Essays II

ACCESSING KNOWLEDGE IN A DISCONTINUOUS WORLD.

A BRIEF COMMENT FROM SOUTHERN CHILE1
// MARCELO I. GONZLEZ GLVEZ

//

This paper was written as part of the FONDECYT postdoctoral research project

N3130415, entitled: El mundo, la realidad y el conocimiento: la versin de los mapuches.

36

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http://journals.ed.ac.uk/unfamiliar/

would like to know what it is to be a Mapuche, I told

Juan, one of the most prominent elders in Elicura, trying to explain to him the purpose of my doctoral research.
Elicura is a small valley in southern Chile, where I carULHGRXWHOGZRUNEHWZHHQ6HSWHPEHUDQG2FWREHU
,WLVLQKDELWHGE\DSSUR[LPDWHO\SHRSOHRI
which half are self-declared Mapuche, the most numerous indigenous people in Chile. As Juan was listening
to my claim, he looked at me puzzled, and after a few
moments he smiled and replied: Thats impossible! You
cannot know what it is to be a Mapuche. [] The only
way to know what is to be a Mapuche is to be one, so to
know it you would have to be born again! [This time as
a Mapuche] Disappointed by Juans reaction, I did not
fully comprehend the depth of his assertion until a few
months later. When Juan claimed the impossibility of my
ethnographic effort, he did not intend to be rude or unsupportive, as he also did not point out that I could not
know what is to be a Mapuche because I was an outsider
who, additionally, was not a Mapuche racially speaking.
Rather, as I understood later, he was implicitly maintaining a twofold principle that is obvious for most rural Mapuche people I have met, and which might be explained
as follows.
Firstly, Mapuche people usually uphold that any meaning
of anything, even of what the term Mapuche means, is
deeply personal. This is regardless of those aspects one
may externally and prima facie assess as evidently collective. Thus, for instance, although there might be a collective of people one might externally label as the Mapuche, it is expected that what it is to be a Mapuche for
each one of its members would be something radically
GLIIHUHQW6LPLODUO\HDFKSHUVRQDOSHUVSHFWLYHRQWKHQDture of this so-called Mapuche collective would be different for those who comprise it). Although Juan thought
I could not know what it is to be a Mapuche because I was
not what he considered Mapuche people to be; for him,
additionally, there was not even a tiny possibility that I
could know what is to be Mapuche to his view. Although
one could make up ones own mind about certain things
given certain circumstances, any possibility of knowing
what is on other peoples minds seems, for the Mapuche,
to be simply beyond discussion. This issue has several
practical implications in Mapuche rural life, and it may
be observed in a strong reluctance to give advice, or in
the ubiquitous doubt people maintain towards what is really meant by other peoples words (see Gonzlez Glvez

6HFRQGO\ DQG LQWLPDWHO\FRQQHFWHGWR WKH IRUPHU VWDWHment, by denying to me the possibility of understanding
the other, Juan was simultaneously sharing with me one
of the key principles of what can be loosely labelled as a
Mapuche philosophy. Although this principle may be
very simple, its implications are enormous (as we will
see later), and exceed by far the small aspect I address in
this paper. In short, the principle states that the only way
of really knowing about something is by experiencing that
something yourself. It was also due to this principle that

ISSN: 2050-778X

Juan was actually one of the most renowned people in

Elicura. It is common among the Mapuche, as elsewhere,
to assert that some people know more than others. HowHYHU LQ 0DSXFKH OLIH WKLV FXPXODWLYH DQG TXDQWLDEOH
conception of knowledge is conceived of as inextricable
IURPWKHVHYHUDOUVWKDQGH[SHULHQFHVWKDWSHRSOHKDYH
had in life. Thence, it is generally supposed that the older
the person, the more experience he has had, and the more
knowledge he has accumulated. This was the reason for
Juans fame: it was simply because he was one of the oldest people living in Elicura.

