se fuqit e mdha dshirojn pajtimin e Serbis pr pavarsin e
Kosovs, deri ktu mund t arrijn n katr mnyra. E para mnyr sht q Beogradi ta
sjell n pushtet Jovanoviqin dhe t tjert. Por, kjo sht e mundur vetm me ndihmn e
tankeve amerikane, e jo edhe prmes zgjedhjeve. Kjo mnyr gjithsesi sht m e shpejta,
dhe duket se sht zgjidhja m e thjesht. Por, nuk jam i sigurt se mimi q kjo mnyr
nnkupton sht i pranueshm pr ndoknd. Mnyra e dyt n t ciln mund t arrihet
pajtimi i Serbis pr pavarsin e Kosovs sht q serbt e Kosovs t mos marrin vetm
para. Sikur t mbanin qoft edhe pjesn m t vogl t saj, ose sovranitetin m t vogl
simbolik, do t mjaftonte pr serbt. Nuk do t kishin m prshtypjen e hidhur se e kan
tregtuar barrn e tyre me para. Por, pr kt mnyr, s paku deri tash, t gjith n bashksin ndrkombtare jan t sigurt se nuk e dshirojn.
Mnyra e tret sht q serbt n Kosov t mos marrin para. Ather nuk do t mund
as ti thon vetes se kan shitur dika. Ndrsa pajtimi i tyre do t arrihet prmes krcnimit me sanksione t reja. Serbia sht lodhur nga luftrat dhe presioni. E ka dorzuar Millosheviqin, i ka dorzuar gjeneralt, do ta dorzoj edhe Kosovn.. vetm duhet pasur kujdes q me dorzimin e Kosovs, Serbia t mos dorzoj edhe demokracin. Nuk sht
Perndimi kundr Serbis pr shkak se e urren Millosheviqin. Prkundrazi, Perndimi
sht kundr Millosheviqit pr shkak se e urren Serbin, ka shpjeguar pr popullin, pak
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Sidoqoft, shpallja e ekipit negociator nga ana e Rugovs, edhe pse ishte br pa konsulta paraprake as me opozitn e as me Qeverin e Kosovs, hapi nj rrug tjetr pr prfaqsimin m komplet dhe unitet. Por, kjo nuk zgjodhi t gjitha problemet, sepse projekti i
Rugovs nuk ishte i detajizuar, ishte pa shpjegime pr mandatin, kompetencat dhe procedurat e vendosjes, dhe nga lidert e opozits, sidomos Hashim Thai, kuptohej si nj kurth:
nse do ta pranonin nuk do t kishin rolin dhe peshn e ndikimit q pretendonin, kurse nse
do ta kundrshtonin, do t tregonin vetn se jan kundr unitetit. Thai kritikonte sidomos
mungesn e nj platforme pr negociata, q do t fiksonte edhe pragun e koncesioneve t
mundshme n negociata. Pr kt arsye Thai krkoi q Kuvendi i Kosovs paraprakisht t
aprovoj nj Rezolut pr pavarsin e Kosovs, e cila do t obligonte edhe grupin negociator q n negociata gjithsesi t mbrohet pavarsia e Kosovs, si opsion i panegociueshm, ndrkaq q do t mund t bisedohet pr shtjet tjera, si decentralizmi dhe pozita
dhe roli i minoriteteve n Kosovn e pavarur.

Forum

draft projekt i ndrkombtarve i prbrjes s qeveris teknike, ndodhi nj kthes q anuloi

prkohsisht edhe iden e Forumit edhe t rikonstruktimit t Qeveris. Ibrahim Rugova me
12 shtator shpalli nj propozim t tij t prbrjes s grupit negociator q do t udhhiqej
nga ai vet, ku ishin prfshir t gjith lidert relevant dhe drejtuesit e institucioneve
kryesore. Propozimi i tij sht prkrahur fuqimisht nga zyrat diplomatike, sidomos nga
Zyra Amerikane n Prishtin, pr t ciln dyshohej se n t vrtet ishte ideatorja dhe hartuesja e ktij propozimi, ndrkaq q roli i Rugovs ishte si n pranver t vitit 1998, kur
sipas dshmive t protagonistve n at koh, lista 15 antarshe ishte prpiluar nga amerikant!

Me gjasa, ky projekt i Rugovs, pa marr parasysh gjendjen e tij shndetsore dhe

pjesmarrjen aktive n negociata, do t jet modeli aplikues n muajt e ardhshm, kur pritet
q t fillojn negociatat pr statusin, fillimisht n formn e shatll diplomacis. N esenc
kjo do t siguroj nj koalicion t gjer t t gjitha subjekteve relevante shqiptare, e mbase
do t kyen edhe ato t prfaqsuesve t minoritarve jo-serb, ndrkaq q serbt sipas t
gjitha gjasave, as vet nuk e shohin veten n prbrjen e delegacionit kosovar, por duan q
t jan me delegacionin e Serbis.
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para rrzimit t tij Sllobodan Millosheviqi. N rast se Serbia demokratike prballet me

sanksione sikur edhe Serbia n krye me Millosheviqin, shumica e serbve nuk do t kan
rrugdalje tjetr vetm t mendojn se diktatori i vjetr ka pasur t drejt. Ndrsa kur serbt
mendojn kshtu, nuk do t besojn m as n Perndim, as n demokraci. N rast se Perndimi e detyron Serbin q t heq dor nga Kosova, kjo do t jet shum e ngjashme me
rastin kur e ka detyruar ekosllovakin demokratike q t heq dor nga Sudeti. Demokracia n ekosllovaki ka mbijetuar vetm edhe disa muaj pas ksaj. N Serbi, sigurisht se
nuk do t mbijetonte as aq.
Prfundimisht, sht edhe mnyra e katrt, m kompleksja dhe mundsia m e krkuar
e kohs. Dhe kjo sht ndryshimi i identitetit serb. Kjo, pr nj serb, nuk sht e leht pr
t thn. Kjo do t thot t pranosh humbjen. Kjo do t thot t prballesh me dorn tnde
t amputuar. Kjo do t thot t msohesh t jetosh pa Kosov. Kjo do t thot t kesh n
zemr nj grop t prgjakshme n vend t zemrs prderisa t gjesh nj zemr t re.
Identiteti i ri: sa e dhimbshme sht kjo. Identiteti i ri: sa e vshtir sht kjo. Dhe kjo assesi nuk sht problem vetm i serbve. Serbis i duhet ndihm jo vetm nga Perndimi,
por edhe nga vet Kosova. Paraja nuk sht e vetmja gj q i duhet Serbis pr t bler
protezn apo karrocn e invalidve. Serbis i duhet mirkuptim dhe koh; koh q t
riprtrij ndjenjn e vetrespektit dhe dinjitetit.
Kosova e pavarur 2006 ky sht gabim fatal. Kjo sht nj dhun plotsisht e panevojshme t ciln Serbia thjesht nuk do ta mbijetoj. Dhe tek e fundit pse tr kjo nguti? Nse
Serbis asgj nuk do ti jepni, jepni s paku koh. Koh q forcat demokratike prbrenda
t ja dalin t ndrtojn nj identitet fardo. Me nj identitet t ri, Serbia demokratike
ndoshta do tia dalte t mbijetonte pavarsin e Kosovs demokratike pr njzet, apo
tridhjet vjet. Por, para ksaj, Kosova s pari duhet t jet demokratike. Edhe Serbia duhet
t jet demokratike. Fatkeqsisht, vshtir se Kosova dhe Serbia do t arrijn deri te ky
identitet i ri mu n vitin 2006. N vitin 2006, Kosova mund t arrij deri te pavarsia. Por
me kt as Kosova, as Serbia e as Ballkani nuk do t arrijn deri aty ku ktu t gjith dshirojn m s shumti deri te paqja e qndrueshme. Si do q t jet, themelet e saj duhet t
ndrtohen shum m gjat dhe me m shum durim.
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U susret pregovorima o statusu Kosova: Nezavisno Kosovo 2006. sudbinska greka

Pie: Slobodan Antoni, docent Filozofskog fakulteta u Beogradu

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Srbija ulazi u pregovore o Kosovu kao osuenik koji eka na izvrenje teke i, po njegovom miljenju, nezasluene kazne. Ta kazna je, naravno, nezavisnost Kosova.
Da se velike sile, a pre svih SAD, pripremaju da Kosovu daju nezavisnost, to je u
Srbiji svakome jasno. Vidi se to po brojnim izjavama atlantskih zvaninika da se ne protive
nezavisnosti Kosova (ali se, zato, veoma protive podeli Kosova, ili njegovom vraanju pod
suverenitet Beograda). Vidi se to i po nastupima onog dela ovdanje drutvene elite koji se
oduvek trudio da pogodi elje vaingtonske ili briselske administracije i pre nego to su
tamonji zvaninici ita poeleli. Taj deo elite, kroz usta Sonje Biserko ili edomira
Jovanovia, poslednjih meseci ne prestaje srpskoj javnosti da objanjava kako je nezavisnost Kosova izvrsna stvar.
Kosovo, dakle, ide ka nezavisnosti. Nema sumnje da u osnovi te nezavisnosti lei
jednoduna volja albanskog stanovnistva na Kosovu da vie ne ivi u Srbiji. Ali, isto tako,
nema sumnje da u osnovi te nezavisnosti lei i jedno nasilje. To nasilje se zove vojna
agresija na Srbiju 1999. i okupacija dela njene teritorije. Naravno da je Miloevi kriv za
mnogo toga. Naravno da su vojne operacije koje je preduzimao na Kosovu imale mnoge
elemente ratnih zloina. Ali, sva njegova nasilja ne mogu biti opravdanje za ozakonjenje
jednog drugog nasilja. Za ozakonjenje ratnog otrgnua dela teritorije neke zemlje. Svima
je u meunarodnoj zajednici jasno da bi tako neto stvorilo opasan presedan, koban po
svetski mir. Nakon njega bi svaka zemlja sa jaim miicama mogla da od slabijeg suseda
otme deo njegove teritorije i tamo proglasi novu nezavisnu dravu. Zato se nezavisnosti
Kosova mora dati naknadni legitimitet.
Kada je NATO napao Srbiju, 1999. godine, on za to nije imao dozvolu Saveta bezbednosti. Naknadno je ipak itava stvar kako-tako ozakonjena rezolucijom Saveta bezbednosti 1244. Ta rezolucija donesena je nakon Kumanovskog sporazuma, iji je potpisnik
bila Srbija. Dakle, srpska saglasnost na dolazak NATO trupa na Kosovo posluila je kao
naknadna legitimacija za Milosrdnog anela, odnosno za NATO napad na Srbiju.
Isto se reenje vidi i sada. Kosovo je praktino ve nezavisno. Jasno je to ne samo po
izjavama atlantskih zvaninika, ve i po nainu na koji UNMIK upravlja Kosovom. Ali,
nezavisnost Kosova nikada nee biti legitimna bez saglasnosti Srbije. Bez te saglasnosti,
nezavisno Kosovo postaje opasan presedan, avo iz kutije koji u svakom trenutku moe da
iskoi i udari bilo koga u lice. Sa tom saglasnosti, meutim, nezavisno Kosovo postaje
primer sporazumnog i mirnog reavanja teritorijalnih problema, uzor koji e se i drugima
pokazivati (Kad su Srbi i Albanci mogli da se dogoovre, moi ete i vi!).
Zato se na Srbiju vri snaan pritisak da se ukljui u proces pregovaranja. Za taj proces joj se unapred kae da praktino ima samo jedan ishod - nezavisnost Kosova. Ali, taj
proces se Srbiji prikazuje i kao veoma otvoren za razliite dobitke koje donosi nepromen112

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Nametnuto jedinstvo

Koliko je Kosovo spremno za razgovore o reavanju statusa Kosova? Interne analize su

uglavnom pesimistike. Istie se nedostatak jedinstva, iskustva i strunosti. Na Kosovu su
jo na prolee propali napori za stvaranje takvog predstavnikog modela koji bi zadovoljio
aspiracije svih politikih subjekata. Vlada Bajrama Kosumija, nedovoljno ubedljivo, bez
autoriteta kakvog je imala vlada Ramua Haradinaja, teila je da upravo ona sama bude
nosilac pregovora, ne predviajui nikakvu ulogu za opoziciju. S druge strane, opozicija je
smatrala da bi takvo zastupanje Kosova u pregovorima bilo neadekvatno i slabo, ne samo
zato to je vladina koalicija DSK i AZBK relativno slaba, sa ne tako stabilnom veinom,
ve i zbog toga to u njenom sastavu ima nekoliko korumpiranih i nesposobnih ministara,
kojima se ne bi smela prepustiti odgovornost za pregovore.

Forum

Pie: Skeljzen Maljii, novinar i publicista

Specijalni predstavnik generalnog sekretara UN na Kosovu, Soren Jesen-Petersen, u

stvari je bio predvideo stvaranje Politikog foruma Kosova, kojim bi bili obuhvaeni svi
lideri vlasti i opozicije, kao i rukovodioci glavnih institucija, i taj bi forum imao vodeu
ulogu u pregovorima. Meutim, forum se sastao samo jednom krajem maja, kada je primeeno da postoje ogromne koncepcijske razlike u vezi sa njegovim mandatom i nainom
rada.
Vlada Bajrama Kosumija je sve vreme opstruirala taj predlog, pokuavajui da umanji
mandat i kompetencije foruma, smatrajui ga samo savetodavnim telom, mada ni opozicija nije bila zadovoljna fluidnim konceptom foruma sa savetodavnim funkcijama. Opozicija
je zahtevala da forum bude organ koji donosi odluke i nosilac pregovora o statusu, zahtevajui ak i rukovodeu ulogu opozicije na tim pregovorima, jer bi se time, po njihovom
miljenju, pridobilo poverenje i uvrstilo jedinstvo meu Kosovarima. Druga opcija
opozicije bila je stvaranje nove vlade, na bazi iroke koalicije.
Tako je celo leto proteklo uz koncepcijske razlike i ideju o Politikom forumu, koja je
visila u vazduhu, dok su meusobne optube i pokuaji komprimitovanja premijera Kosumija i nekoliko ministra stvarali napetu atmosferu vrele krvi, a to je, prema optem
miljenju, bila nepovoljna okolnost za Kosovo, ukoliko bi se u proces pregovora ulo sa
podelama.
Druga briga se pojavila nakon bolesti predsednika Rugove, koji je i javno saoptio da
boluje od raka plua. Iako nije objavljena tana dijagnoza o tome u kojoj je fazi bolest i o
opasnosti koja preti predsednikovom ivotu, to je uticalo na irenje spekulacija i mnogobrojnih nagaanja o njegovom moguem nasledniku, o krizi autoriteta i moguim nesporazumima i podelama u najveoj partiji, DSK, ukoliko Rugova ne bi mogao dalje da obavlja
svoje dunosti u bliskoj budunosti, kada bi mogli zapoeti razgovori o statusu.
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ljivi ishod. Srbiji se stavlja u izgled poveana finansijska pomo, podsticanje zapadnih ulaganja i, konano, ubrzano prikljuenje Evropskoj uniji. Kosovo e sigurno biti nezavisno, kae se. Ali, samo od Srbije zavisi da li e od te nezavisnosti imati i veliku i
opipljivu korist, ili samo tetu.
Zato vi Srbi ne budete makar jednom racionalni?, pitao me je, nedavno, jedan
ameriki prijatelj. Ako je nezavisnost Kosova neto to je neminovno, zato iz toga, onda,
ne izvuete najvie to moete?. Zato, dragi prijatelju, odgovorio sam, to Kosovo za
Srbe nije stvar racionalnosti. Ono je stvar identiteta.

Forum

I zbilja, veina Srba nikada nije bila na Kosovu. Niti koga tamo ima, niti koga tamo zna.
I veina e vam rei: Ko jo mari za Kosovo. Samo da je boljeg ivota. Da je vie posla i
da nam deca nisu gladna. Ali, veina Srba e se najdublje uasnuti kada bude videla kartu
Srbije bez Kosova. Prva svadba, prva sahrana, ili prva utakmica, i Srbi e se setiti bez ega
su ostali. Jo ako su im depovi zbog toga puniji Pa vi ste prodali Kosovo. Prodali ste Hrista! Prodali ste sopstveno dete!, rei e svojoj eliti. I evo gneva hiljada Srba na ulicama - Jude! Izdajice! Srebroljupci!
Nema demokratske Srbije sa nezavisnim Kosovom, jednom je rekao Vojislav
Kotunica. I to je potpuno tano. Nijedna srpska vlada, demokratski izabrana, nee danas
potpisati dokument o nezavisnosti Kosova. Moe se zamisliti kako taj dokument potpisuje
edomir Jovanovi. Moe se zamisliti kako taj dokument potpisuje Goran Svilanovi.
Moe se zamisliti kako taj dokument potpisuje Sonja Biserko. Ali niko od njih i nikada ne
moe u Srbiji biti izabran na demokratskim izborima. Svako ko kae drugaije, ili o Srbima
nita ne zna, ili ima rave i po sve nas zlokobne namere.
I tako, ako velike sile ele saglasnost Srbije na nezavisnost Kosova, do toga mogu da
dou na etiri naina. Prvi je da u Beogradu na vlast dovedu Jovanovia i ostale. Ali, to je
mogue samo uz pomo amerikih tenkova, ne i preko birakih listia. Taj nain je svakako najbri i izgleda kao najjednostavnije reenje. Ali, nisam siguran da su trokovi koje on
nosi za bilo koga prihvatljivi. Drugi nain na koji se moe postii srpska saglasnost sa
kosovskom nezavisnou jeste da Srbi za Kosovo ne dobiju samo novac. Ako bi zadrali
makar i najmanji njegov deo, ili najmanju, makar i simboliku suverenost - to bi za Srbe
bilo dovoljno. Ne bi vie imali gorak utisak da su svoju relikviju trampili za pare. Ali, za
ovaj nain su, barem zasad, gotovo svi u meunarodnoj zajednici sigurni da ga ne ele.
Trei nain je da Srbi za Kosovo ne dobiju nikakav novac. Onda sebi nee moi ni
prebacivati da su bilo ta prodali. A njihova saglasnost bi se iznudila pretnjom novim sankcijama. Ni to nije rava opcija. Srbija je umorna od ratova, i pritisaka. Isporuila je Miloevia, isporuila je generale, isporuie i Kosovo. Samo, trebalo bi pripaziti da sa Kosovom Srbija ne isporui i demokratiju. Nije Zapad protiv Srbije zato to mrzi Miloevia.
On je protiv Miloevia zato to mrzi Srbiju, objanjavao je narodu, neposredno pred svoj
pad, Slobodan Miloevi. Ako i demokratska Srbija doivi sankcije kao i ona Miloevieva,
veina Srba nee imati kud nego da pomisli kako je stari diktator bio u pravu. A kada Srbi
to pomisle, nee vie verovati niti u Zapad, ni u demokratiju. Natera li Zapad demokratsku
Srbiju da se odrekne Kosova, bie to u mnogome slino kao kada je demokratsku
ehoslovaku naterao da se odrekne Sudeta. Demokratija je u ehoslovakoj posle toga
jo nekoliko meseci preivela. U Srbiji sigurno nee ni toliko.
Konano, postoji i etvrta, najsloenija i vremenski najzahtevnija mogunost. A to je
promena srpskog identiteta. To jednom Srbinu nije lako da kae. To znai priznati poraz.
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Bilo kako bilo, Rugovino imenovanje pregovarake ekipe, iako je obavljeno bez prethodnih konsultacija, ak ni sa partijama na vlasti ni sa Vladom Kosova, otvorilo je drugi novi put kompletnijeg predstavljanja i jedinstva. To, meutim, nije reilo sve probleme, jer
Rugovin predlog nije bio detaljan, nedostajala su objanjenja mandata, nadlenosti i procedure odluivanja, pa su ga kao takvog lideri opozicije, a naroito Haim Tai, shvatili kao
mamac: ukoliko bi ga prihvatili, ne bi imali ulogu i teinu uticaja koju su zamiljali, a ukoliko bi ga odbili, smatralo bi se da su protiv jedinstva. Tai je naroito otro kritikovao
nedostatak platforme za pregovore, u kojoj bi se utvrdile granice moguih odstupanja tokom pregovarakog procesa. Zbog toga je Tai zatraio da Skuptina Kosova prethodno
usvoji Rezoluciju o nezavisnosti Kosova, koja bi obavezala pregovaraku grupu da na
svaki nain brani nezavisnost Kosova, kao opciju o kojoj se ne moe pregovarati, dok bi se
moglo raspravljati o drugim pitanjima, kao to su decentralizacija i poloaj i uloga manjina
u nezavisnom Kosovu.

Forum

Meutim, u jeku tih spekulacija, kada se mislilo da je stvaranje nove sveobuhvatne

vlade praktino neizbeno, ak su neki neimenovani medunarodni zvaninici objavili nacrt
nekakvog projekta o sastavu tehnike vlade, dolo je do preokreta koji je privremeno otklonio ideju o forumu i rekonstrukciji vlade. Ibrahim Rugova je 12. septembra saoptio svoj
predlog o sastavu pregovarake grupe, kojom bi on sam rukovodio, a kojom bi bili obuhvaeni svi relevantni lideri i rukovodioci glavnih kosovskih institucija. Njegov predlog su
svesrdno podrale diplomatske misije, naroito Amerika kancelarija u Pritini, za koju se
sumnjalo da je u stvari bila glavni inicijator i sastavlja predloga, dok je uloga Rugove bila
slina onoj iz prolea 1998. godine, kada su, prema svedoenju protagonista iz tog vremena, listu od petnaest lanova ekipe za pregovore sastavili upravo Amerikanaci!

Svi su izgledi da e taj Rugovin projekat, bez obzira na njegovo zdravstveno stanje i
aktivno uee u pregovorima, biti model koji e se primenjivati tokom narednih meseci,
kada se oekuje poetak pregovora o statusu, prvobtino u obliku atl diplomatije. U
stvari, to e obezbeivati iroku koaliciju svih vanih albanskih politikih subjekata, a
mogue je da se prikljue i predstavnici nesrpskih manjina, dok Srbi, po svemu sudei, ne
vide svoje mesto u sastavu kosovske delegacije, ve ele da budu sastavni deo delegacije
Srbije.
06. oktobar 2005.

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Forum

To znai suoiti se sa svojom amputiranom rukom. To znai nauiti iveti bez Kosova. To
znai mesto srca u grudima nositi krvavu rupu - sve dok ne naete novo srce. Novi identitet: kako je to bolno. Novi identitet: kako je to teko. I kako to nipoto nije samo srpski
problem. Srbiji treba pomo, ne samo od Zapada, ve i od Kosova. Srbiji ne treba samo
novac, da bi kupila protezu ili invalidska kolica. Srbiji treba razumevanje i vreme, vreme
da obnovi oseaj samopotovanja i dostojanstva.

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Nezavisno Kosovo 2006.- to je sudbinska greka. To je sasvim nepotrebno nasilje koje

Srbija jednostavno nee preiveti. I emu uopte tolika urba? Ako Srbiji neete ba nita
drugo da date, dajte joj makar vreme. Vreme potrebno da demokratske snage u njoj stignu
da naprave kakav-takav identitet. Sa novim identitetom, demokratska Srbija e moda i
moi da preivi nezavisnost demokratskog Kosova - za dvadeset, ili trideset godina. Ali,
pre toga, Kosovo najpre mora biti demokratsko. I Srbija mora biti demokratska. Naalost,
do tog novog, demokratskog identiteta i Kosovo i Srbija teko da e stici ba 2006. godine.
Te 2006. godine Kosovo moe doi do nezavisnosti. Ali time ni Kosovo, ni Srbija, ni Balkan nee stii do onoga ega smo svi ovde najvie eljni - do trajnog mira. Njegove osnove
se ipak moraju mnogo due i strpljivije graditi.
06. oktobar 2005.

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KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

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More than Autonomy, Less than Independence - A Fair Offer

By Sanda Raskovic-Ivic, President of the Serbian government's Coordinating Center for
Kosovo and Metohija

Forum

The announcement of the start of negotiations on the final status of Kosovo is reminiscent of some kind of postwar peace conference. This conclusion is bolstered by the
actual situation on the ground, especially the living conditions faced by Serbs in Kosovo and Metohija.

Sanda Raskovic-Ivic

Serbs enjoy freedom of movement and decent lives in

general only in areas where they constitute an absolute majority, such as in the north of city of Kosovska Mitrovica.
Their enclaves are like ghettos or maybe modern-day concentration camps. There, they have to live on handouts since
they are not allowed to farm their fields or enter the forests.
They are not allowed to work for a living and every time
they venture outside of their enclaves they risk being attacked or shot at.

Only a handful of Serbs are still living in urban areas such as Pristina, Pec, and Prizren.
Some of them have been unable to leave their homes or apartments for years out of fear that
Albanians will attack them if they go out into the streets.
The final status of Kosovo is going to be discussed in this kind of situation, five years
after the international community bombed our country, a move it justified as necessary
because of Albanians being terrorized. Unfortunately, the same people have not displayed
a fraction of such concern in the last five years for Serbs exposed to terror in Kosovo and
Metohija.
The uninformed could say that this puts the Serb side in a better negotiating position
and that the Albanians, as those to blame for five years of continuous terror against the
Serbs, are not to be commended for what they have done. Unfortunately, the fact remains
that such reasoning applies only to other nations. Sadly, Serbs are still a people to whom
the principles of international humanitarian law do not apply. This might be a painful and
brutal statement, but it is true.
The Serb side, and when I say this I mean both Belgrade and the Kosovo Serbs, advocates a peaceful solution to the problem and the introduction of a formula that will bring
lasting peace to Kosovo and the entire region. I would like to recall the fact that armed
conflict began in Kosovo in 1997 when the Albanian side launched an armed insurrection,
ambushing police and military forces and abducting Serb civilians. This unquestionable
fact has unjustifiably and inexplicably been forgotten.
Pro-democracy political parties are in power in Belgrade. The Serbian cabinet has been
given the green light for negotiations on EU membership, reforms are proceeding at a
faster rate than in any other country that has been through or is going through transition.
All of this lends Belgrade additional credibility in securing support for its more than autonomy, less than independence policy.
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Why Kosova needs independence

Author: Veton Surroi, member of the Kosovar delegation for status talks and the Chairman of ORA
1.

Let us begin with management. This is a territory that

after so many conflicts, that culminated with the attempted
genocide against the Albanian majority, has reached a stage
of maturity that requires it to be managed by its inhabitants.
This has been called and is called self-determination; but
within the context here, let us name it simply in a business Veton Surroi
term, management. Of course, one can say that this can be
corporate management; thus Kosova can be part of a bigger enterprise, of Serbia and Montenegro, for example, but the answer to this is simple. The big corporation, the socialist
Yugoslavia has bankrupted and separated enterprises derived from it. Some of them, e.g.
Slovenia and Croatia, with extraordinary success, while some others, e.g. Bosnia and Herzegovina, still deficient. Serbia and Montenegro is a small corporation on the verge of
bankruptcy, and as such not attractive to anyone, not even its constitutive enterprises.

Forum

Independence of Kosova is not a matter of flag, anthem

or emblem. It is not a matter of the Battle of Kosovo or
Illyrian-Dardanian continuity, either. Neither is a matter of
isolation from the others. In the 21st century, the independence of Kosova is a matter of management, security and of
prospect.

But, there is one other successful corporation, the EU. However, a prerequisite for an
enterprise to become a part of this corporation is to be healthy, on the one hand, and to have
solved all legal- ownership-issues. Kosova, as a European territory, is interested in becoming a part of the EU, but in order to reach that goal, it has to define its legal-ownership issues, first. This simply means that the definition of Kosovas status as an independent state
should be perceived as a priority for the possibility of adherence into the EU. So, Kosova is
becoming independent though not to be isolated by other European nations and states, but
in order to join the other European nations and states, including the Serb in the future.
2.
Why is it a matter of security?
In the 21st century, the experience of the 20th century was understood, and this is experience is that source of insecurity, both on the global and local level, are countries that have
failed. Two examples are sufficient: former Yugoslavia, whose failure became a source of
the biggest insecurity on the European continent after the World War II, and Afghanistan,
which as a failed country had become a training haven for international terrorism.
Vice versa, functional states represent the source of regional and global security. The
only way in which Kosovo can guarantee security for its citizens, and at the same be a
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Belgrade's offer as contained in this proposition is more than fair. It is a major compromise for the Serb side. We cannot and will not consent to anything more than that. We are
offering the Albanians the opportunity to organize their lives in Kosovo and Metohija as
they see fit, to pass their own laws, have their own legislature, a president, the highest
level of autonomy, and strong decentralization. Kosovo would have many elements of
statehood, but it would never get outright independence. It is a part of our territory and that
we are not willing to negotiate.
Decentralizing the province down to the smallest possible territorial unit is one of the
conditions that has to be met for Serbs to remain in the province. That does not mean fragmentation on an ethnic basis irrespective of the cost, but is rather a matter of survival for
Serbs inhabiting Kosovo and Metohija.

Forum

It is my firm belief that Serbia will never have a government that is prepared to consent
in writing to the secession of Kosovo and Metohija, and some of the proposals coming
from abroad are essentially asking for that.
There are no conditions for independence. Independence is independence. The next
degree before independence is autonomy, in this case autonomy within Serbia. If Kosovo
becomes independent, even on a limited basis, that would make it independent of the state
to which it previously belonged. In this case that means independent of Serbia.
Kosovo and Metohija cannot exist as an independent whole, let alone a state, because
Serbia's southern province shares a border with Albania, which, like Kosovo, is largely
populated by Albanians. There would be two Albanian states side by side. I wonder who
would stop them for uniting and what they would do to stop that from happening.
Modern history knows no example of a country abandoning a part of its territory to
satisfy the appetite of a group desiring that territory.
Without the written consent of Belgrade, any solution dealing with the status of Kosovo
will not be a lasting one and will not contribute to stabilization in Serbia and the entire region. On the contrary, it will fuel new tensions and any precedent could cause a chain reaction that would not be limited to the Balkans. I am referring to southern Serbia, Macedonia,
Greece, Republika Srpska, the Serb question in Croatia, and possible reactions even in
some countries of the EU.
Despite the fact that Kai Eide's report is more than a little contradictory -- it says that
the situation is not good, that the standards have not been met, yet recommends the beginning of status talks -- I want to believe in the goodwill of Eide and that part of the international community that is seeking the urgent start of negotiations on Kosovo's future.
These talks will bring no good if they are based on shuttle diplomacy only. We have to
sit at the negotiating table, expounding our arguments in regard to every problematic issue
in a sober and unlimited debate. Believe me, our arguments are extremely powerful.
In other words, work on achieving the standards should continue, as should the decentralization process in Kosovo and Metohija, together with efforts to find a compromise for
the future status of Kosovo and Metohija.
October 15, 2005

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guarantee for regional security, is through its own functional state. Kosovo in no way can
be part of a Serbian state. This has been proven by all means, including even extreme violence, and it has been proven as a failed project, even to the extent that Serbia cannot still
become a functional state, suffering the consequences of its own fascism, as a driving ideology for the for annexation of Kosovo in that time.
3.

In economy, for example, it has been proven that the can be no economic development
without property being defined. Accordingly, in the overall development of Kosova, there
can be forward steps unless the character of the state is defined. As long as theres duality
as far as the nature of state, there will be dual interpretation of its legal order, and duality
on the fundamental issues, such as the assurance of the economic investments. We have
seen this in Kosova during the six years with UNMIK, where the lack of defined power,
and the resulting duality, have in fact brought enormous stagnation in the development of
institutions, democracy and economy.. When it is unclear who is responsible in government, the whole chain of responsibility is lost, thus the nature of democracy and the power
of the vote of sovereign, the citizen.

Forum

Finally, it is a matter of prospect. In any segment of life, there is a need for fundamentals upon which the future is to be built.

Therefore, Kosovo should become independent in order to build a democratic future of

a responsible government and a future of economic development.
4.
I am aware that in Serbia, which in fact is the only country opposing Kosovos independence, there is a completely different approach, and that other entirely different argument
are in play. I know that would bring about voices telling me: How would you protect
Kosovo Serbs with these three principles of yours? The answer is very simple: So far, all
models that exclude the majority population taking full responsibilities have been used.
The result for the Serbs was catastrophic; Milosevic made of them colonial administrators,
and this put Kosova Serbs into a specific historical position to be regarded as a fifth colon
in their country, new Kosova.
Let us try a model that prevailed in the united Europe, that of the majority population
taking responsibility, in a democratic and functional state.
October 15, 2005

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Formula m shum se autonomi m pak se pavarsi - nj ofert

serioze pr shqiptart
Shkruan: Sanda Rashkoviq-Iviq, kryetare e Qendrs Koordinuese serbe pr Kosovn
Hyrja e paralajmruar n bisedimet pr statusin prfundimtar t Kosovs dhe Metohis
t kujton njfar lloj konference paqsore menjher pas lufts. N nj prfundim t till
na shpie situata n terren; rrethanat n t cilat jetojn serbt n Kosov dhe Metohi.

Forum

Serbt kan liri t lvizjes dhe jet dinjitoze vetm aty ku jan shumic absolute, si p.sh
n pjesn veriore t Mitrovics. Npr enklava ata jetojn si n geto, si n njfar lloji t
kampeve bashkkohore t prqendrimit; jetojn nga lmosha, pasi q nuk u lejohet shkuarja n ara, kullosa dhe pyje; u sht marr e drejta pr pun, ndrsa secila dalje prej atyre
enklavave paraqet rrezik t madh q t jen t sulmuar, q dikush t hap zjarr mbi ta.
Atje ku kan mbetur npr qytete, si n Prishtin, Pej, Prizren...serbt mund t numrohen me gishta t dors, ndrsa disa prej atyre pr m shum se pes vite nuk i lshojn
banesat dhe shtpit, sepse friksohen se do t sulmohen nga shqiptart nse dalin n
rrug.
Ja pra, se n far situate dhe atmosfer ne po hyjm n bisedimet pr statusin prfundimtar t Kosovs dhe Metohis. Kjo ndodh pas pes viteve t bombardimit t vendit ton
nga bashksia ndrkombtare, duke e arsyetuar kt akt me kujdesin ndaj shqiptarve t
terrorizuar. Pr fat t keq pr serbt e terrorizuar n Kosov tash e pes vjet nuk ka as edhe
nj thrrmij t asaj brenge.
Ndonj person i painformuar do t thoshte se e tr kjo situat sht nj prparsi pr paln serbe gjat negociatave, dhe se shqiptart si barts t vazhdueshm t terrorit ndaj serbve nuk guxojn t shprblehen. Ndoshta kjo edhe sht e vrtet, por un friksohem se kjo
vlen vetm kur jan n pyetje t tjert. Pr fat t keq, serbt edhe m tutje mbajn statusin e
popullit, pr t cilin nuk vlejn parimet e garantuara n baz t s drejts ndrkombtare dhe
humanitare. Ky sht nj konkluzion i dhembshm dhe i vrazhdt, por kjo sht e vrteta.
Pala serbe, ktu mendoj n Beogradin zyrtar dhe serbt e Kosovs dhe Metohis, angazhohet pr nj zgjidhje paqsore t problemit dhe pr zbatimin e formuls q do t sillte
paqe t qndrueshme n territorin e Kosovs dhe Metohis, si dhe n tr rajonin. Ktu
dshiroj t rikujtoj faktin se konflikti i armatosur n Kosov ka filluar n vitin 1997, me
kryengritjen e armatosur t pals shqiptare, duke vrar nga prita pjestart e forcave t
rregullta t policis dhe ushtris dhe duke kidnapuar civilt serb. Ky fakt i patjetrsueshm
po harrohet n mnyr t paarsyeshme dhe t pasqaruar.
N Beograd n pushtet jan forcat demokratike. Qeveria e Serbis ka marr dritn e
gjelbr pr bisedimet pr Stabilizim-Asociim n Bashkimin Evropian, reformat po zbatohen m shpejt sesa n vendet tjera q kan kaluar ose po kalojn npr tranzicion. Krejt
kjo i jep nj kredibilitet Beogradit q t marr mbshtetje pr qasjen e vet t paraqitur n
formuln m shum se autonomi, m pak se pavarsi.
Oferta e Beogradit e paraqitur n kt formul sht jashtzakonisht fer. Ky sht nj
kompromis i madh pr paln serbe. Prtej saj ne as nuk dshirojm por as nuk mundemi t
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Pse i nevojitet Kosovs pavarsia?

Shkruan: Veton Surroi, antar i delegacionit kosovar pr bisedimet pr statusin dhe
kryetar i partis ORA

T fillojm me menaxhim. Ky sht nj territor i cili pas nj sr konfliktesh, duke arritur edhe n prpjekjen pr gjenocid kundr popullats shumic shqiptare ka arritur fazn
e atill t pjekuris q krkon t menaxhohet nga banort e saj. Kjo sht quajtur dhe quhet
vetvendosje, por n kontekstin pr t cilin po flasim, n terminologji ndrmarrjesh, ta
quajm thjesht menaxhim. Natyrisht, dikush mund t thot , ky mund t jet menaxhim
korporativ, pra Kosova mund t jet pjes e nj ndrmarrje m t madhe, p.sh Serbi e Mal
t Zi, por prgjigja pr kt sht e thjesht. Korporata e madhe, Jugosllavia socialiste,
falimentoi, dhe nga kjo korporat kan dal ndrmarrjet e veanta. Disa me sukses t
jashtzakonshm, si Sllovenia e Kroacia, e disa ende defiente si sht Bosnja e Hercegovina. Serbia e Mali i Zi sht nj korporat e vogl n falimentim, dhe nuk sht trheqse
pr ask, as pr vet ndrmarrjet q e prbjn.

Forum

Pavarsia e Kosovs nuk sht pun flamuri, himni e steme, betejs s Fush Kosovs
dhe kontinuitetit iliro-dardan. As nuk sht pun izolimi nga t tjert. Pavarsia e Kosovs,
n shekullin XXI sht shtje menaxhimi, sigurie dhe perspektive.

Por, ekziston nj korporat tjetr e suksesshme, ajo e BE-s. Por, parakusht pr t qen
pjes e ksaj koorporate sht q ndrmarrja t jet e shndosh, nga njra an, dhe ti ket
t spastruara t gjitha shtjet pronsore-juridike. Kosova, si territor evropian, gjithsesi
sht e interesuar t jet pjes e BE-s, dhe pr ta br kt, duhet t definoj shtjet
pronsore-juridike. Kjo , thjesht, do t thot se definimi i statusit t Kosovs si shtet t
pavarur duhet t shihet si shtje parsore pr mundsin e aderimit n BE. Pra, Kosova po
pavarsohet jo pr tu izoluar nga popujt e shtetet evropiane, por pr tiu bashkuar popujve
e shteteve t tjer evropian, duke prfshir n t ardhmn edhe at serb.
2.
E, pse sht shtje sigurie?
N shekullin XXI sht kuptuar prvoja e shekullit XX, e kjo prvoj sht se burim i
pasiguris, edhe n nivel global edhe rajonal, jan shtetet e dshtuara. Mjaftojn dy shembuj: ish Jugosllavia, e cila me dshtimin e saj u b burim i pasiguris m t madhe n
kontinentin evropian pas Lufts s Dyt Botrore, dhe Afganistani, i cili si shtet i dshtuar
u shndrrua n parajs pr trajnim t terrorizmit ndrkombtar.
Anasjelltas, burim i siguris rajonale dhe globale jan shtetet funksionale. E vetmja
mnyr se si Kosova mund t garantoj sigurin pr qytetart e vet dhe njhersh t jet
garanc pr sigurin rajonale sht nprmjet t shtetit t vet funksional. Kosova nuk mund
t jet pjes e nj shteti serb,n asnj form Kjo u provua me t gjitha masat, duke prfshir
edhe dhunn ekstreme, dhe u tregua si projekt i dshtuar, bile aq sa Serbia ende nuk po
mund t bhet shtet funksional, duke i vuajtur pasojat e fashizmit vetjak, si ideologji motorike pr aneksimin e asokohshm t Kosovs.
3.
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shkojm. Shqiptarve u ofrojm q t rregullojn jetn e tyre n Kosov dhe Metohi ashtu
si ata mendojn se duhet, u ofrojm mundsin e nxjerrjes s ligjeve, u ofrojm parlamentin, presidentin, shkalln m t lart t autonomis, u ofrojm konceptin e decentralizimit
t fuqishm. Kosova do t fitonte elementin e shtetsis, mirpo assesi nuk do t mund t
fitonte pavarsin. Kjo sht pjes e territorit ton, dhe rreth ksaj nuk mund t ket pazar.
Decentralizimi i fuqishm deri n trsit m t mundshme t imta, sht nj prej
parakushteve pr mbijetesn e serbve n Kosov dhe Metohi. Kjo nuk paraqet ndonj
ndarje n baza etnike, por paraqet shtjen e mbijetess ose zhdukjes s serbve nga territori i Kosovs dhe Metohis.

Forum

Un besoj fuqishm se Serbia kurr nuk do ta ket ndonj pushtet q do t jet i gatshm
t nnshkruaj ndarjen e Kosovs dhe Metohis nga Serbia, ndrsa ajo q n disa qarqe
ndrkombtare qarkullon si zgjidhje e mundshme, n realitet nnkupton shkputjen e
Kosovs dhe Metohis nga Serbia.
Nuk ka pavarsi t kushtzuar. Pavarsia sht pavarsi. Nse sht dika nn t, ather
ajo paraqet autonomi brenda nj shteti, n kt rast brenda Serbis. Nse sht pavarsi,
qoft e kushtzuar, ather sht pavarsi n raport me at q deri ather i ka takuar. M
sakt, pavarsi n raport me Serbin.
Kosova dhe Metohija nuk mund t jet trsi e pavarur, e sidomos jo shtet, sepse kjo
krahin jugore serbe kufizohet me Shqiprin, n t ciln ngjashm si n Kosov shqiptart
prbjn shumicn drmuese. Do t ishin kto dy shtete shqiptare, ndrsa un shtroj pyetjen, kush do ta pengonte bashkimin praktik t ktyre dy vendeve dhe n far mnyr do
ta parandalonte at?
Historia bashkkohore nuk njeh ndonj rast n t cilin ndonj shtet ka hequr dor nga
nj pjes e territorit t saj, pr ta knaqur apetitet e atyre q e kan dshiruar at.
Pa pajtimin dhe nnshkrimin e Beogradit, zgjidhja e ardhshme e statusit t Kosovs dhe
Metohis nuk do t zgjas shum dhe nuk do t kontribuoj n stabilitetin e Serbis dhe at
t rajonit. Prkundrazi, ajo do t shkaktoj tensione t reja n rajon, ndrsa do precedenc
e mundshm, do t mund t shkaktonte reagim zinxhiror jo vetm n Ballkan. Kur e them
kt, mendoj n Jugun e Serbis, n Maqedoni, Greqi, Republikn Serbe, zgjidhja e problemit t serbve n Kroaci...si dhe n reflektimet e mundshme edhe n vendet e Bashkimit
Evropian.
Me gjith faktin q raporti i Kai Eides n mas t madhe sht mjaft kontradiktor - pohohet se situata nuk sht e mir, se standardet nuk jan prmbushur, por rekomandohet
fillimi i bisedimeve pr zgjidhjen prfundimtare, dua t besoj n vullnetin e mir t Eides
dhe asaj pjese t bashksis ndrkombtare, e cila angazhohet pr fillimin urgjent t bisedimeve pr statusin prfundimtar.
Ato bisedime nuk do t sjellin asgj t mir nse mbshteten vetm n formuln e
shuttle diplomacis. Duhet t ulemi n tryezn e bisedimeve dhe prmes nj diskutimi t
kthjellt dhe t pakufizuar do t mund ti paraqisnim argumentet tona pr seciln fush
problematike, ndrsa m besoni, kto argumente jan shum t fuqishme.
Pra, duhet t vazhdoj puna n prmbushjen e standardeve, t vazhdoj procesi i decentralizimit t Kosovs dhe Metohis dhe me shum durim t punohet n gjetjen e nj zgjidhjeje kompromisi pr statusin e ardhshm t Kosovs dhe Metohis.
15 tetor 2005
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S fundmi, sht shtje perspektive. N fardo fushe t jets, ekziston nevoja pr

bazamentet mbi t cilat ndrtohet ardhmria. N ekonomi,pr shembull, sht vrtetuar se
nuk mund t ket zhvillim ekonomik pa definim t prons. Njjt, n zhvillimin e prgjithshm t Kosovs, nuk mund t ket ecje prpara nse nuk definohet karakteri i shtetit.
Prderisa t ket dualitet t natyrs s shtetit, do t ket dualitet interpretimi t rendit t tij
ligjor dhe dualitet n shtje fundamentale, si sht garantimi i investimit. Kt e kemi
par n Kosov gjat gjasht viteve t kaluara me UNMIK-un, ku mosprcaktimi i natyrs
s pushtetit, dhe krijimi i dualitetit t tij , n fakt solli ngecje t madhe n zhvillimin e institucioneve, t demokracis dhe ekonomis. N momentin kur nuk dihet se ku sht
prgjegjs n pushtet, humbet i tr zinxhiri i prgjegjsis, pra edhe natyra e demokracis
dhe fuqia e vots s sovranit, qytetarit.
Prandaj Kosova duhet t jet e pavarur, q t mund t ndrtoj nj ardhmri demokratike t pushtetit t prgjegjshm dhe zhvillimit ekonomik
E di q n Serbi, q realisht sht i vetmi vend n bot i cili sht kundr pavarsis s
Kosovs, ekziston nj qasje krejt e ndryshme, dhe se prdoren argumente krejt tjera. E di
se nga andej do t vijn zra q do t m thoshin : E me kto tri parime tuajat, si do ti
mbroni serbt e Kosovs?. Prgjigja sht shum e thjesht. Deri m sot jan prdorur t
gjitha modelet q prjashtojn marrjen e prgjegjsive t plota nga populli shumic. Rezultati pr serbt ka qen katastrofal; Milosheviqi i bri administrator kolonial dhe kjo i vuri
serbt e Kosovs n nj situat t veant historike: q t kundrohen si kolon e pest n
vendin e tyre, Kosovn e re.

Forum

4.

Ta provojm nj model i cili ka fituar n Evropn e bashkuar, ai i marrjes s prgjegjsis s popullit shumic, n nj shtet demokratik e funksional.
15 tetor 2005

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Formula vie od autonomije, a menje od nezavisnosti - fer ponuda

Sanda Rakovi-Ivi, predsednik Koordinacionog centra za Kosovo i Metohiju
Najavljeni ulazak u razgovore o konanom statusu Kosova i Metohije podsea na neku
vrstu mirovne konferencije neposredno posle rata. Na takav zakljuak navodi nas situacija
na terenu, okolnosti u kojima ive Srbi na Kosovu i Metohiji.

Forum

Samo tamo gde su apsolutna veina, kao na primer u severnom delu, Kosovskoj Mitrovici, Srbi imaju slobodu kretanja i ivot dostojan oveka. U enklavama ive kao u getima,
kao u nekoj vrsti savremenih koncentracionih logora; ive od milostinje, poto im nije dozvoljen odlazak na oranice i panjake, u ume; oduzeto im je pravo na rad, a svaki izlazak
iz tih enklava predstavlja veliki rizik i opasnost da budu napadnuti, da na njih neko otvori
vatru.
Tamo gde su ostali u gradovima, kao sto je Pritina, Pe, Prizren.. Srbi se broje na prste
ruku, a neki od njih ve pet godina ne naputaju svoje stanove i kue, jer se plae da e ih
Albanci napasti ako izau na ulicu.
Eto, u takvoj situaciji i atmosferi mi ulazimo u razgovore o konanom statusu Kosova i
Metohije, i to pet godina nakon to je meunarodna zajednica bombardovala nau zemlju,
opravdavajui takav in brigom za terorisane Albance. Na alost, ni deli te i takve brige
nema za danas i ve pet godina terorisane Srbe na Kosovu i Metohiji.
Neko neupuen i neobaveten rekao bi da je sve ovo velika pregovaraka prednost za
srpsku stranu i da Albanci, kao nosioci kontinuiranog petogodinjeg terora nad Srbima,
ne smeju da budu nagraeni. Moda je to i tano ali, plaim se, samo kada su drugi u
pitanju. Srbi, na alost, i dalje imaju status naroda za koji ne vae principi usklaeni sa
meunarodnim i humanitarnim pravom. To jeste bolna i surova konstatacija, ali to je istina.
Srpska strana - kad to kaem mislim i na slubeni Beograd i na Srbe sa Kosova i
Metohije - zalae se za mirno reenje problema i za uspostavu formule koja e na prostor
Kosova i Metohije i itavog regiona trajno doneti mir. Ovde elim da podsetim na injenicu
da su oruani sukobi na Kosovu poeli 1997. godine, tako to je albanska strana podigla
oruani ustanak, ubijajui iz zaseda pripadnike regularnih policijskih i vojnih snaga i kidnapujui srpske civile. Ta nesporna injenica neopravdano i neobjanjivo se zaboravlja.
U Beogradu su na vlasti demokratske snage. Vlada Srbije je dobila zeleno svetlo za pregovore o pridruivanju Evropskoj uniji, reforme se sprovode bre nego u drugim zemljama
koje su prole ili prolaze tranziciju. Sve to daje kredibilitet Beogradu da dobije podrku za
svoj pristup sadran u formuli vie od autonomije, manje od nezavisnosti.
Ponuda Beograda sadrana u toj formuli predstavlja krajnje fer ponudu. To je veliki
kompromis sa srpske strane. Ispod toga, mi niti hoemo, niti moemo da idemo. Albancima nudimo da urede svoj ivot na Kosovu i Metohiji kako oni misle da treba, nudimo im
mogunost donoenja zakona, nudimo im skuptinu, predsednika, najvii stepen autonomije, nudimo koncept snane decentralizacije. Kosovo bi dobilo elemente dravnosti, ali nikako nee moi da dobije nezavisnost. To je deo nae teritorije i oko toga nema pogaanja.
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Zato je Kosovu potrebna nezavisnost?

Pie Veton Suroi, predsednik partije Ora i publicista

1.

Da ponemo sa upravljanjem. To je teritorija, koja je nakon niza konflikata koji su stigli i do pokuaja genocida veinskog albanskog stanovnitva, dostigla takvu fazu zrelosti
koja iziskuje da njome upravljaju njeni stanovnici. To je nazivano i naziva se samoopredeljenje, ali u kontekstu o kome govorimo, u terminologiji preduzetnitva, moemo ga
prostije nazvati upravljanjem. Naravno, neko moe rei da to moe biti kooperativno upravljanje, to bi znailo da Kosovo moe da bude deo nekakvog veeg preduzea, na primer u
Srbiji i Crnoj Gori, ali je odgovor na to prost. Velika korporacija, socijalistika Jugoslavija
se raspala i iz te korporacije su proizala posebna preduzea. Neka izvanredno uspena,
kao Slovenija i Hrvatska, neka jo uvek deficitarna, kao Bosna i Hercegovina.

Forum

Nezavisnost Kosova nije pitanje zastave, himne, grba, bitke na Kosovu Polju i ilirskodardanskog kontinuiteta. Nije ni stvar izolacije od ostalih. Nezavisnost Kosova u XXI veku
je pitanje upravljanja, bezbednosti i perspektive.

Srbija i Crna Gora su jedna mala korporacija u raspadanju, koja nije privlana ni za
koga, ak ni za sama preduzea koja ga sainjavaju.
Postoji, meutim, jedna druga, uspena korporacija, a to je EU. Meutim, preduslov da
se postane deo te korporacije je da preduzee bude zdravo, sa jedne strane, i da je raistilo
sve imovinsko-pravne odnose. Kosovo je, kao evropska teritorija, svakako zainteresovano
da postane deo EU, ali da bi to postiglo, treba da razrei imovinsko-pravna pitanja. To,
prosto, treba da znai da definisanje statusa Kosova, kao nezavisne drave, mora da se
posmatra kao prioritetno pitanje mogunosti ulanjenja u EU. Dakle, Kosovo se osamostaljuje ne da bi se izolovalo od drugih evropskih naroda i drava, ve da bi se prikljuilo
drugim evropskim narodima i dravama, ukljuujui u budunosti i srpski narod i njegovu
dravu.
2.
A zato je pitanje bezbednost?
U XXI veku je shvaeno iskustvo iz XX veka, a to iskustvo je da su izvor nesigurnosti
i na globalnom i na regionalnom nivou raspadnute drave. Dovoljna su dva primera:
biva Jugoslavija, koja je svojim raspadanjem postala izvorom najvee nesigurnosti u
evropskom kontinentu nakon Drugog svetskog rata, i Avganistan, koji je kao raspadnuta
drava pretvoren u raj za obuku meunarodnih terorista.
Obrnuto, izvor regionalne i globalne sigurnosti su funkcionalne drave. Jedini nain da
Kosovo moe garantovati bezbednost svojim graanima i da ujedno bude garancija za regionalnu bezbednost je da stvori svoju funkcionalnu dravu. Kosovo ne moe da bude deo
srpske drave, ni u kakvom obliku. To je potvreno svim merama, ukljuujui i ekstremno
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Jaka decentralizacija, do najmanjih moguih celina, jedan je od preduslova opstanka

Srba na Kosovu i Metohiji. To ne znai fragmentaciju na etnikoj osnovi po svaku cenu,
ve znai pitanje opstanka ili nestanka Srba sa prostora Kosova i Metohije.
vrsto verujem da Srbija nikada nee imati vlast koja e biti spremna da potpie odvajanje Kosova i Metohije od Srbije, a ono to u nekim meunarodnim krugovima provejava
kao reenje, sutinski znai odvajanje Kosova i Metohije od Srbije.
Nema uslovne nezavisnosti. Nezavisnost je nezavisnost. Ako je ispod toga, onda je
autonomija unutar neega, u ovom sluaju unutar Srbije. Ako je nezavisnost, makar i uslovna, onda je nezavisnost u odnosu na ono emu je do tada pripadalo. Tanije, nezavisnost
u odnosu na Srbiju.

Forum

Kosovo i Metohija ne moe da bude nezavisna celina, posebno ne drava, zato to se ta

juna srpska pokrajina granii sa Albanijom, u kojoj, kao i na Kosovu i Metohiji, u ogromnoj veini ive Albanci. Bile bi to dve albanske drave jedna uz drugu, a ja pitam - ko bi
spreavao praktino ujedinjavanje tih dveju drava i na koji bi nain to spreavao?
Savremena istorija ne poznaje primer da se neka drava odrekla dela svoje teritorije tek
da bi zadovoljila apetite onih koji su hteli tu teritoriju.
Bez saglasnosti i potpisa Beograda, budue reenje statusa Kosova i Metohije nee
trajati dugo i nee doprineti stabilizaciji Srbije i regiona. Naprotiv, stvorie nove tenzije
u regionu, a svaki eventualni presedan mogao bi da izazove lananu reakciju, ne samo na
Balkanu. Kada to kaem, mislim na jug Srbije, na Makedoniju, Grku, Republiku Srpsku,
reenje srpskog pitanja u Hrvatskoj ... kao i na mogue refleksije, ak i u zemljama Evropske unije.
Uprkos tome to je u znaajnoj meri izvetaj Kaja Ejdea kontradiktoran - tvrdi se da situacija nije dobra, da standardi nisu ispunjeni, ali se predlae poetak razgovora o konanom
reenju - elim da verujem u dobru volju Ejdea i onog dela meunarodne zajednice koji se
zalae za hitno otpoinjanje razgovora o konanom statusu.
Ti razgovori nee doneti dobro ako se budu oslanjali samo na formulu atl-diplomatije. Moramo da sednemo za pregovaraki sto i da za svaku problematizovanu oblast,
u trezvenoj i neogranienoj raspravi,
iznesemo svoje argumente, a ti argumenti, verujte mi, vrlo su jaki.
Dakle, treba nastaviti rad na ispunjenju standarda, nastaviti proces decentralizacije
Kosova i Metohije i sa mnogo strpljenja raditi na kompromisnom reenju budueg statusa
Kosova i Metohije.
15. oktobar 2005.

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nasilje, i to se pokazalo kao propali projekat, ak u toj meri u kojoj Srbija jo uvek ne moe
da postane funkcionalna drava, plaajui danak posledicama sopstvenog faizma kao notorne ideologije za tadanju aneksiju Kosova.

Konano, to je pitanje perspektive. U svim oblastima ivota postoji potreba za osnovama na kojima e se graditi budunost. U privredi, na primer, utvreno je da ne moe biti
privrednog razvoja bez definisanja svojine. Isto tako, i u ukupnom razvoju Kosova ne moe
biti kretanja napred ukoliko se ne definie karakter drave. Sve dok bude dualizma u prirodi drave, bie i dvojakog tumaenja njegovog pravnog sistema i dualizma u fundamentalnim pitanjima, kao to je garantovanje investicija. To smo imali prilike da vidimo na Kosovu tokom proteklih est godina sa UNMIK-om, gde je nedefinisana priroda drave i njen
dualizam u stvari i doveo do velikog zastoja u razvoju institucija, demokratije i privrede. U
trenutku kada se ne zna ko je odgovoran na vlasti, gubi se ceo lanac odgovornosti, a to
znai i priroda demokratije, kao i snaga glasa suverena, graanina.
Zbog toga Kosovo treba da bude nezavisno, kako bi moglo da gradi svoju demokratsku
budunost odgovorne vlasti i privrednog razvoja.

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3.

4.
Znam da u Srbiji, koja je realno jedina zemlja na svetu koja se protivi nezavisnosti
Kosova, postoji sasvim drugaiji prilaz, i da se koriste potpuno razliiti argumenti. Znam
da e odatle doi glasovi koji e mi rei: Sa ta tvoja tri naela, kako e biti zatieni Srbi
na Kosovu? Odgovor je veoma prost. Do danas su korieni svi modeli koji iskljuuju da
veinski narod preuzme potpunu odgovornost. Rezultat je po Srbe bio katastrofalan;
Miloevi ih je pretvorio u kolonijalne administratore i to je kosovske Srbe dovelo u poseban istorijski poloaj, da se ponaaju kao peta kolona u svojoj zemlji, na novom Kosovu.
Da isprobamo jedan drugi model koji je pobedio u ujedinjenoj Evropi, a to je model da
veinski narod preuzme odgovornost u demokratskoj i funkcionalnoj dravi.
15. oktobar 2005.

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Kosovo is the only region in Europe where international standards are

not respected

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By Jelena Markovic, Assistant Minister of Human and Minority Rights of

Serbia-Montenegro
In reality, the situation in Kosovo is such that SerbiaMontenegro is not in a position to exercise any of the powers granted to it by Resolution 1244 and has very little access to information, especially that concerning the interim
institutions and UNMIK. Therefore, the Ministry of Human
and Minority Rights of Serbia-Montenegro, the Coordinating Center for Kosovo, and other institutions of the state
union and Serbia derive information from indirect channels.
When it comes to human rights, the international ombudsman and international organizations are good sources. However, there is a problem in that the U.N., when its views are
expressed by officials representing the U.N. administration,
does not give adequate assessments of the actual state of
Jelena Markovic
affairs. If one speaks of improvement in the realm of human
rights, there has to be a set of criteria used to measure that improvement against the initial
situation. Sometimes the statistics look encouraging when you look only at the percentages, but the other figures show that just several families are returning to Kosovo per year,
which paints a dismal picture.
Statistics can be very misleading when it comes to people and their fates. Kosovo is
nowhere near complying with human and minority rights standards, not in comparison to
Serbia-Montenegro, which is in the top level in Europe, but other European countries.
Without any doubt, the situation in Kosovo is unparalleled by any other part of Europe.
People there live in the worst possible conditions and their human and minority rights are
entirely unprotected. There are few places in Europe where a complete segment of rights
-- from the freedom of movement, the right to life, the use of one's native language, return
to one's property, education and so on -- is endangered. Kosovo is the only area in Europe
where international standards are not respected. We have tried to get the interim institutions
to enforce the Conventions on Human Rights, which are adhered to in Serbia- Montenegro
and supersede domestic legislation, since Kosovo remains a part of Serbia-Montenegro.
UNMIK has closed bilateral agreements with the Council of Europe binding it to respect
the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and the Convention
Against Torture. However, very little has been done about this in Kosovo. The fact is that
independent monitors representing the Council of Europe have yet to be allowed to visit
prisons in Kosovo and this speaks volumes about UNMIK's readiness to supervise the
implementation of the rights and freedoms of man. The Council of Europe's Committee
Against Torture has the right to enter any prison in any country at any time without prior
notification. Negotiations that have been in progress for four years already have sought to
secure adherence to international human rights conventions, which illustrates the mood in
the province when it comes to international obligations and norms. It is ironic that Kosovo
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Situation of human rights and of minorities

By Nazmi Fejza, the Deputy Minister for Communities and Return

Kosovo had two fair parliamentary elections evaluated

highly by the international community, in which all its citizens and political entities could participate and represent
their interests. Regardless of this fact, 20 out of 120 seats in Nazmi Fejza
the Parliament were reserved for non-Albanian communities, in addition to the seats they won during the elections, which is a unique case in the
region.

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The determination of Kosovo citizens for a democratic,

functional and progressive state for all citizens, irrespective
of ethnicity or religion can be clearly seen in all its institutions, laws, and resolutions passed by the Parliament, in the
governments program, as well as in the municipal programs.

I also need to emphasize that during this period, the Parliament approved a large number of laws and resolutions, which are in the interest of all Kosovo citizens.
The ethnic structure of Kosovar MPs, except Serbs, reflects the ethnic structure of Kosovar citizens. So, the majority of them are Albanians, but there are also MPs representing
Turkish, Bosniac, Askali, Roma, Egyptian, Goran and Serb communities.
The minorities make up almost 12% of employees in the public sector and our goal is
to increase this rate up to 16.6% by the end of this year. But the boycotting of Kosovar institutions from the side of Serb community has made difficult for us to achieve this goal.
It is difficult to talk of full respect for human rights, when according to the World Bank
assessments over 52% of people here live in poverty.
The level of human and community rights protection varies from the aspects of life and
work. We have not a desirable progress over these rights in the areas where the competences are reserved for internationals (UNMIK and KFOR), such as in security, justice,
socially owned and publicly owned property management, etc.
The negligence of Kosovo Trust Agency in the privatization process did not allow those
who were earlier employed to get their jobs back, whereas the legal right over the 20% of
the sold enterprise that belongs to workers is being realized with long delays.
The aspects of security and freedom of movement is below its normal and desirable
level, regardless of the progress achieved. We have several parallel institutions in Serb
enclaves, especially in the north of Mitrovica. This happens because of UNMIK and KFOR
hesitation to control the entire territory of Kosovo, for what they are also obliged by the
UNSC resolution.
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is still part of Serbia-Montenegro, a country where international conventions are fully enforced and where this is closely watched. Given that UNMIK, not the interim institutions,
has signed these agreements, the responsibility for not implementing international human
rights standards lies with UNMIK. The Council of Europe ended up waiting for a minority
rights report from UNMIK for over a year and a half and the report has yet to be released.
Then, all of a sudden, right ahead of the beginning of negotiations on the final status of
Kosovo, Pristina started taking action to enforce certain international norms. This is commendable, but it has given rise to suspicions about the sincerity and duration of these efforts. It is problematic that the Council of Europe's committee supervising the implementation of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities has been
allowed to visit Kosovo only two weeks ago. One thing that is little talked about is the fact
that UNMIK has oddly begun to insist on the readmission of citizens who have lost their
right to residency in Western Europe to Kosovo, and also that minorities cannot be readmitted until their safety can be guaranteed. Without consulting Serbia-Montenegro, UNMIK
signed an agreement with Germany on the return of non-Albanians to Kosovo through the
readmission process, with UNMIK tasked with ensuring their safety. However, if you take
a look at the situation so far and the fact that minorities do not enjoy even basic security in
Kosovo, how will these individuals, two-time refugees, after being sent back from Switzerland, Germany, the Netherlands and so on, and now refugees in Kosovo, be able to exercise
their elementary rights when not even those who have been trying to do so since 1999 have
succeeded?
From the viewpoint of a person who has been professionally involved in human rights
it is very difficult to compare the situation in Kosovo with that anywhere else in the world.
For example, in the realm of education, minorities have the right to education at all levels,
bilingualism, courses, and precedence in jobs that require degrees. Yet in Kosovo children
are followed to school by police or military escorts. A successful education means any kind
of education without losing life or limbs. Education quality is a secondary matter altogether given such conditions. The situation is little different when it comes to the protection of rights such as that to cultural identity, information access, and official use of a minority language.
I want to bring up another problem that is usually neglected in Kosovo. Although the
problem largely boils down to the relationship between Serbs and Albanians, there are
ethnic groups in Kosovo that have sustained collateral damage on account of this relationship. I am primarily referring to Roma. The predicament of the Goranian and Bosniak
communities are slightly different in that they have been partially integrated in the institutions of government and enjoy partial access to them. The position of Roma in Kosovo is
alarming, however. They are living in conditions that are entirely inadequate when it comes
to hygiene, such as the Plemetina camp, where they are dying of infectious diseases, entirely isolated, in poverty, struck by hunger. Nobody is reacting. What little action has been
taken to solve their problem and status has been insufficient and used for political gain. If
it is clear that Roma largely live in Serb communities, mostly because of the language barrier, and if internally displaced Roma are leaving Albanian parts of the province for those
populated by Serbs, then their future place is obvious. Despite this, the actions of the international community in this regard have been inexplicable, such as building a Roma settlement in the southern part of Kosovska Mitrovica. This region is supposed to house returning Roma, who would then be surrounded by Albanians and exposed to a potential exodus
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The citizens who are in small numbers there do not have their essential right of electing
or being elected in the municipal authority structures. I am talking about the residents of
Koshtova, Bistrica, Cerraja in Leposavic municipality and for the residents of villages
Kelmend, Zhazha and Boletin in Zvecan.
Each political entity and each community had its opportunity to elect its representatives
to the Municipal Assembly. However we should emphasize a case in the Municipality of
Mitrovica in 2002, in which the Special Representative invalidated the free vote of the
citizens.

The fact that radios and televisions in Kosovo broadcast programs in Albanian, Serbian,
Bosniac, Turkish and Roma languages shows the great progress that has been made in the
area of information, without going through a deep analysis of program schedules.
There area 26 radios in Serbian language in Kosovo. In Gracanica, alone, an area with
some 3500 residents, there are three radio stations in Serbian.

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Great progress in the area of human and community rights has been achieved in the area
of education, whereas the health sector has gone through a good transformation, for the
good of all the citizens.

Serbs make up the largest number of employees in the Ministry of Communities and
Return (MCR), headed by the Serb Minister, Slavisa Petkovic. MCR in cooperation with
other partners in the Working Group for Return (including UNMIK, UNHCR and KFOR)
have prepared the Strategic Framework for Return for 2005.
In order to improve the further implementation of human rights and rights of communities:
1. We need to intensify the process of final status settlement independence of Kosovo,
so the citizens understand that they need to address their problems to Pristina and not to
Belgrade.
2. We need to create new ministries and to see a power handover to locals in the area of
police and justice, which is necessary.
3. Government and political leaders should work persistently with citizens from all the
communities for the democratization of the Kosovo society.
4. We need to reform the election system, and together with it to ensure an affordable
representation of all communities, in central and local level.
5. We need to continue the process of reconciliation between the communities, which has
become worse because of war and Serbian suppression policy in Kosovo.
6. Kosovo government institutions, including the Presidency, Parliament and the Government should permanently prove that they are determined to establish good neighboring
relations and that they strongly support the regional stability.
November 9, 2005
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and extermination. It is apparent in advance that Roma will not agree to live there and what
is the result? That money designated for housing for Roma will continue to be spent in
majority Albanian areas.
If we want to deal with the problems faced by other minorities, we should do so in a way
that suits them instead of having Belgrade or UNMIK try to deal with these issues without
their approval. I am not trying to say that given enough time Roma and other non-Albanians
will not be able to live in Albanian communities, or that a multiethnic Kosovo is impossible, but that it is not possible at this time. The worst thing that one can do is to experiment
with multiethnic principles using Roma, the most vulnerable group. Kosovo Serbs are
mostly organized and can rely on the institutions in Belgrade, but the Roma are wide open
to all types of manipulation, just as they were targeted by assimilation efforts in the past.

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November 9, 2005

Kosova sht i vetmi rajon n Evrop ku nuk respektohen standardet

ndrkombtare
Shkruan: Jelena Markoviq, ndihmsministre pr t drejtat e njeriut dhe pakicave
Situata reale n Kosov dhe Metohi sht e atill, saq Serbia dhe Mali i Zi (SMZ) nuk
mund t realizoj asnj form t kompetencave nga Rezoluta 1244 e Kshillit t Sigurimit
t KB dhe ka qasje mjaft t dobt n informata, veanrisht n ato q kan t bjn me
punn e Institucioneve t Prkohshme dhe UNMIK-ut.
Si pasoj e ksaj, Ministria pr t Drejtave e Njeriut dhe t Pakicave e SMZ-s, Qendra
Koordinuese dhe institucionet e tjera t Unionit shtetror i sigurojn informatat n mnyr
indirekte. Si burime mjaft t rndsishme n fushn e t drejtave t njeriut dhe t pakicave
jan raportet e Ombudspersonit ndrkombtar dhe organizatave tjera ndrkombtare. Sidoqoft ktu duhet t bhet nj ndarje, meqense kur prfaqsuesit e administrats s KB i
paraqesin qndrimet e tyre, vlersimet e tyre nuk prkojn me gjendjen reale. Sepse nse
flitet pr prparimin e arritur n fushn e t drejtave t njeriut, ather shtrohet pyetja se
cili sht standardi i cili prdoret pr ta matur kt dhe cila sht baza fillestare, me t ciln
matet prparimi. Nse prmendim prqindjet, ato nganjher duken inkurajuese, sepse
tregojn se n krahasim me vitin e kaluar ka nj prqindje m t madhe t njerzve q jan
kthyer n Kosov, mirpo nse shikohen shifrat, ather kihet parasysh fakti se brenda nj
viti vetm disa familje kthehen n Kosov, gj q sht shum dekurajuese.
Statistikat jan shum mashtruese kur bhet fjal pr njerzit dhe fatet e tyre. Kosova
nuk sht as afr standardeve n fushn e t drejtave t njeriut dhe t pakicave, dhe kjo jo
n krahasim me SMZ-n e cila sht n rangun m t lart evropian, mirpo as n krahasim
me disa vende tjera n Evrop. Kosova, pa kurrfar dyshimi sht nj rajon i pashembullt
n Evrop, ku banort e saj jan n pozitn m t vshtir dhe m t rnd, dhe ku t drejtat
e tyre t njeriut dhe ato t pakicave jan plotsisht t pambrojtura.

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Gjendja e t drejtave t njeriut dhe e pakicave n Kosov

Shkruan: Nazmi Fejza, zvendsministr n Ministrin pr Komunitete dhe Kthim

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Prcaktimi i qytetarve t Kosovs pr nj shtet demokratik, funksional dhe zhvillimor

i t gjith qytetarve, pavarsisht prkatsis s tyre etnike a fetare, sht i dukshm n
t gjitha institucionet e saj, n ligjet, rezolutat a deklaratat e nxjerra nga Kuvendi, n programin e Qeveris dhe n programet e pushteteve komunale.
Pavarsisht q Kosova dy her mbajti zgjedhjet parlamentare t drejta dhe n prputhje
me normat ndrkombtare, q u vlersuan lart edhe nga bashksia ndrkombtare, ku t
gjith qytetart e saj dhe subjektet politike kan mundur t marrin pjes dhe t prfaqsojn interesat e tyre n kuvend, 20 vende nga 120 sa ka Kuvendi i Kosovs jan vende t
rezervuara pr komunitetet joshqiptare, pavarsisht vendeve t fituare drejtprdrejt, ka
sht rast unik n raport me kuvendet e shteteve t rajonit, me t vetmin qllim q komunitetet pakic t mund n mnyr sa m t madhe t mbrojn interesat e tyre n kuadr t
institucioneve .
T shtojm se Kuvendi i Kosovs gjat ksaj periudhe ka miratuar nj numr t madh
ligjesh dhe rezolutash n interes t t gjith qytetarve t Kosovs.
Struktura nacionale e deputetve t Kuvendit t Kosovs, prve atyre serb, reflekton
strukturn etnike t qytetarve t Kosovs, pra shumica jan shqiptar, por ka edhe t komunitetit turk, boshnjak, ashkalinj, rom, egjiptian, goran dhe serb.
Numri i t punsuarve nga radht e minoriteteve n institucionet e Kosovs tani sht
afr 12%,ndrsa sht synim q deri n fund t vitit ky numr t jet s paku 16.6%. Bojkotimi i institucioneve t Kosovs nga komuniteti serb ka vshtirsuar arritjen e objektivit
pr punsim t minoriteteve.
sht vshtir t flitet pr respektim t plot t t drejtave t njeriut kur Kosova, sipas
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Rrallkund n Evrop mund t gjendet ndonj vend, n t cilin shkelen pothuajse t

gjitha t drejtat e njeriut, duke filluar nga liria e lvizjes, e jets, e drejta e prdorimit t
gjuhs amtare dhe e arsimimit. Kosova sht i vetmi rajon n Evrop ku nuk respektohen
standardet ndrkombtare.
Ne jemi munduar t ndikojm n Institucionet e Prkohshme q n Kosov t zbatohen
konventat pr t drejtat e njeriut, t cilat respektohen edhe n SMZ, duke pasur parasysh
q ajo ende sht pjes e SMZ-s. UNMIK-u ka nnshkruar me Kshillin e Evrops (KE)
marrveshje bilaterale, n baz t t cilave detyrohet t respektoj Konventn Korniz pr
mbrojtjen e pakicave dhe Konventn pr parandalimin e torturs. Mirpo n praktik n
kt fush n Kosov sht br shum pak. Fakti se vzhguesit e pavarur t KE-s nuk
kan ishin lejuar ti vizitojn burgjet n Kosov, tregon se sa sht i gatshm UMIK-u pr
zbatimin e mbikqyrjes mbi respektimin e t drejtave dhe lirive t njeriut. Komiteti i KE-s
kundr torturs ka t drejt q n secilin vend, n do koh dhe pa paralajmrim t hyj n
cilindo institucion t burgjeve. S dyti, bisedimet pr respektimin e konventave ndrkombtare pr mbrojtjen e t drejtave t njeriut n Kosov zgjasin tani e katr vite, gj q flet
pr disponimin q ekziston rreth respektimit t normave dhe detyrimeve ndrkombtare
n Kosov. Ironia qndron n faktin se Kosova sht ende pjes e SMZ-s, shtetit n t
cilit konventat ndrkombtare respektohen n trsi ndrsa zbatimi i tyre mbikqyret me
rigorozitet. Duke pasur parasysh se UNMIK-u sht nnshkrues i ktyre marrveshjeve, e
jo Institucionet e Prkohshme, ather vmendja pr prgjegjsin dhe mosrespektimin e t
drejtave t njeriut duhet t prqendrohet n UNMIK-un. KE-ja tani nj vit e gjysm sht
duke pritur raportin e UNMIK-ut pr gjendjen e t drejtave t njeriut n Kosov, ndrsa ky
raport nuk sht publikuar ende.
N ndrkoh, n Prishtin prnjher ka filluar prmbushja e disa normave ndrkombtare, pikrisht para fillimit t bisedimeve pr statusin prfundimtar, gj q sht pr do
lvdat, por ngrit dyshimin n sinqeritetin dhe kohzgjatjen e ktyre prpjekjeve. sht
indikativ fakti q Komiteti i KE-s pr monitorimin e zbatimit t Konvents Korniz pr
mbrojtjen e pakicave sht lejuar t vizitoj Kosovn.
Ajo pr t ciln pak po flitet, sht fakti q UNMIK-u uditrisht ka filluar t insistoj
n riatdhesimin e qytetarve t Kosovs, q kan humbur t drejtn e qndrimit n Evropn
perndimore. sht qndrim i SMZ-s, q qytetart duhet t kthehen n vendbanimet e
tyre. Nse jan nga Kosova, ather duhet t kthehen n Kosov, nse jan pjestar t pakicave, ather nuk mund t kthehen derisa nuk u garantohet siguria. UNMIK-u pa u konsultuar me SMZ-n ka nnshkruar marrveshjen pr kthimin e joshqiptarve n Kosov,
prmes procesit t riatdhesimit, dhe n baz t ktij procesi, UNMIK-u garanton sigurin e
tyre. Mirpo nse e vshtroni situatn e tanishme dhe faktin se n Kosov nuk ekziston as
siguria elementare pr pakica, ather pyetja ime do t ishte se si kta refugjat me status t
dyfisht (sepse m par kan qen refugjat n Zvicr, Gjermani, Holand etj.) ndrsa tani
do t jen refugjat brenda Kosovs, do t mund ti realizojn t drejtat e tyre elementare,
kur n fakt ato nuk mund t realizohen as nga ata ata q kan qndruar n Kosov edhe pas
vitit 1999, pavarsisht prpjekjeve t tyre t vazhdueshme.
Nga kndvshtrimi i dikujt q merret n mnyr profesionale me t drejtat e njeriut,
sht shum vshtir t bhet krahasimi i gjendjes n Kosov me cilindo territor n bot.
Marrim si shembull fushn e arsimit, ku e drejta e pakicave nnkupton arsimimin n t
gjitha nivelet, dygjuhsin, kurset dhe diskriminim pozitiv n punsimin e kuadrove t
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vlersimeve t Banks Botrore, ka 37% t popullsis n varfri,ndrsa 15% n varfri t

skajshme.
Niveli i realizimit t t drejtave t njeriut dhe t komuniteteve dallojn varsisht nga
lmenjt e puns dhe t jets. N fushat e rezervuara q udhhiqen nga ndrkombtart
(UNMIK dhe KFOR), si n siguri, gjyqsi, menaxhimin e prons publike dhe shoqrore
etj, kemi ngecje n prparimin e dshiruar t ktyre t drejtave.

Fusha e siguris dhe e lvizjes s lir t qytetarve, edhe pse ka shnuar prparim, sht
akoma nn nivelin normal dhe t dshirueshm. Tani n Kosov pr shkak t hezitimit t
UNMIK-ut dhe KFOR-it pr ta kontrolluar tr hapsirn e Kosovs, ka e obligon edhe
rezoluta e Kshillit t Sigurimit, n praktik kemi funksionimin e strukturave paralele n
enklavat serbe, posarisht n veri t Kosovs.
Qytetart q atje jan pakic n numr jan t privuar nga e drejta themelore q t
zgjedhin dhe q t jen t zgjedhur n strukturat e pushtetit lokal. Ktu sht fjala pr
banort e Koshtovs, Bistrics, Cerrajs n komunn e Albanikut, dhe banort e Kelmendit, Zhazhs dhe Boletinit n komunn e Zveanit.

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Vemas neglizhenca e AKM n procesin e privatizimit u ka pamundsuar t punsuarve

t mhershm t punojn, ndrsa shfrytzimi i t drejts ligjore nga 20% i ndrmarrjes s
shitur, q u takon puntorve,realizohet me vonesa t mdha.

do subjekt politik dhe do komunitet ka pasur mundsi q prmes zgjedhjeve demokratike, t zgjedh prfaqsuesit e vet n pushtetin lokal. Megjithat, duhet cekur rastin
e komuns s Mitrovics t vitit 2002 kur prfaqsuesi special me ndrhyrje administrative
zhvlersoi votn e lir t qytetarve.
Prparim n realizimin e t drejtave t njeriut dhe komuniteteve vemas sht arritur n
sfern e arsimit, ndrkoh q sfera e shndetsis gjithashtu ka psuar transformim t mir
n dobi t t gjith qytetarve.
Prparimi i madh n sfern e informimit, pa hyr n analizn e skems programore t
radio e televizioneve n gjuht e komuniteteve, tregohet me faktin se n Kosov tani radiot
dhe televizionet emitojn programe n gjuhn shqipe,serbe, boshnjake, turke, rome etj.
Vetm n gjuhn serbe kemi 26 radio. Graanica, nj lokalitet me prafrsisht 3 500
banor, ka tri radiostacione n gjuhn serbe.
Shumica e zyrtarve n Ministrin pr Komunitete dhe Kthim q udhhiqet nga ministri i komunitetit serb, Sllavisha Petkoviq, jan po t atij komuniteti. MKK s bashku me
partnert tjer n Grupin Punues mbi Kthimet (UNMIK-u, UNHCR-i dhe KFOR-i) kan
prgatitur Kornizn strategjike pr kthim pr 2005.
Pr avancimin mtejm t realizimit t t drejtave t njeriut dhe komuniteteve::
1. Duhet t intensifikohet procesi i definimit t statusit prfundimtar-pavarsimi i Kosovs,
n mnyr q qytetart t kuptojn se,pik referimi pr problemet e tyre sht Prishtina
e jo Beogradi.
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edukimit, ndrsa kur flitet pr Kosovn, duhet theksuar se fmijt shkojn n shkoll me
prcjellje policore ose ushtarake. Shkollim i suksesshm n Kosov konsiderohet mundsia e njerzve pr tu shkolluar pa e humbur jetn e tyre gjat ktij procesi. Pr cilsin e
shkollimit n kto kushte sht shum vshtir t flitet. E njjta situata vlen edhe kur flasim
pr mbrojtjen e t drejtave t lidhura me identitetin kulturor, si sht informimi, prdorimi
zyrtar i gjuhs, etj.
Dshiroj t trheq vmendjen edhe n nj problem tjetr i cili po harrohet n Kosov.
sht e vrtet se esenca e problemit qndron n marrdhniet ndrmjet serbve dhe shqiptarve, mirpo ka grupe etnike n Kosov q paraqesin dm kolateral pr shkak t ktyre
marrdhnieve. Ktu para s gjithash mendoj n romt. Situata e goranve dhe boshnjakve
sht pak m ndryshe, sepse ata jan dukshm t integruar npr institucione dhe kan nj
qasje m t dukshme, mirpo pozita e romve n Kosov sht alarmante. Ata jetojn n
kushte trsisht t paprshtatshme higjienike, si sht kampi i Plemetinit, ku ata i nnshtrohen vdekjes pr shkak t smundjeve t ndryshme, izolimit t plot n varfri, mjerimit
dhe uris. Askush nuk reagon pr kt. Ather kur bhen prpjekje pr zgjidhjen e problemit dhe statusit t tyre, kjo bhet n mnyr joadekuate dhe mnyr t instrumentalizuar
politikisht. Nse sht e qart se romt kryesisht jetojn n ambiente serbe, dhe se ata pr
shkak t pengess s gjuhs, meqense nuk flasin shqip, m me dshir shprngulen nga
pjest e shqiptarve n ato serbe, ather sht e qart se ku duhet t krkohet e ardhmja e
tyre. Pa marr parasysh kt, bashksia ndrkombtare ndrmerr hapa t pabesueshm kur
dshiron t zgjedh problemin e romve, si sht ndrtimi i lagjes s romve n pjesn
jugore t Mitrovics. Aty do t duhej t bhej kthimi kolektiv i romve, n nj rreth plotsisht shqiptar, ku i nnshtrohen shprnguljes dhe shfarosjes s mundshme. sht pothuajse
e ditur se romt nuk do t pranojn kt. Cili sht rezultati? Edhe m tutje do t vazhdojn
t jetojn n trevat serbe, n kushte t padurueshme, ndrsa mjetet pr prmirsimin e
problemeve t tyre banesore do t investohen n pjest e Kosovs me shumic shqiptare.
Nse dshirojm t zgjedhim problemin e pakicave tjera, ather kt duhet ta bjm n
at mnyr q sht e pranueshme pr ta, e jo ashtu q Beogradi ose UNMIK-u t ndikojn n fatin e tyre pa e pasur miratimin e tyre rreth ksaj shtjeje. Me kt nuk dshiroj
t them se me kalimin e kohs nuk do t jet e mundur q romt t jetojn n vendbanimet shqiptare dhe t kemi nj Kosov shumetnike, mirpo n kt moment, kjo sht
pamundur. Varianti m i keq sht q t eksperimentohet modeli shumetnik, dhe kjo me
bashksin m t prekur romt. Serbt jan pak a shum t organizuar, kan mbshtetjen
n institucionet e Beogradit, mirpo romt jan n nj territor t pastruar, m s lehti t
nnshtruar ndaj t gjitha llojeve t manipulimeve, njjt sikur viteve t kaluara kur kan
qen nn ndikimin e asimilimit.
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2. Formuar ministri t reja dhe bartja e kompetencave tek vendort n sfern e drejtsis
dhe t rendit e siguris sht domosdoshmri.
3. Udhheqsit institucional dhe ata politik duhet t punojn m me ngulm me qytetart
dhe komunitetet n demokratizimin e shoqris kosovare.
4. Duhet t reformohet sistemi zgjedhor dhe me t t sigurohet prfaqsimi i prshtatshm
pr t gjitha komunitetet ,si n nivelin qendror ashtu edhe at lokal.
5. Duhet t vazhdohet procesi i pajtimit n mes komuniteteve,i rnduar si pasoj e lufts
dhe e politiks nnshtruese q kishte Serbia n Kosov.
6. Institucionet e Kosovs (Presidenca, Kuvendi, Qeveria) t vazhdojn n mnyr t
prhershme t dshmojn se jan t prcaktuar pr ndrtimin e marrdhnieve t mira
fqinjsore dhe se jan mbshtetje e forte e stabilitetit n rajon dhe m gjer.

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9 nntor 2005

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Kosovo je jedina oblast u Evropi gde se ne potuju meunarodni

standardi
Jelena Markovi, pomonik ministra za ljudska i manjinska prava u Savetu ministara
SCG

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Stvarno stanje na Kosovu i Metohiji je takvo da Srbija i Crna Gora (SCG) nijedan oblik
kompetencija iz Rezolucije 1244 SB UN ne ostvaruje i ima veoma slab pristup informacijama, naroito onim koje se tiu rada privremenih institucija i UNMIK-a. Stoga Ministarstvo za ljudska i manjinska prava SCG, Koordinacioni centar za Kosovo i druge institucije dravne zajednice i Srbije, do informacija dolaze posredno.
U oblasti ljudskih i manjinskih prava, vrlo znaajni izvori su izvetaji meunarodnog
ombudsmana i meunaronih organizacija. Meutim, tu treba staviti ogradu, s obzirom na
to da u UN, kada svoje vienje stanja izlau predstavnici administracije UN, njihove ocene
ne odgovaraju stvarnom stanju. Jer, ako govorite o napretku uinjenom u oblasti ljudskih
prava, onda je pitanje ta je standard koji se uzima za merilo i ta je poetna osnova preko
koje merimo napredak. Ako pominjemo procente, oni ponekad deluju ohrabrujue, pa pokazuju da se, u odnosu na proteklu godinu, vei procenat ljudi vratio na Kosovo, ali ako se
pogledaju brojke, onda imate injenicu da se na Kosovo vraa svega nekoliko porodica
godinje, to je veoma obeshrabrujue.
Statistika je vrlo varljiva kada je re o ljudima i njihovim sudbinama. Kosovo nije ni
blizu standarda u oblasti zatite ljudskih i manjinskih prava, i to ne u odnosu na SCG, koja
je u viem evropskom rangu, nego u odnosu na druge zemlje u Evropi. Kosovo je, bez ikakve sumnje, bez primera oblast u Evropi gde su u najteem i najgorem poloaju tamonji
itelji i gde su njihova ljudska i manjinska prava potpuno nezatiena. Retko se gde moe
nai deo Evrope gde ugroen je itav korpus ljudskih prava - od prava na kretanje, na ivot,
na upotrebu maternjeg jezika, na povratak, do prava na obrazovanje. Kosovo je jedina
oblast u Evropi gde se ne potuju meunarodni standardi. Probali smo da utiemo na privremene institucije da konvencije o ljudskim pravima, koje se potuju u SCG i koje su iznad
naeg zakonodavstva, budu obavezujue i na Kosovu, s obzirom da je ono i dalje deo SCG.
UNMIK je potpisao sa Savetom Evrope (SE) bilateralne ugovore kojima se obavezuje da
e potovati Okvirnu konvenciju o zatiti manjina i Konvenciju o spreavanju torture.
U praksi je, meutim, na Kosovu vrlo malo toga uinjeno. injenica da nezavisnim
posmatraima SE koji bi obili zatvore na Kosovu, do danas nije omogueno da ih obiu,
govori o tome koliko je UNMIK spreman na to da se izvri nadzor potovanja ljudskih
prava i sloboda oveka. Komitet protiv torture SE ima pravo da u svakoj zemlji, u svakom
trenutku, bez najave ue u bilo koju zatvorsku instituciju. Drugo, pregovori da se na Kosovu potuju meunarodne konvencije o zatiti ljudskih prava traju ve etiri godine, to
dovoljno govori o tome kakvo je raspoloenje da se u pokrajini potuju meunarodne
obaveze i norme. Ironija je da je Kosovo jo uvek deo SCG, zemlje u kojoj se meunarodne
konvencije u potpunosti potuju, a njihova primena veoma strogo nadzire. S obzirom da je
UNMIK potpisnik tih sporazuma, a ne privremene institucije, za odgovornost i nepotovanje
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Stanje ljudskih i manjinskih prava na Kosovu

Nazmi Fejza, zamenik Ministra za povratak i zajednice

Pored toga to je Kosovo dva puta odralo regularne parlamentarne izbore, u skladu sa
meunarodnim normama, koje je visoko ocenila i meunarodna zajednica i na kojima su
mogli da uestvuju svi njegovi graani i politiki subjekti kako bi zastupali svoje interese
u Skuptini, 20 mesta od ukupno 120, koliko ima Skuptina Kosova, rezervisana su za predstavnike nealbanskih zajednica, bez obzira na mesta osvojena neposrednim glasanjem, to
je jedinstven sluaj u odnosu na skuptine zemalja regiona, a sa jedinim ciljem da manjinske zajednice budu u mogunosti da to uspenije brane svoje interese u okviru institucija.

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Opredeljenje graana Kosova za demokratsku, funkcionalnu i razvijenu dravu svih

stanovnika Kosova, bez obzira na njihovu etniku i versku pripadnost, oigledno je u svim
njegovim institucijama, u zakonima, rezolucijama i deklaracijama usvojenim u Skuptini
Kosova, zacrtanim u programima Vlade i u programima institucija optinske vlasti.

Dodajmo i to da je Skuptina Kosova u ovom periodu usvojila velik broj zakona i rezolucija u interesu svih graana.
Nacionalna struktura poslanika Skuptine Kosova, osim onih iz redova Srba, reflektuje
etniku strukturu Kosova, to znai da su veina Albanci, ali da ima i predstavnika Turaka,
Bonjaka, Akalija, Roma, Egipana, Goranaca i Srba.
Broj zaposlenih iz redova manjina u institucijama Kosova sada je oko 12 odsto, ali je
tenja da do kraja godine taj procenat bude najmanje 16,6. Bojkot kosovskih institucija od
strane predstavnika srpske zajednice oteao je postizanje cilja veeg zapoljavanja pripadnika manjinskih zajednica.
Teko je govoriti o potpunom potovanju ljudskih prava u situaciji kada je na Kosovu,
prema procenama Svetske banke, 37 odsto stanovnitva siromano, dok 15 odsto ivi u
krajnjem siromatvu.
Nivo ostvarivanja ljudskih prava i prava zajednica razlikuje se u zavisnosti od oblasti rada i ivota. U takozvanim rezervisanim oblastima, kojima rukovode predstavnici
meunarodnih institucija (UNMIK i Kfor), kao to su bezbednost, pravosue, upravljanje
javnom i drutvenom svojinom i drugo, ima zastoja u eljenom napretku u ostvarivanju tih
prava.
Posebno je naglaena nemarnost Kosovske poverilake agencije (KPA) u procesu privatizacije, to je onemoguilo ranije zaposlenima da rade, dok se zakonsko pravo radnika na
20 odsto od vrednosti prodatih preduzea ostvaruje sa velikim zakanjenjem.
U oblasti bezbednosti i slobode kretanja graana, iako je postignut napredak, jo ima
zastoja i stanje je ispod normalnog i eljenog nivoa. Sada na Kosovu, usled nespremnosti
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meunarodnih standarda u sprovoenju prava oveka treba skretati panju na UNMIK. SE

je, inae, godinu i po dana ekao na inicijalni izvetaj UNMIK-a o stanju manjinskih prava
na Kosovu i injenica je da taj izvetaj jo nije objavljen.

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Meutim, odjednom se u Pritini krenulo sa ispunjavajem pojedinih meunarodnih

normi, upravo pred poetak pregovora o konanom statusu, to je za svaku pohvalu, ali
izaziva sumnju u iskrenost i trajnost takvih nastojanja. Indikativno je da je Komitetu SE za
ispitivanje sprovoenja Okvirne konvencije o zatiti manjina pre dve nedelje dozvoljeno
da poseti Kosovo. Ono o emu se malo govori je i to da je UNMIK poeo sa udnovatim
insistiranjem na readmisiji graana koji su u zapadnoj Evropi izgubili pravo na boravak.
Stav SCG je da se graani moraju vraati u mesto svog prebivalita. Ako su sa Kosova,
onda moraju biti vraeni na Kosovo, a ako su pripadnici manjina, ne mogu biti vraeni dok
im se ne garantuje bezbednost.
UNMIK je bez konsultacija sa SCG potpisao sa Nemakom ugovor o povratku nealbanaca na Kosovo, kroz proces readmisije, i kroz taj sporazum UNMIK garantuje njihovu
bezbednost. Ali, ako pogledate dosadanju situaciju i ako pogledate injenicu da na Kosovu
ne postoji ni elementarna bezbednost za manjine, moje je pitanje kako e dodatni broj lica,
sada u statusu dvostrukih izbeglica (prvo su bili izbeglice u vajcarskoj, Nemakoj, Holandiji, a sada e biti izbeglice i unutar Kosova) ostvariti svoja elementarna prava, kada to ne
mogu oni koji su sve vreme od 1999. do danas bili na Kosovu i uporno to pokuavali.
Vrlo je teko sa aspekta nekoga ko se profesionalno bavi ljudskim pravima uporeivati
stanje na Kosovu sa bilo kojim prostorom na svetu. Primera radi, oblast obrazovanja i pravo manjina podrazumeva obrazovanje na svim nivoima, dvojezinost, kurseve i pozitivnu
diskriminaciju u zapoljavanju obrazovnih kadrova, a kada govorite o Kosovu, to znai da
deca idu do kole uz policijsku ili vojnu pratnju. Uspenim kolovanjem na Kosovu smatra
se mogunost da se ljudi koluju, a da u tom procesu ne izgube ivot. O kvalitetu kolovanja
u takvim uslovima veoma je teko govoriti. Ista je situacija i kada govorimo o zatiti prava
vezanih za kulturni identitet, kao to su informisanje i slubena upotreba jezika.
elim da skrenem panju na jo jedan problem koji se na Kosovu zaboravlja. Jeste da
je sutina problema u odnosima izmeu Srba i Albanaca, ali ima etnikih grupa na Kosovu
koje su zbog takvih odnosa kolateralna teta. Tu pre svega mislim na Rome. Situacija
Goranaca i Bonjaka malo je drugaija, oni su delimino integrisani u institucije i imaju
delimian pristup njima, ali je pozicija Roma na Kosovu alarmantna. Oni ive u higijenski
potpuno neadekvatnim uslovima, kakvi su u kampu u Plemetini, gde im preti smrt od
zaraznih bolesti, gde su potpuno izolovani u siromatvu, bedi i gladi. Niko na to ne reaguje.
U sluajevima kada se pokuava reavanje njihovih problema i statusa, to se ini na neadekvatan i politiki instrumentalizovan nain. Ako je jasno da Romi uglavnom ive u srpskom
okruenju i da se oni zbog jezike barijere, poto ne govore albanski, radije sklanjaju u
srpske sredine, ako je jasno da su interno raseljeni Romi odlazili iz albanskih u srpske delove, jasno je gde treba traiti njihovu budunost. Uprkos tome, meunarodna zajednica se,
kada eli da reava problem Roma, odluuje na neverovatne poteze, kakav je izgradnja
romskog naselja u junom delu Mitrovice. Tu bi Romi trebalo da se kolektivno vrate, u
potpuno albansko okruenje, gde su izloeni potencijalnom egzodusu i istrebljenju. Unapred se zna da Romi to nee prihvatiti i, ta je rezultat? Nastavie da i dalje ive u srpskim
sredinama u nepodnoljivim uslovima, a sredstava za reavanje njihovih stambenih problema bie investirana u delove sa albanskom veinom na Kosovu.
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UNMIK-a i Kfora da kontroliu celu teritoriju Kosova, na ta ih obavezuje Rezolucija

1244 Saveta bezbednosti UN, u praksi imamo funkcionisanje paralelnih struktura u srpskim enklavama, naroito u severnom delu Kosova.
Graani koji su tamo brojano u manjini, lieni su osnovnog prava da biraju i da budu
birani u strukture lokalne vlasti. Ovde je re o stanovnicima Koutova, Bistrice i Ceraje u
optini Zubin Potok i stanovnicima sela Keljmend, ae i Boljetin u optini Zvean.
Svaki politiki subjekt i svaka zajednica imala je mogunost da neposrednim glasanjem
u demokratskim izborima izabere svoje predstavnike u lokalnim organima vlasti. Meutim,
treba istai primer Mitrovice iz 2002. godine, kada je specijalni predstavnik generalnog
sekretara UN administrativnim posredovanjem ponitio slobodan glas graana.

Veliki napredak u oblasti informisanja, ne ulazei u analizu programskih ema radijskih

i televizijskih stanica na jezicima manjina, predstavlja injenica da na Kosovu sada radio i
televizija emituju program na albanskom, srpskom, bonjakom, turskom, romskom i drugim jezicima. Samo na srpskom jeziku imamo 26 radio stanica. Graanica, naselje sa oko
3.500 stanovnika, ima tri radio stanice koje emituju program na srpskom jeziku.

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Postignut je napredak u ostvarivanju ljudskih prava i prava zajednica, naroito u oblasti

obrazovanja, a i u oblasti zdravstva takoe je zabeleen znaajan preobraaj u korist svih
gradana.

Veina slubenika u Ministarstvu za povratak i zajednice, kojim rukovodi ministar iz

redova srpske zajednice, g. Slavia Petkovi, pripadnici su te nacionalnosti.
Ministarstvo za povratak i zajednice je u saradnji sa drugim partnerima u radnoj grupi
za povratak (UNMIK, UNHCR i Kfor) pripremilo dokument nazvan Strateki okvir za
povratak u 2005. godini.
Za dalje unapreenje procesa realizacije ljudskih prava i prava zajednica, treba:
1. Intenzivirati proces definisanja konanog statusa nezavisnosti Kosova - kako bi
graani shvatili da je mesto za reavanje njihovih problema Pritina, a ne Beograd.
2. Osnovati nova ministarstava i preneti nadlenosti na lokalne institucije u oblastima
pravosua, reda i bezbednosti, jer je to neophodnost.
3. Institucionalni i politiki rukovodioci treba da rade predano sa graanima i pripadnicima nacionalnih zajednica na daljoj demokratizaciji kosovskog drutva.
4. Reformisati izborni sistem, koji treba da obezbedi adekvatnu zastupljenost svih nacionalnih zajednica, kako na centralnom, tako i na lokalnom nivou.
5. Nastaviti proces pomirenja meu zajednicama, koji je poremeen kao posledica rata i
osvajake politike koju je Srbija vodila na Kosovu.
6. Institucije Kosova (Predsednitvo, Skuptina i Vlada) treba da nastave da stalno dokazuju da su opredeljene za izgradnju dobrosusedskih odnosa i da su dobar oslonac za
stabilnost u regionu i ire.
09. novembar 2005.
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Ako elimo da reimo pitanje drugih manjina, to bi trebalo da uinimo na nain za njih
prihvatljiv, a ne da Beograd ili UNMIK utiu na njihovu sudbinu, bez njihove saglasnosti
o tome. Ovim ne elim da kaem da vremenom nee biti mogue da i Romi i drugi ive u
albanskom okruenju i da imamo multietniko Kosovo, ali u ovom trenutku to nije mogue.
Najgora varijanta je eksperimentisati sa multietninou i to sa najranjivijom zajednicom
- Romima. Srbi su koliko-toliko organizovani, imaju oslonac na institucije Beograda, ali
Romi su na brisanom prostoru, najlake izloeni svim vrstama manipulacija, kao to su
prethodnih godina bili pod udarom asimilacije.

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09. novembar 2005.

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Negotiations on Kosovo's Future - A New Security Challenge

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By Zoran Dragisic, Military Analyst and a Professor at the School of Civil Defense in
Belgrade

Zoran Dragisic

The question of Kosovo's final status is most of all a

question of security. Of course, the roots of the Kosovo and
Metohija problem reach much father back into the past than
1999. The province has almost permanently been under the
shadow of crisis. Historically, every power that has tried its
hands at the so-called "Kosovo knot" has encountered the
same problems. These problems mostly stem from the inability of Kosovo society to find a sustainable model of cohabitation for the province's different ethnic communities.
Kosovo's differences have typically always manifested
themselves in the form of brutal violence and intolerance,
which have long been obstacles to society's modernization.
The direct result of these historical conditions is today's
Kosovo society, in many ways an anachronism in modern
Europe.

The situation in contemporary Kosovo and Metohija was

caused by several factors, each of which, one can safely say, had disastrous effects. These
different factors have combined to produce a Kosovo bogged in the mud of crime, terrorism
and political radicalism, run by an administration of incompetent and uninterested international bureaucrats, whose actions, or rather, inaction, has bred a political and social climate
which leaves little hope of Kosovo becoming a normal society any time soon.
The beginning of negotiations on Kosovo and Metohija's final status is a new security
challenge. After Serbian forces left the province in June 1999, any attempt to initiate a
political process in the province has seen Albanian extremists using violence and terrorism
to intimidate and expel the Serb community on one side, and on the other, to send a clear
message to the international community that the Albanians have no intention of allowing
the southern Serbian province to remain a part of Serbia. As negotiations on the province's
final status draw closer, the use of this tactic is evident in the appearance of an organization
which calls itself the Army for Kosovo's Independence. The organization has warned that
it plans to launch terrorist attacks on Albanian delegates in Kosovo's Assembly and other
Albanian politicians in the province unless they declare absolute independence. The shadow of this terrorist threat will certainly have its effect on the position of the Albanian negotiating team in the talks, indirectly bring the terrorists to the negotiating table. Clearly, this
makes any serious negotiations impossible. Analysts are unanimous in their expectations
of fresh violence in Kosovo and Metohija, and possibly in other parts of Serbia, in the event
the Albanians fail to achieve their goals.
The above conclusion is drawn from past Albanian extremist behavior and on the basis
of the Albanian national movement's objectives, which have been stated more than clearly.
The matter, however, does not end there. Another question is will the violence end if the
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Current security situation in Kosovo

Ramadan Qehaja, Political Advisor for Security Affairs of Kosovos Prime Minister

But since Kosovo has entered the sensitive phase of

defining the final status, and based on some of the latest developments and on anticipations for possible actions, the Ramadan Qehaja
situation could destabilize and affect the ongoing political-diplomatic activities in and
about Kosovo.