M. Gonzlez Glvez

In this paper I intend to problematize the idea of accessing knowledge, considering my ethnographic experience
among the Mapuche people of southern Chile. Drawing
on the aforementioned principle underlining the relevance
of personal experience, I will attempt a twofold comment.
7KHUVWFRPPHQWUHIHUVWRWKHZRUOGZKLFKNQRZOHGJH
makes reference to, which involves confronting two possible understandings: the one implicit in the project La
mia cura, and the one summarised in asserting that the
only way of knowing what it is to be a Mapuche is by being one. The second comment refers to the potential that
any knowledge has to be shared and/or accessed, which
eventually involves challenging many assumptions that
the idea of knowledge often implies (e.g. an intersubjective ethos). This latter comment will eventually lead us to
deal with the problematic relationship between ontology
and epistemology, which, as I argue, ultimately reclaims
an always-contingent ethnographic solution.
THE WORLD
6LQFH,UVWSODQQHGZULWLQJWKLVSLHFH,ZRQGHUHGZKDW
my friend Juan would think about the project La mia
cura. In case the reader is not acquainted with it, in brief,
WKLVLVDSURMHFWFDUULHGRXWE\6DOYDWRUH,DFRQHVLDQ,WDOian artist who suffers from a brain tumour. Considering
this, he has uploaded all his medical records to a freeaccess website, intending to share them with everybody.
7KURXJKWKLV6DOYDWRUHDLPVWRQGDFXUHWRKLVLOOQHVV
which he expects to be suggested by any, some, or many
RIWKLVHYHU\ERG\ORRNLQJDWKLVOHV$IHZWLPHV,KDYH
WKRXJKWWKDWSHUKDSV-XDQZRXOGGDUHWRJLYH6DOYDWRUH
one possible cure, suggesting that he should take a plane
to Chile in order to visit the powerful evangelical prophet
who cured his wife from what she described as a stomach
cancer. Nevertheless, I am more inclined to think that
Juan would not do that. This is not because Juan would
QRW IHHO HPSDWK\ IRU 6DOYDWRUHV VXIIHULQJ ,W LV VLPSO\
EHFDXVH UHJDUGOHVV RI DQ\ FRPSDVVLRQ 6DOYDWRUHV FDVH
may awake in Juan, he would probably think it extremely
RGGWRQGRXWZKDWLVJRRGIRURQHVHOIWKURXJKDQRWKHU
persons experiences. How can a person, who is not even
related to him, know what is good for him?, Juan would
SUREDEO\ DVN $QG SHUKDSV 6DOYDWRUH ZRXOG DQVZHU
,QVSLUDWLRQDOSLHFHIRUWKLVLVVXHRI7KH8QIDPLOLDU6HHKWWS
www.artisopensource.net/cure/

The Unfamiliar

37

Essays II

because in the past he might have had the same illness I

am now experiencing.
,QWKLVFWLRQDOFRQYHUVDWLRQOLHVWKHFRUHRIWKHSRLQW,
want to put forward. I have the strong impression that
what might be at stake here is an equivocation (sensu
9LYHLURV GH &DVWUR  LQYROYLQJ WZR VXSHUFLDOO\
similar references, which point to two extremely different
UHIHUHQWV6XSSRUWLQJERWK6DOYDWRUHVDQG-XDQVDOORFXtions, we may discern two different premises responding,
eventually, to two mutually incommensurate understandings of the world (sensu0HUOHDX3RQW\2QWKH
RQH KDQG ZH KDYH 6DOYDWRUHV SUHPLVH ZKLFK DVVXPHV
(considering certain nuances) that there exists an overarching category (we can call it humanity) that is set out
in an immutable setting (the world, reality), which is
beyond human agency. It is nothing but this assumption
that explains why it is worth sharing his medical records
and why it is worth listening to other peoples solutions:
IRU6DOYDWRUHWKHUHLVDJLYHQFRQWLQXLW\LHKXPDQELROogy) allowing the recurrence of certain phenomena (e.g.
cancer), and because of this continuity it is possible to
replicate certain ways of action (e.g. treatments) in order
to obtain the expected results (i.e. a cure). Even though
each human being is considered to be unique in a psychological sense, in this understanding there is a biological
connection that brings them all together, allowing them to
have the same diseases and treatments.
On the other hand, we have the premise supporting the
claim which, I suppose, Juan would make. In his view,
FRQWUDU\ WR 6DOYDWRUHV WKHUH LV QRW D JLYHQ FRQWLQXity between different human beings (at best, this contiQXLW\ PXVW EH FUHDWHG >*RQ]iOH] *iOYH] @ LQ WKH
same way as there is not a transcendental unity inherent
LQWKHZRUOGWREHH[SHULHQFHG,ILQ6DOYDWRUHVFDVH
there is an implicit subject/object dualism, which allows
subjects to replicate their equivalent experiences of the
same objects, in Juans case such a dualism cannot even
be claimed to exist (because subjects and objects do not
belong a priori to the same categories). Considering
this, we can have a better grasp of the reasons behind
Juans assertion of the impossibility of acquiring certain
knowledge (e.g. the meaning of being Mapuche): because
to his view what may be labelled as world and humanity are discontinuous categories. What this discontinuity
implies, fundamentally, is a denial of any given possibility of phenomenological replication. There is no reason
to suppose one person is perceptively and substantially
equivalent to another, and thus there is no reason to surmise that their personal experiences might be replicable
by others. That is exactly why, to know something, each
person must personally experience that something.
One immediate problem emerging from such a stance regards the notion of what so far I have called the world.
,Q 6DOYDWRUHV FDVH GXH WR LWV LPPXWDELOLW\ WKH ZRUOG
appears to be frozen in ceteris paribus (cancer, humanity, and cure are concepts which are part of this
unitary world, insofar as they are essentially independent