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It is a bit difficult to make a genuine analysis of the current security situation in Kosovo due to the complexity of
this issue. Without wanting to make any pompous introduction about this topic, I want to emphasize that the current
security situation can be evaluated as satisfying, because
there is a kind of stable situation in terms of security in
Kosovo.

The prolongation of Kosovo status settlement (for over 6 years) brought a situation, in
which the economic problems were brought in the first plan, and thus negatively reflected
on the security situation. On the other hand, there was enough time, opportunities and
vacuum for different destructive and hostile actions to destabilize the situation, according
to the political moment Kosovo, as a transitional society, was going through.
In this regard, the most essential factor for destabilization of the security situation is the
northern part of Kosovo and the intensive actions of the Serb parallel structures, which are
organized, directed and activated by Belgrade. Furthermore, Belgrade has and is infiltrating various police and military experts to destabilize this and other parts of Kosovo.
Belgrades current destructive policy against every effort for progress and success in
Kosovo, was manifested not only in political, but also in security area. Self-isolation of Serb
population into the enclaves and the boycott of Kosovo institutions did not have negative
connotation among the Serbs, but sometimes it has created an irritation among the majority
in Kosovo, which has, with few exceptions, a positive stance on the need of Kosovo Serbs
for the freedom of movement. Therefore, Belgrades negative approach towards Kosovo
has and continues to have a direct negative impact in this aspect of security, as well.
A topic on its own is the continuous organization and operation of the Serb civilian and
military intelligence throughout the territory of Kosovo, since the end of the war. It is not
a surprise that a large number of serious crimes are not solved yet in Kosovo. If we say that
there are indications, which reflect a possible escalation of the security situation, then we
need to emphasize the arrest of three uniformed and armed members of the Serb Gendarmerie inside the territory of Kosovo, the attempt murder on the KPS regional Commander
in Gjilan Col. Petkovic, the murder of two Serbs and wounding of two others and demolition of the KLA monument in Strpce, a number of other explosions, especially on police
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Albanian radicals achieve their strategic goal of independence and what will happen when
they do?

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A credible forecast of Kosovo's security situation in the future, and that of the wider
Balkan region, first requires an examination of the very nature of the Albanian national
movement for Kosovo and Metohija's independence, its ideological tenets, history, international influences and the future that the factors interested in the matter are projecting for
Kosovo.
The Albanian pro-independence movement for Kosovo and Metohija has a long history,
despite the fact that its declarative goals have ranged from annexing Kosovo to Albania to
creating an independent state of Kosovo, as embodied in the terrorist Kosovo Liberation
Army in the mid-1990s. In the beginning, the KLA represented itself as an armed formation of insurgents fighting against repression of the Albanian population in Kosovo and
Metohija, under Slobodan Milosevic's regime of terror. By presenting itself as the next
stage of a non-violent popular movement fighting for the rights of the Albanian population
in Kosovo and Metohija, the KLA had no trouble in picking up the sympathies of certain
European and U.S. circles. The Western public turned a blind eye to its terrorist actions in
1997, 1998 and 1999 for two reasons.
The first reason was that these operations were seen as targeting the Milosevic regime,
who, after signing the Dayton Peace Accords, had once again become the "butcher of the
Balkans." If already fighting for human rights, couldn't the KLA have helped the Serbian
opposition beat Milosevic in elections, thereby enabling the Albanians to solve the problem
of minority rights in a democratic Serbia? No one thought to ask this question at the time
for a simple reason -- at its core the Albanian national movement's struggle was not about
human rights but about territory. The second reason is that Islamic terrorism only became
the number one global concern that it is today after Sept. 11, 2001. The fact that Osama Bin
Laden was active in Albania during the 1990s was not seen as a problem at the time, although Slobodan Milosevic was. In the same way, Al Qaeda's financing of the Albanian
insurgency in Kosovo at the turn of the century did not make the same alarming headlines
that it would today. Believing it was helping democracy, the shortsighted U.S. administration directly supported terrorism in Kosovo, enabling Osama Bin Laden to turn the movement into one of his bases, now being used against U.S. interests.
What will happen in Kosovo depends on the outcome of a power struggle between the
province's two contesting groups - the secular ethno-separatist group and the religiously
motivated Islamic group. For the time being both groups share the same goal -- an independent Kosovo, but their visions of Kosovo's future differ enormously. The ethno-separatists
see themselves as Kosovo's new political elite and rulers of a secular Kosovo, while the
Islamists see Kosovo as a part of the new Caliphate. Conflict is imminent in the event that
Kosovo and Metohija receives independence. The Islamists will target the secular authorities, as in every other predominantly Muslim state with a secular government for that matter. And at the moment, the Islamic camp is believed to be stronger. If it does win, in addition to the Serbs and other ethnic communities, members of international forces and foreign
nationals in Kosovo will be targeted as well. Since international forces arrived in the province, the Islamists have been developing and expanding their terrorist network, unhindered
by international forces. This has led to the biggest security threat today, which mostly endanger international forces. In addition, there is the problem of very influential organized
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vehicles of the international staff. These criminal acts lead us to conclusion that the escalation of security situation is possible.
Indirectly, this shows the fragility and non-sustainability of the security situation, which
needs a different approach, having in mind that we do not have any internal security service, which would research and analyze possible destabilizations. When we add to it, the
lack of competencies for locals in the area of security, the situation becomes more sensitive, although we should not underestimate the current activities of the international relevant security factors in Kosovo.

If we want to make a more comprehensive review of the security situation, we should

take into account our internal problems, mainly those of economic nature, such as unemployment and difficult social situation, organization of strikes, protests and other ways of
expressing the dissatisfaction from the side of our citizens. Therefore we can conclude that
we are facing a very complex situation, especially when this dissatisfaction is being used
by different destructive elements and different intelligence services for destabilization purposes.

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Recently, it is reported for emergence of different armed and masked groups, especially
in Dukagjini region, known as KIA (Kosovo Independence Army). One thing is for sure,
that the security situation is becoming harsh, especially having in mind the fact that the
activity of these groups is addressed against the internationals working in Kosovo, which
is very harmful to us.

In this context, we also must emphasize the disunity between our political parties,
which sometimes lead to huge confrontations, a situation that has been used perfectly by
different elements in preparing and waging a special war against Kosovo, taking place at
this very sensitive stage we are going through.
We need also to emphasize here that the opponents of the Kosovo status talks are also
complicating the security situation. In this regard, it is very important to continue with
standards implementation, which should be in the center of our political and security activities, along the status talks. The efforts to include more members of minority communities in the Kosovo Police, Kosovo Protection Corps and other governmental structures is
also positive for the security aspect. The importance of this element is increasing especially at this moment, when competencies in the area of police and justice are expected to
be handed over to locals. This may improve the security situation and the public order.
Taking into account Kosovos important geo-strategic position in the region as well as
the occurrence of corruption, trafficking, smuggling and other crimes, building of a functional security system is necessary.
The breaking of the current stability, although it is evaluated as fragile, could have numerous consequences for Kosovo. Orientation of KFOR, UNMIK Police, KPS and other
structures of the society in raising the level of operational preparedness is right and necessary, because only this way we could control the security situation. There is no dilemma
about this.
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crime groups in Kosovo. These groups have no political power but they are a major financial force, devoted to and under the absolute control of international Islamic terrorism
which they support in every way.
Furthermore, recognizing Kosovo's independence is likely to ignite Serbia's three
southern municipalities, which the Albanian separatists are now calling eastern Kosovo,
making an an armed conflict highly likely. This conflict will in all likelihood spread to others parts of the region. If the radical Albanians start feeling that negotiations on Kosovo's
final status are heading in an unfavorable direction, violence will be unavoidable. The Islamists will not miss out on the opportunity to fully marginalize the secular Albanian politicians, and create a situation similar to Iraq. This scenario is possible in the context of a
new front against "modern imperialists and crusaders," as a way to help the terrorists fighting in Iraq. Being pulled into a global jihad will take a devastating toll on the Albanians. A
war of this kind could easily entail terrorist attacks like the ones in Madrid, London and
other urban areas in the region, mainly Serbian cities outside of Kosovo, but cities in Macedonia, Albania, Greece, Montenegro, Croatia, Bulgaria and possibly elsewhere as well.
If this actually happens, the Albanians will lose all international support they managed
to win for their armed insurgency against Serbia. Furthermore, they may be confronted by
a broad alliance of Balkan states against Islamic terrorism, that will naturally draw massive
U.S. and EU support. This dark, but unfortunately very plausible scenario sees the Balkans
plunged into all-out war, and the Kosovo Albanians made the hostages of international terrorists, who are not likely to have any qualms about sacrificing them for their own goals.
Instead, the Albanians in Kosovo and Metohija have an historical chance to create "a state
within a state."
The Serbian side would gladly accept a division of Kosovo into two entities. If not
nominally, the Albanian entity would de facto represent a separate state. The Albanians
would have almost full control over their own institutions, with the exception, of course, of
an army and diplomacy. The Albanian entity would get to pass its own laws... This kind of
a solution would guarantee lasting peace in the Balkans, a requisite for the region's economic development and consequently its inclusion in the EU. The key to a solution lies in
the hands of the Kosovo Albanians. They have the sole power to confront the Islamic fanatics and demand a solution according to their own interests, not those of international terrorists and criminals. A wrong decision will have catastrophic repercussions. The Serbs' historical mistakes may serve as an excellent example for them.
December 2, 2005

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In the end, I must emphasize that there is a need:

1. For an intensive international pressure on Belgrade authorities to dismantle Serb parallel structures in Kosovo, since it would have a positive impact on the security issue.
2. To continue even with bigger intensity the proper functional and capacity organization
in receiving the competencies in the area of security and justice, because only the locals
(in cooperation and under the monitoring of UNMIK respective institutions) could address the security issues and rule of law in a comprehensive manner, by creating conditions for a free movement for Kosovo Serb community.

December 2, 2005

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3. To launch an awareness campaign on security issues in every area, especially in multiethnic ones, to increase the cooperation between the community and security institutions in fighting those occurrences, which makes the security situation even more
complicated.

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Fillimi i negociatave nj sfid e re pr sigurin

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Shkruan: Zoran Dragishiq, profesor i Fakultetit t Mbrojtjes Civile dhe analist

ushtarak
shtja e zgjidhjes t statusit prfundimtar t Kosovs shtrohet para s gjithash si
shtje e siguris. Problemi kosovar, i cili natyrisht nuk ka zn fill prej vitit 1999, gjithmon ka bartur n vete nj potencial tejet t madh krize dhe secila fuqi q ka tentuar q ta
zgjidh t ashtuquajturn nyje kosovare sht prballur me probleme pothuajse identike.
Problemet kan qen, para s gjithash, t lidhura me paaftsin e shoqris kosovare q t
gjej forma t qndrueshme t jets t prbashkt n mes t bashksive etnike. Dallimet
gjithmon jan shfaqur prmes forms s dhuns brutale dhe prjashtimit, t cilat n periudh t gjat kohore kan penguar shoqrin kosovare q t modernizohet. Pasoj e drejtprdrejt e nj historie t till sht shoqria e sotme kosovare, e cila paraqet nj anakronizm t llojit t vet n truallin e Evrops bashkkohore.
Situata n Kosovn e tashme sht pasoj e veprimit t disa faktorve, nga t cilt secili
ka pasur ndikim, i cili lirshm mund t quhet edhe katastrofal. Si rezultati i ndikimit t
ktyre fuqive, Kosova e sotme sht e zhytur n krim, terrorizm, dhe radikalizm politik,
nn udhheqjen e burokratve ndrkombtar t paaft dhe t pa-interesuar, veprimet apo
mosveprimet e t cilve kan krijuar rrethana politike dhe shoqrore, nga t cilat sht
vshtir t gjendet rrugdalja drejt krijimit n nj shoqri normale.
Fillimi i negociatave pr statusin prfundimtar t Kosovs paraqet nj sfid t re pr
sigurin. Ekstremistt shqiptar pas qershorit 1999, kur forcat serbe t siguris kan lshuar
hapsirn e Kosovs, kurdo q sht shfaqur ndonj shenj e fillimit t procesit i cili do t
onte te ndonj zgjidhje e statusit t Kosovs, kan nisur val terroriste me qllim q ta
tmerrojn komunitetin serb dhe ta dbojn at nga Kosova, dhe n ann tjetr q t drgojn mesazhe politike pr prfaqsuesit e bashksis ndrkombtare se shqiptart nuk jan
t gatshm t mbesin n kornizn shtetrore-ligjore t Serbis. Fillimi i negociatave ka
shnuar shfaqjen e t ashtuquajturs Ushtria pr Pavarsin e Kosovs, e cila n paraqitjen
e saj publike, ka paralajmruar akte t reja terroriste, por ksaj here kundr delegatve
shqiptar t Kuvendit t Kosovs dhe politikanve tjer shqiptar n Kosov, n rast se nuk
e shpallin pavarsin e plot t Kosovs. Hija e krcnimeve terroriste gjithsesi se do t
karakterizoj edhe pozitn e ekipit negociues shqiptar, gj q trthorazi, do ti bjer terroristt n tavolinn e bisedimeve. sht e qart se n situat t till, nuk ka asgj nga negociatat serioze. Ajo pr t ciln t gjith analistt plotsisht pajtohen sht pritja e dhuns
s re n Kosov, e ndoshta edhe n pjes t tjera t Serbis, n rast se shqiptart nuk arrijn
qllimet e veta gjat bisedimeve.
Nj prfundim i ktill mund t arrihet n baz t sjelljes s deritanishme t ekstremistve shqiptar dhe duke ditur qllimet e lvizjes kombtare shqiptare, t cilt jan t
deklaruara shum qart. Megjithat, ky pohim, edhe pse sht shum i logjikshm, nuk
sht i plot. Mbetet e hapur shtja se ka do t mund t ndodhte, dhe a do t ket dhun
t re, n rast se radikalt shqiptar plotsisht realizojn pavarsin e Kosovs si qllim t
tyre strategjik?
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Situata aktuale e siguris n Kosov

Shkruan: Ramadan Qehaja, Kshilltar Politik pr shtje t Siguris i Kryeministrit t
Kosovs

Mirpo, pasi q kemi hyr n fazn shum t ndjeshme t fillimit t prcaktimit t

statusit definitiv t Kosovs, dhe duke u bazuar n disa ngjarje t cilat ndodhn n kohn
e fundit, si dhe parashikimet dhe analizat pr veprime te mundshme, ather ajo mund t
ashprsohet, prkatsisht t bhet krcnuese dhe t ket ndikim negativ n aktivitetin
politiko- diplomatik, i cili sht duke u zhvilluar n Kosov dhe rreth saj.

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Pr ta br nj analiz t mirfillt t situats aktuale t siguris n vend sht paksa

vshtir, sepse ajo sht lmi mjaft komplekse. Duke mos dashur q t bj ndonj hyrje t
posame lidhur me temn n fjal, duhet theksuar se situata e siguris n momentin e tanishm mund t cilsohet si e knaqshme. Sepse n aspektin e siguris n Kosov ekziston
nj lloj stabiliteti.

Kur themi kt, ather duhet pasur parasysh faktin e pamohueshm se prolongimi i
deritanishm i prcaktimit t statusit t Kosovs (m tepr se 6 vite), bri q disa vshtirsi,
sidomos t karakterit ekonomik dhe social, t dalin n plan t par dhe t reflektohen
edhe n situatn e siguris. N ann tjetr pati koh, mundsi dhe zbrazsi pr aksione t
ndryshme destruktive armiqsore, t cilat me intensitet t vogl apo t madh t ndikojn
n destabilizimin e kohpaskohshm, varsisht prej momentit politik, n t cilin Kosova si
shoqri n tranzicion sht gjendur.
N kt drejtim si faktor m esencial pr ashprsimin e situats s siguris ishte dhe
mbeti ndarja e pjess veriore t Kosovs dhe veprimet intensive t strukturave paralele
serbe, t cilat jan t organizuara, drejtuara dhe aktivizuara nga Beogradi zyrtar, si jan
stacionet policore t MUP-it serb, lnia e mhershme dhe detashimi i mvonshm i specialistve t ndryshm policor e ushtarak pr veprime t ndryshme destabilizuese n kt
dhe pjest tjera t Kosovs,etj.
Destruktiviteti i politiks aktuale t Beogradit ndaj fardo tentative t prparimeve dhe
sukseseve n Kosov nuk u manifestua vetm n planin politik, por edhe n at t siguris.
Vetizolimi i popullats serbe npr enklava, mos hyrja n institucione vendore, jo vetm se
kishte konotacion negativ n vet popullatn serbe, por nganjher shkaktonte edhe iritim
dhe ndasi edhe te nj pjese t popullats shumic n Kosov, e cila, duke prjashtuar rastet
e izoluara, ka qndrim pozitiv ndaj nevojs s lvizjes s lir t qytetarve serb t Kosovs.
Prandaj qasja negative e Beogradit zyrtar ndaj Kosovs pati dhe ka ende ndikim t drejtprdrejt negativ edhe n aspektin e siguris.
Tem e posame sht organizimi dhe veprimi i sigurimit sekret civil e ushtarak serb
n territorin e Kosovs, i cili vepron n vazhdimsi q nga mbarimi i lufts e deri n ditt
e sotme. Nuk sht pr tu uditur se nj numr i krimeve t rnda t cilat ndodhn n
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Q t jepet nj parashikim i kualifikuar i siguris s Kosovs, por edhe t rajonit, duhet

t nisemi nga natyra e lvizjes kombtare shqiptare pr pavarsin e Kosovs, bazat e tyre
ideologjike, historin, ndikimin e faktorit t jashtm, dhe t ardhmen, t ciln pr Kosovn
e projektojn faktort e interesuar.
Lvizja shqiptare pr pavarsin e Kosovs, edhe pse ekziston si ide qe nj koh t
gjat, dhe shpesh ka ndryshuar qllimet e veta t deklaruara, prej bashkimit me Shqiprin
deri t krijimi i shtetit sovran dhe t pavarur t Kosovs, n formn bashkkohore t
mishruar n UK-n terroriste sht shfaqur n mesin e viteve 90 t shekullit t kaluar.
N fazat fillestare t krijimit, UK-ja paraqitet si formacion i armatosur kryengrits i cili
lufton pr t drejtat e cenuara t popullats shqiptare n Kosov, e cili gjendet nn terrorin
e fuqishm t regjimit t Millosheviqit. E paraqitur si faza e dyt e lvizjes kombtare jo e
dhunshme, e cila lufton pr t drejtat e shqiptarve n Kosov, UK-ja shum leht ka
fituar simpatin e qarqeve t caktuara n Evrop dhe SHBA. Aktet terroriste t cilat UK
i ka ndrmarr gjat viteve 1997, 1998, 1999, opinioni perndimor i ka toleruar pr shkak
t dy arsyeve.
Arsyeja e par qndron n faktin se aksionet e ndrmarra kundr regjimit t Millosheviqit, i cili pas Dejtonit, ishte br prap kasapi i Ballkanit. Prandaj, edhe pse luftonin pr
t drejtat e njeriut, askush nuk ka br pyetjen pse ather nuk i ndihmojn opozits serbe
q n zgjidhje ta mundin Sllobodan Millosheviqin, e m pas t zgjedhin problemet e lidhura me t drejtat e pakicave n Serbin demokratike. Prgjigjja sht e thjesht: lvizja
kombtare shqiptare nuk sht nj lvizje e cila lufton pr t drejta e njeriut, por sht nj
lvizje e cila lufton pr territor. Arsyeja e dyt e pasqyrohet n faktin se terrorizmi ndrkombtar islamik bhet problemi botror numr nj vetm pas 11 shtatorit 2001. Prania e Osama Bin Ladenit n Shqipri gjat viteve 90 t shekullit t kaluar nuk sht perceptuar si
problem i madh, ather armiku m i madh ishte Sllobodan Millosheviq. Informatat se rrjeti ndrkombtar islamik Al Kaida financonte kryengritjen e shqiptarve n Kosov n
fund t viteve 90 nuk ishin aq alarmante sa jan sot. Megjithat, prderisa administrata e
athershme shkurtpamse n Amerik drejtprdrejt prkrahte terroristt n Kosov, duke
besuar se po i ndihmon demokracis, Osama Bin Lladen nga e njjta lvizje ka krijuar
njrn nga bazat e tija, e cila po shfrytzohet drejtprdrejt kundr interesave kombtare
amerikane.
Ngjarjet e ardhshme n Kosov do t varen drejtprsdrejti nga ajo se cili grup do t
dominoj: grupi jofetar i prir nga separatizmi kombtar, apo ai i motivuar nga feja islame.
T dy grupet terroriste tani kan qllimin e njjt, krijimin e Kosovs s pavarur, por qndrimet e tyre prkitazi me t ardhmen e shtetit t ri ndryshojn mjaft. Separatistt, t prir
nga baza kombtare e shohin veten si elit e re politike e cila do t udhheq me Kosovn
jofetare, prderisa islamistt e shohin Kosovn e pavarur si pjes t nj kalifati t ri. N rast
t njohjes s pavarsis t Kosov, kto dy grupe shum shpejt do t binin n konflikt,
sepse qeverisja jofetare e Kosovs t pavarur do t ishte cak i islamistve, sikur n t gjitha
qeverit jofetare me shumic myslimane. Vlersimet e raportit n mes t ktyre dy grupeve
tregojn se islamistt do tia dilnin t fitojn, por gjat konfliktit, prve serbve dhe pakicave tjera, caqe kryesore do t ishin edhe pjestart e forcave ndrkombtare dhe personeli civil i cili gjendet n Kosov. Q nga arritja e forcave ndrkombtare, islamistt ia kan
dal q t zhvillojn dhe forcojn rrjetin terrorist, t papenguar nga forcat ndrkombtare,
gj q sot paraqet krcnimin kryesor ndaj siguris, para s gjithash pr veta forcat
ndrkombtare. Prve ksaj, duhet pasur parasysh edhe ndikimin q grupet e organizuara
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Kjo n mnyr t drejtprdrejt tregon tr brishtsin dhe paqndrueshmrin e situats

s siguris n t ciln gjendemi dhe e cila domosdoshmrisht krkon nj qasje tjetrfare,
aq m par kur ne si shoqri nuk kemi nj shrbim t sigurimit t brendshm, i cili do
ti hulumtonte dhe analizonte destabilizimet e mundshme. Kur ksaj i shtohet mungesa e
kompetencave t vendorve n lmin e siguris, ather ky element e bn situatn edhe
m t ndjeshme, edhe pse nuk duhet nnmuar tr aktivitetin e deritanishm t faktorve
relevant ndrkombtar t siguris n Kosov.

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Kosov, ende nuk jan zbuluar. Nse themi se ka indikacione t cilat, q nga momenti
i paralajmrimit t nevojs s fillimit t negociatave pr zgjidhjen e statusit definitiv t
Kosovs e kndej, reflektojn nj ashprsim t mundshm t situats s siguris. Duhet
theksuar ndalimin dhe paraburgosjen e dy-tre xhandarve t uniformuar dhe t armatosur
serb t futur n territorin e Kosovs, tentimvrasjen e komandantit rajonal t policis n
Gjilan, Kolonel Jankoviqit, vrasjen e dy serbve dhe plagosja e dy t tjerve, prdhosjen
e monumentit t UK-s n rajonin e Shtrpcs, si dhe disa eksplodime t aty ktushme,
sidomos ndaj veturave policore dhe stafit ndrkombtar. Nga kjo lirisht mund t konkludojm se sht i mundshm ashprsimi i mtejm i situats s siguris n Kosov.

N kohn e fundit raportohet edhe pr aktivitetet e grupeve t ndryshme t armatosura

dhe t maskuara, sidomos n rajonin e Dukagjinit, e q vetn e kan quajtur si APK. Nj gj
sht m se e vrtet, me kt edhe m tepr ashprsohet situata e siguris, e cila si tham,
edhe ashtu karakterizohet me nj brishtsi, posarisht pasi q aktiviteti i tyre kryesisht
sht i organizuar dhe orientuar kundr ndrkombtarve t cilt punojn dhe veprojn n
Kosov, gj q sht edhe m e dmshme pr ne.
N shqyrtimin e mtejm t situats s siguris duhet patjetr ti kemi parasysh edhe
problemet tona t brendshme, si jan ato t karakterit ekonomik, papunsia, gjendja e
rnd sociale etj. si dhe organizimi i grevave, protestave dhe formave tjera t paknaqsis
t qytetarve tan. Duhet konkluduar se gjendemi n nj situat mjaft t ndrlikuar, aq m
par q duke i shprehur kto paknaqsi, e q n shumics e rasteve jan t arsyeshme, n
momentin e pikrishm nganjher ato po shfrytzohen nga elementet e ndryshm destruktiv dhe nga shrbimeve t ndryshme informative pr qllime destabilizuese.
N kt kontekst nuk duhet mund t mos theksohen edhe ndasit tona sidomos ndrpartiake t cilat nganjher po marrin karakter t konfrontimeve t skajshme dhe shum
t thella. Kjo situat disa her me mjeshtri t posame, sht prdorur nga element t
ndryshm pr prgatitjen dhe zbatimin e lufts speciale, e cila po zhvillohet ndaj Kosovs,
sidomos n kt faz shum t ndjeshme n t ciln kemi hyr.
Duhet theksuar se edhe kundrshtart e negociatave pr prcaktimin e statusit t
Kosovs me qndrimet e tyre po e rndojn situatn e siguris. N kt drejtim si domosdoshmri vlersohet edhe realizimi i standardeve pr Kosovn, dhe realizimi i tyre krahas
negociatave pr status duhet t jen n qendr t aktivitetit ton politik e t siguris.
Orientimi q n policin e Kosovs dhe Trupat e Mbrojtjes s Kosovs t prfshihen nj
numr sa ma i madh i minoriteteve, sikurse edhe n strukturat tjera vetqeverisse, sht
tejet pozitiv edhe n aspektin e siguris. Ky element gjithnj e m tepr po vjen n shprehje
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kriminale kan n Kosov. Kriminelt paraqesin nj forc shum t rndsishme, para s

gjithash nj forc financiare. Megjithat, kriminelt shqiptar nuk jan forc politike, sepse
gjenden n funksion t terrorizmit ndrkombtar islamik, i cili n trsi i kontrollon, dhe
pr t cilt ata realizojn t hyra t rndsishme.
Njohja e pavarsis t Kosovs do t hapte edhe probleme n tri komunat n jug t
Serbis, t cilat nga ana e ekstremistve shqiptar quhen Kosov lindore. Ky problem sigurisht do t onte deri te konflikte t reja t armatosura, gj q do ta zgjeronte problemin
kosovar edhe n pjes t tjera t rajonit. N rast se negociatat pr statusin prfundimtar t
Kosovs fillojn n drejtim t pavolitshm pr radikalt shqiptar, dhuna gjat negociatave
sht m se e sigurt. N kt rast, islamistt do t shfrytzonin rastin q plotsisht ti margjinalizojn politikant jofetar shqiptar, dhe n Kosov do t krijonin nj situat t ngjashme me at n Irak. Nj skenar i ktill sht i mundshm n kuadr t hapjes t nj
fronti t ri kundr pushtuesve dhe kryqzorve modern, gj q do t ndihmonte terroristt q po luftojn n Irak. N kt mnyr, islamistt do ti trhiqnin shqiptart n nj
xhihad botror, i cili do t prfundonte si katastrof pr ta. N kuadr t nj lufte t ktill
do t mund t priteshin sulme terroriste t ngjashme me ato n Madrid dhe Londr si dhe
n qytetet e tjera t rajonit, para s gjithash n qytetet serbe jasht Kosovs, por edhe n
qytetet e Maqedonis, Shqipris, Greqis, Malit t Zi, Kroacis, Bullgaris, e ndoshta
edhe m gjer.
Zhvillimi i ktill i ngjarjeve do t onte deri te humbja e plot e prkrahjes ndrkombtare, t ciln shqiptart ja kan dal ta fitojn pr kryengritjen e tyre t armatosur kundr
Serbis, si dhe do t mund t krijonte nj lloj bashkimi n mes vendeve t Ballkanit pr t
luftuar terrorizmin islamik n rajon, i cili, natyrisht se do t gzonte prkrahje t fuqishme
t SHBA-ve dhe t BE-s. Ky skenar i errt, por fatkeqsisht shum i mundshm, do t na
onte deri te nj luft e prgjithshme n Ballkan, ndrsa shqiptart e Kosovs do ti bnte
peng t terroristve ndrkombtar, t cilt shum leht do ti viktimizonin pr qllimet e
tyre. N vend t ksaj, shqiptart n Kosov kan shans historik q t krijojn shtet n
shtet.
Pala serbe n negociata, me knaqsi do t pranonte ndarjen e Kosovs n dy entitete,
ku entiteti shqiptar praktikisht do t mund t ishte shtet, i cili vetm nuk do t quhej ashtu.
Praktikisht shqiptart do t kishin t gjitha institucionet shtetrore, prve natyrisht ushtris dhe diplomacis. Ligjet e Serbis nuk do t aplikoheshin pr ta, po ata do ti hartonin
ligjet e veta. Nj zgjidhje e ktill do t garantonte paqe afatgjate n Ballkan e cila sht e
domosdoshme pr fillimin e prosperitetit ekonomik dhe pr kyjen e tr rajonit n Bashkimin Evropian. elsin e zgjidhjes e mbajn shqiptart e Kosovs, vetm nga ata varet se
a do ti kundrshtohen fanatikve islamik dhe do t krkojn nj zgjidhje e cila do ti jepte
rndsi interesave t tyre e jo interesave t terroristve botror dhe kriminelve. Nse tash
marrin vendim t gabuar, pasojat mund t jen katastrofale. Gabimet historike t popullit
serb mund t jen shembull i shklqyeshm pr ta.
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n kt periudh kur pason marrja e kompetencave n lmin e siguris dhe drejtsis nga
ndrkombtart nga vendort, sepse vetm n kt mnyr mund t prmirsohet gjendja e
siguris, prkatsisht ruajtja e rendit t duhur publik.

1. Shtrohet domosdoja e nj trysnie diplomatike nga faktori ndrkombtar ndaj regjimit aktual t Beogradit pr fillimin e shuarjes s strukturave paralele serbe t cilat n Kosov
veprojn n vazhdimsi e q do t ndikonte pozitivisht edhe n shtjet e siguris.
2. T vazhdohet me nj intensitet edhe m t madh n organizimin adekuat kadrovik e
funksional n marrjen e kompetencave n lmin e siguris dhe drejtsis sepse vetm
vendort (n bashkpunim dhe monitorim t organeve prkatse t UNMIK-ut ) mund
ti qasen shtjeve t siguris dhe sundimit t ligjit n mnyr t gjithanshme, duke
krijuar kushte, para se gjithash pr nj lvizje edhe m t lir t komunitetit serb n
Kosov dhe

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Duke pasur parasysh pozitn e rndsishme gjeostrategjike t Kosovs n rajon, aktet e korrupsionit, trafikimeve t paligjshme, kontrabands etj, dukuri kto q rrnojn
shoqrin ton, ather ndrtimi i nj sistemi funksional t siguris sht tejet i nevojshm.
Prishja e stabilitetit t tanishm, edhe pse me t drejt e cilsojm si t brisht, mund t kt
pasoja t mdha n shum aspekte pr Kosovn. Orientimi i KFOR-it, Policis s UNMIKut, SHPK-s dhe strukturave tjera t shoqris n ngritjen e gatishmris vepruese sht
i qlluar dhe i domosdoshm sepse vetm n kt mnyr mund t kontrollohet situata e
siguris. Dilem lidhur me kt nuk mund t ket. Dhe s fundi duke konkluduar duhet
thn:

3. N aktivitetin e prditshm politik vazhdimisht t iniciohet nevoja e sensibilizimit t

shtjeve t siguris n do mjedis, posarisht n mjediset shumetnike, si dhe nevoja
e bashkpunimit t popullats me organet e siguris n luftimin e dukurive t cilat situatn e siguris e bjn t ndrlikuar.
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Poetak pregovora - novi bezbednosni izazov

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Pie: Zoran Dragii, profesor Fakuleta civile odbrane i vojni analitiar

Pitanje reavanja konanog statusa Kosova i Metohije postavlja se, pre svega, kao pitanje bezbednosti. Kosovskometohijski problem, koji naravno nije poeo 1999. godine,
oduvek je u sebi nosio ogroman krizni potencijal i svaka sila koja je pokuavala da rei tzv.
kosovski vor suoavala se sa gotovo identinim problemima. Problemi su bili, pre svega, vezani za nesposobnost kosovskog drutva da pronae odrive oblike zajednikog
ivota izmeu razliitih etnikih zajednica. Kosovske razliitosti uvek su se ispoljavale
kroz forme brutalnog nasilja i iskljuivosti, koje su u dugom vremenskom periodu spreile
kosovskometohijsko drutvo da se modernizuje. Direktna posledica takve istorije je dananje kosovsko drutvo, koje je svojevrsni anahronizam na tlu savremene Evrope.
Situacija na savremenom Kosovu i Metohiji posledica je delovanja vie faktora, od
kojih je svaki izvrio, slobodno se moe zakljuiti, katastrofalan uticaj. Rezultanta delovanja ovih sila je dananje Kosovo i Metohija, zaglavljeno u blatu kriminala, terorizma i
politikog radikalizma, pod upravom nesposobnih i nezainteresovanih meunarodnih birokrata ije injenje, i jo vie neinjenje, stvara politiko i drutveno okruenje iz koga se
teko nazire izlaz prema normalnom drutvu.
Poetak pregovora o konanom statusu Kosova i Metohije prestavlja novi bezbednosni
izazov. Albanski ekstremisti su nakon juna 1999. godine, kada su srpske snage bezbednosti
napustile prostor Kosova i Metohije, na svaki nagovetaj otpoinjanja politikog procesa
koji bi trebalo da dovede do bilo kakvog reenja statusa june srpske pokrajine, pokretali
talas teroristikog nasilja radi, sa jedne strane, zastraivanja srpske zajednice i njenog proterivanja sa Kosova i Metohije i, sa druge strane, slanja politike poruke predstavnicima
meunarodne zajednice da Albanci nisu spremni na ostanak u dravno-pravnom okviru
Srbije. Poetak pregovora obeleilo je pojavljivanje takozvane Vojske za nezavisnost
Kosova, koja je u proglasu najavila nove teroristike akte, ovaj put prema albanskim poslanicima kosovskog parlamenta i drugim albanskim politiarima na Kosovu i Metohiji
ukoliko ne proglase apsolutnu nezavisnost Kosova i Metohije. Senka teroristike pretnje
svakako e obeleiti poziciju albanskog pregovarakog tima, to e, posredno, dovesti teroriste za pregovaraki sto. Jasno je da u takvoj situaciji od ozbiljnih pregovora nema nita.
Ono u emu se svi analitiari potpuno slau su oekivanja novog nasilja na Kosovu i Metohiji, pa moda i u drugim delovima Srbije, ukoliko Albanci ne postignu svoje ciljeve tokom
pregovora.
Ovakav zakljuak se moe izvesti na osnovu dosadanjeg ponaanja albanskih ekstremista i na osnovu poznavanja ciljeva albanskog nacionalnog pokreta, koji su veoma
jasno deklarisani. Meutum, ova tvrdnja, iako veoma logina, nije potpuna. Ostaje otvoreno pitanje ta bi se moglo deavati, i da li e biti novog nasilja ukoliko albanski radikali potpuno ostvare nezavisno Kosovo kao svoj strateki cilj?
Da bi se dalo kvalifikovano predvianje bezbednosti Kosova i Metohije, ali i ireg regiona Balkana, mora se poi od prirode albanskog nacionalnog pokreta za nezavisnost
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Aktuelna bezbednosna situacija na Kosovu

Prilino je teko sainiti analizu aktuelne bezbednosne situacije na Kosovu, jer je to

kompleksna oblast. Ne elei da pravim poseban uvod o pomenutoj temi, treba istai
da se trenutna bezbednosna situacija na Kosovu moe oceniti zadovoljavajuom, jer je
obezbeena izvesna stabilnost u pogledu bezbednosti. Meutim, poto smo ve uli u veoma osetljivu fazu poetka pregovora o utvrivanju konanog politikog statusa Kosova,
a imajui u vidu neke dogaaje u poslednje vreme, kao i mogue aktivnosti, situacija se
moe zaotravati, odnosno moe postati pretnja i imati negativan uticaj na politiko-diplomatsku aktivnost koja je u toku na Kosovu i u zemljama regiona. Takoe, treba imati u vidu
nepobitnu injenicu da je dosadanje odlaganje utvrivanja politikog statusa Kosova (vie
od est godina) uticalo na to da u prvi plan izbiju mnoge potekoe, naroito ekonomskog i
socijalnog karaktera, koje se odraavaju i na bezbednosnu situaciju. Zbog toga je bilo dosta
vremena, pa i mogunosti, za pojavljivanje raznih desktruktivnih i neprijateljskih delatnosti, koje su manjim ili veim intenzitetom uticale na povremenu destabilizaciju, zavisno
od politikog trenutka u kome se nalazilo Kosovo kao drutvo u tranziciji. U tom pravcu,
sutinski inilac zaotravanja bezbednosne situacije bilo je i ostalo odvajanje severnog dela
Kosova i intenzivno delovanje paralelnih organizovanih srpskih struktura, kojima upravlja
i koje je aktivirao zvanini Beograd. To su, na primer, policijske stanice srpskog MUP-a
koje su ostale od ranije ili su uspostavljene kasnije, ili destruktivno delovanje raznih policijskih i vojnih specijalista u tom delu Kosova, ali i u drugim njegovim delovima.

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Pie: Ramadan ehaja, politiki savetnik premijera Kosova za pitanja bezbednosti

Destruktivnost aktuelne politike Beograda po svaki napredak i uspeh na Kosovu nije

ispoljena samo na politikom planu, ve i na bezbednosnom. Samo zatvaranje srpskog
ivlja u enklave i njihovo neukljuivanje u lokalne institucije, ne samo to ima negativnu
konotaciju kod samog srpskog stanovnitva, ve ponekad izaziva iritaciju i odbojnost kod
dela veinskog naroda na Kosovu, koji, iskljuujui pojedinane i izolovane sluajeve, ima
pozitivan stav prema potrebi obezbeivanja slobode kretanja za srpske graane na Kosovu.
Zbog toga je negativni pristup zvaninog Beograda prema Kosovu imao i jo uvek ima
neposredan negativni uticaj i na bazbednosno stanje.
Posebna tema je organizovano delovanje srpskih tajnih slubi, civilnih i vojnih, na teritoriji Kosova, koje neprestano traje od zavretka rata sve do danas. Zato nije udno to je
jo uvek jedan broj tekih krivinih dela koja su se dogodila na Kosovu ostao nerazjanjen.
Kada kaemo da ima indicija, i to jo od same najave poetka pregovora o statusu Kosova,
da moe doi do zaotravanja bezbednosne situacije, treba spomenuti hvatanje i pritvaranje
dva-tri uniformisana i naoruana srpska andara ubaena na teritoriju Kosova, pokuaj
ubistva pripadnika KPS-a, pukovnika Jankovia (komandanta regionalne policije u Gnjilanu), zatim ubitstvo dva i ranjavanje jo dva Srbina, skrnavljenje spomenika boraca OVK
u regionu trpca, kao i nekoliko pojedinanih eksplozija, naroito usmerenih na policij159

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Kosova i Metohije, njegove ideoloke osnove, istorijata, uticaja stranog faktora i budunosti
koju za Kosovo i Metohiju projektoju zainteresovani inioci.

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Albanski pokret za nezavisnost Kosova i Metohije, iako postoji kao ideja veoma dugo,
i esto je menjao svoje deklarisane ciljeve u rasponu od pripajanja Kosova i Metohije Albaniji, pa do stvaranja suverene i samostalne drave Kosovo, u savremenoj formi olienoj u
teroristikoj OVK, javlja se sredinom 90-ih godina prologa veka. U poetnim fazama
nastanka, OVK se predstavljala kao ustanika oruana formacija koja se bori za prava ugroenog albanskog stanovnitva na Kosovu i Metohiji, koje je bilo pod snanim terorom
Miloevievog reima. Predstavljena kao druga faza nenasilnog narodnog pokreta koji se
bori za ljuska prava Albanaca na Kosovu i Metohiji, OVK je veoma lako zadobila naklonost odreenih krugova u Evropi i SAD. Teroristike akcije koje je OVK izvodila tokom
1997, 1998. i 1999. godine, zapadna javnost je tolerisala iz dva razloga.
Prvi razlog lei u injenici da su akcije izvoene protiv reima Slobodana Miloevia,
koji je tada, posle dejtonske mirotvorake faze, ponovo postao balkanski kasapin. Pri tom,
niko nije postavljao pitanje zato, kada se ve bore za ljudska prava, ne pomognu srpskoj
opoziciji da na izborima obori Slobodana Miloevia, a nakon toga u demokratskoj Srbiji
ree probleme vezane za manjinska prava. Odgovor je prost, albanski nacionalni pokret
nije pokret koji se bori za ljudska prava, ve pokret koji se bori za teritoriju. Drugi razlog
ogleda se u injenici da meunarodni islamistiki terorizam postaje svetski problem broj
jedan tek nakon 11. septembra 2001. Prisustvo Osame bin Ladena u Albaniji 90-ih godina
prolog veka nije doivljavano kao veliki problem, tada je mnogo vei neprijatelj bio Slobodan Miloevi. Saznanja da meunarodna islamistika mrea Al Kaida finansira ustanak
Albanaca na Kosovu i Metohiji krajem 90-ih godina, nisu ni priblino bila alarmantna kao
danas. Meutim, dok je ondanja kratkovida amerika administracija direktno podravala
teroriste na Kosovu i Metohiji, verujui da pomae demokratiju, Osama bin Laden je od
tog istog pokreta stvorio jednu od svojih baza koja se koristi direktno protiv amerikih
nacionalnih interesa.
Budua deavanja na Kosovu i Metohiji direktno e zavisiti od toga koja e grupacija
odneti prevagu, sekularna etno-separatistika ili verski motivisana, islamistika. Obe teroristike grupacije imaju za sada isti cilj, stvaranje nezavisnog Kosova, ali se njihovi stavovi u pogledu budunosti nove drave znatno razlikuju. Etno-separatisti vide sebe kao novu
politiku elitu koja e vladati sekularnim Kosovom, dok islamisti nezavisno Kosovo vide
kao deo novog kalifata. U sluaju priznavanja nezavisnosti Kosova i Metohije, ove dve
grupacije veoma brzo bi se sukobile, jer bi sekularna vlast nezavisnog Kosova i Metohije
bila na meti islamista, kao uostalom i sve sekularne vlade zemalja sa veinskim muslimanskim stanovnitvom. Procene odnosa snaga ove dve grupacije ukazuju da bi islamisti uspeli da odnesu pobedu, ali bi u tom sukobu, pored Srba i drugih manjinskih zajednica,
glavne mete postali i pripadnici meunarodnih snaga i civilno osoblje koje se nalazi na
Kosovu i Metohiji. Od dolaska meunarodnih snaga, islamisti su uspeli da razviju i ojaaju
teroristiku mreu, neometani od meunarodnih snaga, to danas predstavlja glavnu bezbednosnu pretnju, pre svega za same meunarodne snage. Pored toga, treba imati u vidu
uticaj koji organizovane kriminalne grupe imaju na Kosovu. Kriminalci predstavljaju veoma znaajnu snagu, pre svega finansijsku. Meutim, albanski kriminalci nisu politika
snaga, poto se nalaze u funkciji meunarodnog islamistikog terorizma, koji ih u potpunosti kontrolie i za koji ostvaruju znaajne prihode.
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ska vozila i na vozila meunarodnih misija, to navodi na zakljuak da je zaotravanje

bezbednosne situacije na Kosovu mogue. To govori o rovitoj i nestabilnoj bezbednosnoj
situaciji u kojoj se nalazimo, to zahteva drugaiji pristup tom problemu, utoliko pre to
kao drutvo jo uvek nemamo slubu unutranje bezbednosti koja bi istraila i analizirala
moguu destabilizaciju. Kada se tome doda nedostatak nadlenosti lokalnih institucija u
oblasti bezbednosti, taj element ini situaciju jo sloenijom, mada ne treba potcenjivati svu dosadanju aktivnost nadlenih meunarodnih subjekata u oblasti bezbednosti na
Kosovu.

Kada se razmatra bezbednosna situacija, obavezno treba imati u vidu i unutranje

probleme, naroito one koji se tiu privrede, nezaposlenosti, tekog socijalnog poloaja,
uestalih trajkova i protesta, kao i drugih oblika izraavanja nezadovoljstva graana, to
svakako daje zakljuiti da se nalazimo u sloenoj situaciji, utoliko pre to je izraeno nezadovoljstvo u veini sluajeva opravdano, a to esto zloupotrebljavaju razni destruktivni
elementi i obavetajne slube drugih zemalja sa ciljem destabilizacije

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U poslednje vreme se izvetava i o aktivnosti razliitih naoruanih i maskiranih grupa,

naroito u oblasti Metohije, koje su sebe nazvale Vojska za nezavisnost Kosova (VNK).
To ionako rovitu bezbednosnu situaciju ini jo sloenijom, pogotovo to je aktivnost tih
grupa usmerena uglavnom prema osoblju meunarodnih misija, koje rade i deluju na Kosovu, a to je za nas veoma tetno.

Kosova. U tom kontekstu ne treba zanemariti ni unutranje trzavice, naroito

meupartijske deobe, koje ponekada poprimaju karakter krajnje zaotrenih i veoma dubokih
konfrontacija, to su razni tui elementi vie puta veto iskoristili za pripremanje i voenje
specijalnog rata prema Kosovu u ovoj, veoma osetljivoj fazi u koju smo uli. Treba istai
i to da bezbednosnu situaciju, svojim iskljuivim stavovima, ine sloenijom i protivnici
pregovora o utvrivanju konanog statusa Kosova.
U tom pravcu namee se kao neophodnost ostvarivanje standarda za Kosovo, to je zadatak koji treba da bude u sreditu politike i bezbednosne aktivnosti, uporedo sa voenjem
pregovora o konanom statusu. Naa orijentacija da u Kosovsku policijsku slubu i u
Kosovski zatitni korpus bude ukljuen to vei broj pripadnika manjinskih zajednica, kao
i u druge strukture samouprave, veoma je pozitivna i u pogledu bezbednosne stabilizacije.
Taj element sve vie dolazi do izraaja u sadanjem periodu, kada se oekuje prenoenje
nadlenosti u oblasti bezbednosti i pravosua sa meunarodnih na lokalne institucije, jer
se samo na taj nain moe poboljati bezbednosno stanje, odnosno uspeno sauvati javni
red i mir.
Svesni smo da Kosovo ima veoma znaajan geostrateki poloaj u regionu i da je zbog
toga ono esto izloeno raznim tetnim pojavama, kakve su korupcija, nezakonita trgovina, verc, krijumarenje itd, kao i da te pojave razaraju temelje drutva, pa je izgradnja
funkcionalnog sistema bezbednosti vie nego neophodna. Iako sadanju situaciju s pravom
ocenjujemo kao jo uvek rovitu, njeno remeenje moe imatio veoma tetne posledice
po Kosovo u mnogo aspekata. Opredeljenje Kfora, UNMIK-ove policije, KPS-a i drugih
drutvenih struktura za podizanje nivoa bezbednosne spremnosti ne samo to je na mestu,
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Priznavanje nezavisnosti Kosova otvorilo bi i problem tri optine na jugu Srbije, koje
albanski separatisti nazivaju istono Kosovo. Ovaj problem bi sigurno doveo do novih
oruanih sukoba, to bi kosovsko-metohijski problem proirilo i na druge oblasti regiona.
Ukoliko pregovori o konanom statusu Kosova i Metohije budu krenuli u nepovoljnom
pravcu po radikalne Albance, nasilje u toku trajanja pregovora je izvesno. U tom sluaju,
islamisti bi iskoristili priliku da potpuno marginalizuju sekularne albanske politiare i na
Kosovu stvore situaciju slinu irakoj. Ovakav scenario mogu je u sklopu otvaranja novog fronta protiv modernih osvajaa i krstaa, ime bi se pomoglo teroristima koji se
bore u Iraku. Na taj nain, islamisti bi Albance uvukli u globalni dihad, koji bi se zavrio
katastrofalno po njih. U sklopu ovakvog rata mogu se oekivati teroristiki napadi slini
onima u Madridu i Londonu i u drugim gradovima regiona, pre svega u srpskim gradovima
izvan Kosova i Metohije, ali i u gradovima Makedonije, Albanije, Grke, Crne Gore,
Hrvatske, Bugarske, a moda i ire.
Ovakav razvoj dogaaja doveo bi do potpunog gubitka meunarodne podrke koju su
Albanci uspeli da zadobiju za oruanu pobunu protiv Srbije i do stvaranja neke vrste saveza balkanskih zemalja za borbu protiv islamskog terorizma u regionu, koji bi, prirodno,
uivao ogromnu podrku SAD i EU. Ovaj mrani, ali naalost veoma mogui scenario,
doveo bi do opteg rata na Balkanu, a kosovsko-metohijske Albance uinio taocima meunarodnih terorista, koji bi ih veoma lako rtvovali za svoje ciljeve. Umesto toga, Albanci
na Kosovu i Metohiji imaju istorijsku ansu da stvore dravu u dravi.
Srpska strana u pregovorima sa zadovoljstvom bi prihvatila podelu Kosova i Metohije
na dva entiteta, pri emu bi albanski entitet praktino mogao biti drava koja se samo tako
ne bi zvala. Albanci bi imali praktino sve dravne institucije osim, naravno, vojske i diplomatije, zakoni Srbije ne bi se odnosili na njih, ve bi oni donosili vlastite propise. Ovakvo
reenje garantovalo bi dugotrajan mir na Balkanu, koji je neophodan za poetak ekonomskog prosperiteta i prikljuenje celokupnog regiona Evropskoj uniji. Klju reenja dre
kosovski Albanci, samo od njih zavisi da li e se suprotstaviti islamskim fanaticima i traiti
reenje koje e uvaavati njihove, a ne interese svetskih terorista i kriminalaca. Ako sada
donesu pogrenu odluku, posledice mogu biti katastrofalne. Istorijske greke srpskog naroda mogu im biti odlian primer.
02. decembar 2005.

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ve je i nuno, jer se samo tako bezbednosna situacija moe drati pod kontrolom. O tome
nema dileme.
Na kraju, kao zakljuke treba istai:
1. Neophodan je diplomatski pritisak meunarodnih inilaca na zvanine vlasti u Beogradu da ukinu paralelne srpske strukture, koje na Kosovu deluju u kontinuitetu, to bi
svakako pozitivno uticalo na stanje bezbednosti.

3. Da se u svakodnevnoj politikoj aktivnosti inicira potreba za neprestanim razmatranjem

pitanja bezbednosti u svim sredinama, naroito u multietnikim, kao i potreba saradnje
stanovnitva sa organima bezbednosti u borbi protiv svih pojava koje bezbednosnu
situaciju ine sloenijom.

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2. Treba jo intenzivnije nastaviti odgovarajue kadrovsko i funkcionalno organizovanje za

preuzimanje nadlenosti u oblasti bezbednosti i pravosua, jer e samo domae institucije, uz saradnju i nadzor odgovarajuih organa UNMIK-a, moi da uspeno reava
sloena bezbednosna pitanja i da obezbedi vladavinu zakona, pre svega stvaranjem
uslova za jo slobodnije kretanje pripadnika srpske nacionalnosti na Kosovu, i

02. decembar 2005.

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Debts for Serbia - property for Kosovo

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By Prof. Ljubodrag Savic, Ph.D.Econ., Faculty of Economics in Belgrade

Serbia is once again faced with a historic decision, for
who-knows-what time in its two centuries of statehood. This
time, the status of its southern province is being finally set.
And once again, like so many times before, the Serbs are
sharply divided and confronted. There is no unified stand
and solution regarding the future status of Kosovo. It is as
though the members of the Serbian negotiating team are
afraid of publicly articulating Serbia's interests and of attracting the attention of the world to the catastrophic consequences of the economic genocide against the property of Serbian citizens, companies and state in Kosovo and Metohija.
For the Serb people, Kosovo and Metohija is the cradle
of spirituality, statehood and historic memory. After the
bloody war of 1999 and the expulsion of the Serbs and the
Serbian state from its southern province, valuable Serb
Ljubodrag Savic
property remained in Kosovo and Metohija. Serb houses
have been burned and destroyed, vineyards, orchards and fields are overgrown with weed
and the property of Serb companies is being sold, with the purpose of eradicating any trace
of existence of the Serbs in the region of Kosovo and Metohija. This will happen unless we
attract the attention of the world to the fact that, in the past 50 years, Serbia has conducted
a strong policy of reducing great regional differences, investing huge amounts of money
into a quicker development of Kosovo and Metohija, in spite of the fact that certain parts
of Serbia were also undeveloped. It was this selfless help that has brought the significant
increase of the living standard of the citizens of Kosovo and Metohija..
Serbia knew that the spiritual and national emancipation of the population of its southern province was impossible without an above-average rate of economic development.
This was why the Fund for Boosting Underdeveloped Republics and the Province of Kosovo was founded soon after WWII. Until 1963, these funds have been taken directly from
the state budget. In that year, a legal obligation was introduced about the designation of
1.92 percent of domestic product of Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia and Vojvodina for the boosting of development of the remaining three underdeveloped republics of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the province of Kosovo and Metohija. During the 1990s,
besides the mandatory 1.92 percent, it was envisaged that each developed republic and the
province of Vojvodina build a factory in Kosovo and Metohija each year. As the least developed region, Kosovo and Metohija had a special status, since between 33 and 38 percent
of all funding has been sent there.
What is the value of the "imprisoned" Serbian property in Kosovo and Metohija?
The Serbian government estimated that Kosovo and Metohija's obligations toward the
Fund for Boosting the Underdeveloped add up to more than $17 billion. Considering that
Serbia had participated in the Fund with one-third of money, one can conclude that our
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Who owes whom?

By Nuri Bashota, a Lecturer at the Faculty of Economy at the University of Pristina

Kosovo covers an area of 10.906 square kilometers and

has a lot of various natural resources. Furthermore, Kosovo
is rich with agriculture land, which covers 53% of its territory (52,3% arable land and 31% meadows), whereas 39.1%
is forestry land. It also has a number of water resources, Nuri Bashota
picturesque places that are very favourable for the development of winter and summer tourism, and so forth.

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There are only few countries in the world rich with human and natural resources, such as Kosovo, which now after
the enforcement of the Law on Promotion of Foreign Capital is very attractive and supportive for foreign investments.

It is an undeniable fact that due to those natural and human resources and to the geostrategic position, Kosovo was a target of various invaders from the ancient time to now,
when the status of the liberated Kosovo is being negotiated.
Kosovo, as continuity of ancient Dardania, has its natural borders and is located in a
key position of the Illyrian Peninsula, which later was named Balkans (Balkans in Turkish means mountainous area) by Turkish invaders.
According to the OSCE, in 2002 Kosovo had some 2.4 million people, which is 220
people for a square meter; 95% of them are Albanians, 4% Serbs, and 1% other communities. Furthermore, Kosovo has a very young population, 72% of them are under 35 years
old.
These data shows that Kosovo has a number of comparative advantages, which under
the conditions of full independence can secure an accelerated economic development, an
enhancement of social welfare for all its citizens, irrespective of ethnicity, religion, and
political affiliation.
Although during the time of Yugoslav annexation, it was put under a colonial position
and was exploited, Kosovo has managed to reach an evident economic development, thanks
to the hard work of its inhabitants first of all.
An accelerated development started especially after the constitutional amendments in
1973-74, when in addition to its advancement as a constitutive unit in the former SFRY,
Kosovo gained the right on concessions for using of loans of the Federal Fund in Support
to Undeveloped Areas, as well as some other facilities.
For Kosovos economic development, we should also mention here the support of the
Federal Fund, which is not anything else but the return of a part of the national income that
was taken from Kosovo by the developed republics.
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claims add up to $5.5 billion. According to the Belgrade Chamber of Commerce, companies from Serbia have 1,358 facilities in Kosovo, of which only the PTT has 130, the Serbian Railways 55, the Serbian Electric Power Company 18 and Srbijasume 45. This property is estimated to be worth at least $1.5 billion, considering that 140 companies have been
sold in Kosovo so far for EUR143 million.
Under pressure from the international community, the state of Serbia has taken over Kosovo's $1.1 billion debt, and has already paid $350 million in interests in the past few years.
After 1999, more than 30,000 Serb families have fled Kosovo and Metohija, and the value of the property they have left there has been estimated to be worth at least $4 billion.

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Therefore, based on the property of its citizens and companies, on claims of the former
fund for the underdeveloped and on Kosovo's foreign debt, the state of Serbia is claiming
at least $12.5 billion from Kosovo. This is a massive sum, considering that Kosovo's gross
domestic product (GDP) has been estimated at $2.5 billion, while, at the same time, Serbia's GDP is $22 billion and foreign debt $14 billion.
What will be the fate of Serb property in Kosovo and Metohija?
For several years now, UNMIK has been selling Serbian property via the Kosovo Trust
Agency (KTA), with no knowledge or participation of our companies and citizens. The
KTA, contrary to European standards for privatization, is forming new companies and
transferring property to them, while the debts remain in previous companies. The property
of the newly formed companies is being sold as seen, with no precise assessment of its
value and establishing of owners. Income from privatization is directed to the Kosovo
budget. The KPA, with UNMIK's blessing, is illegally selling off Serbian property, while
the real owners are unable to do anything.
The current Serbian government is doing nothing to protect the interests of Serbian companies and citizens, unlike the government of the late premier Zoran Djindjic, which has
addressed the United Nations, the European Union, the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), with a very clear and precise demand, but has received no reply to
this day. The economies of Serbia and Kosovo and Metohija are largely complementary. The
Kosovo energy system depends almost fully on that of Serbia. It is a paradox that Serbia
delivered electricity to Kosovo and Metohija even at times when the citizens of Serbia and
the Serbs in Kosovo and Metohija were having power cuts. The numerous, well-developed
ties between companies in Serbia and in Kosovo and Metohija were brutally severed by the
1999 war. Serbia has great interest in developing good economic cooperation with the economy of Kosovo and Metohija, primarily because of the Serbs who remain there, but also
because, sooner or later, all countries of the Western Balkans would become EU members.
We expect the negotiating team, formed by the Serbian government, to present reliable
and very precise information to the Serbian, Kosovo and international public, before the
beginning of talks on the future status, on the value of Serbia's property in Kosovo and
Metohija. This is especially important bearing in mind that the future final status of Kosovo
and Metohija could be defined in complete opposition to Serbia's interests. It is extremely
important for the Serbian negotiating team, therefore, to inform the world of the insufficiently known fact that for more than half a century Serbian citizens have selflessly been
giving huge amounts of money to help the quick development and prosperity of all citizens
of Kosovo and Metohija.
January 4, 2005
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In 1990, three main branches of Kosovos industry, electro economy, coal production,
and mines and mineral production, represented the colonial exterritorial sectors, which had
a high coefficient of capital, low employment, and insufficient accumulative and reproductive capacities, due to the discouraging instruments of economic policies. On the contrary,
there were almost no industrial sectors for processing of those natural resources in Kosovo.
Those sectors were in the developed territories of the former Yugoslavia, which has conditioned Kosovos national income to go to the other parts of the former SFRY.
This development was reached due to the accumulative capability of Kosovos economy, which was mainly based in regular payment of various credit annuities and returning
of the funds to the Federal Fund.

But after the classic occupation of Kosovo by Serbia in 1989, came to the purposeful
shattering of its economy. This along with Serb police and military violence aimed at making it difficult for Albanians live in their own territories.
In addition to removing 150,000 Albanian workers from work and misappropriation of
basic equipment and assets, it came also to swallowing of Kosovar giants by the so-called
big systems of Serbia, as well as by misappropriation of Kosovos wealth by Serb mafia
structures. This resulted in a total shattering of Kosovos economy and the annihilation of
those nucleuses that were the bedrock of Kosovos economy, thus putting Kosovo in a very
difficult economic and social situation.

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This is shown by the fact that in the critical year 1989, there were 845 SOEs with
172.794 employees and 253 private businesses with 5.818 employees. This very valuable
economic potential was an important initial base for the current transition period in order it
can create a democratic society based on the market economy.

In addressing the causes that put Kosovo into a very difficult economic situation and
rendering its economy in pre-industrial phase, we should take into account in particular the
10 year-long results of the Serb-Montenegrin violence, which had a lot of consequences
for Kosovos economy and population.
From 350,000 houses in Kosovo, over 135,000 were destroyed (these are the records of
the international organizations) ;of those 100,000 were burnt down and were classified in
Category V by UNMIK. The total damage caused by those barbaric actions of Serb military, police and paramilitary forces against Kosovos human and material resources reaches some 20 billion.
Kosovo institutions declared openly that they are ready to pay the annuities for the
debts of Kosovos economy, at the time when Kosovo was part of the former SFRY, according to the records pre installation of Serb discriminatory emergency management. But
Kosovo will not accept any obligation taken by the emergency management.
But before that, the war damage that the Serb state structures caused to Kosovos material and human resources should be evaluated and compensated. An international arbitrage
is needed to settle those things. This arbitrage, in addition to those damages, should also
take into consideration returning of the pension fund of 120,000 Kosovo pensioners, the
fund of social insurance, as well as the deposits misappropriated by Serbia during Kosovos
occupation in 1989. Kosovo should ask be a participant in the process of succession, as it
was a constitutive unit of the former SFRY and one of the contributors to the wealth, which
is now shared by the constitutive units of this former federation.
January 4, 2005
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Borxhet Serbis Prona Kosovs

Shkruan: Prof. Dr. Lubodrag Saviq, Fakulteti Ekonomik, Beograd

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Pr t satn her gjat ktyre dy shekujve t shtetsis s saj, Serbia prsri gjendet para
nj vendimi historik. Ksaj radhe prfundimisht do t zgjidhet statusi i krahins s saj
jugore. Si edhe herve t tjera, serbt prap jan t prar dhe t ndar. Nuk ekziston
ndonj qndrim ose zgjidhje pr statusin e ardhshm t Kosovs. Duket sikur Ekipi Negociator i Beogradit i friksohet artikulimit t hapur t interesave t tij dhe tia paraqes bots
pasojat katastrofave t gjenocidit ekonomik q po bhet ndaj prons s qytetarve, ndrmarrjeve dhe shtetit serb n Kosov.
Kosova sht djep i shpirtit, shtetsis dhe kujtess historike t popullit serb. Mirpo
pas lufts s prgjakshme t vitit 1999 dhe prznies s serbve dhe shtetit serb nga territori i krahins s saj jugore, n Kosov ka mbetur pasuria e vlefshme e serbve.
Shtpit e serbve jan djegur dhe rrnuar, vreshtat, pemishtet, arat dhe fushat e tyre
kan mbetur djerr, ndrsa prona e ndrmarrjeve serbe sht vn n shitje, q sa m par
t zhduket fardo gjurme pr ekzistencn e serbve n hapsirat e Kosovs. Kjo n t
vrtet edhe do t ndodh, nse bots nuk ja trheqim vmendjen, se n gjysm shekullin
e fundit Serbia ka udhhequr politik t fuqishme n zvoglimin e dallimeve rajonale, duke
investuar mjete t shumta pr zhvillimin e shpejt t Kosovs, pa marr parasysh se edhe
disa pjes t Serbis kan qen njsoj t pazhvilluara.
Kjo ndihm altruiste e Serbis ka sjell deri te nj rritje e lart e standardit jetsor t
qytetarve t Kosovs.
Serbia e ka ditur se pa nj zhvillim t shpejt mbi-mesatar t krahins s saj jugore, nuk
do t mund t arrij as emancipimin shpirtror dhe nacional t banorve t saj. Pr kt
arsye menjher pas Lufts s Dyt Botrore sht formuar fondi pr zhvillim t shpejt t
republikave dhe krahins s Kosovs.
Deri n vitin 1963, mjetet e destinuara pr kt qllim jan marr nga buxheti shtetror.
Nga ky vit sht fuqizuar detyrimi ligjor pr ndarjen e 1,92 % nga t ardhurat shoqrore t
ekonomis s Serbis, Kroacis, Sllovenis dhe Vojvodins, t cilat jan shfrytzuar pr
arritjen e zhvillimit m t shpejt t tri republikave t tjera t pazhvilluara dhe Kosovs.
Gjat viteve t 90-ta, prve ksaj ndarje t detyruar, ka qen e parashikuar q secila republik e zhvilluar dhe krahina e Vojvodins t ndrtojn nga nj fabrik n vit n Kosov.
Kosova, si territori m i pazhvilluar ka pasur status special, meqense nga mjetet totale t
fondit, 33 deri n 38% jan plasuar n Kosov.
Sa sht vlera e pasuris s burgosur t Serbis n Kosov?
Qeveria e Serbis vlerson se detyrimet e Kosovs ndaj fondit pr arritjen e zhvillimit
t shpejt t republikave t pazhvilluara sa duhet dhe Kosovs arrijn n m tepr se 17
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Kush kujt duhet ti paguaj borxhet?

Shkruan: Prof. Dr. Nuri Bashota, profesor n Fakultetin Ekonomik t Universitetit t
Prishtins

Konkretisht, n nj territor prej vetm 10.906 km katror gjenden rezerva kolosale t

resurseve t siprfaqe llojllojshme natyrore. Njherazi, Kosova sht e pasur me toka bujqsore q prbjn 53% (52.3% e lvrueshme dhe 31% kullosa) si dhe me 39,1% pyje me nj
vegjetacion t bujshm, burime t shumta t ujrave t mbla, kullosa t pasura dhe piktoreske pr turizm veror e dimror, me gryka malesh t prshtatshme pr komunikacion, etj.
sht fakt i pamohueshm, se krahas rndsis q kan kto resurse natyrore e njerzore
dhe pozita e volitshme gjeostrategjike pr zhvillimin e shpejtuar t Kosovs, njhersh kto
ishin dhe mbeten edhe sot objekt lakmie e grabitjeje pr okupimin e Kosovs nga pushtues
t ndryshm q nga lashtsia e deri m sot, kur po negociohet pr statusin politik final t
Kosovs s liruar.

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Jan t rralla n bot vendet e pasura me resurse natyrore e njerzore, si sht Kosova,
t cilat tani n saje t Ligjit pr avancimin e investimeve t huaja n Kosov, jan joshse
pr avancimin e kapitalit t huaj nga cilido vend i bots s lir.

Kosova e sotme, si vazhdimsi e Dardanis s lasht, me kufijt e saj t natyrshm, shtrihet n Evropn Juglindore, me nj pozicion qendror t Gadishullit Ilirik, m von t
quajtur nga pushtuesit turq Ballkan q do t thot vend malor. Njherazi, Kosova kufizohet me Serbin (352 km.), Malin e Zi (77 km.) Maqedonin (161 km.) dhe me Shqiprin e cunguar (112 km.). Kosova shtrihet n nj gjersi gjeografike veriore prej 41 o,
50, 58, e deri n 43 o, 15, 42 dhe gjatsie gjeografike dhe gjatsi gjeografike lindore
prej 20 o, 01, 02 t Grinuiit. Njherazi, Kosova ka nj siprfaqe prej 10.906 km katror,
n t cilin territor (sipas OSBE-s n vitin 2002) jetojn rreth 2.410.906 milion banor, q
do t thot 220 banor n nj kilometr katror. Sa i prket strukturs s popullsis, 72%
banorve jan nn moshn 35 vjeare, me nj struktur kombtare prej 95% shqiptar, 4%
serb dhe 1% t minoriteteve tjera. Kto t dhna tregojn se Kosova posedon me nj mori
prparsish komparative, t cilat n kushtet e pavarsis s plot t Kosovs si shtet sovran
demokratik, mund t siguroj nj zhvillim t shpejtuar ekonomik dhe ngritjen e mirqenies
t t gjith banorve t saj, pavarsisht nga prkatsia e tyre racore, etnike, fetare e politike,
t mbshtetur n ekonomin e tregut dhe barazin e plot midis njerzve.
Edhe pse gjat tr kohs s aneksimit t Kosovs nga ish Jugosllavia i qe imponuar nj
pozit koloniale dhe shfrytzohej n do pikpamje n saje t ktyre kushteve t volitshme
natyrore, pozits gjeostrategjike dhe angazhimit vetmohues t banorve t vyeshm,
Kosova kishte arritur nj zhvillim evident ekonomik.
Nj zhvillim i shpejtuar filloi sidomos pas ndryshimeve kushtetuese t vitit 1973-74,
kur krahas avancimit t pozits s saj si element konstituiv i ish RSFJ-s, fitoi t drejtn
edhe n shfrytzimin e koncesioneve pr shfrytzimin e kredive t Fondit federativ pr viset jo mjaft t zhvilluara dhe lehtsi tjera t instrumenteve t politiks ekonomike, si edhe
tri republikat tjera jo mjaft t zhvilluara.
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miliard dollar. Duke pasur parasysh q n kt fond Serbia ka derdhur nj t tretn e

mjeteve, n baz t ksaj mund t prfundohet se Serbis i takojn 5.5 miliard dollar.
Sipas t dhnave t Ods Ekonomik t Beogradit, ndrmarrjet nga Serbia n Kosov
kan rreth 1 358 objekte, prej t cilave vetm PTT-ja ka 130, NHT 55, EES, 18 ndrsa
Srbijasuma 45. Prona e ktyre 1 358 objekteve vlersohet t jet 1,5 miliard dollar duke
pasur parasysh q deri m tani n Kosov jan shitur 140 ndrmarrje pr 143 milion
euro.
Nn presionin e bashksis ndrkombtare, shteti i Serbis ka marr prsipr borxhin e
Kosovs n vler totale prej 1,1 miliard dollarsh, ndrsa gjat disa viteve t fundit edhe ka
paguar 350 milion dollar.

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Pas vitit 1999, nga Kosova kan ikur m se 30.000 familje serbe, ndrsa vlera e objekteve dhe pasuris s tyre vlersohet n m s paku 4 miliard dollar.
Sipas ksaj, shteti i Serbis n baz t pasuris s qytetarve dhe ndrmarrjeve t saja,
si dhe n baz t detyrimeve t ish fondit pr kreditimit t republikave m pak t zhvilluara
dhe krahins s Kosovs si dhe borxhit t jasht t Kosovs, mund t krkoj m s paku
12.5 miliard dollar, Se bhet fjal pr nj krkes t madhe, vrteton edhe fakti se GDP
e Kosovs vlersohet n 2.5 miliard dollar, derisa n t njjtn koh GDP-ja e Serbis
sht 22 miliard dollar ndrsa borxhi i jashtm 14 miliard dollar.
Cili sht fati i prons serbe n Kosov?
Tani e disa vite, UNMIK-u nprmjet Agjencis Kosovare t Mirbesimit (AKM) po e
shet pronn serbe, pa kurrfar dijenie dhe pjesmarrjeje t ndrmarrjeve dhe qytetarve
tan. AKM, n kundrshtim me standardet evropiane t privatizimit, formon ndrmarrje t
reja, n t cilat bn bartjen e prons, prderisa detyrimet u mbeten ndrmarrjeve t mhershme. Prona e ktyre ndrmarrjeve t reja shitet n baz t gjendjes s llogaritur, pa ndonj
vlersim preciz t vlers dhe pronarit t saj. Mjetet nga privatizimi shkojn n buxhetin e
Kosovs. AKM, me dijenin e UNMIK-ut shet n mnyr joligjore pronn serbe, ndrsa
pronart e saj t vrtet praktikisht nuk mund t bjn asgj.
Qeveria aktuale e Serbis nuk bn asgj pr t mbrojtur interesat e ndrmarrjeve dhe
qytetarve serb, pr dallim nga qeveria e kryeministrit t ndjer serb, Zoran Gjingjiqit e
cila me krkesa t qarta dhe precize i sht drejtuar Kombeve t Bashkuara, Bashkimit
Evropian, Banks Botrore dhe FMN, prej t cilve fatkeqsisht nuk ka marr asnj
prgjigje as sot e ksaj dite.
Ekonomit e Serbis dhe Kosovs n mas t madhe jan komplementare. Sistemi energjetik i Kosovs varet nga ai i Serbis. sht paradoksale q Serbia e ka furnizuar me
rrym Kosovn edhe ather kur qytetart e Serbis kan qen n terr. Lidhjet e shumta
midis ndrmarrjeve t Serbis dhe atyre t Kosovs jan ndrprer me dhun gjat lufts s
vitit 1999.
sht n interes t Serbis q t zhvilloj marrdhnie t mira ekonomike me Kosovn,
para s gjithash pr shkak t popullsis s mbetur serbe, por edhe pr vet faktin se hert a
von t gjitha vendet e Ballkanit perndimor do t bhen antare t BE-s.
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Njherazi, nj zhvillim i till ishte arritur edhe n saje t rritjes s aftsis akumuluese
dhe riprodhuese t ekonomis s Kosovs, e cila mbshtetej kryesisht n pagimin e rregullt
t anuiteteve kreditorve t ndryshm dhe kthimit t mjeteve t Fondit Federativ pr zhvillimin ekonomik t shpejtuar t Kosov si territori m i pazhvilluar n krahasim me republikat jo mjaft t zhvilluara n suaza t ish RSFJ-s. Kt e dshmon fakti se n vitin kritik
1989, veprimtaria ekonomike prbhej nga 845 ndrmarrje t sektorit shoqror me 172 794
t punsuar dhe 253 ekonomi individuale t sektorit privat me 5 818 t punsuar. Ky potencial tejet i vlefshm ekonomik do t ishte nj baz e rndsishme fillestare pr fazn e
tanishme t tranzicionit, ashtu q krahas procesit t privatizimit t prons shoqrore, t
krijoj nj shoqri demokratike t mbshtetur n ekonomin e tregut t subjekteve t pavarura ekonomike.

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N veanti, duhet cekur ndihmesn e kreditimit nga mjetet e Fondit Federativ pr zhvillimin e shpejtuar t Kosovs, q nuk ishte gj tjetr vese kthim i nj pjes t t ardhurave
kombtare, q i merreshin Kosovs nga republikat e zhvilluara, nprmes t shprndarjes
primare dhe t mimeve t deprimuara administrative t lndve t para e t gjysmfabrikateve q prodhoheshin nga industria q vuante nga nj struktur e rnd koloniale. Kt e
dshmon fakti se n vitin kritik 1990, tri degt kye t industris s Kosovs prbnin degt
koloniale eksterritoriale: elektro-ekonomia, prodhimi i qymyrit dhe prodhimi i xeheve t
metaleve me ngjyra, t cilat njhersh ishin intensive n kapital (koeficient t lart kapitali),
absorbim t vogl t punsimit dhe me aftsi t pamjaftueshme akumuluese e riprodhuese,
pr shkak t instrumenteve destimuluese t politiks ekonomike. Prkundrazi, degt prpunuese t ktyre resurseve natyrore t Kosovs, thuaja se nuk ekzistonin fare n Kosov,
por n territoret e zhvilluara t ish Jugosllavis, gj q kushtzonte derdhjen e vazhdueshme
t t ardhurave kombtare nga Kosova n pjest tjera t ish-Jugosllavis etj.

Mirpo, pas okupimit klasik t Kosovs nga Serbia gjat viteve 1989-1998, erdhi deri
t rrnimi me paramendim i ekonomis s Kosovs, ashtu q krahas dhuns ushtarakopolicore, edhe nprmjet t presionit ekonomik tu bj shqiptarve autokton t pamundur
ekzistencn n vatrat e tyre strgjyshore.
Krahas dbimit t m se 150 000 puntorve shqiptar nga puna dhe plakitjes spektakulare t mjeteve themelore e qarkulluese t ndrmarrjeve kosovare, erdhi edhe deri t
glltitja e gjigantve kosovar nga t ashtuquajturat sisteme t mdha dhe trsi
teknologjike t Serbis si dhe prvetsimit t pasuris nga strukturat mafioze t regjimit
serb. Me kt erdhi deri t rrnimi katastrofal i ekonomis s Kosovs dhe asgjsimi edhe i
atyre nukleuseve q ishin bartse t zhvillimit ekonomik, duke e katandisur Kosovn n nj
kriz t thell ekonomike e sociale e cila vazhdon edhe sot e ksaj dite.
Duhet theksuar se n trajtimin objektiv i shkaqeve q kushtzuan krizn e thell ekonomike dhe katandisjen e ekonomis s Kosovs n fazn paraindustriale, duhet t kemi
parasysh sidomos rezultatet e dhuns dhjetvjeare t pushtuesit serbo-malazez gjat
viteve 1989-1999, q patn pasoja katastrofale pr ekonomin dhe popullsin e Kosovs.
Njherazi, nga 335.000 shtpive n Kosov, m se 135 000 (shnimet e organizatave
ndrkombtare) prej tyre u dmtuan, ndrsa 100 000 prej tyre u shkatrruan trsisht, rrnimi i t cilave u klasifikuan nga UNMIK-u si e shkalls s pest. Vlera e gjithmbarshme e
dmeve t shkaktuara nga kjo barbari e forcave ushtarake, policore e paramilitare serbomalazeze ndaj resurseve njerzore, materiale e financiare t Kosovs, prafrsisht arrin nj
shum prej rreth 20 miliard euro, pr t ciln mas sht varfruar ekonomia dhe popullsia
e Kosovs.
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Nga Ekipi Negociator i Serbis presim q para fillimit t bisedimeve pr statusin prfundimtar t Kosovs, para publikut ton, t Kosovs dhe atij ndrkombtar t dal me
informacione t sakta dhe t besueshme rreth asaj se cila sht vlera e prons serbe n
Kosov. Kjo sht sidomos me rndsi, sepse statusi prfundimtar i Kosovs mund t definohet n kundrshtim t plot me interesat serbe n Kosov.
Mirpo sht shum me rndsi q Ekipi Negociator i Serbis tia bj me dije faktin e
panjohur mir se qytetart e Serbis gjat gjysm s shekullit t kaluar kan ndar mjete t
mdha pr nj zhvillim t shpejt dhe prosperitet t t gjith qytetarve t Kosovs.

Forum

4 janar 2006

Dugovi Srbiji - imovina Kosovu

Pie: Prof. dr Ljubodrag Savi, Ekonomski fakultet Beograd

Po ko zna koji put u svoja dva veka dravnosti, Srbija se ponovo nalazi pred istorijskom
odlukom. Ovaj put se konano odreuje status njene june pokrajine. Srbi su opet, kao i
toliko puta u istoriji, otro suprostavljeni i podeljeni. Nema jedinstvenog stava i reenja za
budui status Kosova i Metohije. Kao da se srpski pregovaraki tim plai da javno artikulie
svoje interese i svetu ukae na katastrofalne posledice ekonomskog genocida koji se na
Kosovu i Metohiji ini prema imovini srpskih graana, preduzea i drave.
Za srpski narod, Kosovo i Metohija je kolevka duhovnosti, dravnosti i istorijskog
pamenja. Ali, na Kosovu i Metohiji je posle krvavog rata iz 1999. godine i proterivanja
Srba i srpske drave sa teritorije njene june pokrajine, ostala vredna srpska imovina. Srpske kue su spaljene i sruene, vinogradi, vonjaci, njive i livade zakorovljeni, a imovina
srpskih preduzea se rasprodaje, da se to pre zatre svaki trag o postojanju Srba na kosovsko-metohijskim prostorima. To e se zaista i desiti, ako svetu ne skrenemo panju da je
Srbija u poslednjih pola veka vodila snanu politiku smanjivanja velikih regionalnih razlika, ulaui ogromna sredstva za bri razvoj Kosova i Metohije, uprkos injenici da su i
neki delovi Srbije isto tako bili nerazvijeni. Ta nesebina pomo Srbije dovela je do ogromnog porasta ivotnog standarda graana Kosova i Metohije.
Srbija je znala da bez natproseno brzog ekonomskog razvoja svoje june pokrajine,
nije mogue ostvariti ni duhovnu ni nacionalnu emancipaciju njenih stanovnika. Zbog toga
je neposredno posle II svetskog rata i ustanovljen Fond za podsticanje breg razvoja nerazvijenih republika i pokrajine Kosovo. Do 1963, sredstva za te namene su direktno uzimana
iz dravnog budeta. Od te godine uvedena je zakonska obaveza izdvajanja 1,92 odsto
ukupnog domaeg proizvoda Srbije, Hrvatske, Slovenije i Vojvodine, koja su koriena za
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Institucionet e Kosovs kan deklaruar haptazi se jan t gatshme t bjn pagesn e

anuiteteve pr borxhet e ekonomis s Kosovs n kohn kur Kosova ishte pjes e RSFJ-s
sipas bilanceve t bra para futjes s masave te jashtzakonshme n shumicn e ekonomis
kosovare. Kosova nuk do t pranoj asnj obligim q e kan marr strukturat e dhunshme
serbe n Kosov. Mirpo, kjo nnkupton vlersimin e mparshm t kompensimit t
dmeve t lufts q i shkaktoi shteti serb ndaj resurseve materiale dhe njerzore t Kosovs,
plakitjen e pasuris s Kosovs Pr kt sht i nevojshm nj arbitrazh meritor ndrkombtar, i cili prve asaj q u prmend m lart duhet t ket parasysh edhe kthimin e fondeve
t 120 000 pensionistve dhe t sigurimit social bashk me kursimet devizore t plakitura
nga Serbia gjat okupimit t Kosovs. Po kshtu duhet krkuar pjesmarrjen e Kosovs n
procesin e suksesionit, pasi Kosova ishte element konstituiv i ish RSFJ-s dhe krijuese e
drejtprdrejt e pasuris q po ndahet midis pjesve prbrse t ksaj ish Federate.

Ko kome treba da plaa dugove?

Forum

4 janar 2006

Pie Prof. dr Nuri Baota, Ekonomski fakultet u Pritini

U svetu su retke zemlje koje su bogate prirodnim i ljudskim resursima kao to je Kosovo. Ta bogatstva su sada, na osnovu Zakona o stranim investicijama na Kosovu, jo
privlanija za ulaganje stranog kapitala iz bilo koje zemlje slobodnog sveta. Konkretno, na
povrini od samo 10.906 km2, nalaze se ogromne rezerve raznovrsnih prirodnih resursa.
Istovremeno, Kosovo je bogato poljoprivrednim zemljitem, koje ini oko 53 odsto (52.3
odsto je obradivo zemljite, dok su 31 odsto panjaci) kao i 39,1 odsto uma sa bujnom
vegetacijom. Kosovo je bogato i mnogobrojnim izvorima slatkih voda, panjacima i
ivopisnim pejzaima pogodnim za letnji i zimski turizam, sa kanjonima i vrhovima planina
koji su povezani saobraajem, itd.
Nepobitna je injenica da uporedo sa znaajem tih prirodnih i ljudskih resursa, Kosovo
ima i pogodan geostrateki poloaj koji omoguava bri razvoj, a sve je to bilo i ostalo primamljivo raznim osvajaima za grabljenje i okupiranje od davnih vremena pa sve do
dananjih dana, kada se pregovara o konanom politikom statusu osloboenog Kosova.
Dananje Kosovo, kao nastavak stare Dardanije, sa svojim prirodnim granicama, protee
se na prostoru jugoistocne Evrope, na centralnom delu Ilirskog poluostrva, koji su turski
osvajai kasnije nazvali Balkan, to znai umovita zemlja. Ujedno, Kosovo se granii
sa Srbijom (352 km), Crnom Gorom (77 km) Makedonijom (161 km) i sa osakaenom Albanijom (112 km). Kosovo se protee na severnoj geografskoj irini od 41 o, 50, 58, pa
sve do 43 o, 15, 42 i na istonoj geografskoj duini od 20 o, 01, 02 po Griniu. Kosovo
raspolae povrinom od 10.906 km2, na kojoj (prema podacima OEBS-a iz 2002. godine)
ivi oko 2,4 miliona stanovnika, to znai oko 220 stanovnika na jedan kvadratni kilometar.
Strukturu stanovnitva na Kosovu ine 72 odsto mladih ispod 35 godina, dok je nacionalna
struktura - oko 95 odsto Albanaca, 4 odsto Srba i jedan odsto pripadnika drugih manjinskih
zajednica. Ti podaci pokazuju da Kosovo raspolae veim brojem uporednih prednosti, koje
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podsticanje breg razvoja ostale tri nerazvijene republike i pokrajine Kosovo i Metohija.
Devedesetih godina, osim obaveznog izdvajanja dela domaeg proizvoda iz privrede, bilo
je predvieno da svaka razvijena republika i pokrajina Vojvodina na Kosovu izgrade po
jednu fabriku godinje. Kosovo i Metohija je, kao najnerazvijenije podruje, imalo specijalni status, poto se od ukupnih sredstava Fonda na Kosovo i Metohiju plasiralo izmeu
33 i 38 odsto.

Forum

Kolika je vrednost zarobljene srpske imovine na Kosovu i Metohiji?

Srpska Vlada procenjuje da obaveze Kosova i Metohije prema Fondu za podsticanje
breg razvoja nedovoljno razvijenih republika i pokrajine Kosovo i Metohija iznose preko
17 milijardi dolara. S obzirom da je Srbija u sredstvima Fonda uestvovala sa treinom,
moe se zakljuiti da su naa potraivanja po tom osnovu vredna 5,5 milijardi dolara.
Prema podacima Privredne komore Beograda, preduzea iz Srbije imaju na Kosovu 1.358
objekata, pri emu samo PTT ima 130, TP 55, EPS 18, a Srbijaume 45. Imovina ovih
1.358 preduzea se procenjuje na najmanje 1,5 milijardi dolara, s obzirom da je do sada na
Kosovu prodato 140 preduzea za 143 miliona evra.
Drava Srbija je, pod pritiskom meunarodne zajednice, preuzela kosovski dug u ukupnom iznosu od 1,1 milijarde dolara, a u poslednjih nekoliko godina je, po osnovu kamata
za kosovski dug, ve otplatila 350 miliona dolara.
Posle 1999. sa Kosova i Metohije je izbeglo preko 30 hiljada srpskih porodica, a vrednost objekata i njihove imovine koju su tamo ostavili procenjuje se na najmanje etiri
milijarde dolara.
Prema tome, drava Srbija po osnovu imovine svojih graana i preduzea, kao i obaveza biveg Fonda za kreditiranje breg razvoja nedovoljno razvijenih republika i pokrajine
Kosovo i kosovskog spoljnog duga, potrauje najmanje 12,5 milijardi dolara. Da su u pitanju velika potraivanja, potvruje i podatak da se kosovski bruto domai proizvod procenjuje na 2,5 milijarde dolara, dok je istovremeno srpski bruto domai proizvod 22 milijarde dolara, a spoljni dug 14 milijardi dolara.
Kakva je sudbina srpske imovine na Kosovu i Metohiji?
Ve nekoliko godina UNMIK, preko Kosovske poverilake agencije, rasprodaje srpsku
imovinu, bez bilo kakvog znanja i uea naih preduzea i graana. Kosovska poverilaka
agencija (KPA), suprotno evropskim standardima privatizacije, formira nova preduzea, na
koja prenosi imovinu, dok obaveze ostaju ranijim preduzeima. Imovina tih novoformiranih preduzea se prodaje u vienom stanju, bez preciznog utvrivanja njene vrednosti i
vlasnika. Prihodi od privatizacije odlaze u kosovski budet. KPA, sa znanjem UNMIK-a,
nezakonito rasprodaje i krmi srpsku imovinu, a da njeni stvarni vlasnici praktino ne
mogu uiniti nita.
Aktuelna srpska Vlada ne ini nita da zatiti interese srpskih preduzea i graana, za
razliku od Vlade pokojnog srpskog premijera Zorana inia, koja se veoma jasnim i preciznim zahtevom obratila Ujedinjenim nacijama, Evropskoj Uniji, Svetskoj banci i MMFu, od kojih, naalost, ni do dana dananjeg nije dobila nikakav odgovor. Privrede Srbije i
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u uslovima njegove pune nezavisnosti kao suverene i demokratske zemlje mogu obezbediti
ubrzani privredni razvoj i poveanje dobrobiti svih njegovih graana, nezavisno od njihove
etnike, verske, politike ili rasne pripadnosti, oslanjajui se na trinu privredu i uvaavajui
potpunu ravnopravnost svih ljudi.
Iako je sve vreme trajanja aneksije od bive Jugoslavije, Kosovu bio nametnut kolonijalni poloaj uz iskoriavanje u svakom pogledu, zahvaljujui pomenutim povoljnim
prirodnim uslovima, geostratekom poloaju i ogromnom angaovanju i portvovanju vrednih itelja, Kosovo je ipak postiglo zavidan privredni razvoj.

Posebno treba naglasiti pomo putem kreditiranja iz sredstava Saveznog fonda za ubrzani
razvoj Kosova, to nije bilo nita drugo nego vraanje jednog dela nacionalnog dohotka koji
su Kosovu oduzimale razvijene republike putem primarne raspodele i deprimiranih administrativnih cena sirovina i poluproizvoda koje je proizvodila industrija optereena tekom
kolonijalnom strukturom. To potvruje injenica da su kritine 1990. godine, tri kljune
industrijske grane na Kosovu bile kolonijalne eksteritorijalne grane: elektroprivreda, proizvodnja uglja i proizvodnja ruda i obojenih metala, koje su istovremeno bile intenzivne u
kapitalu (sa visokim koeficijentom kapitala), uz malu zaposlenost i sa nedovoljnom akumulativnom i reproduktivnom sposobnou, zbog destimulativnih elemenata ekonomske politike. Preraivakih kapaciteta tih prirodnih resursa na Kosovu takorei nije ni bilo, ve su
oni postojali u razvijenim regionima bive Jugoslavije, to je uslovljavalo stalno prelivanje
nacionalnog dohotka sa Kosova u druge delove bive Jugoslavije.

Forum

Ubrzaniji razvoj poeo je naroito posle ustavnih promena iz 1973-74. godine, kada je
uporedo sa definisanjem poloaja Kosova kao konstitutivnog elementa bive SFRJ, ono
steklo pravo i na korienje koncesija za kredite iz Fonda federacije za nedovoljno razvijene
krajeve, a dobilo je i neke druge olakice iz domena ekonomske politike, kao i tri ostale
nedovoljno razvijene republike.

Takav razvoj je postignut i zahvaljujui poveanju akumulativne i reproduktivne sposobnosti privrede Kosova, koja se uglavnom oslanjala na urednom plaanju anuiteta raznim
kreditorima i na vraanju sredstava Saveznom fondu za ubrzani privredni razvoj Kosova,
kao nanerazvijenijem podruju u odnosu na nedovoljno razvijene republike u okviru bive
SFRJ. O tome svedoi injenica da su se u kritinoj 1989. godini privrednom delatnou
bavila 845 preduzea drutvenog sektora sa 172.794 zaposlenih i 253 individualna preduzea
iz privatnog sektora, sa 5.818 zaposlenih. Taj veoma koristan privredni potencijal bio bi
vana polazna osnova za sadanju etapu tranzicije, tako to bi se uporedo sa procesom privatizacije drutvene svojine stvorilo demokratsko drutvo zasnovano na trinoj privredi nezavisnih privrednih subjekata.
Meutim, posle klasine srpske okupacije Kosova u periodu od 1989. do 1998. godine,
dolo je do namernog razaranja privrede Kosova, tako to je uporedo sa vojno-policijskim
nasiljem izvren i privredni pritisak na autohtone Albance, kako bi im se onemoguio opstanak na svojim pradedovskim ognjitima.
Uporedo sa proterivanjem s posla vie od 150.000 albanskih radnika i spektakularnom
pljakom osnovnih i obrtnih sredstava kosovskih preduzea, kosovske gigante progutali su
takozvani veliki sistemi i tehnoloke celine Srbije i prisvojile su ih mafiozne strukture
srpskog reima. Time je prouzrokovano katastrofalno razaranje privrede Kosova i unitavanje
i onih nukleusa koji su bili nosioci privrednog razvoja, ime je Kosovo uvueno u duboku
privrednu i socijalnu krizu, koja se nastavlja i dan-danas.
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Forum

Kosova i Metohije su u velikoj meri komplementarne. Kosovski energetski sistem presudno zavisi od srpskog. Paradoksalno je da je Srbija Kosovu i Metohiji isporuivala struju i kada su graani Srbije, a i Srbi sa Kosova i Metohije, bili u mraku. Brojne i razvijene
veze srpskih i kosovsko-metohijskih preduzea su ratom iz 1999. nasilno prekinute. Srbija
ima veliki interes da sa privredom Kosova i Metohije razvija dobru ekonomsku saradnju,
pre svega zbog preostalog srpskog stanovnitva, ali i zbog toga to e pre ili kasnije sve
drave sa prostora zapadnog Balkana postati lanice EU.

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Od pregovarakog tima koji je formirala Vlada Srbije oekujemo da pre otpoinjanja

pregovora o konanom statusu Kosova i Metohije, pred nau, kosovsku i svetsku javnost
izae sa pouzdanim i veoma preciznim informacijama, kolika je vrednost srpske imovine
na Kosovu i Metohiji. Ovo je naroito vano, jer budui konani status Kosova i Metohije
moe biti definisan i potpuno suprotno od srpskih interesa. Ali, veoma je bitno da srpski
pregovaraki tim svetu saopti nedovoljno poznatu injenicu, da su graani Srbije u proteklih pola veka nesebino izdvajali ogromna sredstva za bri razvoj i prosperitet svih
graana Kosova i Metohije.
04. januar 2006.

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

Treba naglasiti da prilikom objektivnog razmatranja uzroka koji su doveli do duboke

ekonomske krize i uvlaenja privrede Kosova u predindustrijsku fazu, treba posebno imati
u vidu rezultate desetogodinjeg nasilja srpsko-crnogorskih osvajaa u periodu 19891999. godine, to je imalo katastrofalne posledice za privredu i za stanovnitvo Kosova.

Institucije Kosova su otvoreno izrazile spremnost da plaaju anuitete za dugove privrede

Kosova za vreme dok je ono bilo deo SFRJ, na osnovu bilansa koji je uraen pre uvoenja
prinudnih mera u veini privrednih preduzea na Kosovu. Kosovo nee prihvatiti nikakvu
obavezu koju su preuzele prinudne srpske strukture na Kosovu. Meutim, to podrazumeva
da se prethodno proceni naknada za ratnu tetu koju je srpska drava priinila materijalnim
i ljudskim resursima na Kosovu, kao i kolika je bila pljaka imovine Kosova. Za to je
potrebna odgovarajua meunarodna arbitraa koja bi, osim pomenutih injenica, trebalo da
ima u vidu i povraaj sredstava iz fonda u koji je prihode uplaivalo oko 120.000 penzionera, kao i iz fondova socijalnog osiguranja, zajedno sa deviznom tednjom koju je Srbija
opljakala tokom okupacije Kosova. Takoe, treba traiti da Kosovo uestvuje u procesu
sukcesije, jer je ono bilo konstitutivni element bive SFRJ i neposredni stvaralac imovine
koja se deli izmeu sastavnih delova bive federacije.

Forum

Istovremeno, od 335.000 stambenih zgrada na Kosovu, oteeno je vie od 135.000

(prema podacima meunarodnih organizacija), dok je oko 100.000 njih potpuno uniteno,
prema proceni UNMIK-a, u petom stepenu. Ukupna vrednost teta priinjenih ljudskim,
materijalnim i finansijskim resursima na Kosovu varvarstvom srpsko-crnogorskih vojnih,
policijskih i paravojnih snaga, aproksimativno dostie iznos od oko 20 milijardi evra, za
koliko su osiromaeni privreda i stanovnitvo Kosova.

04. januar 2006.

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What can International law do to Help Resolve the Kosovo Issue?

Forum

By Prof. Vojin Dimitrijevic

Prof. Vojin Dimitrijevic

First, a word of caution: the matter of Kosovo will not be

decided in court, but by bodies that are primarily political in
nature. The Contact Group is a latter-day version of the
famed Concert of Europe that existed in the 19th century
and which remains virtually unchanged to this day. The
states in the Contact Group are at the same time privileged
and permanent members of the Security Council, the most
powerful body of the United Nations, which can adopt binding decisions provided that they are based on Chapter VII of
the U.N. Charter dealing with action with respect to threats
to peace. Without the consent (or at least non-opposition) of
any permanent member, the Security Council cannot reach a
substantive decision.

In such places of debate, arguments based on international law, which would otherwise be crucial in court, are of relative value. Their force is
rhetorical: law is something that sides involved in a dispute rely on, together with the principles of morality and justice. Such arguments are derived from international documents of
various legal force and credibility.
At the very top lies the U.N. Charter as an international treaty or, more accurately, super-treaty: Article 103 of the Charter requires member-states to give it precedence over all
other treaties. Member-states are ordered to develop friendly relations based on respect
for the principles of equal rights and self-determination of peoples (Art. 1, Par. 2); they are
told to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state (Art. 2, Par. 4), whereas the U.
N. will not interfere in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of
any state... but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures
under Chapter VII. (Art. 2, Par. 7). The underlined words are especially important in regard to Kosovo.
Back during the Cold War the U.N. General Assembly adopted the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States
in accordance with the U.N. Charter (Oct. 24, 1970). This document is of lesser rank than
the Charter. It is in fact an interpretation of it by an important U.N. body in which every
member is represented but which, unlike the Security Council, does not have the power to
pass binding decisions. Given that the newly independent countries were at the time striving to protect the fruits of their struggle against colonialism, a few words on how the Declaration deals with the right to self-determination are necessary. It states that the establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free association or integration with an
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To what extent can international law have an impact on the resolution

of the Kosovo Issue?
By Prof. Dr. Enver Hasani, Professor of International Law and International Relations

International law is not an external factor which impacts

on state behavior. As such, it follows the practice of states,
Prof. Dr. Enver Hasani
not the opposite. The factors that have an impact on state
behavior are connected with their interests and the configuration of power in international
relations. States follow their interests, and depending on their power they realize their interests in an anarchic environment with no centralized government. This means that states
are rational actors, which act seeking to realize their own interests. What looks like a usual
state behavior in international relations is nothing but a misperception. International law,
each and every of its norms regardless of their source, reflects four categories, through
which we could explain state behavior in international relations. These four categories
are: coincidence of (the country respects international law, because its individual interests
converge with those of other countries); coordination (the country respects international
law, because it gains more if it takes actions in conformity with other countries actions);
cooperation (the country respects international law because it benefits more if it undertakes
actions which are not in its immediate interest, for the sake of long-term and mid-term
benefits); and finally, compulsion (the country respects international law and takes actions
which are contrary to its interests, as a result of the threat with the use of force).

Forum

In international law, as opposed to internal law an initial,

basic and essential norm does not exist (Hans Kelsen) or any
kind of a first decision (Karl Schmitt), which we can say that
represents the beginning of its birth. This means that, there
is no norm or decision, which would end the development of
this branch of law. Both the the beginning and the end of
international law are in a state of continuous motion depending on the circumstances in time and space.

The rhetoric over the application and the practical role of the international law must be
seen within the viewpoint of these four categories. This was even seen in the behavior of
the states during the crisis and the tragedy in the former Yugoslavia since 1991, but also in
other similar cases of solving the crisis related to the sovereignty and self-determination
over the last decade, such as the Northern Ireland (The Good Friday Agreement), Israel
and Palestine (Road Map), Western Sahara (The Baker Peace Plan), Sudan (The Machako
Protocol) and so forth.
The role and importance of international law and its norms have no reason to be different when applied for the solution of the issue of Kosovo. Just as in the above-mentioned
cases, in Kosovo case too, the object of solution is the right to self-determination in all its
forms , or the political contest over territorial sovereignty. Self-determination, in the current phase of the development of international law, is represented only as a principle , not
as a predetermined norm. That is to say, in the case of Kosovo as well there is no an international norm which would impose a particular model of self-determination, be it internal
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independent State or the emergence into any other political status freely determined by a
people constitute modes of implementing the right of self-determination by that people.
However, later treatment of this principle reconciles the right to self-determination with the
need to protect the territorial integrity of existing states: Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and
independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights
and self-determination of peoples as described above and thus possessed of a government
representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race,
creed or colour. (From the section titled The principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.)
At the end of the first meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
five years later, a document was adopted, the Helsinki Final Act, which is not a treaty in the
formal sense, but rather a document that imposes political obligations on the signatories
and is known as soft law, law without legal sanctions. The participating States will respect each others... right to... juridical equality, to territorial integrity and to freedom and
political independence... They consider that their frontiers can be changed, in accordance
with international law, by peaceful means and by agreement... The participating States regard as inviolable all one anothers frontiers as well as the frontiers of all States in Europe
and therefore they will refrain now and in the future from assaulting these frontiers. Accordingly, they will also refrain from any demand for, or act of, seizure and usurpation of
part or all of the territory of any participating State.
Security Council Resolution 1244, which, we all know very well, ended the NATO
armed intervention in Yugoslavia on June 10, 1999, is not a general legal act but a concrete
decision reached by a powerful U.N. body, based on Chapter VII and consequently binding
on all members. It quotes the Helsinki Final Act when Reaffirming the commitment of all
Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other States of the region... Regarding a solution for Kosovo and Metohija,
the Security Council seeks substantial self-government in the province, reaffirms the Rambouillet accords, and establishes an interim administration to create conditions for substantial autonomy for the people of Kosovo within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations. The same conclusions are
repeated at the very end of the document, in Paragraph 8. Let us repeat here that resolutions
adopted on the basis of the Chapter VII are final: there is no instance that can annul or
change them. However, they are not a source of international law and the Security Council
can adjust or alter its decisions. Space for this exists in Resolution 1244 since the Security
Council reserves the right to determine what kind of autonomy Kosovo will enjoy.
It is interesting to note that the Resolution mentions the Rambouillet accords, whose
independent status is unclear from the standpoint of international law. This provisional
agreement was supposed to be signed at Rambouillet Castle by representatives of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Serbia, and Kosovo, with officials of the EU, Russian
Federation, and U.S. acting as witnesses. Even though it was eventually signed by Kosovo
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Applying in practice these two principles, which exclude each other, could result in confirmation of the existing abstract and general international norm, regardless of its source,
but it also can lead to the modification or the creation of a new norm on self-determination
and the territorial integrity. The final result shall depend on depends on which of the abovementioned categories dominate the current policy of the Contact Group member states,
which are involved in solving of the issue of Kosovo. This international body, informal
from the standpoint of international law, was set up in 1994 to evade the role of the UN
SC, which then proved incapable in stopping the genocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Had
international law been respected, the Contact Group would have never been formed, but
more people would have died in Bosnia in Herzegovina. The same would have happened
had NATO not intervened in Kosovo in 1999 withou the UN SC authorization..

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or external. The fact that Serbs perceive the self-determination of Kosovo as an internal
self-determination, which according to them derives from the UN SC Resolution 1244, is
only one of the possible interpretations of the self-determination as a principle. The Serb
interpretation claims that the defending of the principle of territorial integratiy is guaranteed under whatever conditions and circumstances. In international law, both self-determination and territorial integrity are presented as a principle not as an international norm
applicable any time and in all cases. If it were so, there would be no breakup of Yugoslavia
in 1991, while international community would have had to react in defence of sovereignty
and territorial integrity of that country, as it did in Congo/Zaire at the beginning of 1960s
when the UN suppressed by force the bid for independence of the province of Katanga,
which took the life of the then UN Secretary General U. Tant.

The transformation of the principle of self-determination into a mandatory international

legal norm of self-determination binding on all parties and other relevant international actors requires the intervention of an arbiter. This was the practice of states in the past. This
arbiter is called international community, and can take different forms of representation of
the interests of the member states of this community. In 1815, it was called the Congress of
Vienna, in 1918 the Conference of Versailles, during the decolonization the UN and the
OAU (The Organization of African Unity, now the Union of African Unity) and so forth..
In the case of former Yugoslavia (1991-1995), this arbiter was called the International
Conference for former Yugoslavia, initially known as the EU Conference for Yugoslavia
(1991-1992). This conference applied the principles of international law on self-determination and the succession of states. These principles have been transformed into a mandatory
norms of international law only then when this body decided who the the subjects entitled
to self-determination were, both internal and external, and when it received a general support by all international actors and the greatest powers of the time. The conference reflected
the four above-mentioned categories and demonstrated that the approach of other states
towards former Yugoslavia cannot not lead to the unconditional protection of its territorial
integrity and that it was a need for finding new modalities and forms of Yougoslav self-determination . In this context, two form and modalities of self-determination were created,
one internal and the other external.
The first one implied the right for a coexistence of all peoples of the former Yugoslav
republics, without having a right to change the administrative republican borders, which
were declared international ones since the very moment of the declaration of independence
of the former Yugoslav republics. Serb efforts for the creation of two new entities through
the ethnic cleansing were declared null and void from the standpoint of international law,
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Albanian representatives, nobody did so on behalf of Serbia and Yugoslavia. Therefore, the
document is not a valid international treaty (except possibly to the Kosovo Albanian side
as a unilateral obligation). However, the Security Council grants it indirect strength in Resolution 1244 by referring to it as an element of its decision, which is not unheard of in law.
According to the Security Council, the solution for Kosovo should be similar to that envisioned by the Rambouillet agreement. The agreement lists as its principles respect of human rights in Kosovo, the right to democratic self-government of all the citizens of Kosovo,
as well as the obligation that all national communities must enjoy additional rights but not
in a way that endangers the rights of other national communities or the rights of citizens,
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, or the functioning of representative democratic government in Kosovo. The accords also state that an
international conference is to be held three years after the document enters in force to lay
down mechanisms for a final solution to the Kosovo issue based on the will of the people,
the opinion of relevant authorities, and each Partys efforts regarding the implementation
of this Agreement, and the Helsinki Final Act, and to undertake a comprehensive assessment of the implementation of this Agreement and to consider proposals by any Party for
additional measures. One can see that the 1975 Helsinki Final Act is again in the game.
The bodies that will hand down the final decision in the difficult matter of the future of
Kosovo will, therefore, have to choose between a number of important principles of international law contained in documents of very different types. These same principles will be
cited by representatives of Serbia, representatives of the interim administration in Kosovo,
and representatives of the non-Albanian national communities in Kosovo, particularly the
Serb one. On the one hand lies the principle of preservation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of every state, which is inviolable and dates long before the U.N. Charter. Territorial integrity manifests itself through the inviolability of borders, which can be altered
only through consent by countries that share a border. Sovereignty is a more elusive concept
because following the Second World War it has been limited and no longer means absolute
authority over ones subjects, but applies to governments that respect human rights and the
rule of law. The debate on democratic states centers around such governments.
On the other hand is the principle of self-determination of nations, formulated at the
close of the First World War in the famous 14 points announced by President Woodrow
Wilson; they served as a basis for territorial settlements in the Versailles system, as a result
of which Austria-Hungary and Germany lost considerable portions of their territory to new
states formed on national principles. The principle of self-determination was also a tenet
of the decolonization process after World War Two, which is visible in the aforementioned
Security Council resolution of 1970. The right of a people to self-determination is guaranteed in both U.N. human rights covenants of 1966.
The scope of the principle of self-determination is limited by the very fact that not every group can claim to be a people. However, no international court or equivalent body has
produced a binding definition of the term people. In response to a number of a tribal
groups in Canada, the U.N. Human Rights Committee declined to hand down a decision on
that score.

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In fact, these two forms of self-determination were just a new implementation of the
colonial self-determination in the contest of the dissolution of an existing sovereign and
independent state former Yugoslavia. The new implementation of these two forms of
self-determination was strongly confirmed in Dayton (1995), because once again it was
proven that the international law follows the practice of states , not the opposite. The 1995
Dayton model, for pragmatic reasons, provisionally endorsed all de facto actors, those prestate entities resulting from violence, genocide and other actions against international law,
(Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Republika Srpska Krajina in Croatia). The precedent of
taking into consideration of these two pre-state entities and, later, other semi-legal movements while solving the problems of the former Yugoslav self-determination and succession was repeated later on in the Rambouillet talks over Kosovo (1999). NATO, a defensive
alliance of the Cold War, took over the role of a guardian of the implementation of the new
rules of international law coupled with the new protection of human and minority rights,
the rule of law and democracy, while at the same time it protected the territorial integrity
of the former Yugoslav republicsl. The perceptions of the parties over NATO intervention
in former Yugoslavia are different, and this action has caused contradictory arguments
among the parties. In the eayes of the Serbs eyes, NATO should defend territorial integrity
of the FRY/SMU, as it did defend the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Bosnia and
Herzegovina. Albanians and other non-Serbs see this as a sign of the new implementation
of the principle pf territorial integrity and sovereignty due to the fact that this principle is
not unconditionally protected and guaranteed by the UN Charter (1945), Colonial Declaration (1960), the Declaration on Friendly Relations (1970), 1966 Pacts and the Final Act of
Helsinki (1975). These documents , so goes the Albanian and other non-Serbs argument,
condition this protection with the respect of individual and collective rights of the population and the citizens of the existing sovereign states. This respect was lacking during the
time of the Serb rule in Kosovo so that we can say that Albanians see this as a strong argument justifying their demand for full independence and sovereignty..

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meaning that such actions were not to be rewarded much in the same way as it had been
done in Southern Rhodesia, during the Smith regime. The external self-determination implied the right of the former Yugoslav republics to become new sovereign and independent
states within their administrative republican borders, including the right to an eventual
association with other sovereign and independent states or the establishment of new sovereign and independent states from two or more former Yugoslav republics.

In addition to the above, international law is on the side of Kosovo and its majority
population because in no case (except during the 1912-1913 Balkans Wars), Kosovo was
part of Serbia and Montenegro: Kosovo Albanians were in no other case citizens of Serbia
and Montenegro. These two countries have never had an internationally recognized subjectivity over Kosovo, except during that period. The last in the line of arguments based
on international law, which favors the realization of external self-determination of Kosovo,
that is, its full independence and sovereignty, is that Kosovos right to self-determination
forms part of the former Yugoslav self-determination, and it cannot have other treatment.
Every other approach is not based on the current stage of international law.
It remains to be seen which combination of the states interests and which configuration
of the forces among the Contact Group member states is going to be predominant during
the interpretation of the UN SC Resolution 1244. It is difficult to believe that there will be
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As can well be seen from the portion of the 1970 resolution mentioned above, the right
to self-determination does not amount to the right to secede. International law recognizes
the right to internal self-determination, which is granted by giving every group, particularly ethnic minorities, representation in government and the ability to influence the decision-making process, and the right to external self-determination, which means the right to
create ones own state if internal self-determination has not produced adequate results.
That is probably the sense in which the term substantial autonomy used by international
officials and the phrase more than autonomy, less than independence, voiced by representatives of Serbia, should be understood.
January 11, 2006

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Sa mund t ndikoj e drejta ndrkombtare n zgjidhjen e shtjes s

Kosovs?
Shkruan: Prof. Dr. Vojin Dimitrijeviq
Pikspari duhet theksuar se shtja e Kosovs nuk do t zgjidhet para gjyqit, por para
trupave t cilt para s gjithash jan politike. Grupi i Kontaktit, n realitet paraqet versionin
e sotm e t famshmit koncert i fuqive t mdha, i cili ekzistonte n shekullin XIX,
ndrsa qndrimi i tyre i sotm sht plotsisht i ngjashm.
Antart e Grupit t Kontaktit n t njjtn koh jan edhe antar t prhershm dhe t
privilegjuar t Kshillit t Sigurimit (KS), organit m t fuqishm t Kombeve t Bashkuara (KB), vendimet e t cilit jan t detyrueshme, nse arrihen n pajtueshmri me Kapitullin VII t Konvents s KB-ve rreth masave t mbrojtjes s paqes dhe siguris. Pa
plqimin e antarve t prhershm t KS nuk mund t arrihet asnj vendim substancial.
Argumentet e s drejts ndrkombtare, t cilat do t ishin vendimtare n gjyq n forumet e tilla kan nj vler relative. N t vrtet, forca e tyre sht retorike: E drejta sht
pik e fuqishme n t cilat mbshteten palt n konflikt, bashk me parimet e moralit dhe
rendit. Kto argumente dalin nga dokumentet ndrkombtare t forcs s ndryshme t drejtsis dhe bindjeve.
N krye t hierarkis qndron Konventa e KB si nj lloj kontrate ndrkombtare, dhe jo
si kontrat e thjesht, por nj lloj mbi-kontrate: Neni i saj 103 i thrret shtetet antare q n
baz t detyrimeve t konvents, tu japin prparsi t gjith t tjerve. Konventa thrret
shtetet antare q t zhvillojn marrdhnie t mbshtetura n respektimin e parimeve t
barazis dhe vetvendosjes s popujve, (neni 1,2); ato prmbahen nga krcnimi me
forc dhe prdorimi i forcs kundr integritetit territorial ose pavarsis politike t secilit
shtet, (neni 2,4) ndrsa OKB-ja nuk przihet n shtjet t cilat n mnyr thelbsore
jan pjes e prgjegjsis s brendshme t secilit shtet; sidoqoft kjo ndales nuk do t
ndikoj n zbatimin e masave t dhunshme, t parashikuara n Kapitullin VII (neni 2,7).
Jan t mnjanuara ato fjal, t cilat jan t rndsis s veant pr shtjen e
Kosovs.

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any matching of interests of CG member states with the Serbian and Russian version of
interpreting the UN SC Resolution 1244. In the case of Kosovo, the interpretation of the
UN SC Resolution 1244 in international law must be innovative and set up a new precedent
in every aspect, if the the aim is to have a better coordination and cooperation among CG
member states. The opposite means that NATO would have to be ready to play a role of the
Serbian military force, namely to protect Serb national interests in Kosovo and become a
hostage to the dogmatic and arbitrary interpretation of the principle of territorial integrity,
an integrity created by force in 1992 against the will of Kosovo, at the time when the FRY/
SMU was set up by, the very state the UN 1244 Resolution referes to.
January 11, 2006

Sa mund t ndikoj e drejta ndrkombtare n zgjidhjen e shtjes s

Kosovs?

Forum

Shkruan: Prof. Dr. Enver Hasani, Profesor i s drejts dhe marrdhnieve ndrkombtare n Universitetin e Prishtins
Pr dallim nga e drejta e brendshme, n t drejtn ndrkombtare nuk ekziston nj
norm fillestare, bazike, themelore (Hans Kelsen), apo nj vendim primar (Karl Shmit) pr
t cilin mund t thuhet se paraqet fillimin e lindjes s saj.
Pr pasoj, nuk ekziston asnj norm, apo vendim, me t cilin do t mbyllej zhvillimi
i ksaj deg t s drejts. Si fillimi ashtu dhe fundi i t drejts ndrkombtare jan n
gjendje t nj lvizjeje e ndryshimi t vazhdueshm, n varsi t rrethanave.
E drejta ndrkombtare nuk sht faktor i jashtm i cili ndikon n sjelljet e shteteve.
Si e till, ajo ndjek praktikn. Faktort q ndikojn n sjelljet e shteteve lidhen me interesin e tyre dhe konfiguracionin e forcave n planin ndrkombtar n kohn dhe hapsirn
e dhn. Shtetet ndjekin interesat e tyre dhe n varsi t forcs q kan n disponim i
realizojn ato n kuadr t nj ambienti anarkik ku nuk ka pushtet qendror. M tutje, kjo
do t thot se shtetet jan aktor racional, t cilat veprojn n krkim t realizimit t interesave t tyre vetjake. Ajo q duket si mnyr e zakonshme e sjelljes s shteteve n
marrdhniet ndrkombtare nuk sht vese perceptim i gabuar. E drejta ndrkombtare,
secila norm e saj, pa marr parasysh burimin, reflekton katr kategori prmes t cilave
mund t shpjegohen sjelljet e shteteve n marrdhniet ndrkombtare. Ato katr kategori
jan: puqja e interesave (shteti respekton t drejtn ndrkombtare sepse interesat individuale t shteteve puqen me ato t shteteve tjera); koordinimi (shteti respekton t drejtn
ndrkombtare sepse fiton m shum nse ndrmerr veprime simetrike dhe t njjta m ato
t shteteve tjera); bashkpunimi (shteti respekton t drejtn ndrkombtare sepse fiton m
shum nse ndrmerr veprime t cilat nuk jan n interes imediat pr hir t prfitimeve t
mvonshme afatgjate dhe afatmesme); dhe, s fundi, shtrngimi (shteti respekton t drejtn
ndrkombtare dhe ndrmerr veprime kundr interesave t tij si pasoj e krcnimit me
prdorimin e forcs).
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Qysh n koht e lufts s ftoht, Asambleja e Prgjithshme e OKB-s ka miratuar

Deklaratn e Parimeve t t Drejts Ndrkombtare rreth marrdhnieve miqsore dhe
bashkpunimit t shteteve, n pajtueshmri me Konventn e OKB-s (24 tetor 1970).
Ky sht akt i nivelit m t ult se Konventa; fjala sht pr shpjegimin e saj nga ana e
organit t rndsishm t OKB-s, n t cilin marrin pjes t gjith antart, mirpo i cili
n krahasim me KS-n, nuk ka t drejt t marr vendime t rndsishme. Duke pasur
parasysh se n at moment historik, shtetet e porsakrijuara jan prpjekur t mbrojn frytet
e lufts s tyre antikolonialiste, sht me rndsi t bhet prpunimi i t drejts pr vetvendosje n kt rezolut. Sipas saj, krijimi i shteteve sovrane dhe t pavarura, bashkngjitja
e lir dhe integrimi me ndonj shtet t pavarur apo krijimi i fardolloj rendi tjetr politik,
i cili do t zgjidhej lirisht nga ndonj popull, paraqet pr at popull mnyrn e prmbushjes
s t drejts s tyre pr vetvendosje. Sidoqoft, n saje t prpunimit t parimit t njjt,
e drejta pr vetvendosje duhet t jet n pajtim me ruajtjen e integritetit territorial t
shteteve: Asgj n paragraft e mparshm nuk do t shpjegohet si dika q autorizon apo
nxit ndonj veprim, qllimi i t cilit do t ishte rrezikimi i plot apo i pjesshm i integritetit
territorial ose pavarsis politike i cilitdo shtet sovran ose t pavarur, i cili sillet n pajtueshmri me parimin e barazis dhe vetvendosjes s popujve...dhe i cili udhhiqet nga qeveria
e cila prfaqson tr popullin e territorit, pa marr parasysh dallimet n kuptimin e racs,
besimit apo ngjyrs. (Pjesa e emrtuar si Parim i Barazis dhe Vetvendosjes s Popujve).
Pes vite m von, n fund t mbledhjes s par t Konferencs pr Siguri dhe Bashkpunim n Evrop sht miratuar Akti i saj prfundimtar, i cili nuk paraqet ndonj marrveshje n kuptimin e plot t fjals, por nj dokument i cili krijon obligime politike t
shteteve miratuese dhe hyn n at q tash quhet e drejt e but, e drejt pa sanksione
ligjore. Shtetet pjesmarrse...jan t obliguara t respektojn t drejtn e secilit pr barazi ligjore, integritet territorial...liri dhe barazi politike...Ato vlersojn se kufijt e tyre
mund t ndryshohen n pajtueshmri me t drejtn ndrkombtare, n mnyr paqsore
dhe me marrveshje...ato vlersojn pacenueshmri t kufijve t tyre si dhe kufijve t t
gjitha shteteve t Evrops dhe po ashtu ato do t prmbahen nga fardolloj krkese apo
akti t prvetsimit apo uzurpimit t territorit t secilit shtet antar.
T gjith e din mir se Rezoluta 1244 e KS-s, me t ciln m 10 qershor iu dha fund
intervenimit t armatosur t NATO-s kundr Jugosllavis, nuk sht kurrfar rregulloreje,
por vendim konkret e nj organi t fuqishm t OKB-s, i miratuar n baz t Kapitullit
VII, q n t njjtn koh sht e obligueshme pr t gjith antart. Ajo thirret n Aktin
Final t Helsinkit kur prsri vrteton ruajtjen e sovranitetit dhe integritetit t RF t Jugosllavis dhe shteteve t tjera t rajonit.
Lidhur me zgjidhjen e shtjes s Kosovs, KS krkon nj vetqeverisje substanciale n
Kosov, duke marr pr baz n trsi marrveshjet nga Rambujeja, q obligojn administratn e prkohshme n Kosov q t sigurojn kushte pr autonomi substanciale t popullit t Kosovs brenda RF t Jugosllavis, pr t ciln do t vendos Kshilli i Sigurimit i
OKB-s. Kto konkluzione prsriten n vet fundin e Rezoluts n pikn 8 t saj.
Prsrisim, rezultat e KS-s t nxjerra n baz t Kapitullit VII jan prfundimtare, dhe
nuk ka gjyq ndrkombtar i cili mund ti ndryshoj apo anuloj. Sidoqoft ato nuk jan
burim i s drejts ndrkombtare dhe vet KS mund ti ndryshoj ose prshtas vendimet e
tij. Ai i kalan vetes nj hapsir t till edhe n rezolutn 1244, duke mbajtur t drejtn q
vet t vendos se cila do t jet autonomia e Kosovs.
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Roli dhe rndsia e s drejts ndrkombtare, i normave t saj, n zgjidhjen e shtjes

s Kosovs nuk ka pse t jet ndryshe. Sikundr rastet e siprprmendura, n Kosov
objekt zgjidhjeje sht e drejta pr vetvendosje dhe format e saj, apo kontesti politik pr
sovranitetin territorial. Vetvendosja, n stadin aktual t zhvillimit t s drejts ndrkombtare, paraqitet vetm si nj parim , jo si norm e prcaktuar. As n rastin e Kosovs nuk
ekziston nj norm ndrkombtare e cila do ta impononte zbatimin e llojit t caktuar t
vetvendosjes, interne ose eksterne. Fakti q serbt me insistim vetvendosjen e Kosovs
e paraqesin si vetvendosje t brendshme, e cila sipas tyre buron nga Rezoluta 1244 e
KS t OKB-s, sht vetm nj nga interpretimet e mundshme t vetvendosjes si parim.
Ky interpretim serb supozon mbrojtjen me do kusht dhe n do rrethan t parimit t
integritetit territorial. N t drejtn ndrkombtare, si vetvendosja ashtu dhe mbrojtja e
integritetit territorial jan n nivel parimesh, jo n nivel normash ndrkombtare t cilat
do t vlenin pr do kohe dhe pr t gjitha rastet. Po t ishte kshtu, ish Jugosllavia nuk do
t shprbhej m 1991 kurse bashksia ndrkombtare do t kishte ndrhyr n mbrojtje
t sovranitetit e integritetit territorial t atij shteti, si pat br n Kongo/Zaire n fillim t
viteve 60 t shekullit t kaluar. Me at rast, OKB shtypi me dhun krkesn pr pavarsi
t provincs Katanga sado q i kushtoi me jet U. Tant-it, Sekretarit t Prgjithshm t
OKB-s t asaj kohe.

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Retorika mbi zbatimin dhe rolin praktik t s drejts ndrkombtare duhet t shikohet
n prizmin e ktyre katr kategorive. Kjo sht vrejtur edhe me sjelljet e shteteve n rastin
e krizs dhe tragjedis ish jugosllave q nga vitit 1991, por edhe n rastet tjera t ngjashme
t zgjidhjes s krizave rreth sovranitetit dhe vetvendosjes gjat dekads s fundit: Irlanda
e Veriut (Marrveshja e t Premtes s Mir), Izraeli dhe Palestina (Karta pr Paqen), Saharaja Perndimore (Plani Paqsor i Backer-it), Sudani (Protokolli i Machakos) e kshtu
me radh.

Zbatimi i ktyre dy parimeve, zakonisht prjashtues ndaj njri tjetrit, n praktik mund
t rezultoj me konfirmimin e norms ekzistuese abstrakte dhe t prgjithshme ndrkombtare, pa marr parasysh burimin e saj, por edhe me modifikimin, ndryshimin ose krijimin e norms s re mbi vetvendosjen dhe integritetin territorial. Rezultati prfundimtar
prcaktohet nga ajo se cila nga kategorit e siprprmendura do ta dominojn politikn
aktuale t antarve t Grupit t Kontaktit t cilt jan t involvuar n zgjidhjen e shtjes
s Kosovs. Tek e fundit, vet ky organ joformal ndrkombtar, i formuar n prill t vitit
1994, rezulton t jet pasoj e anashkalimit t KS t OKB-s, i cili u tregua i paaft pr ta
ndalur gjenocidin n Bosnje-Hercegovin. Po t respektohej e drejta ndrkombtare, Grupi
i Kontaktit nuk do t ishte formuar kurr, mirpo n Bosnje Hercegovin do t vriteshin
m shum njerz. E njjta vlen edhe pr intervenimin e NATO-s n Kosov m 1999.
Konvertimi i parimit t vetvendosjes n norm ndrkombtare t detyrueshme pr
palt e vetvendosjes dhe aktert tjer relevant ndrkombtar krkon ndrhyrjen e nj arbitri. Kjo ka qen praktika e shteteve n t kaluarn. Ai arbitr quhet bashksi ndrkombtare
dhe mund t ket forma t ndryshme prfaqsimi t interesave t shteteve antare t ksaj
bashksie. M 1815, ai sht quajtur Kongresi i Vjens, m 1878 Kongresi i Berlinit, m
1918 Konferenca e Versajs, me rastin e dekolonizimit - OKB dhe OUA (Organizata e
Unitetit Afrikan, tani Unioni i Unitetit Afrikan), etj. N rastin e ish Jugosllavis (19911995), ai arbitr u quajt Konferenca Ndrkombtare pr ish Jugosllavin, fillimisht e njohur si Konferenca e UE-s pr Jugosllavin (1991-1992). Kjo konferenc ka zbatuar parimet e t drejts ndrkombtare mbi vetvendosjen dhe trashgimin e shteteve. Ato parime
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sht interesant fakti se KS thirret n marrveshjen e Rambujes, statusi i s cils

sht i paqart sipas t drejts ndrkombtare. Kjo marrveshje e prkohshme sht
dashur q m 13 mars 1999 n kshtjelln e Rambujes t nnshkruhet nga palt ose prfaqsuesit e RFJ-s, Serbis dhe Kosovs, dhe dshmitart ose prfaqsuesit e Bashkimit
Evropian, Federats Ruse dhe SHBA-ve.
Edhe pse ai sht nnshkruar nga prfaqsuesit e shqiptarve t Kosovs, ajo nuk sht
br nga ana e Jugosllavis dhe Serbis. N baz t ksaj, ai dokument nuk sht i vlefshm
si marrveshje ndrkombtare (por vetm si obligim i njanshm pr paln kosovare).
Sidoqoft, KS me rezolutn 1244 i jep fuqi, duke u thirrur n t si prshkrim i prmbajtjes
s vendimit t tij, q sa i prket drejtsis nuk sht rast i rrall. Sipas KS-s, marrveshja
pr Kosovn duhet t jet e ngjashme me marrveshjen e Rambujes. N parimet e saj, kjo
marrveshje prfshin respektimin e t drejtave t njeriut n Kosov, t drejtn pr vetqeverisje demokratike t t gjith qytetarve t Kosovs dhe detyrimin q t gjitha bashksit
etnike dhe prfaqsuesit e tyre n Kosov do t ken t drejta shtes, duke mos cenuar t
drejtat e bashksive tjera etnike, t drejtat e qytetarve dhe sovranitetin dhe integritetin
territorial t Republiks Federale t Jugosllavis, si dhe funksionimin e pushtetit demokratik prfaqsues n Kosov. Marrveshja parasheh q tri vite pas hyrjes s tij n fuqi, do t
thirret nj takim ndrkombtar q do t caktonte mekanizmin pr statusin prfundimtar t
Kosovs, n baz t vullnetit t popullit, mendimit t autoriteteve prgjegjse, prpjekjeve
t t gjitha palve pr implementimin e marrveshjes dhe Aktit Final t Helsinkit, dhe q
n mnyr gjithprfshirse t vlersoj zbatimin e ksaj marrveshje dhe t shqyrtoj
propozimet e palve pr masat shtes.
Si po shihet, duke u thirrur n Rambuje, KS po kthen n loj edhe Aktin Final t Helsinkit t vitit 1975.
Organet t cilat prfundimisht do t vendosin rreth shtjes s vshtir t statusit t ardhshm t Kosovs, duhet t vendosin ndrmjet disa parimeve t rndsishme t s drejts
ndrkombtare, t formuluara n dokumente t natyrs s ndryshme.
N po ato parime dhe t drejta do t thirren edhe prfaqsuesit e Serbis, prfaqsuesit
e autoriteteve t prkohshme n Kosov dhe prfaqsuesit e bashksive etnike joshqiptare
n Kosov, sidomos bashksia serbe.
N njrn an qndron parimi pr ruajtjen e sovranitetit dhe integritetit territorial t
secilit shtet, q sht i paprekshm dhe q sht shfaqur shum koh para Konvents s
OKB-s. Integriteti territorial manifestohet prmes pacenueshmris s kufijve, t cilat
mund t ndryshohen vetm prmes marrveshjeve midis shteteve fqinje. Sovraniteti sht
term m pak i kapshm, sepse sht kufizuar n mnyr t dukshme pas prfundimit t
Lufts s Dyt Botrore, ashtu q ai nuk nnkupton pushtet absolut t qeveris ndaj
qytetarve, por angazhohet pr nj qeveri q respekton qeverisjen e s drejts dhe t drejtat
e njeriut. N qeveri t tilla mendohet ather kur pr kt rast flitet pr shtete demokratike.
N kundrshtim me kt, ekziston parimi i vetvendosjes s popujve, i formuluar pas
prfundimit t Lufts s Par Botrore, n 14 pikat e njohura t Presidentit t SHBA-ve,
Woodrow Wilson; ato kan shrbyer si themel i zgjidhjeve territoriale sipas sistemit t
Versajs, n baz t t cilit Austro-Hungaria dhe Gjermania humbn pjes t caktuara t
territorit t tyre n favor t shteteve t reja, t krijuara n baz t parimit t kombsis.
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Me t parn u nnkuptua e drejta pr jetes t prbashkt t t gjith popujve n kudr

t ish republikave jugosllave, pa pasur t drejtn e ndryshimit t kufijve republikan, t cilt
u shpalln si ndrkombtar q nga momenti i deklarimit t pavarsis s ish republikave
jugosllave. Prpjekjet serbe pr krijimin e entiteteve t reja prmes politiks s pastrimit
etnik u shpalln t kundrligjshme sipas t drejts ndrkombtare dhe nuk u shprblyen
m njohje, ngjashm si pat ndodhur me Rodezin e Jugut n kohn e regjimit t Smith-it.
Me vetvendosje eksterne u nnkuptua e drejta e ish republikave jugosllave pr tu br
shtete t reja sovrane dhe t pavarura brenda kufijve administrativ republikan, prfshir
ktu t drejtn e asocimit eventual me shtetet tjera sovrane dhe t pavarura ose themelimin
e shteteve t reja sovrane dhe t pavarura nga dy ose m shum ish republika jugosllave.

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jan transformuar n norma t detyrueshme vetm ather kur ky organ ka vendosur pr

subjektet e vetvendosjes, interne dhe eksterne, dhe kur sht prkrahur n trsi nga t
gjitha strukturat ndrkombtare dhe fuqit e mdha t kohs. Konferenca ka reflektuar
katr kategorit e siprme dhe ka treguar se sjelljet e shteteve karshi ish Jugosllavis nuk
mund t shpijn n mbrojtjen me do kusht t integritetit territorial dhe se duhen gjetur
modalitetet e vetvendosjes s re t popujve t ish Jugosllavis. N kt kontekst u krijuan
dy modalitete t vetvendosjes, interne dhe eksterne.

N fakt, kto dy forma t vetvendosjes nuk ishin vese nj zbatim i ri i vetvendosjes

koloniale n kontestin e shprbrjes s nj shteti ekzistues sovran dhe i pavarur ish Jugosllavis. Zbatimi i ri i ktyre dy formave t vetvendosjes u konfirmua fuqishm edhe n
Dejton (1995) sepse u dshmua edhe njher se e drejta ndrkombtare ndjek praktikn e
shteteve, jo anasjelltas. Modeli i Dejtonit, pr arsye pragmatike, futi nn sqetull t gjith
aktert faktik, pra edhe entitetet parashtetrore t cilat doln nga dhuna dhe gjenocidi dhe
veprimet tjera kundr t drejts ndrkombtare (Republika Srpska n Bosnje-Hercegovin dhe Republika Srpska Krajina n Kroaci). Precedenti i marrjes parasysh t entiteteve
parashtetrore dhe i lvizjeve gjysmlegale me rastin e zgjidhjes s kontesteve pr vetvendosjen ish jugosllave u prsrit m von n Rambuje (1999). NATO, aleanca mbrojtse
e Lufts s Ftoht, mori rolin e garantuesit t zbatimit t dispozitave t reja t s drejts
ndrkombtare t cilat kan t bjn me respektimin e t drejtave t njeriut, t drejtave
t minoriteteve dhe sundimin e ligjit, por edhe me ruajtjen e integritetit territorial t ish
republikave jugosllave. Perceptimet e palve rreth ndrhyrjes s NATO-s n ish Jugosllavi
jan t ndryshme dhe ai veprim i saj ka krijuar argumente normative t kundrta n mesin e
palve. N syt e serbve NATO n Kosov me do kusht duhet ta mbroj integritetin territorial t RFJ/USM, njjt si integritetin territorial dhe sovranitetin e Bosnje - Hercegovins. Shqiptart dhe jo serbt kt ndrhyrje e shohin si nj shenj t zbatimit t ri t parimit
t integritetin territorial dhe sovranitetit, pra se ai parim nuk gzon mbrojtje t pakusht as
sipas Karts s OKB (1945), Deklarats Koloniale (1960), Deklarats mbi Marrdhniet
Miqsore (1970), Pakteve t viti 1966, si dhe Aktit Final t Helsinkit (1975). T gjitha kto
dokumente kushtzojn kt mbrojtje me respektimin e t drejtave individuale e kolektive
t popullsis dhe shtetasve t shteteve sovrane ekzistuese. Ky respekt ka munguar gjat
tr kohs s sundimit serb n Kosov dhe mund t thuhet se n kt drejtim shqiptart e
shohin kt si nj adut t fort n arsyetimin e krkess s tyre pr pavarsi.
Prve ktij aduti, e drejta ndrkombtare e mban ann e Kosovs dhe popullit t saj
shumic edhe pr faktin se n asnj rast, prve viteve 1912-13 (pas Luftrave Ballkanike),
Kosova nuk ka qen pjes e Serbis dhe Malit t Zi, pra n asnj rast tjetr shqiptart e
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Parimi i vetvendosjes ka qen edhe moto e procesit t dekolonializimit pas Lufts s

Dyt Botrore, gj q shihet mir nga rezoluta e prmendur e Asambles s Prgjithshme
t vitit 1970. E drejta e popujve pr vetvendosje sht e garantuar n t dyja paktet e
OKB-s mbi t drejtat e njeriut t vitit 1996.

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E drejta e parimit t vetvendosjes sht e kufizuar me vet faktin q secili grup nuk
mund t pretendoj q sht popull. Mirpo, termi popull nuk sht definuar me ndonj
vendim tjetr obligues t ndonj gjyqi ndrkombtar ose ndonj organi tjetr. Duke u
prgjigjur krkesat e disa grupeve fisnore n Kanada, Komiteti i OKB-s pr t drejtat e
njeriut refuzoi t diskutonte rreth ksaj shtje.
Si shihet mjaft mir nga pjesa e lartprmendur e rezoluts s vitit 1970, e drejta pr
vetvendosje paraqet edhe t drejtn pr shkputje. N fushn e t drejts ndrkombtare,
tash flitet pr vetprcaktimin e brendshm, ka nnkupton se secili grup, sidomos minoritetet etnike, mund t prfaqsohet n mnyr efikase n qeverisje dhe t ndikoj n
procesin e vendimmarrjes s shtetit. Gjithashtu ekziston edhe vetvendosja e jashtme, q
nnkupton t drejtn pr krijimin e shtetit nse nuk prmbushen kushtet e vetprcaktimit t
brendshm. N kt kuptim duhet kuptuar shprehjen autonomi substanciale, t prdorur
nga aktert ndrkombtar, si dhe fjalt m shum se autonomi, m pak se pavarsi, t
cilat dgjohen nga prfaqsuesit e Republiks s Serbis.
11 janar 2006

Koliko meunarodno pravo moe da doprinese reavanju kosovskog

pitanja?
Pie Prof. dr Vojin Dimitrijevi
Na poetku, re opreza: kosovsko pitanje nee se reavati pred sudom, ve pred telima
koja su prvenstveno politika. Kontakt grupa je zapravo dananja verzija uvenog koncerta velikih sila, koji je postojao u XIX veku i iji je dananji sastav takorei istovetan.
Pripadnice Kontakt grupe istovremeno su stalne, privilegovane lanice Saveta bezbednosti,
najmonijeg organa Ujedinjenih nacija, ije su odluke obavezne, ako su donesene na osnovu Glave VII Povelje UN o merama za zatitu mira i bezbednosti. Bez pristanka (ili u najmanju ruku neprotivljenja) stalnih lanica, Savet bezbednosti ne moe doneti nijednu
sutinsku odluku.
U takvim forumima argumenti meunarodnog prava, koji bi bili odluujui na sudu,
imaju relativnu vrednost. Naime, njihova snaga je retorika: pravo je vrsta taka na koju
se strane u sporu oslanjaju, zajedno s naelima morala i pravinosti. Ovi argumenti crpu se
iz meunarodnih dokumenata razliite pravne snage i uverljivosti.
Na vrhu hijerarhije stoji Povelja UN kao meunarodni ugovor, i to ne obian ugovor,
ve neka vrsta nad-ugovora: njen lan 103 nalae dravama lanicama da obavezama po
Povelji daju prednost pred svim drugima. Povelja nalae dravama lanicama da razvijaju
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Tani mbetet t shihet se cili kombinim i interesave shtetrore dhe cili konfiguracion i
forcave n mesin e antarve t Grupit t Kontaktit do t jet mbizotrues gjat interpretimit t Rezoluts 1244 t KS t OKB-s. Vshtir mund t besohet se n mesin e vendeve t
Grupit t Kontaktit do t ket puqje t interesave pr versionin serb dhe rus t interpretimit
t Rezoluts 1244 t KS t OKB-s. Interpretimi i t drejts ndrkombtare n rastin e
Kosovs, i Rezoluts 244 t KS t OKB-s, duhet t jet inovativ dhe precedent i ri n do
aspekt nse mendohet t ket koordinim dhe bashkpunim n mes t antarve t Grupit t
Kontaktit. Ndryshe, NATO duhet t bhet gati pr ta luajtur rolin e forcs ushtarake serbe,
pra ti mbroj interesat nacionale serbe n Kosov dhe t bhet peng i interpretimit dogmatik e arbitrar t parimit t integritetit territorial dhe sovranitetit territorial, i cili sht sajuar
me dhun ndaj Kosovs m 1992, kur sht krijuar RFJ/USM, shteti t cilit i referohet
Rezoluta 1244 e KS t OKB-s.

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Kosovs nuk kan qen shtetas t Serbis dhe Malit t Zi. Kto dy shtete nuk kan pasur
asnjher subjektivet ndrkombtar t njohur juridikisht mbi Kosovn, prve periudhs
n fjal. Aduti i fundit i mbshtetur n t drejtn ndrkombtare q shkon n favor t realizimit t vetvendosjes eksterne t Kosovs dhe pavarsimit t saj t plot sht se vetvendosja e Kosovs sht pjes e vetvendosjes ish jugosllave dhe nuk guxon t ket trajtim
tjetr. do qasje tjetr nuk ka mbshtetje n t drejtn aktuale ndrkombtare.

11 janar 2006

Kako meunarodno pravo moe da utie na reavanje pitanja Kosova?

Pie Prof. dr Enver Hasani, profesor Meunarodnog prava i meunarodnih odnosa na
Univerzitetu u Pritini
Za razliku od unutranjeg prava, u meunarodnom pravu ne postoji neka poetna osnovna norma (Hans Kelsen), ili neka primarna odluka (Karl Smit) za koje bi se moglo rei
da predstavljaju poetak njegovog raanja. Kao posledica toga, ne postoji nijedna norma
ili odluka kojima bi se zatvorio razvoj te grane prava. Kako poetak, tako je i kraj
meunarodnog prava u stalnom kretanju i u stanju neprestanih promena, zavisno od okolnosti. Meunarodno pravo nije spoljanji faktor koji utie na ponaanje drava. Ono, kao
takvo, sledi praksu. inioci koji utiu na ponaanje drava u vezi su sa njihovim interesom
i konfiguracijom snaga na meunarodnom planu, u odreenom vremenu i prostoru. Drave
slede svoje interese i, u zavisnosti od snage koju imaju na raspolaganju, ostvaruju ih u
okviru anarhinog ambijenta, gde nema centralne vlasti. Nadalje, to znai da su drave
racionalan sudeonik koji radi na ostvarenju sopstvenih interesa. Ono to izgleda kao obian
nain ponaanja drava u meunarodnim odnosima, nije nita drugo do pogrena procena.
Meunarodno pravo, svaka njegova norma, bez obzira na izvor, sadri etiri kategorije
kojima se moe objasniti ponaanje drava u meunarodnim odnosima. Te etiri kategorije
su: poklapanje interesa (drava potuje meunarodno pravo jer se individualni interesi
drave poklapaju sa interesima drugih drava); koordinacija (drava potuje meunarodno
pravo jer dobija vie ako preduzima simetrine i iste korake kao i druge drave); saradnja
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odnose zasnovane na potovanju naela ravnopravnosti i samoopredeljenja naroda (lan

1,2); one se uzdravaju od pretnje silom i upotrebe sile protiv teritorijalnog integriteta ili
politike nezavisnosti svake drave (lan 2,4) a UN se ne meaju u pitanja koja se po
sutini nalaze u unutranjoj nadlenosti svake drave; ova zabrana pak nee uticati na
primenu prinudnih mera predvienih u glavi VII (lan 2,7). Podvuene su one rei koje su
od posebnog znaaja za pitanje Kosova.
Jo u doba hladnog rata, Generalna skuptina UN usvojila je Deklaraciju o naelima
meunarodnog prava o prijateljskim odnosima i saradnji drava u skladu s Poveljom UN
(24. oktobar 1970). Ovo je akt nieg ranga od Povelje: re je o njenom tumaenju od
vanog organa UN, u kome sede sve lanice, ali koji, za razliku od Saveta bezbednosti,
nema pravo da donosi obavezujue odluke. S obzirom da su u tom istorijskom trenutku
novonastale drave nastojale da zatite plodove svoje antikolonijalne borbe, vana je razrada prava na samoopredeljenje u ovoj rezoluciji. Prema njoj, stvaranje suverene i nezavisne drave, slobodno udruivanje i integracija s nekim nezavisnim dravama ili uspostavljanje bilo kog drugog politikog poretka koji bi jedan narod slobodno odabrao,
predstavlja za taj narod nain vrenja njegovog prava na samoopredeljenje. Meutim, u
okviru razrade istog naela, pravo na samoopredeljenje se miri sa zatitom teritorijalnog
integriteta drave: Nita u prethodnim paragrafima nee biti tumaeno kao da ovlauje ili
podstie bilo kakvu akciju koja bi imala za cilj da razori ili ugrozi, potpuno ili delimino,
teritorijalni integritet ili politiku nezavisnost bilo koje suverene i nezavisne drave, koja
se ponaa u skladu s naelom ravnopravnosti i samoopredeljenja naroda ... i kojom otuda
upravlja vlada koja predstavlja celokupan narod teritorije, bez obzira na razlike u pogledu
rase, vere ili boje. (Deo pod naslovom Princip ravnopravnosti i samoopredeljenja naroda)
Pet godina kasnije, na kraju prvog sastanka Konferencije o bezbednosti i saradnji u
Evropi, usvojen je njen Zavrni akt, koji nije ugovor u pravom smislu rei, nego dokumenat koji stvara politike obaveze drava potpisnica i spada u ono to se sada naziva meko
pravo, pravo bez pravnih sankcija. Drave uesnice ... se obavezuju da e potovati pravo svake drave na pravnu jednakost, teritorijalni integritet ... slobodu i politiku jednakost
... One smatraju da se njihove granice mogu menjati u skladu s meunarodnim pravom,
mirnim putem i sporazumno... smatraju meusobno nepovredivim sve svoje granice, kao i
granice svih drava u Evropi, i stoga e se ... uzdravati od svakog nasrtaja na te granice ...
one e se takoe uzdravati od svakog zahteva ili ina zaposedanja i uzurpiranja ... teritorije bilo koje drave uesnice.
Svima dobro poznata rezolucija Saveta bezbednosti 1244, kojom je 10. juna 1999.
okonana oruana intervencija NATO u Jugoslaviji, nije opti propis, nego konkretna odluka jednog monog organa UN, doneta na osnovu glave VII, i stoga obavezna za sve
lanice. Ona se poziva na Zavrni akt iz Helsinkija, kada ponovo potvruje privrenost ...
suverenitetu i teritorijalnom integritetu SR Jugoslavije i drugih drava regiona. U pogledu
reenja za Kosovo i Metohiju, Savet bezbednosti trai sutinsku samoupravu na Kosovu,
uzimajui u potpunosti u obzir sporazume iz Rambujea, i stavlja u dunost privremenoj
upravi na Kosovu da obezbedi uslove za sutinsku autonomiju naroda Kosova u okviru
SR Jugoslavije, o emu e odluku doneti Savez bezbednosti UN. Ovi se zakljuci ponavljaju na samom kraju rezolucije, u njenoj taki osam. Ponavljamo, rezolucije Saveta bezbednosti donete po glavi VII su konane i nema meunarodnog suda koji ih moe ni titi ili
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Nema razloga da bude drugaija uloga i znaaj meunarodnog prava i njegovih normi
u reavanju pitanja Kosova. Kao i u gore navedenim sluajevima, na Kosovu je objekat
reavanja pravo na samoopredeljenje i njegovi oblici, ili politiki spor o teritorijalnom
suverenitetu. Samoopredeljenje u sadanjem stepenu razvitka meunarodnog prava pojavljuje se samo kao naelo, a ne kao utvrena norma. Ni u sluaju Kosova ne postoji neka
meuarodna norma koja bi nametnula sprovodenje odreenog oblika samoopredeljenja,
internog ili eksternog. injenica da kosovski Srbi samoopredeljenje Kosova posmatraju
kao unutranje samoopredeljenje koje, po njima, proizilazi iz Rezoluzcije 1244 Saveta
bezbednosti UN, samo je jedna od moguih interprertacija samoopredeljenja kao naela.
Ta srpska interpretacija podrazumeva zatitu po svaku cenu i u svim okolnostima naela
teritorijalnog integriteta. U meunarodnom pravu, samoopredeljenje kao i zatita teritorijalnog integriteta su na nivou naela, a ne na nivou meunarodnih normi koje bi vaile u
svako vreme i za sve sluajeve. Kada bi bilo tako, biva Jugoslavija se ne bi raspala 1991.
godine, a meunarodna zajednica bi intervenisala da bi titila suverenitet i teritorijalni
integritet te drave, kao to je uinila u Kongu/Zairu poetkom ezdestih godina prolog
veka. Tom prilikom, UN su silom uguile zahtev za nezavisnou provincije Katanga,
mada je to kotalo ivota tadanjeg generalnog sekretara UN, Daga Hamarelda.

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(drava potuje meunarodno pravo jer e dobiti vie ukoliko preduzima takve radnje koje
joj trenutno nisu od interesa, usled kasnije, dugorone ili srednjerone dobiti); i poslednje, nunost (drava potuje meunarodno pravo i preduzima radnje protiv sopstvenih
interesa kao posledica pretnji upotrebom sile). Retoriku o sprovoenju i praktinoj ulozi
meunarodnog prava trebalo bi posmatrati sa ugla te etiri kategorije. To je bilo oigledno
i u ponaanju drava prilikom krize i tragedije bive Jugoslavije, poev od 1991. godine,
ali i u drugim slinim sluajevima reavanja kriza vezanih za suverenitet ili samoopredeljenje tokom poslednje decenije: Severna Irska (Sporazum na Veliki Petak), Izrael i
Palestina (Mirovni plan), Zapadna Sahara (Bejkerov mirovni plan), Sudan (Protokol
iz Maakoa), i tako dalje.

Realizacija ta dva naela, koja po pravilu iskljuuju jedno drugo, u praksi moe da
rezultira potvrivanjem postojee apstraktne i uoptene meunarodne norme, bez obzira
na njen izvor, ali i modifikacijom, izmenom ili stvaranjem novih normi samoopredeljenja i
teritorijalnog integriteta. Konani rezultat se odreuje na osnovu toga koja e od gore navedenih kategorija dominirati u trenutnoj politici lanova Kontakt grupe, koji su ukljueni
u reavanje pitanja Kosova. Na kraju, sam taj neformalni meunarodni organ, osnovan u
aprilu 1994. godine, posledica je razmimoilaenja Saveta bezbednosti Ujedinjenih nacija,
koji se pokazao nesposobnim da zaustavi genocid u Bosni i Hercegovini. Ukoliko bi bilo
potovano meunarodno pravo, Kontakt grupa ne bi bila osnovana nikada, ali bi u Bosni
i Hercegovini izginulo vie ljudi. Isto vai i za intervenciju NATO-a na Kosovu 1999.
godine.
Transformacija naela samoopredeljenja u obaveznu meunarodnu normu za zainteresovane strane i za druge relevantne meunarodne uesnike, zahteva posredovanje
nekog arbitra. To je bila praksa drava u prolosti. Taj arbitar se zove meunarodna zajednica i moe imati razliite oblike zastupanja interesa zemalja lanica te zajednice. Godine
1815, on je nazvan Beki kongres, 1878. godine Berlinski kongres, 1918. godine - Versajska konferencija, prilikom dekolonizacije - UN i OAJ (Organizacija afrikog jedinstva,
sada Unija afrikog jedinstva), itd. U sluaju bive Jugoslavije (1991-1995), taj arbitar se
zvao meunarodna konferencija za bivu Jugoslaviju, na poetku poznata kao Konferen193

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izmeniti. Meutim, one nisu izvor meunarodnog prava i sam Savet bezbednosti moe da
menja ili prilagoava svoje odluke. On je sebi ostavio takav prostor i u Rezoluciji 1244,
zadravajui pravo da sam odluuje o tome kakva e biti autonomija na Kosovu.
Zanimljivo je da se Savet bezbednosti poziva na sporazume iz Rambujea, iji je samostalan status u meunarodnom pravu nejasan. Ovaj privremeni sporazum je 13. marta
1999. u zamku Rambuje trebalo da kao stranke potpiu predstavnici SRJ, Srbije i Kosova,
a kao svedoci predstavnici Evropske unije, Ruske Federacije i SAD. Iako su ga predstavnici kosovskih Albanaca konano potpisali, to nije uinio niko u ime Jugoslavije i Srbije. Taj
dokument, prema tome, ne vai kao meunarodni ugovor (sem moda za kosovsko-albansku stranu kao jednostrana obaveza). Meutim, Savet bezbednosti mu u Rezoluciji 1244
daje posrednu snagu, time to upuuje na njega kao na opis sadrine svoje odluke, to u
pravu nije retko. Prema Savetu bezbednosti, dakle, reenje za Kosovo i Metohiju treba da
bude slino reenju iz sporazuma u Rambujeu. Ovaj sporazum u svoje principe ubraja
potovanje ljudskih prava na Kosovu, pravo na demokratsku samoupravu svih graana
Kosova i obavezu da e sve nacionalne zajednice i njihovi pripadnici na Kosovu imati
dopunska prava, ali da tako ne mogu da ugroavaju prava drugih nacionalnih zajednica,
prava graana i suverenitet i teritorijalni integritet Savezne Republike Jugoslavije i funkcionisanje predstavnike demokratske vlasti na Kosovu. Sporazum jo predvia da e se,
tri godine posle njegovog stupanja na snagu, sazvati meunarodni skup da odredi mehanizam za konano reenje za Kosovo, na osnovu volje naroda, miljenja odgovarajuih
vlasti, napora svih strana da primene ... Sporazum i Helsinki zavrni akt i da sveobuhvatno
oceni primenu ovog Sporazuma i razmotri predloge stranaka za dopunske mere. Kao to
se vidi, pozivajui se na Rambuje, Savet bezbednosti vraa u igru i Helsinki zavrni akt iz
1975. godine.
Tela koja e konano odluivati o tekom pitanju budueg statusa Kosova moraju se,
dakle, opredeljivati izmeu nekih vanih naela meunarodnog prava, koja su formulisana
u dokumentima vrlo razliite prirode. Na ta e se naela i na pravila koja su u skladu s
njima pozivati predstavnici Srbije, predstavnici privremenih vlasti na Kosovu i predstavnici nealbanskih nacionalnih zajednica na Kosovu, poglavito srpske.
S jedne strane stoji naelo ouvanja suvereniteta i teritorijalnog integriteta svake drave,
koje je neprikosnoveno i koje je nastalo mnogo pre Povelje UN. Teritorijalni integritet se
manifestuje u nepovredivosti granica, koje se mogu menjati samo uz saglasnost pograninih
drava. Suverenitet je manje uhvatljiv pojam, jer je posle Drugog svetskog rata znatno
ogranien, tako da ne znai apsolutnu vlast svake vlade nad svojim podanicima, ve se
odnosi na vlade koje potuju vladavinu prava i ljudska prava. Na takve vlade se misli kada
se ovim povodom govori o demokratskim dravama.
Nasuprot ovom stoji naelo samoopredeljenja naroda, formulisano tek potkraj Prvog
svetskog rata, u uvenih 14 taaka predsednika SAD Vudroa Vilsona; one su posluile kao
osnov teritorijalnih reenja u versajskom sistemu, na osnovu kojih su Austrougarska i
Nemaka izgubile znatne delove svojih teritorija u korist novih drava, nastalih na narodnosnom principu. Naelo samoopredeljenja bilo je i geslo procesa dekolonizacije posle
Drugog svetskog rata, to se dobro vidi iz pomenute rezolucije Generalne skuptine UN iz
1970. Pravo naroda na samoopredeljenje zagarantovano je u oba pakta UN o ljudskim
pravima iz 1966. godine.
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cija Evropske zajednice za Jugoslaviju (1991-1992). Ta konferencija je potovala naela

meunarodnog prava o samoopredeljenju i nasleivanju drava. Ta naela su preobraena
u obavezne norme samo onda kada je taj organ odluivao o subjektima internog i eksternog
samoopredeljenja, i kada su ih u potpunosti podravale sve strukture meunarodne zajednice i tadanje velike sile. Konferencija je uvaavala etiri napred navedene kategorije i
pokazala da ponaanje drava prema bivoj Jugoslaviji ne moe voditi ka zatiti teritorijalnog integriteteta po svaku cenu, ve da treba nalaziti nove modele samoopredeljenja za
narode Jugoslavije. U tom kontekstu, stvorena su dva modela samoopredeljenja, internog i
eksternog. Prvim se podrazumevalo pravo na zajedniki ivot svih naroda u okviru bivih
jugoslovenskih republika, bez prava na promenu republikih granica, koje su proglaene
meunarodnim granicama od trenutka proglaenja nezavisnosti bivih jugoslovenskih republika. Srpsko angaovanje za stvaranje novih entiteta putem etnikog ienja proglaeni
su nezakonitim na osnovu meunarodnog prava i nisu nagraeni priznanjem, slino kao
to se dogodilo ranije sa Junom Rodezijom u vreme Smitovog reima. Eksternim samoopredeljenjem podrazumevano je pravo bivih jugoslovenskih republika da postanu nove,
suverene i nezavisne drave u okviru administrativnih republikih granica, ukljuujui i
pravo eventualnog udruivanja sa drugim suverenim i nezavisnim dravama, ili osnivanje
novih suverenih i nezavisnih drava od dve ili vie bivih jugoslovenskih republika. U
stvari, ta dva oblika samoopredeljenja nisu bila nita drugo do nove realizacije kolonijalnog samoopredeljenja u kontekstu raspada jedne postojee, suverene i nezavisne drave
- bive Jugoslavije. Nova realizacija ta dva oblika samoopredeljenja snano je potvrena i
u Dejtonu (1995), jer je jo jednom utvreno da meunarodno pravo sledi praksu drava,
a ne obratno. Model Dejtona je, iz pragmatinih razloga, stavio pod jedno okrilje sve
faktike uesnike, dakle i paradravne entitete koji su proizali iz nasilja i genocida, kao
i drugih radnji suprotnih meunarodnom pravu (Republika Srpska u Bosni i Hercegovini i Republika Srpska Krajina u Hrvatskoj). Obrazloenje za prihvatanje paradravnih
entiteta i polulegalnih pokreta prilikom reavanja sporova o samoopredeljenju u bivoj
Jugoslaviji ponovljeno je kasnije u Rambujeu (1999). NATO, odbrambena alijansa hladnog rata, preuzela je ulogu garanta za ostvarivanje novih odredbi meunarodnog prava
koje se tiu potovanja ljudskih prava, prava manjina i vladavine zakona, ali i ouvanja
teritorijalnog integriteta bivih jugoslovenskih republika. Percepcije razliitih strana oko
intervencije NATO-a u bivoj Jugoslaviji se razlikuju i takvo ponaanje je stvorilo razliitu
normativnu argumentaciju tih strana. Po shvatanju Srba, NATO bi na Kosovu po svaku
cenu trebalo da brani teritorijalni integritet SRJ/SCG, isto kao i teritorijalni integritet i
suverenitet Bosne i Hercegovine. Albanci i nesrbi su tu intervenciju videli kao znak realizacije novog naela teritorijalnog integriteta i suvereniteta, dakle da to naelo ne uiva bezuslovnu zatitu ni prema Povelji UN (1945), Kolonijalnoj deklaraciji (1960), Deklaraciji
o odnosima prijateljstva (1970), paktovima iz 1966. godine, kao ni Zavrnom Helsinkom
aktu (1975). Svi ti dokumenti uslovljavaju zatitu potovanjem individualnih i kolektivnih
prava stanovnitva i graana postojeih suverenih drava. To potovanje je nedostajalo
tokom celog perioda srpske vladavine na Kosovu, pa se moe rei da Albanci u tome vide
snaan adut za obrazloenje njihovog zahteva za nezavisnost.

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Osim tog aduta, meunarodno pravo je na strani Kosova i njegovog veinskog naroda i zbog injenice da ni u jednom sluaju, osim 1912-13. godine (posle balkanskih ratova), Kosovo nije bilo deo Srbije i Crne Gore, dakle ni u jednom drugom sluaju Albanci sa Kosova nisu bili dravljani Srbije i Crne Gore. Te dve drave nisu nikada imale
meunarodni, pravno priznati subjektivitet nad Kosovom, osim u pomenutom periodu.
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Domaaj naela samoopredeljenja ogranien je samim tim to svaka grupa ne moe

pretendovati da je narod. Meutim, nijednom obaveznom odlukom nekog meunarodnog
suda ili drugog takvog organa nije definisan pojam naroda. Odgovarajui na zahteve
nekih plemenskih grupa u Kanadi, Komitet UN za ljudska prava odbio je da se izjanjava
o tom pitanju.

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Kako se dobro vidi iz navedenog dela rezolucije iz 1970, pravo na samoopredeljenje ne

predstavlja i pravo na otcepljenje. U meunarodnom pravu se sada govori o unutranjem
samoopredeljenju, koje se zadovoljava time to svaka grupa, naroito manjinska u etnikom
smislu, moe efikasno da bude predstavljena u vlasti i da utie na odluivanje u dravi, i o
spoljnom samoopredeljenju, koje znai pravo na stvaranje sopstvene drave, ako uslovi
unutranjeg samoopredeljenja nisu zadovoljeni. U tom smislu treba verovatno razumeti
izraz sutinska autonomija, koji koriste meunarodni akteri, i rei vie od autonomije,
manje od nezavisnosti, koje se uju od predstavnika Republike Srbije.

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Sada ostaje da se vidi koja e kombinacija dravnih interesa i koja e konfiguracija

snaga u okviru lanica Kontakt grupe dominirati prilikom interpretacije Rezolucije 1244
Saveta bezbednosti UN. Teko je verovati da e u okviru zemalja lanica Kontakt grupe
biti usaglaenosti interesa za srpsku i rusku verziju interpretacije Rezolucije 1244. Interpretacija meunarodnog prava Rezolucije UN 1244 u sluaju Kosova treba da bude
inovativna u svakom pogledu, ukoliko se tei ostvarenju koordinacije i saradnje meu
lanicama Kontakt grupe. U suprotnom, NATO treba da bude spreman da odigra ulogu
srpskih oruanih snaga na Kosovu, znai da brani srpske nacionalne interese i da bude talac
dogmatske i jednostrane interpretacije naela teritorijalnog integriteta i suvereniteta, koji
je nasilno stvoren prema Kosovu u 1992. godini, kada je stvorena SRJ/SCG, drava koju
priznaje Rezolucija UN 1244.
11. januar 2006.

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Poslednji adut, oslonjen na meunarodno pravo, a koji ide u prilog ostvarivanju eksternog
samoopredeljenja Kosova i njegove potpune nezavisnosti, jeste taj to je samoopredeljenje
Kosova deo samoopredeljenja u bivoj Jugoslaviji i ne sme imati drugaiji tretman. Svaki
drugi pristup nema oslonca na vaee meunarodno pravo.

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Combating Hate Speech and Supporting Tolerance

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By Bojan Toncic, Belgrade newspaper Danas

Serbias print media and broadcasters, aside from a few

exceptions often perceived as disturbing by the public, are
continuously spreading hate speech targeting Albanians.
This language is based on stereotypes, half-truths, and often
on lies almost pathological in extent. Professional and ethical standards are ignored, as is basic courteousness; it all
boils down to us and them and giving coverage to nationalistic analysts whose opinions are based on myths and
Bojan Toncic
prejudice. According to public opinions polls, articles and
broadcasts of this sort have contributed to creating a negative disposition towards Albanians among Serbian citizens and encouraging extremist views in regard to resolving the
problem of Kosovo.
Disparaging terms such as Sqhipetar and Arnaut are just the tip of the iceberg and
relatively mild manifestations of this phenomenon. Man-eating sharks and the white Al
Qaeda have appeared in Belgrades high-circulation papers in recent years in connection
with Albanians, as well as in publications that have a nationalistic slant.
Also, as of late there has been a growing presence of radical Islamic religious movements [in addition to the usual and confirmed arms and drug trafficking], especially the
Wahhabi variant, and in some cases Al Qaeda. It is common knowledge that a number of
religious buildings were erected in Kosovo with money from supporters of Osama bin Laden, wrote Democratic Party of Serbia senior official Dusan Prorokovic in the Politika paper. The high-circulation Kurir, Nedeljni Telegraf, Srpski Nacional, and Glas Javnosti are at
the forefront of anti-Albanian analyses and first-hand reports claiming that Kosovo
Serbs will not make it out of the province alive and that Albanians are a threat to civilization. Similar discourse is fostered by the editors of most popular newspapers Vecernje Novosti and Politika. The latter often boasts of being the oldest paper in the Balkans. Both have
a legacy of war-mongering: after the idea of a Greater Serbia was discredited, their pro-war
machinery created in the late 1980s by Slobodan Milosevic, most of their staff turned their
sights on the Kosovo Albanians, catering to the tastes of their faithful readership.
Some media outlets have accused the Albanians of importing terrorism experts. Terror aimed at Serbs requires terrorism experts. However, the Albanian leaders are trying to
avoid compromising themselves through contact with Islamic extremists and are therefore
resorting to EU nationals. It is this very type of terrorist that is trained in the assassination
of VIPs, reported the Tabloid (Stockpiling Arms for the Final Solution, Jan. 25, 2005).
Hygiene is not one of the Albanians strong points. Today, Prizren looks like a flea
market, wrote Politikas reporter after visiting the city (March 7, 2005).

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Let us not lie to one another!

by Bahri Cani, political scientist and correspondent of Deutsche Welle

The shortest answer would be -- no. We are not ready,

because we have not yet learned to think reasonably, independently, without emotions and pressure from others. No,
because we do not want and do not know how to respect
others. No, because we most often want to make our fortune
Bahri Cani
on the misfortune of others. No, because we have not yet
prepared the public for this historic year. No, because we are terribly indoctrinated...

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For the past two decades, every year has been labeled as
historic. This one will be, too. Still, 2006 has a real chance
of being historic, because a resolution is expected in the
Serbia-Kosovo-Montenegro triangle. But, are we ready and
prepared to write history?

I read statements on the web-site of the Serbian government. One obtains an impression
that a war is about to break out?! Murders, persecution, shooting, embezzlement, robberies,
crime...
On that same web-site, Serbian politicians declare that Kosovo is a part of Serbia and
that it will always be so. That they will never accept independence for Kosovo, because
that was against all domestic and international documents.
I read and listen to Kosovo politicians, who claim that standards are being implemented
according to plan. I hear that the Serbs are doing well and that only those rights that they
do not want to exercise are actually being withheld from them. Everything is ready: the
only thing now is to wait for independence, the end of all hardship(?!). But, I no longer
work in Pristina or Belgrade. From the city that was once Germanys capital, Bonn, one
has a somewhat different perspective. Since I am a journalist, working for at least four
departments of the Deutsche Welle, I have had many opportunities to speak with German
and other diplomats, to read and hear about their ideas, comments and suggestions. I know
for certain that the situation in Kosovo is not as black or as white as the Serb and Albanian
sides are making it look.
Wiser men than me have said that politicians worry about next elections, while statesmen worry about the future. And do our politicians, intellectuals and public opinion creators think about the future? Or do they only think about next elections, the sale of their
books or circulation of their newspapers, the ratings of radio and television stations?
For more than ten years, Milosevic has used Kosovo as a trump card for winning or
rigging elections. In the end, he lost the elections because of Kosovo itself -- after a completely pointless war and capitulation. Still, the Serbs were not so blind as to believe Milosevics state, military, police and, above all, media apparatus, which have declared the
defeat a victory.
Unfortunately, the Serbs got the short end of the stick once again. The October revolution has not brought the expected changes. Serbia has been and still is functioning largely
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In the Serbian press extreme chauvinism is fused with fabrications and conspiracy theories. Vecernje Novosti ran a series of articles based on Kosovo: the Black Hole of Europe, by Italians Umberto Tomac and Mariana Cataldo.
An independent state of Kosovo is supported by Germany and the U.S., great powers
that are bent on taking control of the natural resources of this country, according to the
articles authors.

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It is their belief that Kosovos reserves of coal are inexhaustible (tens of billions of
tons of lignite) and that the industrialized nations are searching for new sources of energy (Chasing Out Serbs to Get to Coal, Jan. 25, 2005).
The result of this systematic approach is that the public is dominated by feelings of
hostility towards Kosovo Albanians. According to a study done by Strategic Marketing, a
respected pollster, last year for the European Movement in Serbia, most respondents said
they considered Albanians enemies. Most also described them as a closed community
and bad neighbors. This is no doubt influenced by views expressed by senior government
officials and politicians belonging to leading parties. Their statements on the issue are
dominated by hate speech, rejection of dialog, observations such as that living together
with the Albanians is a burden for democracy in Serbia. Most media outlets feature editorial policies that emphasize such views and statements made by extremists on the Albanian
side in prime time shows or on front pages.
The actions of the media, expression of extremist opinions, hate speech, and incitement
to violence such as that registered in March 2004, when demonstrators in Belgrade and Nis
torched mosques and wrecked business operated by Albanians in response to anti-Serb violence in Kosovo, has yet to be addressed by prosecutors. This too is part of the social atmosphere that fosters the belief that hating Albanians should not be punished and is also a
desirable type of behavior. Serbias police were accomplices to this savagery because they
did nothing to stop it. This and the fact that only a small number of hooligans received mere
slaps on the wrist goes a long way in finishing this monstrous picture.
Key issues that did not receive adequate treatment by the Serbian media are missing
persons, who were instead used to bolster intolerance, and the matter of war crimes, their
perpetrators, their punishment, and their consequences. This is closely related to the Hague
tribunal and the conviction of former police officer Sasa Cvjetan, who served in a paramilitary group called the Scorpions. Stories about exiles, the position of the Kosovo Serbs,
and their return often contain the seed of revenge. Reporting from the field on incidents is
often very direct and fraught with commentary, practically a judgement in itself.
One thing that our media outlets need to do right now is work with the young reporters
who grew up and received their education during the rise of Serb nationalism. Often they
are encouraged by editors who built careers on hate speech to make thoughtless and unprofessional allegations, provide incomplete coverage, distort the truth, choose poor sources,
and cite those that are unnamed. With the expansion of the tabloids, cub reporters are
competing for part-time jobs that are easy to lose. The cure for our sick society is not
solely in the hands of the media. Yet if the media were devoted to encouraging tolerance,
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on the basis of threats, economic and political pressure, instead of on the basis of well-conceived moves of their own. The organizers and perpetrators of the assassination of Zoran
Djindjic have probably never imagined what sort of service they were doing to their
beloved Serbia.

I guess the people are expected to forget that those same politicians, generals and representatives of the media have said that they never saw Mladic in Serbia. People must have
been amazed or must have pinched themselves, not being certain whether they saw Mladic
in the Banovo Brdo district of Belgrade, or his ghost.
It is more likely that the authorities, before and after the October revolution, were
unprepared to rid themselves of the heroes, who have held Serbia hostage for almost a
decade now.

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Pressure will continue: because of Kosovo, The Hague, Montenegro... It was at a very
late date that the so called voluntary extradition of war crime suspects began in Serbia,
and preparations about the possible voluntary extradition of Ratko Mladic and Radovan
Karadzic were being hinted to for the past two months. It sounded ridiculous and completely paradoxical to hear how certain ministers, generals and politicians have only now
discovered that Mladic had been receiving his pension regularly until November! Still, this
discovery could be the first step in preparing the public for the fact that the two main accused for war crimes and genocide must be handed over to the Hague court.

There has been word in public (in the form of a semi-joke) for a while now, that war
crime suspects were Serbias most expensive export goods. I guess it would be so with
Mladic as well, in order for Belgrade to obtain a better position ahead of the final negotiations on Kosovo and to finally receive those promised millions of U.S. dollars. They would
probably request EU membership in exchange for Karadzic.
As for Kosovo, the president, premier, ministers and almost all of Serbian politicians,
are saying that this was the heart, soul and cradle of Serbia.
I would like to ask two questions, one realistic and the other hypothetical -- after which
dozens of other questions add on.
The realistic one first: What if Kosovo becomes independent? Would Serbia start another war? Would politicians lie again, saying that they had done everything humanly possible, but that this wild and hostile West hated the Serbs? Would they, like Seselj and his
Radicals, promise that they would once take Kosovo back? Would Tadic and Kostunica
invent another Kosovo to build their political positions there?
And the other, hypothetical one: What would Serbia do if the Albanians were to say:
OK, Serbia is our state, we want to live in it as equal citizens! Has anyone in Serbia
contemplated a possibility for Agim Ceku to be the chief of staff of the Serbia-Montenegro
Army, for Hashim Thaqi to be interior minister, for Fatmir Limaj to be defense minister,
for Bahri Cani to be foreign minister, or for Ibrahim Rugova to be the president of the
Albanians, Serbs and Montenegrins in a joint state, whatever its name might be? Would
Serb soldiers be safe on the borders between Kosovo and Albania and Kosovo and Macedonia? Does anyone want Kosovo to remain a part of Serbia, as the politicians are saying
it should?
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there would be at least a little hope that the younger generations would not feed on hate of
their neighbors. As an important element in forging opinions, the media have to maintain a
higher level of responsibility for the written and spoken word, which must be subject to
public criticism and sanctions if it exceeds the bounds of freedom of information and fosters hate and violence. Not every idea, platform, and quasi-analysis deserves to be carried
by the media under the pretext of democracy. Journalist associations, which today are
rarely heard when one of their members breaks the rules, must play a much bigger role.
Right now the media situation is very discouraging, but that does not mean it is permissible to flaunt professional standards and ethics.
(Mr Toncic writes for the Belgrade newspaper Danas.)

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January 17, 2006

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I would like to see a public debate in Serbia about all these questions. I would like to
hear politicians, experts, media and ordinary citizens publicly declaring their opinions and
views of this problem, in a sober fashion and without too much emotion (since emotions
can certainly not be completely excluded in such important matters).
That would certainly be in the interest of Serbia. As for me, I promise that I would be
one of the more careful observers of such a discussion and that I would report about it to
the public.
The Kosovo public is also not prepared for all possible solutions. The Albanians must
realize that respect of the rights of the Serbs and other minorities is in their interest. They
must know that any crime, even against the hated Serbs, is punishable. Criminals belong
in prison and citizens must be respected. They must be free, regardless of their ethnic
background.

And what if Kosovo does not become fully independent at this moment, as the politicians are promising?

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Economic and democratic standards are primarily in the interest of Kosovo, and only
after that in the interest of the international community.

A debate about this must also be opened in Kosovo. For a long time now, some sort of
conditional independence has been spoken about in the international public. The former
foreign minister, Goran Svilanovic, spoke about it in public in Belgrade, and was almost
lynched.
Anyone who said in Kosovo that it should remain a part of Serbia would be lynched,
too.
There is less and less time for preparing the public for all the possible solutions. Martti
Ahtisaari stated recently that his contract expires this autumn.
The people must be told the truth, regardless of how bitter it might be.
January 17, 2006

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Kundr gjuhs s urrejtjes pr toleranc

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Shkruan: Bojan Tonqiq, gazetar i s prditshmes Dnevnik nga Beogradi

Mediat e shkruara dhe elektronike, pos prjashtimeve q n opinionin e ktushm kuptohen si incidente, vazhdimisht prhapin gjuhn e urrejtjes ndaj shqiptarve, duke e bazuar
at n stereotipe, informata jo t plota, si dhe n gnjeshtra t cilat kan prmasa patologjike. Nuk ka respektim t standardeve profesionale dhe etike, dhe t mirsjelljes elementare; kryesisht, gjithka kufizohet n ne dhe ata dhe favorizohen analistt nacionalist, t cilt i bazojn vlersimet e tyre n mite dhe paragjykime. Prshkrime t tilla n
emisionet e radiove dhe televizioneve, sipas hulumtimit t opinionit publik, i kan kontribuar mjaft qndrimit negativ t qytetarve t Serbis ndaj shqiptarve, si dhe kan nxitur
qndrime ekstremiste sa i prket zgjidhjes s shtjes s Kosovs.
Termat shiptari dhe arnauti jan ilustrim pr gjuhn e urrejtjes ndaj shqiptarve n
paraqitjen m t but t tyre. Sintagmat si peshkaqen kanibal dhe Al Kaida e bardh
jan paraqitur gjat viteve t fundit jo vetm n gazetat me tirazh t madh nga Beogradi,
por edhe n mediat t cilat pr vete thon se kan karakter kombtar.
Gjithashtu (prve armve dhe narkotikut t dshmuar), kohve t fundit vrehet
prani gjithnj m e madhe e liderve radikal fetar islamik, posarisht e vehabive, e n disa
raste edhe e Al Kaids. sht sekret publik q ndrtimin e disa objekteve fetare n Kosov
e kan financuar pasuesit e Osama bin Ladenit, kshtu thot n shkrimin e tij Dushan
Prokoroviq, nj zyrtar i lart i Partis Demokratike t Serbis, botuar n t prditshmen
Politika. E prditshmja Kuriri, Nedeljni Telegraf, Srpski Nacional, dhe Glas Javnosti u kan prir analizave antishqiptare dhe me informata nga dora e par, sipas t
cilave serbt nuk do t dalin t gjall nga Kosova, prkatsisht shqiptart jan krcnim pr
civilizimin. Nj diskurs i till, gjithashtu, sht edhe nj prej m t rndsishmve n politikn redaktuese t s prditshmes me tirazh m t madh Veernje Novosti, dhe Politika, e cila krenohet se sht gazeta m e vjetr n Ballkan. T dy t prditshmet bartin
hipoteka t rnda t s kaluars; pas falimentimit t ides pr Serbin deri n Karllobag e
Virovitic, makineria e tyre luftnxitse, e krijuar nga Sllobodan Millosheviq n fund t
viteve tetdhjeta dhe n fillim t viteve t nntdhjeta t shekullit t kaluar, sht vrsulur
kundr shqiptarve t Kosovs, duke iu nnshtruar epsheve m t ulta t lexuesve t tyre
besnik.
Nj pjes e mediave akuzojn shqiptart pr importim t ekspertve pr terrorizm.
Pr terror kundr Serbis duhet t shfrytzohen ekspertt e importuar pr terrorizm. Por,
lidert shqiptar i shmangen kontakteve komprometuese me islamistt ekstremist, kshtu q
i angazhojn shtetasit e vendeve antare t Bashkimit Evropian. Dhe mu ky lloj i terroristve sht i trajnuar pr vrasjen e personaliteteve t rndsishme (V.I.P), shkruan Tablloid (Grumbullimi i armve pr zgjidhjen prfundimtare, 25 janar 2005.)

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Mos t gnjehemi!
Autor: Bahri Cani, politolog i diplomuar dhe gazetar i Deutsche Welles

Prgjigja m e shkurtr do t ishte Jo. Nuk jemi t gatshm, sepse end nuk kemi
msuar t mendojm n mnyr t arsyeshme, t pavarur, pa emocione dhe presione nga
jasht. Jo, sepse ende nuk jemi msuar ti respektojm t tjert. Jo, sepse lumturin ton
shum shpesh dshirojm ta ndrtojm n fatkeqsin e t tjerve. Jo, sepse nuk e kemi
prgatitur opinionin publik pr kt vit historik, madje jo deri m tani. Jo, sepse jemi t
indoktrinuar tej mase...

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N 20 vitet e fundit, secili vit sht vlersuar si historik. Edhe ky vit do t vlersohet
si i till. Mirpo, viti 2006 ka me t vrtet shansin q t marr epitetin historik, meqense
pritet sqarimi i marrdhnieve n trekndshin: Serbi-Kosov-Mali i Zi. Por, a jemi ne t
gatshm dhe t prgatitur pr ta shkruar historin?

I shikoj njoftimet pr Kosovn n faqen e internetit t qeveris s Serbis. Krijohet

prshtypja se lufta sa nuk ka filluar?! Vrasje, prznie, gjuajtje me arm, malverzime, plakitje, krime...
N t njjtn faqe interneti, t gjith politikant serb flasin se si Kosova sht pjes e
Serbis dhe se do t mbetet e till. Se ata kurr nuk do ta pranojn pavarsin e Kosovs,
sepse kjo sht n kundrshtim me t gjitha dokumentet e vendit dhe ato ndrkombtare.
Lexoj dhe dgjoj politikant kosovar, t cilt pohojn se standardet po realizohen sipas
planit. E shoh se serbve po u shkon gjithnj e m mir, dhe se u jan cenuar vetm ato t
drejta t cilat ata nuk dshirojn ti shfrytzojn. Gjithka sht gati: Vetm pritet pavarsia, dhe ktu sht fundi i t gjitha t kqijave(?!).
Mirpo, un m nuk punoj n Prishtin e as n Beograd. N Bon, n kryeqytetin e
dikurshm gjerman, njeriu i sheh gjrat m ndryshe. Meqense jam gazetar dhe meqense
punoj pr s paku katr redaksi t Deutsche Welles, shum shpesh kam pasur rastin t
bisedoj me diplomat gjerman dhe t tjer, ti lexoj dhe dgjoj idet e tyre, komentet
dhe sugjerimet. E di me siguri se gjendja n Kosov nuk sht aq zi as aq bardh, ashtu si
e paraqesin pala serbe, apo ajo shqiptare.
Njerzit e menur, edhe para meje kan thn se politikant kujdesen pr zgjedhjet e
ardhshme, derisa burrshtetasit brengosen pr t ardhmen. Por a mendojn politikant,
intelektualt dhe kreatort e mendimit publik pr t ardhmen? Apo vetm pr zgjedhjet,
shitjet e librave ose gazetave t tyre, dgjueshmrin e radiove ose shikueshmrin e televizioneve?
Pr m tepr se dhjet vite, Sllobodan Millosheviq e ka shfrytzuar Kosovn si adut pr
fitimin, ose vjedhjen e zgjedhjeve. N fund, zgjedhjet i ka humbur, kryesisht pr shkak t
Kosovs pas lufts trsisht t pakuptimt dhe kapitullimit. Sidoqoft, serbt nuk kan
qen aq t verbr q t besojn n makinerin shtetrore, ushtarake, policore dhe asaj mediave t Millosheviqit, t cilat humbjen e kan paraqitur si fitore.
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Higjiena nuk sht virtyt i shqiptarve. Prizreni sot duket si nj treg i gjsendeve t
vjetra shkruan korrespondenti i Politiks pas vizits n Prizren (Politika, 7 mars,
2005)
Shovinizmi ekstremist noton n shtypin serb me shpikje dhe teori t mashtrimit. Kshtu, Veernje Novosti publikon fejtonin nga libri i autorve italian, Umberto Tomaci dhe
Marijana Katalldo Kosova-vrima e zez e Evrops.
Shteti i pavarur i Kosovs ka prkrahjen e Gjermanis dhe SHBA-ve, kto fuqi t
mdha t cilat vazhdojn ti vn kthetrat n pasurit natyrore t ktij vendi, thon autort
e ktij fejtoni.

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Vlersimi i tyre sht se rezervat e linjitit n Kosov praktikisht nuk shterren (ka me
dhjetra miliard ton t linjitit), dhe se vendet e industrializuara po hulumtojn burime t
reja t energjis (I przn serbt pr shkak t thngjillit 25 janar 2005)
Pasoj e nj formsimi sistematik t ktill t disponimit t opinionit publik jan qndrimet dominuese armiqsore ndaj shqiptarve t Kosovs. Sipas nj hulumtimi t opinionit publik, t br vitin e kaluar nga Agjencia e respektuar Strategic Marketing pr
nevojat e Lvizjes Evropiane n Serbi, t anketuarit kryesisht kishin qndrim armiqsor pr
shqiptart. Gjithashtu, i vlersojn ata si komunitet i mbyllur dhe fqinj t kqij. N
formimin e qndrime t tilla, gjithsesi se ndikon edhe sjellja e politikanve nga kreu
shtetror dhe i partive m me ndikim; n deklaratat e tyre dominojn gjuha e urrejtjes, refuzimi i dialogut, konstatimet sipas t cilve bashkjetesa me shqiptart sht barr pr
demokracin n Serbi. N politikn redaktuese t shumics s mediave vrehet se deklaratat e tilla, si dhe deklaratat e ekstremistve nga pala shqiptare, plasohen n faqet dhe terminet kryesore.
Sjellja e mediave duke prcjell qndrime ekstreme, gjuha e urrejtjes, thirrja pr dhun
t till si ajo e marsit t vitit 2004, kur n Beograd dhe Nish jan djegur xhamit dhe jan
demoluar lokalet e shqiptarve, si prgjigje e mendur ndaj dhuns s shqiptarve kundr
serbve n Kosov, deri m tash nuk ka hasur n asnj reagim t prokuroris. Dhe kjo sht
pjes e atmosfers n t ciln urrejtja ndaj shqiptarve prjetohet si e padnueshme, pr m
shum edhe si sjellje e dshirueshme nga shoqria. Fakti se policia serbe, pr shkak t
mosreagimit, sht bashkpjesmars n kt huliganizm, si dhe q vetm nj pjes e vogl
e huliganve kan marr dnime simbolike, e prplotsojn kt ambient t shmtuar.
Ndr temat kryesore, t cilat nuk jan trajtuar dhe plasuar n mnyr adekuate n mediat e ktushme t shkruara dhe elektronike jan edhe shtja e t zhdukurve, i cili shfrytzohet si arsye pr prhapjen e jotolerancs, pastaj qndrimi ndaj kriminelve t lufts dhe
pasojave e tyre, prkatsisht gjykimet pr krime lufte, burgosjes s t akuzuarve nga Tribunali i Hags, shqiptimit t dy dnimeve ndaj Sasha Cvjetanit, pjestarit t njsitit t MPBs, Shkorpiont. Tregimet pr prndjekje, pr pozitn e serbve n Kosovs, kthimin,
shpesh prshkohen me thirrje pr revanshizm, ndrkoh q raportimi nga terreni pr
ndonj incident n disa media bhet pa distancim dhe me komente, prkatsisht me gjykimin e dhn.
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Pr fat t keq, serbt prsri kan humbur shortin. Revolucioni i tetorit nuk ka sjell
ndryshimet e pritura. Serbia ka funksionuar edhe m tutje, por edhe sot n numrin m
t madh t rasteve funksionon jo n bazn e lvizjeve vullnetare dhe mir t menduara,
por vetm n baz t krcnimeve, presioneve ekonomike dhe politike. Organizatort dhe
vrassit e Zoran Gjingjiqit, me siguri as nuk e kan parandier se far t keqeje po ja sjellin
vendit t tyre.

Populli ndoshta do t harroj se si m hert t njjtit politikan, gjeneralt e ndryshm

dhe prfaqsuesit e fjals publike kan folur se si nuk e kan par kurr Mlladiqin n Serbi.
Njerzit sht dashur t bjn kryq edhe me dorn e majt, edhe me t djathtn, duke mos
ditur nse n Banovo Brd ata me t vrtet kan par Mlladiqin, apo shpirtin e tij.

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Presionet do t vazhdojn: pr shkak t Kosovs, pr shkak t Hags, pr shkak t Malit

t Zi...Dorzimi i ashtuquajtur vullnetar i t akuzuarve pr krimet e lufts ka filluar shum
von n Serbi. Ndrsa prgatitja e opinionit publik pr dorzimin eventual vullnetar
n Hag t Ratko Mlladiqit dhe Radovan Karaxhiqit, ka filluar t bhet dy muajt e fundit. Tingllon shum qesharake dhe trsisht paradoksale kur disa ministra, gjeneral dhe
politikan zbuluan se Mlladiqi ka marr rregullisht pension deri n nntor! Mirpo ky
zbulim ndoshta paraqet hapin e par n prgatitjen e publikut se dy t akuzuarit kryesor
pr krime t lufts dhe gjenocid duhet t shkojn n Hag.

Mirpo, m tepr do t jet se pushteti, para dhe pas revolucionit t tetorit, nuk ka
dashur t lirohet nga trimat dhe heronjt, t cilt po e mbajn peng Serbin, gati nj
dekad t plot.
Tani e nj koh t gjat, n publik po flitet se si t akuzuarit pr krime lufte paraqesin
mallin m t shtrenjt serb pr eksport. Me siguri q kshtu do t ndodh edhe me Mlladiqin, ashtu q Beogradi do t krijonte nj pozit m t prshtatshme para bisedimeve
prfundimtare pr Kosovn, si dhe do ti fitonte milionat amerikane. Pr Karaxhiqin, me
siguri do t krkojn antarsimin n BE.
Sa i prket marrdhnieve ndaj Kosovs: presidenti, kryeministri, ministrat dhe pothuajse t gjith politikant serb, prap flasin se si ajo paraqet zemrn, shpirtin dhe djepin e
serbizimit.
Po i shtroj dy pyetje, njra shum reale dhe tjetra m hipotetike n t ciln lidhen
dhjetra pyetje t tjera.
E para reale: ka nse Kosova megjithat bhet e pavarur? A do t niset Serbia prap n
luft? A do t gnjejn prap politikant se si kan br gjithka, mirpo ja q ky perndimi
armiqsor dhe i egr i urren serbt? A do t premtojn edhe ata sikurse Shesheli dhe radikalt se hert a von do ta kthejn Kosovn? A do t gjejn Tadiqi dhe Koshtunica ndonj
Kosov t re, n t ciln do ti ndrtojn pozicionet e tyre?...
E dyta hipotetike: far do t bnte Serbia nse shqiptart do t thoshin: OK, Serbia
sht shteti yn, por duam t jemi t barabart n t!
A ka menduar dikush n Serbi rreth mundsis q Agim eku t bhet shef i shtabit
t prgjithshm t Ushtris s Serbis dhe Malit t Zi, q Hashim Thai t jet ministr i
policis, Fatmir Limaj ministr i mbrojtjes, Fahri Musliu ministr i informimit, Bahri Cani
shef i diplomacis, ose q Ibrahim Rugova t bhet president i shqiptarve, serbve dhe
malazezve n shtetin e prbashkt, pa marr parasysh si do t quhej ai? A do t ishin t
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Ajo q n kt moment sht e qart se u mungon mediave tona sht puna me gazetar
t rinj, t cilt jan pjekur dhe shkolluar n kohn e prshkallzimit t nacionalizmit serbomadh; prandaj, ata, shpesh nn presionin e redaktorve t cilt kan br karrier mbi
gjuhn e urrejtjes, leht dhe joprofesionalisht i gjykojn gjrat, japin informata jo t plota,
i ndryshojn tezat n prpjekjet e analizimit, kan zgjedhje t keqe t bashkbiseduesve,
dhe thirren n burime t paidentifikuara. N kohn e tablloidizimit t mediave, gazetart
e rinj vrapojn pr honorar kryesisht t paguar dobt, pr t gjetur pun, t cilat humben
leht. Terapia pr nj smundje t ktill t rnd t shoqris nuk mund t varet vetm nga
mediat, por kur nga faqet e gazetave dhe nga programet e mediave elektronike do t
ndrionte toleranca ndretnike do t kishte sadopak shpres se gjeneratat e reja nuk do t
ushqehen me dhun ndaj fqinjve. Mediat, si segment i rndsishm i formsimit t qndrimeve t qytetarve, duhet t tregojn shkall t lart t prgjegjsis pr fjaln e shkruar
dhe t thn, e cila duhet ti nnshtrohet kritiks publike, por edhe sanksioneve, n rast se
i tejkalon kufijt e informimit t lir dhe bn thirrje pr dhun dhe urrejtje. As t gjitha
idet, programet, gjysmanalizat nuk bn q prmes mediave, nn arsyetimin se sht
fjala pr t drejtn demokratike, t fitojn t drejtn e popullsis. Posarisht ato q nxisin
urrejtje. Nj rol t pashmangshm ktu duhet ta ken shoqatat e gazetaris profesionale t
cilat rrall deklarohen kur ndonjri nga antart e tyre shkelin rregullat.
Situata aktuale n media duket dekurajuese, por kjo nuk do t thot se sht e lejueshme
shkelja e rregullave profesionale dhe t etiks.
17 janar 2006

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sigurt ushtart serb n kufirin midis Kosovs, Shqipris dhe Maqedonis? A ka dikush q
dshiron q Kosova t mbetet brenda Serbis, ashtu si flasin politikant?
Do t dshiroja nse ndokush n Serbi do t hapte diskutim publik rreth t gjitha ktyre
shtjeve. Do t doja nse politikant, ekspertt, mediat dhe njerzit e thjesht, n mnyr
t kthjellt dhe pa emocione t tepruara (meqense sht e qart se n kt moment t
rndsishm nuk mund t prjashtohen emocionet), n mnyr t hapur do ti paraqisnin
mendimet dhe pikpamjet e tyre rreth ktij problemi.

As opinioni Kosovar nuk sht i prgatitur pr t gjitha zgjidhjet e mundshme. Shqiptart duhet ta din se respektimi i t drejtave t serbve dhe t gjitha minoriteteve tjera
sht n interes t tyre. Ata duhet ta din se secili krim sht i ndshkueshm, prfshir
edhe krimet kundr serbve. Vendi i kriminelve sht n burg, ndrsa qytetart duhet t
respektohen. Ata duhet t jen t lir, pa marr parasysh prkatsin e tyre etnike.
Standardet ekonomike dhe demokratike, para s gjithash jan n interes t Kosovs, e
m pastaj edhe n interes t bashksis ndrkombtare.

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N fardo rasti, kjo do t ishte n interes t Serbis. Sa m prket mua personalisht,

premtoj se do t isha njri nga vzhguesit m t vmendshm t nj diskutimi t till, dhe
se do ta njoftoja publikun pr kt.

ka nse Kosova n kt moment nuk e fiton pavarsin e plot, ashtu si premtojn

politikant?
Edhe n Kosov duhet t hapet nj diskutim n lidhje me kt. N qarqet ndrkombtare, tani e nj koh t gjat po flitet pr nj lloj pavarsie t kushtzuar. N lidhje me
kt, n Beograd haptazi ka folur edhe ish ministri i Punve t Jashtme, Goran Svillanoviq,
pr ka kan dashur ta vrasin.
Edhe n Kosov me siguri q do ta ekzekutonin cilindo q do t thoshte se duhet mbetur
n kuadr t Serbis.
Ka mbetur gjithnj e m pak koh pr prgatitjen e opinionit publik rreth t gjitha
zgjidhjeve t mundshme. N fakt, Martti Ahtisaari ka deklaruar se kontrata e tij skadon n
vjesht t ktij viti.
Popullit duhet ti thuhet e vrteta dhe ti paraqitet realiteti, pa marr parasysh se sa i
hidhur sht ai.
17 janar 2006

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Protiv govora mrnje - za toleranciju

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Pie: Bojan Toni, novinar beogradskog dnevnika Danas

Pisani i elektronski mediji u Srbiji, uz izuzetke koji gotovo da se u ovdanjoj javnosti

poimaju kao incident, kontinuirano ire govor mrnje prema Albancima, temeljei ga na
stereotipima, nepotpunim informacijama, esto na laima koje imaju patoloke razmere.
Nema potovanja profesionalnih i etikih standarda, elementarne utivosti; sve se, uglavnom, svodi na mi i oni i favorizovanje analitiara - nacionalista koji svoje procene zasnivaju na mitovima i predrasudama. Takvi napisi, radio i televizijske emisije znaajno su,
prema istraivanjima javnog mnenja, doprineli negativnom stavu graana Srbije prema Albancima i podsticanju ekstremistikih stavova u vezi sa reavanjem kosovskog problema.
Termini iptari i Arnauti su ilustracija za govor mrnje prema Albancima i njegov
tek blai pojavni oblik. Sintagme ajkule ljudoderi i bela Al Kaida pojavljivale su se
proteklih godina u tiranim beogradskim dnevnicima, ali i u medijima koji za sebe tvrde
da imaju nacionalni predznak.
Takoe, u poslednje vreme, belei se (osim dokazanog oruja i narkotika, prim.
aut.) vee prisustvo radikalnih islamskih verskih pravaca, pogotovu vehabija, a u nekim
sluajevima i Al Kaide. Javna je tajna da su izgradnju pojedinih verskih objekata na Kosmetu finansirale pristalice Osame bin Ladena, napisao je visoki funkcioner Demokratske
stranke Srbije Duan Prorokovi, a objavila Politika. Tirani Kurir, Nedeljni telegraf, Srpski nacional i Glas javnosti prednjaili su u antialbanskim analizama i informacijama
iz prve ruke, po kojima se sa Kosova Srbi nee ivi izvui, odnosno da su Albanci pretnja
civilizaciji. Takav diskurs je, takoe, i jedan od kljunih u ureivakoj politici najtiranijeg
dnevnika Veenje novosti, i Politike koja se dii time da je najstariji list na Balkanu.
Oba dnevnika nose teku hipoteku prolosti; nakon kraha ideje o Srbiji do granice Karlobag - Virovitica njihova se ratnohukaka mainerija, koju je s kraja osamdesetih i poetka
devedesetih godina prolog veka kreirao Slobodan Miloevi, personal je samo neznatno promenjen, ostrvila samo na kosovske Albance, podilazei najniim porivima svojih
vernih italaca.
Deo medija optuuje Albance za uvoz strunjaka za terorizam. Za teror po Srbiji treba da se koriste uvezeni strunjaci za terorizam. No, albanske voe izbegavaju
kompromitujue kontakte sa ekstremnim islamistima, pa angauju dravljane zemalja
lanica Evropske unije. I upravo je taj tip terorista obuen za ubijanje V.I. P linosti, pie
Tabloid (Gomilanje oruja za konano reenje, 25. januar 2005).
Higijena Albancima nije jaa strana. Prizren danas izgleda kao buvlja pijaca zabeleie Politikin reporter nakon posete Prizrenu (Politika, 7. mart 2005).
Ekstremni ovinizam preplie se u srbijanskoj tampi sa izmiljotinama i teorijom zavere. Veernje novosti objavie, tako, feljton na osnovu knjige italijanskih autora Um-

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Nemojmo da se laemo!
Autor: Bahri Cani, diplomirani politolog i novinar Doje Vele.

Najkrai odgovor bio bi - ne. Nismo spremni, jer nismo jo nauili da mislimo razumno, samostalno, bez emocija i bez pritisaka sa strane. Ne, jer ne znamo i ne zelimo
da potujemo druge. Ne, jer svoju sreu najee elimo da gradimo na nesrei drugih.
Ne, jer nismo, barem do sada, pripremili javnost za ovu istorijsku godinu. Ne, jer smo
indoktrinisani do zla Boga...
Gledam saoptenja o Kosovu na sajtu Vlade Republike Srbije. Stie se utisak, samo to
nije zapucao rat?! Ubistva, progoni, pucnjave, malverzacije, pljake, kriminal...

Forum

U poslednjih dvadesetak godina, svaka je ocenjena kao istorijska. I ova e. Ipak, 2006.
godina ima stvarno ansi da ponese epitet istorijska, poto se oekuje razjanjenje odnosa
na trouglu: Srbija - Kosovo - Crna Gora. A, da li smo mi spremni i prepremljeni da piemo
istoriju?

Na iston sajtu svi srpski politiari saopstavaju, kako je Kosovo deo Srbije i kako e tako
uvek i ostati. Kako oni nikada nee prihvatiti nezavisnost Kosova, jer je to u suprotnosti sa
svim domaim i meunarodnim dokumentima.
itam i sluam kosovske politiare, koji tvrde kako se standardi realizuju po planu.
Vidim da Srbima ide sve bolje, i da su im uskraena samo ona prava koja oni zapravo
nee da koriste. Sve je spremno: samo se eka nezavisnost, i tu je kraj svih nedaca(?!). Ali,
ja vie ne radim u Pritini niti u Beogradu. U nekadanjoj nemakoj prestonici, u Bonu,
ovek ima neke malo drugaije vidike. Poto sam novinar i poto radim za najmanje etiri
redakcije Dojce Velea, vrlo esto sam imao prilike da razgovaram sa nemakim i drugim
diplomatama, da cictam i sluam i njihove ideje, komentare i sugestije. Znam sigurno da
slika na Kosovu nije tako crno - bela, kao to predstavlja srpska ili albanska strana.
Pametniji ljudi su jo pre mene rekli da politiari brinu za sledee izbore, dok dravnici
brinu za budunost. A da li nai politiari, intelektualci i kreatori javnog mnenja misle na
budunosti? Ili samo na izbore, prodaju svojih knjiga ili novina, sluanost radija ili gledanost televizije?
Vie od deset godina je Slobodan Miloevi koristio Kosovo kao adut za dobijanje, ili
za krau, izbora. Na kraju je izbore izgubio upravo zbog Kosova - nakon totalno besmislenog rata i kapitulacije. Srbi ipak nisu bili toliko slepi da poveruju Miloevievoj dravnoj,
vojnoj, policijskoj i nadasve medijskoj maineriji, koje su poraz proglasile pobedom.
Na alost, Srbi su opet izvukli krau. Oktobarska revolucija nije donela oekivane
promene. I dalje je Srbija funkcionisala, a i danas u ogromnom broju sluajeva, funkcionie
ne na bazi dobrovoljnih i dobro promiljenih poteza, nego samo nakon pretnji, ekonomskih
i politkih pritisaka. Organizatori i ubice Zorana inia verovatno nisu ni slutili kakvu
medveu uslugu ine svojoj Srbiji.
Pritisci e se nastaviti: zbog Kosova, zbog Haga, zbog Crne Gore... U Srbiji je vrlo
kasno poela takozvana dobrovoljna predaja optuenih za ratne zloine. A priprema ja211

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

berta Tomaci i Marijane Kataldo Kosovo - crna rupa Evrope.

Samostalna drava Kosovo ima podrku Nemake i SAD, velikih sila koje nastoje da
se domognu prirodnih bogatstava ove zemlje, istiu autori feljtona.

Forum

Njihova procena je da su rezerve lignita na Kosovu praktino neiscrpe (na desetine

milijardi tona lignita), te da industrijalizovane zemlje tragaju za novim izvorima energije
(Teraju Srbe zbog uglja, 25. januar 2005.).
Posledica ovakvog sistematskog kreiranja raspoloenja javnosti su dominantno neprijateljski stavovi prema kosovskim Albancima. Prema istraivanju respektabilne agencije
Stratedik marketing, uraenom prole godine za potrebe Evropskog pokreta u Srbiji,
ispitanici odgovaraju da, uglavnom, o Albancima misle kao o neprijateljima. Ocenjuju
ih, takoe, kao zatvorenu zajednicu i loe susede. Na takve stavove svakako utie i
ponaanje politiara iz vrha vlasti i najuticajnih partija; u njihovim istupima dominiraju
govor mrnje, odbijanje dijaloga, konstatacije po kojima je suivot sa Albancima teret za
demokratiju u Srbiji. U ureivakoj politici veine medija primetno je da se takvi istupi,
kao i izjave ekstremista sa albanske strane, plasiraju na udarnim stranama i terminima.
Ponaanje medija, iznoenje ekstremnih stavova, govor mrnje, pozivanje na nasilje
kakvo je zabeleeno u martu 2004, kada su u Beogradu i Niu zapaljene damije i demolirani lokali Albanaca, kao sumanuti odgovor na nasilje Albanaca prema Srbima na Kosovu,
nije dosad nailo na bilo kakvu reakciju tuilatava. I to je deo atmosfere u kojoj se mrnja
prema Albancima doivljava kao nekanjivo, tavie kao drutveno poeljno ponaanje.
injenica da je srbijanska policija, zbog neinjenja, sauesnik u divljanju, kao i to to je tek
manji deo huligana dobio simboline kazne, upotpunjuju ovaj nakazni milje.
Kljune teme koje nisu na adekvatan nain obraene i plasirane u ovdanjim pisanim i
elektronskim medijima su problem nestalih koji je korien kao podloga za irenje netrpeljivosti, kao i odnos prema ratnim zloinima i njihovim posledicima, odnosno suenjima
za ratne zloine, hapenjima optuenih pred Hakim tribunalom, izricanju dveju presuda
pripadniku jedinice MUP Srbije korpioni Sai Cvjetanu. Prie o prognanima, poloaju
Srba na Kosovu, povratku, esto imaju neskrivenu nit poziva na revanizam, a izvetavanje
sa terena o incidentnim situacijama je na nekim medijima bez distance i sa komentarom,
odnosno donetom presudom.
Ono to u ovom trenutku naim medijima vidljivo nedostaje je rad sa mladim novinarima koji su stasavali i kolovali se u vreme eskalacije velikosrpskog nacionalizma; zbog
toga oni, esto podstaknuti od urednika koji su gradili karijere na govoru mrnje, olako i
neprofesionalno izriu sudove, nepotpuno izvetavaju, zamenjuju teze u pokuajima analiza, imaju lo izbor sagovornika, pozivaju se na neimenovane izvore. U eri tabloidizacije
medija mladi novinari tre za uglavnom slabo plaenim honoranim nametenjem koje se
lako gubi. Terapija za ovako teko oboljenje drutva ne moe da zavisi samo od medija,
ali kada bi sa novinskih strana i iz programa elektronskih medija zraila meunacionalna
tolerancija bilo bi bar malo nade da se mlade generacije nee napajati mrnjom prema
susedima. Mediji kao znaajan segment kreiranja stavova graana treba da pokau visok stepen odgovornosti za napisanu i izgovorenu re koja mora da bude podlona javnoj
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vnosti za eventualnu dobrovoljnu predaju u Hag, Ratka Mladia i Radovana Karadia,

se nasluuje u poslednja dva meseca. Zvuci smeno i totalno paradoksalno kada neki ministri, generali i politicari otkriju da je Mladi do novembra redovno primao penziju! Ali
je to otkrie valjda prvi korak ka pripremi javnosti da dvojica glavnooptuenih za ratne
zloine i genocid, moraju u Hag.
Valjda e narod da zaboravi da su ranije ti isti politiari, razni generali i predstavnici
javne rei govorili kako Mladia nikada nisu videli u Srbiji. Ljudi su morali da se krste i
levom i desnom, i da se utinu za obraz, ne znajui da li su na Banovom Brdu stvarno videli
Mladia ili njegov duh.

U javnosti se ve dugo govori (u vidu poluvica), kako su optueni za ratne zloine,

najskuplja srpska roba, za eksport. Valjda e tako biti i sa Mladiem, kako bi Beograd
stekao povoljniju poziciju pred finalne pregovore o Kosovu i kako bi dobila te americke
milione. Za Karadia e se verovatno traiti ulanjenje u EU.
to se odnosa prema Kosovu tie: predsednik, premijer, ministri i skoro svi srpski
politiari, opet govore kako je to srce, dua i kolevka srpstva.

Forum

Ipak, pre e biti da vlast, pre i posle oktobarske revolucije, nije htela da se oslobodi
junaka i heroja, koji Srbiju dre kao taoca, ve skoro punu deceniju.