38

The Unfamiliar

of people), but in Juans case the equation seems to go as

follows: If the way we know what is out there is by experiencing it, and if experience is something fundamentally personal, it is necessary to conclude that people do
not inhabit one, but multiple worlds of experience. These
multiple worlds lack, as might be expected, any necessary unity, and if they sometimes overlap, this is more
due to the similarity of the people experiencing their own
worlds than to an intrinsic characteristic of the world out
there.
ACCESSING KNOWLEDGE
Once discussed, the ontological relativity to which
knowing may be subdued, and taking seriously the path
opened up by Juan, it seems that the questions one might
ask regarding the subject of accessing knowledge are
very different from the ones one would ask if one takes,
for example, a political approach. Indeed, following Juan,
we are quite unexpectedly very far away from any sort of
ethical discussion that argues against any form of restricting knowledge, and we are not even close to a celebration
of any free access to it. Conversely, perhaps we may recognise ourselves discussing another dimension of topics,
PRUH UHODWHG WR GHQLQJ NQRZOHGJH LQ WKH UVW SODFH ,
think there are at least two critical, but interrelated, points
LQWKLVVHQVH7KHUVWLVUHODWHGWRFKDOOHQJLQJWKHVRFLDO
nature of knowledge, whereas the second refers to a denial of its potential for institutionalisation.
7KH UVW WKLQJ -XDQV SUHPLVH DOORZV XV LV WR FKDOOHQJH
the notion of knowledge as an artefact, which may be
traded and exchanged within social life. Even though
for Juan knowledge is something one possesses, it is
not something one immediately could share, due to the
strict personal nature of that knowledge. As stated above,
in Juans view what is known and what is not known is
entirely up to a person, in its pure singularity. This notion
brings out two subjects immediately: 1) a veil of incertitude regarding the ways (if any) that Mapuche people
consider it possible to transmit knowledge3DQGWKH
implications of thinking about knowledge not only as detached from its social nature, but also unleashed from
the constraints imposed by thinking about it as a social
artefact. It is on this second subject that I want to focus
my attention.
As stated before, thinking about the world as something dependent upon each singular person posits a problem concerning the way we might think about accessing
knowledge. It does not only challenge any preconceived
idea of what constitutes knowledge, but it asks for a reEventually most knowledge can be partially transmitted if one
follows certain ways of action, but this is a subject I deliberately chose to leave out of this argument in order to emphasise
the discontinuity of the Mapuche way of thinking about the
world. If the reader is interested, these ways are described in
*RQ]iOH]*iOYH]

http://journals.ed.ac.uk/unfamiliar/

determining, the other. This implies denying the existence

of an ultimate ontology and of a concurrent privileged
epistemology in order to access this ontology. And, on the
contrary, recognising the existence of multiple ontologies,
which may be accessed and reproduced only by their own
particular epistemologies. Denying the existence of one
XQLWDU\ DQG GHQLWLYH RQWRORJ\ LV QRWKLQJ EXW EUHDNLQJ
a continuity that we may see in the world, but which is
not necessarily in the world. Once the world appears
as discontinuous, we are thus forced to look at each possible ontology-epistemology relationship in particular,
avoiding the imposition of our own terms on others.