Postavljam dva pitanja, jedno vrlo realno i drugo hipoteticko - na koja se nadovezuju
na desetine ostalih.
Prvo realno: ta ako Kosovo ipak postane nezavisno? Hoe li Srbija opet krenuti u rat?
Hoe li politiari opet da lau kako su uinili sve, ali eto taj divlji i neprijateljski zapad
mrzi Srbe? Hoe li, kao eelj i radikali, obeati da e Kosovo kada tad da povrate? Hoe
li Tadi i Kotunica da nau neko novo Kosovo gde e graditi svoje politike pozicije?...
I drugo hipotetiko: ta bi Srbija uradila kada bi Albanci rekli: OK Srbija je naa drava,
elimo da u njoj budemo ravnopravni! Da li je neko u Srbiji razmiljao o mogunosti da
naelnik Generalstaba Vojske SCG bude Agim eku, da ministar policije bude Haim Tai,
da ministar odbrane bude Fatmir Ljimaj, da ministar informisanja bude Fahri Musljiu, da
ef diplomatije bude Bahri Cani ili da Ibrahim Rugova, bude predsednik Albanaca, Srba i
Crnogoraca u zajednikoj dravi, kako god se ona zvala? Da li bi srpski vojnici na granici
izmeu Kosova i Albanije i Kosova i Makedonije bili bezbedni? Da li neko uopte eli da
Kosovo ostane u okviru Srbije, kako im politiari govore?
Voleo bih kada bi neko u Srbiji otvorio javnu raspravu o svim ovim pitanjima. Voleo
bih kada bi politiari, strunjaci, mediji i obini ljudi, vrlo trezveno i bez suvie emocija
(poto je sigurno da se emocije o ovako vanom pitanju ne mogu totalno iskljuiti), javno
izneli svoja miljenja i vienja ovog problema.
To bi u svakom sluaju bilo u interesu Srbije. to se mene lino tie, obeavam da bih
bio jedan od najpomnijih posmatraa takve diskusije i da bih o tome izvetavao javnost.
O svim moguim solucijama nije pripremljena ni kosovska javnost. Albanci moraju
znati da je postovanje prava Srba i svih ostalih manjina, u njihovom interesu. Moraju znati
da je svaki zloin kanjiv, pa bio to i protiv mrskih Srba. Zloincima je mesto u zatvorima, a graani se moraju potovati. Moraju da budu slobodni, bez obzira gde su im
etnicki koreni.
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kritici, ali i sankcijama, ako prevazilazi okvire slobodnog informisanja i poziva na mrnju
i nasilje. Ni sve ideje, programi, kvazi analize ne smeju putem medija, pod obrazloenjem
da je re o demokratskom pravu, da dobijaju pravo graanstva. Pogotovu one koje generiu
mrnju. Nezaobilaznu ulogu tu bi trebalo da imaju profesionalna novinarska udruenja
koja se retko oglaavaju kada neko od njihovih lanova prekri uzuse.
Danas stanje u medijima deluje obeshrabrujue, to ne znai da je dozvoljeno pogaziti
profesionalna pravila i etiku.

Forum

17. januar 2006.

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Ekonomski i demokratski standardi su pre svega u interesu Kosova, a tek potom

meunarodne zajednice.
A ta ukoliko Kosovo u ovom trenutku ne dobije punu nezavisnost, kako politiari
obeavaju?
O tome se takoe mora otvoriti rasprava i na Kosovu. U meunarodnim krugovima se
odavno govori o nekoj vrsti uslovne nezavisnosti. O tome je u Beogradu javno progovorio
i bivsi ministar inostranih poslova Goran Svilanovi, pa su hteli da ga linuju.
I na Kosovu bi verovatno linovali nekoga ko bi rekao da Kosovo treba da ostane u
okviru Srbije.
Vremena za pripremu javnosti, za sva mogua reenja, je sve manje. Marti Ahtisari je
upravo izjavio da njegov ugovor traje do jeseni ove godine.
17. januar 2006.

Forum

Narodu treba saoptiti istinu i prezentirati realnost, bez obzira koliko je ona gorka.

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Research

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KOSOVO - KOSOVA
Coming to Terms with the Problem of Kosovo:
The Peoples Views from Kosovo and Serbia

About the Poll

This survey of public opinion was undertaken to find out what the people of Kosovo
and Serbia believe needs to be done to bring lasting peace and stability to the region.

Dr. Irwin collected the questions for the survey through extensive interviews (with
Serbs and Albanians) in Kosovo and Serbia during May and June 2005. The questionnaire
was then administered to approximately 1200 people from Kosovo and 1200 people from
Serbia to complete representative samples in terms of age, gender, social class, political
and ethnic affiliation and geographical area for a total of approximately 2400 interviews.
To make sure all groups were brought into this programme of research these interviews
included special booster samples of Serbs in Kosovo enclaves and Serb IDPs in Serbia.
The interviews for the poll were conducted between August 26th and September 2nd 2005.
In Serbia the fieldwork was carried out by Strategic Marketing Research of Belgrade and
in Kosovo by Strategic Puls Research of Tirana, Albania.

Research

The research was carried out by the Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in South
East Europe from Thessaloniki in Greece, KosovaLive in Pristina and Beta Media Center
in Belgrade with advice from Dr. Colin Irwin from the Queens University Belfast, Northern Ireland.

The results are being made available for public access on the internet, in the local newspapers and in reports that will be given to all the political parties in Kosovo and Serbia as
well as all the major international organisations working in the region.
Topics covered include the problems faced by the people, their politicians and the international community in the region, what will happen if these problems are not properly
addressed and a range of solutions to deal with these problems.
For further technical details see Methodology, Questionnaire and Demographics in the
Appendix.

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About the Project

The Albanian-Serb Information Exchange Forum

Three project partners - the Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast
Europe (CDRSEE) in Thessaloniki, the Beta Media Center in Belgrade and KosovaLive
agency in Pristina have jointly established an internet based, interactive news resource
called, The Albanian-Serb Information Forum. The Forum is locally owned and uses three
languages: Albanian, English and Serbian. The actions of the project consist of creating an
Internet Forum, providing a news service in three languages, conducting opinion polls, and
convening two conferences for journalists. Re-establishing direct information exchange
channels between Albanians and Serbs is crucial in the year 2005 and www.kosovakosovo.
com will do just that.

Research

Objectives
The overarching and long-term objective of this project is to broaden and strengthen the
common ground between Serb and Albanian media and journalists as well as the respective societies at large. The idea is to help enhance a robust peace process between the two
communities which will in one other shape or form inevitably take place in the immediate
future. A public support for it could be enhanced through the power of the media.
The specific project objectives are:
To facilitate and improve dialogue between Albanian and Serb journalists and media
and their readers;
To combat stereotypes that Serbs and Albanians have of each other by providing informed and reliable news;
The above objectives would be achieved through the following time-bound project
aims:
To re-establish direct information channels between Albanians and Serbs;
To improve the quality and accuracy of the news in the Albanian and Serb communities
in the region and in the diaspora;
To increase the availability to the public of good quality news on the other community;
To increase the communication and contacts between Albanian and Serb journalists;
To de-polarise the extreme views that Serbs and Albanians have of each other through
conducting and publishing an opinion poll.
Project partners
CDRSEE: The Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast Europe
(CDRSEE) was founded in The Netherlands in 1998 by private citizens from the SEE re220

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gion, and from Western Europe and the United States. The aim of the CDRSEE is to foster
democratic, pluralist, and peaceful societies in Southeast Europe by advocating principles
of social responsibility, sustainable development, and reconciliation among the peoples in
the region. The CDRSEE currently has six full time staff members, and five interns. The
CDRSEE activities raise awareness via publications, workshops, textbook analysis, academic conferences, opinion polls, training sessions, and cultural and artistic programmes.
The CDRSEE is currently running four major projects: the Joint History Project, Disclosing Hidden History: Lustration in the Western Balkans, Our Town Our Future, the Serb
Albanian Information Exchange Forum, as well as several smaller initiatives.

Beta Media Center: Beta Media Center is the not-for-profit arm of BETA news agency, established in 2004. The Centers Council brings together a number of prominent public
figures intent on strengthening the freedom and responsibility of the media in Southeastern
Europe . The Beta Media Center has taken over the agencys non-commercial activities,
which aim at raising public awareness of current affairs and, particularly, of contentious
political, economic and social issues. The Beta news agency began operating in 1994 and
has meanwhile grown into one of the leading news agencies of the Western Balkans. The
agency has over 600 customers at home and abroad, and a staff consisting of 250 journalists, translators, technicians and office personnel. Beta also has a well developed network
of correspondents in Southeastern Europe and elsewhere in the world. For more information on Beta visit www.beta.co.yu

Research

KosovaLive news agency: Since the end of 2000, when it was launched, KosovaLive
has been the main local provider of daily news from Prishtina and Kosova with a focus on
grass roots issues of everyday life in English and Albanian. It was established as an unaffiliated nonprofit NGO and supported by contributions from a consortium of donors . The
staff consists of 10 journalists and 4 translators, while KosovaLive also employs 15/20
stringers/correspondent throughout Kosovo and in Albania, Macedonia and Montenegro .
Starting 2001, KosovaLive provides a subscription paid service to media and organizations. The first category includes print and broadcasters, among them most relevant local
radio stations in towns throughout Kosova, for most of which KosovaLive is the main
source of information. The other category includes local and international governmental
and non-governmental institutions/organizations.

Contact information
CDRSEE Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast Europe
Nenad SEBEK Executive Director
Phone: + 30 2310 960-820/1
Fax: + 30 2310 960-822
9 Krispou St.
54634 Thessaloniki
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Greece.
KosovaLive
Kelmend HAPCIU Manager/Editor-in-chief
Media House Annex, Top Floor
Prishtina, Kosovo/UNMIK
Phone : +381 38 248 276, 248 277
Fax: +381 (038) 248 319.
Medijski Centar BETA
Ljubica MARKOVIC Chair
Srpskih Vladara 4
11000 Beograd
Serbia and Montenegro

Research

Phone + 381 11 3602 400

Fax + 381 11 687 869.
Donors
The Albanian Serb Information Exchange Forum was made possible through support
provided by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, the German Government via the Stability Pact,
the Institut fr Auslandsbeziehungen e.V. (IFA), International Research and Exchanges
Board (IREX), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), UNESCO, and the Kosovo Mission of the US Agency for International Development (under the
terms of award No. 167-A-00-01-00107-00). The opinions expressed herein are those of
the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the organisers or of the donors listed
above.

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Executive Summary
About the research
Using methods well tried in Northern Ireland and other parts of the Balkans a public
opinion poll was simultaneously run in both Serbia and Kosovo to find out what the people
there believe needs to be done to bring lasting peace and stability to the region. Critically
the poll has several distinctive features.
1. The questions were drafted through in depth interviews with politicians, journalists and
academics from both Kosovo and Serbia. The questions asked were therefore the questions the people of Kosovo and Serbia wanted answers to.
2. The same questions were asked in both Kosovo and Serbia so that comparisons could
easily be made on all matters of concern to both peoples.
3. The research and all the results are being made public to ensure high professional standards, stimulate public debate, assist negotiations and foster positive public diplomacy.

1. Amongst Kosovo Albanians the top priorities remain Kosovos final status and the
economy while for Kosovo Serbs it is the power supply and security. For Sebia Serbs
it is security and missing persons and for Serb IDPs it is the return process. Fortunately
both communities do recognise these problems as problems, particularly the economy,
although their priorities are different.
2. With regards to final status Kosovo Albanians believe lack of agreement is holding
back the economy, creating instability and could lead to a new war if Kosovo remains
part of Serbia. Serbs believe an independent Kosovo will be unsafe and will lead to an
exodus of Serbs from Kosovo. But both communities believe there should be a role for
Kosovo Serbs in negotiations.

Research

The problems

3. When it comes to relations between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs they share a common
concern about the negative effects of the war with regards to missing persons and so
many killed. They also share a concern about those involved in the war being in government or the police. But each side also believes the other still wants a greater Albania
or greater Serbia and while Kosovo Albanians still consider past discrimination to be a
major problem Serbs are concerned that Kosovo Albanians will not condemn Albanian
ethnic violence.
4. Everyone wants improvements to the criminal justice system including a multiethnic
police service where required. However, Kosovo Albanians do not seem to share the
same level of very deep concern that Serbs have with regards to their security and lack
of freedom of movement.
5. Serbs are more worried about the future if these problems are not solved. Particularly
organised crime. However neither Serbs nor Kosovo Albanians believe the international community will isolate them.

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The solutions
6. Kosovo Albanians want to be treated as equals by Serbs and Serbs want to be made
welcome in Kosovo and Pristina. In this regard both communities are able to agree
on a significant list (but not all) of confidence building measures ranging from student
exchange, support for Serbian TV, a common Balkan history curriculum etc. etc.
7. With regards to the future of Mitrovica Kosovo Albanians and Serbs can only agree to
disagree. One group want the city divided the other united. It seems to have come to
symbolise the problem of Kosovo in microcosm. But both Kosovo Albanians and Serbs
want all possible measures taken to strengthen the rule of law including police reform, a
special property court and the prosecution of all ethnic crimes with the highest possible
penalties.

Research

8. With regards to negotiations and procedural issues Kosovo Albanians want a referendum in Kosovo and Serbs want a referendum in Serbia. This is to be expected as is a
desire by both communities for negotiations to proceed in as open a way as may be possible. Everyone also wants to see Kosovo Serbs represented at the negotiating table.
9. The general consensus over most matters of procedure breaks down when it comes to
matters of substance. Eighty one percent of Kosovo Albanians consider full independence essential while 69% of Kosovo Serbs, 65% of Serbia Serbs and 73% of Serb
IDPs consider Kosovo remaining part of Serbia to be essential. However, beyond
these initial negotiating positions there is scope for some flexibility in the context of
a continued NATO presence, EU membership, economic development, meeting Standards before final status and Serbs being able to retain their citizenship.
10. When looked at jointly, from the perspective of both communities, the least unacceptable option for a constitutional package seems to be Kosovo as a protectorate of the
EU at only 20% unacceptable for Kosovo Albanians, 58% for Kosovo Serbs, 60% for
Serbia Serbs and 58% for Serb IDPs.
11. Similarly more Kosovo Albanians, Kosovo Serbs and Serb IDPs would elect to stay in
or return to Kosovo as a EU protectorate at 83%, 45% and 27% respectively. Under the
ideal conditions of complete safety, choice of citizenship and full equality these figures
rise to 83% for Kosovo Albanians, 71% for Kosovo Serbs and 61% for Serb IDPs.
Conclusion
As all the questions on relations between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs would indicate,
along with all the questions on matters of security, the ideal solution of complete safety,
choice of citizenship and full equality is at best an aspiration that could be strived for. It is
a dream that would take at least a lifetime to achieve if ever. But what can be achieved is
real progress towards this ideal in terms of social and political reform in combination with
suitable constitutional arrangements that will go as far as such arrangements can to ensure
security for all. By bringing together the most workable elements of all the questions reviewed in the second half of this report this can be done and this must be the objective of
the negotiations ahead. Implementation, however, will take time. Fortunately both Kosovo
Albanians and Serbs welcome the involvement of the international community, particularly the EU, whose influence in the region is clearly on the rise.
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Introduction

In the modern political world of international norms, globalisation, mass media and an
increasingly wellinformed electorate, solutions to political, economic and social problems
require a discourse and decisionmaking process that engages with the leadership, civil society and population at large. Achieving such a process in divided societies is problematic
and requires every possible assistance and support. However, by taking advantage of some
features that characterise and shape contemporary societies, it is possible to initiate a process of top-down and bottom-up communication and centre-out to polarities-in decisionmaking that can bring divided communities closer to a consensus as to how they can
best manage their affairs. By pro-actively testing public opinion as part of the search for
compromise and common ground, it is possible for negotiators to build consensus and
strengthen the potential for political stability, economic prosperity and the degree of social
cohesion necessary to sustain them.
To this end, nine surveys of public opinion were conducted in support of the Northern
Ireland peace process between April 1996 and February 2003. Critically the questions for
eight of these polls were drafted and agreed with the co-operation of party negotiators to
enhance the peace process by increasing party inclusiveness, developing issues and language, testing party policies, helping to set deadlines and increase the overall transparency
of negotiations through the publication of technical analysis and media reports.

Research

Social and political conflicts are a major source of instability in the world today. They
affect not just the countries in which they occur, but very often engulf their neighbors and
have a potential to throw entire regions into turmoil. Even if settlements are reached they
often remain unstable resulting in a return to violence or necessitating ongoing intervention
by the international community. Tragically Kosovo may be such a case. But the potential
for the success of peace processes can be greatly increased when all sections of society are
provided with opportunities to become active partners in their own peace process. Imposed
solutions and deals done behind closed doors and backed up with international pressure
and force may bring temporary relief to apparently intractable problems. But home grown
solutions that have the widest possible support amongst the various elements that make up
a society are essential for progress towards long-term stability and peace.

In so far as it was possible the parties were given ownership of the research so that
they would take the results seriously. Each party to the negotiations nominated a member
of their team to work with the facilitator on the polls. Questions were designed to test
party policies as a series of options or preferences from across the social and political spectrum. The moderating voice of the silent majority was thus given expression while extremist positions were demonstrated to be marginal with little cross community support.
All questions, options and preferences had to be agreed as not being partisan or misleading.
From the drafting of these questions to sample design, ethics, timing and publication, the
programme of research was decided by all the parties and they were encouraged to take the
work in any direction that they believed would be helpful to the peace process.
The focus of the research was on problems, solutions and policies for conflict resolution
as opposed to inter-community attitudes and values. Personality and popularity contest
questions were avoided unless it was clear that running such a question would help to solve
a problem. Questions were pitched at what most people could understand most of the time
NOT at the lowest common denominator. All relevant issues were covered and NO irrele225

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

vant issues. All the results were also made publicly available effectively giving the wider
community a seat at the negotiating table and exposing the research to the highest standards of peer review and public scrutiny. There was no cherry picking of the results. Everyone had to deal with all the issues that were raised as part of what became a pre-negotiation problem solving exercise.
This inter-track activity, that extended across the political spectrum to all the major parties, civil society and the public at large helped to build a consensus for the Belfast Agreement that lead to a successful referendum and subsequent period of increasing stability and
peace. In an effort to internationalize this work a book The Peoples Peace Process in
Northern Ireland was published by Palgrave/MacMillan; numerous papers and reports
have also been made available on the project website at peacepolls.org; a poll was completed in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in 2002, Bosnia Herzegovina in
2004 and Alexandros Lordos initiated a similar programme of research in Cyprus in 2004
and 2005. The Northern Ireland methods can and have been applied successfully elsewhere.

Research

The poll reviewed in this report is a first attempt to replicate these methods in Kosovo
and Serbia. Uniquely the same set of questions has been asked in both societies and representatives of these different communities wrote them. Politicians, journalists, academics,
civil servants and business people all made a contribution to drafting the questions and all
sections of the two populations had an opportunity to answer them.
It is not up to me to say if this or that solution is the best solution to deal with the problems that must be faced by the people of Kosovo and Serbia or even if this or that question
is the right question to be asked. It is up to the people of Kosovo and Serbia and their
elected representatives to do this. This report contains a wealth of interesting responses to
the questions that the people of Kosovo and Serbia wanted answers to. It provides a basis
for much rich and fruitful discussion for the people, their elected representatives and the
negotiating teams who must now shoulder the responsibility of their respective communities future security and prosperity.
In this regard I hope they will find this report of value and I wish them every success in
their endeavours.
Colin Irwin.
Belfast, October 2005.

226

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

Part 1
Problems
1. The range of problems
The question
Firstly with regards to the range of problems that need to be dealt with please indicate
which ones you consider to be Very Significant, Significant, Of Some Significance, Of
Little Significance or Of No Significance at all.
Kosovo Albanian priorities
From a list of 31 items (see tables 1.1 to 1.6) the top five priorities for Kosovo Albanians are Kosovos final status at 87% very significant followed by unemployment at 85%,
the weak economy at 75%, corruption at 70% and education standards also at 70%.

87%
85%
75%
70%
70%

Research

Very Significant - Kosovo Albanian

1 Kosovos final status
2 Unemployment in Kosovo
3 The weak economy of Kosovo
4 Corruption in Kosovo
5 Kosovo education standards

In polls run by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and others final
status and unemployment have also come out as the top priorities for Kosovo Albanians.
This result is consistent with those results.
Serbian priorities
For Serbs living in Kosovo the top priority is the power supply at 78% very significant.
But for Serbs living in Serbia it is security at 83% very significant and for Serb IDPs in
Serbia it is missing persons and the return process for IDPs both at 84%.
Very Significant - Kosovo Serb
1 Kosovo power supply

78%

2
3
4
5

Public and personal security

in Kosovo
Return
process
of
IDPs/refugees
Kosovos final status
Missing persons

83%

Serbia Serb IDPs

1 Missing persons

84%

74%

Serbia Serb
1 Public and personal security
in Kosovo
2 Missing persons

76%

84%

72%

Organised crime in Kosovo

72%

65%
62%

4
5

Kosovos final status

Return
process
IDPs/refugees

72%
71%

4
5

of

Return
process
of
IDPs/refugees
Public and personal security
in Kosovo
The rights of victims
Kosovos final status

83%
82%
79%

These results are also consistent with similar polls run in Kosovo which place personal security at the top of the Kosovo Serb list. But it is only number 2 here behind power
227

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

supply which does not even get into the top five for Serbia Serbs and Serb IDPs. For all
Serbs the other top items are the rights of victims, Kosovos final status and organised
crime.
Others
The priorities for the others in both Kosovo and Serbia seem to reflect the views of the
majority population in both places. Although, as minorities in both societies with a slightly
different set of interests their top 5 priorities come out a little different with a stronger emphasis on unemployment (94% very significant in Kosovo) and Serb and Albanian relations (65% very significant in Serbia).
Very Significant - Kosovo Others
1 Unemployment in Kosovo
2 Kosovos final status
3 Kosovo power supply
4 Organised crime in Kosovo
5 The weak economy of Kosovo

94%
82%
77%
75%
68%

Serbia Others
1 Public and personal security in Kosovo
2 Organised crime in Kosovo
3 The rights of victims
4 Missing persons
5 Serb and Albanian relations

71%
69%
67%
67%
65%

Research

Some points of disagreement

49% of Kosovo Albanians consider the role of the Serbian government in the affairs of
Kosovo to be of no significance while only 1% of Kosovo Serbs share this view. Conversely 19% of Kosovo Serbs consider the actions of the Kosovo government to be of no
significance while only 1% of Kosovo Albanians share this view. Acknowledging and accepting the role of both the governments in Pristina and Belgrade as having a legitimate
role in the affairs and future of the peoples of Kosovo seems to be problematic for a significant percentage of both communities in Kosovo.
Of no significance
The role of the Serbian government in the affairs of Kosovo
The actions of the Kosovo government

Kosovo
Albanian
49%
1%

Kosovo
Serb
2%
19%

Serbia
Serb
4%
7%

Serbia
Serb IDPs
4%
6%

Some points of agreement

Public and personal security came in at number 8 on the list of 31 items for Kosovo
Albanians (65% very significant). So they share this concern with Serbs although it is not
such a big problem for them. Power supply came in at 6 (69% very significant). Serbs are
also concerned about the final status of Kosovo being 4th or 5th on their lists of priorities
- and so on and so on. The point to be made here is that although everyones order of priorities is different Albanians and Serbs seem to share, or understand or at the very least
acknowledge each others priorities. In all of this there is clearly a shared basis for discussion and points of negotiation. Reaching an agreement, however, may be quite another
matter.
The other important conclusion to take away from this analysis is that nearly all of the
31 items in this list are recognised as being problems by Kosovo Albanians and Serbs alike.
228

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

Very few items are listed as being of no significance by one community or the other. But
this list of items is very broad indeed ranging from security to sports facilities. With a
tighter focus on the central points of disagreement between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs it
may not be possible to sustain this degree of apparent consensus.

Of No
Significance

87%
85%
75%
70%
70%
69%
67%
65%
61%
54%
53%
51%
46%
43%
40%
35%
35%
32%
31%
30%
28%
27%
20%
19%
19%
17%
16%
9%
8%
6%
5%

11%
13%
22%
25%
26%
25%
23%
30%
36%
41%
40%
30%
37%
33%
32%
45%
52%
47%
50%
44%
44%
44%
40%
37%
34%
40%
45%
18%
28%
19%
9%

2%
1%
3%
4%
5%
5%
8%
6%
3%
4%
5%
11%
12%
18%
19%
17%
12%
16%
16%
22%
25%
21%
29%
30%
34%
33%
25%
25%
28%
28%
16%

0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
1%
0%
0%
0%
1%
7%
3%
5%
8%
3%
1%
4%
2%
3%
3%
6%
11%
13%
11%
7%
10%
31%
31%
33%
22%

0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
1%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
2%
1%
0%
0%
0%
1%
0%
0%
0%
2%
1%
1%
3%
3%
3%
17%
6%
13%
49%

Research

Of Little
Significance

Kosovos final status

Unemployment in Kosovo
The weak economy of Kosovo
Corruption in Kosovo
Kosovo education standards
Kosovo power supply
The actions of the Kosovo government
Public and personal security in Kosovo
The quality of Kosovo healthcare services
Missing persons
Organised crime in Kosovo
Environment issues in Kosovo
Irresponsible politicians
Police reform in Kosovo
Kosovo day care facilities
The rights of victims
The quality of Kosovo transportation and communications
The role of the international community in the affairs of Kosovo and Serbia
Lack of prosecution of war crimes
Ineffective criminal justice system
Kosovo privatisation
The actions of the UN authority in Kosovo (UNMIK)
Lack of cultural events in Kosovo
Poor sports facilities in Kosovo
Decentralisation of government in Kosovo
Biased media in Kosovo
Return process of IDPs/refugees
Reconciliation
Serb and Albanian relations
Serb Albanian language barrier
The role of the Serbian government in the affairs of Kosovo

Of Some
Significance

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

Significant

Question 1 - Firstly with regards to the range of problems that need to be dealt with
please indicate which ones you consider to be Very Significant, Significant, Of
Some Significance, Of Little Significance or Of No Significance at all.

Very
Significant

Table 1.1. Question 1 Kosovo Albanian

229

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

230

Of Little
Significance

Of No
Significance

Kosovo power supply

Public and personal security in Kosovo
Return process of IDPs/refugees
Kosovos final status
Missing persons
Organised crime in Kosovo
The weak economy of Kosovo
Unemployment in Kosovo
The role of the international community in the affairs of Kosovo and Serbia
The role of the Serbian government in the affairs of Kosovo
Environment issues in Kosovo
Corruption in Kosovo
Ineffective criminal justice system
Lack of prosecution of war crimes
The rights of victims
The quality of Kosovo transportation and communications
Kosovo privatisation
Serb and Albanian relations
Irresponsible politicians
The quality of Kosovo healthcare services
Kosovo day care facilities
Decentralisation of government in Kosovo
Reconciliation
Biased media in Kosovo
The actions of the UN authority in Kosovo (UNMIK)
Police reform in Kosovo
Kosovo education standards
Serb Albanian language barrier
Poor sports facilities in Kosovo
The actions of the Kosovo government
Lack of cultural events in Kosovo

Of Some
Significance

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

Significant

Research

Question 1 - Firstly with regards to the range of problems that need to be dealt with
please indicate which ones you consider to be Very Significant, Significant, Of
Some Significance, Of Little Significance or Of No Significance at all.

Very
Significant

Table 1.2. Question 1 - Kosovo Serb

78%
74%
72%
65%
62%
61%
53%
53%
52%
52%
50%
49%
48%
47%
42%
39%
39%
38%
38%
36%
36%
36%
34%
34%
34%
30%
26%
21%
21%
19%
18%

17%
24%
24%
27%
29%
31%
38%
31%
32%
30%
26%
31%
40%
35%
43%
41%
32%
33%
31%
42%
29%
28%
34%
45%
42%
39%
45%
33%
31%
29%
37%

1%
1%
3%
6%
1%
4%
3%
9%
11%
9%
11%
13%
7%
13%
9%
16%
15%
19%
22%
17%
20%
20%
19%
12%
16%
19%
22%
25%
29%
22%
35%

1%
0%
0%
1%
4%
3%
3%
2%
4%
6%
7%
3%
5%
4%
3%
1%
12%
7%
4%
1%
5%
8%
8%
4%
6%
8%
3%
19%
12%
12%
7%

4%
1%
1%
1%
4%
1%
3%
5%
1%
2%
6%
4%
1%
2%
2%
4%
2%
3%
4%
4%
10%
9%
4%
5%
1%
4%
3%
3%
8%
19%
3%

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

Of No
Significance

94%
82%
77%
75%
68%
67%
66%
60%
57%
56%
45%
45%
41%
40%
40%
36%
36%
34%
26%
17%
17%
15%
15%
14%
10%
9%
8%
5%
3%
3%
0%

3%
10%
19%
25%
25%
29%
32%
20%
35%
36%
39%
45%
41%
39%
33%
39%
41%
55%
43%
26%
40%
42%
16%
14%
43%
38%
44%
56%
53%
25%
9%

3%
5%
4%
0%
6%
3%
0%
11%
3%
8%
3%
11%
18%
16%
27%
22%
23%
11%
30%
40%
43%
25%
49%
25%
28%
47%
42%
30%
28%
18%
37%

0%
2%
0%
0%
0%
0%
2%
2%
0%
0%
13%
0%
0%
5%
0%
3%
0%
0%
0%
17%
0%
18%
18%
10%
19%
6%
4%
9%
16%
45%
48%

0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
6%
5%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
2%
37%
0%
0%
2%
0%
0%
9%
6%

Research

Of Little
Significance

Unemployment in Kosovo
Kosovos final status
Kosovo power supply
Organised crime in Kosovo
The weak economy of Kosovo
Public and personal security in Kosovo
Missing persons
The actions of the Kosovo government
Kosovo education standards
The quality of Kosovo healthcare services
Corruption in Kosovo
Lack of prosecution of war crimes
Kosovo day care facilities
Kosovo privatisation
Environment issues in Kosovo
Return process of IDPs/refugees
The rights of victims
The quality of Kosovo transportation and communications
Irresponsible politicians
Decentralisation of government in Kosovo
Ineffective criminal justice system
The actions of the UN authority in Kosovo (UNMIK)
Serb and Albanian relations
The role of the Serbian government in the affairs of Kosovo
Biased media in Kosovo
Lack of cultural events in Kosovo
Police reform in Kosovo
The role of the international community in the affairs of Kosovo and Serbia
Poor sports facilities in Kosovo
Reconciliation
Serb Albanian language barrier

Of Some
Significance

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

Significant

Question 1 - Firstly with regards to the range of problems that need to be dealt with
please indicate which ones you consider to be Very Significant, Significant, Of
Some Significance, Of Little Significance or Of No Significance at all.

Very
Significant

Table 1.3. Question 1 - Kosovo Others

231

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

232

Of Little
Significance

Of No
Significance

Public and personal security in Kosovo

Missing persons
Organised crime in Kosovo
Kosovos final status
Return process of IDPs/refugees
Serb and Albanian relations
Corruption in Kosovo
The rights of victims
Ineffective criminal justice system
Unemployment in Kosovo
Reconciliation
Irresponsible politicians
Lack of prosecution of war crimes
Kosovo power supply
The role of the Serbian government in the affairs of Kosovo
Police reform in Kosovo
The quality of Kosovo healthcare services
Kosovo education standards
The role of the international community in the affairs of Kosovo and Serbia
Biased media in Kosovo
Kosovo day care facilities
The weak economy of Kosovo
The quality of Kosovo transportation and communications
The actions of the Kosovo government
Decentralisation of government in Kosovo
The actions of the UN authority in Kosovo (UNMIK)
Environment issues in Kosovo
Kosovo privatisation
Serb Albanian language barrier
Lack of cultural events in Kosovo
Poor sports facilities in Kosovo

Of Some
Significance

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

Significant

Research

Question 1 - Firstly with regards to the range of problems that need to be dealt with
please indicate which ones you consider to be Very Significant, Significant, Of
Some Significance, Of Little Significance or Of No Significance at all.

Very
Significant

Table 1.4. Question 1 - Serbia Serb

83%
76%
72%
72%
71%
69%
65%
65%
65%
59%
57%
57%
57%
55%
51%
50%
48%
45%
45%
43%
43%
40%
36%
36%
35%
34%
31%
30%
29%
20%
13%

13%
21%
23%
21%
21%
21%
26%
28%
27%
24%
23%
29%
29%
31%
29%
33%
31%
32%
27%
34%
32%
34%
36%
33%
35%
27%
28%
31%
25%
28%
23%

1%
2%
3%
5%
5%
6%
7%
5%
6%
11%
10%
9%
9%
10%
10%
11%
13%
14%
14%
15%
14%
14%
17%
16%
17%
17%
19%
23%
21%
26%
29%

2%
0%
1%
1%
2%
2%
2%
1%
1%
4%
5%
3%
3%
3%
6%
4%
6%
6%
7%
6%
7%
8%
8%
9%
7%
13%
12%
9%
14%
15%
18%

1%
0%
1%
2%
1%
1%
1%
1%
1%
2%
5%
1%
3%
1%
4%
2%
2%
3%
7%
2%
4%
5%
2%
7%
5%
9%
9%
7%
11%
10%
16%

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

Of No
Significance

84%
84%
83%
82%
79%
78%
76%
75%
72%
71%
70%
68%
67%
65%
62%
60%
56%
55%
54%
51%
50%
48%
47%
46%
46%
43%
42%
41%
38%
31%
26%

13%
15%
15%
17%
16%
17%
11%
19%
20%
21%
25%
21%
20%
18%
26%
22%
21%
26%
21%
26%
28%
33%
26%
20%
28%
25%
31%
17%
27%
17%
12%

3%
1%
1%
1%
5%
4%
7%
4%
7%
4%
3%
7%
5%
14%
5%
10%
15%
16%
14%
12%
14%
9%
13%
14%
20%
22%
19%
26%
17%
20%
17%

0%
1%
0%
0%
0%
0%
6%
2%
0%
3%
2%
4%
3%
1%
2%
7%
5%
2%
8%
5%
2%
6%
8%
12%
3%
4%
5%
10%
13%
15%
22%

0%
0%
1%
0%
0%
1%
1%
0%
0%
1%
0%
1%
4%
1%
4%
1%
4%
1%
3%
6%
6%
4%
5%
8%
4%
5%
2%
6%
5%
17%
22%

Research

Of Little
Significance

Missing persons
Return process of IDPs/refugees
Public and personal security in Kosovo
The rights of victims
Kosovos final status
Organised crime in Kosovo
Serb and Albanian relations
Ineffective criminal justice system
Kosovo power supply
Corruption in Kosovo
Lack of prosecution of war crimes
Irresponsible politicians
Reconciliation
Biased media in Kosovo
The role of the Serbian government in the affairs of Kosovo
The role of the international community in the affairs of Kosovo and Serbia
Police reform in Kosovo
Unemployment in Kosovo
The actions of the UN authority in Kosovo (UNMIK)
The actions of the Kosovo government
Decentralisation of government in Kosovo
The weak economy of Kosovo
Kosovo privatisation
Serb Albanian language barrier
The quality of Kosovo healthcare services
The quality of Kosovo transportation and communications
Kosovo education standards
Kosovo day care facilities
Environment issues in Kosovo
Lack of cultural events in Kosovo
Poor sports facilities in Kosovo

Of Some
Significance

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

Significant

Question 1 - Firstly with regards to the range of problems that need to be dealt with
please indicate which ones you consider to be Very Significant, Significant, Of
Some Significance, Of Little Significance or Of No Significance at all.

Very
Significant

Table 1.5. Question 1 Serbia Serb IDPs

233

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

234

Of Little
Significance

Of No
Significance

Public and personal security in Kosovo

Organised crime in Kosovo
The rights of victims
Missing persons
Serb and Albanian relations
Reconciliation
Ineffective criminal justice system
Corruption in Kosovo
Lack of prosecution of war crimes
Return process of IDPs/refugees
Kosovos final status
Kosovo power supply
Unemployment in Kosovo
Irresponsible politicians
The role of the Serbian government in the affairs of Kosovo
Police reform in Kosovo
Kosovo education standards
The role of the international community in the affairs of Kosovo and Serbia
The actions of the Kosovo government
The quality of Kosovo healthcare services
The weak economy of Kosovo
The actions of the UN authority in Kosovo (UNMIK)
Serb Albanian language barrier
Biased media in Kosovo
Kosovo day care facilities
The quality of Kosovo transportation and communications
Decentralisation of government in Kosovo
Environment issues in Kosovo
Kosovo privatisation
Lack of cultural events in Kosovo
Poor sports facilities in Kosovo

Of Some
Significance

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

Significant

Research

Question 1 - Firstly with regards to the range of problems that need to be dealt with
please indicate which ones you consider to be Very Significant, Significant, Of
Some Significance, Of Little Significance or Of No Significance at all.

Very
Significant

Table 1.6. Question 1 Serbia Others

71%
69%
67%
67%
65%
65%
64%
61%
61%
60%
59%
58%
56%
55%
45%
43%
43%
40%
39%
38%
37%
37%
35%
34%
34%
34%
26%
25%
24%
18%
14%

25%
25%
22%
25%
21%
18%
28%
27%
29%
27%
30%
29%
25%
28%
30%
38%
27%
30%
36%
38%
38%
31%
29%
40%
35%
33%
40%
28%
33%
28%
26%

1%
3%
8%
7%
5%
6%
6%
9%
6%
10%
8%
11%
13%
9%
14%
12%
19%
20%
12%
18%
12%
18%
16%
15%
23%
25%
23%
22%
30%
28%
28%

0%
2%
2%
0%
5%
7%
0%
1%
2%
1%
0%
0%
4%
4%
9%
4%
10%
4%
6%
5%
7%
9%
8%
6%
3%
7%
8%
15%
10%
13%
17%

4%
2%
2%
2%
3%
4%
2%
3%
2%
2%
3%
2%
2%
4%
2%
3%
2%
6%
6%
2%
5%
5%
12%
4%
5%
2%
3%
10%
3%
13%
15%

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

2. Kosovos final status

The question
Now with regards to Kosovos Status please indicate which aspects of this problem you
consider to be Very Significant, Significant, Of Some Significance, Of Little Significance, Of No Significance at all or Not Even True
Kosovo Albanian priorities

Very Significant - Kosovo Albanian

1 The economy in Kosovo will not develop until final status is agreed
2 Keeping Kosovo in Serbia will lead to a new war
3 If things stay the same in Kosovo it will become unstable
4 Only the international community can settle the Kosovo issue
5 Belgrade are using Kosovo Serbs to make political points

46%
43%
42%
32%
30%

Serbian priorities
For Serbs in Serbia and Serb IDPs the top concern is that Kosovo independence will
lead to an exodus of Serbs at 74% and 93% very significant respectively. This item comes
in 5th on the list for Serbs living in Kosovo at 78% very significant. Their top item is that
an independent Kosovo will be less secure at 80% very sigmificant. For Serbs in Serbia and
Serb IDPs this item is second on their lists. Understandebly Serb IDPs believe UNMIK is
not doing enough to work with Belgrade to help Kosovo Serbs at 80% very significant (5th
on their list).
Very Significant - Kosovo Serb
1 An independent Kosovo will
be less secure for everyone
2 If final status of Kosovo is
made without agreement
Kosovo Serbs will not feel
safe
3 An independent Kosovo will
become a mafia state

80%
79%

Serbia Serb
1 Kosovo independence will
lead to an exodus of Serbs
2 An independent Kosovo will
be unsafe for Serbs

79%

An independent Kosovo will

be unsafe for Serbs

79%

Kosovo independence will

lead to an exodus of Serbs

78%

If final status of Kosovo is

made without agreement
Kosovo Serbs will not feel
safe
Kosovo government have
not offered sufficient
guarantees to Kosovo Serbs
An independent Kosovo will
be less secure for everyone

74%
73%

Serbia Serb IDPs

1 Kosovo independence will lead
to an exodus of Serbs
2 An independent Kosovo will
be unsafe for Serbs

73%

71%

70%

The international community

use different standards in their
dealings with Serbs and
Albanians
Kosovo government is not
doing enough to work with
Kosovo Serbs
UNMIK is not doing enough to
work with Belgrade to help
Kosovo Serbs

Research

Unfortunately the sense of common understanding for the general problems that the
people of Kosovo and Serbia have to deal with, illustrated in question 1, does break down
when dealing with the sensitive topic of the final status of Kosovo here in question 2. From
a list of 42 items (see tables 2.1 to 2.6) Kosovo Albanian priorities start with the failure to
develop the Kosovo economy before final status is agreed at 46% very significant followed
by keeping Kosovo in Serbia will lead to a new war at 43%.

93%
88%

83%

81%

80%

235

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

Already a bit of a pattern seems to be emerging here where Serbs in Kosovo are perhaps
a little less alarmed by matters of concern than their brothers and sisters in Serbia and the
Serbia IDPs are most concerned of all.
Others
Again the priorities for the others in both Kosovo and Serbia seem to reflect the views
of the majority population in both places. However, Serbia others, perhaps as minorities in
Serbia, give greater emphasis to the Kosovo government not offering sufficient guarantees
to Kosovo Serbs at 55% very significant.
Very Significant - Kosovo Others
1 Keeping Kosovo in Serbia will lead to a
new war
2 Belgrade are using Kosovo Serbs to make
political points
3 Russia insists Kosovo stays part of Serbia
4
5

If things stay the same in Kosovo it will

become unstable
Serb parallel institutions in Kosovo

64%

Serbia Others
1 Kosovo independence will lead to an exodus of Serbs

62%

61%

62%

57%

55%
55%

If final status of Kosovo is made without agreement Kosovo

Serbs will not feel safe
Kosovo government have not offered sufficient guarantees
to Kosovo Serbs
An independent Kosovo will be unsafe for Serbs

54%

If things stay the same in Kosovo it will become unstable

52%

55%

Research

Some points of disagreement

If the not even true responses to the questions are examined it is possible to find out
what can best be called a credibility gap is between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs. For
example the suggestion that Kosovo independence will result in more violence is not considered true by 88% of Kosovo Albanians while only about 1% of Serbs share this view.
Similarly 65% of Kosovo Albanians do not believe the statement that the Kosovo government have not offered sufficient guarantees to Kosovo Serbs while almost no Serbs at all
share this sceptical opinion.
Not even true
Kosovo independence will result in more violence
An independent Kosovo will become a mafia state
An independent Kosovo will be less secure for everyone
An independent Kosovo will be unsafe for Serbs
Only Belgrade can settle the Kosovo issue
Kosovo government have not offered sufficient guarantees to Kosovo Serbs
It is an illusion that Serbs can hold Kosovo in their hands
Belgrade are using Kosovo Serbs to make political points
Keeping Kosovo in Serbia will lead to a new war
Only the international community can settle the Kosovo issue
Serbia is not doing enough to help IDPs/refugees

Kosovo
Albanian
88%
85%
80%
75%
73%
65%
6%
3%
11%
8%
12%

Kosovo
Serb
1%
2%
3%
3%
16%
0%
50%
41%
38%
34%
26%

Serbia
Serb
2%
2%
2%
2%
33%
0%
27%
21%
39%
27%
18%

Serbia
Serb IDPs
0%
1%
2%
1%
23%
1%
41%
13%
51%
19%
9%

It is an illusion that Serbs can hold Kosovo in their hands is only considered not true
by 6% of Kosovo Albanians while 50% of Kosovo Serbs do not believe this followed by
41% for Serb IDPs and 27% for Serbs living in Serbia. The credibility gap is not only between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs but also between Kosovo Serbs, Serbia Serbs and Serbia Serb IDPs. Interestingly keeping Kosovo in Serbia will lead to a new war was number
2 on the Kosovo Albanian list at 43% very significant but 11% also believe this statement
not to be true. Opinion on this issue seems to be some what split.

236

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

Some points of agreement

Not even true

Kosovo
Albanian

Kosovo
Serb

Serbia
Serb

The economy in Kosovo will not develop until final status is agreed
Procedures for negotiations have not been decided
Lack of political role of Kosovo Serbs in negotiations
Russia insists Kosovo stays part of Serbia
If things stay the same in Kosovo it will become unstable
No one in Serbia will sign a document for an independent Kosovo
International community distracted by Iraq
The international community use different standards in their dealings with Serbs and
Albanians
The Serbs in Kosovo hold its status hostage
Poor quality of Serb and Albanian politicians

2%
0%
3%
2%
7%
5%
3%
17%

4%
6%
4%
5%
3%
7%
15%
3%

2%
2%
1%
6%
2%
10%
10%
1%

Serbia
Serb
IDPs
22%
1%
1%
6%
1%
6%
7%
0%

15%
19%

5%
4%

8%
2%

3%
1%

Research

Conversely, when both Kosovo Albanians and Serbs agree with regards to the basic
truth of a statement then a point of some agreement may have been achieved even if they
do rate the issue at hand as being more or less significant. Everyone seems to believe, for
example, that procedures for negotiations have not been decided and that there is a lack of
a political role for Kosovo Serbs in negotiations. Providing Kosovo Serbs with such a role
seems to be a problem that everyone would like to see resolved.

237

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42

238

Not Even
True

29
30

Of No
Significance

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Of Little
Significance

Research

12
13

The economy in Kosovo will not develop until final status is agreed
Keeping Kosovo in Serbia will lead to a new war
If things stay the same in Kosovo it will become unstable
Only the international community can settle the Kosovo issue
Belgrade are using Kosovo Serbs to make political points
Lack of engagement by the international community
Belgrade holds Kosovos status hostage
It is an illusion that Serbs can hold Kosovo in their hands
Russia insists Kosovo stays part of Serbia
Poor quality of Serb and Albanian politicians
The financial costs of keeping Kosovo in Serbia will be a continual drain on the
Serbian economy
International community distracted by Iraq
The international community use different standards in their dealings with
Serbs and Albanians
Belgrade is not doing enough to work with UNMK to help Kosovo Serbs
Resolving Kosovos final status will bring instability to the region
Pristina has more say in the eyes of the international community
The international community does not speak with one voice
Serb parallel institutions in Kosovo
The Serbs in Kosovo hold its status hostage
No one in Serbia will sign a document for an independent Kosovo
Too many people have an interest in the failure of negotiations
Serbia is not doing enough to help IDPs/refugees
Lack of political role of Kosovo Serbs in negotiations
Kosovo independence will lead to an exodus of Serbs
Serbia still pays the interest on Kosovos debts
An independent Kosovo will lead to a new war
UNMIK is not doing enough to work with Belgrade to help Kosovo Serbs
Negotiations will lead to an unresolved conflict requiring continued
international presence
Belgrade is not doing enough to secure Serb property in Kosovo
Kosovo Serbs will ask for an independent state separate from an independent
Kosovo
If Belgrade does not sign all agreements are provisional
Kosovo government is not doing enough to work with Kosovo Serbs
An independent Kosovo will be unsafe for Serbs
An independent Kosovo will be less secure for everyone
An independent Kosovo will lose its trade links with Serbia
Kosovo independence will result in more violence
The political costs of keeping Kosovo in Serbia will bring long term problems
to Serbian society
Kosovo government have not offered sufficient guarantees to Kosovo Serbs
An independent Kosovo will become a mafia state
Only Belgrade can settle the Kosovo issue
If final status of Kosovo is made without agreement Kosovo Serbs will not feel
safe
Procedures for negotiations have not been decided

Of Some
Significance

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

Significant

Question 2 - Now with regards to Kosovos Status please indicate which

aspects of this problem you consider to be Very Significant, Significant, Of
Some Significance, Of Little Significance, Of No Significance at all or
Not Even True

Very
Significant

Table 2.1. Question 2 Kosovo Albanian

46%
43%
42%
32%
30%
26%
20%
20%
20%
20%
16%

29%
32%
41%
26%
28%
24%
31%
10%
13%
30%
8%

16%
7%
8%
24%
18%
20%
19%
14%
24%
16%
19%

5%
4%
1%
8%
16%
5%
10%
18%
21%
7%
23%

2%
3%
0%
2%
6%
1%
4%
32%
20%
8%
15%

2%
11%
7%
8%
3%
24%
16%
6%
2%
19%
19%

16%
15%

25%
25%

32%
32%

17%
10%

7%
1%

3%
17%

15%
14%
14%
11%
11%
11%
11%
10%
9%
8%
8%
6%
6%
5%
4%

14%
5%
10%
21%
9%
24%
15%
22%
15%
31%
4%
10%
5%
11%
16%

13%
1%
28%
21%
23%
22%
17%
25%
20%
24%
13%
9%
0%
13%
21%

20%
2%
25%
5%
15%
15%
18%
21%
21%
24%
9%
17%
1%
14%
14%

22%
7%
4%
6%
28%
14%
34%
4%
23%
10%
14%
12%
4%
18%
9%

16%
71%
19%
36%
14%
15%
5%
17%
12%
3%
51%
46%
84%
39%
36%

4%
4%

6%
8%

10%
10%

21%
15%

36%
34%

23%
29%

4%
3%
3%
3%
3%
2%
2%

9%
11%
1%
3%
5%
1%
5%

15%
11%
3%
4%
11%
2%
13%

25%
9%
5%
2%
28%
2%
10%

19%
7%
13%
8%
25%
5%
14%

28%
58%
75%
80%
28%
88%
55%

2%
1%
1%
0%

3%
2%
3%
0%

15%
1%
5%
3%

8%
3%
6%
11%

8%
8%
13%
28%

65%
85%
73%
58%

0%

7%

45%

40%

7%

0%

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42

80%
79%

9%
12%

4%
2%

2%
1%

3%
0%

3%
6%

79%
79%
78%
77%
75%
72%
72%
68%

9%
17%
17%
13%
17%
20%
17%
23%

6%
1%
3%
4%
4%
2%
5%
4%

1%
0%
0%
6%
1%
1%
2%
1%

4%
0%
2%
0%
0%
0%
2%
1%

2%
3%
1%
0%
2%
5%
2%
3%

65%
63%
63%
55%
55%
55%
54%
54%
51%
50%
44%

15%
9%
21%
25%
26%
27%
19%
24%
17%
32%
27%

3%
7%
6%
10%
9%
10%
6%
8%
5%
12%
12%

6%
2%
3%
5%
2%
2%
5%
2%
9%
2%
9%

2%
12%
3%
2%
1%
3%
5%
8%
9%
0%
2%

8%
7%
4%
2%
7%
5%
11%
5%
8%
3%
6%

44%
43%
42%
41%
40%
38%
37%
37%
36%

21%
28%
30%
15%
32%
29%
17%
30%
22%

11%
10%
10%
12%
13%
22%
13%
11%
13%

8%
11%
11%
7%
1%
3%
8%
10%
9%

4%
2%
2%
10%
8%
2%
20%
6%
2%

12%
6%
4%
16%
6%
6%
5%
5%
19%

35%
33%
31%
29%
28%
27%
27%

41%
17%
18%
32%
22%
18%
28%

10%
12%
13%
15%
23%
22%
12%

10%
7%
6%
9%
7%
3%
4%

0%
4%
17%
5%
5%
4%
11%

4%
26%
14%
9%
15%
26%
19%

18%

19%

13%

4%

8%

39%

18%
16%
15%
13%

19%
9%
18%
9%

19%
7%
9%
6%

8%
12%
8%
15%

3%
15%
12%
8%

34%
41%
38%
50%

Research

Not Even
True

22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

Of No
Significance

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

Of Little
Significance

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

An independent Kosovo will be less secure for everyone

If final status of Kosovo is made without agreement Kosovo Serbs will not feel
safe
An independent Kosovo will become a mafia state
An independent Kosovo will be unsafe for Serbs
Kosovo independence will lead to an exodus of Serbs
Kosovo government have not offered sufficient guarantees to Kosovo Serbs
UNMIK is not doing enough to work with Belgrade to help Kosovo Serbs
Kosovo independence will result in more violence
Kosovo government is not doing enough to work with Kosovo Serbs
The international community use different standards in their dealings with
Serbs and Albanians
Pristina has more say in the eyes of the international community
No one in Serbia will sign a document for an independent Kosovo
Lack of political role of Kosovo Serbs in negotiations
Serbia still pays the interest on Kosovos debts
Resolving Kosovos final status will bring instability to the region
An independent Kosovo will lead to a new war
If Belgrade does not sign all agreements are provisional
The Serbs in Kosovo hold its status hostage
Belgrade holds Kosovos status hostage
If things stay the same in Kosovo it will become unstable
Negotiations will lead to an unresolved conflict requiring continued
international presence
Belgrade is not doing enough to secure Serb property in Kosovo
The international community does not speak with one voice
Poor quality of Serb and Albanian politicians
Only Belgrade can settle the Kosovo issue
Procedures for negotiations have not been decided
Lack of engagement by the international community
Russia insists Kosovo stays part of Serbia
An independent Kosovo will lose its trade links with Serbia
Kosovo Serbs will ask for an independent state separate from an independent
Kosovo
The economy in Kosovo will not develop until final status is agreed
Belgrade is not doing enough to work with UNMK to help Kosovo Serbs
Serb parallel institutions in Kosovo
Too many people have an interest in the failure of negotiations
International community distracted by Iraq
Serbia is not doing enough to help IDPs/refugees
The financial costs of keeping Kosovo in Serbia will be a continual drain on the
Serbian economy
The political costs of keeping Kosovo in Serbia will bring long term problems
to Serbian society
Only the international community can settle the Kosovo issue
Belgrade are using Kosovo Serbs to make political points
Keeping Kosovo in Serbia will lead to a new war
It is an illusion that Serbs can hold Kosovo in their hands

Of Some
Significance

1
2

Significant

Question 2 - Now with regards to Kosovos Status please indicate which

aspects of this problem you consider to be Very Significant, Significant, Of
Some Significance, Of Little Significance, Of No Significance at all or
Not Even True

Very
Significant

Table 2.2. Question 2 Kosovo Serb

239

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42

240

Not Even
True

16
17
18
19
20
21
22

Of No
Significance

Research

13
14
15

Of Little
Significance

9
10
11
12

Keeping Kosovo in Serbia will lead to a new war

Belgrade are using Kosovo Serbs to make political points
Russia insists Kosovo stays part of Serbia
If things stay the same in Kosovo it will become unstable
Serb parallel institutions in Kosovo
Belgrade holds Kosovos status hostage
The Serbs in Kosovo hold its status hostage
The international community use different standards in their dealings with
Serbs and Albanians
No one in Serbia will sign a document for an independent Kosovo
Lack of engagement by the international community
Resolving Kosovos final status will bring instability to the region
The financial costs of keeping Kosovo in Serbia will be a continual drain on the
Serbian economy
Kosovo government have not offered sufficient guarantees to Kosovo Serbs
Serbia still pays the interest on Kosovos debts
If final status of Kosovo is made without agreement Kosovo Serbs will not feel
safe
Kosovo independence will result in more violence
An independent Kosovo will become a mafia state
An independent Kosovo will be less secure for everyone
An independent Kosovo will lead to a new war
Poor quality of Serb and Albanian politicians
Only Belgrade can settle the Kosovo issue
The political costs of keeping Kosovo in Serbia will bring long term problems
to Serbian society
Negotiations will lead to an unresolved conflict requiring continued
international presence
Kosovo independence will lead to an exodus of Serbs
Pristina has more say in the eyes of the international community
International community distracted by Iraq
The economy in Kosovo will not develop until final status is agreed
The international community does not speak with one voice
Kosovo government is not doing enough to work with Kosovo Serbs
Too many people have an interest in the failure of negotiations
If Belgrade does not sign all agreements are provisional
An independent Kosovo will be unsafe for Serbs
UNMIK is not doing enough to work with Belgrade to help Kosovo Serbs
Lack of political role of Kosovo Serbs in negotiations
Belgrade is not doing enough to work with UNMK to help Kosovo Serbs
An independent Kosovo will lose its trade links with Serbia
Kosovo Serbs will ask for an independent state separate from an independent
Kosovo
Belgrade is not doing enough to secure Serb property in Kosovo
Serbia is not doing enough to help IDPs/refugees
Procedures for negotiations have not been decided
Only the international community can settle the Kosovo issue
It is an illusion that Serbs can hold Kosovo in their hands

Of Some
Significance

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Significant

Question 2 - Now with regards to Kosovos Status please indicate which

aspects of this problem you consider to be Very Significant, Significant, Of
Some Significance, Of Little Significance, Of No Significance at all or
Not Even True

Very
Significant

Table 2.3. Question 2 Kosovo Others

64%
61%
57%
55%
55%
53%
53%
45%

15%
7%
0%
13%
24%
0%
16%
20%

21%
10%
30%
0%
6%
17%
14%
8%

0%
8%
0%
32%
6%
18%
6%
17%

0%
0%
13%
0%
6%
8%
0%
0%

0%
13%
0%
0%
4%
4%
11%
10%

40%
38%
37%
36%

0%
7%
6%
0%

19%
41%
29%
51%

11%
0%
0%
13%

29%
0%
0%
0%

0%
15%
28%
0%

33%
32%
24%

8%
0%
0%

33%
10%
9%

15%
24%
8%

0%
0%
48%

12%
34%
12%

24%
24%
24%
21%
20%
20%
20%

9%
0%
0%
11%
27%
0%
17%

0%
0%
15%
0%
33%
0%
20%

6%
0%
16%
0%
9%
10%
9%

0%
8%
0%
0%
6%
0%
6%

62%
69%
46%
68%
6%
70%
28%

18%

37%

12%

8%

0%

26%

17%
17%
16%
16%
14%
13%
13%
13%
13%
13%
10%
8%
5%
0%

8%
16%
6%
70%
15%
16%
0%
8%
0%
8%
57%
6%
36%
38%

7%
51%
26%
15%
52%
21%
16%
19%
0%
17%
17%
10%
16%
0%

8%
17%
32%
0%
8%
0%
43%
24%
8%
7%
16%
14%
21%
18%

32%
0%
11%
0%
0%
8%
8%
4%
48%
41%
0%
25%
0%
41%

27%
0%
10%
0%
11%
43%
21%
32%
31%
15%
0%
37%
22%
4%

0%
0%
0%
0%
0%

0%
8%
20%
16%
0%

27%
39%
63%
28%
11%

8%
22%
17%
21%
13%

41%
6%
0%
9%
50%

24%
25%
0%
26%
26%

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42

74%
73%
73%

17%
18%
21%

4%
5%
4%

1%
1%
0%

2%
1%
1%

2%
2%
1%

71%
70%
65%
63%

22%
19%
21%
26%

4%
8%
8%
7%

1%
1%
1%
1%

2%
1%
1%
1%

0%
2%
4%
1%

63%
62%
58%
57%
54%
53%
53%
50%
47%
46%
46%
44%

22%
28%
28%
29%
27%
32%
25%
15%
23%
34%
26%
28%

9%
6%
11%
9%
11%
9%
13%
11%
9%
12%
14%
18%

2%
1%
1%
3%
4%
2%
4%
8%
3%
3%
4%
5%

1%
2%
1%
1%
1%
2%
3%
6%
4%
2%
2%
2%

2%
1%
1%
1%
3%
2%
2%
10%
13%
2%
9%
3%

42%
42%
39%
36%
36%
35%

35%
29%
36%
25%
27%
25%

13%
10%
17%
14%
19%
18%

5%
3%
5%
7%
7%
7%

2%
2%
2%
9%
3%
5%

2%
14%
2%
8%
8%
9%

35%
33%

24%
36%

16%
18%

5%
2%

2%
2%

18%
8%

33%
31%
30%
30%
28%
28%
27%
26%
24%
22%
20%

30%
19%
29%
27%
24%
25%
16%
28%
26%
20%
15%

18%
22%
21%
14%
19%
19%
18%
20%
18%
21%
15%

10%
10%
9%
9%
11%
10%
6%
11%
5%
9%
9%

5%
12%
5%
9%
7%
8%
5%
10%
5%
7%
11%

3%
6%
6%
12%
11%
10%
27%
5%
22%
21%
30%

20%
20%
19%
18%

18%
15%
15%
20%

20%
16%
15%
25%

9%
11%
6%
13%

6%
5%
7%
14%

27%
33%
39%
10%

Research

26
27

Not Even
True

20
21
22
23
24
25

Of No
Significance

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

Of Little
Significance

4
5
6
7

Kosovo independence will lead to an exodus of Serbs

An independent Kosovo will be unsafe for Serbs
If final status of Kosovo is made without agreement Kosovo Serbs will not feel
safe
Kosovo government have not offered sufficient guarantees to Kosovo Serbs
An independent Kosovo will be less secure for everyone
Kosovo independence will result in more violence
The international community use different standards in their dealings with
Serbs and Albanians
An independent Kosovo will become a mafia state
Kosovo government is not doing enough to work with Kosovo Serbs
Lack of political role of Kosovo Serbs in negotiations
UNMIK is not doing enough to work with Belgrade to help Kosovo Serbs
Pristina has more say in the eyes of the international community
If things stay the same in Kosovo it will become unstable
Serbia still pays the interest on Kosovos debts
No one in Serbia will sign a document for an independent Kosovo
An independent Kosovo will lead to a new war
Poor quality of Serb and Albanian politicians
Belgrade is not doing enough to secure Serb property in Kosovo
The financial costs of keeping Kosovo in Serbia will be a continual drain on the
Serbian economy
The economy in Kosovo will not develop until final status is agreed
Resolving Kosovos final status will bring instability to the region
Procedures for negotiations have not been decided
The Serbs in Kosovo hold its status hostage
Too many people have an interest in the failure of negotiations
The political costs of keeping Kosovo in Serbia will bring long term problems
to Serbian society
Serbia is not doing enough to help IDPs/refugees
Negotiations will lead to an unresolved conflict requiring continued
international presence
The international community does not speak with one voice
Russia insists Kosovo stays part of Serbia
Lack of engagement by the international community
An independent Kosovo will lose its trade links with Serbia
If Belgrade does not sign all agreements are provisional
Belgrade holds Kosovos status hostage
It is an illusion that Serbs can hold Kosovo in their hands
Serb parallel institutions in Kosovo
Belgrade is not doing enough to work with UNMK to help Kosovo Serbs
Belgrade are using Kosovo Serbs to make political points
Kosovo Serbs will ask for an independent state separate from an independent
Kosovo
Only the international community can settle the Kosovo issue
Only Belgrade can settle the Kosovo issue
Keeping Kosovo in Serbia will lead to a new war
International community distracted by Iraq

Of Some
Significance

1
2
3

Significant

Question 2 Now with regards to Kosovos Status please indicate which

aspects of this problem you consider to be Very Significant, Significant, Of
Some Significance, Of Little Significance, Of No Significance at all or
Not Even True

Very
Significant

Table 2.4. Question 2 Serbia Serb

241

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42

242

Not Even
True

29
30
31
32

Of No
Significance

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Of Little
Significance

Research

4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

Kosovo independence will lead to an exodus of Serbs

An independent Kosovo will be unsafe for Serbs
The international community use different standards in their dealings with
Serbs and Albanians
Kosovo government is not doing enough to work with Kosovo Serbs
UNMIK is not doing enough to work with Belgrade to help Kosovo Serbs
An independent Kosovo will lead to a new war
Lack of political role of Kosovo Serbs in negotiations
If things stay the same in Kosovo it will become unstable
Pristina has more say in the eyes of the international community
An independent Kosovo will be less secure for everyone
Kosovo government have not offered sufficient guarantees to Kosovo Serbs
Kosovo independence will result in more violence
An independent Kosovo will become a mafia state
If final status of Kosovo is made without agreement Kosovo Serbs will not feel
safe
Belgrade holds Kosovos status hostage
No one in Serbia will sign a document for an independent Kosovo
If Belgrade does not sign all agreements are provisional
Resolving Kosovos final status will bring instability to the region
Russia insists Kosovo stays part of Serbia
Too many people have an interest in the failure of negotiations
Belgrade is not doing enough to secure Serb property in Kosovo
Serbia still pays the interest on Kosovos debts
Lack of engagement by the international community
The international community does not speak with one voice
The Serbs in Kosovo hold its status hostage
Procedures for negotiations have not been decided
Only Belgrade can settle the Kosovo issue
Negotiations will lead to an unresolved conflict requiring continued
international presence
The economy in Kosovo will not develop until final status is agreed
An independent Kosovo will lose its trade links with Serbia
Belgrade are using Kosovo Serbs to make political points
The financial costs of keeping Kosovo in Serbia will be a continual drain on the
Serbian economy
Poor quality of Serb and Albanian politicians
Serbia is not doing enough to help IDPs/refugees
Serb parallel institutions in Kosovo
International community distracted by Iraq
Kosovo Serbs will ask for an independent state separate from an independent
Kosovo
Keeping Kosovo in Serbia will lead to a new war
Belgrade is not doing enough to work with UNMK to help Kosovo Serbs
Only the international community can settle the Kosovo issue
The political costs of keeping Kosovo in Serbia will bring long term problems
to Serbian society
It is an illusion that Serbs can hold Kosovo in their hands

Of Some
Significance

1
2
3

Significant

Question 2 Now with regards to Kosovos Status please indicate which

aspects of this problem you consider to be Very Significant, Significant, Of
Some Significance, Of Little Significance, Of No Significance at all or
Not Even True

Very
Significant

Table 2.5. Question 2 Serbia Serb IDPs

93%
88%
83%

6%
8%
11%

0%
2%
4%

0%
0%
0%

0%
0%
1%

0%
1%
0%

81%
80%
76%
74%
73%
72%
72%
69%
68%
67%
64%

9%
17%
12%
17%
21%
19%
22%
26%
30%
20%
29%

5%
2%
8%
6%
4%
3%
4%
3%
1%
10%
6%

2%
1%
0%
0%
1%
1%
0%
1%
0%
1%
0%

0%
0%
0%
2%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%

3%
0%
5%
1%
1%
6%
2%
1%
0%
1%
1%

63%
61%
60%
58%
56%
56%
53%
52%
51%
50%
50%
48%
45%
45%

4%
14%
11%
26%
10%
19%
19%
28%
20%
24%
23%
27%
6%
30%

17%
8%
7%
5%
10%
9%
8%
7%
14%
15%
14%
22%
8%
18%

2%
2%
6%
2%
6%
4%
11%
2%
4%
4%
3%
1%
8%
2%

9%
8%
12%
1%
13%
1%
1%
1%
5%
4%
7%
2%
10%
3%

5%
6%
4%
7%
6%
11%
7%
10%
6%
2%
3%
1%
23%
2%

43%
42%
41%
41%

17%
18%
15%
33%

7%
17%
22%
4%

2%
4%
4%
1%

9%
9%
5%
7%

22%
9%
13%
13%

37%
34%
31%
30%
29%

23%
28%
25%
29%
10%

34%
24%
17%
11%
6%

3%
4%
1%
9%
4%

2%
1%
20%
13%
10%

1%
9%
7%
7%
40%

27%
24%
21%
17%

14%
24%
25%
26%

5%
12%
26%
16%

2%
1%
5%
3%

2%
1%
4%
3%

51%
38%
19%
36%

13%

28%

12%

6%

1%

41%

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42

62%
62%

22%
25%

10%
6%

2%
4%

2%
2%

3%
2%

55%
54%
52%
52%
51%
50%

30%
23%
27%
23%
22%
28%

11%
11%
6%
13%
8%
10%

1%
5%
6%
3%
4%
5%

2%
3%
3%
5%
2%
5%

1%
5%
6%
4%
12%
2%

47%
44%
43%
42%
42%
42%
42%
40%

24%
40%
35%
35%
12%
30%
23%
27%

9%
11%
13%
6%
12%
10%
17%
16%

8%
0%
7%
3%
15%
9%
3%
8%

7%
4%
2%
5%
5%
3%
4%
5%

5%
1%
0%
9%
15%
7%
11%
5%

39%
39%
39%
38%
38%
38%
37%
37%
36%
35%
34%

24%
35%
18%
32%
24%
24%
24%
26%
19%
38%
30%

9%
10%
19%
13%
25%
18%
15%
23%
13%
22%
10%

7%
3%
11%
9%
4%
6%
8%
5%
15%
2%
12%

2%
6%
4%
4%
5%
5%
10%
3%
8%
1%
1%

19%
8%
9%
4%
4%
9%
6%
5%
9%
2%
13%

33%
32%
32%
30%
29%

37%
18%
15%
30%
18%

24%
12%
12%
17%
18%

3%
4%
15%
10%
12%

2%
3%
11%
4%
5%

1%
31%
16%
9%
18%

28%
27%

27%
41%

13%
17%

8%
4%

8%
5%

16%
5%

27%
26%
24%
22%
21%
19%
18%
17%

36%
26%
20%
20%
28%
31%
29%
17%

18%
17%
19%
24%
28%
22%
27%
11%

6%
10%
7%
6%
13%
6%
11%
16%

4%
7%
6%
6%
6%
3%
6%
8%

9%
14%
25%
21%
5%
18%
9%
30%

Research

Not Even
True

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

Of No
Significance

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

Of Little
Significance

3
4
5
6
7
8

Kosovo independence will lead to an exodus of Serbs

If final status of Kosovo is made without agreement Kosovo Serbs will not feel
safe
Kosovo government have not offered sufficient guarantees to Kosovo Serbs
An independent Kosovo will be unsafe for Serbs
If things stay the same in Kosovo it will become unstable
Kosovo independence will result in more violence
Resolving Kosovos final status will bring instability to the region
The financial costs of keeping Kosovo in Serbia will be a continual drain on the
Serbian economy
Serbia still pays the interest on Kosovos debts
Lack of political role of Kosovo Serbs in negotiations
Kosovo government is not doing enough to work with Kosovo Serbs
An independent Kosovo will be less secure for everyone
No one in Serbia will sign a document for an independent Kosovo
The economy in Kosovo will not develop until final status is agreed
Pristina has more say in the eyes of the international community
The international community use different standards in their dealings with
Serbs and Albanians
An independent Kosovo will lead to a new war
An independent Kosovo will become a mafia state
Belgrade holds Kosovos status hostage
Lack of engagement by the international community
UNMIK is not doing enough to work with Belgrade to help Kosovo Serbs
Serbia is not doing enough to help IDPs/refugees
Russia insists Kosovo stays part of Serbia
The international community does not speak with one voice
The Serbs in Kosovo hold its status hostage
Poor quality of Serb and Albanian politicians
The political costs of keeping Kosovo in Serbia will bring long term problems
to Serbian society
Procedures for negotiations have not been decided
Keeping Kosovo in Serbia will lead to a new war
An independent Kosovo will lose its trade links with Serbia
Belgrade is not doing enough to secure Serb property in Kosovo
Kosovo Serbs will ask for an independent state separate from an independent
Kosovo
If Belgrade does not sign all agreements are provisional
Negotiations will lead to an unresolved conflict requiring continued
international presence
Too many people have an interest in the failure of negotiations
Belgrade are using Kosovo Serbs to make political points
Only the international community can settle the Kosovo issue
It is an illusion that Serbs can hold Kosovo in their hands
Serb parallel institutions in Kosovo
Belgrade is not doing enough to work with UNMK to help Kosovo Serbs
International community distracted by Iraq
Only Belgrade can settle the Kosovo issue

Of Some
Significance

1
2

Significant

Question 2 Now with regards to Kosovos Status please indicate which

aspects of this problem you consider to be Very Significant, Significant, Of
Some Significance, Of Little Significance, Of No Significance at all or
Not Even True

Very
Significant

Table 2.6. Question 2 Serbia Others

243

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

3. Serb and Albanian relations

The question
Now with regards to Serbs and Albanians please indicate which aspects of this problem
you consider to be Very Significant, Significant, Of Some Significance, Of Little Significance, Of No Significance at all or Not Even True
Kosovo Albanian priorities

Research

With regards to relations between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs, from a list of 48 items
(tables 3.1 to 3.6) the most significant problem for Kosovo Albanians is not knowing the
fate of lost persons at 73% very significant followed by discrimination against Albanians
in the 90s at 58%. Unfortunately 52% of Kosovo Serbs, 36% of Serbia Serbs and 44% of
Serb IDPs do not even believe this discrimination to be true. Failure to prosecute war
criminals comes in third at 41% very significant for Kosovo Albanians followed by the
legacy of so many killings 4th at 38% and KLA officers in the police 5th at 37% very significant. As would be expected and noted below this policing issue is also a problem for
Serbs.
Very Significant - Kosovo Albanian
1 Not knowing the fate of lost persons
2 Discrimination against Albanians in the 90s
3 Failure to prosecute war criminals
4 The legacy of so many killings
5 KLA officers in the police

73%
58%
41%
38%
37%

Serbian priorities
For all Serbs, in Kosovo and Serbia, the most pressing problem is Albanians wanting a
greater Albania at 75% very significant for Kosovo Serbs, 74% for Serbia Serbs and 79%
for Serb IDPs. But 14% of Kosovo Albanians also think this is a very significant problem
and 23% do not even think this is true. This issue gets visited again in the constitutional
questions at the end of this report. KLA officers in the police is a matter of considerable
concern for Kosovo Serbs at 74% very significant and 77% for Serb IDPs. But again 37%
of Kosovo Albanians share this view. Perhaps something can be done about this.

244

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM
Very Significant - Kosovo Serb
1 Albanians want a greater
Albania
2 Kosovo Albanians are getting
closer to Tirana while
expecting Kosovo Serbs to
stop talking to Belgrade
3 KLA officers in the police

75%

Serbia Serb
1 Albanians want a greater
Albania
2 The legacy of so many killings

74%

75%

KLA officers in government

71%

Kosovo Albanians not

prepared to unequivocally
condemn Albanian ethnic
violence

67%

Kosovo Albanians not

prepared to unequivocally
condemn Albanian ethnic
violence
Kosovo Albanians are getting
closer to Tirana while
expecting Kosovo Serbs to
stop talking to Belgrade
Not knowing the fate of lost
persons

73%

Serbia Serb IDPs

1 Albanians want a greater
Albania
2 KLA officers in the police

69%

Apologies without security

will not help

73%

61%

Albanian provocations

72%

59%

Kosovo Albanians not

prepared to unequivocally
condemn Albanian ethnic
violence

72%

74%

79%
77%

Kosovo Albanians not being prepared to unequivocally condemn Albanian ethnic violence comes in 5th at 67% for Kosovo Serbs, 3rd at 69% for Serbs in Serbia and 5th again
at 72% for Serb IDPs. Unfortunately 51% of Kosovo Albanians do not believe this to be
true. There is a serious credibility gap here that needs attention.

Two interesting observations or priorities feature in the top five problems of the others. For Kosovo others, at number 2, they suggest that a lack of mutual trust separates
Serbs and Albanians at 70% very significant. At 3rd on their list Serbia others have whole
ethnic groups blamed for the crimes of a few at 57% very significant. Again, the views of
others, although very similar to the majority perspective of the communities they live
amongst, are a little different and this difference can sometimes be instructive or even refreshing.
Very Significant - Kosovo Others
1 Not knowing the fate of lost persons
2 Lack of mutual trust separates Serbs and Albanians
3 KLA officers in government

77%
70%
58%

4
5

Serbs claim to be victims by not having effective

representation in Kosovo institutions
Serbs take their instructions from Belgrade

57%

Serbia Others
1 Albanians want a greater Albania
2 The legacy of so many killings
3 Whole ethnic groups are blamed for the
crimes of a few
4 Not knowing the fate of lost persons

55%

57%

53%

KLA officers in government

Research

Others

68%
67%
57%

Some points of disagreement

Eighty percent of Kosovo Albanians do not believe they are blackmailing Kosovo Serbs
to stop contact with Belgrade. Only 5% of Kosovo Serbs, 4% of Serbia Serbs and 2% of
Serb IDPs share this view. Similarly 66% of Kosovo Albanians do not believe in an Albanian culture of violence and revenge and only between 3% and 6% of Serbs share this view.
On the other hand 61% of Kosovo Serbs, 46% of Serbia Serbs and 51% of Serb IDPs do
not believe in a Serb culture of violence and dominance. This time 15% of Kosovo Albanians agree with them, but most do not. However, beyond this particular credibility gap
there are some grounds for hope. Both Kosovo Albanians (56%) and Serbs (between 37%
and 42%) do not believe all the people of the Balkans share a culture of violence.
245

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM
Not even true

Kosovo
Albanian

Kosovo
Serb

Serbia
Serb

Kosovo Albanians are blackmailing Kosovo Serbs to stop contact with Belgrade
Albanian culture of violence and revenge
Albanians lack confidence to negotiate
Kosovo Albanians are getting closer to Tirana while expecting Kosovo Serbs to stop
talking to Belgrade
All the people of the Balkans share a culture of violence
Serbs exaggerate the security problem
Serb culture of violence and dominance
Serb provocations
Serb war criminals should be tried in Kosovo
Serbs want a greater Serbia

80%
66%
66%
58%

5%
3%
42%
2%

4%
5%
30%
2%

Serbia
Serb
IDPs
2%
6%
49%
0%

56%
6%
15%
9%
5%
2%

42%
68%
62%
61%
59%
56%

37%
67%
46%
33%
38%
52%

40%
74%
51%
59%
40%
65%

In contrast to the point about a greater Albania made earlier it should be noted that 56%
of Kosovo Serbs, 52% of Serbia Serbs and 65% of Serb IDPs do not believe Serbs want a
greater Serbia. Unfortunately only 2% of Kosovo Albanians share this view so this particular credibility gap seems to be quite mutual.

Research

Some points of agreement

There are some significant points of agreement to be taken from this analysis. Firstly
both Kosovo Albanians and Serbs agree that not knowing the fate of lost persons and the
legacy of so many killings are significant problems. Almost no ones believes these problems are not true. Some what surprisingly both Kosovo Albanians and Serbs also believe
KLA officers in the police and government is also a problem. Hardly anyone thinks this is
not true although, for example, while 71% of Kosovo Serbs think this problem is very significant only between 28% and 37% of Kosovo Albanians feel this strongly about this issue.
But there is clearly sufficient common ground here to build on. There is also much agreement about the problems of inflammatory language in the media, the influence of war criminals in politics and a general lack of trust between Serbs and Albanians. But these problems are not unique to Kosovo and Serbia alone, the different ethnic groups and nationalities
of Bosnia Herzegovina and Macedonia have to struggle with these same difficulties.
Not even true
Not knowing the fate of lost persons
The legacy of so many killings
KLA officers in the police
KLA officers in government
Inflammatory language from politicians
Lack of mutual trust separates Serbs and Albanians
Inflammatory language from the media
Influence of war criminals in politics
Failure to prosecute war criminals
Serb desire to return to pre-war status

246

Kosovo
Albanian
0%
2%
3%
1%
5%
3%
7%
3%
1%
5%

Kosovo
Serb
0%
0%
1%
5%
3%
6%
4%
8%
12%
7%

Serbia
Serb
2%
0%
1%
1%
2%
1%
2%
2%
4%
5%

Serbia
Serb IDPs
0%
0%
1%
0%
5%
1%
5%
1%
17%
11%

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

43
44
45
46
47
48

73%
58%
41%
38%
37%
37%
36%
32%
28%
22%
21%
20%
19%
19%
19%
18%
17%
17%
16%
16%
15%
14%
14%
13%
12%
12%
11%

21%
32%
41%
36%
27%
26%
25%
24%
34%
30%
20%
33%
30%
13%
23%
20%
31%
36%
21%
18%
28%
6%
28%
13%
15%
16%
24%

5%
5%
13%
21%
22%
16%
15%
18%
24%
21%
30%
28%
20%
30%
36%
14%
19%
25%
28%
15%
23%
11%
17%
8%
22%
27%
30%

1%
1%
5%
3%
7%
15%
7%
9%
11%
11%
19%
12%
18%
25%
11%
22%
5%
16%
18%
17%
5%
15%
15%
8%
15%
10%
17%

0%
0%
1%
0%
4%
1%
2%
9%
3%
15%
3%
4%
7%
12%
7%
24%
13%
3%
11%
32%
1%
51%
3%
5%
15%
7%
15%

0%
4%
1%
2%
3%
5%
16%
9%
1%
1%
7%
3%
6%
1%
5%
1%
15%
3%
6%
2%
27%
2%
23%
52%
19%
27%
4%

10%
9%

25%
8%

24%
7%

16%
18%

23%
51%

2%
5%

9%
9%
9%
8%
8%
8%
8%
8%
7%
7%
6%

6%
12%
19%
19%
17%
26%
7%
32%
9%
8%
7%

5%
9%
21%
18%
21%
23%
6%
30%
12%
14%
13%

12%
5%
12%
19%
4%
18%
23%
21%
3%
8%
23%

11%
4%
7%
21%
4%
23%
50%
6%
4%
20%
43%

57%
61%
32%
15%
46%
2%
5%
4%
66%
44%
8%

5%

11%

29%

9%

4%

42%

5%

2%

2%

4%

7%

80%

4%

8%

11%

12%

6%

58%

4%
3%
3%
3%
2%

15%
7%
5%
3%
6%

18%
8%
15%
14%
7%

10%
7%
12%
13%
15%

2%
8%
18%
11%
24%

51%
66%
46%
56%
46%

Research

Not Even
True

42

Of No
Significance

31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41

Of Little
Significance

29
30

Not knowing the fate of lost persons

Discrimination against Albanians in the 90s
Failure to prosecute war criminals
The legacy of so many killings
KLA officers in the police
Serb war criminals should be tried in Kosovo
Playing politics with bodies
Serb provocations
KLA officers in government
Highly arrogant attitude of Serb Government
Inflammatory language from the media
Influence of war criminals in politics
Serbs exaggerate the security problem
Serbs take their instructions from Belgrade
Inflammatory language from politicians
Serbs do not even want to learn about and understand Albanians
Serb culture of violence and dominance
Lack of mutual trust separates Serbs and Albanians
Inflammatory language from clerics
Serbs unwilling to become full participants in Kosovo society as it is today
Whole ethnic groups are blamed for the crimes of a few
Serbs want a greater Serbia
Albanians want a greater Albania
Kosovo Albanian politicians not prepared to make difficult decisions
Apologies without security will not help
Serb and Albanian politicians unwilling to discuss issues in public
Serb DK to deal with Albanians on equal terms
Kosovo Serb politicians use international community as excuse for their
failures
Albanian politicians unable to agree amongst themselves
Serbs claim to be victims by not having effective representation in Kosovo
institutions
Albanian provocations
Kosovo Serbs and Albanians share the same problems
Kosovo Serb politicians not prepared to make difficult decisions
Albanians lack of political experience in developing and implementing policies
Serb resistance to accept the withdrawal of Serb administration from Kosovo
Serb desire to return to pre-war status
Mutual boycott of Pristina/Belgrade talks
Albanians lack confidence to negotiate
Albanians feel inferior to Serbs
Serb politicians unable to agree amongst themselves
Kosovo Albanian politicians use international community as excuse for their
failures
Kosovo Albanians are blackmailing Kosovo Serbs to stop contact with
Belgrade
Kosovo Albanians are getting closer to Tirana while expecting Kosovo Serbs to
stop talking to Belgrade
Kosovo Albanians not prepared to unequivocally condemn Albanian ethnic
violence
Albanian culture of violence and revenge
Albanian war criminals should be tried in Serbia
All the people of the Balkans share a culture of violence
Serbs feel inferior to Albanians

Of Some
Significance

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Significant

Question 3 Now with regards to Serbs and Albanians please indicate which
aspects of this problem you consider to be Very Significant, Significant, Of
Some Significance, Of Little Significance, Of No Significance at all or
Not Even True

Very
Significant

Table 3.1. Question 3 - Kosovo Albanian

247

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

Research

15

248

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48

Not Even
True

12
13
14

Of No
Significance

6
7
8
9
10
11

Of Little
Significance

3
4
5

Albanians want a greater Albania

Kosovo Albanians are getting closer to Tirana while expecting Kosovo Serbs to
stop talking to Belgrade
KLA officers in the police
KLA officers in government
Kosovo Albanians not prepared to unequivocally condemn Albanian ethnic
violence
Albanian provocations
Apologies without security will not help
Whole ethnic groups are blamed for the crimes of a few
The legacy of so many killings
Albanian culture of violence and revenge
Kosovo Albanians are blackmailing Kosovo Serbs to stop contact with
Belgrade
Lack of mutual trust separates Serbs and Albanians
Not knowing the fate of lost persons
Kosovo Albanian politicians use international community as excuse for their
failures
Serbs claim to be victims by not having effective representation in Kosovo
institutions
Serb resistance to accept the withdrawal of Serb administration from Kosovo
Influence of war criminals in politics
Playing politics with bodies
Albanian war criminals should be tried in Serbia
Albanians lack of political experience in developing and implementing policies
Inflammatory language from the media
Serb desire to return to pre-war status
Kosovo Serb politicians use international community as excuse for their
failures
Mutual boycott of Pristina/Belgrade talks
Serbs take their instructions from Belgrade
Serb and Albanian politicians unwilling to discuss issues in public
Inflammatory language from politicians
Kosovo Albanian politicians not prepared to make difficult decisions
Albanians feel inferior to Serbs
Failure to prosecute war criminals
Kosovo Serb politicians not prepared to make difficult decisions
Serb politicians unable to agree amongst themselves
Inflammatory language from clerics
Serbs unwilling to become full participants in Kosovo society as it is today
Serbs feel inferior to Albanians
Serb DK to deal with Albanians on equal terms
Discrimination against Albanians in the 90s
Kosovo Serbs and Albanians share the same problems
Serbs exaggerate the security problem
Serb provocations
Albanians lack confidence to negotiate
Serbs want a greater Serbia
Albanian politicians unable to agree amongst themselves
Serb culture of violence and dominance
Serbs do not even want to learn about and understand Albanians
Serb war criminals should be tried in Kosovo
All the people of the Balkans share a culture of violence
Highly arrogant attitude of Serb Government

Of Some
Significance

1
2

Significant

Question 3 Now with regards to Serbs and Albanians please indicate which
aspects of this problem you consider to be Very Significant, Significant, Of
Some Significance, Of Little Significance, Of No Significance at all or
Not Even True

Very
Significant

Table 3.2. Question 3 - Kosovo Serb

75%
75%

14%
19%

4%
2%

1%
1%

6%
2%

1%
2%

74%
71%
67%

18%
16%
18%

3%
2%
6%

3%
3%
2%

1%
3%
5%

1%
5%
2%

63%
62%
59%
58%
54%
54%

22%
27%
31%
34%
28%
23%

7%
3%
6%
3%
9%
8%

4%
2%
1%
5%
3%
3%

1%
1%
1%
0%
3%
6%

4%
4%
1%
0%
3%
5%

51%
51%
48%

32%
26%
31%

5%
11%
6%

6%
7%
3%

0%
6%
4%

6%
0%
7%

45%

25%

13%

3%

3%

9%

43%
39%
38%
38%
37%
37%
36%
29%

20%
19%
36%
24%
24%
33%
30%
24%

11%
13%
21%
9%
16%
17%
9%
16%

5%
12%
4%
10%
4%
9%
10%
2%

7%
10%
1%
11%
6%
1%
9%
10%

13%
8%
0%
9%
13%
4%
7%
20%

27%
25%
25%
25%
24%
23%
22%
22%
22%
17%
15%
15%
14%
12%
11%
10%
10%
10%
9%
9%
6%
6%
5%
4%
3%

31%
11%
40%
39%
40%
11%
26%
28%
26%
20%
16%
20%
21%
6%
13%
9%
4%
18%
2%
19%
10%
7%
3%
16%
3%

12%
10%
20%
24%
15%
8%
20%
19%
20%
15%
18%
8%
11%
14%
12%
7%
3%
14%
5%
22%
2%
5%
10%
16%
7%

8%
17%
1%
9%
1%
6%
13%
2%
8%
9%
12%
4%
8%
7%
6%
5%
5%
8%
16%
10%
2%
14%
7%
11%
15%

4%
17%
2%
1%
3%
9%
7%
11%
12%
18%
12%
14%
14%
8%
12%
1%
18%
8%
12%
8%
17%
18%
17%
10%
18%

18%
20%
12%
3%
16%
43%
12%
17%
11%
20%
27%
40%
32%
52%
46%
68%
61%
42%
56%
33%
62%
51%
59%
42%
54%

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48

77%
70%
58%
57%

19%
18%
15%
13%

4%
8%
28%
0%

0%
4%
0%
8%

0%
0%
0%
0%

0%
0%
0%
22%

57%
57%
55%
55%
53%
49%
49%
45%
45%
38%
34%
32%
32%
32%
32%
32%
32%

8%
14%
25%
0%
11%
0%
0%
41%
31%
16%
22%
30%
21%
0%
0%
0%
7%

11%
6%
7%
32%
17%
26%
0%
15%
16%
4%
15%
13%
0%
0%
0%
0%
19%

10%
10%
13%
0%
0%
8%
4%
0%
0%
32%
0%
25%
28%
0%
25%
22%
4%

13%
0%
0%
0%
0%
17%
27%
0%
8%
0%
11%
0%
19%
8%
30%
17%
17%

0%
13%
0%
13%
19%
0%
20%
0%
0%
10%
18%
0%
0%
59%
13%
29%
21%

32%
30%
30%
27%
26%
24%

29%
23%
0%
15%
22%
13%

0%
41%
12%
15%
19%
16%

16%
0%
25%
5%
6%
9%

0%
0%
20%
0%
13%
10%

23%
6%
13%
38%
13%
28%

19%

27%

16%

27%

0%

11%

19%

0%

6%

0%

0%

75%

18%
18%
17%
16%
15%
14%
14%
13%
13%

0%
26%
28%
19%
11%
6%
18%
6%
0%

48%
21%
40%
16%
34%
8%
9%
47%
0%

10%
16%
0%
16%
0%
31%
55%
20%
0%

15%
6%
9%
0%
19%
19%
0%
8%
0%

9%
13%
6%
32%
20%
22%
4%
6%
87%

13%
13%
10%
8%
4%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%

8%
7%
16%
7%
21%
0%
69%
0%
0%
12%

17%
33%
25%
32%
42%
33%
12%
9%
6%
27%

0%
0%
22%
18%
18%
0%
0%
22%
18%
23%

16%
0%
15%
21%
0%
4%
0%
22%
8%
14%

47%
47%
11%
14%
15%
63%
19%
46%
68%
24%

Research

Not Even
True

28

Of No
Significance

22
23
24
25
26
27

Of Little
Significance

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

Not knowing the fate of lost persons

Lack of mutual trust separates Serbs and Albanians
KLA officers in government
Serbs claim to be victims by not having effective representation in Kosovo
institutions
Serbs take their instructions from Belgrade
Discrimination against Albanians in the 90s
KLA officers in the police
Serb provocations
Playing politics with bodies
Serbs unwilling to become full participants in Kosovo society as it is today
Serbs want a greater Serbia
The legacy of so many killings
Failure to prosecute war criminals
Whole ethnic groups are blamed for the crimes of a few
Serbs exaggerate the security problem
Influence of war criminals in politics
Serb desire to return to pre-war status
Albanians lack confidence to negotiate
Albanian politicians unable to agree amongst themselves
Serb politicians unable to agree amongst themselves
Kosovo Serb politicians use international community as excuse for their
failures
Serb culture of violence and dominance
Serb and Albanian politicians unwilling to discuss issues in public
Albanians want a greater Albania
Kosovo Albanian politicians not prepared to make difficult decisions
Serb war criminals should be tried in Kosovo
Kosovo Albanians are getting closer to Tirana while expecting Kosovo Serbs to
stop talking to Belgrade
Kosovo Albanians not prepared to unequivocally condemn Albanian ethnic
violence
Kosovo Albanian politicians use international community as excuse for their
failures
Serb DK to deal with Albanians on equal terms
Serbs do not even want to learn about and understand Albanians
Kosovo Serb politicians not prepared to make difficult decisions
Kosovo Serbs and Albanians share the same problems
Albanians lack of political experience in developing and implementing policies
Serbs feel inferior to Albanians
Apologies without security will not help
Inflammatory language from politicians
Kosovo Albanians are blackmailing Kosovo Serbs to stop contact with
Belgrade
Albanian culture of violence and revenge
Albanian provocations
Highly arrogant attitude of Serb Government
Serb resistance to accept the withdrawal of Serb administration from Kosovo
Inflammatory language from the media
Albanians feel inferior to Serbs
Mutual boycott of Pristina/Belgrade talks
Albanian war criminals should be tried in Serbia
All the people of the Balkans share a culture of violence
Inflammatory language from clerics

Of Some
Significance

1
2
3
4

Significant

Question 3 Now with regards to Serbs and Albanians please indicate which
aspects of this problem you consider to be Very Significant, Significant, Of
Some Significance, Of Little Significance, Of No Significance at all or
Not Even True

Very
Significant

Table 3.3. Question 3 Kosovo Others

249

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48

250

Not Even
True

Research

17
18

Of No
Significance

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

Of Little
Significance

Albanians want a greater Albania

The legacy of so many killings
Kosovo Albanians not prepared to unequivocally condemn Albanian ethnic
violence
Kosovo Albanians are getting closer to Tirana while expecting Kosovo Serbs to
stop talking to Belgrade
Not knowing the fate of lost persons
Lack of mutual trust separates Serbs and Albanians
Apologies without security will not help
KLA officers in government
KLA officers in the police
Influence of war criminals in politics
Whole ethnic groups are blamed for the crimes of a few
Serb politicians unable to agree amongst themselves
Albanian provocations
Inflammatory language from the media
Mutual boycott of Pristina/Belgrade talks
Kosovo Albanian politicians use international community as excuse for their
failures
Inflammatory language from politicians
Kosovo Albanians are blackmailing Kosovo Serbs to stop contact with
Belgrade
Serbs feel inferior to Albanians
Albanian culture of violence and revenge
Serbs claim to be victims by not having effective representation in Kosovo
institutions
Failure to prosecute war criminals
Playing politics with bodies
Serb desire to return to pre-war status
Serb and Albanian politicians unwilling to discuss issues in public
Kosovo Albanian politicians not prepared to make difficult decisions
Kosovo Serb politicians not prepared to make difficult decisions
Albanians lack of political experience in developing and implementing policies
Serb resistance to accept the withdrawal of Serb administration from Kosovo
Kosovo Serb politicians use international community as excuse for their
failures
Albanian war criminals should be tried in Serbia
Inflammatory language from clerics
Serbs unwilling to become full participants in Kosovo society as it is today
Kosovo Serbs and Albanians share the same problems
Albanian politicians unable to agree amongst themselves
Albanians feel inferior to Serbs
Serb provocations
All the people of the Balkans share a culture of violence
Albanians lack confidence to negotiate
Serbs take their instructions from Belgrade
Serb DK to deal with Albanians on equal terms
Serb culture of violence and dominance
Discrimination against Albanians in the 90s
Serb war criminals should be tried in Kosovo
Serbs want a greater Serbia
Serbs do not even want to learn about and understand Albanians
Highly arrogant attitude of Serb Government
Serbs exaggerate the security problem

Of Some
Significance

1
2
3

Significant

Question 3 Now with regards to Serbs and Albanians please indicate which
aspects of this problem you consider to be Very Significant, Significant, Of
Some Significance, Of Little Significance, Of No Significance at all or
Not Even True

Very
Significant

Table 3.4. Question 3 Serbia Serb

74%
73%
69%

15%
20%
21%

6%
6%
7%

2%
1%
2%

2%
1%
1%

0%
0%
1%

61%

18%

15%

3%

1%

2%

59%
59%
58%
58%
57%
53%
51%
45%
45%
45%
44%
44%

28%
28%
26%
23%
26%
27%
31%
25%
28%
30%
36%
25%

7%
8%
9%
11%
11%
11%
12%
18%
16%
15%
12%
16%

3%
2%
3%
3%
3%
4%
2%
6%
4%
5%
2%
4%

1%
1%
2%
5%
2%
3%
1%
3%
2%
3%
2%
5%

2%
1%
1%
1%
1%
2%
3%
3%
5%
2%
4%
6%

44%
43%

32%
30%

14%
13%

5%
6%

4%
4%

2%
4%

41%
39%
37%

19%
33%
31%

15%
14%
16%

5%
5%
3%

3%
5%
4%

18%
5%
9%

37%
36%
35%
35%
34%
31%
31%
29%
28%

27%
32%
29%
34%
24%
27%
19%
28%
24%

17%
23%
16%
21%
17%
17%
24%
21%
20%

6%
5%
7%
3%
7%
9%
11%
7%
7%

9%
3%
9%
3%
5%
4%
7%
9%
6%

4%
1%
5%
5%
12%
12%
8%
7%
15%

26%
24%
24%
23%
17%
17%
17%
17%
15%
14%
13%
12%
11%
10%
9%
7%
6%
6%

19%
20%
26%
19%
13%
10%
14%
14%
17%
25%
23%
11%
16%
11%
5%
13%
12%
5%

19%
19%
23%
12%
19%
11%
16%
19%
15%
28%
16%
11%
14%
18%
10%
18%
15%
11%

12%
7%
8%
6%
12%
8%
7%
6%
11%
11%
9%
8%
10%
10%
9%
12%
9%
5%

10%
10%
5%
6%
18%
13%
13%
7%
12%
9%
8%
11%
14%
12%
14%
18%
10%
5%

15%
19%
14%
34%
21%
42%
33%
37%
30%
12%
31%
46%
36%
38%
52%
32%
48%
67%

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48

79%
77%
73%
72%
72%

8%
11%
13%
18%
21%

9%
7%
7%
6%
6%

2%
2%
1%
0%
1%

2%
1%
3%
0%
0%

0%
1%
3%
3%
1%

70%
64%
60%

27%
29%
21%

3%
5%
11%

0%
2%
1%

0%
0%
4%

0%
1%
2%

59%

22%

14%

2%

2%

0%

57%
56%
54%
54%
54%
53%
52%
52%
49%
48%

28%
29%
20%
8%
15%
24%
13%
16%
31%
15%

12%
14%
22%
7%
12%
8%
12%
14%
8%
8%

0%
1%
3%
3%
11%
3%
11%
12%
2%
5%

0%
0%
1%
17%
3%
10%
6%
2%
11%
2%

2%
0%
0%
11%
5%
1%
6%
5%
0%
23%

45%

21%

17%

1%

4%

12%

42%
37%
34%
33%
32%
30%
29%
29%
27%
27%
25%
23%
21%
20%
18%
18%
16%
16%
15%
12%
10%

4%
15%
24%
28%
31%
30%
20%
19%
22%
28%
18%
22%
5%
18%
7%
13%
16%
3%
10%
11%
24%

5%
21%
16%
12%
13%
17%
23%
30%
31%
10%
16%
21%
4%
17%
8%
12%
9%
4%
12%
9%
17%

3%
8%
3%
8%
1%
1%
5%
5%
4%
8%
6%
9%
2%
6%
2%
22%
6%
6%
5%
2%
7%

6%
6%
6%
4%
3%
17%
6%
6%
5%
11%
7%
2%
10%
10%
14%
8%
1%
7%
9%
6%
6%

39%
13%
17%
15%
20%
5%
17%
10%
12%
16%
28%
22%
59%
28%
51%
26%
52%
65%
49%
59%
36%

10%
9%
7%
7%
5%
4%
3%

9%
8%
20%
18%
8%
7%
5%

16%
18%
17%
16%
23%
18%
4%

20%
6%
8%
7%
6%
5%
9%

10%
19%
8%
3%
14%
10%
5%

36%
40%
40%
48%
44%
55%
74%

Research

20

Not Even
True

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

Of No
Significance

Of Little
Significance

6
7
8

Albanians want a greater Albania

KLA officers in the police
Apologies without security will not help
Albanian provocations
Kosovo Albanians not prepared to unequivocally condemn Albanian ethnic
violence
The legacy of so many killings
Lack of mutual trust separates Serbs and Albanians
Kosovo Albanians are blackmailing Kosovo Serbs to stop contact with
Belgrade
Kosovo Albanians are getting closer to Tirana while expecting Kosovo Serbs to
stop talking to Belgrade
Whole ethnic groups are blamed for the crimes of a few
Not knowing the fate of lost persons
Playing politics with bodies
Serb desire to return to pre-war status
Inflammatory language from politicians
Influence of war criminals in politics
Albanian culture of violence and revenge
Inflammatory language from the media
KLA officers in government
Serbs claim to be victims by not having effective representation in Kosovo
institutions
Kosovo Albanian politicians use international community as excuse for their
failures
Albanians feel inferior to Serbs
Albanians lack of political experience in developing and implementing policies
Mutual boycott of Pristina/Belgrade talks
Kosovo Albanian politicians not prepared to make difficult decisions
Serbs feel inferior to Albanians
Albanian war criminals should be tried in Serbia
Failure to prosecute war criminals
Serb politicians unable to agree amongst themselves
Serb and Albanian politicians unwilling to discuss issues in public
Serb resistance to accept the withdrawal of Serb administration from Kosovo
Serbs unwilling to become full participants in Kosovo society as it is today
Kosovo Serb politicians not prepared to make difficult decisions
Serb provocations
Serbs take their instructions from Belgrade
Serb culture of violence and dominance
Inflammatory language from clerics
Kosovo Serbs and Albanians share the same problems
Serbs want a greater Serbia
Albanians lack confidence to negotiate
Highly arrogant attitude of Serb Government
Kosovo Serb politicians use international community as excuse for their
failures
Albanian politicians unable to agree amongst themselves
Serb war criminals should be tried in Kosovo
All the people of the Balkans share a culture of violence
Serb DK to deal with Albanians on equal terms
Discrimination against Albanians in the 90s
Serbs do not even want to learn about and understand Albanians
Serbs exaggerate the security problem

Of Some
Significance

1
2
3
4
5

Significant

Question 3 Now with regards to Serbs and Albanians please indicate which
aspects of this problem you consider to be Very Significant, Significant, Of
Some Significance, Of Little Significance, Of No Significance at all or
Not Even True

Very
Significant

Table 3.5. Question 3 Serbia Serb IDPs

251

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48

252

Not Even
True

28
29

Of No
Significance

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

Of Little
Significance

Research

Albanians want a greater Albania

The legacy of so many killings
Whole ethnic groups are blamed for the crimes of a few
Not knowing the fate of lost persons
KLA officers in government
Lack of mutual trust separates Serbs and Albanians
Apologies without security will not help
Kosovo Albanians are getting closer to Tirana while expecting Kosovo Serbs to
stop talking to Belgrade
Kosovo Albanians not prepared to unequivocally condemn Albanian ethnic
violence
Inflammatory language from politicians
Inflammatory language from the media
Serb politicians unable to agree amongst themselves
KLA officers in the police
Playing politics with bodies
Influence of war criminals in politics
Albanian provocations
Mutual boycott of Pristina/Belgrade talks
Albanian culture of violence and revenge
Serbs unwilling to become full participants in Kosovo society as it is today
Serb desire to return to pre-war status
Failure to prosecute war criminals
Serbs feel inferior to Albanians
Inflammatory language from clerics
Kosovo Serbs and Albanians share the same problems
Serb provocations
Serb and Albanian politicians unwilling to discuss issues in public
Kosovo Albanian politicians use international community as excuse for their
failures
Serb DK to deal with Albanians on equal terms
Kosovo Serb politicians use international community as excuse for their
failures
Kosovo Albanians are blackmailing Kosovo Serbs to stop contact with
Belgrade
Albanian war criminals should be tried in Serbia
Serbs claim to be victims by not having effective representation in Kosovo
institutions
Discrimination against Albanians in the 90s
Serb culture of violence and dominance
Highly arrogant attitude of Serb Government
Serbs want a greater Serbia
Albanians lack confidence to negotiate
Serb resistance to accept the withdrawal of Serb administration from Kosovo
Serbs take their instructions from Belgrade
Albanians feel inferior to Serbs
All the people of the Balkans share a culture of violence
Kosovo Serb politicians not prepared to make difficult decisions
Albanian politicians unable to agree amongst themselves
Albanians lack of political experience in developing and implementing policies
Serb war criminals should be tried in Kosovo
Kosovo Albanian politicians not prepared to make difficult decisions
Serbs do not even want to learn about and understand Albanians
Serbs exaggerate the security problem

Of Some
Significance

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Significant

Question 3 Now with regards to Serbs and Albanians please indicate which
aspects of this problem you consider to be Very Significant, Significant, Of
Some Significance, Of Little Significance, Of No Significance at all or
Not Even True

Very
Significant

Table 3.6. Question 3 Serbia Others

68%
67%
57%
55%
53%
52%
51%
50%

14%
24%
30%
29%
23%
28%
32%
27%

11%
6%
4%
10%
6%
12%
9%
11%

4%
1%
6%
4%
10%
4%
3%
3%

2%
0%
0%
1%
8%
0%
3%
3%

1%
2%
3%
0%
0%
3%
2%
6%

48%

34%

7%

7%

1%

2%

47%
47%
45%
42%
41%
41%
40%
40%
40%
38%
37%
34%
29%
28%
27%
26%
24%
24%

30%
27%
22%
36%
37%
32%
36%
31%
32%
32%
37%
37%
25%
26%
20%
31%
32%
31%

11%
10%
19%
10%
17%
14%
13%
19%
15%
12%
6%
17%
19%
9%
11%
13%
15%
28%

4%
5%
4%
5%
1%
4%
3%
3%
6%
3%
10%
40%
8%
12%
7%
7%
9%
6%

4%
5%
2%
2%
2%
3%
3%
1%
2%
3%
3%
3%
3%
10%
5%
2%
5%
3%

3%
6%
8%
4%
2%
6%
5%
6%
5%
11%
7%
5%
15%
16%
30%
20%
15%
8%

24%
23%

22%
39%

8%
22%

9%
5%

8%
1%

28%
9%

23%

45%

18%

7%

1%

6%

22%
22%

24%
38%

16%
18%

10%
11%

8%
4%

20%
7%

20%
19%
18%
18%
18%
18%
17%
17%
15%
15%
15%
14%
13%
13%
11%
10%

18%
29%
17%
28%
40%
45%
38%
27%
20%
37%
29%
22%
16%
37%
22%
16%

23%
13%
13%
11%
16%
14%
27%
13%
25%
19%
19%
18%
15%
21%
12%
10%

12%
8%
10%
9%
3%
9%
5%
10%
7%
18%
13%
23%
11%
10%
7%
6%

6%
4%
5%
3%
4%
7%
5%
4%
7%
4%
7%
9%
6%
8%
13%
2%

22%
27%
36%
30%
18%
7%
8%
29%
25%
7%
18%
14%
38%
12%
34%
54%

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

4. Security
The question
Now with regards to security please indicate which aspects of this problem you consider to be Very Significant, Significant, Of Some Significance, Of Little Significance,
Of No Significance at all or Not Even True
Kosovo Albanian priorities

Very Significant - Kosovo Albanian

1 Weak justice system
2 Organised political crime
3 Albanians are afraid to talk Albanian in North Mitrovica
4 Lack of trust in the justice system
5 Slow working of the justice system

49%
48%
46%
46%
43%

Serbian priorities
The most important security concern for Serbs is that people do not have full freedom
of movement in Kosovo at 84% very significant for Kosovo Serbs, 91% for Serbia Serbs
and 94% for Serb IDPs. This is followed by isolated Serbs are prisoners in their own homes
for Kosovo Serbs at 72%, Serbia Serbs 83% and Serb IDPs 76%. After this comes no unconditional support from the Albanian political leadership to improve security at 66% for
Kosovo Serbs, 71% for Serbia Serbs and 82% for Serb IDPs. Kosovo Serbs do not trust the
Kosovo Police Service (KPS) comes in 5th on the Kosovo Serb (65%) and Serbia Serb
(71%) lists but, perhaps understandably Serb IDPs put UNMIK do not provide effective
security in their top five concerns at 82% very significant.
Very Significant - Kosovo Serb
1 Serbs are afraid to talk
Serbian in Pristina

89%

People do not have full

freedom of movement in
Kosovo

84%

Isolated Serbs are prisoners

in their own homes

72%

No unconditional support
from Albanian political
leadership to improve
security
Kosovo Serbs do not trust the
Kosovo Police Service (KPS)

66%

65%

Serbia Serb
1 People do not have full
freedom of movement in
Kosovo
2 Isolated Serbs are prisoners
in their own homes

No unconditional support
from Albanian political
leadership to improve
security
Serbs are afraid to talk
Serbian in Pristina

71%

Serbia Serb IDPs

1 People do not have full
freedom of movement in
Kosovo
2 No unconditional support
from Albanian political
leadership to improve
security
3 Organised political crime

71%

UNMIK do not provide

effective security

82%

Kosovo Serbs do not trust the

Kosovo Police Service (KPS)

71%

Slow working of the justice

system

79%

91%

83%

Research

The security list of problems contains 29 items (see tables 4.1 to 4.6). The weak justice
system comes in at the top of the Kosovo Albanian list at 49% very significant. This is followed by organised political crime at 48%, Albanians are afraid to talk Albanian in North
Mitrovica and a lack of trust in the justice system both at 46% and then 5th, at 43% very
significant, slow working of the justice system. Seventy nine percent of Serb IDPs share
this concern. However 89% of Kosovo Serbs also consider Serbs being afraid to talk Serbian in Pristina to be very significant. Fear, in these regards, seems to be quite mutual.

94%

82%

82%

253

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

Others
Like Serbs and Kosovo Albanians others are also concerned about the slow working
of the justice system at 85% very significant for Kosovo others and 60% for Serbia others.
However the top priorities for the Kosovo others then depart a little from that of their Albanian fellow citizens with security forces not accountable to the people at 70% very significant followed by corruption in UNMIK at 66%, organised political crime at 64% and
then 5th, UNMIK police and KPS do not do enough to arrest criminals, at 44% very significant.
Very Significant - Kosovo Others
1 Slow working of the justice system

85%

2
3
4
5

70%
66%
64%
44%

Security forces are not accountable to the people

Corruption in UNMIK
Organised political crime
UNMIK police and KPS do not do enough to arrest
criminals

Serbia Others
1 People do not have full freedom of movement in
Kosovo
2 Isolated Serbs are prisoners in their own homes
3 Organised political crime
4 Lack of trust in the justice system
5 Slow working of the justice system

75%
68%
63%
63%
60%

Research

Some points of disagreement

For Serbs the problem of security is their biggest problem. It is therefore a matter of
some concern that Kosovo Albanians do not seem to believe how seriously Serbs take this
issue. Sixty nine percent of Kosovo Albanians do not consider the proposition that people
do not have full freedom of movement in Kosovo to be true. They also do not believe the
Kosovo Albanian political leadership are failing to give unconditional support to the improvement of security (67% not even true) and that isolated Serbs are prisoners in their own
homes (65% not even true). But then, somewhat similarly, 60% of Kosovo Serbs (45%
Serbia Serbs and 51% Serb IDPs) do not believe Serbs take the law into their own hands
and block roads. Only 13% of Kosovo Albanians would agree. And then again 60% of
Kosovo Serbs (55% Serbia Serbs and 51% Serb IDPs) do not believe Albanians fear an
external military threat. This time only 22% of Kosovo Albanians would agree. Finally, in
this list there is also the Pristina/Mitrovica credibility gap mentioned earlier where neither
group believe the other when they say they are afraid to speak their own language in the
others territory.
Not even true

Kosovo
Albanian

Kosovo
Serb

Serbia
Serb

People do not have full freedom of movement in Kosovo

Serbs are afraid to talk Serbian in Pristina
No unconditional support from Albanian political leadership to improve security
Isolated Serbs are prisoners in their own homes
Politicians and media projecting other ethnic groups as security threats
Not enough minorities in government posts
Serbs take the law into their own hands and block roads
Albanian fear from external military threat
War crimes prosecuted in Serbia do not meet Albanian needs for justice
Albanians are afraid to talk Albanian in North Mitrovica
Clandestine information structures operating in Kosovo (both Albanian Shik and Sia
and Serbian)

69%
68%
67%
65%
65%
20%
13%
22%
4%
4%
4%

0%
0%
3%
7%
5%
1%
60%
60%
45%
44%
13%

0%
2%
0%
0%
3%
1%
45%
55%
20%
38%
2%

Serbia
Serb
IDPs
1%
0%
1%
0%
3%
0%
51%
51%
31%
50%
6%

With regards to clandestine information structures operating in Kosovo the results for
both Serbs and Kosovo Albanians are mixed. Some think this is a problem and some do
not, while a few do not believe it to be true. So this item ended up in both this list and the
one below.
254

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

Some points of agreement

Not even true

Kosovo
Albanian

Kosovo
Serb

Serbia
Serb

Weak justice system

No local police whose ethnic composition reflects local population
Slow working of the justice system
Lack of trust in the justice system
Organised political crime
Kosovo Serbs do not trust the Kosovo Police Service (KPS)
Clandestine information structures operating in Kosovo (both Albanian Shik and Sia
and Serbian)
Opposite visions for the future of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC)
Lack of prosecution of war criminals in the Hague and locally

2%
4%
5%
2%
2%
9%

0%
3%
2%
5%
5%
7%

1%
1%
0%
0%
0%
1%

Serbia
Serb
IDPs
0%
4%
1%
0%
1%
1%

4%
10%
16%

13%
12%
9%

2%
1%
6%

6%
1%
3%

Most Serbs and Kosovo Albanians agree that they have opposite visions for the future
of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) but this can hardly be counted as real progress.
However, there does seem to be general support for the prosecution of war criminals from
both communities.

Research

With regards to the weak justice system, slow working of the justice system and lack of
trust in the justice system everyone seems to think there is plenty of room for improvement
and very few people, from both communities, do not consider these problems to be true.
Organised political crime is also a common problem for everyone as well as a lack of local
police whose ethnic composition reflects the local populations. Even 43% of Kosovo Albanians believe the problem of Kosovo Serbs not being able to trust the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) to be very significant or significant. Clearly movement can be made on all these
issues with a minimum of political leadership.

255

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

256

Not Even
True

25
26
27
28
29

Of No
Significance

21
22
23
24

Of Little
Significance

Research

19
20

Weak justice system

Organised political crime
Albanians are afraid to talk Albanian in North Mitrovica
Lack of trust in the justice system
Slow working of the justice system
Lack of prosecution of war criminals in the Hague and locally
War crimes prosecuted in Serbia do not meet Albanian needs for justice
Serbs take the law into their own hands and block roads
UNMIK police and KPS do not do enough to arrest criminals
Opposite visions for the future of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC)
Corruption in UNMIK
Albanian fear from external military threat
No local police whose ethnic composition reflects local population
Security forces are not accountable to the people
Lack of coordination in KFOR
Kosovo Serbs do not trust the Kosovo Police Service (KPS)
The International community use local politicians as an excuse for their failures
Clandestine information structures operating in Kosovo (both Albanian Shik
and Sia and Serbian)
UNMIK do not provide effective security
4 Official/unofficial governments in Kosovo: Kosovo, UNMIK, Serb and
Opposition/Shadow
The Kosovo government do not have powers to manage security
KFOR are not trained for policing duties
People do not have full freedom of movement in Kosovo
No unconditional support from Albanian political leadership to improve
security
Politicians and media using political issues to stir up trouble and fear
Not enough minorities in government posts
Politicians and media projecting other ethnic groups as security threats
Isolated Serbs are prisoners in their own homes
Serbs are afraid to talk Serbian in Pristina

Of Some
Significance

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

Significant

Question 4 - Now with regards to the security please indicate which aspects of
this problem you consider to be Very Significant, Significant, Of Some
Significance, Of Little Significance, Of No Significance at all or Not Even
True

Very
Significant

Table 4.1. Question 4 Kosovo Albanian

49%
48%
46%
46%
43%
42%
35%
33%
31%
30%
29%
21%
21%
19%
16%
16%
15%
14%

32%
29%
25%
29%
35%
26%
37%
27%
23%
27%
21%
21%
24%
28%
24%
27%
16%
31%

14%
15%
20%
18%
12%
11%
14%
12%
9%
16%
8%
16%
29%
15%
16%
15%
19%
29%

2%
6%
5%
5%
5%
4%
5%
7%
4%
6%
4%
13%
19%
6%
7%
15%
12%
20%

1%
1%
0%
0%
1%
1%
4%
7%
3%
11%
10%
7%
4%
1%
3%
16%
3%
2%

2%
2%
4%
2%
5%
16%
4%
13%
30%
10%
28%
22%
4%
31%
35%
9%
36%
4%

14%
14%

21%
16%

16%
24%

5%
20%

10%
8%

34%
18%

13%
12%
10%
10%

12%
20%
8%
11%

14%
10%
5%
5%

3%
7%
3%
3%

5%
3%
5%
3%

53%
49%
69%
67%

7%
6%
4%
3%
1%

17%
8%
8%
5%
11%

22%
21%
9%
9%
7%

15%
28%
6%
7%
7%

3%
16%
9%
11%
6%

36%
20%
65%
65%
68%

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

89%
84%
72%
66%

11%
16%
17%
22%

0%
0%
4%
2%

1%
0%
0%
1%

0%
1%
0%
6%

0%
0%
7%
3%

65%
59%
59%
59%
56%
54%
54%
53%
47%
46%
43%
43%
42%
41%
40%
37%
33%
29%
27%
22%

18%
27%
31%
23%
25%
29%
30%
33%
38%
23%
30%
36%
37%
36%
40%
40%
32%
44%
24%
30%

7%
5%
5%
10%
11%
3%
9%
5%
8%
8%
15%
11%
12%
11%
12%
12%
17%
20%
12%
18%

1%
3%
0%
1%
4%
6%
1%
3%
1%
5%
6%
5%
4%
3%
1%
4%
7%
4%
14%
12%

1%
1%
2%
1%
1%
1%
5%
1%
4%
7%
4%
5%
2%
7%
2%
6%
3%
2%
13%
5%

7%
5%
3%
6%
3%
5%
1%
5%
2%
12%
2%
0%
3%
3%
5%
1%
8%
0%
9%
13%

21%

30%

19%

12%

9%

9%

11%
7%
7%
3%

12%
8%
6%
6%

10%
12%
6%
3%

6%
11%
10%
6%

16%
18%
12%
22%

45%
44%
60%
60%

Research

Not Even
True

26
27
28
29

Of No
Significance

25

Of Little
Significance

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

Serbs are afraid to talk Serbian in Pristina

People do not have full freedom of movement in Kosovo
Isolated Serbs are prisoners in their own homes
No unconditional support from Albanian political leadership to improve
security
Kosovo Serbs do not trust the Kosovo Police Service (KPS)
Politicians and media projecting other ethnic groups as security threats
UNMIK do not provide effective security
The Kosovo government do not have powers to manage security
Security forces are not accountable to the people
Organised political crime
Not enough minorities in government posts
UNMIK police and KPS do not do enough to arrest criminals
Slow working of the justice system
Opposite visions for the future of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC)
Corruption in UNMIK
Weak justice system
No local police whose ethnic composition reflects local population
KFOR are not trained for policing duties
Lack of trust in the justice system
The International community use local politicians as an excuse for their failures
Lack of coordination in KFOR
Politicians and media using political issues to stir up trouble and fear
Lack of prosecution of war criminals in the Hague and locally
Clandestine information structures operating in Kosovo (both Albanian Shik
and Sia and Serbian)
4 Official/unofficial governments in Kosovo: Kosovo, UNMIK, Serb and
Opposition/Shadow
War crimes prosecuted in Serbia do not meet Albanian needs for justice
Albanians are afraid to talk Albanian in North Mitrovica
Albanian fear from external military threat
Serbs take the law into their own hands and block roads

Of Some
Significance

1
2
3
4

Significant

Question 4 - Now with regards to the security please indicate which aspects of
this problem you consider to be Very Significant, Significant, Of Some
Significance, Of Little Significance, Of No Significance at all or Not Even
True

Very
Significant

Table 4.2. Question 4 Kosovo Serb

257

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

258

Not Even
True

25
26
27
28
29

Of No
Significance

21
22
23
24

Of Little
Significance

Research

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Slow working of the justice system

Security forces are not accountable to the people
Corruption in UNMIK
Organised political crime
UNMIK police and KPS do not do enough to arrest criminals
Not enough minorities in government posts
KFOR are not trained for policing duties
Serbs are afraid to talk Serbian in Pristina
Lack of prosecution of war criminals in the Hague and locally
Serbs take the law into their own hands and block roads
Clandestine information structures operating in Kosovo (both Albanian Shik
and Sia and Serbian)
Opposite visions for the future of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC)
UNMIK do not provide effective security
Lack of coordination in KFOR
War crimes prosecuted in Serbia do not meet Albanian needs for justice
Albanians are afraid to talk Albanian in North Mitrovica
The Kosovo government do not have powers to manage security
Lack of trust in the justice system
No local police whose ethnic composition reflects local population
No unconditional support from Albanian political leadership to improve
security
Isolated Serbs are prisoners in their own homes
Kosovo Serbs do not trust the Kosovo Police Service (KPS)
People do not have full freedom of movement in Kosovo
4 Official/unofficial governments in Kosovo: Kosovo, UNMIK, Serb and
Opposition/Shadow
Weak justice system
The International community use local politicians as an excuse for their failures
Politicians and media using political issues to stir up trouble and fear
Albanian fear from external military threat
Politicians and media projecting other ethnic groups as security threats

Of Some
Significance

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

Significant

Question 4 - Now with regards to the security please indicate which aspects of
this problem you consider to be Very Significant, Significant, Of Some
Significance, Of Little Significance, Of No Significance at all or Not Even
True

Very
Significant

Table 4.3. Question 4 Kosovo Others

85%
70%
66%
64%
44%
43%
42%
40%
38%
32%
32%

0%
0%
20%
0%
37%
13%
15%
0%
36%
16%
13%

0%
0%
0%
0%
9%
41%
10%
0%
14%
8%
23%

10%
0%
0%
36%
5%
0%
0%
0%
6%
10%
25%

0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
20%
0%
0%
0%
7%

4%
30%
15%
0%
6%
4%
11%
60%
6%
33%
0%

32%
32%
32%
32%
27%
24%
23%
21%
20%

32%
30%
20%
24%
34%
6%
21%
11%
8%

32%
24%
25%
0%
20%
28%
47%
36%
32%

0%
0%
0%
27%
0%
0%
9%
6%
0%

0%
0%
19%
4%
0%
6%
0%
25%
0%

4%
15%
4%
13%
19%
36%
0%
0%
40%

18%
18%
13%
13%

13%
29%
0%
10%

0%
33%
32%
16%

9%
6%
0%
61%

0%
15%
4%
0%

60%
0%
51%
0%

11%
10%
9%
8%
0%

37%
25%
32%
12%
13%

52%
27%
28%
0%
32%

0%
24%
10%
21%
7%

0%
0%
0%
6%
8%

0%
15%
22%
54%
40%

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

91%
83%
71%

8%
15%
25%

1%
2%
3%

0%
0%
0%

1%
0%
1%

0%
0%
0%

71%
71%
67%
66%
66%
66%
65%
62%
60%
58%
56%
52%
51%
50%
46%
45%
41%
40%
38%

21%
23%
23%
24%
24%
23%
26%
25%
26%
29%
26%
28%
27%
28%
26%
32%
22%
29%
28%

6%
4%
7%
6%
7%
8%
8%
8%
8%
8%
12%
14%
12%
13%
16%
15%
21%
21%
19%

0%
0%
3%
2%
1%
2%
2%
3%
3%
2%
3%
3%
2%
4%
5%
5%
6%
7%
9%

1%
0%
0%
2%
0%
1%
0%
1%
2%
1%
1%
2%
2%
3%
3%
2%
3%
1%
4%

2%
1%
0%
0%
1%
0%
0%
0%
1%
2%
1%
1%
7%
1%
3%
2%
8%
3%
2%

38%
34%

23%
28%

19%
22%

7%
9%

6%
3%

6%
4%

33%
14%
14%
7%
6%

32%
19%
15%
7%
8%

21%
17%
14%
11%
12%

9%
13%
7%
8%
11%

4%
17%
13%
12%
19%

1%
20%
38%
55%
45%

Research

Not Even
True

25
26
27
28
29

Of No
Significance

23
24

Of Little
Significance

4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

People do not have full freedom of movement in Kosovo

Isolated Serbs are prisoners in their own homes
No unconditional support from Albanian political leadership to improve
security
Serbs are afraid to talk Serbian in Pristina
Kosovo Serbs do not trust the Kosovo Police Service (KPS)
UNMIK do not provide effective security
Organised political crime
Weak justice system
UNMIK police and KPS do not do enough to arrest criminals
Lack of trust in the justice system
Slow working of the justice system
Corruption in UNMIK
Security forces are not accountable to the people
Not enough minorities in government posts
No local police whose ethnic composition reflects local population
The Kosovo government do not have powers to manage security
Lack of coordination in KFOR
The International community use local politicians as an excuse for their failures
Politicians and media projecting other ethnic groups as security threats
KFOR are not trained for policing duties
Politicians and media using political issues to stir up trouble and fear
Clandestine information structures operating in Kosovo (both Albanian Shik
and Sia and Serbian)
Lack of prosecution of war criminals in the Hague and locally
4 Official/unofficial governments in Kosovo: Kosovo, UNMIK, Serb and
Opposition/Shadow
Opposite visions for the future of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC)
War crimes prosecuted in Serbia do not meet Albanian needs for justice
Albanians are afraid to talk Albanian in North Mitrovica
Albanian fear from external military threat
Serbs take the law into their own hands and block roads

Of Some
Significance

1
2
3

Significant

Question 4 Now with regards to the security please indicate which aspects of
this problem you consider to be Very Significant, Significant, Of Some
Significance, Of Little Significance, Of No Significance at all or Not Even
True

Very
Significant

Table 4.4. Question 4 Serbia Serb

259

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

260

Not Even
True

24
25
26
27
28
29

Of No
Significance

20
21
22
23

Of Little
Significance

Research

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

People do not have full freedom of movement in Kosovo

No unconditional support from Albanian political leadership to improve
security
Organised political crime
UNMIK do not provide effective security
Slow working of the justice system
Corruption in UNMIK
Lack of coordination in KFOR
Isolated Serbs are prisoners in their own homes
Security forces are not accountable to the people
Serbs are afraid to talk Serbian in Pristina
UNMIK police and KPS do not do enough to arrest criminals
Not enough minorities in government posts
Kosovo Serbs do not trust the Kosovo Police Service (KPS)
Politicians and media projecting other ethnic groups as security threats
Lack of trust in the justice system
KFOR are not trained for policing duties
Opposite visions for the future of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC)
No local police whose ethnic composition reflects local population
4 Official/unofficial governments in Kosovo: Kosovo, UNMIK, Serb and
Opposition/Shadow
The Kosovo government do not have powers to manage security
Weak justice system
The International community use local politicians as an excuse for their failures
Clandestine information structures operating in Kosovo (both Albanian Shik
and Sia and Serbian)
Politicians and media using political issues to stir up trouble and fear
Lack of prosecution of war criminals in the Hague and locally
War crimes prosecuted in Serbia do not meet Albanian needs for justice
Albanians are afraid to talk Albanian in North Mitrovica
Serbs take the law into their own hands and block roads
Albanian fear from external military threat

Of Some
Significance

1
2

Significant

Question 4 Now with regards to the security please indicate which aspects of
this problem you consider to be Very Significant, Significant, Of Some
Significance, Of Little Significance, Of No Significance at all or Not Even
True

Very
Significant

Table 4.5. Question 4 Serbia Serb IDPs

94%
82%

4%
13%

1%
3%

0%
1%

0%
0%

1%
1%

82%
82%
79%
79%
77%
76%
75%
75%
71%
70%
70%
64%
63%
63%
56%
55%
54%

15%
14%
18%
10%
17%
19%
18%
14%
19%
19%
17%
24%
19%
22%
18%
28%
25%

1%
3%
2%
6%
5%
5%
4%
4%
6%
8%
9%
6%
13%
12%
18%
9%
9%

1%
1%
0%
0%
0%
1%
2%
6%
3%
1%
2%
3%
4%
0%
4%
2%
5%

0%
0%
0%
2%
0%
0%
0%
1%
0%
2%
1%
0%
1%
2%
3%
1%
5%

1%
0%
1%
4%
1%
0%
1%
0%
0%
0%
1%
3%
0%
1%
1%
4%
2%

50%
48%
47%
45%

33%
34%
26%
25%

12%
11%
22%
13%

1%
7%
0%
4%

2%
1%
1%
8%

3%
0%
4%
6%

41%
41%
20%
13%
4%
4%

21%
24%
4%
9%
7%
10%

34%
17%
9%
12%
18%
11%

3%
6%
22%
4%
10%
11%

1%
9%
15%
12%
10%
13%

1%
3%
31%
50%
51%
51%

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

75%
68%
63%
63%
60%
60%
55%
54%
51%

19%
18%
31%
24%
31%
29%
25%
34%
30%

3%
8%
3%
8%
5%
8%
11%
8%
13%

0%
2%
1%
2%
2%
1%
2%
2%
2%

0%
1%
0%
1%
0%
2%
0%
2%
2%

3%
2%
2%
2%
2%
0%
8%
0%
2%

49%
48%
47%
44%
43%
39%

33%
30%
34%
25%
36%
22%

11%
7%
10%
8%
14%
25%

4%
4%
4%
13%
4%
7%

4%
4%
3%
3%
0%
1%

0%
6%
2%
8%
3%
7%

39%
38%
37%
36%
36%
36%
34%
33%
32%

35%
38%
29%
42%
31%
31%
32%
42%
39%

14%
11%
15%
14%
19%
19%
12%
13%
19%

9%
9%
9%
4%
3%
5%
12%
8%
6%

1%
3%
4%
1%
4%
5%
5%
0%
1%

2%
1%
7%
3%
7%
3%
4%
3%
4%

30%
22%
17%
13%
7%

29%
14%
33%
20%
10%

18%
14%
13%
21%
14%

12%
10%
19%
17%
11%

4%
9%
5%
6%
19%

7%
31%
14%
23%
39%

Research

Not Even
True

25
26
27
28
29

Of No
Significance

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

Of Little
Significance

10
11
12
13
14
15

People do not have full freedom of movement in Kosovo

Isolated Serbs are prisoners in their own homes
Organised political crime
Lack of trust in the justice system
Slow working of the justice system
Kosovo Serbs do not trust the Kosovo Police Service (KPS)
UNMIK do not provide effective security
Weak justice system
No unconditional support from Albanian political leadership to improve
security
No local police whose ethnic composition reflects local population
Serbs are afraid to talk Serbian in Pristina
UNMIK police and KPS do not do enough to arrest criminals
Corruption in UNMIK
Not enough minorities in government posts
4 Official/unofficial governments in Kosovo: Kosovo, UNMIK, Serb and
Opposition/Shadow
Security forces are not accountable to the people
Lack of prosecution of war criminals in the Hague and locally
Lack of coordination in KFOR
Politicians and media projecting other ethnic groups as security threats
Politicians and media using political issues to stir up trouble and fear
The Kosovo government do not have powers to manage security
The International community use local politicians as an excuse for their failures
Opposite visions for the future of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC)
Clandestine information structures operating in Kosovo (both Albanian Shik
and Sia and Serbian)
KFOR are not trained for policing duties
Albanians are afraid to talk Albanian in North Mitrovica
War crimes prosecuted in Serbia do not meet Albanian needs for justice
Serbs take the law into their own hands and block roads
Albanian fear from external military threat

Of Some
Significance

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Significant

Question 4 Now with regards to the security please indicate which aspects of
this problem you consider to be Very Significant, Significant, Of Some
Significance, Of Little Significance, Of No Significance at all or Not Even
True

Very
Significant

Table 4.6. Question 4 Serbia Others

261

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

5. A future without agreement

The question
And from the different possibilities listed below what do you think will happen if the
people of Kosovo, Serbia and the International Community fail to take the necessary steps
needed to deal with these problems. Please indicate which possibilities you consider to be
Very probable, Probable, Not sure about, Improbable or Very improbable.
Kosovo Albanian possible futures

Research

Relatively speaking Kosovo Albanians are not nearly so worried about the future as
Kosovo Serbs, Serbia Serbs and Serbia IDPs. If the problems reviewed in questions 1 to 4
do not get properly addressed then only 31% of Kosovo Albanians believe this will very
probably lead to social unrest and only 17% believe this will very probably lead to the
isolation of Kosovo and Serbia.
Very Probable - Kosovo Albanian
1
Social unrest
2
Increased criminalisation
3
Lack of investment
4
Increased emigration
5
Renewed violent conflict
6
Decrease in international assistance
7
Increased international military presence
8
Escalation of ethnic tensions
9
Increased political instability
10 Increased regional instability
11 Isolation of Kosovo and Serbia

31%
29%
28%
28%
26%
24%
24%
20%
19%
18%
17%

Serbian possible futures

All the groups of Serbs interviewed for this poll believed the most likely outcome of not
adequately dealing with these problems will very probably lead to increased criminalisation at 55% for Kosovo Serbs, 65% for Serbia Serbs and 70% for Serb IDPs. However, like
their Albanian counterparts, they also believe the least likely outcome of such a failure
would be the isolation of Kosovo and Serbia. Clearly very few people in Kosovo or Serbia
believe the international community is about to turn their back on them, whatever happens.

262

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM
Very Probable - Kosovo Serb
1
Increased criminalisation
2
Increased emigration

55%
47%

Increased
regional
instability
Increased
political
instability
Renewed violent conflict
Escalation of ethnic tensions

47%

Serbia Serb
1
Increased criminalisation
2
Increased
political
instability
3
Escalation of ethnic tensions

42%

41%
40%

5
6

34%

Decrease in international
assistance
Isolation of Kosovo and
Serbia
Lack of investment

10
11

4
5
6
7
8

65%
57%

Serbia Serb IDPs

1
Increased criminalisation
2
Renewed violent conflict

70%
62%

54%

61%

Social unrest

53%

Increased
political
instability
Escalation of ethnic tensions

51%
51%

5
6

51%

Social unrest
Increased
regional
instability
Increased emigration

56%
51%

Increased emigration
Increased
regional
instability
Renewed violent conflict

33%

Lack of investment

41%

47%

32%

41%

Social unrest

30%

10

39%

10

Increased international
military presence

28%

11

Increased international
military presence
Decrease in international
assistance
Isolation of Kosovo and
Serbia

Increased international
military presence
Decrease in international
assistance
Lack of investment

32%

11

Isolation of Kosovo and

Serbia

59%

49%

45%
40%
30%

Like the majority population in which they live Kosovo others are far less concerned
about the future than their Serbia other counterparts. Increased emigration comes in at the
top of the Kosovo others list at 27% very probable while increased criminalisation comes
in on the top of the Serbia others list at 57% very probable.
Very Probable - Kosovo Others
1
Increased emigration
2
Renewed violent conflict
3
Increased regional instability
4
Increased international military presence
5
Isolation of Kosovo and Serbia
6
Increased political instability
7
Increased criminalisation
8
Social unrest
9
Decrease in international assistance
10 Lack of investment
11 Escalation of ethnic tensions

27%
26%
23%
22%
20%
20%
18%
18%
17%
17%
15%

Serbia Others
1
Increased criminalisation
2
Increased political instability
3
Escalation of ethnic tensions
4
Social unrest
5
Increased regional instability
6
Increased emigration
7
Lack of investment
8
Increased international military presence
9
Renewed violent conflict
10 Decrease in international assistance
11 Isolation of Kosovo and Serbia

57%
57%
52%
51%
46%
45%
39%
39%
39%
35%
31%

Research

Others

263

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

Probable

Not sure

Improbable

Very
improbable

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

Question 5 - And from the different possibilities listed below what do you think will
happen if the people of Kosovo, Serbia and the International Community fail to take
the necessary steps needed to deal with these problems. Please indicate which
possibilities you consider to be Very probable, Probable, Not sure about,
Improbable or Very improbable.

Very
probable

Table 5.1. Question 5 Kosovo Albanians

Social unrest
Increased criminalisation
Lack of investment
Increased emigration
Renewed violent conflict
Decrease in international assistance
Increased international military presence
Escalation of ethnic tensions
Increased political instability
Increased regional instability
Isolation of Kosovo and Serbia

31%
29%
28%
28%
26%
24%
24%
20%
19%
18%
17%

41%
47%
54%
51%
36%
55%
44%
43%
51%
49%
28%

26%
21%
16%
19%
29%
19%
27%
32%
27%
29%
23%

2%
2%
2%
2%
7%
2%
3%
3%
3%
4%
12%

1%
1%
0%
0%
2%
1%
1%
1%
1%
1%
20%

Probable

Not sure

Improbable

Very

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

Question 5 - And from the different possibilities listed below what do you think will
happen if the people of Kosovo, Serbia and the International Community fail to take the
necessary steps needed to deal with these problems. Please indicate which possibilities
you consider to be Very probable, Probable, Not sure about, Improbable or Very
improbable.

Very
probable

Research

Table 5.2. Question 5 Kosovo Serb

Increased criminalisation
Increased emigration
Increased regional instability
Increased political instability
Renewed violent conflict
Escalation of ethnic tensions
Decrease in international assistance
Isolation of Kosovo and Serbia
Lack of investment
Social unrest
Increased international military presence

55%
47%
47%
42%
41%
40%
34%
33%
32%
30%
28%

40%
46%
38%
42%
49%
46%
51%
40%
52%
55%
47%

4%
6%
9%
12%
8%
11%
11%
19%
12%
8%
13%

1%
1%
4%
2%
1%
2%
2%
3%
3%
6%
5%

0%
0%
1%
2%
1%
2%
1%
5%
1%
1%
7%

264

Probable

Not sure

Improbable

Very
improbable

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

Question 5 - And from the different possibilities listed below what do you think will
happen if the people of Kosovo, Serbia and the International Community fail to take the
necessary steps needed to deal with these problems. Please indicate which possibilities
you consider to be Very probable, Probable, Not sure about, Improbable or Very
improbable.

Very
probable

Table 5.3. Question 5 Kosovo Others

Increased emigration
Renewed violent conflict
Increased regional instability
Increased international military presence
Isolation of Kosovo and Serbia
Increased political instability
Increased criminalisation
Social unrest
Decrease in international assistance
Lack of investment
Escalation of ethnic tensions

27%
26%
23%
22%
20%
20%
18%
18%
17%
17%
15%

54%
34%
40%
26%
33%
45%
32%
47%
68%
78%
44%

19%
34%
31%
39%
23%
28%
50%
35%
15%
5%
36%

0%
6%
6%
0%
6%
7%
0%
0%
0%
0%
5%

0%
0%
0%
13%
17%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

Probable

Not sure

Improbable

Very

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

Question 5 - And from the different possibilities listed below what do you think will
happen if the people of Kosovo, Serbia and the International Community fail to take the
necessary steps needed to deal with these problems. Please indicate which possibilities
you consider to be Very probable, Probable, Not sure about, Improbable or Very
improbable.

Very
probable

Table 5.4. Question 5 Serbia Serb

Increased criminalisation
Increased political instability
Escalation of ethnic tensions
Social unrest
Increased emigration
Increased regional instability
Renewed violent conflict
Lack of investment
Increased international military presence
Decrease in international assistance
Isolation of Kosovo and Serbia

65%
57%
54%
53%
51%
51%
51%
41%
41%
39%
32%

29%
37%
36%
34%
36%
35%
34%
43%
35%
43%
30%

6%
6%
10%
10%
11%
12%
12%
12%
18%
15%
22%

0%
1%
1%
2%
1%
2%
2%
3%
4%
3%
10%

0%
0%
0%
1%
0%
1%
1%
1%
2%
2%
6%

Not sure

Improbable

Very
improbable

Increased criminalisation
Renewed violent conflict
Increased political instability
Escalation of ethnic tensions
Social unrest
Increased regional instability
Increased emigration
Increased international military presence
Decrease in international assistance
Lack of investment
Isolation of Kosovo and Serbia

70%
62%
61%
59%
56%
51%
49%
47%
45%
40%
30%

22%
33%
30%
32%
27%
30%
33%
32%
34%
38%
22%

7%
4%
7%
9%
12%
15%
16%
13%
17%
18%
26%

0%
1%
1%
0%
4%
2%
1%
3%
2%
3%
11%

1%
0%
0%
0%
1%
1%
1%
4%
2%
1%
11%

Research

Probable

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

Question 5 - And from the different possibilities listed below what do you think will
happen if the people of Kosovo, Serbia and the International Community fail to take
the necessary steps needed to deal with these problems. Please indicate which
possibilities you consider to be Very probable, Probable, Not sure about,
Improbable or Very improbable.

Very
probable

Table 5.5. Question 5 Serbia Serb IDPs

Probable

Not sure

Improbable

Very

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

Question 5 - And from the different possibilities listed below what do you think will
happen if the people of Kosovo, Serbia and the International Community fail to take the
necessary steps needed to deal with these problems. Please indicate which possibilities
you consider to be Very probable, Probable, Not sure about, Improbable or Very
improbable.

Very
probable

Table 5.6. Question 5 Serbia Others

Increased criminalisation
Increased political instability
Escalation of ethnic tensions
Social unrest
Increased regional instability
Increased emigration
Lack of investment
Increased international military presence
Renewed violent conflict
Decrease in international assistance
Isolation of Kosovo and Serbia

57%
57%
52%
51%
46%
45%
39%
39%
39%
35%
31%

34%
31%
36%
39%
31%
38%
42%
34%
43%
43%
29%

5%
9%
10%
7%
16%
10%
12%
18%
13%
15%
24%

2%
1%
1%
1%
5%
4%
4%
5%
2%
3%
11%

2%
3%
2%
2%
3%
2%
3%
5%
3%
4%
6%

265

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

Part 2
Solutions
Part 2: Question design and interpreting results
For the second part of the questionnaire, which deals with solutions to problems, the
general design of the questions used followed a well tested style that was developed in cooperation with the negotiating teams responsible for the completion of the Northern Ireland
peace process and Belfast Agreement. The instructions Choosing your options for peace
and stability in the region, copied below, were given to everyone being interviewed before
they answered these questions.

Research

The analysis of the results from these questions tends to focus on the essential response in order to find out what the priorities of the different communities are and on unacceptable to find out what will be most problematic in negotiations the full results for
each question are given in the accompanying tables. These results give a very subtle break
down of how each community feel about each issue and should provide both Kosovo Albanian and Serb negotiators with very detailed information on these matters.
Choosing your options for peace and stability in the region
Most of the remainder of this questionnaire will present you with various options on
what could be done to improve the prospects for peace and stability in the region.
For each option you will be asked to indicate which ones you consider to be Essential,
Desirable, Acceptable, Tolerable or Unacceptable.
For the purposes of this poll Essential, Desirable, Acceptable, Tolerable and Unacceptable mean:
Essential You believe this option is a necessary part of a secure, stable and better
future for the region and should be fully implemented.
Desirable This option is not what you would consider to be Essential, but you think
this option, or something very similar to it, is a good idea and should be put into practice.
Acceptable This option is not what you would consider to be Desirable, if you were
given a choice, but you could certainly live with it.
Tolerable This option is not what you want. But, as part of a secure, stable and better future, you would be willing to put up with it.
Unacceptable This option is completely unacceptable under any circumstances. You
would not accept it, even as part of a secure, stable and better future for the region.
You may use each of the terms Essential, Desirable, Acceptable, Tolerable and
Unacceptable as many times as you wish in each question.

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KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

6. Serb and Albanian relations

The question
With regards to the Serbs and Albanians please indicate which of the following options
you consider to be Essential, Desirable, Acceptable, Tolerable or Unacceptable.
Kosovo Albanian priorities
When it comes to the solutions to the problems reviewed in the first part of this report
Kosovo Albanians put Belgrade should stop dreaming of the return of Kosovo at the top of
their list at 46% essential from a total of 33 possible options (see tables 6.1 to 6.6). This is
followed by Serbs should acknowledge Albanians as equals and Kosovo Serbs should be
more independent from Belgrade both at 28% essential. Then comes public apologies from
Serbs for past wrongs at 25% and student cultural exchange programmes in the region, EU
and US at 21% essential.

46%
28%
28%
25%
21%

Research

Essential - Kosovo Albanian

1 Belgrade should stop dreaming of the return of Kosovo
2 Serbs should acknowledge Albanians as equals
3 Kosovo Serbs should be more independent from Belgrade
4 Public apologies from Serbs for past wrongs
5 Student cultural exchange programmes in the region, EU and US

Serbian priorities
The emphasis for Kosovo Serbs, with regards to improving Kosovo Albanian/Serb relations, is on the people of Kosovo doing more to make Kosovo Serbs welcome at 77% essential, the city of Pristina doing more at 70% and the Kosovo government doing more at
61%. Kosovo Serbs would also like a special status for Serb religious sites at 70% essential
and Pristina should stop dreaming about an independent Kosovo at 66% essential. Serbia
Serbs agree with all of this but they also think Pristina should start paying Kosovo Serb
pensions at 63% essential. Again Serb IDPs share the same views but they also emphasise
an obligation for Albanians to hire Serbs at 65% essential and to encourage the return of
Kosovo Serbs into Kosovo institutions at 64% essential.
Essential - Kosovo Serb
1 The people of Kosovo should
actively make Kosovo Serbs
welcome
2 The city of Pristina should do
more to make Serbs welcome
3
4

77%

70%

Special status for Serb

religious sites
Pristina should stop dreaming
about an independent Kosovo

70%

Kosovo government and

politicians should actively
make Kosovo Serbs welcome

61%

66%

Serbia Serb
1 Kosovo government and
politicians should actively
make Kosovo Serbs welcome
2 The people of Kosovo should
actively make Kosovo Serbs
welcome
3 Pristina should stop dreaming
about an independent Kosovo
4 The city of Pristina should do
more to make Serbs welcome
5

Pristina should start paying

Kosovo Serb pensions

71%

Serbia Serb IDPs

1 Special status for Serb
religious sites

76%

67%

68%

63%

63%

63%

The city of Pristina should

do more to make Serbs
welcome
Obligation for Albanians
to hire Serbs
The people of Kosovo
should actively make
Kosovo Serbs welcome
Encourage the return of
Kosovo Serbs into Kosovo
institutions

65%
65%

64%

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KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

Clearly improved community relations and with it real political progress will be very
much dependent on making Serbs feel truly welcome in Kosovo.
Others

Research

Interestingly both Kosovo and Serb others do emphasise slightly different issues to
their mainstream counterparts when it comes to community relations. Kosovo others believe Belgrade should develop all their policies in cooperation with Kosovo Serbs at 38%
essential. They also place the teaching of a common Balkan history and culture curriculum
in schools (32% essential) and the separation of all government affairs and the Orthodox
Church in Serbia (24% essential) in their top five to do list. While, with a sense of some
equity and balance, Serb others put each side should give up their maximum demands first
on their list at 65% essential followed by those involved in the war should not be in government or police on both sides at 62% essential.
Essential - Kosovo Others
1 Belgrade should develop all their policies in
cooperation with Kosovo Serbs
2 Belgrade should stop dreaming of the return of
Kosovo
3 Public apologies from Serbs for past wrongs
4 Teach a common Balkan history and culture
curriculum in schools
5 Separation of all government affairs and the
Orthodox Church in Serbia

38%

Serbia Others
1 Each side should give up their maximum demands

65%

37%

62%

32%
32%

3
4

24%

Those involved in the war should not be in

government or police on both sides
Pristina should start paying Kosovo Serb pensions
The people of Kosovo should actively make Kosovo
Serbs welcome
Albanians should acknowledge Serbs as equals

55%
55%
55%

Points of agreement and disagreement

It is much easier to identify the options that are acceptable to both Kosovo Albanians
and Serbs using the style of question employed in section 2. In table 6 below all 33 suggestions for improving community relations have been listed in their order of being unacceptable for Kosovo Albanians from a low of only 3% unacceptable for student exchange
programmes to a high of 80% unacceptable for Pristina should stop dreaming about an independent Kosovo. Against these values for Kosovo Albanians the levels of unacceptable
for the three groups of Serbs sampled in these polls have been added in along side each
option. For student exchange it is only 8% unacceptable for Kosovo Serbs, 2% for Serbia
Serbs and 3% for Serb IDPs. This is clearly a popular option and should be implemented.
However, directly below this option is Kosovo Serbs should be more independent from
Belgrade. Most Kosovo Albanians think this is a good idea with only 6% opposed to it as
unacceptable. Nineteen percent of Serbia Serbs find this suggestion unacceptable as do
29% of Kosovo Serbs, but 40% of Serb IDPs find it unacceptable. This idea concerns Serb
IDPs very much. They clearly rely on the support of Belgrade.
I have marked up all the items where one community or the other finds a suggested
policy more than 40% unacceptable as being problematic to implement by shading them
grey. The decision to make this cut at 40% is a little arbitrary and almost any value
could be used. But experience in Northern Ireland and elsewhere suggests that if items get
to be much more than 40 to 50 percent unacceptable then they may have to be horse
traded for something the other community want in negotiations or might have to be sweetened in some way, perhaps with some concessions or compensation from one or an-

268

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

other source as part of an overall settlement or package. In Northern Ireland that source
was usually the British Government.

Research

Some of the items in this list are not acceptable to either community. Item 30 for example. No one seems to think mixed schools are a very good idea except of Serbia Serbs
who only oppose this suggestion at a level of 17% unacceptable (44% for Kosovo Albanians, 60% for Kosovo Serbs and 45% for Serb IDPs). However, at least half of the items
on this list are acceptable or at least tolerable and could be implemented with a little political leadership and cooperation between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs. I will not go
through the list here. The reader can do that and draw their own conclusions. And if they
wish they can explore the results for any policy suggestion in much more detail in tables
6.1 to 6.6.

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KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

Table 6. Points of agreement and disagreement

270

Kosovo Serb

Serbia Serb

Serbia IDPs

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33

Percent Unacceptable

Kosovo
Albanian

Research

Question 6 - With regards to the Serbs and Albanians please indicate which of the following
options you consider to be Essential, Desirable, Acceptable, Tolerable or
Unacceptable.

Student cultural exchange programmes in the region, EU and US

Kosovo Serbs should be more independent from Belgrade
Increased cooperation between Pristina and Belgrade
Kosovo government and politicians should actively make Kosovo Serbs welcome
Kosovo Serbs should get more involved in Kosovo affairs
Serbs should acknowledge Albanians as equals
Kosovo government support for Local Serbian TV stations
Cooperation between the leaders of Islam, the Orthodox and Catholic Church
Government support for bilingual media
Public apologies from Serbs for past wrongs
Free Albanian classes for Serbs in Kosovo
Belgrade should develop all their policies in cooperation with Kosovo Serbs
Teach a common Balkan history and culture curriculum in schools
Encourage the return of Kosovo Serbs into Kosovo institutions
Belgrade should stop dreaming of the return of Kosovo
Separation of all government affairs and the Orthodox Church in Serbia
Albanians should acknowledge Serbs as equals
The city of Pristina should do more to make Serbs welcome
Those involved in the war should not be in government or police on both sides
Public apologies for past wrongs from both sides
Decentralisation at the municipal level
The people of Kosovo should actively make Kosovo Serbs welcome
An international fund to help Kosovo Serbs in Kosovo and Serbia
Offer higher education for Serbs from all parts of Kosovo
Each side should give up their maximum demands
Offer higher education in both languages
Obligation for Albanians to hire Serbs
Pristina should start paying Kosovo Serb pensions
Teach both the Serbian and Albanian languages in schools
Mixed schools for Albanians and Serbs
Public apologies from Albanians for past wrongs
Special status for Serb religious sites
Pristina should stop dreaming about an independent Kosovo

3%
6%
10%
11%
11%
11%
12%
13%
14%
15%
16%
17%
17%
18%
18%
19%
19%
20%
21%
27%
27%
27%
28%
30%
38%
42%
43%
44%
44%
47%
49%
53%
80%

8%
29%
7%
0%
2%
17%
8%
7%
6%
20%
36%
0%
33%
4%
73%
21%
6%
0%
6%
6%
9%
1%
3%
3%
2%
19%
1%
25%
18%
60%
11%
2%
4%

2%
19%
0%
0%
1%
11%
2%
6%
4%
26%
22%
0%
5%
2%
65%
28%
7%
1%
4%
6%
3%
1%
0%
1%
3%
5%
3%
1%
6%
17%
9%
1%
3%

3%
40%
1%
0%
1%
12%
7%
7%
7%
48%
25%
1%
21%
3%
66%
28%
10%
3%
1%
16%
8%
3%
0%
0%
3%
7%
1%
11%
10%
45%
15%
0%
5%

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

Unacceptable

46%
28%
28%
25%
21%
20%
15%
14%
13%
10%
10%
10%
10%
8%
8%
8%
6%
5%
5%
5%
5%
5%
4%
3%
3%
3%
2%
2%
2%
2%
1%
0%
0%

13%
24%
24%
28%
37%
22%
22%
13%
19%
17%
16%
11%
32%
9%
15%
27%
25%
21%
16%
9%
8%
21%
15%
10%
20%
16%
16%
7%
13%
11%
10%
11%
8%

17%
22%
26%
20%
29%
19%
31%
25%
33%
28%
35%
25%
35%
20%
34%
32%
37%
25%
43%
31%
6%
41%
31%
19%
29%
17%
27%
14%
23%
21%
29%
28%
36%

7%
15%
16%
12%
10%
12%
12%
28%
17%
24%
24%
16%
11%
14%
26%
22%
18%
21%
19%
28%
1%
24%
38%
21%
30%
20%
28%
23%
20%
23%
30%
17%
45%

18%
11%
6%
15%
3%
27%
19%
20%
19%
21%
14%
38%
13%
49%
17%
11%
16%
27%
17%
27%
80%
10%
12%
47%
18%
43%
28%
53%
42%
44%
30%
44%
11%

Research

Tolerable

Belgrade should stop dreaming of the return of Kosovo

Serbs should acknowledge Albanians as equals
Kosovo Serbs should be more independent from Belgrade
Public apologies from Serbs for past wrongs
Student cultural exchange programmes in the region, EU and US
Public apologies for past wrongs from both sides
Separation of all government affairs and the Orthodox Church in Serbia
The city of Pristina should do more to make Serbs welcome
Albanians should acknowledge Serbs as equals
Those involved in the war should not be in government or police on both sides
Government support for bilingual media
Each side should give up their maximum demands
Cooperation between the leaders of Islam, the Orthodox and Catholic Church
Public apologies from Albanians for past wrongs
Belgrade should develop all their policies in cooperation with Kosovo Serbs
Kosovo Serbs should get more involved in Kosovo affairs
Free Albanian classes for Serbs in Kosovo
The people of Kosovo should actively make Kosovo Serbs welcome
Teach a common Balkan history and culture curriculum in schools
Decentralisation at the municipal level
Pristina should stop dreaming about an independent Kosovo
Increased cooperation between Pristina and Belgrade
Kosovo government support for Local Serbian TV stations
Mixed schools for Albanians and Serbs
Encourage the return of Kosovo Serbs into Kosovo institutions
Obligation for Albanians to hire Serbs
An international fund to help Kosovo Serbs in Kosovo and Serbia
Special status for Serb religious sites
Offer higher education in both languages
Teach both the Serbian and Albanian languages in schools
Offer higher education for Serbs from all parts of Kosovo
Pristina should start paying Kosovo Serb pensions
Kosovo government and politicians should actively make Kosovo Serbs welcome

Acceptable

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33

Desirable

Question 6 - With regards to the Serbs and Albanians please indicate which of the
following options you consider to be Essential, Desirable, Acceptable, Tolerable
or Unacceptable.

Essential

Table 6.1. Question 6 Kosovo Albanian

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KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

272

Tolerable

Unacceptable

The people of Kosovo should actively make Kosovo Serbs welcome

The city of Pristina should do more to make Serbs welcome
Special status for Serb religious sites
Pristina should stop dreaming about an independent Kosovo
Kosovo government and politicians should actively make Kosovo Serbs welcome
Increased cooperation between Pristina and Belgrade
Kosovo Serbs should get more involved in Kosovo affairs
Obligation for Albanians to hire Serbs
Decentralisation at the municipal level
Belgrade should develop all their policies in cooperation with Kosovo Serbs
Those involved in the war should not be in government or police on both sides
An international fund to help Kosovo Serbs in Kosovo and Serbia
Offer higher education for Serbs from all parts of Kosovo
Pristina should start paying Kosovo Serb pensions
Encourage the return of Kosovo Serbs into Kosovo institutions
Albanians should acknowledge Serbs as equals
Offer higher education in both languages
Each side should give up their maximum demands
Student cultural exchange programmes in the region, EU and US
Government support for bilingual media
Public apologies from Albanians for past wrongs
Serbs should acknowledge Albanians as equals
Kosovo government support for Local Serbian TV stations
Public apologies for past wrongs from both sides
Separation of all government affairs and the Orthodox Church in Serbia
Teach both the Serbian and Albanian languages in schools
Teach a common Balkan history and culture curriculum in schools
Public apologies from Serbs for past wrongs
Cooperation between the leaders of Islam, the Orthodox and Catholic Church
Kosovo Serbs should be more independent from Belgrade
Mixed schools for Albanians and Serbs
Free Albanian classes for Serbs in Kosovo
Belgrade should stop dreaming of the return of Kosovo

Acceptable

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33

Desirable

Research

Question 6 - With regards to the Serbs and Albanians please indicate which of the
following options you consider to be Essential, Desirable, Acceptable, Tolerable
or Unacceptable.

Essential

Table 6.2. Question 6 Kosovo Serbs

77%
70%
70%
66%
61%
53%
51%
48%
47%
46%
46%
43%
41%
41%
41%
38%
32%
31%
29%
26%
24%
23%
22%
21%
18%
18%
17%
14%
14%
10%
9%
8%
1%

18%
25%
21%
21%
29%
29%
26%
34%
27%
35%
32%
47%
41%
24%
40%
26%
29%
34%
41%
28%
39%
22%
36%
38%
13%
24%
24%
31%
38%
18%
16%
17%
9%

4%
4%
7%
5%
6%
9%
17%
15%
11%
15%
11%
4%
13%
5%
14%
18%
11%
22%
17%
14%
14%
21%
19%
28%
22%
16%
13%
16%
24%
17%
4%
12%
10%

0%
1%
0%
4%
5%
2%
4%
2%
6%
3%
5%
3%
2%
4%
1%
12%
9%
11%
5%
27%
11%
17%
14%
8%
25%
25%
13%
18%
17%
26%
11%
26%
7%

1%
0%
2%
4%
0%
7%
2%
1%
9%
0%
6%
3%
3%
25%
4%
6%
19%
2%
8%
6%
11%
17%
8%
6%
21%
18%
33%
20%
7%
29%
60%
36%
73%

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

Unacceptable

38%
37%
32%
32%
24%
24%
23%
20%
17%
17%
14%
13%
13%
13%
13%
13%
13%
13%
13%
11%
11%
10%
9%
6%
4%
4%
4%
4%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%

32%
6%
0%
25%
28%
18%
8%
8%
27%
16%
0%
18%
41%
6%
0%
10%
10%
8%
32%
9%
26%
8%
11%
20%
6%
0%
0%
15%
59%
17%
17%
17%
34%

4%
11%
27%
13%
13%
36%
32%
35%
19%
41%
11%
11%
0%
24%
25%
7%
17%
40%
43%
23%
6%
25%
39%
55%
40%
25%
52%
24%
24%
7%
26%
4%
49%

26%
9%
21%
30%
13%
22%
0%
0%
15%
22%
35%
57%
0%
51%
18%
66%
48%
39%
8%
23%
16%
24%
31%
19%
50%
71%
44%
51%
13%
72%
32%
47%
17%

0%
36%
20%
0%
21%
0%
36%
36%
22%
4%
40%
0%
45%
6%
45%
4%
13%
0%
4%
33%
41%
32%
10%
0%
0%
0%
0%
6%
4%
4%
25%
32%
0%

Research

Tolerable

Belgrade should develop all their policies in cooperation with Kosovo Serbs
Belgrade should stop dreaming of the return of Kosovo
Public apologies from Serbs for past wrongs
Teach a common Balkan history and culture curriculum in schools
Separation of all government affairs and the Orthodox Church in Serbia
Kosovo Serbs should be more independent from Belgrade
Public apologies from Albanians for past wrongs
Decentralisation at the municipal level
Public apologies for past wrongs from both sides
Those involved in the war should not be in government or police on both sides
Special status for Serb religious sites
Kosovo government and politicians should actively make Kosovo Serbs welcome
Pristina should stop dreaming about an independent Kosovo
Increased cooperation between Pristina and Belgrade
The city of Pristina should do more to make Serbs welcome
The people of Kosovo should actively make Kosovo Serbs welcome
Pristina should start paying Kosovo Serb pensions
Albanians should acknowledge Serbs as equals
Encourage the return of Kosovo Serbs into Kosovo institutions
Obligation for Albanians to hire Serbs
An international fund to help Kosovo Serbs in Kosovo and Serbia
Each side should give up their maximum demands
Free Albanian classes for Serbs in Kosovo
Student cultural exchange programmes in the region, EU and US
Offer higher education for Serbs from all parts of Kosovo
Teach both the Serbian and Albanian languages in schools
Government support for bilingual media
Kosovo Serbs should get more involved in Kosovo affairs
Cooperation between the leaders of Islam, the Orthodox and Catholic Church
Offer higher education in both languages
Mixed schools for Albanians and Serbs
Kosovo government support for Local Serbian TV stations
Serbs should acknowledge Albanians as equals

Acceptable

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33

Desirable

Question 6 - With regards to the Serbs and Albanians please indicate which of the
following options you consider to be Essential, Desirable, Acceptable, Tolerable
or Unacceptable.

Essential

Table 6.3. Question 6 Kosovo Others

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KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

274

Tolerable

Unacceptable

Kosovo government and politicians should actively make Kosovo Serbs welcome
The people of Kosovo should actively make Kosovo Serbs welcome
Pristina should stop dreaming about an independent Kosovo
The city of Pristina should do more to make Serbs welcome
Pristina should start paying Kosovo Serb pensions
Belgrade should develop all their policies in cooperation with Kosovo Serbs
Those involved in the war should not be in government or police on both sides
Encourage the return of Kosovo Serbs into Kosovo institutions
Special status for Serb religious sites
Obligation for Albanians to hire Serbs
Increased cooperation between Pristina and Belgrade
An international fund to help Kosovo Serbs in Kosovo and Serbia
Albanians should acknowledge Serbs as equals
Each side should give up their maximum demands
Offer higher education for Serbs from all parts of Kosovo
Kosovo Serbs should get more involved in Kosovo affairs
Serbs should acknowledge Albanians as equals
Offer higher education in both languages
Kosovo government support for Local Serbian TV stations
Decentralisation at the municipal level
Public apologies from Albanians for past wrongs
Government support for bilingual media
Teach both the Serbian and Albanian languages in schools
Public apologies for past wrongs from both sides
Student cultural exchange programmes in the region, EU and US
Teach a common Balkan history and culture curriculum in schools
Cooperation between the leaders of Islam, the Orthodox and Catholic Church
Mixed schools for Albanians and Serbs
Public apologies from Serbs for past wrongs
Kosovo Serbs should be more independent from Belgrade
Separation of all government affairs and the Orthodox Church in Serbia
Free Albanian classes for Serbs in Kosovo
Belgrade should stop dreaming of the return of Kosovo

Acceptable

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33

Desirable

Research

Question 6 - With regards to the Serbs and Albanians please indicate which of the
following options you consider to be Essential, Desirable, Acceptable, Tolerable
or Unacceptable.

Essential

Table 6.4. Question 6 Serbia Serb

71%
67%
63%
63%
63%
61%
61%
59%
57%
56%
54%
52%
51%
51%
49%
47%
41%
38%
38%
34%
31%
31%
31%
31%
30%
30%
28%
25%
18%
17%
15%
11%
8%

23%
27%
22%
29%
30%
30%
26%
32%
34%
28%
36%
36%
25%
30%
38%
40%
23%
33%
46%
39%
37%
38%
33%
38%
44%
35%
41%
27%
21%
24%
29%
26%
8%

3%
5%
7%
6%
4%
7%
7%
6%
6%
9%
8%
6%
13%
13%
10%
9%
14%
18%
11%
19%
17%
15%
19%
16%
19%
22%
17%
19%
18%
27%
18%
23%
7%

2%
1%
4%
1%
3%
2%
2%
1%
2%
4%
2%
6%
4%
2%
2%
2%
11%
6%
3%
6%
6%
12%
12%
10%
5%
9%
8%
11%
17%
12%
11%
18%
12%

0%
1%
3%
1%
1%
0%
4%
2%
1%
3%
0%
0%
7%
3%
1%
1%
11%
5%
2%
3%
9%
4%
6%
6%
2%
5%
6%
17%
26%
19%
28%
22%
65%

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

Unacceptable

76%
68%
65%
65%
64%
64%
61%
61%
60%
58%
58%
55%
54%
54%
53%
51%
47%
47%
46%
45%
40%
36%
33%
33%
27%
26%
21%
19%
16%
14%
13%
8%
6%

19%
24%
21%
26%
19%
23%
20%
34%
23%
30%
21%
21%
26%
36%
36%
23%
19%
32%
32%
25%
28%
42%
34%
28%
36%
49%
21%
11%
14%
22%
27%
19%
8%

4%
5%
10%
4%
10%
2%
8%
5%
5%
12%
8%
15%
17%
9%
10%
17%
11%
19%
11%
19%
9%
18%
22%
21%
13%
15%
21%
15%
8%
25%
18%
25%
19%

0%
0%
3%
3%
4%
0%
6%
0%
4%
0%
3%
1%
2%
0%
1%
5%
10%
1%
3%
4%
9%
2%
7%
9%
8%
3%
16%
10%
13%
10%
16%
7%
2%

0%
3%
1%
3%
3%
11%
5%
0%
7%
0%
10%
7%
1%
1%
0%
3%
12%
1%
8%
7%
15%
1%
3%
10%
16%
7%
21%
45%
48%
28%
25%
40%
66%

Research

Tolerable

Special status for Serb religious sites

The city of Pristina should do more to make Serbs welcome
Obligation for Albanians to hire Serbs
The people of Kosovo should actively make Kosovo Serbs welcome
Encourage the return of Kosovo Serbs into Kosovo institutions
Pristina should start paying Kosovo Serb pensions
Pristina should stop dreaming about an independent Kosovo
An international fund to help Kosovo Serbs in Kosovo and Serbia
Kosovo government support for Local Serbian TV stations
Kosovo government and politicians should actively make Kosovo Serbs welcome
Albanians should acknowledge Serbs as equals
Offer higher education in both languages
Those involved in the war should not be in government or police on both sides
Belgrade should develop all their policies in cooperation with Kosovo Serbs
Offer higher education for Serbs from all parts of Kosovo
Each side should give up their maximum demands
Serbs should acknowledge Albanians as equals
Increased cooperation between Pristina and Belgrade
Decentralisation at the municipal level
Government support for bilingual media
Public apologies from Albanians for past wrongs
Kosovo Serbs should get more involved in Kosovo affairs
Student cultural exchange programmes in the region, EU and US
Teach both the Serbian and Albanian languages in schools
Public apologies for past wrongs from both sides
Cooperation between the leaders of Islam, the Orthodox and Catholic Church
Teach a common Balkan history and culture curriculum in schools
Mixed schools for Albanians and Serbs
Public apologies from Serbs for past wrongs
Separation of all government affairs and the Orthodox Church in Serbia
Free Albanian classes for Serbs in Kosovo
Kosovo Serbs should be more independent from Belgrade
Belgrade should stop dreaming of the return of Kosovo

Acceptable

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33

Desirable

Question 6 - With regards to the Serbs and Albanians please indicate which of the
following options you consider to be Essential, Desirable, Acceptable, Tolerable
or Unacceptable.

Essential

Table 6.5. Question 6 Serbia Serb IDPs

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KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

276

Tolerable

Unacceptable

Each side should give up their maximum demands

Those involved in the war should not be in government or police on both sides
Pristina should start paying Kosovo Serb pensions
The people of Kosovo should actively make Kosovo Serbs welcome
Albanians should acknowledge Serbs as equals
Encourage the return of Kosovo Serbs into Kosovo institutions
The city of Pristina should do more to make Serbs welcome
Kosovo government and politicians should actively make Kosovo Serbs welcome
Serbs should acknowledge Albanians as equals
An international fund to help Kosovo Serbs in Kosovo and Serbia
Belgrade should develop all their policies in cooperation with Kosovo Serbs
Special status for Serb religious sites
Obligation for Albanians to hire Serbs
Pristina should stop dreaming about an independent Kosovo
Kosovo Serbs should get more involved in Kosovo affairs
Increased cooperation between Pristina and Belgrade
Public apologies for past wrongs from both sides
Offer higher education for Serbs from all parts of Kosovo
Teach both the Serbian and Albanian languages in schools
Teach a common Balkan history and culture curriculum in schools
Government support for bilingual media
Public apologies from Albanians for past wrongs
Offer higher education in both languages
Kosovo government support for Local Serbian TV stations
Separation of all government affairs and the Orthodox Church in Serbia
Student cultural exchange programmes in the region, EU and US
Decentralisation at the municipal level
Kosovo Serbs should be more independent from Belgrade
Mixed schools for Albanians and Serbs
Cooperation between the leaders of Islam, the Orthodox and Catholic Church
Public apologies from Serbs for past wrongs
Belgrade should stop dreaming of the return of Kosovo
Free Albanian classes for Serbs in Kosovo

Acceptable

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33

Desirable

Research

Question 6 - With regards to the Serbs and Albanians please indicate which of the
following options you consider to be Essential, Desirable, Acceptable, Tolerable
or Unacceptable.

Essential

Table 6.6. Question 6 Serbia Others

65%
62%
55%
55%
55%
54%
54%
53%
53%
48%
46%
45%
45%
44%
42%
39%
38%
33%
32%
31%
30%
30%
30%
29%
28%
26%
26%
25%
22%
21%
20%
14%
12%

19%
22%
31%
34%
18%
27%
33%
39%
21%
30%
35%
28%
41%
16%
43%
49%
31%
45%
38%
34%
41%
38%
41%
47%
22%
43%
32%
28%
37%
52%
32%
14%
26%

7%
12%
11%
5%
11%
9%
9%
5%
8%
17%
16%
18%
6%
22%
9%
8%
8%
14%
16%
24%
14%
18%
19%
18%
24%
21%
33%
16%
18%
18%
20%
14%
26%

5%
0%
1%
3%
7%
4%
1%
0%
8%
2%
2%
5%
4%
10%
2%
2%
12%
4%
5%
5%
7%
4%
6%
3%
8%
6%
6%
13%
8%
4%
8%
9%
17%

4%
4%
2%
3%
9%
6%
3%
2%
10%
3%
2%
4%
4%
8%
4%
2%
11%
4%
9%
7%
8%
11%
5%
3%
19%
5%
3%
19%
15%
6%
20%
48%
20%

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

7. Security
The question
With regards to security please indicate which of the following options you consider to
be Essential, Desirable, Acceptable, Tolerable or Unacceptable.
Kosovo Albanian priorities

Essential - Kosovo Albanian

1 Mitrovica should become a unified city
2 Cooperation with the Hague Tribunal
3 Establish a Kosovo Ministry of the Interior
4 Better training for the police
5 One legal government

83%
67%
63%
59%
59%

Serbian priorities
The number one security priority for Kosovo Serbs is to have Serb police guard monasteries in Kosovo at 67% essential. All Serbs believe the security forces should be made
accountable to the people of all ethnic groups at 66% essential for Kosovo Serbs, 68% for
Serbia Serbs and 75% for Serb IDPs. Serb IDPs place the need for a special property court
to deal with property disputes at the top of their list at 82% essential. This item is also in
the top five for Kosovo Serbs at 47% essential. Cooperation between countries in the region to fight organised crime and all ethnic crimes should be prosecuted to the full extent
of the law with the highest possible penalties also feature in the top five of Kosovo Serb,
Serbia Serb and Serb IDPs lists. However Kosovo Serbs also place North and South Mitrovica should be separate municipalities third in their list at 50% essential. The emphasis in
all of this seems to be the application of the rule of law both in Kosovo and throughout the
region and an accountable police service.

Research

The proposal that Mitrovica should become a unified city comes in at the top of the list
of Kosovo Albanian priorities for security at 83% essential (see tables 7.1 to 7.6). Kosovo
Albanians also place a great deal of importance on cooperation with the Hague Tribunal at
67% essential, establish a Kosovo Ministry of the Interior at 63% and better training for the
police and one legal government both at 59% essential.

277

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

Essential - Kosovo Serb

1 Serb police to guard
monasteries in Kosovo
2 Security forces made
accountable to the
people of all ethnic
groups
3 Cooperation between
countries in the region to
fight organised crime
4 North
and
South
Mitrovica should be
separate municipalities
5

Special property court to

deal with property
disputes

67%
66%

Serbia Serb
1 Security forces made accountable
to the people of all ethnic groups
2 Decommissioning of privately
held weapons

68%
63%

Serbia Serb IDPs

1 Special property court to deal
with property disputes
2 Security forces made
accountable to the people of
all ethnic groups

82%
75%

51%

More efficient and effective

judicial system

63%

Serb police to guard

monasteries in Kosovo

72%

50%

Cooperation between countries in

the region to fight organised crime

62%

67%

47%

All ethnic crimes should be

prosecuted to the full extent of the
law with the highest possible
penalties

59%

All ethnic crimes should be

prosecuted to the full extent
of the law with the highest
possible penalties
Cooperation
between
countries in the region to
fight organised crime

66%

Others

Research

Interestingly Kosovo others share the concern or need for a special property court to
deal with property disputes with Kosovo Serbs. Kosovo others put this item first in their list
of priorities at 80% essential while Serbia others place decommissioning of privately held
weapons first at 62% essential.
Essential - Kosovo Others
1 Special property court to deal with
property disputes
2 Establish a Kosovo Ministry of the
Interior
3 One legal government
4 Better training for the police
5 Parallel reform of police with local
government reform

80%

Serbia Others
1 Decommissioning of privately held weapons

62%

79%

61%

73%
70%
54%

3
4
5

Security forces made accountable to the people of all ethnic

groups
More efficient and effective judicial system
One legal government
All ethnic crimes should be prosecuted to the full extent of the law
with the highest possible penalties

59%
52%
52%

Points of agreement and disagreement

The points of agreement and disagreement have been analysed and identified in the
same way as previously done in question 6. Those items, from a list of 32, which Serbs or
Kosovo Albanians identify as being more than 40% unacceptable have been highlighted in
grey in table 7 below.
At the present time both Serbs and Kosovo Albanians do not trust each other to take
care of security and justice. Sixty five percent of Kosovo Serbs and 49% of Serb IDPs do
not want Kosovo to establish their own Ministry of the Interior or their own war crimes
court at 67% unacceptable for Kosovo Serbs, 53% unacceptable for Serbia Serbs and 55%
unacceptable for Serb IDPs. Similarly 70% of Kosovo Albanians do not want Serb police
to guard monasteries in Kosovo. But both communities do want a whole range of reforms
that will make the criminal justice system fairer, more efficient and accountable. Interestingly both Kosovo Albanians and Serbs do not want the establishment of separate monoethnic Kosova/Kosovo Protection Corps (59% unacceptable for Kosovo Albanians and
44% unacceptable for Kosovo Serbs, 33% for Serbia Serbs and 34% for Serb IDPs). However, most importantly, no one is opposed to the idea that all ethnic crimes should be prosecuted to the full extent of the law with the highest possible penalties. The percentage unacceptable for this item was Kosovo Albanian 1%, Kosovo Serb 0%, Serbia Serb 0% and
278

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

Serb IDPs 0%. Clearly such prosecutions and the reform of the criminal justice system are
the first steps that need to be taken to the establishment of real security for all.
Having joint Serb and Kosovo police to guard monasteries in Kosovo may be a workable compromise on this issue as the level of opposition seems to be balanced at 33% unacceptable for Kosovo Albanians and 29% unacceptable for Kosovo Serbs. But there is no
consensus on the future of Mitrovica, 94% of Kosovo Albanians are opposed to separate
municipalities as unacceptable while 64% of Kosovo Serbs, 11% of Serbia Serbs and 42%
of Serb IDPs are opposed to a unified municipality as unacceptable. Perhapsquestions of
security will have to be satisfactorily dealt with before this kind of problem can be addressed.

32

Serbia IDPs

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

Establish a Kosovo Ministry of the Interior

Better training for the police
Municipality should play an active role in choosing senior police officers
Special property court to deal with property disputes
Cooperation between countries in the region to fight organised crime
Appropriate selection and training of KPS officers to ensure local respect and authority
Kosovo should have its own war crimes court
Parallel reform of police with local government reform
All ethnic crimes should be prosecuted to the full extent of the law with the highest possible
penalties
More efficient and effective judicial system
Properly paid safe judges
Local control of police but one police service to ensure effective cooperation
Mitrovica should become a unified city
Cooperation with the Hague Tribunal
Security forces made accountable to the people of all ethnic groups
Politicians and the media must be more careful with what they say
To ensure Kosovo Serb security Belgrade must support final status agreement
Central coordination of all security structures in Kosovo
The security services, including the KPC, should proactively enrol minorities
Local courts initially supervised by the international community
One legal government
One unified judicial system
Decommissioning of privately held weapons
Active recruitment of Serbs into the KPS to ensure their participation
Demilitarisation of border regions
KPC with senior officers from Albanian and Serb communities
Joint Serb and Kosovo police to guard monasteries in Kosovo
Separate mono-ethnic Kosova/Kosovo Protection Corps
Serb police to guard monasteries in Kosovo
Two official languages
One safe autonomous region for Serbs in Kosovo like Republika Srpska in Bosnia
Herzegovina
North and South Mitrovica should be separate municipalities

Serbia Serb

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Kosovo Serb

Percent Unacceptable

Kosovo
Albanian

Question 7 With regards to security please indicate which of the following options you
consider to be Essential, Desirable, Acceptable, Tolerable or Unacceptable.

0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
1%
1%

65%
0%
7%
0%
1%
14%
67%
9%
0%

24%
1%
3%
0%
0%
3%
53%
2%
0%

49%
17%
20%
1%
3%
9%
55%
24%
0%

1%
1%
1%
1%
1%
2%
2%
3%
4%
4%
5%
5%
8%
10%
10%
14%
28%
33%
59%
70%
77%
78%

3%
3%
4%
64%
14%
2%
4%
51%
23%
28%
8%
21%
16%
15%
13%
35%
26%
29%
44%
2%
22%
18%

0%
0%
3%
11%
13%
0%
0%
14%
5%
6%
8%
4%
3%
3%
5%
24%
5%
2%
33%
3%
21%
19%

0%
5%
8%
42%
8%
2%
0%
30%
24%
15%
9%
6%
5%
7%
9%
20%
16%
25%
34%
6%
7%
39%

94%

14%

23%

11%

Research

Table 7. Points of agreement and disagreement

279

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

280

Tolerable

Unacceptable

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

Mitrovica should become a unified city

Cooperation with the Hague Tribunal
Establish a Kosovo Ministry of the Interior
Better training for the police
One legal government
Cooperation between countries in the region to fight organised crime
Kosovo should have its own war crimes court
More efficient and effective judicial system
One unified judicial system
Appropriate selection and training of KPS officers to ensure local respect and authority
Local control of police but one police service to ensure effective cooperation
Security forces made accountable to the people of all ethnic groups
Parallel reform of police with local government reform
Special property court to deal with property disputes
To ensure Kosovo Serb security Belgrade must support final status agreement
All ethnic crimes should be prosecuted to the full extent of the law with the highest
possible penalties
Politicians and the media must be more careful with what they say
Municipality should play an active role in choosing senior police officers
Properly paid safe judges
Central coordination of all security structures in Kosovo
Decommissioning of privately held weapons
Demilitarisation of border regions
The security services, including the KPC, should proactively enrol minorities
Active recruitment of Serbs into the KPS to ensure their participation
Local courts initially supervised by the international community
Joint Serb and Kosovo police to guard monasteries in Kosovo
KPC with senior officers from Albanian and Serb communities
Separate mono-ethnic Kosova/Kosovo Protection Corps
Two official languages
North and South Mitrovica should be separate municipalities
Serb police to guard monasteries in Kosovo
One safe autonomous region for Serbs in Kosovo like Republika Srpska in Bosnia
Herzegovina

Acceptable

Research

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

Desirable

Question 7 With regards to security please indicate which of the following options
you consider to be Essential, Desirable, Acceptable, Tolerable or
Unacceptable.

Essential

Table 7.1. Question 7 Kosovo Albanian

83%
67%
63%
59%
59%
55%
51%
48%
47%
43%
42%
41%
36%
36%
35%
34%

12%
23%
28%
30%
21%
32%
29%
30%
28%
35%
33%
32%
32%
49%
26%
35%

4%
8%
8%
10%
13%
11%
14%
17%
16%
19%
21%
21%
26%
14%
24%
22%

1%
2%
1%
1%
2%
2%
6%
4%
1%
4%
4%
5%
5%
1%
13%
7%

1%
1%
0%
0%
5%
0%
0%
1%
8%
0%
1%
2%
1%
0%
3%
1%

34%
33%
33%
26%
24%
20%
18%
17%
16%
10%
5%
5%
3%
3%
1%
1%

33%
51%
39%
33%
35%
21%
27%
18%
38%
12%
13%
11%
4%
2%
3%
6%

24%
13%
23%
30%
20%
35%
40%
38%
30%
23%
34%
12%
9%
2%
9%
8%

7%
3%
4%
7%
11%
10%
11%
17%
11%
21%
19%
13%
7%
0%
18%
7%

2%
0%
1%
4%
10%
14%
4%
10%
5%
33%
28%
59%
77%
94%
70%
78%

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

67%
66%
51%
50%
47%
43%

23%
25%
33%
19%
42%
44%

5%
5%
13%
5%
10%
12%

3%
3%
3%
12%
0%
1%

2%
2%
1%
14%
0%
0%

42%
41%
40%
38%
36%
35%
34%
33%
29%
28%
28%
28%

33%
41%
31%
37%
43%
41%
30%
28%
50%
44%
39%
29%

10%
14%
7%
11%
17%
17%
18%
7%
13%
15%
11%
11%

8%
2%
6%
6%
4%
3%
15%
10%
5%
5%
9%
14%

7%
3%
15%
8%
0%
4%
4%
22%
3%
9%
13%
18%

26%
25%
22%
21%
21%
20%
19%
19%
19%
18%
13%
13%
11%
8%

34%
25%
24%
31%
24%
18%
19%
27%
42%
11%
19%
10%
8%
16%

21%
16%
14%
14%
10%
14%
19%
14%
13%
11%
10%
2%
7%
3%

4%
13%
14%
20%
16%
14%
21%
11%
10%
9%
15%
8%
9%
8%

14%
21%
26%
14%
28%
35%
23%
29%
16%
51%
44%
67%
65%
64%

Research

Unacceptable

19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

Tolerable

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

Serb police to guard monasteries in Kosovo

Security forces made accountable to the people of all ethnic groups
Cooperation between countries in the region to fight organised crime
North and South Mitrovica should be separate municipalities
Special property court to deal with property disputes
All ethnic crimes should be prosecuted to the full extent of the law with the highest
possible penalties
Municipality should play an active role in choosing senior police officers
Properly paid safe judges
Decommissioning of privately held weapons
Local courts initially supervised by the international community
Better training for the police
Politicians and the media must be more careful with what they say
Local control of police but one police service to ensure effective cooperation
Two official languages
More efficient and effective judicial system
Parallel reform of police with local government reform
Active recruitment of Serbs into the KPS to ensure their participation
One safe autonomous region for Serbs in Kosovo like Republika Srpska in Bosnia
Herzegovina
Appropriate selection and training of KPS officers to ensure local respect and authority
One legal government
KPC with senior officers from Albanian and Serb communities
Cooperation with the Hague Tribunal
The security services, including the KPC, should proactively enrol minorities
Demilitarisation of border regions
Central coordination of all security structures in Kosovo
Joint Serb and Kosovo police to guard monasteries in Kosovo
One unified judicial system
To ensure Kosovo Serb security Belgrade must support final status agreement
Separate mono-ethnic Kosova/Kosovo Protection Corps
Kosovo should have its own war crimes court
Establish a Kosovo Ministry of the Interior
Mitrovica should become a unified city

Acceptable

1
2
3
4
5
6

Desirable

Question 7 With regards to security please indicate which of the following options
you consider to be Essential, Desirable, Acceptable, Tolerable or
Unacceptable.

Essential

Table 7.2. Question 7 Kosovo Serb

281

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

282

Unacceptable

26
27
28
29
30
31
32

Tolerable

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Special property court to deal with property disputes

Establish a Kosovo Ministry of the Interior
One legal government
Better training for the police
Parallel reform of police with local government reform
More efficient and effective judicial system
Appropriate selection and training of KPS officers to ensure local respect and authority
All ethnic crimes should be prosecuted to the full extent of the law with the highest
possible penalties
Security forces made accountable to the people of all ethnic groups
Properly paid safe judges
Kosovo should have its own war crimes court
Mitrovica should become a unified city
One unified judicial system
Local control of police but one police service to ensure effective cooperation
Municipality should play an active role in choosing senior police officers
Cooperation between countries in the region to fight organised crime
Cooperation with the Hague Tribunal
Active recruitment of Serbs into the KPS to ensure their participation
Politicians and the media must be more careful with what they say
Central coordination of all security structures in Kosovo
Decommissioning of privately held weapons
Local courts initially supervised by the international community
Two official languages
KPC with senior officers from Albanian and Serb communities
One safe autonomous region for Serbs in Kosovo like Republika Srpska in Bosnia
Herzegovina
To ensure Kosovo Serb security Belgrade must support final status agreement
Serb police to guard monasteries in Kosovo
Demilitarisation of border regions
Joint Serb and Kosovo police to guard monasteries in Kosovo
North and South Mitrovica should be separate municipalities
The security services, including the KPC, should proactively enrol minorities
Separate mono-ethnic Kosova/Kosovo Protection Corps

Acceptable

Research

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Desirable

Question 7 With regards to security please indicate which of the following options
you consider to be Essential, Desirable, Acceptable, Tolerable or
Unacceptable.

Essential

Table 7.3. Question 7 Kosovo Others

80%
79%
73%
70%
54%
52%
47%
42%

13%
8%
0%
30%
25%
15%
24%
8%

0%
0%
4%
0%
13%
20%
29%
18%

7%
0%
13%
0%
8%
6%
0%
32%

0%
13%
10%
0%
0%
8%
0%
0%

40%
38%
38%
36%
36%
33%
32%
32%
29%
25%
25%
24%
20%
18%
17%
17%
17%

45%
13%
31%
10%
6%
52%
45%
10%
43%
13%
55%
11%
13%
34%
32%
24%
0%

7%
43%
8%
41%
35%
15%
0%
49%
16%
15%
20%
49%
35%
32%
0%
16%
0%

8%
7%
6%
0%
15%
0%
23%
8%
13%
7%
0%
15%
0%
16%
10%
15%
10%

0%
0%
18%
13%
8%
0%
0%
0%
0%
41%
0%
0%
32%
0%
41%
28%
73%

16%
13%
11%
9%
9%
8%
0%

0%
17%
22%
15%
6%
26%
6%

44%
0%
29%
31%
5%
32%
6%

20%
18%
15%
16%
8%
35%
13%

19%
53%
24%
28%
73%
0%
75%

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

68%
63%
63%
62%
59%

25%
26%
29%
28%
29%

6%
6%
6%
8%
10%

1%
3%
1%
1%
2%

0%
3%
0%
0%
0%

55%
54%
52%
50%
48%
47%
46%
45%
44%
40%
35%
34%
34%
33%
31%
31%
29%
29%
28%
27%
24%
22%
21%
19%

34%
31%
33%
30%
28%
33%
42%
25%
38%
33%
46%
23%
32%
38%
47%
39%
47%
24%
32%
23%
20%
25%
25%
22%

9%
8%
13%
13%
12%
12%
11%
18%
10%
16%
14%
16%
23%
19%
15%
23%
17%
23%
20%
16%
18%
25%
17%
21%

2%
3%
2%
4%
7%
5%
2%
8%
3%
6%
4%
15%
7%
8%
5%
4%
4%
11%
12%
13%
14%
14%
14%
19%

0%
3%
0%
3%
5%
2%
0%
4%
5%
6%
1%
11%
5%
3%
2%
3%
3%
13%
8%
21%
24%
14%
23%
19%

15%
12%
8%

24%
17%
12%

21%
22%
11%

17%
16%
16%

24%
33%
53%

Research

Unacceptable

30
31
32

Tolerable

6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

Security forces made accountable to the people of all ethnic groups

Decommissioning of privately held weapons
More efficient and effective judicial system
Cooperation between countries in the region to fight organised crime
All ethnic crimes should be prosecuted to the full extent of the law with the highest
possible penalties
Special property court to deal with property disputes
Serb police to guard monasteries in Kosovo
Properly paid safe judges
One unified judicial system
KPC with senior officers from Albanian and Serb communities
Joint Serb and Kosovo police to guard monasteries in Kosovo
Politicians and the media must be more careful with what they say
One legal government
Active recruitment of Serbs into the KPS to ensure their participation
The security services, including the KPC, should proactively enrol minorities
Better training for the police
Mitrovica should become a unified city
Central coordination of all security structures in Kosovo
Appropriate selection and training of KPS officers to ensure local respect and authority
Parallel reform of police with local government reform
Local control of police but one police service to ensure effective cooperation
Municipality should play an active role in choosing senior police officers
Cooperation with the Hague Tribunal
Local courts initially supervised by the international community
Two official languages
Establish a Kosovo Ministry of the Interior
To ensure Kosovo Serb security Belgrade must support final status agreement
North and South Mitrovica should be separate municipalities
One safe autonomous region for Serbs in Kosovo like Republika Srpska in Bosnia
Herzegovina
Demilitarisation of border regions
Separate mono-ethnic Kosova/Kosovo Protection Corps
Kosovo should have its own war crimes court

Acceptable

1
2
3
4
5

Desirable

Question 7 With regards to security please indicate which of the following options
you consider to be Essential, Desirable, Acceptable, Tolerable or
Unacceptable.

Essential

Table 7.4. Question 7 Serbia Serb

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KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

284

Unacceptable

31
32

Tolerable

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

Special property court to deal with property disputes

Security forces made accountable to the people of all ethnic groups
Serb police to guard monasteries in Kosovo
All ethnic crimes should be prosecuted to the full extent of the law with the highest
possible penalties
Cooperation between countries in the region to fight organised crime
Active recruitment of Serbs into the KPS to ensure their participation
Decommissioning of privately held weapons
Properly paid safe judges
More efficient and effective judicial system
Politicians and the media must be more careful with what they say
One legal government
Cooperation with the Hague Tribunal
One unified judicial system
Two official languages
Parallel reform of police with local government reform
Central coordination of all security structures in Kosovo
Joint Serb and Kosovo police to guard monasteries in Kosovo
Better training for the police
Municipality should play an active role in choosing senior police officers
KPC with senior officers from Albanian and Serb communities
Local courts initially supervised by the international community
The security services, including the KPC, should proactively enrol minorities
Establish a Kosovo Ministry of the Interior
Local control of police but one police service to ensure effective cooperation
Appropriate selection and training of KPS officers to ensure local respect and authority
North and South Mitrovica should be separate municipalities
Mitrovica should become a unified city
To ensure Kosovo Serb security Belgrade must support final status agreement
Separate mono-ethnic Kosova/Kosovo Protection Corps
One safe autonomous region for Serbs in Kosovo like Republika Srpska in Bosnia
Herzegovina
Demilitarisation of border regions
Kosovo should have its own war crimes court

Acceptable

Research

1
2
3
4

Desirable

Question 7 With regards to security please indicate which of the following options
you consider to be Essential, Desirable, Acceptable, Tolerable or
Unacceptable.

Essential

Table 7.5. Question 7 Serbia Serb IDPs

82%
75%
72%
67%

15%
19%
14%
23%

2%
4%
8%
6%

0%
0%
1%
4%

1%
2%
6%
0%

66%
60%
60%
53%
52%
44%
43%
40%
39%
35%
32%
32%
32%
31%
30%
30%
30%
29%
28%
27%
23%
22%
21%
21%
20%
15%

21%
25%
25%
33%
29%
36%
35%
25%
34%
36%
24%
25%
28%
30%
38%
34%
28%
34%
6%
38%
32%
31%
13%
15%
31%
25%

8%
5%
7%
8%
18%
19%
15%
18%
20%
18%
16%
16%
15%
20%
12%
14%
24%
17%
8%
22%
34%
25%
12%
12%
10%
13%

2%
1%
0%
0%
1%
1%
1%
9%
2%
4%
4%
2%
1%
2%
1%
7%
9%
6%
9%
5%
2%
11%
12%
23%
5%
9%

3%
9%
7%
5%
0%
0%
6%
8%
5%
7%
24%
24%
25%
17%
20%
16%
9%
15%
49%
8%
9%
11%
42%
30%
34%
39%

14%
13%

22%
10%

24%
19%

20%
3%

20%
55%

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

62%
61%
59%
52%
52%

29%
28%
33%
33%
36%

3%
8%
7%
5%
6%

0%
1%
0%
4%
3%

6%
2%
1%
6%
3%

52%
51%
47%
47%
46%
42%
41%
38%
36%
36%
35%
34%
32%
32%
31%
30%
28%
27%
27%
26%
22%
22%
19%
11%

38%
29%
42%
32%
38%
46%
43%
33%
38%
41%
33%
33%
50%
41%
32%
43%
31%
36%
46%
56%
60%
37%
23%
37%

6%
16%
7%
15%
11%
10%
9%
17%
11%
11%
17%
17%
11%
22%
21%
14%
22%
22%
21%
13%
12%
24%
33%
11%

0%
0%
1%
1%
4%
1%
2%
4%
11%
9%
6%
4%
1%
1%
3%
5%
8%
5%
2%
2%
1%
9%
11%
11%

3%
3%
3%
4%
1%
1%
4%
8%
4%
4%
10%
11%
6%
4%
13%
8%
12%
11%
4%
4%
5%
8%
13%
30%

10%
8%
6%

9%
22%
20%

21%
28%
22%

16%
15%
21%

45%
28%
31%

Research

Unacceptable

30
31
32

Tolerable

6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

Decommissioning of privately held weapons

Security forces made accountable to the people of all ethnic groups
More efficient and effective judicial system
One legal government
All ethnic crimes should be prosecuted to the full extent of the law with the highest
possible penalties
Cooperation between countries in the region to fight organised crime
Special property court to deal with property disputes
Properly paid safe judges
KPC with senior officers from Albanian and Serb communities
One unified judicial system
Politicians and the media must be more careful with what they say
The security services, including the KPC, should proactively enrol minorities
Active recruitment of Serbs into the KPS to ensure their participation
Serb police to guard monasteries in Kosovo
Joint Serb and Kosovo police to guard monasteries in Kosovo
Mitrovica should become a unified city
Two official languages
Better training for the police
Appropriate selection and training of KPS officers to ensure local respect and authority
Cooperation with the Hague Tribunal
Central coordination of all security structures in Kosovo
To ensure Kosovo Serb security Belgrade must support final status agreement
Establish a Kosovo Ministry of the Interior
Local control of police but one police service to ensure effective cooperation
Parallel reform of police with local government reform
Municipality should play an active role in choosing senior police officers
Local courts initially supervised by the international community
Demilitarisation of border regions
One safe autonomous region for Serbs in Kosovo like Republika Srpska in Bosnia
Herzegovina
Kosovo should have its own war crimes court
North and South Mitrovica should be separate municipalities
Separate mono-ethnic Kosova/Kosovo Protection Corps

Acceptable

1
2
3
4
5

Desirable

Question 7 With regards to security please indicate which of the following options
you consider to be Essential, Desirable, Acceptable, Tolerable or
Unacceptable.

Essential

Table 7.6. Question 7 Serbia Others

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KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

8. Negotiations on the final status of Kosovo

Question
With regards to negotiations on the final status of Kosovo please indicate which of the
following options you consider to be Essential, Desirable, Acceptable, Tolerable or
Unacceptable.
Kosovo Albanian priorities

Research

Fifty nine percent of Kosovo Albanians consider it essential that Belgrade agree final
status. They would also like the US to be more pro-active at 57% essential, for the international community to agree final status (56% essential), for there to be a referendum in
Kosovo on final status (53% essential) and for talks in both the US and EU (49% essential).
So Kosovo Albanian priorities seem to emphasise the involvement of the international
community in both negotiations and the recognition of final status and, naturally, they
would like a referendum (see tables 8.1 to 8.6).
Essential - Kosovo Albanian
1 Belgrade will have to agree final status
2 The US should be more pro-active
3 The International Community - Security Council and EU - will have to agree final status
4 There should be a referendum in Kosovo on final status
5 Talks in the US and EU

59%
57%
56%
53%
49%

Serbian priorities
Kosovo Serbs and Serb IDPs both want the international community to involve Belgrade more at 70% and 72% essential respectively. Serbia Serbs also take the view that
Belgrade negotiators must have the support of Kosovo Serbs (73% essential) and that
Kosovo Serbs should have a seat at the negotiating table (71% essential). Naturally Kosovo
Serbs and Serb IDPs agree. Both Serbia Serbs (65% essential) and Kosovo Serbs (58% essential) put the requirement that the international community must deal equally with all
elected representatives whatever their political background in their top five priorities and
open talks are in the top five for both Serb IDPs (79% essential) and Kosovo Serbs (60%
essential). However Kosovo Serbs, perhaps understandably, also put meet the Standards set
by the international community for social and political reform in Kosovo before negotiations as their third priority at 58% essential.

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KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM
Essential - Kosovo Serb
1 International community
should involve Belgrade more

70%

Serbia Serb
1 Belgrade negotiators must have
the support of Kosovo Serbs

73%

Belgrade negotiators must have

the support of Kosovo Serbs
Open talks

61%

71%

Serbia Serb IDPs

1 Belgrades priority in
negotiations should be
the safety and well being
of the Kosovo Serbs
2 Open talks

60%

69%

Belgrade negotiators
must have the support of
Kosovo Serbs

76%

Meet the Standards set by the

international community for
social and political reform in
Kosovo before negotiations

58%

65%

Kosovo Serbs should

have a seat at the
negotiating table

75%

The international community

must deal equally with all
elected
representatives
whatever their political
background

58%

63%

International community
should involve Belgrade
more

72%

Kosovo Serbs should have a

seat at the negotiating table
Belgrades
priority
in
negotiations should be the
safety and well being of the
Kosovo Serbs
The international community
must deal equally with all
elected
representatives
whatever their political
background
Belgrade should develop their
negotiating position in full
cooperation with Kosovo Serbs

80%

79%

Others
The views and priorities of others in both Kosovo and Serbia are very similar to those
of their respective Albanian and Serb majorities with the exception of training for local
politicians to meet their requirements and needs which Kosovo others place second on their
list at 48% essential.
Essential - Kosovo Others
1 Belgrade will have to agree final status

65%

48%

4
5

Training for local politicians to meet their

requirements and needs
The international community must deal equally
with all elected representatives whatever their
political background
There should be a referendum in Kosovo on final
status
Open talks

45%

Serbia Others
1 Kosovo Serbs should have a seat at the negotiating
table
2 Kosovo Serbs should speak for Kosovo Serbs not
Belgrade
3 Belgrade negotiators must have the support of
Kosovo Serbs

Research

Although the priorities of Kosovo Albanians and Serbs are a little different these points
of negotiation procedure or what are sometimes referred to as shape of the table questions
are not necessarily mutually exclusive so most of them can be given the attention of Pristina, Belgrade and the international community.

70%
67%
66%

45%

Open talks

65%

43%

The international community must deal equally

with all elected representatives whatever their
political background

62%

Points of agreement and disagreement

As can easily be seen from the lack of grey in table 8 below most of the suggestions for
negotiations are acceptable to both Kosovo Albanians and Serbs alike. However there are
a few notable exceptions.
There should be a referendum in Kosovo on final status is not supported by 84% of
Kosovo Serbs as unacceptable, 63% of Serbs as unacceptable and 52% of Serb IDPs as
unacceptable. Conversely there should be a referendum in Serbia on final status is not supported by 66% of Kosovo Albanians as unacceptable.
287

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

Although all Serbs want Kosovo Serbs to be in negotiations Kosovo Serbs have strong
reservations about elections in this regard. Forty percent of Kosovo Serbs consider the idea
that Belgrade should support new Kosovo elections before negotiations to be unacceptable.
One way or another a resolution to this problem is going to have to be found, as everyone
seems to agree that Kosovo Serbs should speak for Kosovo Serbs not Belgrade, at only 3%
unacceptable for Kosovo Albanians, 2% unacceptable for Kosovo Serbs, 3% unacceptable
for Serbia Serbs and 9% unacceptable for Serb IDPs.

Research

Kosovo Serbs do not want the international community to impose a settlement if negotiations fail (46% unacceptable) and 54% of Kosovo Albanians do not want the Serbian
Orthodox Church to have a role in negotiations. But no one wants secret talks at 67% unacceptable for Kosovo Albanians, 71% unacceptable for Kosovo Serbs and 72% unacceptable for both Serbia Serbs and Serb IDPs.

288

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41

0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
1%
1%
1%
2%
2%
2%
3%
3%
4%
4%
4%
5%
11%

4%
36%
12%
8%
32%
4%
7%
25%
2%
6%
4%
2%
9%
40%
4%
13%
84%
1%

2%
32%
4%
5%
28%
3%
5%
7%
1%
5%
1%
3%
7%
23%
10%
7%
63%
1%

18%
25%
12%
11%
15%
1%
15%
22%
0%
2%
7%
9%
6%
34%
10%
10%
52%
0%

12%
14%
15%

3%
14%
1%

8%
5%
5%

10%
3%
6%

15%
17%
17%
17%

11%
8%
0%
46%

8%
0%
2%
36%

10%
0%
8%
28%

19%
20%
21%
22%
23%
23%
24%
27%
31%
32%
34%
36%
39%
54%
66%
67%

4%
7%
21%
4%
17%
4%
19%
1%
6%
5%
6%
23%
16%
13%
17%
71%

1%
1%
3%
5%
3%
0%
9%
0%
9%
1%
3%
8%
14%
8%
28%
72%

0%
1%
0%
4%
1%
0%
9%
0%
4%
0%
17%
15%
4%
3%
18%
72%

Research

19
20
21

An open forum for political parties and experts

Talks in the US and EU
The International Community - Security Council and EU - will have to agree final status
The EU should be more pro-active
The US should be more pro-active
The Contact Group should have one position
Training for local politicians to meet their requirements and needs
Belgrade will have to agree final status
Open talks
Understanding the concerns, fears, problems and point of view of other politicians
Fixed time table for negotiations
Kosovo Serbs should speak for Kosovo Serbs not Belgrade
The EU and US should have one position
Belgrade should support new Kosovo elections before negotiations
Appointment of a full time EU or UN diplomat to work with both parties
Talks between Belgrade and Pristina with the help of an intermediary
There should be a referendum in Kosovo on final status
The international community must deal equally with all elected representatives whatever their
political background
Increased international pressure for discussions between politicians
Anyone elected to negotiations must be accepted by the other side
Meet the Standards set by the international community for social and political reform in
Kosovo before negotiations
International penalties for not negotiating
Kosovo Serbs should have a seat at the negotiating table
International community should involve Belgrade more
If no agreement after fixed period of negotiations then the international community should
make the agreement
Belgrades priority in negotiations should be the safety and well being of the Kosovo Serbs
Talks in Kosovo and Serbia
Start negotiations and meet Standards before final status
Official negotiators can not have been participants in the recent conflict
Belgrades priority in negotiations should be the final status of Kosovo
Belgrade negotiators must have the support of Kosovo Serbs
Talks between Belgrade and Washington as well as Belgrade and Brussels
Belgrade should develop their negotiating position in full cooperation with Kosovo Serbs
Negotiations should be given plenty of time
Joint meetings of Belgrade, Pristina and Kosovo Serbs without preconditions
Belgrade and Pristina must have equal say in negotiations
New parliamentary elections in Kosovo to bring Serbs there into the negotiations
Direct talks between Belgrade and Pristina without an intermediary
The Serbian Orthodox Church should have a role in negotiations
There should be a referendum in Serbia on final status
Secret talks

Serbia IDPs

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

Serbia Serb

Percent Unacceptable

Kosovo Serb

Question 8 With regards to negotiations on the final status of Kosovo please indicate which
of the following options you consider to be Essential, Desirable, Acceptable, Tolerable
or Unacceptable.

Kosovo
Albanian

Table 8. Points of agreement and disagreement

289

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

Research

20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41

290

Unacceptable

15
16
17
18
19

Tolerable

4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

Belgrade will have to agree final status

The US should be more pro-active
The International Community - Security Council and EU - will have to agree final
status
There should be a referendum in Kosovo on final status
Talks in the US and EU
The EU and US should have one position
The EU should be more pro-active
An open forum for political parties and experts
Open talks
Kosovo Serbs should speak for Kosovo Serbs not Belgrade
The Contact Group should have one position
Start negotiations and meet Standards before final status
Talks between Belgrade and Pristina with the help of an intermediary
The international community must deal equally with all elected representatives
whatever their political background
Belgrade should support new Kosovo elections before negotiations
Training for local politicians to meet their requirements and needs
Appointment of a full time EU or UN diplomat to work with both parties
Belgrades priority in negotiations should be the final status of Kosovo
Meet the Standards set by the international community for social and political reform
in Kosovo before negotiations
Understanding the concerns, fears, problems and point of view of other politicians
If no agreement after fixed period of negotiations then the international community
should make the agreement
Official negotiators can not have been participants in the recent conflict
International community should involve Belgrade more
Increased international pressure for discussions between politicians
Negotiations should be given plenty of time
Talks between Belgrade and Washington as well as Belgrade and Brussels
International penalties for not negotiating
Talks in Kosovo and Serbia
Belgrades priority in negotiations should be the safety and well being of the Kosovo
Serbs
There should be a referendum in Serbia on final status
Kosovo Serbs should have a seat at the negotiating table
Anyone elected to negotiations must be accepted by the other side
Belgrade and Pristina must have equal say in negotiations
Direct talks between Belgrade and Pristina without an intermediary
Belgrade negotiators must have the support of Kosovo Serbs
New parliamentary elections in Kosovo to bring Serbs there into the negotiations
Joint meetings of Belgrade, Pristina and Kosovo Serbs without preconditions
Belgrade should develop their negotiating position in full cooperation with Kosovo
Serbs
Fixed time table for negotiations
Secret talks
The Serbian Orthodox Church should have a role in negotiations

Acceptable

1
2
3

Desirable

Question 8 With regards to negotiations on the final status of Kosovo please indicate
which of the following options you consider to be Essential, Desirable,
Acceptable, Tolerable or Unacceptable.