Perhaps the most relevant outcome of this new and asocial notion of knowledge is that it resists the key problem
of free access to knowledge: its institutionalisation. To
consider knowledge as a social artefact, which may be
exchanged and transmitted, is what eventually makes it
something to be restricted, valued, and commoditised.
On the contrary, if we take knowledge to be an intimate
and personal possession, any possible restriction or comPRGLFDWLRQRILWVHHPVQRWKLQJEXWDEVXUG:K\ZRXOG
somebody want to restrict access to something that cannot be un-restricted? (i.e. other peoples knowledge-s).
Why would somebody commodify something that only
has value for the only person able to commodify it? Consequently, accessing knowledge is no longer a social
problem but an epistemological one. Thus, we would not
have to worry about the dilemmas involving the dissemination of social knowledge, and instead should introspectively consider our own personal potential to know what
is good/bad for us in worlds that are entirely dependent
upon that personal potential.

7KLV WDNHV XV QDOO\ WR UHHFW DERXW WKH IXQGDPHQWDO

place ethnography should enjoy, not only as a research
method, but also as a means of creating relational bridges
between the discontinuities of the world. It is only by a
deep and committed engagement between people that one
PD\SDUWLDOO\JXUHRXWRWKHURQWRORJ\HSLVWHPRORJ\UHODtionships. In anthropology, it is perhaps Martin Holbraad
ZKRODWHO\KDVEHHQPRVWFOHDUO\PDLQWDLQLQJWKLV
kind of stance, dismissing the classical representational
approach (which assumes a natural continuity bringing
together different cultures) in order to take one what he
labels as ontographic. Following this papers subject,
this implies that anthropology should not be about asking why Juan believes those things about knowledge, but
what knowledge is in his view. However, it must be clear
WKDWQRQHRIWKHVHFODLPVVKRXOGEHXQGHUVWRRGDVGHQLtive. If ontologies and epistemologies are always continJHQW WKHUH LV QR SUREOHP DW DOO LI 6DOYDWRUH ORRNV IRU D
cure employing whichever means he wants, as long as
that means are coherent with the ontology he maintains.
A problem would only arise if one assumed that the same
methods and ontological assumptions are valid for everyone, including Juan, without even asking them if they are
in agreement with that supposition. uf

CONCLUSION
To conclude this brief set of comments I would like to
clarify that it is not my intention to criticise the project La mia cura, which, regardless of what I seem to
SXWIRUZDUGLQWKLVSDSHU,QGWUXO\UHPDUNDEOHDQGLQ
many ways admirable. To have employed it here is only
for the sake of making a point I think of as crucial when
approaching the subject of accessing knowledge from
an anthropological perspective. Put simply, before dealing with a subject we must avoid taking any part of that
subject for granted. If you want, before asking questions
DERXWWKHEHQHWVRUGLIFXOWLHVSRVLWHGE\WKHSUREOHP
of accessing knowledge nowadays, it is compulsory (at
least if one wants to keep equivocations [sensu Viveiros
GH&DVWUR@WRDPLQLPXPUVWWRFRPSUHKHQGZKDW
is to be understood as knowledge and the means one may
use to access it. In this sense, it seems that we should
be constantly reviewing the relationship between ontology (what things are) and epistemology (the means employed to understand what things are). I sincerely think
this relationship should be conceived as an open-ended
mutual determination, which considers none of the terms
LQYROYHGDVQDODQGHVVHQWLDOO\HVWDEOLVKHGEXWLQDFRQtinual motion of being determined by, and simultaneously

ISSN: 2050-778X

M. Gonzlez Glvez

conceptualization of the ways we think one may access

any knowledge. If people cannot necessarily replicate
other peoples personal experiences, and if one cannot really learn anything from others (the only way of really
knowing about something is experiencing that something
yourself), any access to knowledge seems to be limited
to each personal engagement with the world. In a literal
sense, accessing knowledge appears freed from any social
mediation, and seems to be entirely up to each personal
agency. Knowledge is, thus, no longer a social artefact,
but an inalienable personal possession resulting from an
open-ended personal experience.

REFERENCES
*RQ]iOH] *iOYH] 0  Personal truths, shared
equivocations. Otherness, uniqueness and social life
among the Mapuche of southern Chile. PhD Thesis. University of Edinburgh.
+ROEUDDG02QWRJUDSK\DQGDOWHULW\'HQLQJ
anthropological truth. Social Analysis
0HUOHDX3RQW\0The world of perception. London: Routledge.
9LYHLURVGH&DVWUR(3HUVSHFWLYDODQWKURSRORJ\
and the method of controlled equivocation. Tipit

The Unfamiliar

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