Essential

Table 8.1. Question 8 Kosovo Albanian

59%
57%
56%

24%
29%
25%

13%
11%
16%

3%
3%
3%

1%
0%
0%

53%
49%
49%
46%
41%
41%
38%
38%
32%
31%
31%

27%
32%
23%
27%
43%
22%
24%
37%
26%
26%
29%

11%
17%
18%
16%
14%
21%
27%
21%
13%
23%
22%

4%
1%
7%
11%
2%
15%
7%
2%
8%
15%
8%

5%
0%
3%
0%
0%
2%
3%
1%
21%
4%
11%

30%
26%
24%
22%
21%

37%
41%
41%
24%
34%

16%
30%
25%
20%
21%

12%
2%
5%
12%
8%

4%
1%
4%
23%
15%

21%
21%

27%
25%

37%
26%

12%
11%

2%
17%

18%
17%
16%
16%
15%
14%
13%
11%

18%
22%
36%
14%
17%
31%
19%
14%

32%
20%
25%
27%
27%
24%
31%
28%

10%
24%
12%
13%
16%
16%
17%
28%

22%
17%
12%
31%
24%
15%
20%
19%

10%
9%
9%
8%
8%
6%
6%
6%
5%

11%
18%
34%
15%
15%
10%
14%
21%
25%

6%
32%
30%
20%
25%
33%
28%
21%
27%

7%
23%
13%
22%
13%
27%
17%
20%
16%

66%
17%
14%
34%
39%
23%
36%
32%
27%

4%
4%
2%

32%
5%
2%

43%
13%
6%

19%
11%
35%

2%
67%
54%

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41

70%
61%
60%
58%

25%
30%
33%
27%

2%
1%
6%
7%

2%
4%
0%
7%

0%
4%
2%
1%

58%

31%

7%

3%

1%

54%
53%

31%
37%

10%
4%

2%
1%

4%
4%

50%
49%
49%
48%

17%
32%
36%
38%

6%
8%
6%
10%

6%
9%
1%
3%

21%
2%
8%
1%

47%
43%
41%
41%

37%
34%
36%
29%

4%
7%
12%
10%

7%
9%
6%
7%

6%
7%
4%
12%

40%
39%
39%
36%
36%
36%
36%
33%
33%
33%
32%
29%
26%
26%
26%
25%
22%
19%
18%
17%
16%
14%
14%
9%
8%

43%
36%
40%
50%
38%
34%
36%
31%
40%
29%
38%
26%
38%
43%
35%
48%
39%
38%
23%
37%
57%
28%
14%
6%
24%

9%
18%
15%
8%
13%
9%
12%
12%
12%
11%
4%
10%
19%
19%
9%
7%
24%
20%
12%
10%
14%
9%
11%
1%
8%

3%
4%
3%
1%
5%
5%
7%
10%
4%
8%
9%
10%
11%
6%
13%
6%
8%
11%
14%
13%
8%
8%
24%
12%
14%

5%
3%
4%
4%
8%
16%
9%
13%
11%
19%
17%
25%
6%
6%
17%
14%
7%
13%
32%
23%
4%
40%
36%
71%
46%

5%

5%

6%

0%

84%

Research

8
9
10
11

Unacceptable

6
7

Tolerable

International community should involve Belgrade more

Belgrade negotiators must have the support of Kosovo Serbs
Open talks
Meet the Standards set by the international community for social and political reform
in Kosovo before negotiations
The international community must deal equally with all elected representatives
whatever their political background
Official negotiators can not have been participants in the recent conflict
Belgrades priority in negotiations should be the safety and well being of the Kosovo
Serbs
Start negotiations and meet Standards before final status
Kosovo Serbs should speak for Kosovo Serbs not Belgrade
Kosovo Serbs should have a seat at the negotiating table
Belgrade should develop their negotiating position in full cooperation with Kosovo
Serbs
Belgrade and Pristina must have equal say in negotiations
Talks in Kosovo and Serbia
The Contact Group should have one position
The International Community - Security Council and EU - will have to agree final
status
Joint meetings of Belgrade, Pristina and Kosovo Serbs without preconditions
Increased international pressure for discussions between politicians
Appointment of a full time EU or UN diplomat to work with both parties
Fixed time table for negotiations
The EU should be more pro-active
Direct talks between Belgrade and Pristina without an intermediary
The EU and US should have one position
Talks between Belgrade and Pristina with the help of an intermediary
International penalties for not negotiating
Talks between Belgrade and Washington as well as Belgrade and Brussels
There should be a referendum in Serbia on final status
Belgrade will have to agree final status
Understanding the concerns, fears, problems and point of view of other politicians
Negotiations should be given plenty of time
Belgrades priority in negotiations should be the final status of Kosovo
Anyone elected to negotiations must be accepted by the other side
Training for local politicians to meet their requirements and needs
The Serbian Orthodox Church should have a role in negotiations
The US should be more pro-active
New parliamentary elections in Kosovo to bring Serbs there into the negotiations
An open forum for political parties and experts
Belgrade should support new Kosovo elections before negotiations
Talks in the US and EU
Secret talks
If no agreement after fixed period of negotiations then the international community
should make the agreement
There should be a referendum in Kosovo on final status

Acceptable

1
2
3
4

Desirable

Question 8 With regards to negotiations on the final status of Kosovo please indicate
which of the following options you consider to be Essential, Desirable,
Acceptable, Tolerable or Unacceptable.

Essential

Table 8.2. Question 8 Kosovo Serb

291

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

Research

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41

292

Unacceptable

Tolerable

4
5
6

Belgrade will have to agree final status

Training for local politicians to meet their requirements and needs
The international community must deal equally with all elected representatives
whatever their political background
There should be a referendum in Kosovo on final status
Open talks
Belgrades priority in negotiations should be the safety and well being of the Kosovo
Serbs
The International Community - Security Council and EU - will have to agree final
status
Meet the Standards set by the international community for social and political reform
in Kosovo before negotiations
Joint meetings of Belgrade, Pristina and Kosovo Serbs without preconditions
Appointment of a full time EU or UN diplomat to work with both parties
Talks in the US and EU
The EU should be more pro-active
Belgrades priority in negotiations should be the final status of Kosovo
The EU and US should have one position
Belgrade negotiators must have the support of Kosovo Serbs
Start negotiations and meet Standards before final status
An open forum for political parties and experts
If no agreement after fixed period of negotiations then the international community
should make the agreement
Kosovo Serbs should speak for Kosovo Serbs not Belgrade
Belgrade should support new Kosovo elections before negotiations
Direct talks between Belgrade and Pristina without an intermediary
International community should involve Belgrade more
International penalties for not negotiating
Talks in Kosovo and Serbia
Understanding the concerns, fears, problems and point of view of other politicians
Increased international pressure for discussions between politicians
Negotiations should be given plenty of time
Belgrade should develop their negotiating position in full cooperation with Kosovo
Serbs
Kosovo Serbs should have a seat at the negotiating table
Anyone elected to negotiations must be accepted by the other side
Talks between Belgrade and Pristina with the help of an intermediary
The Contact Group should have one position
Talks between Belgrade and Washington as well as Belgrade and Brussels
The US should be more pro-active
Fixed time table for negotiations
Belgrade and Pristina must have equal say in negotiations
Official negotiators can not have been participants in the recent conflict
The Serbian Orthodox Church should have a role in negotiations
New parliamentary elections in Kosovo to bring Serbs there into the negotiations
Secret talks
There should be a referendum in Serbia on final status

Acceptable

1
2
3

Desirable

Question 8 With regards to negotiations on the final status of Kosovo please indicate
which of the following options you consider to be Essential, Desirable,
Acceptable, Tolerable or Unacceptable.

Essential

Table 8.3. Question 8 Kosovo Others

65%
48%
45%

16%
33%
19%

0%
19%
18%

0%
0%
18%

19%
0%
0%

45%
43%
40%

12%
25%
0%

13%
32%
0%

0%
0%
56%

30%
0%
4%

37%

28%

16%

0%

19%

35%

41%

7%

17%

0%

34%
33%
32%
32%
32%
30%
29%
29%
28%
22%

22%
35%
19%
32%
20%
38%
0%
6%
32%
23%

13%
32%
36%
36%
23%
32%
15%
13%
41%
6%

31%
0%
13%
0%
0%
0%
56%
20%
0%
26%

0%
0%
0%
0%
24%
0%
0%
32%
0%
24%

21%
17%
17%
13%
13%
13%
12%
10%
10%
10%

25%
27%
10%
19%
49%
27%
41%
7%
26%
35%

54%
48%
41%
32%
17%
26%
36%
8%
26%
29%

0%
8%
12%
0%
20%
27%
11%
38%
11%
26%

0%
0%
20%
36%
0%
6%
0%
36%
28%
0%

10%
10%
9%
9%
9%
6%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%

26%
44%
0%
42%
17%
65%
27%
25%
37%
13%
19%
0%
0%

40%
20%
64%
35%
26%
20%
32%
13%
43%
10%
18%
0%
11%

24%
16%
27%
14%
22%
0%
41%
18%
0%
16%
21%
8%
15%

0%
9%
0%
0%
26%
9%
0%
45%
21%
61%
42%
92%
73%

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41

73%
71%
69%

22%
23%
23%

4%
5%
6%

1%
1%
1%

0%
0%
1%

65%

27%

5%

1%

1%

63%

26%

9%

2%

0%

60%
57%
56%
56%
54%
53%
49%
44%
39%

28%
28%
28%
29%
26%
27%
28%
32%
29%

9%
10%
9%
11%
14%
10%
15%
11%
20%

2%
4%
4%
2%
2%
4%
5%
8%
8%

1%
2%
3%
1%
3%
5%
3%
5%
4%

39%
37%
37%
37%
37%
36%
33%

32%
41%
32%
29%
30%
35%
30%

23%
18%
19%
14%
22%
17%
21%

4%
4%
8%
7%
9%
9%
10%

1%
1%
5%
14%
3%
3%
5%

33%
32%
32%
31%
31%
30%
27%
27%
24%
24%
22%
21%
21%
20%
20%
12%
11%
11%

30%
33%
29%
31%
32%
30%
32%
32%
35%
35%
21%
20%
26%
46%
44%
18%
14%
16%

20%
16%
18%
18%
19%
20%
25%
23%
29%
19%
18%
20%
29%
21%
24%
22%
27%
19%

9%
11%
12%
11%
12%
13%
9%
10%
8%
12%
11%
16%
14%
7%
9%
20%
18%
17%

8%
9%
8%
8%
7%
7%
7%
8%
5%
9%
28%
23%
10%
5%
2%
28%
32%
36%

8%
3%

10%
5%

7%
8%

11%
12%

63%
72%

Research

6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

Unacceptable

Tolerable

Belgrade negotiators must have the support of Kosovo Serbs

Kosovo Serbs should have a seat at the negotiating table
Belgrades priority in negotiations should be the safety and well being of the Kosovo
Serbs
The international community must deal equally with all elected representatives
whatever their political background
Belgrade should develop their negotiating position in full cooperation with Kosovo
Serbs
Open talks
International community should involve Belgrade more
Kosovo Serbs should speak for Kosovo Serbs not Belgrade
Joint meetings of Belgrade, Pristina and Kosovo Serbs without preconditions
Belgrades priority in negotiations should be the final status of Kosovo
Official negotiators can not have been participants in the recent conflict
Belgrade and Pristina must have equal say in negotiations
Anyone elected to negotiations must be accepted by the other side
The International Community - Security Council and EU - will have to agree final
status
Talks in Kosovo and Serbia
Fixed time table for negotiations
The EU should be more pro-active
Direct talks between Belgrade and Pristina without an intermediary
Start negotiations and meet Standards before final status
The Contact Group should have one position
Meet the Standards set by the international community for social and political reform
in Kosovo before negotiations
International penalties for not negotiating
Negotiations should be given plenty of time
New parliamentary elections in Kosovo to bring Serbs there into the negotiations
The Serbian Orthodox Church should have a role in negotiations
Belgrade will have to agree final status
The EU and US should have one position
Talks between Belgrade and Pristina with the help of an intermediary
Increased international pressure for discussions between politicians
Understanding the concerns, fears, problems and point of view of other politicians
Talks between Belgrade and Washington as well as Belgrade and Brussels
There should be a referendum in Serbia on final status
Belgrade should support new Kosovo elections before negotiations
Appointment of a full time EU or UN diplomat to work with both parties
Training for local politicians to meet their requirements and needs
An open forum for political parties and experts
The US should be more pro-active
Talks in the US and EU
If no agreement after fixed period of negotiations then the international community
should make the agreement
There should be a referendum in Kosovo on final status
Secret talks

Acceptable

1
2
3

Desirable

Question 8 With regards to negotiations on the final status of Kosovo please indicate
which of the following options you consider to be Essential, Desirable,
Acceptable, Tolerable or Unacceptable.

Essential

Table 8.4. Question 8 Serbia Serb

293

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41

294

Unacceptable

Research

8
9

Tolerable

2
3
4
5
6
7

Belgrades priority in negotiations should be the safety and well being of the Kosovo
Serbs
Open talks
Belgrade negotiators must have the support of Kosovo Serbs
Kosovo Serbs should have a seat at the negotiating table
International community should involve Belgrade more
Official negotiators can not have been participants in the recent conflict
The international community must deal equally with all elected representatives
whatever their political background
The Contact Group should have one position
Belgrade should develop their negotiating position in full cooperation with Kosovo
Serbs
Kosovo Serbs should speak for Kosovo Serbs not Belgrade
Talks in Kosovo and Serbia
Belgrades priority in negotiations should be the final status of Kosovo
Joint meetings of Belgrade, Pristina and Kosovo Serbs without preconditions
Belgrade and Pristina must have equal say in negotiations
Fixed time table for negotiations
Talks between Belgrade and Pristina with the help of an intermediary
Negotiations should be given plenty of time
Anyone elected to negotiations must be accepted by the other side
The EU should be more pro-active
International penalties for not negotiating
The Serbian Orthodox Church should have a role in negotiations
The International Community - Security Council and EU - will have to agree final
status
Increased international pressure for discussions between politicians
The EU and US should have one position
Start negotiations and meet Standards before final status
Direct talks between Belgrade and Pristina without an intermediary
Belgrade will have to agree final status
Talks between Belgrade and Washington as well as Belgrade and Brussels
Meet the Standards set by the international community for social and political reform
in Kosovo before negotiations
There should be a referendum in Serbia on final status
New parliamentary elections in Kosovo to bring Serbs there into the negotiations
Understanding the concerns, fears, problems and point of view of other politicians
The US should be more pro-active
Training for local politicians to meet their requirements and needs
An open forum for political parties and experts
Belgrade should support new Kosovo elections before negotiations
Appointment of a full time EU or UN diplomat to work with both parties
Talks in the US and EU
There should be a referendum in Kosovo on final status
If no agreement after fixed period of negotiations then the international community
should make the agreement
Secret talks

Acceptable

Desirable

Question 8 With regards to negotiations on the final status of Kosovo please indicate
which of the following options you consider to be Essential, Desirable,
Acceptable, Tolerable or Unacceptable.

Essential

Table 8.5. Question 8 Serbia Serb IDPs

80%

14%

5%

0%

0%

79%
76%
75%
72%
66%
64%

18%
19%
15%
14%
18%
30%

2%
4%
9%
5%
8%
5%

0%
0%
1%
1%
4%
1%

0%
0%
0%
8%
4%
0%

62%
60%

16%
22%

18%
17%

2%
0%

1%
0%

55%
55%
53%
52%
51%
50%
49%
49%
49%
47%
44%
43%
43%

24%
24%
17%
40%
17%
26%
15%
24%
33%
20%
19%
39%
23%

12%
14%
23%
8%
8%
14%
19%
21%
12%
11%
15%
14%
18%

1%
7%
6%
0%
7%
3%
8%
3%
2%
9%
12%
1%
3%

9%
1%
1%
0%
17%
7%
10%
4%
3%
11%
10%
3%
12%

41%
41%
39%
38%
37%
37%
33%

22%
34%
30%
26%
16%
31%
24%

19%
8%
28%
21%
16%
16%
30%

7%
11%
4%
10%
10%
6%
7%

10%
6%
0%
4%
22%
9%
6%

31%
29%
28%
28%
27%
23%
22%
21%
19%
16%
13%

26%
18%
31%
26%
30%
31%
12%
34%
21%
8%
20%

22%
24%
29%
21%
18%
23%
13%
24%
25%
14%
30%

3%
15%
10%
11%
10%
5%
19%
11%
10%
10%
9%

18%
15%
2%
15%
15%
18%
34%
10%
25%
52%
28%

8%

3%

6%

11%

72%

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41

70%
67%
66%
65%
62%

24%
18%
22%
24%
32%

3%
11%
8%
6%
5%

1%
0%
1%
2%
0%

2%
3%
3%
2%
1%

54%
54%
51%

23%
32%
34%

11%
10%
9%

2%
0%
2%

10%
4%
3%

50%

36%

10%

2%

2%

48%
47%
44%
41%

23%
46%
36%
31%

17%
3%
13%
18%

5%
1%
4%
4%

7%
4%
2%
7%

41%
41%
39%
39%
39%
39%
38%
35%
34%

39%
34%
35%
34%
26%
45%
37%
26%
39%

12%
15%
15%
17%
18%
9%
17%
15%
12%

7%
3%
3%
4%
6%
3%
6%
13%
6%

1%
6%
7%
7%
11%
4%
3%
10%
9%

33%
31%
31%
30%
30%
29%
29%
26%
25%
24%
21%
20%
18%
17%
15%
15%

36%
36%
39%
23%
33%
37%
35%
28%
30%
40%
38%
22%
27%
32%
17%
21%

10%
13%
13%
31%
12%
12%
12%
24%
16%
24%
21%
19%
25%
29%
21%
25%

12%
8%
14%
8%
14%
9%
10%
9%
12%
8%
13%
17%
18%
13%
23%
17%

10%
11%
4%
8%
12%
13%
14%
13%
16%
4%
7%
21%
12%
9%
24%
22%

12%
11%
3%

20%
15%
14%

17%
17%
6%

28%
15%
18%

22%
42%
58%

Research

10
11
12
13

Unacceptable

Tolerable

6
7
8

Kosovo Serbs should have a seat at the negotiating table

Kosovo Serbs should speak for Kosovo Serbs not Belgrade
Belgrade negotiators must have the support of Kosovo Serbs
Open talks
The international community must deal equally with all elected representatives
whatever their political background
Belgrade and Pristina must have equal say in negotiations
Official negotiators can not have been participants in the recent conflict
Belgrades priority in negotiations should be the safety and well being of the Kosovo
Serbs
Belgrade should develop their negotiating position in full cooperation with Kosovo
Serbs
International community should involve Belgrade more
Joint meetings of Belgrade, Pristina and Kosovo Serbs without preconditions
Belgrades priority in negotiations should be the final status of Kosovo
Meet the Standards set by the international community for social and political reform
in Kosovo before negotiations
International penalties for not negotiating
Talks in Kosovo and Serbia
Fixed time table for negotiations
The Contact Group should have one position
Belgrade will have to agree final status
Anyone elected to negotiations must be accepted by the other side
Start negotiations and meet Standards before final status
The EU and US should have one position
The International Community - Security Council and EU - will have to agree final
status
The EU should be more pro-active
Increased international pressure for discussions between politicians
New parliamentary elections in Kosovo to bring Serbs there into the negotiations
Talks between Belgrade and Pristina with the help of an intermediary
Talks between Belgrade and Washington as well as Belgrade and Brussels
Direct talks between Belgrade and Pristina without an intermediary
Negotiations should be given plenty of time
Belgrade should support new Kosovo elections before negotiations
There should be a referendum in Serbia on final status
An open forum for political parties and experts
Training for local politicians to meet their requirements and needs
The US should be more pro-active
Appointment of a full time EU or UN diplomat to work with both parties
Understanding the concerns, fears, problems and point of view of other politicians
The Serbian Orthodox Church should have a role in negotiations
If no agreement after fixed period of negotiations then the international community
should make the agreement
Talks in the US and EU
There should be a referendum in Kosovo on final status
Secret talks

Acceptable

1
2
3
4
5

Desirable

Question 8 With regards to negotiations on the final status of Kosovo please indicate
which of the following options you consider to be Essential, Desirable,
Acceptable, Tolerable or Unacceptable.

Essential

Table 8.6. Question 8 Serbia Others

295

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

9. Guiding principles for the final status of Kosovo

Question
With regards to guiding principles for the final status of Kosovo please indicate which
of the following options you consider to be Essential, Desirable, Acceptable, Tolerable or Unacceptable.
Kosovo Albanian priorities

Research

No one will be at all surprised to find full independence at the top of the Kosovo Albanian list of 49 different principles for the final status of Kosovo at 81% essential (see tables
9.1 to 9.6). Behind this come some of the major characteristics of independence. Kosovo
should be allowed to have its own army at 73% essential, be a member of the UN at 67%
essential and make its own foreign policy at 60% essential. Fifth on the Kosovo Albanian
list is NATO should stay as long as is needed at 57% essential. Kosovo Albanians want
independence but like Kosovo Serbs they also want security and in this they welcome the
assistance and support of the international community.
Essential - Kosovo Albanian
1 Full independence
2 Kosovo should be allowed to have its own army
3 Kosovo should be a member of the UN
4 Kosovo should be allowed to make its own foreign policy
5 NATO should stay as long as is needed

81%
73%
67%
60%
57%

Serbian priorities
Kosovo can not leave Serbia is at the top of all three Serb lists at 69% essential for
Kosovo Serbs, 65% for Serbia Serbs and 73% for Serb IDPs. And second on the list for
Serbia Serbs at 58% and Serb IDPs at 59% is Kosovo Serbs can always keep their Serb
citizenship. This item is third on the Kosovo Serb list at 56% essential after meeting Standards before agreeing final status at 58%. After that various solutions that respect present
boarders and international law are most important and Serb IDPs do not want full independence at 39% essential. Fifth on the Serbia Serb list at 43% essential is the suggestion that
Albanians should pay the financial costs of separating from Serbia.
Essential - Kosovo Serb
1 Kosovo can not leave Serbia
2 Meet Standards before
agreeing final status
3 Kosovo Serbs can always
keep their Serb citizenship

296

69%
58%
56%

Solution inside present

boarders of Kosovo and
Serbia

47%

Solution that respects the

present boarders of Serbia
Montenegro in international
law

47%

Serbia Serb
1 Kosovo can not leave Serbia
2 Kosovo Serbs can always
keep their Serb citizenship
3 Final status should not
include Amnesty for war
crimes
4 Solution that respects the
present boarders of Serbia
Montenegro in international
law
5 Albanians should pay all the
financial costs of separating
from Serbia

43%

Serbia Serb IDPs

1 Kosovo can not leave Serbia
2 Kosovo Serbs can always
keep their Serb citizenship
3 Solution inside present
boarders of Kosovo and
Serbia
4 Not full independence

43%

65%
58%
43%

Solution that respects the

present boarders of Serbia
Montenegro in international
law

73%
59%
43%

39%

38%

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

Others
Like Kosovo Albanians Kosovo others also believe Kosovo should have its own army
(43% essential) and make its own foreign policy (47% essential). They also think NATO
should stay as long as is needed (49% essential). But unlike Kosovo Albanians their top
priority is not full independence but that there should be no return to the way things were
before the war of 1999 at 60% essential. Like Serbs in general, Serb others also want Serbs
to be able to keep their citizenship (48% essential) and for Kosovo to stay part of Serbia
(41% essential). But they also want Kosovo and Serbia to join the EU and NATO, meet
Standards before agreeing final status and for this not to include amnesty for war crimes all
at 35% essential.
Essential - Kosovo Others
1 No return to the way things were
before the war - 1999
2 More investment to solve the
problem of final status quicker
3 NATO should stay as long as is
needed
4 Kosovo should be allowed to make
its own foreign policy
5 Kosovo should be allowed to have its
own army

60%

Serbia Others
1 Kosovo Serbs can always keep their Serb citizenship

48%

57%

Kosovo can not leave Serbia

41%

49%

35%

47%

Kosovo and Serbia membership of EU and NATO as soon as

possible to increase stability and help negotiations
Meet Standards before agreeing final status

43%

Final status should not include Amnesty for war crimes

35%

35%

In contrast to the various points of negotiation or procedural issues listed in question 8

there is little evidence of a Kosovo Albanian and Serb consensus around the guiding principles for the final status of Kosovo (table 9 below). But then this is to be expected. Everyone wants negotiations to resolve the problems of Kosovo but everyone would also like
any settlement achieved to be on their terms. This is quite natural and it is from this point
that negotiations have to start on what are sometimes referred to as the substantive issues.

Research

Points of agreement and disagreement

Perhaps I have been too hard by highlighting everything in grey when a 40% plus level
of unacceptable isreached. A simple majority vote only requires 50% plus 1. It should also
be remembered that items that areunacceptable on their own are often acceptable as part of
a comprehensive agreement or package that hasthe potential to deliver peace, security and
increased prosperity. For example Protestants strongly opposedpolice reform in Northern
Ireland but accepted it as part of the Belfast Agreement.
With all these points in mind what are the clear points of greatest potential agreement
for Kosovo Albanians and Serbs? They are: NATO should stay as long as is needed at 0%
unacceptable for Kosovo Albanians and 3% for Kosovo Serbs; more investment to solve
the problem of final status quicker at 2% unacceptable for Kosovo Albanians but 17% for
Serb IDPs; all Balkan states should join NATO at 3% unacceptable for Kosovo Albanians
but 23% for Serbia Serbs; an international economic regeneration programme for Serbia
and Kosovo as part of a final status agreement at 7% unacceptable for Kosovo Albanians
but only 6% for Serbia Serbs; all of former Yugoslavia should cooperate and work to help
each other join the EU at 11% unacceptable for Kosovo Albanians and less than 4% for all
Serbs; no unification with neighbours is almost equally unacceptable to everyone at 16%
for Kosovo Albanians, 20% for Kosovo Serbs, 36% for Serbia Serbs and 19% for Serb
IDPs; Kosovo Serbs can always keep their Serb citizenship is unacceptable to only 18% of
297

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

Kosovo Albanians; meet Standards before agreeing final status is only unacceptable to
22% of Kosovo Albanians and a solution that respects the present boarders of Serbia Montenegro in international law is only unacceptable to 26% of Kosovo Albanians.

Research

In all of this there is plenty of substance to form a basis for negotiation and all these
points should be borne in mind when examining various constitutional arrangements tested
against public opinion in question 10.

298

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49

0%
0%
1%
1%
2%
3%
3%
4%
5%
7%

51%
3%
92%
91%
14%
89%
15%
67%
71%
22%

48%
23%
87%
84%
13%
72%
23%
52%
70%
6%

54%
21%
81%
76%
17%
67%
11%
59%
66%
33%

7%
11%
15%
16%
18%
18%
22%
22%
26%
34%
34%
34%
38%
39%
42%
43%
43%
45%
47%
48%
54%
57%
57%
62%
64%
64%
67%
68%
68%

57%
4%
47%
20%
9%
86%
3%
68%
21%
72%
42%
68%
61%
87%
9%
48%
18%
33%
42%
77%
84%
79%
71%
41%
73%
68%
11%
62%
34%

21%
4%
24%
36%
6%
79%
3%
34%
6%
68%
21%
49%
66%
79%
6%
65%
7%
17%
19%
83%
53%
56%
71%
39%
81%
59%
14%
41%
26%

50%
3%
43%
19%
16%
71%
18%
56%
19%
60%
21%
67%
61%
66%
3%
60%
31%
35%
32%
72%
56%
78%
66%
47%
76%
59%
36%
61%
28%

70%
76%
78%
78%
80%

16%
29%
10%
36%
83%

32%
39%
17%
24%
63%

38%
47%
32%
27%
57%

81%
82%
84%
86%
90%

62%
31%
31%
4%
24%

63%
52%
20%
3%
8%

61%
57%
41%
5%
27%

Research

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39

Judicial independence within existing boarders with Serbia

NATO should stay as long as is needed
Full independence
Kosovo should be allowed to have its own army
More investment to solve the problem of final status quicker
Kosovo should be allowed to make its own foreign policy
All Balkan states should join NATO
Kosovo should be allowed to have their own civil defence force
Kosovo should be a member of the UN
International economic regeneration programme for Serbia and Kosovo as part of final status
agreement
Standards can be met at the same time as final status
All of former Yugoslavia should cooperate and work to help each other join the EU
No return to the way things were before the war - 1999
No unification with neighbours
Kosovo Serbs can always keep their Serb citizenship
Immediate full independence of Kosovo based on 1991 Kosovo referendum
Meet Standards before agreeing final status
Decentralisation but not by ethnic regions
Solution that respects the present boarders of Serbia Montenegro in international law
Serbia should pay all the financial costs of keeping Kosovo
No partition
Not full integration in Serbia
Independence only when agreed conditions are met
A practically independent Kosovo without the words independent or sovereign
Solution inside present boarders of Kosovo and Serbia
Amnesty as part of final status agreement for war crimes
Reserved positions for Serb minority in all Kosovo institutions
Final status should not include Amnesty for war crimes
Serbia should accept all the political difficulties that would come with keeping Kosovo
Forgive Kosovo debts held by Serbia Montenegro if Kosovo does not stay in Serbia
National anthem to be agreed by Serbs and Albanians
National flag to be agreed by Serbs and Albanians
Independence after a fixed period of adjustment
Economic independence within existing boarders with Serbia
Albanian should be an official language in the Serbian Government
Kosovo as an EU Region in Serbia Montenegro/Balkan Confederation
Security enclaves for Serb minority as a temporary measure
Dual citizenship offered to all citizens in the region
Proportional representation for Albanian politicians in the Serbian Parliament if they keep
Kosovo
Partition into Serb and Albanian regions
Cantons for minorities in both Kosovo and Serbia
Decentralisation by ethnic region
Albanians should pay all the financial costs of separating from Serbia
A Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo Federation should have Serb, Montenegro and Kosovo
Presidents in turn
A practically independent Kosovo but still part of Serbia Montenegro
Delay final status for at least ten years
Less than independence but more than autonomy
Kosovo can not leave Serbia
Not full independence

Serbia IDPs

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Serbia Serb

Percent Unacceptable

Kosovo Serb

Question 9 - With regards to guiding principles for the final status of Kosovo please indicate
which of the following options you consider to be Essential, Desirable, Acceptable,
Tolerable or Unacceptable.

Kosovo
Albanian

Table 9. Points of agreement and disagreement

299

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

49

300

Unacceptable

45
46
47
48

Tolerable

19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44

Full independence
Kosovo should be allowed to have its own army
Kosovo should be a member of the UN
Kosovo should be allowed to make its own foreign policy
NATO should stay as long as is needed
More investment to solve the problem of final status quicker
No return to the way things were before the war - 1999
Kosovo should be allowed to have their own civil defence force
Standards can be met at the same time as final status
Not full integration in Serbia
Immediate full independence of Kosovo based on 1991 Kosovo referendum
No partition
All Balkan states should join NATO
No unification with neighbours
All of former Yugoslavia should cooperate and work to help each other join the EU
Independence only when agreed conditions are met
Serbia should pay all the financial costs of keeping Kosovo
International economic regeneration programme for Serbia and Kosovo as part of final
status agreement
Decentralisation but not by ethnic regions
A practically independent Kosovo without the words independent or sovereign
Kosovo Serbs can always keep their Serb citizenship
Serbia should accept all the political difficulties that would come with keeping Kosovo
Meet Standards before agreeing final status
Forgive Kosovo debts held by Serbia Montenegro if Kosovo does not stay in Serbia
Economic independence within existing boarders with Serbia
Partition into Serb and Albanian regions
National flag to be agreed by Serbs and Albanians
Solution inside present boarders of Kosovo and Serbia
National anthem to be agreed by Serbs and Albanians
Final status should not include Amnesty for war crimes
Solution that respects the present boarders of Serbia Montenegro in international law
Independence after a fixed period of adjustment
Amnesty as part of final status agreement for war crimes
Dual citizenship offered to all citizens in the region
Reserved positions for Serb minority in all Kosovo institutions
Kosovo can not leave Serbia
Cantons for minorities in both Kosovo and Serbia
A practically independent Kosovo but still part of Serbia Montenegro
Less than independence but more than autonomy
Albanian should be an official language in the Serbian Government
Albanians should pay all the financial costs of separating from Serbia
Not full independence
Decentralisation by ethnic region
Proportional representation for Albanian politicians in the Serbian Parliament if they
keep Kosovo
Kosovo as an EU Region in Serbia Montenegro/Balkan Confederation
Delay final status for at least ten years
Judicial independence within existing boarders with Serbia
A Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo Federation should have Serb, Montenegro and Kosovo
Presidents in turn
Security enclaves for Serb minority as a temporary measure

Acceptable

Research

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

Desirable

Question 9 - With regards to guiding principles for the final status of Kosovo please
indicate which of the following options you consider to be Essential, Desirable,
Acceptable, Tolerable or Unacceptable.

Essential

Table 9.1. Question 9 Kosovo Albanian

81%
73%
67%
60%
57%
55%
55%
44%
41%
38%
33%
32%
28%
25%
17%
16%
16%
15%

12%
21%
20%
20%
34%
21%
20%
23%
24%
13%
17%
12%
39%
17%
30%
13%
18%
35%

5%
4%
7%
12%
9%
16%
9%
19%
17%
9%
20%
13%
27%
26%
30%
13%
21%
27%

1%
1%
1%
5%
1%
7%
1%
10%
11%
6%
12%
8%
3%
16%
11%
19%
11%
15%

1%
1%
5%
3%
0%
2%
15%
4%
7%
34%
18%
34%
3%
16%
11%
38%
34%
7%

12%
12%
11%
11%
11%
8%
8%
7%
7%
7%
6%
6%
5%
5%
4%
4%
3%
3%
2%
2%
2%
2%
1%
1%
1%
1%

18%
11%
20%
22%
25%
16%
3%
6%
8%
10%
12%
12%
7%
5%
7%
4%
10%
5%
2%
3%
4%
3%
4%
6%
4%
4%

21%
19%
32%
11%
20%
18%
7%
8%
14%
19%
13%
19%
26%
15%
21%
8%
27%
3%
5%
5%
4%
15%
9%
1%
7%
8%

28%
20%
19%
9%
23%
10%
20%
8%
14%
22%
15%
18%
36%
19%
25%
16%
18%
4%
14%
9%
6%
16%
8%
2%
10%
19%

22%
39%
18%
47%
22%
48%
62%
70%
57%
42%
54%
45%
26%
57%
43%
68%
43%
86%
76%
81%
84%
64%
78%
90%
78%
68%

1%
1%
1%
0%

6%
1%
20%
1%

16%
5%
62%
6%

14%
10%
17%
12%

64%
82%
0%
80%

0%

2%

12%

20%

67%

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

69%
58%
56%
47%
47%
42%
42%
37%

21%
24%
27%
26%
17%
38%
33%
19%

4%
9%
6%
14%
10%
13%
10%
11%

2%
6%
2%
5%
5%
5%
5%
11%

4%
3%
9%
9%
21%
3%
10%
22%

37%
36%
34%
33%
30%

22%
30%
33%
18%
38%

19%
11%
12%
4%
9%

7%
12%
16%
9%
6%

15%
11%
4%
36%
16%

30%
29%
28%
28%
26%
26%
24%
23%

7%
20%
11%
28%
8%
28%
41%
15%

14%
8%
19%
14%
16%
20%
11%
10%

15%
11%
19%
15%
19%
9%
7%
18%

33%
31%
24%
14%
31%
16%
18%
34%

21%
20%
20%
15%
14%
12%
11%
11%
10%
9%
9%
8%
8%
7%

10%
10%
27%
27%
7%
6%
10%
22%
5%
4%
12%
14%
20%
3%

6%
11%
20%
14%
15%
2%
10%
15%
11%
6%
4%
24%
8%
3%

2%
17%
13%
15%
6%
3%
7%
10%
2%
9%
4%
14%
12%
5%

61%
42%
20%
29%
57%
77%
62%
42%
71%
73%
71%
41%
51%
83%

6%
6%
5%
5%
5%
4%
4%
4%
4%
4%
4%
2%
1%
1%
0%

6%
13%
21%
4%
4%
4%
9%
10%
4%
4%
11%
3%
9%
7%
8%

9%
7%
11%
2%
23%
0%
12%
6%
4%
5%
8%
1%
2%
12%
4%

11%
7%
17%
5%
19%
2%
7%
13%
0%
1%
15%
2%
2%
8%
9%

68%
67%
47%
84%
48%
91%
68%
68%
89%
87%
62%
92%
86%
72%
79%

Research

22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35

Unacceptable

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

Tolerable

9
10
11
12
13

Kosovo can not leave Serbia

Meet Standards before agreeing final status
Kosovo Serbs can always keep their Serb citizenship
Solution inside present boarders of Kosovo and Serbia
Solution that respects the present boarders of Serbia Montenegro in international law
NATO should stay as long as is needed
Decentralisation by ethnic region
International economic regeneration programme for Serbia and Kosovo as part of final
status agreement
All Balkan states should join NATO
Security enclaves for Serb minority as a temporary measure
All of former Yugoslavia should cooperate and work to help each other join the EU
Albanians should pay all the financial costs of separating from Serbia
Kosovo and Serbia membership of EU and NATO as soon as possible to increase
stability and help negotiations
Final status should not include Amnesty for war crimes
Delay final status for at least ten years
Not full independence
More investment to solve the problem of final status quicker
Less than independence but more than autonomy
Partition into Serb and Albanian regions
Reserved positions for Serb minority in all Kosovo institutions
Proportional representation for Albanian politicians in the Serbian Parliament if they
keep Kosovo
Independence only when agreed conditions are met
Serbia should accept all the political difficulties that would come with keeping Kosovo
No unification with neighbours
Cantons for minorities in both Kosovo and Serbia
Standards can be met at the same time as final status
Forgive Kosovo debts held by Serbia Montenegro if Kosovo does not stay in Serbia
Dual citizenship offered to all citizens in the region
No partition
Kosovo should be a member of the UN
Albanian should be an official language in the Serbian Government
Independence after a fixed period of adjustment
Economic independence within existing boarders with Serbia
Judicial independence within existing boarders with Serbia
A Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo Federation should have Serb, Montenegro and Kosovo
Presidents in turn
Decentralisation but not by ethnic regions
Kosovo should be allowed to have their own civil defence force
No return to the way things were before the war - 1999
National anthem to be agreed by Serbs and Albanians
Amnesty as part of final status agreement for war crimes
Kosovo should be allowed to have its own army
Not full integration in Serbia
Kosovo as an EU Region in Serbia Montenegro/Balkan Confederation
Kosovo should be allowed to make its own foreign policy
A practically independent Kosovo without the words independent or sovereign
A practically independent Kosovo but still part of Serbia Montenegro
Full independence
Immediate full independence of Kosovo based on 1991 Kosovo referendum
Serbia should pay all the financial costs of keeping Kosovo
National flag to be agreed by Serbs and Albanians

Acceptable

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Desirable

Question 9 - With regards to guiding principles for the final status of Kosovo please
indicate which of the following options you consider to be Essential, Desirable,
Acceptable, Tolerable or Unacceptable.

Essential

Table 9.2. Question 9 Kosovo Serb

301

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

43
44
45
46
47
48
49

302

Unacceptable

41
42

Tolerable

39
40

No return to the way things were before the war - 1999

More investment to solve the problem of final status quicker
NATO should stay as long as is needed
Kosovo should be allowed to make its own foreign policy
Kosovo should be allowed to have its own army
All of former Yugoslavia should cooperate and work to help each other join the EU
Full independence
Standards can be met at the same time as final status
All Balkan states should join NATO
A practically independent Kosovo without the words independent or sovereign
Decentralisation but not by ethnic regions
Kosovo should be a member of the UN
Kosovo should be allowed to have their own civil defence force
No partition
Meet Standards before agreeing final status
Solution that respects the present boarders of Serbia Montenegro in international law
Independence only when agreed conditions are met
Kosovo Serbs can always keep their Serb citizenship
Not full integration in Serbia
Economic independence within existing boarders with Serbia
No unification with neighbours
Immediate full independence of Kosovo based on 1991 Kosovo referendum
Decentralisation by ethnic region
Final status should not include Amnesty for war crimes
Amnesty as part of final status agreement for war crimes
Delay final status for at least ten years
Solution inside present boarders of Kosovo and Serbia
A practically independent Kosovo but still part of Serbia Montenegro
Judicial independence within existing boarders with Serbia
Albanian should be an official language in the Serbian Government
Serbia should pay all the financial costs of keeping Kosovo
Albanians should pay all the financial costs of separating from Serbia
Not full independence
Kosovo can not leave Serbia
Security enclaves for Serb minority as a temporary measure
Dual citizenship offered to all citizens in the region
Less than independence but more than autonomy
Proportional representation for Albanian politicians in the Serbian Parliament if they
keep Kosovo
National flag to be agreed by Serbs and Albanians
Serbia should accept all the political difficulties that would come with keeping
Kosovo
Kosovo as an EU Region in Serbia Montenegro/Balkan Confederation
International economic regeneration programme for Serbia and Kosovo as part of
final status agreement
Partition into Serb and Albanian regions
Independence after a fixed period of adjustment
Cantons for minorities in both Kosovo and Serbia
Reserved positions for Serb minority in all Kosovo institutions
A Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo Federation should have Serb, Montenegro and
Kosovo Presidents in turn
National anthem to be agreed by Serbs and Albanians
Forgive Kosovo debts held by Serbia Montenegro if Kosovo does not stay in Serbia

Acceptable

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38

Desirable

Research

Question 9 - With regards to guiding principles for the final status of Kosovo please
indicate which of the following options you consider to be Essential, Desirable,
Acceptable, Tolerable or Unacceptable.

Essential

Table 9.3. Question 9 Kosovo Others

60%
57%
49%
47%
43%
42%
41%
36%
31%
30%
29%
27%
26%
22%
21%
21%
20%
18%
17%
17%
16%
13%
13%
13%
11%
9%
9%
9%
9%
8%
8%
4%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%

4%
15%
51%
23%
4%
16%
27%
27%
16%
8%
0%
7%
27%
0%
11%
16%
13%
22%
11%
0%
14%
32%
0%
0%
0%
13%
10%
0%
0%
0%
16%
9%
0%
0%
0%
13%
0%
8%

0%
6%
0%
15%
32%
17%
32%
36%
19%
12%
9%
49%
16%
22%
68%
16%
10%
27%
43%
7%
9%
45%
7%
18%
0%
0%
35%
5%
72%
0%
6%
0%
0%
0%
19%
0%
4%
0%

0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
24%
0%
0%
20%
16%
44%
0%
8%
10%
0%
27%
21%
34%
0%
21%
9%
10%
8%
17%
11%
9%
19%
6%
10%
7%
15%
6%
0%
0%
7%
27%
13%
0%

35%
22%
0%
16%
21%
0%
0%
0%
14%
35%
18%
17%
24%
46%
0%
19%
36%
0%
30%
55%
51%
0%
72%
53%
78%
69%
26%
80%
9%
84%
56%
81%
100%
100%
74%
60%
83%
92%

0%
0%

0%
8%

4%
0%

0%
7%

96%
84%

0%
0%

0%
29%

13%
11%

0%
51%

87%
8%

0%
0%
0%
0%
0%

10%
0%
9%
9%
0%

9%
17%
12%
22%
0%

6%
19%
6%
23%
0%

74%
64%
73%
46%
100%

0%
0%

0%
0%

22%
15%

6%
6%

72%
80%

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

49
50

65%
58%
43%
43%
43%
42%
38%
38%
33%

23%
22%
19%
23%
17%
26%
31%
29%
30%

6%
8%
11%
15%
7%
20%
20%
13%
21%

3%
6%
9%
13%
10%
6%
9%
12%
10%

3%
6%
17%
6%
24%
6%
3%
7%
6%

33%
32%
27%
25%
23%
21%

35%
25%
23%
30%
23%
30%

17%
19%
12%
19%
16%
20%

11%
16%
16%
12%
25%
15%

4%
8%
21%
13%
14%
14%

19%
19%
16%
15%
14%
14%

11%
18%
23%
13%
26%
17%

22%
25%
23%
18%
16%
19%

24%
20%
21%
18%
20%
23%

24%
19%
17%
36%
23%
26%

13%
12%
11%
11%
10%
9%
9%
9%
8%
8%
8%
7%
7%
6%
5%
5%
5%
4%
4%
4%
3%
3%
3%
3%
3%
3%
3%

17%
26%
22%
19%
7%
11%
18%
8%
11%
14%
13%
8%
2%
10%
6%
13%
6%
4%
5%
5%
2%
4%
4%
5%
5%
7%
4%

19%
20%
27%
25%
7%
23%
17%
12%
12%
16%
11%
12%
3%
16%
13%
17%
8%
5%
10%
11%
3%
7%
2%
8%
7%
9%
9%

19%
19%
20%
25%
11%
23%
15%
19%
17%
22%
15%
17%
4%
21%
27%
27%
13%
17%
21%
14%
6%
8%
7%
13%
14%
18%
20%

32%
23%
21%
20%
66%
34%
41%
52%
52%
39%
53%
56%
83%
48%
49%
39%
68%
70%
59%
65%
87%
79%
84%
71%
72%
63%
63%

2%
2%

3%
3%

5%
5%

9%
10%

81%
79%

Research

22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48

Unacceptable

16
17
18
19
20
21

Tolerable

10
11
12
13
14
15

Kosovo can not leave Serbia

Kosovo Serbs can always keep their Serb citizenship
Final status should not include Amnesty for war crimes
Solution that respects the present boarders of Serbia Montenegro in international law
Albanians should pay all the financial costs of separating from Serbia
Solution inside present boarders of Kosovo and Serbia
Meet Standards before agreeing final status
Reserved positions for Serb minority in all Kosovo institutions
International economic regeneration programme for Serbia and Kosovo as part of final
status agreement
All of former Yugoslavia should cooperate and work to help each other join the EU
Not full independence
No partition
More investment to solve the problem of final status quicker
Security enclaves for Serb minority as a temporary measure
Kosovo and Serbia membership of EU and NATO as soon as possible to increase
stability and help negotiations
No return to the way things were before the war - 1999
Serbia should accept all the political difficulties that would come with keeping Kosovo
Decentralisation by ethnic region
No unification with neighbours
NATO should stay as long as is needed
Proportional representation for Albanian politicians in the Serbian Parliament if they
keep Kosovo
Partition into Serb and Albanian regions
All Balkan states should join NATO
Standards can be met at the same time as final status
Less than independence but more than autonomy
Independence only when agreed conditions are met
Decentralisation but not by ethnic regions
Dual citizenship offered to all citizens in the region
Kosovo should be allowed to have their own civil defence force
Delay final status for at least ten years
Cantons for minorities in both Kosovo and Serbia
National anthem to be agreed by Serbs and Albanians
National flag to be agreed by Serbs and Albanians
Forgive Kosovo debts held by Serbia Montenegro if Kosovo does not stay in Serbia
Judicial independence within existing boarders with Serbia
Not full integration in Serbia
Economic independence within existing boarders with Serbia
Serbia should pay all the financial costs of keeping Kosovo
Kosovo should be a member of the UN
Kosovo as an EU Region in Serbia Montenegro/Balkan Confederation
Amnesty as part of final status agreement for war crimes
Full independence
Immediate full independence of Kosovo based on 1991 Kosovo referendum
Kosovo should be allowed to have its own army
Independence after a fixed period of adjustment
Kosovo should be allowed to make its own foreign policy
A practically independent Kosovo but still part of Serbia Montenegro
A Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo Federation should have Serb, Montenegro and Kosovo
Presidents in turn
Albanian should be an official language in the Serbian Government
A practically independent Kosovo without the words independent or sovereign

Acceptable

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Desirable

Question 9 - With regards to guiding principles for the final status of Kosovo please
indicate which of the following options you consider to be Essential, Desirable,
Acceptable, Tolerable or Unacceptable.

Essential

Table 9.4. Question 9 Serbia Serb

303

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

304

Unacceptable

Research

15
16

Tolerable

12
13
14

Kosovo can not leave Serbia

Kosovo Serbs can always keep their Serb citizenship
Solution inside present boarders of Kosovo and Serbia
Not full independence
Solution that respects the present boarders of Serbia Montenegro in international law
Albanians should pay all the financial costs of separating from Serbia
No partition
Meet Standards before agreeing final status
NATO should stay as long as is needed
All of former Yugoslavia should cooperate and work to help each other join the EU
Kosovo and Serbia membership of EU and NATO as soon as possible to increase
stability and help negotiations
Reserved positions for Serb minority in all Kosovo institutions
Standards can be met at the same time as final status
Proportional representation for Albanian politicians in the Serbian Parliament if they
keep Kosovo
No return to the way things were before the war - 1999
International economic regeneration programme for Serbia and Kosovo as part of final
status agreement
More investment to solve the problem of final status quicker
Final status should not include Amnesty for war crimes
Security enclaves for Serb minority as a temporary measure
Decentralisation by ethnic region
No unification with neighbours
Kosovo should be allowed to have their own civil defence force
Kosovo should be allowed to make its own foreign policy
Economic independence within existing boarders with Serbia
All Balkan states should join NATO
Partition into Serb and Albanian regions
Immediate full independence of Kosovo based on 1991 Kosovo referendum
Judicial independence within existing boarders with Serbia
Kosovo should be a member of the UN
Serbia should accept all the political difficulties that would come with keeping Kosovo
Kosovo should be allowed to have its own army
A practically independent Kosovo without the words independent or sovereign
A practically independent Kosovo but still part of Serbia Montenegro
Full independence
Independence only when agreed conditions are met
Independence after a fixed period of adjustment
National anthem to be agreed by Serbs and Albanians
Dual citizenship offered to all citizens in the region
Less than independence but more than autonomy
A Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo Federation should have Serb, Montenegro and Kosovo
Presidents in turn
Amnesty as part of final status agreement for war crimes
Delay final status for at least ten years
Cantons for minorities in both Kosovo and Serbia
Kosovo as an EU Region in Serbia Montenegro/Balkan Confederation
Forgive Kosovo debts held by Serbia Montenegro if Kosovo does not stay in Serbia
Decentralisation but not by ethnic regions
National flag to be agreed by Serbs and Albanians
Serbia should pay all the financial costs of keeping Kosovo
Not full integration in Serbia
Albanian should be an official language in the Serbian Government

Acceptable

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

Desirable

Question 9 - With regards to guiding principles for the final status of Kosovo please
indicate which of the following options you consider to be Essential, Desirable,
Acceptable, Tolerable or Unacceptable.

Essential

Table 9.5. Question 9 Serbia Serb IDPs

73%
59%
43%
39%
38%
36%
33%
32%
28%
25%
24%

13%
11%
28%
12%
10%
14%
23%
24%
33%
44%
20%

7%
11%
17%
10%
28%
14%
12%
17%
8%
17%
16%

2%
3%
9%
13%
5%
9%
11%
10%
10%
11%
25%

5%
16%
3%
27%
19%
27%
21%
18%
21%
3%
15%

24%
23%
23%

24%
6%
9%

18%
9%
17%

4%
12%
23%

31%
50%
28%

22%
21%

10%
17%

11%
19%

14%
11%

43%
33%

21%
20%
19%
19%
18%
17%
17%
16%
16%
16%
14%
14%
13%
13%
11%
11%
11%
10%
10%
10%
10%
9%
9%
9%

14%
21%
24%
28%
18%
10%
4%
5%
28%
12%
3%
9%
5%
19%
4%
5%
1%
5%
13%
8%
9%
11%
22%
6%

42%
16%
15%
15%
31%
10%
5%
17%
26%
23%
7%
15%
6%
22%
5%
14%
16%
2%
12%
11%
16%
11%
11%
17%

5%
8%
7%
6%
15%
5%
8%
16%
19%
12%
4%
8%
10%
14%
5%
4%
11%
1%
5%
5%
9%
8%
18%
11%

17%
35%
36%
32%
19%
59%
67%
47%
11%
38%
71%
54%
66%
32%
76%
66%
61%
81%
61%
66%
56%
61%
41%
57%

7%
6%
6%
5%
5%
4%
4%
4%
3%
3%

14%
16%
24%
6%
3%
21%
2%
14%
13%
1%

11%
7%
12%
19%
14%
11%
9%
12%
13%
7%

8%
14%
11%
11%
6%
8%
7%
11%
4%
13%

60%
57%
47%
59%
72%
56%
78%
60%
67%
76%

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

48
49
50

48%
41%
35%

28%
17%
29%

14%
10%
18%

7%
12%
7%

2%
19%
11%

35%
35%
35%
29%
29%

50%
21%
38%
16%
38%

9%
19%
17%
23%
23%

2%
3%
6%
16%
1%

4%
21%
4%
17%
9%

28%
28%
28%
27%
25%
24%
22%
21%
21%
20%
20%
18%
18%
17%

31%
24%
29%
27%
16%
29%
23%
28%
37%
25%
26%
22%
26%
19%

8%
31%
20%
25%
23%
21%
19%
25%
19%
22%
18%
25%
37%
30%

19%
10%
12%
7%
10%
7%
15%
16%
10%
10%
14%
8%
6%
14%

14%
8%
11%
15%
26%
20%
22%
10%
14%
23%
22%
27%
13%
19%

17%
16%
15%
14%
13%
12%
11%
11%
11%
8%
8%
8%
7%
7%
7%
6%
6%
6%
6%
6%
5%
5%
5%
5%
5%

30%
29%
28%
18%
17%
12%
17%
15%
18%
19%
11%
15%
9%
13%
7%
15%
15%
7%
10%
3%
11%
7%
20%
6%
11%

24%
30%
32%
15%
12%
15%
15%
29%
23%
27%
17%
25%
12%
20%
11%
22%
18%
8%
15%
25%
19%
19%
23%
17%
19%

13%
10%
7%
24%
15%
17%
14%
13%
13%
16%
21%
15%
14%
11%
12%
24%
11%
13%
27%
14%
19%
21%
16%
27%
16%

16%
15%
19%
29%
43%
44%
43%
31%
35%
31%
43%
37%
58%
49%
63%
34%
50%
66%
42%
52%
46%
48%
35%
45%
49%

3%
3%
2%

13%
5%
11%

20%
11%
15%

31%
21%
9%

34%
60%
64%

Research

23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47

Unacceptable

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

Tolerable

4
5
6
7
8

Kosovo Serbs can always keep their Serb citizenship

Kosovo can not leave Serbia
Kosovo and Serbia membership of EU and NATO as soon as possible to increase
stability and help negotiations
Meet Standards before agreeing final status
Final status should not include Amnesty for war crimes
All of former Yugoslavia should cooperate and work to help each other join the EU
No return to the way things were before the war - 1999
International economic regeneration programme for Serbia and Kosovo as part of final
status agreement
No partition
Solution inside present boarders of Kosovo and Serbia
Solution that respects the present boarders of Serbia Montenegro in international law
Serbia should accept all the political difficulties that would come with keeping Kosovo
Albanians should pay all the financial costs of separating from Serbia
NATO should stay as long as is needed
Dual citizenship offered to all citizens in the region
Not full independence
Reserved positions for Serb minority in all Kosovo institutions
Less than independence but more than autonomy
National flag to be agreed by Serbs and Albanians
Standards can be met at the same time as final status
More investment to solve the problem of final status quicker
Proportional representation for Albanian politicians in the Serbian Parliament if they
keep Kosovo
All Balkan states should join NATO
Security enclaves for Serb minority as a temporary measure
Decentralisation by ethnic region
National anthem to be agreed by Serbs and Albanians
Kosovo should be a member of the UN
No unification with neighbours
Not full integration in Serbia
Economic independence within existing boarders with Serbia
Kosovo should be allowed to have their own civil defence force
Kosovo as an EU Region in Serbia Montenegro/Balkan Confederation
Kosovo should be allowed to make its own foreign policy
Judicial independence within existing boarders with Serbia
Full independence
Immediate full independence of Kosovo based on 1991 Kosovo referendum
Forgive Kosovo debts held by Serbia Montenegro if Kosovo does not stay in Serbia
Decentralisation but not by ethnic regions
Kosovo should be allowed to have its own army
Albanian should be an official language in the Serbian Government
A practically independent Kosovo but still part of Serbia Montenegro
Serbia should pay all the financial costs of keeping Kosovo
Independence only when agreed conditions are met
Independence after a fixed period of adjustment
Cantons for minorities in both Kosovo and Serbia
A practically independent Kosovo without the words independent or sovereign
A Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo Federation should have Serb, Montenegro and Kosovo
Presidents in turn
Partition into Serb and Albanian regions
Delay final status for at least ten years
Amnesty as part of final status agreement for war crimes

Acceptable

1
2
3

Desirable

Question 9 - With regards to guiding principles for the final status of Kosovo please
indicate which of the following options you consider to be Essential, Desirable,
Acceptable, Tolerable or Unacceptable.

Essential

Table 9.6. Question 9 Serbia Others

305

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

10. A constitutional package for the final status of Kosovo

Question
With regards to a constitutional package for the final status of Kosovo please indicate
which of the following options you consider to be Essential, Desirable, Acceptable,
Tolerable or Unacceptable.

Research

Points of disagreement
In this question the options on offer were deliberately written and arranged across the
full political spectrum from union of all Serbian lands at one extreme to union of all Albanian lands at the other, with a wide selection of various options in between. Inevitably, as
all the answers to all the previous questions would indicate, the first preference for different
constitutional packages is very different for Kosovo Albanians and Serbs (see tables 10.1
to 10.6). Thirty six percent of Kosovo Albanians consider full independence and no choice
of citizenship for Serbs in Kosovo to be essential (table 10.a below). On the other hand
65% of Kosovo Serbs, 46% of Serbia Serbs, 64% of Serb IDPs and 35% of Serb others all
consider full integration of Kosovo into Serbia to be essential as their preferred constitutional option (highlighted in grey). Kosovo others prefer union with Albania at 19% essential. Perhaps quite a few of the Kosovo others have an Albanian background. There are
no real surprises in any of these results but this analysis does not help to solve any problems that will take us beyond what must essentially be seen as the opening negotiating
positions of the two communities.
Table 10.a. Points of disagreement
Question 10 - With regards to a constitutional package for
the final status of Kosovo please indicate which of the
following options you consider to be Essential,
Desirable, Acceptable, Tolerable or Unacceptable.
Per cent Essential
Union of all Serbian lands
Full integration of Kosovo into Serbia
A republic in Serbia Montenegro with control of all
aspects of government locally (1974 Constitution)
A republic in Serbia Montenegro with control of all
aspects of government locally and regional status in the
EU
A protectorate of the EU
An Economic Union of independent states of Kosovo,
Montenegro and Serbia
A state as part of the EU but North Kosovo joins Serbia
A state as part of the EU with choice of citizenship for
Serbs who will share their canton in the North of Kosovo
with Serbia under joint authority
A state as part of the EU with choice of citizenship for
Serbs who will have their own canton in Kosovo
A state as part of the EU with choice of citizenship for
Serbs
Full independence and no choice of citizenship for Serbs
in Kosovo
Union of Kosovo with Albania
Union of all Albanian lands

306

Kosovo
Albanian

Kosovo
Serb

Kosovo
Other

Serbia
Serb

Serbia
Serb
IDPs

Serbia
Others

1%
0%

28%
65%

5%
8%

24%
46%

27%
64%

16%
35%

0%

6%

2%

9%

12%

10%

0%

3%

0%

7%

8%

8%

3%

9%

0%

3%

3%

2%

4%

1%

6%

3%

9%

3%

0%

6%

6%

4%

6%

4%

0%

9%

0%

4%

3%

4%

1%

12%

6%

3%

2%

5%

4%

5%

0%

3%

2%

8%

36%

0%

14%

2%

0%

0%

17%
30%

0%
0%

19%
21%

1%
1%

0%
0%

1%
1%

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

Points of agreement
If we now turn our attention to the levels of unacceptable the position radically changes to identify points of possible compromise (table 10.b below). The lowest levels of unacceptable for both Kosovo Albanians and Serbs together are for a protectorate of the EU at
only 20% unacceptable for Kosovo Albanians, 58% for Kosovo Serbs, 60% for Serbia
Serbs and 58% for Serb IDPs (highlighted in grey). The joint popularity of this option is
followed by two others: a state as part of the EU with choice of citizenship for Serbs who
will have their own canton in Kosovo at 63% unacceptable for Kosovo Albanians 48% for
Kosovo Serbs, 65% for Serbia Serbs and 62% for Serb IDPs; and a state as part of the EU
with choice of citizenship for Serbs at 52% unacceptable for Kosovo Albanians, 64% for
Kosovo Serbs, 67% for Serbia Serbs and 65% for Serb IDPs (also highlighted in grey).
Other contenders might include an Economic Union of independent states of Kosovo,
Montenegro and Serbia but 88% of Kosovo Serbs find this option unacceptable and a state
as part of the EU but North Kosovo joins Serbia is unacceptable to 96% of Kosovo Albanians. Perhaps Kosovo Serbs are split on this particular idea between those who live in the
North of Kosovo and those who do not as 57% of them find this proposal unacceptable
while only 48% consider the prospect of their own canton unacceptable.

Question 10 - With regards to a constitutional package for

the final status of Kosovo please indicate which of the
following options you consider to be Essential,
Desirable, Acceptable, Tolerable or Unacceptable.
Per cent Unacceptable
Union of all Serbian lands
Full integration of Kosovo into Serbia
A republic in Serbia Montenegro with control of all
aspects of government locally (1974 Constitution)
A republic in Serbia Montenegro with control of all
aspects of government locally and regional status in the
EU
A protectorate of the EU
An Economic Union of independent states of Kosovo,
Montenegro and Serbia
A state as part of the EU but North Kosovo joins Serbia
A state as part of the EU with choice of citizenship for
Serbs who will share their canton in the North of Kosovo
with Serbia under joint authority
A state as part of the EU with choice of citizenship for
Serbs who will have their own canton in Kosovo
A state as part of the EU with choice of citizenship for
Serbs
Full independence and no choice of citizenship for Serbs
in Kosovo
Union of Kosovo with Albania
Union of all Albanian lands

Kosovo
Albanian

Kosovo
Serb

Kosovo
Other

Serbia
Serb

Serbia
Serb
IDPs

Serbia
Others

96%
98%

13%
3%

79%
77%

13%
4%

13%
1%

34%
16%

96%

66%

94%

40%

35%

29%

92%

63%

91%

43%

46%

31%

20%

58%

57%

60%

58%

39%

34%

88%

54%

68%

66%

42%

96%

57%

89%

55%

60%

41%

87%

59%

100%

62%

61%

45%

63%

48%

70%

65%

62%

44%

52%

64%

81%

67%

65%

45%

13%

94%

44%

93%

88%

81%

10%
8%

98%
98%

42%
33%

96%
95%

97%
97%

88%
91%

Research

Table 10.b. Points of agreement

But the big worry for both the people of Kosovo, Serbia and the international community is will any of these various constitutional arrangements bring about an exodus of
Kosovo Albanians or Kosovo Serbs from Kosovo. Additionally is there any chance at all
that a significant number of Serb IDPs might return to Kosovo under the right conditions.
These possibilities were tested in question 11.

307

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

Acceptable

Tolerable

Unacceptable

Union of all Serbian lands

Full integration of Kosovo into Serbia
A republic in Serbia Montenegro with control of all aspects of government locally (1974
Constitution)
A republic in Serbia Montenegro with control of all aspects of government locally and
regional status in the EU
A protectorate of the EU
An Economic Union of independent states of Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia
A state as part of the EU but North Kosovo joins Serbia
A state as part of the EU with choice of citizenship for Serbs who will share their canton in
the North of Kosovo with Serbia under joint authority
A state as part of the EU with choice of citizenship for Serbs who will have their own
canton in Kosovo
A state as part of the EU with choice of citizenship for Serbs
Full independence and no choice of citizenship for Serbs in Kosovo
Union of Kosovo with Albania
Union of all Albanian lands

Desirable

Question 10 - With regards to a constitutional package for the final status of Kosovo please
indicate which of the following options you consider to be Essential, Desirable,
Acceptable, Tolerable or Unacceptable.

Essential

Table 10.1. Question 10 Kosovo Albanian

1%
0%
0%

1%
0%
0%

1%
0%
1%

2%
1%
3%

96%
98%
96%

0%

0%

2%

6%

92%

3%
4%
0%
0%

8%
14%
0%
0%

41%
27%
1%
4%

28%
21%
3%
8%

20%
34%
96%
87%

1%

3%

21%

13%

63%

4%
36%
17%
30%

13%
22%
29%
27%

15%
20%
28%
22%

16%
9%
15%
13%

52%
13%
10%
8%

308

Acceptable

Tolerable

Unacceptable

Union of all Serbian lands

Full integration of Kosovo into Serbia
A republic in Serbia Montenegro with control of all aspects of government locally (1974
Constitution)
A republic in Serbia Montenegro with control of all aspects of government locally and
regional status in the EU
A protectorate of the EU
An Economic Union of independent states of Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia
A state as part of the EU but North Kosovo joins Serbia
A state as part of the EU with choice of citizenship for Serbs who will share their canton in
the North of Kosovo with Serbia under joint authority
A state as part of the EU with choice of citizenship for Serbs who will have their own
canton in Kosovo
A state as part of the EU with choice of citizenship for Serbs
Full independence and no choice of citizenship for Serbs in Kosovo
Union of Kosovo with Albania
Union of all Albanian lands

Desirable

Question 10 - With regards to a constitutional package for the final status of Kosovo please
indicate which of the following options you consider to be Essential, Desirable,
Acceptable, Tolerable or Unacceptable.

Essential

Research

Table 10.2. Question 10 Kosovo Serb

28%
65%
6%

26%
21%
6%

12%
7%
10%

21%
4%
12%

13%
3%
66%

3%

7%

10%

16%

63%

9%
1%
6%
9%

6%
4%
11%
9%

12%
4%
6%
9%

15%
3%
20%
14%

58%
88%
57%
59%

12%

13%

14%

13%

48%

5%
0%
0%
0%

11%
1%
1%
1%

13%
2%
0%
1%

8%
3%
1%
1%

64%
94%
98%
98%

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

Acceptable

Tolerable

Unacceptable

Union of all Serbian lands

Full integration of Kosovo into Serbia
A republic in Serbia Montenegro with control of all aspects of government locally (1974
Constitution)
A republic in Serbia Montenegro with control of all aspects of government locally and
regional status in the EU
A protectorate of the EU
An Economic Union of independent states of Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia
A state as part of the EU but North Kosovo joins Serbia
A state as part of the EU with choice of citizenship for Serbs who will share their canton in
the North of Kosovo with Serbia under joint authority
A state as part of the EU with choice of citizenship for Serbs who will have their own
canton in Kosovo
A state as part of the EU with choice of citizenship for Serbs
Full independence and no choice of citizenship for Serbs in Kosovo
Union of Kosovo with Albania
Union of all Albanian lands

Desirable

Question 10 - With regards to a constitutional package for the final status of Kosovo
please indicate which of the following options you consider to be Essential, Desirable,
Acceptable, Tolerable or Unacceptable.

Essential

Table 10.3. Question 10 Kosovo Others

5%
8%
2%

10%
15%
0%

6%
0%
3%

0%
0%
0%

79%
77%
94%

0%

0%

3%

5%

91%

0%
6%
6%
0%

0%
3%
0%
0%

28%
14%
5%
0%

15%
22%
0%
0%

57%
54%
89%
100%

6%

5%

19%

0%

70%

0%
14%
19%
21%

10%
13%
10%
20%

4%
4%
18%
11%

4%
24%
11%
16%

81%
44%
42%
33%

Tolerable

Unacceptable

24%
46%
9%

33%
31%
18%

20%
14%
18%

10%
5%
15%

13%
4%
40%

7%

12%

18%

19%

43%

3%
3%
4%
4%

5%
4%
6%
5%

13%
10%
14%
12%

21%
16%
20%
18%

60%
68%
55%
62%

3%

5%

11%

16%

65%

3%
2%
1%
1%

6%
1%
1%
1%

8%
1%
1%
1%

15%
2%
1%
2%

67%
93%
96%
95%

Research

Acceptable

Union of all Serbian lands

Full integration of Kosovo into Serbia
A republic in Serbia Montenegro with control of all aspects of government locally (1974
Constitution)
A republic in Serbia Montenegro with control of all aspects of government locally and
regional status in the EU
A protectorate of the EU
An Economic Union of independent states of Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia
A state as part of the EU but North Kosovo joins Serbia
A state as part of the EU with choice of citizenship for Serbs who will share their canton in
the North of Kosovo with Serbia under joint authority
A state as part of the EU with choice of citizenship for Serbs who will have their own
canton in Kosovo
A state as part of the EU with choice of citizenship for Serbs
Full independence and no choice of citizenship for Serbs in Kosovo
Union of Kosovo with Albania
Union of all Albanian lands

Desirable

Question 10 - With regards to a constitutional package for the final status of Kosovo please
indicate which of the following options you consider to be Essential, Desirable,
Acceptable, Tolerable or Unacceptable.

Essential

Table 10.4. Question 10 Serbia Serb

309

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

Acceptable

Tolerable

Unacceptable

Union of all Serbian lands

Full integration of Kosovo into Serbia
A republic in Serbia Montenegro with control of all aspects of government locally (1974
Constitution)
A republic in Serbia Montenegro with control of all aspects of government locally and
regional status in the EU
A protectorate of the EU
An Economic Union of independent states of Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia
A state as part of the EU but North Kosovo joins Serbia
A state as part of the EU with choice of citizenship for Serbs who will share their canton in
the North of Kosovo with Serbia under joint authority
A state as part of the EU with choice of citizenship for Serbs who will have their own
canton in Kosovo
A state as part of the EU with choice of citizenship for Serbs
Full independence and no choice of citizenship for Serbs in Kosovo
Union of Kosovo with Albania
Union of all Albanian lands

Desirable

Question 10 - With regards to a constitutional package for the final status of Kosovo please
indicate which of the following options you consider to be Essential, Desirable,
Acceptable, Tolerable or Unacceptable.

Essential

Table 10.5. Question 10 Serbia Serb IDPs

27%
64%
12%

26%
20%
17%

26%
13%
18%

7%
1%
18%

13%
1%
35%

8%

11%

18%

16%

46%

3%
9%
6%
3%

11%
5%
4%
5%

15%
14%
13%
14%

13%
6%
16%
17%

58%
66%
60%
61%

2%

9%

10%

17%

62%

2%
0%
0%
0%

10%
4%
0%
0%

7%
6%
0%
1%

16%
3%
3%
1%

65%
88%
97%
97%

310

Acceptable

Tolerable

Unacceptable

Union of all Serbian lands

Full integration of Kosovo into Serbia
A republic in Serbia Montenegro with control of all aspects of government locally (1974
Constitution)
A republic in Serbia Montenegro with control of all aspects of government locally and
regional status in the EU
A protectorate of the EU
An Economic Union of independent states of Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia
A state as part of the EU but North Kosovo joins Serbia
A state as part of the EU with choice of citizenship for Serbs who will share their canton in
the North of Kosovo with Serbia under joint authority
A state as part of the EU with choice of citizenship for Serbs who will have their own
canton in Kosovo
A state as part of the EU with choice of citizenship for Serbs
Full independence and no choice of citizenship for Serbs in Kosovo
Union of Kosovo with Albania
Union of all Albanian lands

Desirable

Question 10 - With regards to a constitutional package for the final status of Kosovo please
indicate which of the following options you consider to be Essential, Desirable,
Acceptable, Tolerable or Unacceptable.

Essential

Research

Table 10.6. Question 10 Serbia Others

16%
35%
10%

18%
25%
15%

14%
13%
25%

17%
11%
21%

34%
16%
29%

8%

13%

25%

24%

31%

2%
3%
4%
4%

12%
12%
7%
9%

23%
20%
26%
22%

23%
23%
22%
20%

39%
42%
41%
45%

5%

14%

14%

23%

44%

8%
0%
1%
1%

14%
3%
1%
1%

15%
2%
3%
2%

18%
13%
7%
5%

45%
81%
88%
91%

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

11 Displaced persons
Question 11.a
For persons living in Kosovo - And for each of these options would you stay in Kosovo
YES or NO
For Serb IDPs in Serbia And for each of these options would you return to Kosovo
YES or NO
Conditions for staying/returning to Kosovo
Again the most popular constitutional option for both Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo
Serbs and Serb IDPs together seems to be a protectorate of the EU with 83% of Kosovo
Albanians willing to stay, 45% of Kosovo Serbs willing to stay and 27% of Serb IDPs willing to return. The other options of a state as part of the EU, a choice of citizenship for Serbs
with, perhaps, their own canton, also fair quite well. But clearly Kosovo Albanians and
Serbs and the international community would like a better result than this. How can this be
achieved?

Question 11a percent Yes

For each of these options would you stay/return in Kosovo?
Union of all Serbian lands
Full integration of Kosovo into Serbia
A republic in Serbia Montenegro with control of all aspects of
government locally (1974 Constitution)
A republic in Serbia Montenegro with control of all aspects of
government locally and regional status in the EU
A protectorate of the EU
An Economic Union of independent states of Kosovo, Montenegro and
Serbia
A state as part of the EU but North Kosovo joins Serbia
A state as part of the EU with choice of citizenship for Serbs who will
share their canton in the North of Kosovo with Serbia under joint
authority
A state as part of the EU with choice of citizenship for Serbs who will
have their own canton in Kosovo
A state as part of the EU with choice of citizenship for Serbs
Full independence and no choice of citizenship for Serbs in Kosovo
Union of Kosovo with Albania
Union of all Albanian lands

Kosovo
Albanian
9%
8%

Kosovo
Serb
91%
97%

Kosovo
Other
37%
37%

Serbia
Serb IDPs
69%
86%

9%

36%

26%

14%

39%

25%

38%

83%

45%

59%

27%

74%

13%

66%

25%

16%

42%

32%

27%

24%

42%

17%

25%

46%

48%

44%

23%

57%
88%
92%
94%

33%
6%
3%
3%

39%
68%
75%
75%

20%
5%
0%
0%

Research

Table 11.a. Conditions for staying/returning to Kosovo

49%

Question 11.b
And finally: It does not matter so much about the constitution, I would (stay in) or (return to) Kosovo providing I felt completely safe there, could choose my citizenship and was
free to work and practice my culture, language and religion without any fear of discrimination. YES or NO

311

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

In search of the best possible solution

In the final question asked in this poll persons living in Kosovo and those who might
return there were asked a very idealistic question which did not focus on the constitutional
arrangements as such but on security and equality as best understood in terms of human
rights. In this context 83% of Kosovo Albanians said they would stay along with 71% of
Kosovo Serbs and 61% of Serb IDPs would return (see table 11.b below).
Table 11.b. Ideal conditions to stay in/return to Kosovo
Question 11.b percent Yes

It does not matter so much about the constitution, I would (stay in) or (return
to) Kosovo providing I felt completely safe there, could choose my citizenship
and was free to work and practice my culture, language and religion without
any fear of discrimination.

Kosovo
Albanian

83%

Kosovo
Serb

71%

Kosovo
Other

100.0%

Serbia
Serb
IDPs
61%

Research

Conclusion

312

As all the questions on relations between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs would indicate,
along with all the questions on matters of security, this ideal solution is at best an aspiration
that could be strived for. It is a dream that would take at least a lifetime to achieve if ever.
But what can be achieved is real progress towards this ideal in terms of social and political
reform in combination with suitable constitutional arrangements that will go as far as such
arrangements can to ensure security for all. By bringing together the most workable elements of all the questions reviewed in the second half of this report this can be done and
this must be the objective of the negotiations ahead. Implementation, however, will take
time. Fortunately both Kosovo Albanians and Serbs welcome the involvement of the international community, particularly the EU, whose influence in the region is clearly on the
rise.

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

Appendix
Methodology
Duration

From August 26th to September 2nd 2005

Territory

Serbia and Kosovo

Data collection
method

Face to face at respondents home

Questionnaire

Prepared by Client, adapted, translated and printed by SMMRI

Sample type and sample selection procedure

Serbia: 2002 Census figures and estimated population dynamics
Sampling Universe Kosovo: Estimation based on popullation figures estimated by WB, UNMIK,
and SMMRI

Stages

Stratification

Sample size
Sampling error

Interviewers

Control

Stratified three stage random representative

1: Polling station territory chosen with probability proportional to size (PPS)
2: Random route technique starting from the given addresses with equal
probabilities (SRSWoR)
3. Household member with equal probabilities (SRSWoR) Kish scheme
First level in Serbia: Belgrade, Vojvodina, Central Serbia, and IDPs from
Kosovo (disproportional allocation).
First level in Kosovo: North, South, East, West, Serbian enclaves
(disproportional allocation)
Second level: urban and rural settlements
Serbia: 1200 (general population n=1000, IDPs Serbs from Kosovo n=200)
Kosovo: 1200 (general population n=1000, Serbs n=200)
Margin error for 95% confidence (response level 50%): +/- 2.8%;
Response level 5%: n=1200 +/- 1.2%

Research

Type of sample

Fieldwork realization
SMMRI trained interviewers network on the average 100 to 150
interviewers are engaged per (10 interviews per interviewer) in Serbia and 100
local interviewers in Kosovo
Fieldwork control is implemented on at least 12% of totally interviewed in all
strata proportionally to sample size.
According to project design, the following aspects of interviewers' work are
verified:
fact that the interview has actually taken place;
proper application of the sampling plan in selecting the respondents;
approximate duration of the interview;
proper administration of the various sections of the questionnaire, and
Interviewers' general adherence to professional standards.
Following data collection, 100% logic and consistency control are performed.

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Questionnaire
Demographics
Methodology
Kosovo Kosova
Questionnaire
Version A and Version B Split Blocks
1 A and B All of - Range of Problems 31
2 A and B Half and half - Problems of Final status 42
3 A and B - Half and half - Problems of Relations 48
4 A and B - Half and half - Problems of Security 29
5 A and B - All of - The Future 11
6 A and B - Half and half - Solutions for Relations 33

Research

7 A and B - Half and half - Solutions for Security 32

8 A and B - Half and half - Solutions for Negotiations 41
9 A and B - Half and half - Solutions for Principles 50
10 A and B - All of - Constitutional Package 13
11 A and B - All of - Displaced Persons 14

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Kosovo - Kosova
Good morning/afternoon/evening my name is _____ from _____ and we are conducting a survey of publicopinion to find out what the people of Kosovo and Serbia believe
needs to be done to bring lasting peaceand stability to the region.
The research is being carried out by the Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in
South East Europefrom Thessaloniki in Greece, KosovoLive in Pristina and BETA in Belgrade with advice from Dr. ColinIrwin from the Queens University Belfast, Northern Ireland. He collected questions from Serbs andAlbanians in Kosovo and Serbia, and now we
would like to find out what other people in Serbia andKosovo think about these topics.
The results will be made available for public access on the internet, in the local newspapers and in reportsthat will be given to all the political parties in Kosovo and Serbia as
well as all the major internationalorganisations working in the region.

Topics to be covered include the problems faced by the people, their politicians and the
internationalcommunity in the region, what will happen if these problems are not properly
addressed, a range ofsolutions to deal with these problems and finally some questions that
tell us where you fit into our sample.
All your answers will be kept completely confidential.

Research

The survey involves interviewing one thousand two hundred people from both Kosovo
and Serbia tocomplete representative samples in terms of age, gender, social class, political
and ethnic affiliation andgeographical area.

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1. The range of problems (A AND B)

Firstly with regards to the range of problems that need to be dealt with please indicate
which ones you consider to be Very Significant, Significant, Of Some Significance,
Of Little Significance or Of No Significance at all.

Research

Very
Significant

316

1. The weak economy of Kosovo

2. Public and personal security in Kosovo
3. Kosovos final status
4. Organised crime in Kosovo
5. Missing persons
6. Return process of IDPs/refugees
7. Lack of prosecution of war crimes
8. The rights of victims
9. Ineffective criminal justice system
10. The role of the international community in
the affairs of Kosovo and Serbia
11. The actionas of the UN authority in Kosovo
(UNMIK)
12. The role of the Serbian government in the
affairs of Kosovo
13. The actions of the Kosovo government
14. Decentralisation of government in Kosovo
15. Police reform in Kosovo
16. Serb and Albanian relations
17. Serb Albanian language barrier
18. Reconciliation
19. Irresponsible politicians
20. Corruption in Kosovo
21. Unemployment in Kosovo
22. Kosovo education standards
23. The quality of Kosovo healthcare services
24. The quality of Kosovo transportation and
communications
25. Kosovo power supply
26. Kosovo privatisation
27. Biased media in Kosovo
28. Lack of cultural events in Kosovo
29. Poor sports facilities in Kosovo
30. Kosovo day care facilities
31. Environment issues in Kosovo

Significant

Of Some
Of Little
Of No
Significance Significance Significance

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

2. Kosovos final status (A)

Now with regards to Kosovos Status please indicate which aspects of this problem you
consider to be Very Significant, Significant, Of Some Significance, Of Little Significance, Of No Significance at all or Not Even True
Of Some
Of Little
Of No
Very
Significant
Significance Significance Significance
Significant

A
A
A

A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A

Research

1. If things stay the same in Kosovo it

will become unstable
2. The economy in Kosovo will not
develop until final status is agreed
3. The financial costs of keeping
Kosovo in Serbia will be a continual
drain on the Serbian economy
4. Keeping Kosovo in Serbia will
lead to a new war
5. Kosovo independence will lead to
an exodus of Serbs
6. An independent Kosovo will lead
to a new war
7. Pristina has more say in the eyes of
the international community
8. Lack of political role of Kosovo
Serbs in negotiations
9. Kosovo government is not doing
enough to work with Kosovo Serbs
10. Belgrade are using Kosovo Serbs
to make political points
11. Belgrade holds Kosovos status
hostage
12. Lack of engagement by the
international community
13. Russia insists Kosovo stays part of
Serbia
14. The international community use
different standards in their dealings with
Serbs and Albanians
15. Too many people have an interest
in the failure of negotiations
16. Only Belgrade can settle the
Kosovo issue
17. If Belgrade does not sign all
agreements are provisional
18. Kosovo Serbs will ask for an
independent state separate from an
independent Kosovo
19. An independent Kosovo will be
unsafe for Serbs
20. Belgrade is not doing enough to
secure Serb property in Kosovo
21. UNMIK is not doing enough to
work with Belgrade to help Kosovo
Serbs

Not Even
True

A
A

A
A
A
A

A
A
A

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KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

2. Kosovos final status (B)

Now with regards to Kosovos Status please indicate which aspects of this problem you
consider to be Very Significant, Significant, Of Some Significance, Of Little Significance, Of No Significance at all or Not Even True

Research

Very
Of Some
Of Little
Of No
Significant
Significant
Significance Significance Significance

318

22. Resolving Kosovos final status

will bring instability to the region
23. An independent Kosovo will lose
its trade links with Serbia
24. The political costs of keeping
Kosovo in Serbia will bring long term
problems to Serbian society
25. If final status of Kosovo is made
without agreement Kosovo Serbs will
not feel safe
26. Kosovo independence will result in
more violence
27. Negotiations will lead to an
unresolved conflict requiring continued
international presence
28. The Serbs in Kosovo hold its status
hostage
29. Serb parallel institutions in Kosovo
30. Kosovo government have not
offered sufficient guarantees to Kosovo
Serbs
31. Serbia is not doing enough to help
IDPs/refugees
32. Procedures for negotiations have
not been decided
33. International community distracted
by Iraq
34. The international community does
not speak with one voice
35. Poor quality of Serb and Albanian
politicians
36. Only the international community
can settle the Kosovo issue
37. No one in Serbia will sign a
document for an independent Kosovo
38. It is an illusion that Serbs can hold
Kosovo in their hands
39. An independent Kosovo will
become a mafia state
40. An independent Kosovo will be
less secure for everyone
41. Belgrade is not doing enough to
work with UNMK to help Kosovo Serbs
42. Serbia still pays the interest on
Kosovos debts

B
B
B

B
B

B
B
B

B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B

Not Even
True

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

3. Serb and Albanian relations (A)

Now with regards to Serbs and Albanians please indicate which aspects of this problem
you consider to be Very Significant, Significant, Of Some Significance, Of Little
Significance, Of No Significance at all or Not Even True
Very
Of Some
Of Little
Of No
Significant
Significant
Significance Significance Significance

A
A
A
A
A
A

A
A
A

A
A
A

Research

1. Lack of mutual trust separates

Serbs and Albanians
2. The legacy of so many killings
3. Whole ethnic groups are blamed
for the crimes of a few
4. Apologies without security will not
help
5. Serb desire to return to pre-war
status
6. Serbs unwilling to become full
participants in Kosovo society as it is
today
7. Serbs claim to be victims by not
having effective representation in
Kosovo institutions
8. Serbs take their instructions from
Belgrade
9. KLA officers in the police
10. K o s o v o
Albanians
are
blackmailing Kosovo Serbs to stop
contact with Belgrade
11. Serbs want a greater Serbia
12. Albanians feel inferior to Serbs
13. Albanians lack confidence to
negotiate
14. Albanian politicians unable to
agree amongst themselves
15. Serb politicians unable to agree
amongst themselves
16. M u t u a l
boycott
of
Pristina/Belgrade talks
17. Kosovo Albanian politicians use
international community as excuse for
their failures
18. Kosovo Serb politicians use
international community as excuse for
their failures
19. Failure to prosecute war criminals
20. Serb culture of violence and
dominance
21. Albanian culture of violence and
revenge
22. Serb provocations
23. Albanian provocations
24. Playing politics with bodies

Not Even
True

A
A
A
A

A
A
A
A
A
A

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KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

3. Serb and Albanian relations (B)

Now with regards to Serbs and Albanians please indicate which aspects of this problem
you consider to be Very Significant, Significant, Of Some Significance, Of Little
Significance, Of No Significance at all or Not Even True
Very
Of Some
Of Little
Of No
Significant
Significant
Significance Significance Significance

25. Discrimination against Albanians in

the 90s
26. Not knowing the fate of lost persons
27. Kosovo Albanians not prepared to
unequivocally condemn Albanian ethnic
violence
28. Serb resistance to accept the
withdrawal of Serb administration from
Kosovo
29. Serb refusal to deal with Albanians
on equal terms
30. Serbs do not even want to learn

B
B
B

B
B

Research

about and understand Albanians

320

31. Serbs exaggerate the security

problem
32. KLA officers in government
33. Kosovo Albanians are getting closer
to Tirana while expecting Kosovo Serbs
to stop talking to Belgrade
34. Albanians want a greater Albania
35. Highly arrogant attitude of Serb
Government
36. Serbs feel inferior to Albanians
37. Albanians lack of political
experience in developing and
implementing policies
38. Serb and Albanian politicians
unwilling to discuss issues in public
39. Kosovo Serbs and Albanians share
the same problems
40. Kosovo Albanian politicians not
prepared to make difficult decisions
41. Kosovo Serb politicians not
prepared to make difficult decisions
42. Influence of war criminals in
politics
43. Serb war criminals should be tried
in Kosovo
44. Albanian war criminals should be
tried in Serbia
45. All the people of the Balkans share
a culture of violence
46. Inflammatory language from
politicians
47. Inflammatory language from clerics
48. Inflammatory language from the
media

B
B
B

B
B
B
B

B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B

Not Even
True

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

4. Security (A)
Now with regards to the security please indicate which aspects of this problem you
consider to be Very Significant, Significant, Of Some Significance, Of Little Significance, Of No Significance at all or Not Even True
Very
Of Some
Of Little
Of No
Significant
Significant
Significance Significance Significance

A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A

Research

1. People do not have full freedom of

movement in Kosovo
2. No unconditional support from
Albanian political leadership to improve
security
3. Politicians and media projecting
other ethnic groups as security threats
4. Serbs take the law into their own
hands and block roads
5. Clandestine information structures
operating in Kosovo (both Albanian
Shik and Sia and Serbian)
6. Opposite visions for the future of the
Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC)
7. Organised political crime
8. Slow working of the justice system
9. Not enough minorities in
government posts
10. UNMIK do not provide effective
security
11. Corruption in UNMIK
12. Lack of coordination in KFOR
13. 4 Official/unofficial governments in
Kosovo: Kosovo, UNMIK, Serb and
Opposition/Shadow
14. Security forces are not accountable
to the people
15. War crimes prosecuted in Serbia do
not meet Albanian needs for justice

Not Even
True

A
A

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KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

4. Security (B)
Now with regards to the security please indicate which aspects of this problem you
consider to be Very Significant, Significant, Of Some Significance, Of Little Significance, Of No Significance at all or Not Even True

Research

Of Some
Of Little
Of No
Very
Significant
Significance Significance Significance
Significant

322

16. Serbs are afraid to talk Serbian in

Pristina
17. Albanians are afraid to talk Albanian
in North Mitrovica
18. Politicians and media using political
issues to stir up trouble and fear
19. Isolated Serbs are prisoners in their
own homes
20. Kosovo Serbs do not trust the
Kosovo Police Service (KPS)
21. Albanian fear from external military
threat
22. Weak justice system
23. Lack of trust in the justice system
24. No local police whose ethnic
composition reflects local population
25. UNMIK police and KPS do not do
enough to arrest criminals
26. KFOR are not trained for policing
duties
27. The International community use
local politicians as an excuse for their
failures
28. The Kosovo government do not have
powers to manage security
29. Lack of prosecution of war criminals
in the Hague and locally

B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B

Not Even
True

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

5. A future without agreement (A AND B)

And from the different possibilities listed below what do you think will happen if the
people of Kosovo, Serbia and the International Community fail to take the necessary steps
needed to deal with these problems. Please indicate which possibilities you consider to be
Very probable, Probable, Not sure about, Improbable or Very improbable.
Very
probable

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Probable

Not sure

Improbable

Very
improbable

Isolation of Kosovo and Serbia

Decrease in international assistance
Lack of investment
Increased emigration
Increased criminalisation
Escalation of ethnic tensions
Social unrest
Increased political instability
Increased regional instability
Increased international military presence
Renewed violent conflict

Most of the remainder of this questionnaire will present you with various options on
what could be done to improve the prospects for peace and stability in the region.

Research

Choosing your options for peace and stability in the region

For each option you will be asked to indicate which ones you consider to be Essential,
Desirable, Acceptable, Tolerable or Unacceptable.
For the purposes of this poll Essential, Desirable, Acceptable, Tolerable and Unacceptable mean:
Essential You believe this option is a necessary part of a secure, stable and better
future for the region and should be fully implemented.
Desirable This option is not what you would consider to be Essential, but you
think this option, or something very similar to it, is a good idea and should be put into
practice.
Acceptable This option is not what you would consider to be Desirable, if you
were given a choice, but you could certainly live with it.
Tolerable This option is not what you want. But, as part of a secure, stable and better future, you would be willing to put up with it.
Unacceptable This option is completely unacceptable under any circumstances. You
would not accept it, even as part of a secure, stable and better future for the region.
You may use each of the terms Essential, Desirable, Acceptable, Tolerable and
Unacceptable as many times as you wish in each question.
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6. Serbs and Albanians relations (A)

With regards to the Serbs and Albanians please indicate which of the following options
you consider to be Essential, Desirable, Acceptable, Tolerable or Unacceptable.

Research

Essential

324

1. Cooperation between the leaders of Islam,

the Orthodox and Catholic Church
2. Public apologies from Serbs for past
wrongs
3. Public apologies from Albanians for past
wrongs
4. The city of Pristina should do more to
make Serbs welcome
5. The people of Kosovo should actively
make Kosovo Serbs welcome
6. Pristina should start paying Kosovo Serb
pensions
7. Decentralisation at the municipal level
8. Offer higher education in both languages
9. Teach a common Balkan history and
culture curriculum in schools
10. Mixed schools for Albanians and Serbs
11. Special status for Serb religious sites
12. Kosovo government support for Local
Serbian TV stations
13. Each side should give up their maximum
demands
14. Serbs should acknowledge Albanians as
equals
15. Albanians should acknowledge Serbs as
equals
16. Encourage the return of Kosovo Serbs
into Kosovo institutions
17. Belgrade should develop all their policies
in cooperation with Kosovo Serbs

A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A

Desirable Acceptable Tolerable Unacceptable

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

6. Serbs and Albanians relations (B)

With regards to the Serbs and Albanians please indicate which of the following options
you consider to be Essential, Desirable, Acceptable, Tolerable or Unacceptable.
Essential

Desirable Acceptable Tolerable Unacceptable

B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B

Research

18. Separation of all government affairs and

the Orthodox Church in Serbia
19. Public apologies for past wrongs from
both sides
20. Those involved in the war should not be
in government or police on both sides
21. Kosovo government and politicians
should actively make Kosovo Serbs welcome
22. Obligation for Albanians to hire Serbs
23. An international fund to help Kosovo
Serbs in Kosovo and Serbia
24. Offer higher education for Serbs from all
parts of Kosovo
25. Student cultural exchange programmes in
the region, EU and US
26. Teach both the Serbian and Albanian
languages in schools
27. Free Albanian classes for Serbs in
Kosovo
28. Government support for bilingual media
29. Belgrade should stop dreaming of the
return of Kosovo
30. Pristina should stop dreaming about an
independent Kosovo
31. Increased cooperation between Pristina
and Belgrade
32. Kosovo Serbs should get more involved
in Kosovo affairs
33. Kosovo Serbs should be more
independent from Belgrade

B
B
B

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7. Security (A)
With regards to security please indicate which of the following options you consider to
be Essential, Desirable, Acceptable, Tolerable or Unacceptable.
Essential

1. Better training for the police

2. Municipality should play an active role in
choosing senior police officers
3. Parallel reform of police with local
government reform
4. Active recruitment of Serbs into the KPS
to ensure their participation
5. Security forces made accountable to

A
A
A
A
A

Research

the people of all ethnic groups

326

6. Establish a Kosovo Ministry of the

Interior
7. Serb police to guard monasteries in
Kosovo
8. Two official languages
9. One legal government
10. Properly paid safe judges
11. All ethnic crimes should be prosecuted to
the full extent of the law with the highest
possible penalties
12. Special property court to deal with
property disputes
13. Cooperation with the Hague Tribunal
14. Cooperation between countries in the
region to fight organised crime
15. Decommissioning of privately held
weapons
16. Mitrovica should become a unified city

A
A
A
A
A
A

A
A
A
A
A

Desirable Acceptable Tolerable Unacceptable

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

7. Security (B)
With regards to security please indicate which of the following options you consider to
be Essential, Desirable, Acceptable, Tolerable or Unacceptable.
Essential

17. Local control of police but one police

service to ensure effective cooperation
18. Appropriate selection and training of KPS
officers to ensure local respect and authority
19. The security services, including the KPC,
should proactively enrol minorities
20. KPC with senior officers from Albanian
and Serb communities
21. Central coordination of all security
structures in Kosovo
22. Joint Serb and Kosovo police to guard
monasteries in Kosovo
23. Separate mono-ethnic Kosova/Kosovo
Protection Corps
24. Politicians and the media must be

Desirable Acceptable Tolerable Unacceptable

B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B

more careful with what they say

B
B
B
B

Research

25. One unified judicial system

26. More efficient and effective judicial
system
27. Local courts initially supervised by the
international community
28. Kosovo should have its own war crimes
court
29. To ensure Kosovo Serb security Belgrade
must support final status agreement
30. Demilitarisation of border regions
31. One safe autonomous region for Serbs in
Kosovo like Republika Srpska in Bosnia
Herzegovina
32. North and South Mitrovica should be
separate municipalities

B
B
B

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8. Negotiations on the final status of Kosovo (A)

With regards to negotiations on the final status of Kosovo please indicate which of the
following options you consider to beEssential, Desirable, Acceptable, Tolerable or
Unacceptable.

Research

Essential

328

1. Training for local politicians to meet their

requirements and needs
2. An open forum for political parties and
experts
3. Talks between Belgrade and Pristina with
the help of an intermediary
4. Increased international pressure for
discussions between politicians
5. International community should involve
Belgrade more
6. Fixed time table for negotiations
7. Belgrade and Pristina must have equal say
in negotiations
8. Belgrades priority in negotiations should
be the safety and well being of the Kosovo
Serbs
9. Belgrade negotiators must have the
support of Kosovo Serbs
10. Kosovo Serbs should speak for Kosovo
Serbs not Belgrade
11. Belgrade should support new Kosovo
elections before negotiations
12. Official negotiators can not have been
participants in the recent conflict
13. The Serbian Orthodox Church should
have a role in negotiations
14. Open talks
15. Talks in the US and EU
16. The Contact Group should have one
position
17. The EU should be more pro-active
18. The International Community - Security
Council and EU - will have to agree final
status
19. Belgrade will have to agree final status
20. Meet the Standards set by the international
community for social and political reform in
Kosovo before negotiations

A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A

A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A

A
A

Desirable Acceptable Tolerable Unacceptable

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

8. Negotiations on the final status of Kosovo (B)

With regards to negotiations on the final status of Kosovo please indicate which of the
following options you consider to beEssential, Desirable, Acceptable, Tolerable or
Unacceptable.
Essential

Desirable Acceptable Tolerable Unacceptable

B
B
B
B
B

B
B
B
B
B

Research

21. Understanding the concerns, fears,

problems and point of view of other
politicians
22. Appointment of a full time EU or UN
diplomat to work with both parties
23. Direct talks between Belgrade and Pristina
without an intermediary
24. International penalties for not negotiating
25. Negotiations should be given plenty of
time
26. If no agreement after fixed period of
negotiations then the international community
should make the agreement
27. Belgrade should develop their negotiating
position in full cooperation with Kosovo Serbs
28. Belgrades priority in negotiations should
be the final status of Kosovo
29. Kosovo Serbs should have a seat at the
negotiating table
30. New parliamentary elections in Kosovo to
bring Serbs there into the negotiations
31. Joint meetings of Belgrade, Pristina and
Kosovo Serbs without preconditions
32. Anyone elected to negotiations must be
accepted by the other side
33. The international community must deal
equally with all elected representatives
whatever their political background
34. Secret talks
35. Talks in Kosovo and Serbia
36. The EU and US should have one position
37. Talks between Belgrade and Washington
as well as Belgrade and Brussels
38. The US should be more pro-active
39. There should be a referendum in Kosovo
on final status
40. There should be a referendum in Serbia on
final status
41. Start negotiations and meet Standards
before final status

B
B

B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B

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KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

9. Guiding principles for the final status of Kosovo (A)

With regards to guiding principles for the final status of Kosovo please indicate which
of the following options you consider to be Essential, Desirable, Acceptable, Tolerable or Unacceptable.
Essential

Research

1. NATO should stay as long as is needed

2. Kosovo and Serbia membership of EU and
NATO as soon as possible to increase stability
and help negotiations1
3. No return to the way things were before the
war - 1999
4. Full independence
5. Not full independence
6. Meet Standards before agreeing final status
7. Standards can be met at the same time as
final status
8. Kosovo can not leave Serbia
9. Immediate full independence of Kosovo
based on 1991 Kosovo referendum
10. Security enclaves for Serb minority as a
temporary measure
11. Decentralisation by ethnic region
12. Decentralisation but not by ethnic regions
13. Dual citizenship offered to all citizens in
the region
14. Kosovo should be allowed to have its own
army
15. Kosovo should be a member of the UN
16. Less than independence but more than
autonomy
17. Not full integration in Serbia
18. Economic independence within existing
boarders with Serbia
19. Proportional representation for Albanian
politicians in the Serbian Parliament if they
keep Kosovo
20. Albanian should be an official language in
the Serbian Government
21. National flag to be agreed by Serbs and
Albanians
22. Serbia should accept all the political
difficulties that would come with keeping
Kosovo
23. Kosovo as an EU Region in Serbia
Montenegro/Balkan Confederation
24. Final status should not include Amnesty
for war crimes
25. International economic regeneration
programme for Serbia and Kosovo as part of
final status agreement
1

330

Desirable

Acceptable

Tolerable

A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A

By error this question was not included in the Albanian version of the questionnaire.

Unacceptable

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

9. Guiding principles for the final status of Kosovo (B)

With regards to guiding principles for the final status of Kosovo please indicate which
of the following options you consider to be Essential, Desirable, Acceptable, Tolerable or Unacceptable.
Essential

26. All Balkan states should join NATO

27. All of former Yugoslavia should cooperate
and work to help each other join the EU
28. No unification with neighbours
29. Partition into Serb and Albanian regions
30. No partition
31. Independence only when agreed

Desirable

Acceptable

Tolerable

Unacceptable

B
B
B
B
B
B

conditions are met

32. Delay final status for at least ten years
33. Independence after a fixed period of

B
B

adjustment

all Kosovo institutions

37. Kosovo Serbs can always keep their Serb
citizenship
38. Kosovo should be allowed to have their
own civil defence force
39. Kosovo should be allowed to make its own
foreign policy
40. A practically independent Kosovo without
the words independent or sovereign
41. Solution that respects the present boarders
of Serbia Montenegro in international law
42. A practically independent Kosovo but still
part of Serbia Montenegro
43. Judicial independence within existing
boarders with Serbia
44. A Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo Federation
should have Serb, Montenegro and Kosovo
Presidents in turn
45. National anthem to be agreed by Serbs and
Albanians
46. Serbia should pay all the financial costs of
keeping Kosovo
47. Albanians should pay all the financial
costs of separating from Serbia
48. Amnesty as part of final status agreement
for war crimes
49. Forgive Kosovo debts held by Serbia
Montenegro if Kosovo does not stay in Serbia
50. More investment to solve the problem of
final status quicker

B
B
B

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34. Solution inside present boarders of Kosovo B

and Serbia
35. Cantons for minorities in both Kosovo and B
Serbia
36. Reserved positions for Serb minority in B

B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B

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10. A constitutional package for the final status of Kosovo (A AND B)

With regards to a constitutional package for the final status of Kosovo please indicate
which of the following options you consider to be Essential, Desirable, Acceptable,
Tolerable or Unacceptable.
Essential

Desirable

Acceptable

Tolerable

Unacceptable

11. YES/NO2

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1. Union of all Serbian lands

2. Full integration of Kosovo into Serbia
3. A republic in Serbia Montenegro with
control of all aspects of government locally
(1974 Constitution)
4. A republic in Serbia Montenegro with
control of all aspects of government locally
and regional status in the EU
5. A protectorate of the EU
6. An Economic Union of independent
states of Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia
7. A state as part of the EU but North
Kosovo joins Serbia
8. A state as part of the EU with choice of
citizenship for Serbs who will share their
canton in the North of Kosovo with Serbia
under joint authority
9. A state as part of the EU with choice of
citizenship for Serbs who will have their own
canton in Kosovo
10. A state as part of the EU with choice of
citizenship for Serbs
11. Full independence and no choice of
citizenship for Serbs in Kosovo
12. Union of Kosovo with Albania
13. Union of all Albanian lands

11 Displaced persons (A AND B)

For persons living in Kosovo - And for each of these options would you stay in Kosovo
YES or NO
For displaced Serbs in Serbia And for each of these options would you return to
Kosovo YES or NO
And finally: It does not matter so much about the constitution, I would (stay in) or (return to) Kosovoproviding I felt completely safe there, could choose my citizenship and was
free to work and practice myculture, language and religion without any fear of discrimination. YES or NO

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For persons in Kosovo and IDPs/refugees in Serbia ONLY.

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM
DEMOGRAPHY GENERAL
D1. Gender: 1. Male 2. Female
D2. Age: _____

D6B. If the respondent is employed Are you employed ?

1. Full time job
2. Part-time job
D7a. Household type:
1. Lives alone
5. Multigenerational family
2. Married couple no children
6. Single parent
3. Married couple with children
7. Married couple empty nest
4. Married couple grown up children (over 27)
8. Other
D7b: Total number of household members:_________
D7c: Total number of children in the household: ______
Children in high school (secondary education)(from 15 till 17) _____
Children in pre-school age (up to 6) _____
Children in school (7-14) _____
D8a. Total PERSONAL income in month: CARD D8a (FOR KOSOVO SURVEY IN EURO)
1. No income in month
9. 7001 to 9000 Dinars
2. Bellow 1000 dinars
10. 9001 to 11000 Dinars
3. 1001 to 2000 Dinars
11. 11001 to 13000 Dinars
4. 2001 to 3000 Dinars
12. 13001 to 16000 Dinars
5. 3001 to 4000 Dinars
13. 16001 to 19000 Dinars
6. 4001 to 5000 Dinars
14. Over 19001 Dinars
7. 5001 to 6000 Dinars
15. Refusal
8. 6001 to 7000 Dinars
D8b: Total number of household members with regular monthly income: ______

Research

D4. Marital status

1. Single, not living together with the partner
2. Married, lives together with the partner
3. Divorced, widowed (used to be in marriage)
D5. Education last FINISHED school
1. Unfinished primary
5. Finished secondary
2. Finished primary
6. Unfinished university
3. Unfinished secondary
7. University associate degree
4. Unfinished secondary but has got training
8. University bachelor degree at least
D6A. Current occupation
Employed:
Self-employed:
Not employed:
11. Blue-collar worker
21. Highly qualified intellectual
31. Pupil
12. White collar
22. Possesses smaller firm, shop
32. Student
13. Highly qualified intellectual
23. Possesses larger firm, company.
33. Housewife
14. Manager
24. Farmer, fisherman
34. Pensioner
25. Self-employed in other way
35. Unemployed
40. Other:________________

D8c. Total HOUSEHOLD income in month: CARD D8c (FOR KOSOVO SURVEY IN EURO)
1. No income in month
10. 11001 to 13000 dinars
2. Bellow 2000 dinars
11. 13001 to 16000 dinars
3. 2001 to 3000 dinars
12. 16001 to 19000 dinars
4. 3001 to 4000 dinars
13. 19001 to 24000 dinars
5. 4001 to 5000 dinars
14. 24001 to 30000 dinars
6. 5001 to 6000 dinars
15. 30001 to 36000 dinars
7. 6001 to 7000 dinars
16. 36001 to 42000 dinars
8. 7001 to 9000 dinars
17. Over 42001 dinars
9. 9001 to 11000 dinars
18. Refusal
D8d. Do you have in your household
1. Computer
1. Yes
2. No 3. Refusal
2. Internet connection
1. Yes
2. No 3. Refusal
3. Cellular telephone
1. Yes
2. No 3. Refusal
4. Fixed (classic) telephone
1. Yes
2. No 3. Refusal
5. At least on car
1. Yes
2. No 3. Refusal
6. Satellite dish or cable TV
1. Yes
2. No 3. Refusal

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D9. Ethnic Affiliation

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Serb
Montenegrin
Bosniak
Hungarian
Albanian
Croat
Goran
Turk
Roma
Ashkali
Egyptian
Other (specify) _________________________
Refused

DEMOGRAPHY - ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR SERBS IDPs

AD1. When did you come to Serbia? (Month and year) __________________________
AD2. Where did you live before coming to Serbia? (Full name of the city / village, region and municipality)
__________________________________________________________________________

Research

AD3. What was your occupation before coming to Serbia?

Self-employed:
11. Blue-collar worker
21. Highly qualified intellectual
12. White collar
22. Owner of smaller company,
13. Highly qualified intellectual
shop
14. Manager
23. Owner larger company,
company.
24. Farmer, fisherman
25. Self-employed in other way

Wasnt employed:
31. Pupil
32. Student
33. Housewife
34. Pensioner
35. Unemployed
40. Other:_____________

AD4. Where have you been during the NATO intervention, 1999? (Full name of the city / village, region and
municipality) _____________________________________________________________________
AD5. 1. Respondent lives in collective centre 2. Respondent lives in rented premises
3. Respondents is the owner of the premises in which he/she lives
DEMOGRAPHY - ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR KOSOVO SURVEY (REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLE AND SERBS IN KOSOVO)
AD6. Since when are you living in this city / village? (Month and year) _______________________________
AD7. Where did you live before? (Full name of the city / village, region and municipality)
______________________
AD8. Where have you been during the NATO intervention, 1999? (Full name of the city / village, region and
municipality) _____________________________________________________________________

The Albanian Serb Information Exchange Forum was made possible through support
provided by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, the German Government via the Stability Pact,
the Institut fr Auslandsbeziehungen e.V. (IFA), International Research and Exchanges
Board (IREX), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), UNESCO, and the Kosovo Mission of the US Agency for International Development (under the
terms of award No. 167-A-00-01-00107-00). The opinions expressedherein are those of the
authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the organisers or of the donors listed
above.
334

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

KOSOVA KOSOVO
T kuptuarit e problemit t Kosovs Pikpamjet e
qytetarve t Kosovs dhe Serbis
EMBARGO DERI M 20 TETOR, ORA 11:00
Dr, Colin Irwin
Instituti i Qeverisjes
Universiteti Mbretror i Belfastit
Belfast, Irland Veriore, BT7 1NN
Email: c.irwin@qub.ac.uk Web site: www.peacepolls.org

Sondazhi i opinionit publik sht ndrmarr pr t par se far mendon populli i

Kosovs dhe i Serbis se sht e nevojshme t bhet pr tu arritur paqja dhe stabiliteti
i prhershm n rajon. Hulumtimi sht zhvilluar nga Qendra pr Demokraci dhe Pajtim
n Evropn Juglindore me seli n Selanik t Greqis; KosovaLive n Prishtin dhe BETA
n Beograd, me kshilla t Dr. Colin Irwin nga Universiteti Mbretror n Belfast, Irland
Veriore.
Dr. Irwin ka br prmbledhjet e pyetjeve t ankets nprmjet t intervistave
gjithprfshirse t bra me shqiptart dhe serbt, n Kosov dhe Serbi gjat periudhs majqershor t vitit 2005. Pyetsori m von i sht drguar rreth 1.200 personave nga Kosova
dhe 1.200 personave nga Serbia pr t prfshir qytetart e dy gjinive, t gjitha moshave,
klasave sociale, prcaktimeve politike dhe etnike si dhe spektrit gjeografik. Me qllim q
t gjith grupacionet t prfshihen n kt program hulumtues, intervistat kan prmbajtur
edhe mostrat e posame shtytse pr serbt e Kosovs q jetojn npr enklava, si dhe
serbt e zhvendosur q jetojn n Serbi. Intervistat jan zhvilluar n periudhn n mes t
26 gusht dhe 2 shtator 2005. Punn n terren n Serbi e ka kryer Marketingu pr Hulumtim
Strategjik i Beogradit, ndrsa n Kosov Pulsi Strategjik i Tirans, Shqipris.

Research

Pr sondazhin

Rezultatet do t jen t publikuara n internet, n gazetat lokale si dhe n raportet q

do tu jepen partive politike n Kosov dhe Serbi si dhe organizatave m t mdha q
veprojn n rajon. Temat q jan prfshihen n intervista kan t bjn me problemet me
t cilat ballafaqohen njerzit, politikant e tyre si dhe bashksia ndrkombtare n rajon, si
dhe far do t ndodhte nse disa shtje nuk adresohen si duhet, sikundr edhe nj vistr
prgjigjesh si do t duhej qasur ktyre problemeve.
Hyrja
Konfliktet politike dhe sociale jan burimet kryesore t jostabilitetit n bot. Kto
ndikojn jo vetm n vendet ku paraqiten po ndikimi i tyre shtrihet edhe n vendet fqinje
dhe kan nj potencial t shkaktimit t trazirave n tr rajonin. Edhe nse arrihet ndonj
335

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

marrveshje, ato zakonisht mbesin jostabile dhe m von rezultojn n rikthimin e dhuns
dhe krkojn intervenimin e bashksis ndrkombtare. Tragjikisht, Kosova mund t
jet nj shembull i till. Mirpo, potenciali pr sukses i procesit paqsor mund t rritet
nse t gjitha elementet e shoqris kan mundsi q t bhen partner aktiv n proceset
paqsore. Zgjidhjet e imponuara t arritura prapa dyerve t mbyllura (shih Dejtonin ose
Marrveshjen e Ohrit) dhe t mbshtetura nga presioni dhe forca ndrkombtare mund
t ofrojn vetm nj lehtsim afatshkurtr zgjidhjeve problematike. Por, ato zgjidhje q
kan prkrahjen m t madhe t mundur n mesin e t gjitha elementeve prbrse t nj
shoqrie, jan esenciale pr tu arritur prparimi drejt paqes dhe stabilitetit afatgjat.

Research

N botn bashkkohore ku dominojn normat ndrkombtare, mas media dhe elektorati

i informuar mir, zgjidhjet pr probleme politike, ekonomike dhe sociale krkojn diskursin
dhe procesin vendimmarrs q prfshin lidershipin, shoqrin civile dhe popullatn n
prgjithsi. T arrihet nj prparim i ktill n shoqri aq t ndar sht tejet vshtir
andaj edhe krkohet prkrahja sa m e gjer e mundur. Duke testuar aktivisht opinionin
publik si pjes e krkimit t kompromisit dhe fushave t prbashkta, bhet e mundur
pr negociatort q t gjejn koncenzusin dhe forcojn potencialin e stabilitetit politik,
prosperitetit ekonomik dhe nivelin e kohezionit t domosdoshm social.
Deri m tani, me qllim t prkrahjes s procesit paqsor, n Irlandn Veriore jan
zhvilluar nnt anketa, n periudhn n mes t prillit 1996 dhe shkurtit 2003. Pyetjet pr
tet anketat jan prpiluar me plqimin dhe bashkpunimin e negociatorve. N suazat e t
mundurs, palve u sht ofruar q ta ken hulumtimin n pronsi me qllim q rezultatet
e t njjtit ti marrin seriozisht. do pal e ka emruar nga nj antar t ekipit q t punoj
dhe ndihmoj anketn. Pyetjet jan prpiluar pr tu testuar politika e palve me prfshirje
t gjer n aspektin politik edhe at social. Ishte ky rasti q t dgjohet zri i shumics s
heshtur ndrkoh q qndrimet ekstremiste u dshmuan t ken qen nn margjina dhe
me prkrahje tejet t vogl t komuniteteve q prfaqsonin. T gjitha pyetjet duhej t
ishin me plqim t palve ashtu q t eliminohej mundsia e keqinterpretimeve. Programi
i hulumtimit gjithashtu sht vendosur nga vet palt dhe t njjtit ishin t inkurajuar q
punn e hulumtimit ta ojn n drejtimin pr t cilin ata vet besojn se i ndihmon procesit
paqsor.
Fokusi i hulumtimit ishte n probleme, zgjidhje dhe n gjetjen e politiks adekuate n
zgjidhjen e konflikteve. Pyetjet zbukuruese jan evituar maksimalisht dhe jan lejuar
vetm n rastet kur konsiderohej se ky lloj i pyetjeve ndihmon procesin. T gjitha shtjet
relevante jan prfshir n kto pyetje. T gjitha rezultatet jan br publike dhe n kt
mnyr publikut i sht mundsuar nj vend n tryezn e bisedimeve. Nuk kishte zgjidhje
se me cilat probleme mund t merren palt. T gjith duhej t ballafaqoheshin me t gjitha
shtjet q doln n pah dhe kjo u b pjes e t ashtuquajturs strvitje e zgjidhjeve t
problemeve n fazn e para negociatave.
Ky aktivitet q u zgjerua n tr spektrin politik, te partit kryesore, te shoqria civile
dhe publiku n prgjithsi, ndihmoi dukshm n krijimin e koncenzusit pr Marrveshjen
e Belfastit, e cila oi deri te referendumi i suksesshm dhe periudha e paqes dhe stabilitetit
t shtuar. Me qllim t ndrkombtarizimit t puns, u botua edhe libri Procesi paqsor i
popullit ne Irlandn Veriore. Nj anket e ngjashme sht br edhe n Maqedoni n vitin
2002, n Bosnj dhe Hercegovin n vitin 2004, ndrsa Alexandros Lordos nisi sivjet kt
proces n Qipro.
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Anketa e zhvilluar n kt rast sht br me metodat e prsritura. Prmbledhja e

njjt e pyetjeve u sht shtruar t dyja komuniteteve ndrsa prgjigjet jan shkruar nga
prfaqsuesit e ktyre komuniteteve. Politikant, gazetart, akademikt, biznesment; t
gjith kta kontribuar n prpilimin e pyetjeve ndrsa t gjitha shtresat dhe elementet e dy
komuniteteve kishin rastin q t prgjigjen n kto pyetje.
Nuk m takon mua t prononcohem se cila zgjidhje sht m e mira. As nuk m
takon t them se me cilat probleme fillimisht duhet t ballafaqohen popujt e Kosovs dhe
Serbis. Kjo i prket vet popujve t Serbis dhe Kosovs si dhe lidershipit t tyre. Ky
raport prbhet nga nj prmbledhje voluminoze e prgjigjeve interesante n pyetjet q
u interesojn ktyre dy komuniteteve. Gjithashtu kjo ofron nj baz pr diskutime m t
pasura dhe frytdhnse pr njerzit, pr prfaqsuesit e zgjedhur dhe ekipin negociator i
cili tani ka mbi supe prgjegjsin pr ardhmrin, sigurin dhe prparimin e komunitetit
t cilin e prfaqsojn .

Research

N kt rrafsh shpresoj se do ta mojn kt raport dhe njkohsisht ju dshiroj sukses

n rrugtimin e gjat.

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PJESA 1: PROBLEMET

1. Vistri i problemeve: Pyetja

Fillimisht, duke iu referuar vistrit t problemeve q duhet zgjidhur Ju lutemi theksoni se
cilat nga problemet ju i konsideroni Me shum rndsi, T rndsishme, Deri diku t
rndsishme, T rndsis s vogl apo Plotsisht t parndsishme.
Prioritetet e shqiptarve t Kosovs
Nga lista e prbr prej 31 elemente (shiko tabelat 1.1 deri 1.6), pes top prioritetet
pr shqiptart e Kosovs jan, statusi prfundimtar i Kosovs i vlersuar me 87 pr qind
si Shum i rndsishm, m pas vjen shtja e papunsis me 85 pr qind, ekonomia e
dobt me 75%, korrupsioni me 70% dhe standardet e edukimit gjithashtu me 70 pr qind.

Me shum rndsi shqiptart e Kosovs

Research

1
2
3
4
5

Statusi prfundimtar i Kosovs

Papunsia n Kosov
Ekonomia e dobt n Kosov
Korrupsioni n Kosov
Standardet edukative n Kosov

87%
85%
75%
70%
70%

N sondazhet e zhvilluara nga ana e Programit pr Zhvillim t Kombeve t Bashkuara

(UNDP) dhe t tjerve, statusi prfundimtar i Kosovs dhe papunsia jan paraqitur
gjithashtu si prioritete pr shqiptart e Kosovs. Rezultati i ktij hulumtimi andaj sht n
pajtim me rezultatet e hulumtimeve tjera.
Prioritetet e serbve t Kosovs
Pr serbt q jetojn n Kosov, si prioritet numr nj paraqitet furnizimi me rrym dhe
ky pr nga 78 pr qind t t intervistuarve vlersohet si shum i rndsishm. Mirpo,
pr serbt q jetojn n Serbi, siguria paraqet prioritetin kryesor dhe pr 83% t tyre
konsiderohet si shtje me shum rndsi. Pr t zhvendosurit n Serbi paraqitet shtja
e personave t zhdukur dhe procesi i kthimit si shum i rndsishm dhe t dyja shtjet
jan prioritare pr 84% t intervistuarve.
Shum me rndsi serb t Kosovs
1 Furnizimi me rrym
78%
74%
72%

Krimi i organizuar n Kosov

Siguria personale dhe publike

n Kosov
Procesi i kthimit t t
zhvendosurve dhe refugjatve
Statusi prfundimtar i Kosovs

Serb t Serbis
1 Siguria publike dhe personale n
Kosov
2 Personat e zhdukur

65%

Statusi prfundimtar i Kosovs

Personat e zhdukur

62%

Procesi i kthimit t t
zhvendosurve dhe refugjatve

2
3

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83
%
76
%
72
%
72
%
71
%

Serb t zhvendosur n Serbi

1 Personat e zhdukur
2

Procesi i kthimit t t
zhvendosurve dhe refugjatve
Siguria publike dhe personale n
Kosov
T drejtat e viktimave

Statusi prfundimtar i Kosovs

84
%
84
%
83
%
82
%
79
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Kto rezultate jan gjithashtu n pajtim me nj sondazh t ngjashm q u organizua n

Kosov, e sipas t cilit, siguria personale u gjend e para n prioritetet e serbve t Kosovs.
Mirpo, kjo shtje n hulumtimin ton paraqitet n vendin e dyt pas furnizimit me rrym;
shtje kjo q pr serbt e Serbis e as pr serbt e zhvendosur nuk hyn as n kuadr t
top pes prioriteteve. Pr t gjith serbt, shtje me rndsi paraqet e drejta e viktimave,
statusi prfundimtar i Kosovs dhe krimi i organizuar.
Disa pika t mospajtimeve
49% t shqiptarve t Kosovs e konsiderojn t parndsishm rolin e qeveris s
Serbis n shtjet e Kosovs prderisa t njjtin mendim e ndan vetm 1% e serbve t
Kosovs. Nga ana tjetr, 19% e serbve t Kosovs konsiderojn se jan t parndsishme
veprimet e qeveris s Kosovs, ndrsa kt mendim e ndajn vetm nj pr qind e
shqiptarve t Kosovs. Njohja dhe pranimi i rolit legjitim t qeverive si t Prishtins ashtu
edhe t Beogradit n t ardhmen e popullit t Kosovs, duket se paraqitet si problem pr nj
prqindje t konsiderueshme t t intervistuarve nga t dy komunitetet.

Roli i qeveris serbe n shtjet e Kosovs

Veprimet e qeveris s Kosovs

Shqiptart
e Kosovs
49%
1%

Serbt e Kosovs

Serbt e Serbis

2%
19%

4%
7%

Serbt e zhvendosur
n Serbi
4%
6%

Disa pika t pajtimeve

Siguria publike dhe personale erdhi n vendin e tet n listn e prbr nga 31 shtje
q jan me interes pr shqiptart e Kosovs (shum e rndsishme pr 65%). Serbt jan
gjithashtu t brengosur lidhur me statusin prfundimtar t Kosovs dhe kjo paraqitet n
vendin e 4-t dhe 5-t n listn e prioriteteve. Theksi ktu duhet t vihet te fakti se ndonse
rradhitja e prioriteteve dallon - shqiptart dhe serbt duket se ndajn, ose kuptojn apo s
paku i dijn prioritetet e njri-tjetrit. Arritja e pajtimit megjithat mund t jet nj shtje
krejtsisht tjetr.

Research

T parndsishm

Nj konkludim tjetr i rndsishm sht edhe ai se gati t gjitha nga 31 shtjet e

paraqitura n list njihen si probleme si nga shqiptart ashtu edhe nga serbt e Kosovs.
Vetm disa nga shtjet konsiderohen si jo t rndsishme nga njri apo tjetri komunitet.
Por, lista e shtjeve sht e gjer dhe shkon nga shtja e siguris deri te ajo e sportit. Nse
shikohen pr s afrmi shtjet qendrore t mospajtimit n mes t shqiptarve dhe serbve
t Kosovs, duket e pamundur arritja e ndonj shkalle t qart t koncenzusit.
2. Statusi prfundimtar i Kosovs: Pyetja
Tani, duke iu referuar shtjes s statusit prfundimtar t Kosovs, ju lutemi t theksoni
se cilin nga aspektet i konsideroni Shum t rndsishm, T rndsishm, Deri diku
t rndsishm, T rndsis s vogl apo Plotsisht t parndsishm ose edhe
Aspak t vrtet.

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Prioritetet e shqiptarve t Kosovs

Fatkeqsisht, sensi i pajtueshmris n lidhje me problemet e prgjithshme me t cilat
ballafaqohen popujt e Kosovs dhe Serbis, thyhet plotsisht kur bhet fjal pr shtjen
e ndjeshme t statusit t Kosovs me t cilin do merremi n pyetjen numr 2. Nga lista
e prbr prej 42 elementeve (shiko tabelat prej 2.1 deri 2.6), prioritetet e shqiptarve t
Kosovs kan t bjn m dshtimin e zhvillimit t mirfillt ekonomik para zgjidhjes
s statusit me 46 pr qind t intervistuarve dhe pasohet me 43% t atyre q mendojn se
qndrimi i Kosovs nn Serbi on n nj luft t re.
Me shum rndsi shqiptart e Kosovs
1. Ekonomia e Kosovs nuk do t zhvillohet prderisa nuk arrihet marrveshja rreth statusit
2 Mbajtja e Kosovs nn Serbi on n nj luft t re
3 Nse gjrat mbesin ashtu si jan, Kosova mund t bhet jostabile
4 Vetm bashksia ndrkombtare mund t zgjidh shtjen e Kosovs
5 Beogradi i shfrytzon serbt e Kosovs pr qllime politike

46%
43%
42%
32%
30%

Research

Prioritetet e serbve
Pr serbt e Serbis dhe pr serbt e zhvendosur q jetojn n Serbi brenga kryesore
sht ajo se pavarsia e Kosovs mund t oj deri te nj eksod i serbve, me 74 pr qind
respektivisht 93 pr qind q e konsiderojn Shum t rndsishm. Kjo shtje rradhitet
n vendin e pest n listn e serbve q jetojn n Kosov, me 78 pr qind q e konsiderojn Shum t rndsishm. shtja kryesore e tyre sht se nj Kosovs e pavarur do t
ishte m e pasigurt pr ta, me 80 pr qind q e konsiderojn Shum t rndsishm. Pr
serbt n Serbi dhe t zhvendosurit serb kjo shtje radhitet si e dyta n listn e tyre. sht
e kuptueshme, se t zhvendosurit serb mendojn se UNMIK-u nuk punon mjaft me Beogradin q tu ndihmoj serbve t Kosovs, me 80 pr qind q konsiderojn kt Shum
t rndsishme (e pesta n listn e tyre).
Me shum rndsi
1 Kosova e pavarur do t ishte
shum m e pasigurt pr t
gjith
2 Nse statusi i Kosovs
zgjidhet pa marrveshje,
serbt e Kosovs nuk do t
ndihen t sigurt
3 Kosova e pavarur do
shndrrohej n shtet mafioz

80%
79%

Serbt e Serbis
1 Pavarsia e Kosovs
do t oj n nj eksod
t serbve
2 Kosova e pavarur do t
ishte e pasigurt pr
serbt

79%

Kosova e pavarur do t ishte

e pasigurt pr serbt

79%

Pavarsia e Kosovs do t
oj n nj eksod t serbve

78%

74%

Serbt e zhvendosur
1 Pavarsia e Kosovs do t oj n
nj eksod t serbve

93%

73%

Kosova e pavarur do t ishte e

pasigurt pr serbt

88%

Nse statusi i Kosovs 73%

zgjidhet
pa
marrveshje, serbt e
Kosovs nuk do t
ndihen t sigurt
Qeveria e Kosovs 71%
nuk ka ofruar garanca
t mjaftueshme pr
serbt
Kosova e pavarur do t 70%
ishte shum m e
pasigurt pr t gjith

Bashksia ndrkombtare prdor

standardet e dyfishta kur trajton
shqiptart dhe serbt

83%

Qeveria
e
Kosovs
nuk
angazhohet mjaft pr t punuar me
serbt

81%

UNMIK_u nuk punon mjaft me

Beogradin pr tu ndihmuar
serbve t Kosovs

80%

Ktu paraqitet nj element i ri ku dshmohet se serbt e Kosovs jan ndoshta m pak

t alarmuar pr disa shtje n krahasim me vllezrit dhe motrat e tyre n Serbi, ndrsa
t zhvendosurit serb jan m t brengosurit.
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Disa pika t mospajtimit

Nse analizohen vetm prgjigjet Nuk sht aspak e vrtet, sht e mundur t zbulohet ajo q do t quhej boshllk i kredibilitetit n mes t shqiptarve dhe serbve t
Kosovs. P.sh. sugjerimi se pavarsia e Kosovs do t rezultonte n dhun t re, konsiderohet si i pavrtet pr 88 pr qind t shqiptarve e vetm 1 pr qind e serbve. Njkohsisht
65% e shqiptarve t Kosovs besojn se qeveria e tyre ka ofruar mjaft garanca pr serbt,
ndrkohq gati se asnjri nga serbt nuk pajtohet me kt.

Pavarsia e Kosovs do t rezultoj n m shum dhun

Kosova e pavarur do t behet shtet mafioz
Kosova e pavarur do t jet vend m i pasigurt pr dokend
Kosova e pavarur do t ishte vend i pasgurt pr serbt
Vetm Beogradi mund ta zgjidh shtjen e Kosovs
Qeveria e Kosovs nuk ka ofruar mjaft garanca pr serbt
sht iluzion se serbt mund ta kontrollojn Kosovn
Beogradi po i shfrytzon serbt e Kosovs pr qllime politike
Mbajtja e Kosovs nn Serbi do t oj deri te nj luft e re
Vetm bashksia ndrkombtare mund ta zgjidh shtjen e Kosovs
Serbia nuk po angazhohet mjaft pr tu ndihmuar t zhvendosurve serb

Shqiptar
t
Kosovs
88%
85%
80%
75%
73%
65%
6%
3%
11%
8%
12%

Serb t
Kosovs
1%
2%
3%
3%
16%
0%
50%
41%
38%
34%
26%

Serb
t
Serbis
2%
2%
2%2%
2%
33%
0%
27%
21%
39%
27%
18%

Serbt e
zhvendosur
0%
1%
1%
23%
1%
41%
13%
51%
19%
9%

sht iluzion se serbt mund t mbajn Kosovn nn kontroll, konsiderohet si e

pavrtet pr 6 pr qind t shqiptarve t Kosovs, ndrkoh q 50% t serbve t Kosovs
nuk besojn gjithashtu n kt pohim. 41% t t zhvendosurve dhe 27% t serbve t
Serbis gjithashtu e konsiderojn kt si t pavrtet. Boshllku i kredibilitetit nuk shte
evident vetm n mes t shqiptarve dhe serbve t Kosovs por edhe n mes t serbve t
Kosovs atyre t Serbis, si dhe serbve t zhvendosur n Serbi.

Research

Aspak e vrtet

Disa pika pajtimi

Kur shqiptart dhe serbt e Kosovs pajtohen lidhur me ndonj t vrtet bazike t
ndonj deklarate, athere mund t gjinden pikat e pajtimit edhe nse ato ndryshojn n
listn e prioriteteve. P.sh. dokush beson se kornizat e negociatave ende nuk jan prcaktuar
dhe se mungon prcaktimi i rolit politik t serbve t Kosovs n kt proces. Njohja e rolit
politik t serbve t Kosovs n negociata sht krkes t ciln t gjith e konsiderojn si
t nevojshme.
Aspak e vrtet

Shqiptart e Serbt
Kosovs
Kosovs
Ekonomia e Kosovs nuk do t zhvillohet prderisa nuk arrihet 2%
4%
marrveshja mbi statusin
Nuk jan prcaktuar kornizat e negociatave
0%
6%
Mungon roli politik i serbve t Kosovs n negociata
3%
4%
Nse gjrat mbesin si jan, Kosova do bhet vend jostabil
2%
5%
Askush n Serbi nuk do nnshkruaj dokumentin mbi pavarsin 5%
7%
e Kosovs
Bashksia ndrkombtare ka larguar vmendjen pr shkak t 3%
15%
Irakut
3%
Bashksia ndrkombtare prdor standarde t dyfishta kur i 17%
trajton shqiptart dhe serbt
Serbt e Kosovs mbajn peng statusin
15%
5%
Kualiteti i politikanve si shqiptar ashtu edhe serb sht i dobt 19%
4%

e Serbt
Serbis
2%

e Serbt
e
zhvendosur
22%

2%
1%
6%
10%

1%
1%
6%
6%

10%

6%

1%

0%

8%
2%

3%
1%

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KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

3. Raportet n mes t shqiptarve dhe serbve: Pyetja

Duke iu referuar raporteve n mes t shqiptarve dhe serbve ju lutemi theksoni se cilat
aspekte t ktij problemi ju i konsideroni Shum t rndsishme, T rndsishme,Drei
diku t rndsishme, Me pak rndsi, T parndsishme, apo Madje t pavrteta
Prioritetet e shqiptarve

Research

N listn e prbr nga 48 elemente (tabelat 3.1 deri n 3.6), n lidhje me raportet shqiptaro-serbe, problemi m i rndsishm pr shqiptart e Kosovs sht fati i panjohur i t
zhdukurve dhe ky problem konsiderohet pr 73% t t intervistuarve si tejet i rndsishm.
Pason diskriminimi ndaj shqiptarve gjat viteve 90 me 58 pr qind t t intervistuarve q
e konsiderojn kt si tejet t rndsishm. Fatkeqsisht, 52% t serbve t Kosovs, 36%
t serbve t Serbis dhe 44% e serbve t zhvendosur as q besojn se sht i vrtet ky
diskriminim. Dshtimi i akuzimit t personave prgjegjs pr krime lufte vjen n vendin
e tret n list me 41% t t intervistuarve shqiptar t Kosovs q e konsiderojn kt si
problem tejet t rndsishm. Pason n vendin e 4-t trashgimia e aq shum vrasjeve me
38% dhe pjesmarrja e ushtarve t UK-s n strukturat policore, n vendin e 5-t. Si do
pritej, shtja e policis po ashtu paraqitet si problem serioz tek serbt.

Me shum rndsi Shqiptart e Kosovs

1 Fati i panjohur i personave t zhdukur
2 Diskriminimi ndaj shqiptarve gjat t 90-tave
3 Dshtimi i akuzimit t prgjegjsve pr krime lufte
4 Trashgimia e aq shum vrasjeve
5 Pjesmarrja e ushtarve t UK-s n polici

73%
58%
41%
38%
37%

Prioritetet e serbve
Pr t gjith serbt, pavarsisht a bhet fjal pr ata q jetojn n Kosov, apo ata
q jetojn n serbi apo ata t zhvendosurit, problemi m serioz konsiderohet mendimi se
shqiptart krkojn Shqiprin e Madhe. Megjithat edhe pr 14% shqiptarve t Kosovs
kjo shtje konsiderohet si problem shum i rndsishm, ndrsa 23% t tyre konsiderojn
se kjo nuk sht e vrtet.

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Me shum rndsi Serbt e Kosovs

1 Shqiptart e duan Shqiprin e 75%
Madhe
2 Shqiptart e Kosovs gjithnj e 75%
m shum afrohen me Tirann
ndrsa nga serbt krkojn q
t mos flasin me Beogradin
3 Ushtart e UK-s n polici
74%

Serbt e Serbis
1 Shqiptart e duan Shqiprin
e Madhe
2 Trashgimia e aq shum
vrasjeve

Ushtart e UK-s n Qeveri

71%

Shqiptart e Kosovs nuk jan

t gatshm q haptaz dhe pa
kushtzime t dnojn dhunn
etnike

67%

Shqiptart e Kosovs nuk

jan t gatshm q haptaz
dhe pa kushtzime t
dnojn dhunn etnike
Shqiptart
e
Kosovs
gjithnj e m shum afrohen
me Tirann ndrsa nga
serbt krkojn q t mos
flasin me Beogradin
Fati i panjohur i personave t
zhdukur

73%

Serbt e zhvendosur n Serbi

1 Shqiptart e duan Shqiprin e
Madhe
2 Ushtart e UK-s n polici

69%

Krkimfaljet nuk vlejn pa

siguri

73%

61%

Provokimet e shqiptarve

72%

59%

Shqiptart e Kosovs nuk jan

t gatshm q haptaz dhe pa
kushtzime t dnojn dhunn
etnike

72%

74%

79%
77%

Disa pika t mospajtimit

Tetdhjet prqind t shqiptarve t Kosovs mendojn se ata nuk krcnojn serbt
e Kosovs se duhet t ndrpriten kontaktet me Beogradin. Vetm 5 pr qind t serbve
t Kosovs, 4% t Serbis dhe 2% t t zhvendosurve pajtohen me kt konstatim.
Njkohsisht, 66% t shqiptarve t Kosovs nuk besojn se n kulturn e shqiptarve
ekziston dhuna dhe hakmarrja, ndrsa vetm 3% deri n 6% t serbve besojn n kt konstatim. Nga ana tjetr, prqindja e madhe e serbve: 61% t Kosovs, 46% atyre t Serbis
dhe 51% t t zhvendosurve nuk besojn n kulturn serbe t dominimit dhe dhuns. Ksaj
radhe 15% t shqiptarve pajtohen. Prkundr ekzistimit t mtutjeshm t boshllkut t
kredibilitetit ktu ka edhe nj doz shprese sepse edhe shqiptart e Kosovs dhe serbet
nuk besojn se t gjith popujt e Ballkanit kan kulturn e dhuns.
Nuk sht e vrtet
Shqiptart e Kosovs krcnojn serbt se ata duhet t ndrprejn kontaktin
me Beogradin
Kultura shqiptare e dhuns dhe hakmarrjes
Shqiptart nuk kan besim se mund t negociojn
Shqiptart e Kosovs po afrohen me Tirann ndrkoh q presin nga serbt
q t ndalin kontaktet me Beogradin
T gjith popujt e Ballkanit kan kultur t dhuns
Serbt e zmadhojn problemin e siguris
Kultura serbe e dominimit dhe dhuns
Provokimet serbe
Kriminelt serb t lufts duhet t gjykohen n Kosov
Serbt dshirojn Serbin e Madhe

Shqiptart
Kosovs
80%

Serbt
e
Kosovs
5%

Serbt
Serbis
4%

66%
66%
58%

3%
42%
2%

5%
30%
2%

6%
49%
0%

56%
6%
15%
9%
5%
2%

42%
68%
62%
61%
59%
56%

37%
67%
46%
33%
38%
52%

40%
74%
51%
59%
40%
65%

Research

shtja se shqiptart nuk jan t gatshm q haptaz dhe pa kushtzim t dnojn dhunn
etnike shqiptare radhitet si e pest me 67 pr qind pr serbt n Serbi, dhe srish n t 5tin me 72% pr t zhvendosurit serb. Fatkeqsisht 51% t shqiptarve t Kosovs nuk
besojn q kjo sht e vrtet. Ktu sht nj boshllk serioz i kredibilitetit q meriton
vmendje.

T zhvendosurit
Serb n Serbi
2%

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KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

Vlen t theksohet se 56% t serbve t Kosovs, 52% t atyre t Serbis dhe 65% t t
zhvendosurve nuk besojn se dshirohet Serbia e Madhe. Fatkeqsisht me kt pajtohen
vetm 2% t shqiptarve t Kosovs, andaj mund t thuhet se boshllku i kredibilitetit
sht i ndrsjell.
Disa pika pajtimi

Research

Nga kjo analiz mund t dalin disa pika ku pajtohen t dyja palt. Mund t fillohet me
at se edhe shqiptart e Kosovs edhe serbt pajtohen se probleme serioze paraqesin: fati
i pandiruar i t zhdukurve dhe prgjegjsia pr vrasjet e bra. Gati se askush nuk beson
se kto probleme nuk jan t vrteta. Nga kjo analiz del edhe nj befasi tjetr se edhe
shqiptart e Kosovs edhe serbt e konsiderojn si problem serioz faktin se ushtart e
UK-s marrin pjes n strukturat policore si dhe n qeveri. Po ashtu, t pakt jan ata q
besojn se kjo gj nuk sht e vrtet. Gjithashtu ka pajtueshmri rreth problemit t gjuhs
s flakt n mediume, t influencs s kriminelve t lufts n politik si dhe mosbesimit
t prgjithshm n mes t shqiptarve dhe serbve. Kto probleme nuk jan unike vetm
n rastin e Kosovs, edhe grupet q jetojn n Bosnj e Hercegovin si dhe n Maqedoni
ballafaqohen me t njjtat probleme.
Nuk sht e vrtet

Shqiptart
e Kosovs

Serbt e
Kosovs

Fati i pandriuar i personave t zhdukur

Prgjegjsia pr aq shum vrasje
Ushtart e UK-s n polici
Ushtart e UK-s n qeveri
Fjalori i flakt i politikanve
Mosbesimi i ndrsjell i ndan shqiptart dhe serbt
Ndikimi i kriminelve t lufts n politik
Gjuha e flakt e mediave
Mosakuzimi i kriminelve t lufts
Serbt dshirojn t kthehen n kohn e para lufts

0%
2%
3%
1%
5%
3%
3%
7%
1%
5%

0%
0%
1%
5%
3%
6%
8%
4%
12%
7%

Serbt
e
Serbis
2%
0%
1%
1%
2%
1%
2%
2%
4%
5%

T
zhvendosurit
serb n Serbi
0%
0%
1%
0%
5%
1%
1%
5%
17%
11%

4. Siguria: Pyetja
Duke iu referuar shtjes s siguris, ju lutemi t theksoni se cilin nga aspektet i konsideroni Shum t Rndsishm, T rndsishm, Deri diku t rndsishm, T
rndsis s vogl apo Plotsisht t parndsishm ose edhe Aspak t vrtet.
Prioritetet e shqiptarve t Kosovs
Lista e problemeve t siguris prbhet nga 29 elemente (shiko tabelat prej 4.1 deri
4.6). Sistemi i dobt gjyqsor paraqitet si prioritet numr nj pr shqiptart e Kosovs dhe
konsiderohet si problem tejet i rndsishm. Pason krimi i organizuar politik me 48% t t
intervistuarve. Shqiptart deklarohen se nuk guxojn t flasin shqip n Veri t Mitrovics,
ndrsa serbt thon se nuk guxojn t flasin serbisht n Prishtin.

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Me shum rndsi shqiptart e Kosovs

1 Sistemi i dobt gjyqsor
2 Krimi i organizuar politik
3 Shqiptart nuk guxojn t flasin shqip n veri t Mitrovics
4 Munges besimi n sistemin gjyqsor
5 Puna e ngadalshme e sistemit gjyqsor

49%
48%
46%
46%
43%

Prioritetet e serbve
shtja m e rndsihme q sht e lidhur me sigurin, e q ka t bj me serbt e
Kosovs sht ajo se njerzit nuk kan liri t plot t lvizjes n Kosov dhe kjo pr 84% t
serbve t Kosovs konsiderohet si tejet e rndsishme, pr 91% t serbve t Serbis dhe
pr 94% t t zhvendosurve.. Kjo pasohet me konstatimin se serbt e izoluar jan t arrestuar n shtpit e tyre, si dhe mendimi se nuk ekziston gatishmri n lidershipin shqiptar
q t prmirsohet situata e siguris.
Serbt e Serbis
1 Njerzit nuk e kan lirin e
plot t lvizjes n Kosov
2 Serbt e izoluar jan t
burgosurit n shtpit e tyre

Serbt e izoluar jan t

burgosurit n shtpit e tyre

72%

Nuk ka prkrahje t pakusht t

lidershipit shqiptar q t
prmirsohet situata e siguris
Serbt Kosovs nuk i besojn
SHPK-s (Shrbimit Policor t
Kosovs)

66%

65%

Nuk ka prkrahje t pakusht t

lidershipit shqiptar q t
prmirsohet situata e siguris
Serbt friksohen t flasin
serbisht n Prishtin
Serbt Kosovs nuk i besojn
SHPK-s (Shrbimit Policor t
Kosovs)

82%

71%

Serbt e zhvendosur n Serbi

1 Njerzit nuk e kan lirin e plot t
lvizjes n Kosov
2 Nuk ka prkrahje t pakusht t
lidershipit
shqiptar
q
t
prmirsohet situata e siguris
3 Krimi i organizuar politik

71%

UNMIK-u nuk ofron siguri efektive

82%

71%

Puna e ngadalshme e sistemit

gjyqsor

79%

91%
83%

94%

82%

Research

Me shum rndsi serbt e Kosovs

1 Serbt friksohen t flasin 89%
serbisht n Prishtin
2 Njerzit nuk e kan lirin e 84%
plot t lvizjes n Kosov

Disa pika mospajtimi

Pr serbt, shtja e siguris sht problemi m i rndsishm. Andaj sht bengoss
fakti se shqiptart e Kosovs nuk besojn se sa seriozisht serbt e kuptojn kt problem.
69% e shqiptarve t Kosovs nuk e konsideron t vrtet pohimin se njerzit nuk e kan
lirin e plot t lvizjes. Ata gjithashtu nuk besojn se lidershipi shqiptar po dshton n
tendencat e ofrimit t liris s pakusht t lvizjes.Nga ana tjetr, serbt nuk po besojn se
ndonjher marrin drejtsin n duart e veta dhe i bllokojn rrugt. Me kt konstatim pajtohen 13% t shqiptarve t Kosovs. 60% t serbve t Kosovs nuk besojn se shqiptart
i friksohen krcnimit ushtarak nga jasht, Ksaj radhe vetm 22% t shqiptarve do t
pajtoheshin.

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KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM
Nuk sht e vrtet

Shqiptart e
Kosovs

Serbt e
Kosovs

Serbt
Serbis

Njrzit nuk e kan lirin e plot t lvizjes n Kosov

Serbt friksohen q t flasin serbisht n Prishtin
Nuk ka prkrahje t pakusht t lidershipit shqiptar n ofrimin e siguris
Serbt e izoluar jan t burgosur n shtpit e tyre
Politikant dhe mediat i paraqesin pjestart e grupit tjetr si krcnim pr
sigurin
Nuk ka mjaft minoritete n postet qeveritare
Serbt marrin drejtsin n duart e tyre dhe bllokojn rrugt
Shqiptart friksohen nga intervenimi ushatarak nga jasht
Gjykimet pr krime lufte q zhvillohen n Serbi nuk plotsojn nevojat e
shqiptarve pr drejtsi
Shqiptart friksohen t flasin shqip n veri t Mitrovics
Strukturat klandestine t informimit veprojn n Kosov (edhe SIA dhe SHIK-u
i shqiptarve, si dhe strukturat e Serbis)

69%
68%
67%
65%
65%

0%
0%
3%
5%
5%

0%
2%
0%
3%
3%

T
zhvendosurit
serb n Serbi
1%
0%
1%
3%
3%

20%
13%
22%
4%

1%
60%
60%
45%

1%
45%
45%
20%

0%
51%
51%
31%

4%
4%

44%
13%

38%
2%

50%
6%

Duke folur pr strukturat klandestine q veprojn n Kosov, reagimet e shqiptarve

dhe serbve jan t prziera. Disa nga ta mendojn se sht fjala pr nj problem e t tjert
jo, ndrkoh q disa konsiderojn se kjo nuk sht e vrtet. Kshtu kjo shtje u radhit
edhe n kt list, si dhe n listn e mposhtme.

Research

Disa pika t pajtimit

N lidhje me sistemin e dobt gjyqsor, punn e ngadalshme n kt system si dhe
mungesn e besimit n t njjtin, dokush konsideron se ka vend pr prmirsim, ndrsa
vetm disa, prej t dy komuniteteve, nuk e konsiderojn kt problem si t vrtet. Krimi i
organizuar politik gjithashtu sht problem i prbashkt si edhe mungesa e policis lokale,
struktura e s cils do t reflektonte strukturn e popullats ku veprojn. Madje 43% t
shqiptarve t Kosovs e cilsojn si shum t rndsishm apo t rndsishm shtjen se
serbt nuk i besojnShrbimit Policor t Kosovs.
Nuk sht e vrtet
Sistemi i dobt gjyqsor
Nuk ka polici prbrja etnike e t cils reflekton strukturn e popullats lokale
Puna e ngadalshme e sistemit gjyqsor
Munges besimi n sistemin gjyqsor
Krimi i organizuar politik
Serbt e Kosovs nuk i besojn SHPK-s
Strukturat klandestine t informimit veprojn n Kosov (si shqiptare SIA,
SHIK ashtu edhe ato serbe)
Vizione t kundrta rreth t ardhmes s Trupave Mbrojtse t Kosovs (TMK)
Mungesa e ndjekjes s mjaftueshme penale pr krime lufte si n Hag ashtu
edhe n aspektin lokal

Shqiptart
e
Kosovs
2%
4%
5%
2%
2%
9%
4%
10%
16%

Serbt e
Kosovs
0%
3%
2%
5%
5%
7%
13%

Serbt
e
Serbis
1%
1%
0%
0%
0%
1%
2%

Serbt e
zhvendosur
n Serbi
0%
4%
1%
0%
1%
1%
6%

12%
9%

1%
6%

1%
3%

Shumica e serbve dhe shqiptarve t Kosovs pajtohen se kan vizione t kundrta

rreth ardhmris s TMK-s. Nga ana tjetr, ata pajtohen se ka prkrahje t prgjithshme pr
ndekjen penale t kriminelve t lufts t t dy komuniteteve.

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5. Ardhmria pa marrveshje: Pyetja

Nga mundsit e ndryshme t paraqitura n listn e mposhtme rreth asaj se far mendoni se mund t ndodh nse populli i Kosovs, ai i Serbis dhe bashksia ndrkombtare
dshtojn n ndrmarrjen e hapave t domosdoshm pr tu ballafaquar me kto probleme,
Ju lutemi theksoni se cilat nga mundsit i konsideroni Shum t mundshme, T mundshme, Nuk jeni t sigurt, T pamundshme apo Plotsisht t pamundshme.
Ardhmria e Mundshme e shqiptarve t Kosovs

Shum e Mundshme shqiptart e Kosovs

1
Trazirat sociale
2
Kriminalizimi i shtuar
3
Mungesa e investimeve
4
Emigrimi i shtuar
5
Konflikte t reja
6
Zvoglimi i ndihmave ndrkombtare
7
Shtimi i pranis ndrkombtare ushtarake
8
Eskalimi i tensioneve etnike
9
Shtimi i pasiguris politike
10 Shtimi i pasiguris rajonale
11 Izolimi i Kosovs dhe Serbis

31%
29%
28%
28%
26%
24%
24%
20%
19%
18%
17%

Research

Thn n mnyr relative, shqiptart e Kosovs as pr s afrmi nuk jan t brengosur

pr t ardhmen e serbve t Kosovs, serbve t Serbis dhe t zhvendosurve serb. Nse
problemet e shtjelluara n pyetjen prej 1 deri n 4 nuk adresohen si duhet, ather vetm
31 pr qind e shqiptarve t Kosovs besojn se kjo sipas t gjitha gjasave do t oj deri
te trazirat sociale, ndrsa vetm 17% t tyre besojn kjo do t oj nga izolimi i Kosovs
dhe Serbis.

E ardhmja e mundshme e serbve

T gjith serbt e intervistuar n kt hulumtim besojn n skenarin m t mundshm se
n rast t moszgjidhjes s problemeve do t rezultoj me kriminalizimin e shtuar. Sikur se
shqiptart edhe serbt besojn se skenari m pak i mundshm do t ishte izolimi i Kosovs
dhe Serbis. sht e qart se shum pak njerz besojn se bashksia ndrkombtare do tu
kthej shpinn.

347

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM
Shum e mundshme Serbt e
Kosovs
1 Kriminalizimi i shtuar
55%
2 Rritja e emigrimit
47%
3 Jostabiliteti i shtuar 42%
rajonal
4 Shtimi i jostabilitetit 41%
politik
5 Konflikte t reja dhune
41%
6 Eskalimi i tensioneve 40%
etnike
7 Zvoglimi i ndihmave 34%
ndrkombtare
8 Izolimi i Kosovs dhe 33%
Serbis
9 Mungesa e investimeve 32%

Serbt e Serbis

Serbt e zhvendosur n Serbi

1
2
3

Kriminalizimi i shtuar
Shtimi i jostabilitetit politik
Eskalimi i tensioneve etnike

65%
54%
53%

1
2
3

Kriminalizimi i shtuar
Konflikte t reja etnike
Shtimi i jostabilitetit politik

70%
62%
61%

Trazirat sociale

51%

Eskalimi i tensioneve etnike

59%

5
6

Rritja e emigrimit
Shtimi i jostabilitetit rajonal

51%
51%

5
6

Trazirat sociale
Jostabilteti i shtuar rajonal

56%
51%

Konflikte t reja dhune

51%

Rritja e emigrimit

49%

Mungesa e investimeve

41%

47%

Shtimi i pranis ndrkombtare

ushtarake
Zvoglimi
i
ndihmave
ndrkombtare
Izolimi i Kosovs dhe Serbis

41%

Shtimi i pranis ndrkombtare

ushtarake
Zvoglimi i ndihmave ndrkombtare

39%

1
0
1
1

Mungesa e investimeve

40%

Izolimi i Kosovs dhe Serbis

30%

10

Trazirat sociale

30%

10

11

Shtimi
i
pranis
ndrkombtare
ushtarake

28%

11

32%

45%

PJESA 2: ZGJIDHJET
Research

6. Raportet n mes t shqiptarve dhe serbve: Pyetja

Duke iu referuar raporteve shqiptaro-serbe ju lutemi q t theksoni se cilat prej
mundsive i konsideroni Esenciale, T dshirueshme. T pranueshme, T tolerueshme apo T papranueshme.
Prioritetet e shqiptarve t Kosovs
Kur flitet pr zgjidhjen e problemeve, prioriteti i Shqiptarve t Kosovs sht se Beogradi do t duhej t ndalej s ndrruari se do ta kthej Kosovn dhe kt e konsiderojn
46% t t intervistuarve . M pas radhitet krkesa pr krkimfalje publike nga serbt pr
t kqijat e bra n t kaluarn si dhe krkesa pr programe t shkmbimit kulturor pr
student. N rajon, BE dhe n SHBA me 21% qind t t intervistuarve q e konsiderojn
si esenciale.

Esenciale Shqiptart e Kosovs

1 Beogradi do t duhej t ndal s ndrruari se do ta kthej Kosovn
2 Serbt duhet ti pranojn shqiptart si t barabart
3 Serbt e Kosovs do t duhej t ishin m t pavarur nga Beogradi
4 Krkimfalje nga serbt pr shkak t kqijave t bra n t kaluarn
5 Programet e kmbimit kulturor t studentve n rajon, SHBA dhe BE

46%
28%
28%
25%
21%

Prioritetet e serbve
Theksi i serbve t Kosovs, kur flasin pr raportet shqiptaro-serbe sht ai se shqiptart
duhet br m shum q serbt t ndihen t mirseardhur dhe kt e konsiderojn si esenciale 77% t t intervistuarve. Pr 70% konsiderohet se qyteti i Prishtins duhet t
348

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

bj m shum. Serbt gjithashtu krkojn status t posam pr objektet fetare si dhe

q Prishtina duhet t ndalet s ndrruari pr pavarsis e Kosovs. Edhe t zhvendosurit
serb mendojn gati njsoj, mirpo ata theksojn domosdon q shqiptart t punsojn m
shum serb si dhe ti inkurajojn ata q t marrin pjes n institucione kosovare.
Esenciale Serbt e Kosovs
1 Populli i Kosovs duhet
aktivisht t angazhohet q
serbt t ndihen t
mirseradhur
2 Status special pr objektet
fetare serbe
3
4

77%

Serbt e Serbis
1 Qeveria e Kosovs dhe politikant
duhet m aktivisht t mirpresin serbt
e Kosovs

70%

Status special pr objektet

fetare serbe
Prishtina
duhet
t
nderprej me ndrrn e
pavarsis

70%

66%

Qeveria e Kosovs dhe

politikant duhet m
aktivisht t mirpresin
serbt e Kosovs

61%

Populli i Kosovs duhet aktivisht t

angazhohet q serbt t ndihen t
mirseradhur
Prishtina duhet t ndalen s ndrruari
e pavarsis
Qyteti i Prishtins duhet ti mirpres
m shum serbt
Prishtina do t duhej tu paguante
pensionet serbve t Kosovs

71%

Serbt e zhvendosur
1 Status special pr objektet
fetare serbe

76%

67%

Qyteti i Prishtins duhet ti

mirpres m shum serbt

68%

63%

65%

63%

63%

Obligimi q shqiptart t
punsojn serbt
Populli i Kosovs duhet
aktivisht t angazhohet q
serbt
t
ndihen
t
mirseradhur
Inkurajimi i serbve t Kosovs
q t kyen n institucione

65%

64%

Do ishte m leht t identifikohen opsionet e pranueshme, si pr shqiptart e Kosovs

ashtu edhe pr serbt, nse i shfrytzojm pyetjet e seksionit 2. N tabeln numr 6, t
gjitha nga 33 sygjerimet pr prmirsimin e raporteve ndrmjet komuniteteve jan radhitur nga t papranueshme pr shqiptart e Kosovs, nga nj prqindje e ult prej 3% e
papranueshme pr programet e kmbimit studentor, deri te prqindja e lart 80% pr at
se Prishtina duhet t heq dor nga ndrra e pavarsis s Kosovs. Edhe serbt e t gjitha
kategorive (t Kosovs, Serbis dhe t zhvendosurit) me prqindje t vogl jan deklaruar
kundr shkmbimit t studentve. Nga ana tjetr, ajo far shumica e shqiptarve e konsideron t pranueshme, e q sht se serbt e Kosovs duhet t jen m t pavarur nga Beogradi, sht kundrshuar nga 90% e serbve t Serbis. 29 pr qind e serbve t Kosovs,
ndrkoh q 40% e t zhvendosurve serb e konsiderojn kt t papranueshme. Kjo ide
m s shumti i brengos serbt e zhvendosur n Serbi dhe rezultatet dshmojn qart se ata
mbshteten n autoritetet e Beogradit

Research

Pikat e pajtimit dhe mospajtimit

Nga prvoja e Irlands Veriore kemi msuar se sugjerimi q sht prej 40 deri 50% i
papranueshm, duhet doemos q t jt objekt tregtie pr di q e do komuniteti tjetr, apo
mund edhe t zbutet me ndonj koncesion apo kompensim nga njri burim n tjetrin,
e gjith kjo me qllim t krijimit t nj pakoje t marrveshjes. N rastin e Irlands
Veriore, ky burim ishte qeveria e Britanis s Madhe.
Disa nga elemenetet n list nuk jan t pranueshme pr asnjrin komunitet. Shembulli
30. Duket se askush nuk mendon se shkollat e prziera jan ide e mir, pos serbve t Serbis, t cilt vetm kundrshtojn sugjerimin n nivel prej 17% si t papranueshm (44%
shqiptart e Kosovs, 60% serbt e Kosovs dhe 45% t zhvendosurit serb). Megjithat,
s paku gjysma e sugjerimeve jan t pranueshme apo s paku t tolerushme dhe do t
mund t implementoheshi me nj lidership t vogl politik dhe bashkpunim mes shqiptarve dhe serbve t Kosovs. Nuk do t shkoj npr list. Lexuesi mund ta bj vet kt
dhe ti nxjerr konkludimet.
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KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

Tabela 6. Pikat e pajtimit dhe mospajtimit

p j

p j

Research

Tani, duke iu referuar shqiptarve dhe serbve, Ju lutemi theksoni se cilin nga
opsionet i konsideroni t jen "Esenciale", "Dshirueshme", 'Pranueshme",
"Tolerueshme ose t Papranueshme.

Shqiptart
e Kosovs

Serbt e
Kosovs

Serbt e
Serbis

T
zhvendo
surit e
Serbis

Prqindje Papranueshme
Programet e kmbimit kulturor studentor n rajon, BE dhe SHBA

3%

8%

2%

3%

Serbt e Kosovs duhet t jen me t pavarur nga Beogradi

6%

29%

19%

40%

Zhvillim i bashkpunimit ndrmjet Prishtins dhe Beogradit.

10%

7%

0%

1%

Qeveria e Kosovs dhe politikant duhet ti mirpresin serbt

11%

0%

0%

0%

Serbt e Kosovs duhet te kyen m shum n shjet e Kosovs

11%

2%

1%

1%

6
7

Serbt duhet ti pranojn shqiptart si t barabart

Prkrahja e qeveris pr TV programe lokale serbe

11%
12%

17%
8%

11%
2%

12%
7%

Bashkpunim n mes t liderve islamik, ortodoks dhe katolik

13%

7%

6%

7%

9
10
11
12

Prkrahja e qeveris pr media dygjuhsore.

Krkimfalje publike nga serbt pr t kqijat e bra n t kaluarn
Kurse falas n gjuhn shqipe pr serbt n Kosov
Beogradi duhet ta zhvilloj tr politikn e tyre n bashkpunim m serbt e
Kosovs
Msim i prbashkt i historis s Ballkanit nga planprogramet e njjta

14%
15%
16%
17%

6%
20%
36%
0%

4%
26%
22%
0%

7%
48%
25%
1%

17%

33%

5%

21%

14

Nxitja e kthimit t serbve t Kosovs n institucionet kosovare

18%

4%

2%

3%

15

Beogradi duhet t ndalet s endrruari pr kthimin e Kosovs

18%

73%

65%

66%

16

Ndarja e t gjitha shtjeve shtetrore nga Kisha Ortodokse n Serbi

19%

21%

28%

28%

17
18

Shqiptart duhet ti pranojn serbt si t barabart

Qyteti i Prishtins duhet t bj m shum q serbt t ndihen t mirseardhur.

19%
20%

6%
0%

7%
1%

10%
3%

19

21%

6%

4%

1%

20

Ata t ciln ishin t involvuar n luft, nuk duhet t jen n qeveri apo polici nga cila
do an
Krkimfalje publike nga t dyja palt

27%

6%

6%

16%

21
22

Decentralizimi ne nivelin komunal

Populli i Kosovs do t duhej aktivisht ti bj t mirseardhur serbt e Kosovs.

27%
27%

9%
1%

3%
1%

8%
3%

23

Fondi ndrkombtar pr ndihm serbve t Kosovs dhe Serbis

28%

3%

0%

0%

24

Ofrimi i arsimit t lart pr serbt e t gjitha anve t Kosovs

30%

3%

1%

0%

25
26
27
28

do an duhet t heq dor nga krkesat maksimale

Ofrimi i arsimit t lart n t dy gjuht
Obligimi i shqiptarve pr punsimin e serbve
Prishtina duhet t filloj tu paguaj pensionet serbve

38%
42%
43%
44%

2%
19%
1%
25%

3%
5%
3%
1%

3%
7%
1%
11%

29

Msimi i t dy gjuhve shqip dhe serbisht npr shkolla

44%

18%

6%

10%

30
31
32
33

Shkollat e prziera pr shqiptar dhe serb

Krkimfalje publike nga shqiptart pr t kqijat e bra n t kaluarn
Status special pr objektet fetare
Prishtina duht t ndal s ndrruari pr Kosovn e pavarur

47%
49%
53%
80%

60%
11%
2%
4%

17%
9%
1%
3%

45%
15%
0%
5%

7. Siguria: Pyetja
Kur bisedojm pr shtjen e siguris, Ju lutemi theksoni se cilat nga mundsit n vijim i konsideroni Esenciale, T dshirueshme, T pranueshme. T tolerueshme
apo T papranueshme

350

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

Prioritetet e shqiptarve t Kosovs

Sugjerimi se Mitrovica duhet t bashkohet vjen n krye t lists s shqiptarve t Kosovs
si prioritet i siguris. Kjo shtje konsiderohet Esenciale pr 83% t shqiptarve. Rndsi
t posame ata i kushtojn edhe bashkpunimit me Tribunalin e Hags (esencial pr 67%),
pastaj themelimit t Ministris s Brendshme dhe trajnimit m t mir t policve.

Esenciale shqiptart e Kosovs

1 Mitrovica duhet t jet qytet i bashkuar
2 Bashkpunimi me Tribunalin e Hags
3 Themelimi i Ministris s Brendshme t Kosovs
4 Trajnimi m i mir i pjestarve t policis
5 Nj qeveri legale

83%
67%
63%
59%
59%

Prioriteti numr nj pr serbt e Kosovs sht ruajtja e objekteve fetare nga ana e vet
policve ose rojtarve serb dhe kjo pr 67% t tyre konsiderohet Esenciale. T gjith
serbt konsiderojn se forcat e siguris duhet ti prgjigjen popullit, prkatsisht t gjitha
grupeve etnike. Kt e konsiderojn esenciale 66% t serbve t Kosovs, 67% t serbve t
Serbis dhe 75% t t zhvendosrurve serb n Serbi. T zhvendosurit serb e konsiderojn
esenciale domosdoshmrin e ekzistimit t nj gjykate e cila do merrej ekskluzivisht me
konteste pronsore. Kjo shtje sht esenciale edhe pr serbt e Kosovs dhe gjen vendin
n listn e top 5 prioriteteve. Megjithat, serbt e Kosovs konsiderojn se Veriu dhe Jugu
i Mitrovics duhet t jen dy komuna t ndara dhe kjo shtje z vendin e tret n list me
50% q e konsiderojn esenciale. Theksi m i rndsishm n tr kt sht se t gjith
dshirojn sundimin e ligjit, si n Kosov ashtu edhe n rajon si dhe krkojn nj polici t
prgjegjshme.
Esenciale Serbt e Kosovs
1 Policia serbe ti ruaj manastiret

82%

75%

3
4

Serbt e Serbis
Serbt e zhvendosur n Serbi
67%
1 Forcat e siguris tu 68%
1 Gjykata speciale e cila
prgjigjen
t
gjitha
do merrej me kontestet
grupeve etnike
pronsore
Forcat e siguris tu prgjigjen t 66%
2 Shkatrrimi i t gjitha 63%
2 Forcat e siguris tu
gjitha grupeve etnike
armve pa leje
prgjigjen t gjitha
grupeve etnike
Bashkpunimi i vendeve t rajonit 51%
3 Sistemi gjyqsor me 63%
3 Policia serbe ti ruaj
n luftn kundr krimit t
efikas dhe aktiv
manastiret
organizuar
Veriu dhe Jugu i Mitrovics duhet 50%
4 Bashkpunimi i vendeve 62%
4 T gjitha krimet etnike
t jen dy komuna t ndara
t rajonit n luftn kundr
duhet t gjykohen
konform ligjit me
krimit t organizuar
dnime maksimale
Gjykata speciale e cila do merrej me 47%
5 T gjitha krimet etnike 59%
5 Bashkpunimi
i
kontestet pronsore
duhet
t
gjykohen
vendeve t rajonit n
konform ligjit me dnime
luftn kundr krimit t
maksimale
organizuar

Research

Prioritetet e serbve

72%
67%

66%

Pikat e pajtimit dhe mospajtimit

Pikat e pajtimit dhe mospajtimit jan br sikurse edhe n pyetjen 6. Kto pika, nga
lista prej gjithsej 32 sosh, t cilt serbt dhe shqiptart e Kosovs identifikojmn si mbi
40% t papranueshme jan shnjuar me ngjyr hiri n tabeln 7.
351

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

Research

Pr momentin as serbt e as shqiptart e Kosovs nuk mund tia besojn njri-tjetrit

shtjen e siguris dhe gjyqsis. 65% e serbve t Kosovs dhe 49% e serbve t zhvendosur nuk duan q Kosova t ket Ministri t Brendshme. Ngjashm, 70% t shqiptarve
t Kosovs nuk duan q policia serbe ti ruaj manastiret dhe objektet e tjera fetare serbe.
Megjithat, t dy komunitetet dshirojn spektrin e gjr t reformave t cilat do ta bnin
sistemin gjyqsor m efikas, m aktiv dhe m t drejt. sht interesante se as shqiptart e
Kosovs e as serbt e Kosovs nuk dshirojn krijimin e Trupave monoetnike Mbrojtse
t Kosovs. (59% e papranueshme pr shqiptart e Kosovs dhe 44% e papranueshme pr
serbt e Kosovs, 33% pr serbt e Serbis dhe 34% pr t zhvendosurit serb). Megjithat,
q sht m me rndsi, askush nuk kundrshton iden q t gjitha krimet etnike do t
duhej t dnoheshin me dnime m t larta t mundshme. Prqindja e papranueshme pr
kt pik, tek shqiptart e Kosovs sht 1%, tek serbt e Kosovs 0%, serbt e Serbis 0%
dhe serbt e zhvendosur 0%.

352

Njsitet e prbashkta t shqiptarve dhe serbve n polici pr ti ruajtur objektet fetare

serbe do t mund t ishte nj shtje kompromisi dhe nuk sht e pamundur. Nga aspekti
i kundrshtimit, kjo zgjidhje sht e papranueshme pr 33% t shqiptarve dhe 29% t
serbve t Kosovs. Nuk ekziston koncenzusi lidhur me ardhmrin e Mitrovcs, 94%
e shqiptarve kundrshtojn ndarjen e komunave t Mitrovics, ndrsa 64% e serbve t
Kosovs, 11% e serbve t Serbis dhe 42% e t zhvendosurve serb kundrshtojn bashkimin e Mitrovics n nj komun. Ndoshta do t duhej s pari ballafaquar me shtjet e
siguris n mnyrn m adekuate n mnyr q t krijohen kushtet pr tu diskutuar dhe
zgjidhur kto probleme tjera.

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

Tabela 7. Pikat e pajtimit dhe mospajtimit

p j

Shqiptart
e
Kosovs

Serbt e
Kosovs

Serbt e
Serbis

T
zhvendosurit
e Serbis

Krijimi i Ministris s Punve t Brendshme

0%

65%

24%

49%

2
3

Trajnimi m i mir i policis

Komuna duhet t luaj rol aktiv n zgjedhjen e officerve t lart t policis

0%
0%

0%
7%

1%
3%

17%
20%

Gjykata speciale q do te merrej me kontestet pronsore

0%

0%

0%

1%

Bashkpunimi n mes t shteteve n rajon n luftimin e krimit t organizuar

0%

1%

0%

3%

Przgjedhja e duhur dhe trajnimi i eprorve t SHPK-s, pr t siguruar respekt dhe

autoritetit n popullatn lokale
Kosova duhet ta ket gjykatn e vet pr krime lufte
Reforma paralele t policis me reformat lokale qeveritare

0%

14%

3%

9%

0%
1%

67%
9%

53%
2%

55%
24%

do krim etnik duhet t ndiqet penalisht me ligj me dnimet m t mdha t

mundshme
Sistemi juridik sa m efikas dhe efektiv
Gjykatsit e paguar si duhet

1%

0%

0%

0%

1%
1%

3%
3%

0%
0%

0%
5%

Kontrolli lokal policor, por nj shrbim i vetm i policis q siguron

bashkpunimin efektiv.
Mitrovica duhet t bhet qytet i bashkuar
Bashkpunimi me Tribunalin e Hags
Forcat e siguris tu prgjigjen pjestarve t t gjitha grupeve etnike

1%

4%

3%

8%

1%
1%
2%

64%
14%
2%

11%
13%
0%

42%
8%
2%

Politikant dhe mediat duhen t ken kujdes se ka flasin

Pr garantimin e siguris s serbve t Kosovs, Beogradi duhet t prkrah
marrveshjen pr statutin final
Koordinimi qendror i t gjitha strukturave t siguris n Kosov

21%
3%

4%
51%

0%
14%

0%
30%

4%

23%

5%

24%

4%

28%

6%

15%

20

Shrbimet e siguris, prfshir edhe TMK-n, duhet proaktivisht ti angazhoj

minoritetet
Gjyqet lokale, fillimisht t mbikqyren nga bashksia ndrkombtare

5%

8%

8%

9%

21
22
23
24

Nj qeveri juridike
Nj sistem juridik i unifikuar
Shkatrrimi i armve n prone private
Rekrutimi i serbve n TMK pr t siguruar pjesmarrjen e tyre

5%
8%
10%
10%

21%
16%
15%
13%

4%
3%
3%
5%

6%
5%
7%
9%

25
26
27

Demilitarizimi i rajoneve kufitare

TMK me epror t lart prej komuniteteve shqiptare dhe serbe
Polici e prbashkt serbe dhe kosovare pr ruajtjen e manastireve n Kosov

14%
28%
33%

35%
26%
29%

24%
5%
2%

20%
16%
25%

28
29
30
31

TMK-ja e ndar, monoetnike

Mbrojtja e manastireve ne Kosov nga policia serbe
Dy gjuh zyrtare
Nje rajon autonom pr serbet e Kosovs sikurse "Republika Srpska" n Bosnje dhe
Hercegovin
Mitrovica veriore dhe jugore duhen t jen dy komuna t ndara

59%
70%
77%
78%

44%
2%
22%
18%

33%
3%
21%
19%

34%
6%
7%
39%

94%

14%

23%

11%

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

32

Research

p j

Tani, duke iu referuar siguris, Ju lutemi theksoni se cilin nga opinionet i

konsideroni jan "Esenciale", t "Dshirueshme", t 'Pranueshme", "Tolerueshme
ose t "Papranueshme. Prqindje t Papranueshme

8. Negociatat rreth statusit prfundimtar:

Pyetja Kur bisedojm pr negociatat rreth statusit prfundmitar, Ju lutemi theksoni se
cilat nga mundsit n vijim i konsideroni Esenciale, T dshirueshme, T pranueshme. T tolerueshme apo T papranueshme
Prioritetet e shqiptarve t Kosovs
59% t shqiptarve t Kosovs konsiderojn se sht esenciale q edhe Beogradi t
pajtohet me statusin prfundimtar t Kosovs. Po ashtu do t dshironin q SHBA-t t
jen m proaktive, 57% konsiderojn si esenciale, q bashksia ndrkombtare t arrij nj
status prfundimtar (56% si esencial) ) dhe pr bisedimet edhe n SHBA edhe n BE (49%
353

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

konsiderojn esenciale). Prioritetet shqiptare duke se theksojn involvimin e bashksis

ndrkombtare n dy negociatat dhe njohjen e statusit final dhe, natyrisht, do t dshironin
nj referendum.
Esenciale shqiptart e Kosovs
1
Beogradi duhet t pajtohet me statusin prfundimtar
2
SHBA-t duhet t jen shum aktive
3
Bashksia ndrkombtare, Kshilli i Sigurimit dhe BE duhet t arrijn pajtim rreth statusit
4
Duhet t ket referendum mbi statusin prfundimtar
5
Bisedat n SHBA ose BE-s

59%
57%
56%
53%
49%

Prioritetet e serbve
Serbt e Kosovs si dhe serbt e zhvendosur dshirojn q bashksia ndrkombtare t
involvoj Beogradin me m shum se 70% q konsiderojn se kjo sht esenciale. Serbt
e Serbis prkrahin qndrimin se negociatort nga Beogradi duhet t ken prkrahjen e
serbve t Kosovs (73% esenciale), dhe se serbt e Kosovs duhet t ken vendin n
tryezn e bisedimeve (71% esencial). Serbt e Kosovs si dhe ata t zhvendosurit pajtohen
me kt. Serbt e Kosovs, nga ana tjetr, si mund t pritej, insistojn n prmbushjen e
standardeve para nisjes s negociatave (58%).

Research

Esenciale Serbt e Kosovs

1 Bashksia ndrkombtare
duhet ta involvoj m
shum Beogradin
2

70%

Serbt e Serbis
1 Negociatort e Beogradit
duhet t prkrahen nga
serbt e Kosovs

Negociatort e Beogradit
duhet t prkrahen nga
serbt e Kosovs
Bisedat e hapura

61%

60%

Plotsimi i standardeve n
reforma shoqrore dhe
politike para nisjes s
negociatave

58%

Bashksia ndrkombtare
duhet ti trajtoj t gjith
prfaqsuesit e zgjedhur
n mnyr t njjt,
pavarsisht nga baza e tyre
politike

58%

Serbt e Kosovs duhet t

ken vend n tryezn e
bisedimeve
Prioriteti i Beogradit gjat
bisedimeve duhet t jet
siguria dhe mirqenia e
serbve t Kosovs
Bashksia ndrkombtare
duhet ti trajtoj t gjith
prfaqsuesit e zgjedhur n
mnyr
t
njjt,
pavarsisht nga baza e tyre
politike
Beogradi duhet t zhvilloj
pozicionin politik n
pajtueshmri t plot me
serbt e Kosovs

71%

Serbt e zhvendosur n Serbi

1 Prioriteti i Beogradit gjat
bisedimeve duhet t jet
siguria dhe mirqenia e
serbve t Kosovs
2 Bisedat e hapura

69%

Negociatort e Beogradit
duhet t prkrahen nga serbt
e Kosovs

76%

65%

Serbt e Kosovs duhet t

ken vend n tryezn e
bisedimeve

75%

63%

Bashksia ndrkombtare
duhet t involvoj m shum
Beogradin

72%

73%

80%

79%

Pikat e pajtimit dhe mospajtimit

Si sht par, shumica e sugjerime q kan t bjn me negociata jan t pranueshme
si pr shqiptart ashtu edhe pr serbt. Megjithat ka disa prjashtime.
Mbajtja e referendumit rreth statusit prfundimtar t Kosovs nuk prkrahet nga 84%
t serbve t Kosovs, pr 63% t serbve t Serbis kjo sht e papranushme sikur edhe
pr 52% t serbve t zhvendosur.
Edhe nse t gjith serbt dshirojn q serbt e Kosovs t marrin pjes n negociata, serbt e Kosovs kan rezerva n lidhje me zgjedhjen. 40% t serbve t Kosovs
konsiderojn se sht e papranueshme q Beogradi duhet t prkrah zgjedhjet e reja n
354

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

Kosov para nisjes s bisedimeve. N njrn mnyr apo tjetrn, zgjidhja e ktij problemi
duhet t gjindet pasi q dokush pajtohet se serbt e Kosovs duhet t flasin pr serbt e
Kosovs, e jo Beogradi. Kjo sht e papranueshme vetm pr 3 pr qind t shqiptarve t
Kosovs, pr 2% t serbve t Kosovs, pr 3% t serbve t Serbis dhe 9% t serbve t
zhvendosur n Serbi.

Research

Serbt e Kosovs nuk dshirojn q bashksia ndrkombtare t imponoj nj zgjidhje, n rast t dshtimit t negociatave (46% e papranueshme), ndrsa 54% t shqiptarve
nuk duan q Kisha Ortodokse Serbe t ket rol n procesin e negociatave. Askush nuk i
dshiron bisedat sekrete, dhe kjo sht e papranueshme pr 67% shqiptar t Kosovs, 71%
serb t Kosovs dhe 72% serb t Serbis dhe serbt e zhvendosur n Serbi.

355

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

Tabela 8 Pikat e pajtimit dhe mospajtimit

Research

p j

356

p j

Tani, duke iu referuar negociatave pr statutin final, Ju lutemi t theksoni se cilin nga opsionet i
konsideroni t jen "Esenciale", t "Dshirueshme", t 'Pranueshme", "Tolerueshme ose t
"Papranueshme.
Prqindje t Papranueshme

Shqipt
aret e
Kosov
s

Serbt
e
Kosov
s

Serbt
e
Serbis

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Forum i hapur pr partit politike dhe ekspertt

Bisedimet ne SHBA dhe BE
Bashksia ndrkombtare - Kshilli i Sigurimit dhe BE-- duhet t pajtohen pr statusin final
BE-duhet t jet m proaktive
SHBA duhet te jet m proaktive
Grupi i Kontaktit duhet t ket nj qndrim
Trajnimi pr politikant lokal pr prmbushjen e nevojave dhe krkesave t tyre

0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
1%
1%

4%
36%
12%
8%
32%
4%
7%

2%
32%
4%
5%
28%
3%
5%

T
zhven
dosurit
e
Serbis

18%
25%
12%
11%
15%
1%
15%

8
9
10

Beogradi duhet te pajtohet me statusin final

Bisedime t hapura
Duhet kuptuar brengat, frikat, problemet dhe pikpamjet e politikanve tjer

1%
2%
2%

25%
2%
6%

7%
1%
5%

22%
0%
2%

11
12
13
14

Orari i sakt i negociatave

Serbt e Kosovs duhet biseduar pr serbt e Kosovs e jo Beogradi
BE-ja dhe SHBA duhet t ken nj qndrim
Beogradi duhet ti pkrah zgjedhjet e reja n Kosov para negiciatave

2%
3%
3%
4%

4%
2%
9%
40%

1%
3%
7%
23%

7%
9%
6%
34%

15

Caktimi i diplomatit te BE-s apo diplomatit t KB-s q t punoj me orar t plot m t dy

palt

4%

4%

10%

10%

16
17

Bisedimet n mes t Beogradit dhe Prishtins m ndihmn e ndrmjetsuesit

Duhet t ket referendum n Kosov n lidhje me statusin final

4%
5%

13%
84%

7%
63%

10%
52%

18

Bashksia ndrkombtare duhet t mirret n mnyr t barabart me t gjith prfaqsuesit e

zgjedhur pa marr parasysh prkatsin e tyre politike

11%

1%

1%

0%

19

Presioni ndrkombtar pr bisedime n mes t politikanve

12%

3%

8%

10%

20
21

donjri i zgjedhur pr negociata duhet t pranohet nga ana tjetr

Duhet prmbushur standardet e prcaktuara nga bashksia ndrkombtare n reformat politike
dhe shoqrore

14%
15%

14%
1%

5%
5%

3%
6%

22
23

Dnime ndrkombtare pr mosnegociim

Serbt e Kosovs duhet ta ken vendin n tryezn e bisedimeve

15%
17%

11%
8%

8%
0%

10%
0%

24

Bashksia ndrkombtare duhet ta prfshij Beogradin m shum

17%

0%

2%

8%

25

Nse asnj marrveshje nuk arrihet gjat periudhs s negociimit, ather bashksia
ndrkombtare duhet ta bj kt marrveshje

17%

46%

36%

28%

26

Prioriteti i Beogradit n kto negociata duhet t jet ekzistenca dhe siguria e serbve t Kosovs

19%

4%

1%

0%

27
28

Bisedimet n Kosov dhe Serbi

Fillimi i negociatave dhe arritja e standardeve para statusit final

20%
21%

7%
21%

1%
3%

1%
0%

29

Negociatort zyrtar nuk mund t jen pjesmarrs n konfliktin e fundit

22%

4%

5%

4%

30

Prioriteti i Beogradit n kto negociata duhet t jet statusi final i Kosovs

23%

17%

3%

1%

31

Negociatort e Beogradit duhet ta ken prkrahjen e serbve t Kosovs

23%

4%

0%

0%

32

Bisedimet n mes t Beogradit dhe Uashingtonit si edhe Beogradit dhe Brukselit.

24%

19%

9%

9%

33

Beogradi duhet ta zhvilloj qndrimin e vet pr negociata n bashkpunim t plot m serbt e

Kosovs

27%

1%

0%

0%

34

Negociatave duhet tu jepet shum koh

31%

6%

9%

4%

35

Takime t prbashkta t Beogradit, Prishtins dh serbve t Kosovs pa parakushte

32%

5%

1%

0%

36

Beogradi dhe Prishtina duhen t ken t drejt t njjt n negociata

34%

6%

3%

17%

37
38

Zgjedhjet e reja parlamentare duhet ti afrojn serbt n negociata

Bisedimet direkte n mes t Beogradit dhe Prishtins pa ndrmjetsues

36%
39%

23%
16%

8%
14%

15%
4%
3%

39

Kisha Ortodokse Serbe duhet t ket rol n negociata

54%

13%

8%

40

Duhet t ket referendum n Serbi pr statusin final

66%

17%

28%

18%

41

Bisedimet sekrete

67%

71%

72%

72%

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

9. Parimet drejtuese pr statusin prfundimtar t Kosovs: Pyetja

Lidhur me parimet drejtuese t statusit prfundimtar t Kosovs , ju lutem theksoni se
cilat nga mundsit n vijim i konsideroni Esenciale, T dshirueshme, T pranueshme. T tolerueshme apo T papranueshme
Prioritetet e shqiptarve t Kosovs

Esenciale shqiptart e Kosovs

1
Pavarsi e plot
2
Kosovs duhet ti lejohet ta ket ushtrin e vet
3
Kosova duhet t jet antare e OKB-s
4
Kosovs duhet ti lejohet q t formoj politikn e vet t jashtme
5
NATO duhet t mbetet derisa sht e nevojshme

81%
73%
67%
60%
57%

Prioritetet e serbve
Kosova nuk mund t largohet nga Serbia, sht n krye t lists s serbve me 69%
esenciale pr serbt e Kosovs, 65% pr serbt e Serbis dhe 73% t serbve t zhvendosur.
N vendin e dyt n list, figuron se serbt duhet t kan t drejtn t mbajn shtetsin.
Vendin e tret e z domososhmria q t prmbushen stadardet para statusit.
Esenciale serbt e Kosovs
1 Kosova nuk mund t ndahet
nga Serbia
2 Standardet para statusit final
3
4
5

Serbt e Kosovs prher

mund ta mbajn shtetsin e
Serbis
Zgjidhje brenda kufijve
aktual t Kosovs dhe
Serbis
Zgjidhje q respekton kufijt
aktual t Serbis dhe Malit
t Zi n ligjin ndrkombtar

69%
58%
56%

Serbt e Serbis
1 Kosova nuk mund t ndahet nga
Serbia
2 Serbt e Kosovs prher mund ta
mbajn shtetsin e Serbis
3 Statusi final nuk duhet t prfshij
amnestin pr krime t lufts

47%

47%

Zgjidhje q respekton kufijt aktual t

Serbis dhe Malit t Zi n ligjin
ndrkombtar
Shqiptart duhet t paguajn t gjitha
mimet financiare pr ndarje nga
Serbia

T zhvendosurit serb n Serbi

1 Kosova nuk mund t ndahet nga
Serbia
2 Serbt e Kosovs prher mund ta
mbajn shtetsin e Serbis
3 Zgjidhje brenda kufijve aktual t
Kosovs dhe Serbis

59%

43
%

Jo pavarsi t plot

39%

43
%

Zgjidhje q respekton kufijt aktual

t Serbis dhe Malit t Zi n ligjin
ndrkombtar

38%

65
%
58
%
43
%

Research

Askush nuk do t befasohet fare kur sheh se pavarsia e plot e Kosovs gjendet n
vendin e par t prioriteteve t shqiptarve t Kosovs dhe kjo nga 81% e t intervistuarve
u kualifikua si esenciale. Prapa ksaj qndrojn karakteristikat tjera t pavarsis. Kosova
do t duhej t ket ushtrin e vet - 73% esenciale; t jet antare e OKB-s me 67%, t ket
politikn e jashtme me 60%. N vendin e pest t shqiptarve t Kosovs vjen nevoja q
NATO-ja t mbetet derisa t jet e domosodshme me 57% kualifikim se kjo sht esenciale.
Shqiptart e Kosovs duan pavarsin e krahas me serbt e Kosovs, edhe shqiptart duan
sigurin dhe n kt kuadr e mirpresin ndihmn e bashksis ndrkombtare.

73%

43%

Pikat e pajtimit dhe mospajtimit

Pr dallim nga shtjet procedurale q kan t bjn me negociata, shqiptart dhe
serbt e Kosovs nuk mund t arrijn koncenzus rreth parimeve udhheqse t statusit
prfundimtar. Megjithat kjo sht nj gj q tashm sht pritur. T gjith dshirojn q
negociatat t zgjidhin shum probleme n Kosov mirpo do kush dshiron q zgjidhja e
statusit t bhet sipas dshirs s tyre.
357

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

Research

Ndoshta kam qen i ashpr kur kam theksuar gjerat me ngjyr hiri n momentin kur
sht arritur mbi 40 prqindshi i papranueshmris. Shumica e thjesht krkon 50% plus.
Duhet t mbahet mend se elementet q jan t papranueshme n prgjithsi, zakonisht
bhen t pranueshme nse kemi t bjm me nj pako q ofron zgjidhje paqsore. P.sh.
protestantt kan kundrshtuar ashpr reformn policore n Irlandn Veriore mirpo kjo
sht pranuar n kuadr t Marrveshjes s Belfastit.

358

Duke i pasur parasysh kto, ka shenja t qarta se ekziston nj potencial pr arritjen

e marrveshjes n mes t shqiptarve dhe serbve. Kto jan: NATO-ja duhet t mbetet
prderisa ekziston nevoja dhe kjo sht 0% e papranueshme pr shqiptart e Kosovs dhe
pr 3% t serbve t Kosovs; m shum investim pr zgjidhjen m t shpejt t statusit
final, me 2% e papranueshme pr shqiptart e Kosovs, por 17 % e papranueshme pr
serbt e zhvendosur; t gjitha shtetet e Ballkanit duhet ti bashkangjiten NATO-s, me 3% e
papranueshme pr shqiptart e Kosovs, por 3% e papranueshme pr serbt e Serbis; nj
program regjenerues ekonomik pr Serbin dhe Kosovn, si pjes e marrveshjes e statusit
final, me 7% e papranueshme pert shqiptart e Kosovs, por vetm 6% pr serbt e Serbis;
krejt ish-Jugosllavia do t duhej t bashkpunonte dhe t punonte pr ti ndihmuar t tjerve
q ti bashkohen BE-s, me 11% e papranueshme pr shqiptart e Kosovs dhe m pak se
4% e paranueshme pr t gjith serbt; nuk ka bashkim me fqinjt sht thuajse baraz e papranueshme pr dok, me 16% pr shqiptart e Kosovs, 20% pr serbt e Kosovs, 36%
pr serbt e Serbis dhe 19% pr serbt e zhvendosur; serbt e Kosovs gjihtmon mund ta
mbajn shtetsin e tyre sht e papranueshme vetm pr 18% t shqiptarve t Kosovs;
prmbushja e standardeve para statusit sht e papranushme vetm pr 22% t shqiptarve
t Kosovs, e nj zgjidhje q respekton kufijt ekzistues t Serbis dhe Malit t Ziu sipas
ligjeve ndrkombtare sht e papranueshme pr 26 pr qind t shqiptarve t Kosovs. N
krejt kt ka mjaft susbstanc pr t formuar nj baz pr negociata dhe t gjitha kto pika
do t duhej pasur parasysh kur ekzaminohen aranzhmanet e ndryshme kushtetuese q jan
testuar tek opinioni publkc n prgjigjen 10.

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42

Tani, duke iu referuar negociatave pr statusin final, Ju lutemi t

theksoni se cilin nga opsionet i konsideroni t jen "Esenciale", t
"Dshirueshme", t 'Pranueshme", "Tolerueshme ose t
"Papranueshme.
Prqindje t Papranueshme
Pavarsi juridike brenda kufijve ekzistues t Serbis

Shqipta
ret
e
Kosovs

Serbt
e
Kosovs

Serbt e
Serbis

T
zhvendosu
rit
e
Serbis

0%

51%

48%

54%

3%
92%
91%
14%

23%
87%
84%
13%

21%
81%
76%
17%

89%
15%
67%
71%
22%

72%
23%
52%
70%
6%

67%
11%
59%
66%
33%

57%
4%

21%
4%

50%
3%

47%
20%
9%
86%

24%
36%
6%
79%

43%
19%
16%
71%

3%
68%
21%

3%
34%
6%

18%
56%
19%

72%

68%

60%

42%
68%
61%
87%
9%
48%

21%
49%
66%
79%
6%
65%

21%
67%
61%
66%
3%
60%

18%

7%

31%

33%
42%

17%
19%

35%
32%

77%

83%

72%

84%

53%

56%

79%

56%

78%

71%
41%

71%
39%

66%
47%

73%

81%

76%

68%

59%

59%

11%
62%
34%

14%
41%
26%

36%
61%
28%

16%
29%
10%

32%
39%
17%

38%
47%
32%

NATO duhet t mbetet derisa sht e nevojshme

0%
Pavarsia e plot
1%
Kosovs duhet ti lejohet q t ket ushtrin e vet
1%
M shum investime pr zgjidhjen m t shpejt t problemit t statusit 2%
prfundimtar
3%
Kosovs duhet ti lejohet q t formoj politikn e vet t jashtme
T gjitha shtetet ballkanike duhet t hyjn n NATO
3%
Kosovs duhet ti lejohet q t ket forcat civile t mbrojtjes
4%
5%
Kosova duhet t jet antare e KB
Programi ndrkombtar i riprtritjes ekonomike pr Serbin dhe pr 7%
Kosovn si pjes e marrveshjes pr statusin prfundimtar
Standardet mund t prmbushen krahas statusit
7%
T gjitha shtetet e ish-Jugosllavis duhet t bashkpunojn dhe t 11%
punojn pr hyrjen e prbashkt n BE
Nuk ka kthim n statusin e para lufts - 1999
15%
Nuk mund t ket bashkim me fqinjt
16%
Serbt e Kosovs mund t mbeten qytetar serb n Kosov
18%
Pavarsia e plot e drejtprdrejt e Kosovs n baz t referendumit 18%
nga viti 1991
Prmbushja e standardeve para marrveshjes pr statusin final
22%
Decentralizimi sipas rajoneve etnike
22%
Zgjidhja e cila i respekton kufijt e Serbis dhe t Malit t Zi n kuadr 26%
t s drejts ndrkombtare
Serbia duhet t paguaj t gjitha shpenzimet politike t mbajtjes s 34%
Kosovs
Nuk ka ndarje
34%
Pa integrim t plot me Serbin
34%
Pavarsia vetm kur jan arritur kushtet pr t cilat arritur pajtimi
38%
Kosova praktikisht e pavarur pa fjalt e pavarur ose sovrane
39%
Zgjidhja brenda kufijve t tanishm t Kosovs dhe Serbis
42%
Amnistimi pr krime t lufts si pjes e marrveshjes pr statusin 43%
prfundimtar
Postet e rezervuara pr pakicn serbe n t gjitha institucionet e 43%
Kosovs
Statusi final nuk do t duhej t prfshinte amnistin pr krime t lufts
45%
Serbia do t duhej pranuar t gjitha vshtirsit politike q do t 47%
rrjedhin nga mbajtja e Kosovs brenda kufijve t vet
T shlyhen borxhet e Kosovs n Serbi dhe n Mal t Zi nse Kosova 48%
nuk mbetet n prbrje t Serbis
Duhet t arrihet pajtimi mes serbve dhe shqiptarve rreth himnit 54%
shtetror
Duhet t arrihet pajtimi mes serbve dhe shqiptarve rreth flamurit 57%
shtetror
Pavarsia e prkohshme me periudh t caktuar t prshtatjes
57%
62%
Pavarsia ekonomike brenda kufijve ekzistues me Serbin
64%
Gjuha shqipe duhet t jet gjuh zyrtare n Qeverin e Serbis
Kosova si rajon i KB n Serbi dhe n Mal t Zi /Konfederata 64%
ballkanike
Enklavat e siguris pr pakicn serbe si mas e prkohshme
67%
Shtetsia e dyfisht tu ofrohet t gjith qytetarve n rajon
68%
Prfaqsimi prpjestimor i politikanve shqiptar n Parlamentin e 68%
Serbis nse e ruan Kosovn
Ndarja n rajonet serbe dhe shqiptare
70%
Kantonet pr pakica n Kosov dhe n Serbi
76%
Decentralizimi sipas rajoneve etnike
78%

Research

Tabela 9

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KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

43
44
45
46
47
48
49

Shqiptart duhet t paguajn t gjitha shpenzimet politike t ndarjes nga

Serbia
Federata Serbi, Mali i Zi, Kosov duhet t ket presidentin e Serbis, t
Malit t Zi dhe t Federats s Kosovs t cilt ndryshohen sipas radhs
Kosova praktikisht e pavarur por ende pjes e Serbis dhe Malit t Zi
T shtyhet vendimi pr statusin prfundimtar pr m s paku dhjet vjet
M pak se pavarsia por m shum se autonomia
Kosova nuk mund t ndahet nga Serbia
Pa pavarsi t plot

78%

36%

24%

27%

80%

83%

63%

57%

81%
82%
84%
86%
90%

62%
31%
31%
4%
24%

63%
52%
20%
3%
8%

61%
57%
41%
5%
27%

10. Pakoja Kushtetuese pr statusin prfundimtar t Kosovs: Pyetja

Lidhur me pakon kushtetuese pr statusin prfundimtar t Kosovs, Ju lutemi theksoni
se cilat nga mundsit n vijim i konsideroni Esenciale, T dshirueshme, T pranueshme. T tolerueshme apo T papranueshme

Research

Pikat e mospajtimit
N kt seksion, shtjet jan shkruar dhe prpiluar qllimisht duke e prfshir tr
spektrin politik duke filluar nga bashkimi i tr tokave serbe n njrin ekstrem dhe duke
bashkuar tr tokat shqiptare n ekstremin tjetr. N mnyr t pashmangshme, si kan
dshmuar t gjitha prgjigjet e t gjitha pyetjeve edhe ky rast tregon se preferencat e pakos
kushtetuese dallojn shume pr shqiptart n njrn an dhe serbt n ann tjetr (shikoni
tabelat 10.1 deri 10.6). 36% t shqiptarve konsiderojn se pavarsia e plot dhe moslejimi
q serbt t mbajn shtetsin t jet esenciale. Nga ana tjetr, 65% t serbve t Kosovs,
46% t serbve t Serbis dhe 46% t serbve t zhvendosur konsiderojn se sht esencial integrimi i plot i Kosovs n Serbi. T tjert n Kosov preferojn bashkimin me
Shqiprin dhe kjo sht esenciale pr 19% t t intervistuarve.
Tabela 10.a. Pikat e mospajtimit
p j

Pyetja 10 - Tani, duke iu referuar pakos

kushtetuese pr statusin final, Ju lutemi t
theksoni se cilin nga opsionet i konsideroni t
jen "Esenciale", t "Dshirueshme", t
'Pranueshme",
"Tolerueshme
ose
t
"Papranueshme.
Prqindje Esenciale
Bashkimi i t t gjitha tokave serbe
Integrimi i plot i Kosovs n Serbi
Republik n Serbi dhe Mal t Zi bashk me
kontrollin e t t gjitha aspekteve t Qeveris n
nivel lokal (sipas Kushtetuts nga viti 1974)
Republik n Serbi dhe Mal t Zi bashk me
kontrollin e t gjitha aspekteve t Qeveris n
nivel lokal dhe statusi rajonal n BE
Protektorati i Bashkimit Evropian
Bashksia ekonomike e shteteve t pavarura t
Kosovs, Malit t Zi dhe Serbis
Shtet n kuadr t BE, por Kosova Veriore hyn
n prbrje t Serbis

360

Shqiptart
e Kosovs

Serbt e
Kosovs

Kosova
t tjert

1%
0%
0%

28%
65%
6%

0%

Serbt e
Serbis

T
zhvendosur
it
Serb

SerbiaT Tjert

5%
8%
2%

24%
46%
9%

27%
64%
12%

16%
35%
10%

3%

0%

7%

8%

8%

3%
4%

9%
1%

0%
6%

3%
3%

3%
9%

2%
3%

0%

6%

6%

4%

6%

4%

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

Shtet n kuadr t BE me t drejt zgjedhjeje t

shtetsis pr serbt, t cilt do ta ndajn
kantonin e vet n veri t Kosovs me Serbin
nn administrat t prbashkt
Shtet n kuadr t BE me t drejt q serbt t
cilt do ta ken kantonin e vet n Kosov ta
zgjedhin shtetsin
Shtet n kuadr t BE me t drejt q serbt ta
zgjedhin shtetsin
Pavarsia e plot pa t drejt q serbt e
Kosovs ta zgjedhin shtetsin
Bashkimi i Kosovs me Shqiprin
Bashkimi i tokave shqiptare

0%

9%

0%

4%

3%

4%

1%

12%

6%

3%

2%

5%

4%

5%

0%

3%

2%

8%

36%

0%

14%

2%

0%

0%

17%
30%

0%
0%

19%
21%

1%
1%

0%
0%

1%
1%

Nse tash e kthejm vmendjen nga shkalla e i papranueshm, pozita radikalisht

ndryshon q t identifikohen pikat e kompromisit t mundshm. Prqindja m e vogl e
papranueshmris si te shqiptart e Kosovs ashtu edhe t serbt sht Kosova nn protektoratin e BE-s dhe kjo paraqitet 20% e papranueshme pr shqiptart, 58% pr serbt
e Kosovs; 60% pr serbt e Serbis dhe 62% pr t zhvendosurve serb. Popullariteti i
prbashkt i ksaj mundsie pasohet me dy tjera: shteti si pjes e Bashkimit Evropian me t
drejt t zgjedhjes s shtetsis nga ana e serbve t Kosovs t cilt do t kishin kantonin
e tyre n Kosov. Kjo mundsi sht pr 63% t shqiptarve e papranueshme, pr 48% t
serbve t Kosovs; 65% t serbve t Serbis dhe 62% t t zhvendosurve serb gjithashtu
e papranueshme.
Pjesmarrsit tjer kan n konsiderim prfshirjen e nj Unioni Ekonomik t
shteteteve t pavarura t Kosovs, Malit t Zi dhe Serbis, por 88% t serbve t Kosovs e
konsiderojn kt opsion t papranueshm, ndrsa shteti si pjes e BE-s por veriu i mbetet
Serbis, sht opcion i papranueshm pr 96% t shqiptarve t Kosovs. Ndoshta serbt
e Kosovs jan t ndar lidhur me kt ide dhe ndasia ka t bj me ata q jetojn n Veri
dhe Jug t Kosovs.

Research

Pikat e pajtimit

361

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

Tabela 10.b. Pitimit

p j

Research

Pyetja 10 - Tani, duke iu referuar pakos kushtetuese pr statusin

final, Ju lutemi t theksoni se cilin nga opsionet i konsideroni t jen
"Esenciale", t "Dshirueshme", t 'Pranueshme", "Tolerueshme
ose t "Papranueshme.
Prqindje e papranueshme
Bashkimi i t t gjitha tokave serbe
Integrimi i plot i Kosovs n Serbi
Republik n Serbi dhe Mal t Zi bashk me kontrollin e t t gjitha
aspekteve t Qeveris n nivel lokal (sipas Kushtetuts nga viti
1974)
Republik n Serbi dhe Mal t Zi bashk me kontrollin e t gjitha
aspekteve t Qeveris n nivel lokal dhe statusi rajonal n BE
Protektorati i Bashkimit Evropian
Bashksia Ekonomike e shteteve t pavarura t Kosovs, Malit t Zi
dhe Serbis
Shtet n kuadr t BE, por Kosova Veriore hyn n prbrje t
Serbis
Shtet n kuadr t BE me t drejt zgjedhjeje t shtetsis pr
serbt, t cilt do ta ndajn kantonin e vet n veri t Kosovs me
Serbin nn administrat t prbashkt
Shtet n kuadr t BE me t drejt q serbt t cilt do ta ken
kantonin e vet n Kosov ta zgjedhin shtetsin
Shtet n kuadr t BE me t drejt q serbt ta zgjedhin shtetsin
Pavarsia e plot pa t drejt q serbt e Kosovs ta zgjedhin
shtetsin
Bashkimi i Kosovs me Shqiprin
Bashkimi i tokave shqiptare

Shqip
tart
E
Kosov
s
96%
98%
96%

Serbt e
Kosovs

Kosov
a T
tjert

Serbt e
Serbis

13%
4%
40%

T
zhven
dosurit

Serb
13%
1%
35%

13%
3%
66%

79%
77%
94%

92%

63%

20%
34%

Serbia
t
tjert
34%
16%
29%

91%

43%

46%

31%

58%
88%

57%
54%

60%
68%

58%
66%

39%
42%

96%

57%

89%

5%

60%

41%

87%

59%

100%

62%

61%

45%

63%

48%

70%

65%

62%

44%

52%
13%

64%
94%

81%
44%

67%
93%

65%
88%

45%
81%

10%
8%

98%
98%

42%
33%

96%
95%

97%
97%

88%
91%

Brenga e madhe si pr popullin e Kosovs ashtu edhe pr at t Serbis si dhe pr

vet bashksin ndrkombtare sht nse cilado nga pakot kushtetuese mund t shkaktoj
eksodin e serbve apo shqiptarve nga Kosova. Pr m shum, shtrohet pyetja nse ka
gjas q nj numr i konsiderueshm i t zhvendosurve serb t kthehen n Kosov n
rrethana t volitshme. Kto mundsi jan testuar n pyetjen numr 11.
11. Personat e zhvendosur: Pyetja 11.a
Pr persont q jetojn n Kosov Pr donjrin nga kto opsione a do t qndronit
edhe m tutje n Kosov PO ose JO Pr t zhvendosurit n Serbi - Pr do njrin nga kto
opsione a do t ktheheshit n Kosov PO ose JO
Kushtet pr qndrim/kthim n Kosov
Srish, pakoja m e popullarizuar kushtetuese pr t dy komunitetet: shqiptart dhe
serbt, duket se sht protektorati nn BE me 83% shqiptar t Kosovs t gatshm t
mbesin, 45% serb t Kosovs gjithashtu t gatshm t mbesin dhe 27% serb t zhvendosur
t gatshm t kthehen n Kosov.
Opsionet tjera si p.sh. shteti pjes e BE-s me t drejt pr serbt e Kosovs q t
mbajn shtetsin e vet, e ndoshta edhe t ken kantonin e tyre, qndron edhe m tutje
mjaft mir. Megjihat, shqiptart dhe serbt e K si dhe bashksia ndrkombtare do t
dshironin rezultate m t mira se kto.

362

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

Tabela 11.b. Kushtet ideale pr t mbetur/kthyer n Kosov

p

Pyetja 11a, prqindja Po

Pr t gjitha kto opsione a do t mbeteshit/ktheheshit n Kosov
Bashkimi i t gjitha trojave serbe
Integrimi i plot i Kosovs n Serbi
Republik n kuadr t Serbis dhe Malit t Zi me kontroll t plot t qeveris
(modeli i Kushtetts s vitit 74)
Republik n kuadr t Serbis e Malit t Zi me kontroll t plot t qeveris dhe
status rajonal n BE
Protektorat i BE-s
Union ekonomik i shteteve t pavarura t Kosovs, Malit t Zi dhe Serbis
Shtet si pjes e BE-s por pjesa veriore i bashkohet Serbis
Shtet si pjes e BE-s me zgjedhje t shtetsis pr serbt t cilt do t ndajn
kantonin e tyre n veri t Mitrovics me Serbin nn autoritetin e njjt
Shtet si pjes e BE-s me zgjedhje t shtetsis pr serbt t cilt do ta kishin
kantonin e tyre n Kosov
Shtet si pjes e BE-s me zgjedhje t shtetsis pr Serbt
Pavarsi e plot pa zgjedhje t shtetsis pr serbt
Bashkimi i Kosovs me Shqiprin
Bashkimi i t gjitha tokave shqiptare

Shqiptar
t
Kosovs
9%
8%
9%

Serb t
Kosovs
91%
97%
36%

T tjert
n
Kosov
37%
37%
26%

Serb
t
zhvendosur
n Serbi
69%
86%
49%

14%

39%

25%

38%

83%
74%
16%
24%

45%
13%
42%
42%

59%
66%
32%
17%

27%
25%
27%
25%

46%

48%

44%

23%

57%
57%
92%
94%

33%
33%
3%
3%

39%
39%
75%
75%

20%
20%
0%
0%

Sikur q kan treguar t gjitha pyetjet q kishin t bjn me raportet n mes t shqiptarve
dhe serbve, s bashku me t gjitha shtjet q kan t bjn me sigurin, kjo zgjedhje
sht n rastin m t mir, pr ka vlen t angazhohesh. sht nj ndrr e cila krkon tr
nj jet pr tu realizuar. Mirpo, far mund t arrihet ndrkoh sht prparim i vrtet
drejt ktij ideali, n kuptim t reformave politike dhe shoqrore dhe n kombinim me nj
rregullim t prshtatshm kushtetues, i cili mund t shkoj deri aty sa pr t garantuar
sigurin pr t gjith. Duke i bashkuar elementet m t mundshme t t gjitha pyetjeve t
shtjelluara n pjesn e dyt t raportit, kjo dshmon se mund t arrihet dhe duhet t jet
caku i negociatave q do t fillojn. Megjithat, implementimi krkon koh. Fatmirsisht,
edhe shqiptart edhe serbt e Kosovs mirpresin angazhimn e bashksis ndrkombtare,
sidomos t Bashkimit Evropian, ndikimi i t cilit n rajon sht qartas n rritj.

Research

Konkludimi

Forumi Shqiptaro-Serb i Kmbimit t Infomratave sht mundsuar nprmjet

mbshtetjes nga Friedrich Ebert Stiftungh, Qeveria e Gjermanis perms Paktit t Stabilitetit, Institut fr Auslands-beziehungen e.V. (IFA), International Research and Exchanges
Board (IREX), Organizat pr Siguri dhe Bashkpunim np Evrop (OSBE), UNSECO dhe
Misioni n Kosov i Agjencis Amerikane pr Zhvillim Ndrkombtar (USEAID). Opnionet e shprehur ktu jan t autorve dhe nuk pasqyrojn pikapmjet e organizatorve ose t
donatorve t renditur m lart.

363

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

KOSOVO-KOSOVA
Reavanje problema Kosova:
ta misle ljudi sa Kosova i iz Srbije
Dr. Kolin Irvin
Institut za upravljanje Kraljiin univerzitet u Belfastu
Belfast, Severna Irska, BT7 1NN
emejl: c.irwin@qub.ac.uk
Vebsajt: www.peacepolls.org

Research

O istraivanju
Cilj ovog istraivanja javnog mnjenja bilo je da utvrdi ta ljudi na Kosovu i u Srbiji
smatraju da treba uiniti da bi se u regionu uspostavili trajni mir i stabilnost. Istraivanje su
sproveli Centar za demokratiju i pomirenje u Jugoistonoj Evropi, sa seditem u Solunu,
novinska agencija Kosovalajv iz Pritine i Medijski centar Beta iz Beograda, uz savete dr.
Kolina Irvina sa Kraljiinog univerziteta u Belfastu, Severna Irska.
Dr. Irvin je prikupljao pitanja postavljana u istraivanju tokom svojih ekstenzivnih
razgovora (sa Srbima i Albancima) na Kosovu i u Srbiji u maju i junu 2005. Upitnik je potom prosledjen grupi od otprilike 1.200 ispitanika sa Kosova i isto toliko iz Srbije, uzorku
reprezentativnom u pogledu ivotnog doba, pola, drutvenog statusa, politikih ubedjenja
i etnikog porekla, kao i geografske lokacije, to ini otprilike 2400 intervjua. Da bi sve
grupe bile ukljuene u ovaj istraivaki program, intervjui sadre i posebne, ''dodatne''
uzorke odgovora Srba koji ive u enklavama na Kosovu i raseljenih Srba koji ive u centralnoj Srbiji. Anketa je napravljena u periodu izmedju 26. avgusta i 2. septembra 2005.
godine. Istraivanje na terenu u centralnoj Srbiji obavila je agencija Stratedik marketing
iz Beograda a na Kosovu agencija Stratedik pals iz Tirane, Albanija.
Rezultati istraivanja bie dostupni na internetu, u tampi i u izvetajima koji e biti
poslati svim politikim partijama na Kosovu i u Srbiji, kao i svim veim medjunarodnim
organizacijama koje deluju u regionu. Teme kojima se istraivanje bavi su problemi sa
kojima se suoavaju gradjani, njihovi politiki predstavnici i medjunarodna zajednica u
regionu, ta e se dogoditi ako ti problemi ne budu razmotreni na odgovarajui nain, a
istraivanje sadri i niz predloga za reavanje ovih problema.

364

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

Uvod

U savremenom politikom svetu medjunarodnih normi, globalizacije, masovnih komunikacija i sve bolje obavetenog birakog tela, reenja politikih, ekonomskih i drutvenih
problema trae razgovor i proces odluivanja u kome e uestvovati i oni koji vode drutvo,
i gradjansko drutvo kao i celokupno stanovnitvo. U podeljenim drutvima to je teko
postii, i zato je neophodna pomo i podrka. Ali aktivnim ispitivanjem javnog mnjenja,
to je deo traganja za kompromisom i podrujem saglasnosti, pregovarai mogu postii
konsensus i ojaati mogunosti za postizanje politike stabilnosti, ekonomskog napretka i
stepena socijalne kohezije koji je neophodan za njihovo odranje.
Tko je, na primer, od aprila 1996. do februara 2003. obavljeno devet istraivanja u cilju
pruanja podrke mirovnom procesu u Severnoj Irskoj. U meri u kojoj je to bilo mogue
suprotstavljenim stranama je, da bi rezultate shvatile ozbiljno, bilo dato ''vlasnitvo'' nad
istraivanjem. Svaka pregovaraka strana imenovala je jednog lana tima koji je saradjivao
sa medijatorom istraivanja. Pitanja su bila formulisana tako da se moe ispitati politika
strana kao niz izbora (opcija) ili najbliih izbora a obuhvatila su najiri drutveni i politiki
spektar. Umereno oglaavanje takozvane ''utljive veine'' je tako dolo do izraaja, dok
se za ekstremne pozicije ispostavilo da su marginalne i da imaju malu podrku kompletne
zajednice. Za sva pitanja, izbore i najblie izbore morala se postii saglasnost da nisu
pristrasna ili tendenciozna. Sve strane uestvovale su u celokupnom postupku pripreme
istraivanja, od predloga pitanja do pravljenja probnih upitnika, u etikim pitanjima, utvrdjivanju rasporeda i tampanju, a podsticane su da daju sugestije u kom pravcu rad treba da
se odvija kako bi najvie pomogao mirovnom procesu.

Research

Drutveni i politiki sukobi su glavni izvor nestabilnosti u dananjem svetu. Oni pogadjaju ne samo zemlje u kojima se dogadjaju, ve se prenose i na susedne zemlje a esto
izazivaju i regionalne potrese. ak i kada se postignu dogovori, oni retko bivaju stabilni,
to dovodi do ponovnog izbijanja nasilja i zahteva stalno delovanje medjunarodne zajednice. Kosovo moe biti upravo jedan takav tragian primer. Mogunost za uspean ishod
mirovnog procesa moe postati vea ukoliko svi segmenti drutva dobiju priliku da aktivno uestvuju u procesu uspostavljanja mira koji se tie njih samih. Nametnuta reenja
i sporazumi napravljeni iza ''zatvorenih vrata'' (kakvi su na primer Dejtonski i Ohridski
sporazum), sklopljeni pod medjunarodnim pritiskom i pretnjom sile mogu doneti privremeni predah kada su u pitanju naizgled teko reivi problemi. ''Domaa'' reenja, medjutim,
ona koja uivaju najiru podrku raznorodnih grupa koje sainjavaju neko drutvo, su od
sutinskog znaaja za napredak u pravcu trajne stabilnosti i mira.

Istraivanje se usredsredilo na probleme, reenja i politiku za razreenje konflikta imajui u vidu suprotstavljene stavove i vrednosti zajednica. Pitanja koja su se ticala odredjenih
linosti su izbegavana osim onda kada je bilo jasno da njihovo postavljanje moe doprineti
reavanju problema. Pitanja su uobliavana u skladu sa onim to najvei broj ljudi najee
moe da razume i NISU predstavljala najnii zajedniki imenitelj. Pokrivena su sva relevantna pitanja i NIJE ukljueno nijedno irelevantno. Svi rezultati predoeni su javnosti,
ime je iroj zajednici pruena prilika da i sama ''sedne za pregovaraki sto'', a istraivanje
je ponudjeno na procenu kako strunjacima tako i obinim ljudima. Nije pravljena nikakva
prigodna selekcija rezultata. Svi su morali da se pozabave svim pitanjima koja su postavljena kao deo onog to je postalo ''veba u reavanju problema koja prethodi pregovorima''.
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Research

Ta ukrtena aktivnost koja je obuhvatila najvei deo relevantnog politikog spektra,

gradjansko drutvo i iru javnost pomogla je stvaranju konsensusa za Belfastski sporazum
koji vodi uspenom referendumu i potom i periodu rastue stabilnosti i mira. U nastojanju
da internacionalizuje ovaj posao izdavaka kua Palgrejv/Makmilan objavila je knjigu pod
naslovom ''Narodni mirovni proces u Severnoj Irskoj''; objavljeno je i niz radova i izvetaja
na vebsajtu projekta peacepolls.org; sprovedena je anketa u Bivoj jugoslovenskoj republici Makedoniji 2002, godine i u Bosni i Hercegovini 2004., a Aleksandros Lordos pokrenuo
je slian istraivaki program na Kipru 2004. i 2005. Metodi primenjeni u Severnoj Irskoj
primenjeni su i mogu biti primenjeni i na drugim mestima.
Istraivanje koje je prikazano u ovom izvetaju je prvi pokuaj primene tih metoda na
Kosovu i u Srbiji. Potpuno istovetne grupe pitanja postavljene su u oba drutva i napisali su
ih predstavnici tih razliitih drutava. Politiari, novinari, akademici, slubenici i poslovni
ljudi doprineli su formulisanju tih pitanja a svi segmenti dveju populacija dobili su priliku
da na njih odgovore. Nije na meni da kaem da li je ovo ili ono reenje najbolje za probleme s kojima se moraju suoiti ljudi na Kosovu i u Srbiji niti da li je ovo ili ono pitanje ono
pravo. Taj posao je na gradjanima Kosova i Srbije i na njihovim izabranim predstavnicima.
Ovaj izvetaj sadri veliki broj zanimljivih odgovora na pitanja na koja gradjani na Kosovu
i u Srbiji ele da dobiju odgovor. On prua osnovu za mnogo bogatiji i plodniji razgovor za
gradjane, njihove izabrane predstavnike i pregovarake timove koji sada moraju da ponesu
teret odgovornosti za buduu sigurnost i napredak zajednica koje e predstavljati. Nadam
se da e u tom pogledu ovaj izvetaj biti od vrednosti i elim im svaki uspeh u njihovim
nastojanjima.

DEO PRVI: PROBLEMI

1. Znaaj problema: pitanje
Najpre u pogledu znaaja problema koje treba reavati molimo vas oznaite za koje
smatrate da su ''vrlo bitni'', ''bitni'', ''bitni u izvesnoj meri'', ''be mnogo bitni'', ''potpuno
nebitni''.
Prioriteti kosovskih Albanaca
Sa spiska od 31 take pet najvanijih pitanja za kosovske Albance su konani status
Kosova (87%), nezaposlenost (85%), nerazvijena privreda (75%), korupcija (70%) i obrazovni standardi (takodje 70%).

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Vrlo bitno kosovski

Albanci
1 Konani status
Kosova
2 Nezaposlenost na
Kosovu
3 Nerazvijena
privreda
4 Korupcija na
Kosovu
5 Kosovski
obrazovni
standardi

87%
85%
75%
70%
70%

U istraivanjima koje su sprovodili Program za razvoj Ujedinjenih nacija (UNDP) i

druge organizacije konani status i nezaposlenost su takodje istaknuti kao prioritetna pitanja za kosovske Albance.

Za Srbe koji ive na Kosovu najvanije pitanje je snabdevanje strujom (veoma bitno
za 78% ispitanika. Ali za Srbe koji ive u Srbiji najbitnija je bezbednost (83%), a za raseljene kosovske Srbe koji su u centralnoj Srbiji, najvanija pitanja su nestale osobe i
povratak (oba pitanja su najvanija za 84% ispitanika).
Vrlo bitno kosovski
Srbi
1. Snabdevanje
78%
strujom na
Kosovu
2. Opta i lina
74%
bezbednost na
Kosovu
3. Proces
72%
povratka
raseljenih i
izbeglica
4. Konani status 65%
Kosova
5. Nestale osobe 62%

Srbi u Srbiji

Raseljeni Srbi u Srbiji

1. Opta i lina
bezbednost na
Kosovu
2. Nestale osobe

83% 1. Nestale osobe

84%

76% 2. Povratak raseljenih

i izbeglica

84%

3. Organizovani
kriminal na
Kosovu

72% 3. Opta i lina

bezbednost na
Kosovu

83%

4. Konani status
Kosova
5. Povratak raseljenih
i izbeglica

72% 4. Prava rtava

82%

71% 5. Konani status

Kosova

79%

Research

Prioriteti Srba

Ovi rezultati takodje se podudaraju sa rezultatima slinih istraivanja radjenih na Kosovu a po kojima se lina bezbednost nalazi pri vrhu liste najvanijih pitanja za kosovske
Srbe. Ali ovde je to pitanje na drugom mestu, posle snabdevanja strujom, koje se uopte
ne nalazi medju prvih pet pitanja koja istiu Srbi iz Srbije i raseljeni Srbi koji ive u centralnoj Srbiji. Za sve Srbe ostala najvanija pitanja su prava rtava, konani status Kosova
i organizovani kriminal.
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Pitanja u kojima ne postoji saglasnost

Gotovo polovina kosovskih Albanaca (49%) smatra da uloga srpske vlade u poslovima na Kosovu nije uopte bitna, a taj stav deli samo 1% kosovskih Srba. Isto tako 19%
kosovskih Srba smatra delovanje kosovske vlade potpuno nebitnim, to je miljenje s kojim je saglasno samo 1% kosovskih Albanaca. Prihvatanje i priznavanje da vlasti u Pristini
i Beogradu imaju legitimnu ulogu u poslovima i budunosti naroda koji ive na Kosovu je
problematino za veliki procenat pripadnika obe zajednice na Kosovu.
Ni od kakvog znaaja

Kosovski Kosovski Srbi u

Albanci
Srbi
Srbiji

Uloga srpske vlade u poslovima na Kosovu

49%

2%

4%

Raseljeni
Srbi u
Srbiji
4%

Delovanje kosovske vlade

1%

19%

7%

6%

Research

Pitanja u kojima postoji saglasnost

Opta i lina bezbednost nalazi se na osmom mestu na spisku koji obuhvata 31 pitanje
za kosovske Albance (65% smatra da je ono vrlo bitno). To znai da su i oni kao i Srbi
zabrinuti u tom pogledu, mada to za njih nije tako veliki problem. Problem sa snabdevanjem struje nalazi se na estom mestu (69% smatra da je on veoma bitan). Srbi su takodje
zabrinuti oko konanog statusa Kosova koji je na njihovom spisku prioriteta na petom i
estom mestu, i tako dalje. Ono to ovde treba istai je da iako se red prioriteta razlikuje, i
Albanci i Srbi dele, ili razumeju, ili u najmanju ruku priznaju prioritete druge grupe. Jasno
je da postoji zajednika osnova za razgovore i pregovore. Postizanje sporazuma, medjutim,
moe biti sasvim drugo pitanje.
Drugi vaan zakljuak ove analize jeste da i kosovski Albanci i Srbi prihvataju da su
gotovo sva pitanja od 31 koliko ih je na ovom spisku predstavljaju problem. Vrlo malo
pitanja okarakterisano je od strane pripadnika obeju zajednica kao ono koje uopte nije
bitno. Ali spisak obuhvata doista irok spektar pitanja od bezbednosti do sportskih objekata. Ako se obrati vea panja na centralna pitanja oko kojih nema saglasnosti izmedju
kosovskih Albanaca i Srba ovaj stepen prividne saglasnosti bitno se smanjuje.

2. Konani status Kosova: pitanje

U pogledu pitanja statusa Kosova molimo vas oznaite koje aspekte ovog problema
smatrate veoma bitnim, bitnim, bitnim u izvesnoj meri, ne mnogo bitnim, nebitnim ili je odgovor na njih to ak nije ni istina.
Prioriteti kosovskih Albanaca
Naalost, oseaj uzajamnog razumevanja za opte probleme sa kojima ljudi na Kosovu
i u Srbiji treba da se pozabave koji se javio kod pitanja br. 1, nestaje kada se povede re o
osetljivoj temi konanog statusa Kosova u pitanju br. 2.

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Vrlo bitno kosovski Albanci

1.

Privreda na Kosovu nee se razviti dok se ne utvrdi konaan status

46%

2.

Ostanak Kosova u Srbiji dovee do novog rata

43%

3.

Ako se stanje na Kosovu ne promeni ono e postati nestabilno

42%

4.

Jedino medjunarodna zajednica moe reiti stanje na Kosovu

32%

5.

Beograd koristi kosovske Srbe za sticanje politikih poena

30%

Prioriteti Srba
Ono to najvie brine Srbe u Srbiji i raseljene Srbe je da e nezavisnost Kosova dovesti
do egzodusa Srba (74% i 93% to smatra izuzetno bitnim). Ovo pitanje zauzima peto mesto
na spisku prioriteta za Srbe koji ive na Kosovu (78%). Njih 80% je zabrinuto da e nezavisno Kosovo postati jo manje bezbedno. Za Srbe u Srbiji i raseljene Srbe ovo pitanje
nalazi se na drugom mestu. Razumljivo je to raseljeni Srbi veruju da Unmik ne saradjuje
dovoljno sa Beogradom u pomaganju kosovskim Srbima (80% smatra ovo izuzetno bitnim, i to je za njih peto najznaajnije pitanje).
Srbi iz Srbije

Raseljeni Srbi

1. Nezavisno Kosovo 80% 1. Nezavisnost Kosova 74% 1. Nezavisnost

Kosova dovela bi
bilo bi za sve
dovela bi do
manje bezbedno
egzodusa kosovskih
do egzodusa
Srba
kosovskih Srba
79% 2. Nezavisno Kosovo 73% 2. Nezavisno Kosovo
2. Ako bi konaan
ne bi bilo bezbedno
ne bi bilo bezbedno
status bio reen
za Srbe
za Srbe
bez sporazuma
kosovski Srbi ne
bi se oseali
bezbedno
73% 3. Medjunarodna
3. Nezavisno Kosovo 79% 3. Ako bi konaan
zajednica
postalo bi
status bio reen bez
primenjuje
mafijaka drava
sporazuma kosovski
dvostruke standarde
Srbi ne bi se oseali
u odnosima sa
bezbedno
Srbima i Albancima
4. Nezavisno Kosovo 79% 4. Kosovska vlada nije 71% 4. Kosovska vlada ne
ini dovoljno na
ponudila Srbima
ne bi bilo
bezbedno za Srbe
dovoljne garancije
saradnji sa
kosovskim Srbima
78% 5. Nezavisno Kosovo 70% 5. Unmik ne saradjuje
5. Nezavisnost
bilo bi za sve manje
dovoljno sa
Kosova dovela bi
do egzodusa
bezbedno
Beogradom u
kosovskih Srba
pomaganju
kosovskim Srbima

93%

88%

Research

Vrlo bitno kosovski Srbi

81%

81%

80%

Ovde se ve pojavljuje odredjeni model iz koga se vidi da su kosovski Srbi moda neto
manje uznemireni problemima koji najvie brinu njihovu brau i sestre u Srbiji.
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Pitanja u kojima postoji nesaglasnost

Ako se ispitaju pitanja na koja je dat odgovor to ak nije ni istina mogue je zakljuiti
ta je to to se moe nazvati jazom nepoverenja koji postoji izmedju kosovskih Albanaca
i Srba. Tako, na primer, 88% kosovskih Albanaca daje taj odgovor na sugestiju da e nezavisnost Kosova imati za rezultat poveano nasilje, dok je sa njima saglasno samo 1%
Srba. Isto tako 65% kosovskih Albanaca ne veruje da kosovska vlada nije ponudila Srbima
dovoljne garancije, dok ovu skepsu ne deli gotovo nijedan Srbin.

Research

To ak nije istina
Nezavisnost Kosova dovee do poveanog
nasilja
Nezavisno Kosovo e ostati mafijaka drava
Nezavisno Kosov e biti manje bezbedno za
sve
Nezavisno Kosovo nee biti bezbedno za Srbe
Samo Beograd moe da rei pitanje Kosova
Kosovska vlada nije ponudila dovoljne
garancije kosovskim Srbima
Iluzija je da kosovski Srbi mogu drati
Kosovo u svojim rukama
Beograd koristi kosovske Srbe za sticanje
politikih poena
Ostanak Kosova u Srbiji doveo bi do novog
rata
Jedino medjunarodna zajednica moe reiti
pitanje Kosova
Srbija ne ini dovoljno da pomogne
raseljenim/izbeglicama

Kosovski
Albanci
88%

Kosovski Srbi iz
Srbi
Srbije
1%
2%

Raseljeni
Srbi
0%

85%
80%

2%
3%

2%
2%

1%
2%

75%
73%
65%

3%
16%
0%

2%
33%
0%

1%
23%
1%

6%

50%

27%

41%

3%

41%

21%

13%

11%

38%

39%

51%

8%

34%

27%

19%

12%

26%

18%

9%

Iluzija je da kosovski Srbi mogu drati Kosovo u svojim rukama je ono to samo
6% kosovskih Albanaca smatra da nije ak ni istina, dok u to ne veruje 50% kosovskih
Srba, 41% raseljenih Srba i 27% Srba iz Srbije. Jaz nepoverenja ne postoji samo izmedju
kosovskih Albanaca i Srba, ve izmedju kosovskih Srba, Srba iz Srbije i raseljenih Srba.
Interesantno je da je tvrdnja da bi ostanak Kosova u okviru Srbije doveo do novog rata bilo
drugo najbitnije pitanje (43%), ali 11% takodje smatra da ta tvrdnja nije istinita. Izgleda da
su miljenja o ovome donekle podeljena.
Pitanja oko kojih postoji saglasnost
Suprotno tome, kada su i kosovski Albanci i Srbi saglasni u pogledu sutinske istinitosti
neke tvrdnje, onda se moe doi do neke take saglasnosti ak i ako oni to pitanje kvalifikuju kao manje ili vie bitno. Svi izgleda veruju da procedure za pregovore nisu ustanovljene
i da kosovski Srbi nemaju ulogu u pregovorima. Tako je po svemu sudei davanje takve
uloge kosovskim Srbima problem koji bi svi voleli da bude reen.

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Nee biti ekonomskog napretka dok se ne rei

konaan status Kosova
Nije utvrdjena procedura za pregovore
Kosovskim Srbima nije data uloga u
pregovorima
Rusija insistira na tome da Kosovo ostane
deo Srbije
Ako se stanje ne promeni Kosovo e postati
nestabilno
Niko u Srbiji nee potpisati dokument kojim
Kosovo postaje nezavisno
Medjunarodna zajednica okupirana je
dogadjajima u Iraku
Medjunarodna zajednica primenjuje
dvostruke standarde u odnosima sa
Albanicima i Srbima na Kosovu
Kosovski Srbi ne dozvoljavaju promenu
statusa Kosova
Srpski i albanski politiari su loi

Kosovski
Albanci
2%

Kosovski
Srbi
4%

Srbi iz
Srbije
2%

Raseljeni
Srbi
22%

0%

6%

2%

1%

3%

4%

1%

1%

2%

5%

6%

6%

7%

3%

2%

1%

5%

7%

10%

6%

3%

15%

10%

7%

17%

3%

1%

0%

15%

5%

8%

3%

19%

4%

2%

1%

Research

To ak nije istina

3. Srpski i albanski odnosi: Pitanje

U odnosu na Srbe i Albance molimo vas oznaite koje aspekte ovog problema smatrate
veoma bitnim, bitnim, bitnim u izvesnoj meri, ne mnogo bitnim, sasvim nebitnim ili ak ne ni tanim.
Prioriteti kosovskih Albanaca
to se tie odnosa izmedju Albanaca i Srba na Kosovu, od 48 ponudjenih odgovora
za kosovske Albance je od najveeg znaaja to to se ne zna sudbina nestalih (73%), a
zatim diskriminacija Albanaca u devedesetim godinama prolog veka (58%). Naalost,
52% kosovskih Srba, 36% Srba iz Srbije i 44% raseljenih Srba smatra da ta diskriminacija nije postojala. Na treem mestu za kosovske Albance je to to se ne sudi ratnim
zloincima (41%), na etvrtom je nasledje velikog broja ubistava (38%), i prisustvo oficira
Oslobodilake vojske Kosova u policiji (37%). Kao to se i oekivalo, ovo poslednje pitanje koje se tie policije je takodje problem i za kosovske Srbe.
Veoma bitno kosovski Albanci
1
Ne zna se sudbina nestalih
2
Diksriminacija kosovskih Albanaca devedesetih godina prolog veka
3
Ne sudi se ratnim zloincima
4
Nasledje velikog broja ubistava
5
Prisustvo oficira OVK u policiji

73%
58%
41%
38%
37%
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Prioriteti Srba

Research

Za sve Srbe, i na Kosovu i u Srbiji, najvaniji problem je to to Albanci tee stvaranju

velike Albanije (za 75% kosovskih Srba, za 74% Srba iz Srbije i za 79% raseljenih Srba).
Ali, 14% kosovskih Albanaca takodje smatra da je to bitan problem, dok 23% smatra da to
ak nije ni tano. Ovo pitanje ponovo dotiemo kod razmatranja ustavnih reenja na kraju
ovog izvetaja. Prisustvo oficira OVK u policiji takodje je vrlo bitno pitanje za kosovske
Srbe (74%) i za Srbe raseljene sa Kosova (77%). Njihovo miljenje deli 37% kosovskih
Albanaca. Moda se tu neto moe uiniti.
Vrlo bitno kosovski Srbi
1 Albanci ele
75%
veliku Albaniju
75%
2 Kosovski
Albanci
zbliavaju se s
Tiranom a ele
da Srbi prestanu
da razgovaraju sa
Beogradom
3 Prisustvo oficira 74%
OVK u policiji

Srbi iz Srbije
1
Albanci ele
veliku Albaniju
2
Nasledje velikog
broja ubistava

Prisustvo oficira
OVK u vladi

71%

Kosovski
Albanci nisu
spremni da jasno
osude albansko
etniko nasilje

67%

Kosovski
Albanci nisu
spremni da jasno
osude albansko
etniko nasilje
Kosovski
Albanci
zbliavaju se s
Tiranom a ele
da Srbi prestanu
da razgovaraju
sa Beogradom
Ne zna se
sudbina nestalih

74%
73%

Srbi raseljeni sa Kosova

1 Albanci ele
79%
veliku Albaniju
2 Prisustvo oficira
77%
OVK u policiji

69%

Izvinjenja bez
bezbednosti nisu
od znaaja

73%

61%

Albanske
provokacije

72%

59%

Kosovski Albanci
nisu spremni da
jasno osude
albansko etniko
nasilje

72%

Nespremnost kosovskih Albanaca da jasno osude albansko etniko nasilje nalazi se na

petom mestu prioriteta za kosovske Srbe (67%), treem za Srbe iz Srbije (69%), i opet na
petom za Srbe raseljene sa Kosova (72%). Naalost, 51% kosovskih Albanaca ne veruje da
je to tano. Ovde postoji veliki jaz nepoverenja na koji treba obratiti panju.

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Pitanja u kojima postoji nesaglasnost

Osamdeset procenata kosovskih Albanaca ne veruje da ucenjuju kosovske Srbe da
prekinu veze sa Beogradom. S takvim pogledom saglasno je svega 5% kosovskih Srba, 4%
Srba iz Srbije i 2% Srba raseljenih sa Kosova.
Slino tome 66% kosovskih Albanaca ne veruje da su skloni nasilju i osvetoljubivosti, a
sa njima se slae izmedju 3% i 6% Srba. S druge strane, 61% kosovskih Srba, 46% Srba iz
Srbije i 51% Srba raseljenih sa Kosova ne veruje da su Srbi skloni nasilju i tee dominaciji.
Sa njima je saglasno 15% kosovskih Albanaca, ali veina se ne slae. No i pored ovog velikog jaza nepoverenja postoji i prostor za nadu. I kosovski Albanci (56%) i Srbi (izmedju
37% i 42%) ne veruju da su stanovnici Balkana skloni nasilju.

Kosovski Albanci ucenjuju Srbe da prekinu veze

sa Beogradom
Albanci su skloni nasilju i osvetoljubivosti
Albanci nemaju samopouzdanja da pregovaraju
Kosovski Albanci pribliavaju se Tirani a oekuju
da kosovski Srbi prestanu da razgovaraju sa
Beogradom
Svim narodima na Balkanu zajednika je sklonost
nasilju
Srbi preteruju sa isticanjem problema bezbednosti
Srbi su skloni nasilju i tee dominaciji
Srpske provokacije
Srpskim ratnim zloincima treba suditi na Kosovu
Srbi ele veliku Srbiju

Raseljeni
Kosovski Kosovski Srbi
Srbi
Albanci
Srbi
iz
Srbije
80%
5%
4%
2%
66%
66%
58%

3%
42%
2%

5%
30%
2%

6%
49%
0%

56%

42%

37%

40%

6%
15%
9%
5%
2%

68%
62%
61%
59%
56%

67%
46%
33%
38%
52%

74%
51%
59%
40%
65%

Research

To ak nije tano

Za razliku od pitanja koje se tie velike Albanije, treba primetiti da 56% kosovskih
Srba, 52% Srba iz Srbije i 65% Srba raseljenih sa Kosova ne veruje da Srbi ele stvaranje
velike Srbije. Naalost, samo 2% kosovskih Albanaca deli njihovo miljenje, tako da je u
tom pogledu jaz nepoverenja uzajaman.
Pitanja u kojima postoji saglasnost
Ova analiza ukazuje i na neka bitna pitanja u kojima postoji saglasnost. Kao prvo, i
kosovski Albanci i Srbi saglasni su da neizvesna sudbina nestalih i nasledje velikog broja
ubistava predstavljaju veliki problem. Gotovo niko ne smatra da ta pitanja nisu istinita.
Donekle iznenadjuje da i kosovski Albanci i Srbi smatraju da prisustvo oficira OVK u
policiji i vlasti predstavlja problem. Gotovo niko ne smatra da to nije istina, mada, na
primer, dok 71% kosovskih Srba smatra da je to vrlo bitan problem, samo izmedju 28% i
37% kosovskih Albanaca deli takvo njihovo miljenje. Pa ipak, ovde postoji dovoljno prostora za delovanje. Postoji takodje i prilian stepen saglasnosti oko problema koje stvaraju zapaljivi napisi u novinama, uticaj ratnih zloinaca na politiki ivot i opte odsustvo
poverenja izmedju Srba i Albanaca. No ti problemi nisu karakteristini samo za Kosovo i
Srbiju; razliite etnike grupe i nacionalnosti u Bosni i Hercegovini i Makedoniji takodje
se nose sa istim tekoama.
373

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

To ak nije tano
Nepoznata sudbina nestalih
Nasledje velikog broja ubistava
Prisustvo oficira OVK u policiji
Prisustvo oficira OVK u vlasti
Zapaljivi politiki govori
Srbe i Albance razdvaja uzajamno nepoverenje
Zapaljivi tekstovi u novinama
Uticaj ratnih zloinaca u politikom ivotu
Neorganizovanje sudjenja ratnim zloincima
elja Srba da se vrati status koji je postojao pre
rata

Kosovski Kosovski Srbi

Albanci
Srbi
iz
Srbije
0%
0%
2%
2%
0%
0%
3%
1%
1%
1%
5%
1%
5%
3%
2%
3%
6%
1%
7%
4%
2%
3%
8%
2%
1%
12%
4%
5%
7%
5%

Raseljeni
Srbi
0%
0%
1%
0%
5%
1%
5%
1%
17%
11%

4. Bezbednost: pitanje

Research

to se tie bezbednosti molimo vas naznaite koje aspekte ovog problema smatrate
veoma bitnim, bitnim, bitnim u izvesnoj meri, ne mnogo bitnim, nebitnim i
ak ne ni tanim.
Prioriteti kosovskih Albanaca
Spisak pitanja u okviru problema bezbednosti sadrao je 29 taaka. Slab pravosudni
sistem je najvanije pitanje za kosovske Albance (49%). Sledee pitanje je organizovan
politiki kriminal (48%), potom injenica da se Albanci plae da govore albanski u severnoj Mitrovici i nepoverenje u pravosudni sistem (za oba se izjasnilo 46%), a na petom
mestu, sa 43% glasova ispitanika, je sporost pravosudnog sistema. Sedamdeset devet procenata Srba raseljenih sa Kosova takodje doivljava ovo kao najvei problem. Medjutim,
89% kosovskih Srba takodje smatra da je veliki problem to to se Srbi plae da govore
srpski u Pritini. U ovom pogledu strah je, oito, uzajaman.
Veoma bitno kosovski Albanci
1 Slab pravosudni sistem
2 Organizovan politiki kriminal
3 Albanci se plae da govore albanski u severnoj Mitrovici
4 Nepoverenje u pravosudni sistem
5 Sporost pravosudnog sistema

49%
48%
46%
46%
43%

Prioriteti Srba
Najvei problem koji se tie bezbednosti za Srbe je injenica da nemaju potpunu slobodu kretanja na Kosovu (to je za 84% kosovskih Srba, za 91% Srba iz Srbije i 94% Srba
raseljenih sa Kosova veoma bitno). Sledee bitno pitanje je da su izolovani Srbi zatvorenici
374

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

u sopstvenim kuama (za 72% kosovskih Srba, 83% Srba iz Srbije i 76% raseljenih Srba).
Potom sledi injenica da albansko politiko rukovodstvo ne eli da bezuslovno pobolja
bezbednost na Kosovu (za 66% kosovskih Srba, 71% Srba iz Srbije i 82% raseljenih Srba).
Nepoverenje kosovskih Srba u Kosovsku policijsku slubu je na petom mestu za kosovske
Srbe (65%) i Srbe iz Srbije (71%), ali ne iznenadjuje to Srbi raseljeni sa Kosova medju
prvih pet najvanijih pitanja uvruju nevoljnost Unmika da obezbedi sigurnost (82%).

3 Izolovani Srbi su
zatvorenici u
sopstvenim
kuama

4 Albansko
politiko
rukovodstvo ne
daje bezuslovnu
podrku
poboljanju
bezbednosti
5 Kosovski Srbi
nemaju poverenja
u Kosovsku
policijsku slubu

72% 3 Albansko
politiko
rukovodstvo ne
daje bezuslovnu
podrku
poboljanju
bezbednosti
66% 4 Srbi se plae da
govore srpski u
Pritini

65% 5 Kosovski Srbi

nemaju poverenja
u Kosovsku
policijsku slubu

Raseljeni Srbi
91% 1 Ljudi nemaju
potpunu slobodu
kretanja na
Kosovu
83% 2 Albansko politiko
rukovodstvo ne
daje bezuslovnu
podrku
poboljanju
bezbednosti
71% 3 Organizovan
politiki kriminal

94%

82%

82%

71% 4 Unmik ne
obezbedjuje
dovoljnu
bezbednost

82%

71% 5 Sporost
pravosudnog
sistema

79%

Research

Veoma bitno kosovski Srbi Srbi iz Srbije

1 Srbi se plae da
89% 1 Ljudi nemaju
govore srpski u
potpunu slobodu
Pritini
kretanja na
Kosovu
84% 2 Izolovani Srbi su
2 Ljudi nemaju
zatvorenici u
potpunu slobodu
kretanja na
sopstvenim
kuama
Kosovu

Pitanja u kojima ne postoji saglasnost

Za Srbe je problem bezbednosti najvei problem. Stoga u izvesnoj meri zabrinjava
to to kosovski Albanci izgleda ne veruju do koje mere je za Srbe ovo ozbiljno pitanje.
ezdeset devet posto kosovskih Albanaca ne smatra istinitom tvrdnju da ljudi na Kosovu nemaju potpunu slobodu kretanja. Oni takodje ne veruju da politiko rukovodstvo
kosovskih Albanaca ne prua bezuslovnu podrku poboljanju bezbednosti (67% smatra
da to uopte nije tano) i da su izolovani Srbi zatvorenici u sopstvenim kuama (65% odbija da to prihvati kao istinito). Ali istovremeno 60% kosovskih Srba (45% Srba iz Srbije
i 51% raseljenih Srba) odbijaju kao istinitu tvrdnju da Srbi uzimaju zakon u svoje ruke i
blokiraju puteve. Samo 13% kosovskih Albanaca to prihvata. Istovremeno 60 % kosovskih
Srba (55% Srba iz Srbije i 51% raseljenih Srba) ne veruju da se Albanci plae spoljne vojne
pretnje. Sa ovim je saglasno samo 22% kosovskih Albanaca. I na kraju, postoji takodje i jaz
375

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

nepoverenja u odnosu na Pritinu i Mitrovicu, koji je pomenut ranije, jer nijedna grupa ne
veruje drugoj kada tvrdi da se plai da govori svoj jezik na tudjoj teritoriji.

Research

Nije ak ni tano
Ljudi nemaju punu slobodu kretanja na Kosovu
Serbi se plae da govore srpski u Pritini
Albansko politiko rukovodstvo ne daje
bezuslovnu podrku poboljanju bezbednosti
Izolovani Srbi su zatvorenici u sopstvenim
kuama
Politiari i mediji prikazuju druge etnike grupe
kao pretnju bezbednosti
Nema dovoljno predstavnika manjina u vladi
Srbi uzimaju zakon u svoje ruke i blokiraju
puteve
Albanci se plae spoljne vojne pretnje
Sudjenja za ratne zloine u Srbiji ne
zadovoljavaju albansku potrebu za pravdom
Albanci se plae da govore albanski u severnoj
Mitrovici
Tajne obavetajne strukture su aktivne na Kosovu
(i albanske IK i SIA i srpske)

Kosovski Kosovski Srbi

Albanci
Srbi
iz
Srbije
69%
0%
0%
68%
0%
2%
67%
3%
0%

Raseljeni
Srbi
1%
0%
1%

65%

7%

0%

0%

65%

5%

3%

3%

20%
13%

1%
60%

1%
45%

0%
51%

22%
4%

60%
45%

55%
20%

51%
31%

4%

44%

38%

50%

4%

13%

2%

6%

U pogledu tajnih obavetajnih struktura koje deluju na Kosovu rezultati su i za Srbe

i kosovske Albance neujednaeni. Neki smatraju da je to problem, dok drugi smatraju da
nije, a neki opet smatraju da to ak nije ni istina. Tako se ovo pitanje nalo na kraju spiska
i u ovoj i u narednoj tabeli.
Pitanja oko kojih postoji saglasnost
U pogledu slabosti pravosudnog sistema, sporosti pravosudnog sistema i nepoverenja u
pravosudni sistem svi smatraju da ima dovoljno prostora da se tu stvari poprave, a veoma
mali broj ljudi iz obe zajednice smatra da to nije tano. Organizovani politiki kriminal je
takodje zajednini problem, kao to je to i nepostojanje lokalne policije iji etniki sastav
odraava etniki sastav stanovnitva. ak 43% kosovskih Albanaca veruje da je problem
nepoverenja kosovskih Srba u Kosovsku policijsku slubu vrlo bitan ili bitan. Oito je da
moe biti uinjen napredak u ovim pitanjima uz minimum politikog vodjstva.
Nije ak ni tano
Slab pravosudni sistem
Nema lokalne policije iji etniki sastav odraava
etniki sastav stanovnitva
Spor pravosudni sistem
Nepoverenje u pravosudni sistem

376

Kosovski Kosovski Srbi

Albanci
Srbi
iz
Srbije
2%
0%
1%
4%
3%
1%

Raseljeni
Srbi

5%
2%

1%
0%

2%
5%

0%
0%

0%
4%

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

p
j p
Organizovan politiki kriminal
Kosovski Srbi nemaju poverenja u Kosovsku
policijsku slubu
Tajne obavetajne strukture deluju na Kosovu (i
albanski IK i SIA i srpske)
Suprotna vidjenja budunosti Kosovskog
zatitnog korpusa
Neodravanje sudjenja ratnim zloincima u Hagu
i lokalnim sudovima

2%
9%

5%
7%

0%
1%

1%
1%

4%

13%

2%

6%

10%

12%

1%

1%

16%

9%

6%

3%

Veina Srba i kosovskih Albanaca saglasna je da imaju suprotne poglede oko budunosti
Kosovskog zatitnog korpusa, ali to se teko moe ubrojati u stvarni napredak. Medjutim,
izgleda da postoji opta podrka tome da se odravaju sudjenja ratnim zloincima iz obe
zajednice.

Na osnovu razliitih ponudjenih mogunosti navedite ta e se po vaem miljenju dogoditi ako ljudi na Kosovu, Srbija i medjunarodna zajednica ne preduzmu potrebne korake
da se pozabave ovim problemima. Molimo vas navedite koje mogunosti smatrate vrlo
verovatnim i verovatnim, u koje niste sigurni, ta smatrate teko mogunima tai
nemoguim.
Kako kosovski Albanaci vide budunost

Research

5. Budunost bez sporazuma: Pitanje

U relativnom smislu kosovski Albanci nisu ni priblino toliko zabrinuti u pogledu

budunosti kao kosovski Srbi, Srbi iz Srbije i Srbi raseljeni sa Kosova. Ukoliko problemi navedeni u pitanjima od 1 do 4 ne budu uzeti u razmatranje kako treba, samo 30 %
kosovskih Albanaca smatra da to moe dovesti do socijalnih nemira, a svega 17% veruje
da e to dovesti do izolacije Kosova i Srbije.
Vrlo verovatno Kosovski Albanci
1 Socijalni nemiri
2 Poveana kriminalizacija
3 Nedostatak investicija
4 Poveana emigracija
5 Ponovni nasilni sukob
6 Smanjena medjunarodna pomo
7 Poveano medjunarodno vojno prisustvo
8 Eskalacija etnikih tenzija
9 Poveana politika nestabilnost
10 Poveana regionalna nestabilnost
11 Izolacija Kosova i Srbije

31%
29%
28%
28%
26%
24%
24%
20%
19%
18%
17%

377

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

Kako Srbi vide budunost

Research

Sve grupe anketiranih Srba veruju da bi najverovatniji ishod situacije u kojoj se problemi ne bi tretirali kako treba bila poveana kriminalizacija (za 55% kosovskih Srba, za 65%
Srba iz Srbije i 70% raseljenih Srba). Medjutim, kao i kosovski Albanci, i oni smatraju da
bi najmanje verovatan ishod bila izolacija Kosova i Srbije. Jasno je da veoma mali broj
ljudi na Kosovu i u Srbiji smatra da e im medjunarodna zajednica, bez obzira na razvoj
dogadjaja, okrenuti ledja.
Vrlo verovatno Kosovski
Srbi iz Srbije
Srbi
1 Poveana
55% 1 Poveana
kriminalizacija
kriminalizacija
2 Poveana
47% 2 Poveana
emigracija
politika
nestabilnost
47% 3 Eskalacija
3 Poveana
etnikih tenzija
regionalna
nestabilnost
42% 4 Socijalni nemiri
4 Poveana
politika
nestabilnost
5 Ponovni nasilni
41% 5 Poveana
sukob
emigracija
6 Eskalacija
40% 6 Poveana
etnikih tenzija
regionalna
nestabilnost
34% 7 Ponovni nasilni
7 Smanjenje
sukob
medjunarodne
pomoi
8 Izolacija Kosova 33% 8 Nedostatak
i Srbije
investicija
9

Nedostatak
investicija

10 Socijalni nemiri
11 Poveano
medjunarodno
vojno prisustvo

378

32% 9

Poveano
medjunarodno
vojno prisustvo
30% 10 Smanjenje
medjunarodne
pomoi
28% 11 Izolacija Kosova
i Srbije

Raseljeni Srbi
65% 1

Poveana
kriminalizacija
Ponovni nasilni
sukob

70%

Poveana
politika
nestabilnost
Eskalacija
etnikih tenzija

61%

51% 5

Socijalni nemiri

56%

51% 6

Poveana
regionalna
nestabilnost
Poveana
emigracija

51%

57% 2
54% 3
53% 4

51% 7
41% 8

Poveano
medjunarodno
vojno prisustvo
41% 9 Smanjenje
medjunarodne
pomoi
39% 10 Nedostatak
investicija
32% 11 Izolacija Kosova
i Srbije

62%

59%

49%
47%
45%
40%
30%

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

DEO DRUGI: REENJA

6. Srpsko-albanski odnosi: Pitanje
U pogledu Srba i Albanaca molimo vas oznaite koje od datih mogunosti smatrate
sutinskim, poeljnim, prihvatljivim, podnoljivim ili neprihvatljivim.
Prioriteti kosovskih Albanaca

Sutinsko Kosovski Albanci

1
Beograd treba da prestane da sanja o povratku na Kosovo
2
Srbi treba da priznaju Albance kao jednake sebi
3
Kosovski Srbi treba da budu nezavisniji od Beograda
4
Javno izvinjenje Srba za uinjeno zlo
5
Programi kulturne razmene studenata u regionu, EU i SAD

46%
28%
28%
25%
21%

Research

Kada je re o reenjima problema kojima se bavi prvi deo ovog izvetaja kosovski Albanci smatraju da Beograd treba da prestane da sanja o povratku na Kosovu kao prioritet
na njihovom spisku od 33 mogua odgovora i kao sutinski (46%). Sledei stav je da Srbi
treba da priznaju Albance kao sebi jednake i da kosovski Srbi treba da budu nezavisniji
od Beograda (oba odgovora su sutinska za 28% ispitanika). Sledee je javno izvinjenje
Srba za zlo koje su naneli (25%), a potom programi kulturne razmene studenata u regionu,
Evropskoj uniji i SAD (21%).

Prioriteti Srba
to se tie unapredjenja odnosa izmedju kosovskih Albanaca i Srba, za kosovske Srbe
je sutinsko da ljudi na Kosovu ine vie da se kosovski Srbi oseaju dobrodolim (77%),
da grad Pritina uini vie (70%) i da kosovska vlada uini vie (61%). Kosovski Srbi bi takodje eleli poseban status za srpske verske objekte (70% to smatra sutinskim), dok 60%
smatra sutinskim to da Pritina prestane da sanja o nezavisnosti. Srbi iz Srbije dele ova
miljenja, ali takodje smatraju i da bi Pritina morala da pone da plaa penzije kosovskim
Srbima (63% to smatra sutinskim pitanjem). I Srbi raseljeni sa Kosova dele ova miljenja,
ali takodje naglaavaju i obavezu Albanaca da zapoljavaju Srbe (65% to smatra sutinskim
pitanjem), kao i da treba da podstaknu povratak kosovskih Srba u kosovske institucije (to
pitanje je sutinsko za 64% ispitanika). Jasno je da poboljani odnosi izmedju zajednica a
sa tim i stvarni politiki napredak u velikoj meri zavisi od toga da Srbi ponu da se oseaju
zaista dobrodolim na Kosovu.

379

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

Research

Sutinsko Kosovski Srbi

Srbi iz Srbije
1 Ljudi na Kosovu bi 77% 1 Kosovska vlada i
politiari treba da
trebalo aktivno da
aktivno rade na
se trude da se
tome da se Srbi
kosovski Srbi
oseaju
oseaju
dobrodoli na
dobrodolim
Kosovu
2 Grad Pritina
70% 2 Ljudi na Kosovu
trebalo bi da uini
treba aktivno da
vie da se Srbi
se trude da se
oseaju
kosovski Srbi
dobrodolim
oseaju
dobrodolim
70% 3 Pritina treba da
3 Srpski verski
prestane da sanja
objekti treba da
o nezavisnom
imaju specijalan
Kosovu
status
4 Pritina treba da
66% 4 Grad Pritina
prestane da sanja o
treba da uini vie
nezavisnom
da se Srbi oseaju
Kosovu
dobrodolim
5 Kosovska vlada i
politiari treba da
aktivno rade na
tome da se Srbi
oseaju
dobrodolim

61% 5

Raseljeni Srbi
71% 1 Srpski verski
objekti treba da
dobiju specijalan
status

76%

67% 2

Grad Pritina
treba da uini vie
da se Srbi oseaju
dobrodolim

68%

63% 3

Albanci treba da
imaju obavezu da
zapoljavaju Srbe

65%

63% 4

Ljudi na Kosovu
moraju aktivno da
se trude da se
kosovski Srbi
oseaju
dobrodolim
Treba podstai
povratak
kosovskih Srba u
kosovske
institucije

65%

Pritina treba da
63% 5
pone da isplauje
penzije kosovskim
Srbima

64%

Pitanja u kojima postoji saglasnost i pitanja u kojima ne postoji saglasnost

Mnogo je lake utvrditi opcije koje su prihvatljive i kosovskim Albancima i Srbima
koristei stil pitanja primenjen u odeljku 2. I donjoj tabeli br. 6 navedena su 33 predloga za
poboljanje odnosa izmedju dve zajednice, poredjana na osnovu njihove neprihvatljivosti
za kosovske Albance od najmanje neprihvatljivih (3% za programe razmene studenata) do
najneprihvatljivijih (80% za predlog da Pritina prestane da sanja o nezavisnosti Kosova).
Uz te vrednosti dati su stepeni neprihvatljivosti za tri grupe Srba. Programi razmene studenata su neprihvatljivi za svega 8% kosovskih Srba, 2% Srba iz Srbije i 3% raseljenih Srba.
Ovo je oito prihvatljiv predlog i trebalo bi ga uzeti u obzir. Medjutim, odmah posle ovog
predloga dolazi i onaj da kosovski Srbi treba da budu vie nezavisni od Beograda. Veina
kosovskih Albanaca smatra da je to dobra ideja, dok se svega 6% njih tome protivi kao neprihvatljivom. Devetnaest procenata Srba iz Srbije smatra taj predlog neprihvatljivim kao i
29% kosovskih Srba, ali procenat protivljenja raseljenih Srba je 40%. Ta ideja je od velikog
znaaja za raseljene Srbe. Oni se oito oslanjaju na podrku Beograda.
Oznaio sam sva pitanja za koja jedna ili druga zajednica u procentu veem od 40%
kae da su neprihvatljiva kao problematina za primenu i zasenio ih u tabelama sivom
bojom. Odluka da se 40% uzme kao granica je donekle arbitrarna i mogla je biti uzeta
380

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

bilo koja druga veliina. Ali iskustvo iz Severne Irske i sa drugih mesta ukazuje da neki
predlozi, ukoliko se smatraju neprihvatljivim od strane 40% do 50% ispitanika, moraju
biti ''razmenjeni'' za neto to u pregovorima trai ona druga zajednica, ili da moraju biti
''zainjeni'', nekom kompenzacijom ili ustupkom u okviru ireg dogovora ili ''paketa''. U
Severnoj Irskoj izvor kompenzacija ili ustupaka obino je bila britanska vlada.
Neki od predloga na ovom spisku nisu prihvatljivi ni za jednu zajednicu, kao to je to
na primer, predlog br. 30. Izgleda da niko ne smatra da su meane kole dobra ideja osim
Srba iz Srbije, iji je stepen protivljenja 17% (on je za kosovske Albance 44%, za kosovske
Srbe 60% a za raseljene Srbe 45%). Medjutim, barem polovina predloga prihvatljiva je ili
barem podnoljiva, i moe biti primenjena uz pomo politikog vodjstva i malo saradnje
izmedju kosovskih Albanaca i Srba. Ovde neu dalje objanjavati spisak. italac ga moe
sam proitati i izvui zakljuke.

Pitanje br. 6 Imajui u vidu Srbe i

Albance molimo vas naznaite ta od
datih predloga smatrate ''sutinskim'',
''poeljnim'', ''prihvatljivim'',
''podnoljivim'' ili ''neprihvatljivim''.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

Procenat ''neprihvatljivog''
Programi razmene studenata u regionu,
EU i SAD
Kosovski Srbi moraju biti vie nezavisni
od Beograda
Vea saradnja izmedju Pritine i Beograda
Kosovska vlada i politiari moraju da
aktivno rade na tome da se kosovski Srbi
oseaju dobrodolim
Kosovski Srbi moraju biti vie ukljueni u
poslove na Kosovu
Srbi treba da priznaju Albance kao
jednake sebi
Kosovska vlada treba da pomogne
lokalnim srpskim TV stanicama
Saradnja izmedju islamskih, pravoslavnih
i katolikih verskih predvodnika
Podrka vlade dvojezinim medijima
Javno izvinjenje Srba za zlo poinjeno u
prolosti
Besplatni asovi albanskog za Srbe na
Kosovu
Beograd treba da utvrdjuje svoju politiku
u saradnji sa kosovskim Srbima
U kolama treba predavati zajedniki
balkansku istoriju i kulturu
Treba podstai povratak Srba u kosovske
institucije

Kosovski
Albanci

Kosovski Srbi iz
Srbi
Srbije

Raseljeni
Srbi

3%

8%

2%

3%

6%

29%

19%

40%

10%
11%

7%

0%
0%

1%
0%

11%

2%

1%

1%

11%

17%

11%

12%

12%

8%

2%

7%

13%

7%

6%

7%

14%
15%

6%
20%

4%
26%

7%
48%

16%

36%

22%

25%

17%

0%

0%

1%

17%

33%

5%

21%

18%

4%

2%

3%

0%

Research

Tabela br. 6 Take saglasnosti i nesaglasnosti

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KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

Research

25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33

Beograd treba da prestane da sanja o

povratku na Kosovo
Odvajanje dravnih poslova od Srpske
pravoslavne crkve
Albanci treba da prihvate Srbe kao
jednake sebi
Grad Pritina treba da uini vie da se
Srbi oseaju dobrodolim
Ni na jednoj strani oni koji su uestvovali
u ratu ne treba da budu u policiji ili vladi
Javno uzvinjenje za uinjeno zlo na obe
strane
Decentralizacija na nivou optina
Ljudi na Kosovu treba aktivno da rade na
tome da se Srbi oseaju dobrodolim
Medjunarodni fond za pomo kosovskim
Srbima na Kosovu i u Srbiji
Omoguiti vie obrazovanje Srbima iz
svih krajeva Kosova
Obe strane treba da odstupe od svojih
maksimalnih zahteva
Omoguiti vie obrazovanje na oba jezika
Obaveza Albanaca da zapoljavaju Srbe
Pritina treba da pone da isplauje
penzije kosovskim Srbima
Predavati u kolama i srpski i albanski
jezik
Zajednike kole za Albance i Srbe
Javno izvinjenje Albanaca za zlo
poinjeno u prolosti
Specijalni status za srpske verske objekte
Pritina treba da prestane da sanja o
nezavisnom Kosovu

18%

73%

65%

66%

19%

21%

28%

28%

19%

6%

7%

10%

20%

0%

1%

3%

21%

6%

4%

1%

27%

6%

6%

16%

27%
27%

9%
1%

3%
1%

8%
3%

28%

3%

0%

0%

30%

3%

1%

0%

38%

2%

3%

3%

42%
43%
44%

19%
1%
25%

5%
3%
1%

7%
1%
11%

44%

18%

6%

10%

47%
49%

60%
11%

17%
9%

45%
15%

53%
80%

2%
4%

1%
3%

0%
5%

7. Bezbednost: Pitanje
U pogledu bezbednosti molimo vas naznaite za koji od navedenih predloga smatrate
da su ''sutinski'', ''poeljni'', ''prihvatljivi'', ''podnoljivi'' ili, ''neprihvatljivi''.
Prioriteti kosovskih Albanaca
Predlog da Mitrovica bude ujedinjena nalazi se na prvom mestu na listi prioriteta
kosovskih Albanaca kada je u pitanju bezbednost (83% smatra to pitanje sutinskim).
Kosovski Albanci takodje poklanjaju veliku panju saradnji sa Hakim sudom (67% smatra to pitanje sutinskim), formiranju kosovskom ministarstva unutranjih poslova (63%),
boljoj obuci policije (59%) i jednoj legalnoj vladi (takodje 59%).
382

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Sutinsko kosovski Albanci

1
Mitrovica treba da postane celovit grad
2
Saradnja sa Hakim sudom
3
Formiranje kosovskog ministarstva unutranjih poslova
4
Bolja obuka policije
5
Jedna legalna vlada

83%
67%
63%
59%
59%

Prioriteti Srba

Sutinsko kosovski Srbi

Srbi iz Srbije
1 Srpska policija
67% 1 Snage
treba da uva
bezbednosti treba
manastire na
da odgovaraju
Kosovu
ljudima iz svih
etnikih grupa
2 Snage bezbednosti 66% 2 Predaja oruja
koje dre
treba da
pojedinci
odgovaraju
ljudima iz svih
etnikih grupa
3 Saradnja zemalja u 51% 3 Efikasniji i
delotvorniji
regionu u borbi
pravosudni sistem
protiv
organizovanog
kriminala
4 Juna i severna
50% 4 Saradnja zemalja
Mitrovica treba da
u regionu u borbi
budu posebne
protiv
optine
organizovanog
kriminala
5

Poseban imovinski
sud koji bi se
bavio imovinskim
sporovima

47% 5

Svi etniki
motivisani zloini
treba da budu
krivino gonjeni
uz izricanje
najstroijih kazni

Raseljeni Srbi
68% 1 Poseban
imovinski sud koji
bi se bavio
imovinskim
sporovima
63% 2 Snage bezbednosti
treba da
odgovaraju
ljudima iz svih
etnikih grupa
63% 3 Srpska policija
treba da uva
manastire na
Kosovu
62% 4

59% 5

Svi etniki
motivisani zloini
treba da budu
krivino gonjeni
uz izricanje
najstroijih kazni
Saradnja zemalja
u regionu u borbi
protiv
organizovanog
kriminala

82%

Research

Najvanije pitanje iz oblasti bezbednosti za kosovske Srbe je da srpska policija uva

manastire na Kosovu (67% to smatra sutinskim). Svi Srbi smatraju da policija mora da
odgovara svim ljudima, bez obzira iz koje su etnike grupe (66% kosovskih Srba to pitanje smatra sutinskim, a to isto smatra 68% Srba iz Srbije i 75% raseljenih Srba). Raseljeni Srbi smatraju stvaranje imovinskog suda koji e se baviti imovinskim raspravama
kao najvanije (82% njih smatra ovo pitanje sutinskim). To pitanje je na petom mestu
po znaaju za kosovske Srbe (47%). Saradnja zemalja u regionu u borbi protiv organizovanog kriminala i potpuna primena zakona u krivinom gonjenju etniki motivisanih
zloina i izricanje najstroijih kazni prekriocima spadaju takodje u pet najvanijih pitanja
i za kosovske Srbe, Srbe iz Srbije, i raseljene Srbe. Kosovski Srbi, medjutim, smatraju
da juna i severna Mitrovica treba da budu posebne optine (njih 50% smatra ovo pitanje
sutinskim) i po njima je to tree pitanje po vanosti. Akcenat je oigledno na primeni zakona i na Kosovu i u regionu, kao i odgovorna policijska sluba.

75%

72%

67%

66%

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Pitanja oko kojih postoji saglasnost i pitanja oko kojih ne postoji saglasnost

Research

Pitanja oko kojih postoji i oko kojih ne postoji saglasnost analizirana su i utvrdjena
na isti nain kako je bilo uinjeno i kod prethodnog pitanja br. 6. ezdeset pet procenata
kosovskih Srba i 49 procenata raseljenih Srba ne eli da Kosovo ima svoje ministarstvo
unutranjih poslova niti svoj sud za ratne zloine (ovo poslednje neprihvatljivo je za 67%
kosovskih Srba, 53% Srba iz Srbije i 55% raseljenih Srba). Takodje, 70% kosovskih Albanaca ne eli da srpska policija uva manastire na Kosovu. Obe zajednice ele niz reformi
koji bi pravosudni sistem uinio pravednijim, efikasnijim i odgovornijim. Interesantno je
da ni kosovski Albanci ni Srbi ne ele ustanovljenje posebnog monoetnikog Kosovskog
zatitnog korpusa (to je neprihvatljivo za 59% kosovskih Albanaca, 44% kosovskih Srba,
33% Srba iz Srbije i 34% raseljenih Srba). medjutim, ono to je najznaajnije, niko se ne
protivi ideji da svi etniki motivisani zloini treba da u potpunosti budu krivino gonjeni
i da za njih treba izricati najstroije kazne. To je neprihvatljivo za samo 1% kosovskih
Albanaca, a nijedan ispitanik iz grupa koje obuhvataju Srbe ne smatra to neprihvatljivim.
Oito je da su takvo krivino gonjenje i reforma pravosudnog sistema prvi koraci koje
treba preduzeti da bi se osigurala bezbednost za sve stanovnike.
Stvaranje meovite srpsko-kosovske policije koja bi uvala manastire na Kosovu
mogao bi biti prihvatljiv kompromis za ovo pitanje, jer je nivo protivljenja negde oko 33%
za kosovske Albance i 29% za kosovske Srbe. Ali nema konsensusa o budunosti Mitrovice: 94% kosovskih Albanaca apsolutno se protive postojanju odvojenih optina, dok se
64% kosovskih Srba, 11% Srba iz Srbije i 42% raseljenih Srba protive ideji o jedinstvenoj
optini. Moda je potrebno uspeno se pozabaviti pitanjima bezbednosti pre nego to se
ovaj problem uzme u razmatranje.
Tabela br. 7 Take saglasnosti i nesaglasnosti
Pitanje br. 7 U pogledu bezbednosti
molimo vas naznaite koje od
ponudjenih reenja smatrate
''sutinskim'', ''poeljnim'',
''prihvatljivim'', ''podnoljivim'' ili
''neprihvatljivim''.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
384

Kosovski
Albanci

Procenat neprihvatljivog
Formiranje kosovskog ministarstva
0%
unutranjih poslova
Bolja obuka policije
0%
Optine treba da igraju aktivnu ulogu u
0%
izboru viih slubenika policije
Specijalni sud za imovinske sporove
0%
Saradnja zemalja u regionu u borbi protiv 0%
organizovanog kriminala
0%
Odgovarajui izbor i obuka pripadnika
KZK kako bi se obezbedio njihov ugled i
autoritet
Kosovo treba da ima svoj sud za ratne
0%
zloine
Istovremena reforma policije i vlasti
1%

Kosovski Srbi iz
Srbi
Srbije

Raseljeni
Srbi

65%

24%

49%

0%
7%

1%
3%

17%
20%

0%
1%

0%
0%

1%
3%

14%

3%

9%

57%

53%

55%

9%

2%

24%

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

Istovremena reforma policije i vlasti

1%
Svi etniki zloini moraju biti u
1%
potpunosti krivino gonjeni uz najstroije
kazne
Efikasniji i delotvorniji pravosudni
1%
sistem
Adekvatno plaene zatiene sudije
1%
1%
Lokalna kontrola policije ali jedinstvena
policija da bi se obezbedila efikasna
saradnja
Mitrovica treba da postane jedinstveni
1%
grad
Saradnja sa Hakim sudom
1%
Snage bezbednosti moraju biti odgovorne 2%
svim ljudima
Politiari i mediji moraju biti paljiviji
2%
oko toga ta saoptavaju
Da bi osigurao bezbednost kosovskih
3%
Srba Beograd mora da prihvati sporazum
o konanom statusu
Centralna koordinacija svih
4%
bezbednosnih struktura na Kosovu
Bezbednosne slube, ukljuujui i KZK
4%
moraju zapoljavati i pripadnike manjina
U poetku lokalne sudove treba da
5%
nadgleda medjunarodna zajednica
Jedna legalna vlada
5%
Jedan jedinstven pravosudni sistem
8%
Predaja oruja koje je u privatnim
10%
rukama
Aktivna regrutacija Srba u KZK da bi se 10%
obezbedilo njihovo uee
Demilitarizacija pograninih oblasti
14%
KZK sa Albancima i Srbima na
28%
rukovodeim poloajima
Meovita srpsko-albanska policija za
33%
uvanje manastira na Kosovu
Odvojen monoetniki KZK
59%
Srpska policija da uva manastire na
70%
Kosovu
Dva zvanina jezika
77%
Jedna zatiena autonomna oblast za
78%
Srbe kao to je Republika Srpska u BiH
Severna i juna Mitrovica treba da budu
94%
odvojene optine

9%
0%

2%
0%

24%
0%

3%

0%

0%

3%
4%

0%
3%

5%
8%

64%

11%

42%

14%
2%

13%
0%

8%
2%

4%

0%

0%

51%

14%

30%

23%

5%

24%

28%

6%

15%

8%

8%

9%

21%
16%
15%

4%
3%
3%

6%
5%
7%

13%

5%

9%

35%
26%

24%
5%

20%
16%

29%

2%

25%

44%
2%

33%
3%

34%
6%

22%
18%

21%
19%

7%
39%

14%

23%

11%

Research

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

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KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

8. Pregovori o konanom statusu Kosova: Pitanje

Kada je re o pregovorima o konanom statusu Kosova molimo vas naznaite koje od
navedenih reenja smatrate ''sutinskim'', ''poeljnim'', ''prihvatljivim'', ''podnoljivim'' ili
''neprihvatljivim''.
Prioriteti kosovskih Albanaca

Research

Pedeset devet posto kosovskih Albanaca smatra sutinskom saglasnost Beograda oko
konanog statusa Kosova. Oni bi takodje eleli i da SAD budu aktivnije (57% smatra to
sutinskim), da medjunarodna zajednica dogovori konaan status Kosova (53% smatra to
sutinskim), a 49% smatra sutinskim da se pregovori odre u SAD ili EU. Na osnovu toga
je jasno da prioriteti kosovskih Albanaca naglaavaju uee medjunarodne zajednice i u
pregovorima i priznavanju konanog statusa, a, to je i prirodno, eleli bi i da se o tome
odri referendum.
Sutinsko kosovski Albanci
1
Beograd mora da prihvati konani status
2
SAD treba da budu aktivnije
3
Medjunarodna zajednica Savet bezbednosti i EU mora da prihvati konaan
status
4
Na Kosovu treba odrati referendum o konanom statusu
5
Pregovore treba odrati u SAD i EU

59%
57%
56%
53%
49%

Prioriteti Srba
I kosovski Srbi i raseljeni Srbi bi eleli da medjunarodna zajednica vie ukljui Beograd (za 70% prvih i 72% drugih je to sutinsko pitanje). I Srbi iz Srbije smatraju da
pregovarai iz Beograda moraju imati podrku kosovskih Srba (za 73% je to sutinsko
pitanje) i da kosovski Srbi moraju da imaju predstavnike na pregovorima (za 71% je to
sutinsko pitanje). Prirodno je da su kosovski Srbi i Srbi raseljeni sa Kosova saglasni. I Srbi
iz Srbije (65%) i kosovski Srbi (58%) smatraju da je od sutinskog znaaja da medjunarodna zajednica postupa jednako sa svim izabranim predstavnicima bez obzira na njihovu
politiku orijentaciju. To je jedno od pet njihovih prioriteta. Pitanje ''otvorenih razgovora'' je jedno od pet najznaajnijih i za raseljene Srbe (79%) i za kosovske Srbe (60%).
Medjutim kosovski Srbi, to se moe razumeti, smatraju da se standardi za drutvenu i
politiku reformu na Kosovu koje je postavila medjunarodna zajednica moraju ispuniti pre
odluivanja o konanom statusu. Sa 58% onih koji to smatraju sutinskim, ovo pitanje je
na treem mestu na spisku njihovih prioriteta. Mada se prioriteti kosovskih Albanaca i Srba
poneto razlikuju, ova pitanja vezana za pregovaraku proceduru, ili kako se povremeno
nazivaju ''oblikovanje pitanja za pregovore'', ne moraju se uzajamno iskljuivati, tako da bi
Pritina, Beograd i medjunarodna zajednica mogli da na njih obrate panju.

386

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

Pregovarai iz
Beograda moraju
imati podrku
kosovskih Srba
Otvoreni
razgovori

Standardi
medjunarodne
zajednice za
drutvenu i
politiku reformu
moraju biti
dostignuti pre
pregovora
Medjunarodna
zajednica mora
jednako postupati
sa svim izabranim
predstavnicima
bez obzira na
njihovu politiku
pripadnost

Raseljeni Srbi
73% 1 Prioritet
Beograda u
pregovorima
mora biti
bezbednost i
dobrobit
kosovskih Srba
71% 2 Otvoreni
razgovori

61% 2 Kosovski Srbi

moraju imati
predstavnike na
pregovorima
58% 3 Prioritet Beograda 69% 3
na pregovorima
mora biti
bezbednost i
dobrobit kosovskih
Srba
65% 4
58% 4 Medjunarodna
zajednica mora
jednako postupati
sa svim izabranim
predstavnicima bez
obzira na njihovu
politiku
pripadnost
63% 5
58% 5 Beograd treba da
uspostavi svoju
pregovaraku
poziciju u
potpunosti
saradjujui sa
kosovskim Srbima

80%

79%

Pregovarai iz
Beograda moraju
imati potpunu
podrku
kosovskih Srba

76%

Kosovski Srbi
moraju imati
predstavnike na
pregovorima

75%

Medjunarodna
zajednica mora
vie ukljuiti
Beograd

72%

Research

Sutinsko kosovski Srbi

Srbi iz Srbije
70% 1 Pregovarai iz
1 Medjunarodna
Beograda moraju
zajednica bi
imati podrku
trebalo vie da
kosovskih Srba
ukljui Beograd

Take saglasnosti i nesaglasnosti

Kao to se lako moe videti iz odsustva sive boje u tabeli br. 8, veina sugestija koje se
tiu pregovora prihvatljiva je i za kosovske Albance i za Srbe. Ima, medjutim, i nekoliko
uoljivih odstupanja. Predlog da se organizuje referendum o konanom statusu Kosova na
Kosovu neprihvatljiv je za 84% kosovskih Srba, 63% Srba iz Srbije i 53% raseljenih Srba.
Isto tako predlog da se u Srbiji organizuje referendum o konanom statusu neprihvatljiv je
za 66% kosovskih Albanaca.
Mada svi Srbi ele da kosovski Srbi uestvuju u pregovorima, kosovski Srbi imaju
dosta rezervi u vezi sa izborima koji bi povodom toga trebalo da se odre. etrdeset posto
kosovskih Srba apsolutno odbijaju ideju da bi Beograd trebalo da podri odravanje novih
izbora na Kosovu pre pregovora. Na ovaj ili onaj nain reenje tog problema mora biti
pronadjeno, jer su izgleda svi saglasni da kosovski Srbi, a ne Beograd, treba da govore u
ime kosovskih Srba, to je neprihvatljivo za samo 3% kosovskih Albanaca, 2% kosovskih
Srba, 3% Srba iz Srbije i 9% raseljenih Srba.
387

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

Kosovski Srbi ne ele da medjunarodna zajednica nametne reenje ukoliko pregovori

budu neuspeni (to je neprihvatljivo za 46% njih), a 54% kosovskih Albanaca ne eli da
Srpska pravoslavna crkva uestvuje u pregovorima. Ali, niko ne eli tajne pregovore. Oni
su neprihvatljivi za 67% kosovskih Albanaca, 71% kosovskih Srba, 72% Srba iz Srbije i
za 72% raseljenih Srba.
Tabela 8 Take saglasnosti i nesaglasnosti
Pitanje br. 8 U pogledu pregovora
o konanom statusu molimo vas
naznaite koje od navedenih
sugestija smatrate ''sutinskim'',
''poeljnim'', ''prihvatljivim'',
''podnoljivim'' ili ''neprihvatljivim''.
1

Research

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

388

Procenat neprihvatljivog
Otvoreni forum za politike partije i
strunjake
Razgovori i SAD i EU
Medjunarodna zajednica Savet
bezbednosti i EU treba da dogovori
konaan status
EU treba da igra aktivniju ulogu
SAD treba da budu aktivnije
Kontakt grupa treba da ima
jedinstven stav
Obuka za lokalne politiare koja bi
odgovarala njihovim zahtevima i
potrebama
Beograd treba da odobri konaan
status
Otvoreni razgovori
Razumevanje briga, strahova,
problema i stanovita drugih
politiara
Utvrdjen raspored pregovora
Kosovski Srbi a ne Beograd treba da
govore u ime kosovskih Srba
SAD i EU treba da imaju jedinstven
stav
Beograd treba da podri odravanje
novih izbora pre pregovora
Imenovanje diplomate iz EU ili UN
koji e raditi sa obe strane
Razgovori izmedju Beograda i
Pritine uz pomo posrednika
Treba organizovati referendum na
Kosovu o konanom statusu
Medjunarodna zajednica mora
jednako postupati sa svim izabranim
predstavnicima bez obzira na njihovu
politiku pripadnost

Kosovski Kosovski
Albanci
Srbi

Srbi iz
Srbije

Raseljeni
Srbi

0%

4%

2%

18%

0%
0%

36%
12%

32%
4%

25%
12%

0%
0%
1%

8%
32%
4%

5%
28%
3%

11%
15%
1%

1%

7%

5%

15%

1%

25%

7%

22%

2%
2%

2%
6%

1%
5%

0%
2%

2%
3%

4%
2%

1%
3%

7%
9%

3%

9%

7%

6%

4%

40%

23%

34%

4%

4%

10%

10%

4%

13%

7%

10%

5%

84%

63%

52%

11%

1%

1%

0%

19
20
21

22
23
24
25

26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34

35
36
37
38
39
40
41

Povean medjunarodni pritisak na

razgovore izmedju politiara
Svaka strana mora prihvatiti
pregovarae koje je druga strana
izabrala
Standardi koje je medjunarodna
zajednica postavila za drutvenu i
politiku reformu na Kosovu moraju
biti ispunjeni pre pregovora
Medjunarodne kazne za odbijanje
uea u pregovorima
Kosovski Srbi treba da imaju
predstavnike na pregovorima
Medjunarodna zajednica treba vie
da ukljui Beograd
Ako posle utvrdjenog roka dogovor
na pregovorima ne bude postignut,
medjunarodna zajednica treba da ga
nametne
Prioritet Beograda u pregovorima
treba da bude bezbednost i dobrobit
kosovskih Srba
Razgovori na Kosovu i u Srbiji
Poeti pregovore i ostvariti standarde
pre konanog statusa
Zvanini pregovarai ne mogu biti
uesnici u nedavnom sukobu
Prioritet Beograda u pregovorima
treba da bude konaan status Kosova
Pregovarai iz Beograda moraju
imati podrku kosovskih Srba
Treba odrati razgovore izmedju
Beograda i Vaingtona i Beograda i
Brisela
Beograd treba da utvrdi svoju
pregovaraku poziciju uz punu
saradnju sa kosovskim Srbima
Za pregovore treba da postoji puno
vremena
Sastanci Beograda, Pritine i
kosovskih Srba bez preduslova
Beograd i Pritina treba da imaju isti
uticaj na pregovore
Treba odrati nove izbore na Kosovu
da bi se tamonji Srbi ukljuili u
pregovore
Direktni pregovori Beograda i
Pritine bez posrednika
Srpska pravoslavna crkva treba da
uestvuje u pregovorima
U Srbiji treba organizovati
referendum o konanom statusu
Tajni razgovori

12%

3%

8%

10%

14%

14%

5%

3%

15%

1%

5%

6%

15%

11%

8%

10%

17%

8%

0%

0%

17%

0%

2%

8%

17%

46%

36%

28%

19%

4%

1%

0%

20%
21%

7%
21%

1%
3%

1%
0%

22%

4%

5%

4%

23%

17%

3%

1%

23%

4%

0%

0%

24%

19%

9%

9%

27%

1%

0%

0%

31%

6%

9%

4%

32%

5%

1%

0%

34%

6%

3%

17%

36%

23%

8%

15%

36%

23%

8%

15%

54%

13%

8%

3%

66%

17%

28%

18%

67%

71%

72%

72%

Research

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

389

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

9. Rukovodei principi za konaan status Kosova: Pitanje

to se tie rukovodeih principa za konaan status Kosova molimo vas naznaite za koje
od ponudjenih reenja smatrate da su ''sutinski'', ''poeljni'', ''prihvatljivi'', ''podnoljivi''
ili ''neprihvatljivi''.
Prioriteti kosovskih Albanaca

Research

Niko se nee iznenaditi to je potpuna nezavisnost na samom vrhu liste kosovskih Albanaca koja sadri 49 razliitih principa za konani status Kosova. Ona je za 81% njih od
sutinskog znaaja. Posle nje slede glavne odlike nezavisnosti. Da Kosovo treba da ima
svoju vojsku smatra 73% kosovskih Albanaca, 67% smatra sutinskim da Kosovo treba
da bude lan UN, a 60% da treba da vodi svoju spoljnu politiku. Peto mesto na listi njihovih prioriteta je da NATO treba da ostane na Kosovu koliko god bude potrebno (57%).
Kosovski Albanci ele nezavisnost, ali, kao i kosovski Srbi, oni takodje ele i sigurnost, i
u tome prihvataju pomo i podrku medjunarodne zajednice.
Sutinsko kosovski Albanci
1 Puna nezavisnost
2 Kosovu treba da se dozvoli da ima svoju vojsku
3 Kosovo treba da postane lan UN
4 Kosovu treba da bude dozvoljeno da vodi svoju spoljnu politiku
5 NATO treba da ostane koliko bude potrebno

81%
73%
67%
60%
57%

Prioriteti Srba
Kosovo ne moe biti odvojeno od Srbije je stav koji je na poetku liste prioriteta za sve
Srbe (69% kosovskih Srba, 65% Srba iz Srbije i 73% raseljenih Srba). Drugi najsutinskiji
princip je da kosovski Srbi mogu da imaju srpsko dravljanstvo (za 58% Srba iz Srbije
i 59% raseljenih Srba). To je za kosovske Srbe tree najznaajnije pitanje (56%) posle
stava da standardi treba da budu ispunjeni pre reavanja konanog statusa (to je sutinsko
za 58% kosovskih Srba). Potom slede razliita reenja o potovanju postojeih granica i
medjunarodnog prava, kao i to da je od sutinskog znaaja za raseljene Srbe da Kosovo ne
dobije punu nezavisnost (39%). Peto najvanije pitanje za Srbe iz Srbije (43%) je predlog
da Albanci plate trokove odvajanja od Srbije.

390

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

Raseljeni Srbi
65% 1 Kosovo se ne
moe odvojiti od
Srbije
58% 2 Kosovski Srbi
mogu uvek
zadrati srpsko
dravljanstvo
43% 3 Reenje treba nai
u okviru
postojeih granica
Kosova i Srbije
43% 4 Ne moe biti
potpune
nezavisnosti

43% 5

Reenje treba da
potuje postojee
granice Srbije i
Crne Gore u
medjunarodnom
pravu

Srbi iz Srbije
1 Kosovo se ne
moe odvojiti od
Srbije
2 Kosovski Srbi
mogu uvek
zadrati srpsko
dravljanstvo
3 Konano reenje
ne ukljuuje
amnestiju za ratne
zloine
4 Reenje treba da
potuje postojee
granice Srbije i
Crne Gore u
medjunarodnom
pravu
47% 5 Albanci treba da
plate trokove
odvajanja od
Srbije

Reenje treba da
potuje postojee
granice Srbije i
Crne Gore u
medjunarodnom
pravu

73%
59%

43%

39%

38%

Take saglasnosti i nesaglasnosti

Za razliku od pitanja koja se tiu pregovora i procedure navedenih u pitanju br. 8, malo
toga ukazuje na konsensus izmedju kosovskih Albanaca i Srba oko osnovnih principa za
konani status Kosova (tabela br. 9). No to je i bilo oekivano. Svi bi hteli pregovore za
reavanje problema Kosova, ali svi bi takodje eleli i da dogovor koji se postigne najvie
odgovara onome emu oni tee. To je potpuno prirodno i to je taka od koje pregovori o
onome to se obino naziva sutinskim pitanjima treba da ponu.

Research

Sutinsko kosovski Srbi

1 Kosovo se ne
69%
moe odvojiti od
Srbije
2 Treba ispuniti
58%
standarde pre
reavanja
konanog statusa
56%
3 Kosovski Srbi
mogu uvek
zadrati srpsko
dravljanstvo
4 Reenje treba
47%
nai u okviru
postojeih granica
Kosova i Srbije

Moda sam bio i previe striktan kada sam senio sivim sve ono gde je procenat neprihvatljivosti prelazio 40%. Prosta veina pri glasanju zahteva samo jedan glas vie od
50%. Treba takodje imati na umu da pitanja koja su neprihvatljiva sama po sebi esto
postaju prihvatljiva kada su deo sveobuhvatnog sporazuma ili paketa koji moe doneti mir,
bezbednost i napredak. Tako su na primer protestanti snano protivili reformi policije u
Severnoj Irskoj, ali su je prihvatili kao deo celine Belfastskog sporazuma.
Imajui sve te predloge na umu, koji su oni kod kojih postoji najvei potencijal za sporazum izmedju kosovskih Albanaca i Srba? To su sledei: NATO treba da ostane koliko je
potrebno (nivo neprihvatljivosti za kosovske Albance je 0% a za kosovske Srbe 3%); vee
investicije e bre reiti problem konanog statusa (to je neprihvatljivo za 2% kosovskih
Albanaca i 17% raseljenih Srba); sve balkanske drave treba da se prudrue NATO-u (to
je neprihvatljivo za 3% kosovskih Albanaca ali i za 23% Srba iz Srbije); medjunarodni
program obnove za Kosovo i Srbiju treba da bude deo konanog sporazuma (to je neprihvatljivo za 7% kosovskih Albanaca i za samo 6% Srba iz Srbije); sve drave bive Jugoslavije treba da saradjuju i pomognu jedna drugoj u pridruenju EU (to je neprihvatljivo za
11% kosovskih Albanaca i za manje od 4% svih Srba); nema ujedninjenja sa susedima je
391

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

gotovo jednako neprihvatljivo za sve (za 16% kosovskih Albanaca, 20% kosovskih Srba,
36% Srba iz Srbije i 19% raseljenih Srba); traenje da kosovski Srbi u svakom sluaju
mogu da zadre srpsko dravljanstvo je neprihvatljivo za samo 18% kosovskih Albanaca;
ispunjavanje standarda pre reavanja konanog statusa je neprihvatljivo za 22% kosovskih
Albanaca, a reenje koje potuje postojee granice Sebije i Crbe Gore u medjunarodnom
pravu je neprihvatljivo za samo 26% kosovskih Albanaca. U svemu ovom ima dosta prostora za pravljenje osnove za pregovore, i svi ovi pogledi moraju se imati na umu pri razmatranju razliitih ustavnih reenja ispitanih u istraivanju u okviru pitanja br. 10.
Tabela br. 9 Take saglasnosti i nesaglasnosti
Pitanje br. 9 u pogledu osnovnih
principa za konani status Kosova
molimo vas naznaite koje stavove
smatrate ''sutinskim'', ''poeljnim'',
''prihvatljivim'', ''podnoljivim'' ili
''neprihvatljivim''.
1

Research

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

392

Procenat neprihvatljivih
Sudska nezavisnost u okviru postojeih
granica sa Srbijom
NATO treba da ostane koliko je
potrebno
Potpuna nezavisnost
Kosovu treba dozvoliti da ima svoju
vojsku
Vee investicije bi reile pitanje
konanog statusa bre
Kosovu treba da bude dozvoljeno da
vodi svoju spoljnu politiku
Sve balkanske drave treba da se
pridrue NATO-u
Kosovu treba dozvoliti da ima svoju
civilinu odbranu
Kosovo treba da postane lan UN
Medjunarodni program obnove Kosova
i Srbije kao deo konanog sporazuma
Standardi mogu biti ispunjeni
istovremeno s reavanjem konanog
statusa
Sve zemlje bive Jugoslavije treba da
saradjuju i pomognu jedna drugoj u
pridruenju EU
Nema povratka na stanje pre rata iz
1999.
Nema ujedinjenja sa susedima
Kosovski Srbi mogu u svakoj varijanti
da zadre srpski dravljanstvo
Kosovsku nezavisnost treba proglasiti
odmah na osnovu referenduma iz 1991.

Kosovski
Albanci

Kosovski
Srbi

Srbi iz
Srbije

Raseljeni
Srbi

0%

51%

48%

54%

0%

3%

23%

21%

1%
1%

92%
91%

87%
84%

81%
76%

2%

14%

13%

17%

3%

89%

72%

67%

3%

15%

23%

11%

4%

67%

52%

59%

5%
7%

71%
22%

70%
6%

66%
33%

7%

57%

21%

50%

11%

4%

4%

3%

15%

47%

24%

43%

16%
18%

20%
9%

36%
6%

19%
16%

18%

86%

79%

71%

17 Standarde treba ispuniti pre reavanja

konanog statusa
18 Decentralizacija da, ali ne po etnikim
regionima
19 Reenje treba da potuje postojee
granice Srbije i Crne Gore u
medjunarodnom pravu
20 Srbija treba da plati sve trokove
zadravanja Kosova u svojim granicama
21 Nema podele Kosova
22 Nema pune integracije u Srbiju
23 Nezavisnost se moe proglasiti samo
kada se ispune dogovoreni uslovi
24 Praktino nezavisno Kosovo ali bez
upotrebe izraza ''nezavisno'' ili
''suvereno''
25 Reenje u okviru postojeih granica
Kosova i Srbije
26 Amnestija ratnih zloinaca kao deo
konanog reenja
27 Rezervisani poloaju za srpsku manjinu
u kosovskim institucijama
28 Konani status ne treba da ukljui
amnestiju za ratne zloince
29 Srbija treba da prihvati sve politike
tekoe koje e nastati zadravanjem
Kosova
30 Oprostiti dugove Kosova Srbiji ako
Kosovo ne ostane deo Srbije
31 Srbi i Albanci treba da se dogovore oko
himne Kosova
32 Srbi i Albanci treba da se dogovore oko
zastave Kosova
33 Proglasiti nezavisnost posle izvesnog
perioda prilagodjavanja
34 Ekonomska nezavisnost u okviru
postojeih granica sa Srbijom
35 Albanski treba da postane zvanian
jezik u srpskoj vladi
36 Kosovo kao regija EU u okviru Srbije i
Crne Gore/Balkanske konfederacije
37 Bezbedne enklave za srpsku manjinu
kao privremena mera
38 Svi gradjani regiona treba da imaju
dvostruko dravljanstvo
39 Proporcionalna zastupljenost albanskih
politiara u srpskom parlamentu ako
Kosovo ostane deo Srbije
40 Podela na srpsku i albansku oblast
41 Kantoni za manjine i na Kosovu i u
Srbiji

22%

3%

3%

18%

22%

68%

34%

56%

26%

21%

6%

19%

34%

72%

68%

60%

34%
34%
38%

42%
68%
61%

21%
49%
66%

21%
67%
61%

39%

87%

79%

66%

42%

9%

6%

3%

43%

48%

65%

60%

43%

18%

7%

31%

45%

33%

17%

35%

47%

42%

19%

32%

48%

77%

83%

72%

54%

84%

53%

56%

57%

79%

56%

78%

57%

71%

71%

66%

62%

41%

39%

47%

64%

68%

81%

76%

64%

68%

59%

59%

67%

11%

14%

36%

68%

62%

41%

61%

68%

34%

26%

28%

70%
76%

16%
29%

32%
39%

38%
47%

Research

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

393

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

j
42 Decentralizacija na etnikoj osnovi
43 Albanci treba da plate sve trokove
odvajanja od Srbije
44 Federacija Srbije, Crne Gore i Kosova
trebalo bi da ima predsednike koji se
smenjuju iz svake lanice
45 Praktino nezavisno Kosovo ali ipak
deo Srbije
46 Odloiti konani status za barem deset
godina
47 Manje od nezavisnosti, vie od
autonomije
48 Kosovo ne moe napustiti Srbiju
49 Nema pune nezavisnosti

78%
78%

10%
36%

17%
24%

32%
27%

80%

83%

63%

57%

81%

62%

63%

61%

82%

31%

52%

57%

84%

31%

20%

41%

86%
90%

4%
24%

3%
8%

5%
27%

10. Ustavni paket za konani status Kosova: Pitanje

Research

to se tie ustavnog paketa za konani status Kosova molimo vas naznaite koje od ponudjenih formulacija smatrate ''sutinskim'', ''poeljnim'', ''prihvatljivim'', ''podnoljivim''
ili ''neprihvatljivim''.

394

Take nesaglasnosti
Kod ovog pitanja ponudjene opcije namerno su su obuhvatile itav politiki spektar
od ujedninjenja svih srpskih zemalja na jednom polu do ujedinjenja svih albanskih zemalja na suprotnom, sa nizom medju-reenja. Oekivano, kako ukazuju i sva prethodna
pitanja, najprihvatljivija ustavna reenja za kosovske Albance i Srbe se veoma razlikuju.
Trideset est posto kosovskih Albanaca smatra punu nazavisnost i nemogunost izbora
dravljanstva za kosovske Srbe kao sutinsko pitanje (tabela br. 10.a). S druge strane 65%
kosovskih Srba, 46% Srba iz Srbije i 64% raseljenih Srba smatraju sutinskom punu integraciju Kosova u Srbiju, to je ustavno reenje koje je najprihvatljivije za njih (istaknuto
sivim zasenenjem). U ovim rezultatima nema pravih iznenadjenja, ali analiza ne pomae
da se ree oni problemi koji bi nas odveli dalje od onog to se sutinski mora videti kao
poetna pregovaraka pozicija obe zajednice.

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

Pitanje br. 10 U pogledu ustavnog paketa

za konani status Kosova molimo vas
naznaite koja od sledeih opcija je po
vaem miljenju ''sutinska'', ''poeljna'',
''prihvatljiva'', ''podnoljiva'' ili
''neprihvatljiva.
Procenat za sutinsko
Ujedinjenje svih srpskih zemalja
Puna integracija Kosova u Srbiju
Republika u okviru Srbije i Crne Gore sa
kontrolom nad lokalnom vlau (Ustav iz
1974.)
Republika u okviru Srbije i Crne Gore sa
kontrolom nad lokalnom vlau i regionalni
status u okviru EU
EU protektorat
Ekonomska unija nezavisnih drava
Kosova, Crne Gore i Srbije
Drava kao deo EU ali severno Kosovo
pripada Srbiji
Drava kao deo EU, sa izborom
dravljanstva za Srbe koji e imati svoj
kanton u severnom Kosovu i biti pod vlau
Srbije
Drava kao deo EU sa izborom
dravljanstva za Srbe koji bi imali svoj
kanton na Kosovu
Puna nezavisnost sa pravom izbora
dravljanstva za Srbe
Puna nezavisnost bez prava izbora
dravljanstva za Srbe
Ujedinjenje Kosova sa Albanijom
Ujedinjenje svih albanskih zemalja

Ksovski
Albanci

Kosovski
Srbi

Srbi iz
Srbije

Raseljeni
Srbi

1%
0%
0%

28%
65%
6%

24%
46%
9%

27%
64%
12%

0%

3%

7%

8%

3%
4%

9%
1%

3%
3%

3%
9%

0%

6%

4%

6%

0%

9%

4%

3%

1%

12%

3%

2%

4%

5%

3%

2%

36%

0%

2%

0%

17%
30%

0%
0%

1%
1%

0%
0%

Research

Tabela 10.a. Take nesaglasnosti

Take saglasnosti
Ako obratimo panju na nivoe ''neprihvatljivog'', situacija se radikalno menja utvrdjujui
take za mogui kompromis (tabela 10.b). Najnii nivo neprihvatljivog i za kosovske Albance i za Srbe je protektorat EU (za samo 20% kosovskih Albanaca, za 58% kosovskih
Srba, 60% Srba iz Srbije i 58% raseljenih Srba zaseneno je sivim). Zdruenu ''popularnost'' ove opcije slede dve druge: drava kao deo EU sa pravom izbora dravljanstva za
Srbe koji bi imali svoj kanton na severu Kosova (neprihvatljivo za 63% kosovskih Albanaca, 48% kosovskih Srba, 65% Srba iz Srbije i 62% raseljenih Srba), i drava kao deo EU
sa pravom izbora dravljanstva za Srbe(neprihvatljivo za 52% kosovskih Albanaca, 64%
kosovskih Srba, 67% Srba iz Srbije i 65% raseljenih Srba takodje zaseneno sivim).
Drugi ''konkurenti'' ukljuuju ekonomsku uniju nezavisnih drava Kosova, Crne Gore i
Srbije, ali 88% kosovskih Srba smatra ovu opciju neprihvatljivom kao i dravu koja je deo
395

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

EU ali prikljuenje severnog Kosova Srbiji je neprihvatljivo za 96% kosovskih Albanaca.

Moda su kosovski Srbi podeljeni u pogledu ovog pitanja na one koji ive na severnom
Kosovu i one koji ne ive tamo, jer 57% njih smatra ovaj predlog neprihvatljivim, dok
samo 48% smatra mogunost da ima svoj kanton neprihvatljivim.
Tabela br. 10.b. Take saglasnosti

Research

Pitanje br. 10 - U pogledu ustavnog paketa za

konani status Kosova molimo vas naznaite
koje od navedenih opcija smatrate
''sutinskim'', ''poeljnim'', ''prihvatljivim'',
''podnoljivim'' ili ''neprihvatljivim''.
Procenat neprihvatljivih
Ujedinjenje svih srpskih zemalja
Puna integracija Kosova u Srbiju
Republika u okviru Srbije i Crne Gore sa
kontrolom nad svim aspektima lokalne vlasti
(Ustav iz 1974.)
Republika u okviru Srbije i Crne Gore sa
kontrolom nad svim aspektima lokalne vlasti i
regionalni status u okviru EU
Protektorat EU
Ekonomska unija nezavisnih drava Kosova,
Crne Gore i Srbije
Drava u okviru EU, ali severno Kosovo se
ujedinjuje sa Srbijom
Drava u okviru EU sa pravom izbora
dravljanstva za Srbe koji e biti pod
zajednikom vlau sa Srbijom
Drava u okviru EU sa pravom izbora
dravljanstva za Srbe, koji e imati svoj
kanton na severu Kosova
Drava u okviru EU sa izborom dravljanstva
za Srbe
Potpuna nezavisnost bez prava izbora
dravljanstva za Srbe
Ujedinjenje Kosova sa Albanijom
Ujedinjenje svih albanskih zemalja

Kosovski
Albanci

Kosovski
Srbi

Srbi iz
Srbije

Raseljeni
Srbi

96%
98%
96%

13%
3%
66%

13%
4%
40%

13%
1%
35%

92%

63%

43%

46%

20%
34%

58%
88%

60%
68%

58%
66%

96%

57%

55%

60%

87%

59%

62%

61%

63%

48%

65%

62%

52%

64%

67%

65%

13%

94%

93%

88%

10%
8%

98%
98%

96%
95%

97%
97%

Ali velika briga za stanovnitvo na Kosovu, Srbiju i medjunarodnu zajednicu je da

li e ijedan od ovih razliitih ustavnih reenja izazvati egzodus kosovskih Albanaca ili
kosovskih Srba sa Kosova. Osim toga, ima li ikakve anse da se znatniji broj raseljenih
Srba vrati na Kosovo pod odgovarajuim uslovima. Ta pitanja razmotrena su u pitanju br.
11.

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KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

Raseljena lica: Pitanje 11.a

Za osobe koje ive na Kosovu za svaku od ovih opcija navedite da li biste ostali na
Kosovu (odgovorite sa DA ili NE).
Za raseljene Srbe koji su u Srbiji za svaku od ovih opcija navedite da li biste se vratili
na Kosovo (odgovorite sa DA ili NE).
Uslovi za ostanak/povratak na Kosovo
Najpopularnija ustavna opcija izgleda da je ponovo i za kosovske Albance, i za
kosovske Srbe i za raseljene Srbe protektorat EU (u tom sluaju ostalo bi na Kosovu 83%
kosovskih Albanaca, 45% kosovskih Srba bilo bi voljno da u tom sluaju ostane na Kosovu, a 27% raseljenih Srba bilo bi voljno da se vrati na Kosovo. Druge opcije drava u
okviru EU, izbor dravljanstva za Srbe uz, eventualno, njihov kanton, takodje su relativno
dobro prihvaeni. Ali jasno je da bi kosovski Albanci, Srbi i medjunarodna zajednica eleli
bolje rezultate od ovih. Kako se to moe postii?

Pitanje 11a, procenat za odgovor DA

Za svaku od ovih opcija da li biste ostali/vratili se na
Kosovo?
Ujedinjenje svih srpskih zemalja
Puna integracija Kosova u Srbiju
Republika u okviru Srbije i Crne Gore sa kontrolom
nad svim aspektima lokalne vlasti (Ustav iz 1974.)
Republika u okviru Srbije i Crne Gore sa kontrolom
nad svim aspektima lokalne vlasti i regionalnim
statusom u EU
Protektorat EU
Ekonomska unija nezavisnih drava Kosova, Crne
Gore i Srbije
Drava kao deo EU, ali se severno Kosovo prikljuuje
Srbiji
Drava u okviru EU, s pravom Srba da biraju
dravljanstvo, a iji e kanton na severnom Kosovu
biti pod zajednikom vlau sa Srbijom
Drava u okviru EU s pravom izbora dravljanstva za
Srbe koji e imati svoj kanton na Kosovu
Drava u okviru EU sa pravom izbora dravljanstva za
Srbe
Puna nezavisnost, bez prava izbora dravljanstva za
Srbe na Kosovu
Ujedinjenje Kosova sa Albanijom
Ujedinjenje svih albanskih zemalja

Kosovski
Albanci

Kosovski
Srbi

Raseljeni
Srbi

9%
8%
9%

91%
97%
36%

69%
86%
49%

14%

39%

38%

83%
74%

45%
13%

27%
25%

16%

42%

27%

24%

42%

25%

46%

48%

23%

57%

33%

20%

88%

6%

5%

92%
94%

3%
3%

0%
0%

Research

Tabela 11.a. Uslovi za ostanak/povratak na Kosovo

397

KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM

Pitanje 11.b
I konano: Ustav i nije toliko vaan, ostao bih ili se vratio na Kosovo pod uslovom da
se tamo oseam potpuno bezbedno, da mogu da biram dravljanstvo, da imam slobodu da
radim, govorim svoj jezik u drim se svoje kulture i vere bez straha od diskriminacije. DA
ili NE.
U potrazi za najboljim moguim reenjem
U zavrnom delu ovog istraivanja od ljudi koji ive na Kosovu i onih koji bi se moda
vratili tamo zatraeno je da odgovore na veoma idealistiko pitanje, ne toliko usmereno na
ustavna reenja sama po sebi, ve na bezbednost i jednakost kako su one shvaene u smislu
ljudskih prava. U tom kontekstu 83% kosovskih Albanaca odgovorilo je da bi ostalo, uz
71% kosovskih Srba, a 61% raseljenih Srba bi se vratilo (tabela 11.b).
Tabela 11.b. Idealni uslovi za ostanak/povratak na Kosovo

Research

Pitanje 11.b procenat odgovora sa DA

Ustav i nije toliko vaan, ostao bih ili bih se vratio
na Kosovo pod uslovom da se tamo oseam
potpuno bezbedno, da mogu da biram
dravljanstvo, da imam slobodu da radim,
govorim svoj jezik i drim se svoje kulture i vere
bez straha od diskriminacije

Kosovski
Albanci
83%

Kosovski
Srbi
71%

Raseljeni
Srbi
61%

Zakljuak
Kao to to sva pitanja o odnosima izmedju kosovskih Albanaca i Srba ukazuju, zajedno
sa pitanjima iz domena bezbednosti, ovo idealno reenje je u najboljem sluaju neto emu
treba teiti. To je san za ije je ostvarenje, ako je ono uopte mogue, potreban itav ivot.
Ali ono to se moe postii je stvarni napredak u pravcu tog ideala u smislu drutvenih i
politikih reformi, kombinovanih sa pogodnim ustavnim reenjima koja bi ila do moguih
granica u cilju obezbedjenja bezbednosti za sve. To moe biti uinjeno sabiranjem elemenata u pitanjima postavljenim u drugom delu ovog izvetaja koja obeavaju pomak i
to mora biti cilj predstojeih pregovora. Za primenu e, medjutim, biti potrebno vreme.
Sreom i kosovski Albanci i Srbi prihvataju uee medjunarodne zajednice, posebno EU,
iji je uticaj u regionu oigledno u porastu.
Funkcionisanje Albansko-srpskog foruma za razmenu informacija omoguila je
podrka organizacije Fridrih Ebert tiftung, nemake vlade preko Pakta za stabilnost,
nemakog IFA instituta, IREX-a, OEBS-a, Uneska i Kosovske misije Amerike agencije za
medjunarodni razvoj. Miljenja izraena na Forumu su miljenja autora i ne odraavaju
stavove organizatora i donatora.

398

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399

CIP -
,
323.22 (497.115)
323.17 (497.115)
323.1 (=163.41) : (=18) ] (497.115)
341.231.14 (497.115)
341.233.2 (497.115)
321.013 (497.115)
KOSOVAKOSOVO.COM : albanian-serb
information exchange forum = forumi
shqiptaro-serb pr kmbimin e informative =
albansko-srpski forum za razmenu miljenja.
- Beograd : Beta Media Center ;
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Prishtina : KosovaLive News Agency, 2006
(Beograd : Novinska agencija Beta). - 400
str. : portreti ; 24 cm
Tekst na engl., alb. i srp. jeziku.
ISBN 86-905421-2-4 (NA Beta)
a) Srbi - Albanci - Kosovo b) Prava
oveka - Kosovo c) Kosovsko pitanje Meunarodna zajednica d) Kosovo Dravno-pravni poloaj
COBISS.SR-ID 128745740

ISBN 869054212-4

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