KOH TIECK HENG VS PEOPLE

FACTS:Koh Tieck Heng, alias Teddy

Koh, alias Tomas P. Flores was charged
of estafa thru falsification of a
commercial document in the following
manner: after opening a savings
account with SBTC under the name
Tomas P. Flores and somehow illegally
obtained a PBC check issued by one F.
Dycaico, accused making or causing
alterations and changes in a genuine
document w/c changed its meaning
and thereby affixing his signature at
the back of the check, which check
was cleared by the PBC. On the
second instance, accused did not
perform all the acts of execution which
should have produced the crime of
estafa thru falsification of a
commercial document by reason of
some cause other than his own
spontaneous desistance, that is, by
timely discovery made by
officials/employees of said bank of the
forgery and falsification made on the
aforesaid check before payment could
be made which led then and there to
the apprehension of said accused.
Under the two Informations, the mode
of falsification attributed to the
accused is that of having erased and
altered the dates and amounts of the
checks in question, and superimposing
over the original dates and amounts,
thereby making alterations and
changes in genuine documents which

changed their meaning. Accused

misappropriated, misapplied and
converted to his own personal use and
benefit checks in various amounts.
ISSUE:Did accused committed the
crime of attempted estafa in the
absence of deceit and damage?
HELD: Yes. The fact that appellant was
the possessor and utterer of the
checks in question and having
benefited from the subsequent
withdrawals, as well as having
attempted to gain by trying to
withdraw an amount thereon. The use
of the spurious checks is by itself
fraud or deceit. The appellant made
use of and benefited from the falsified
document is a strong evidence that he
either himself falsified it or caused the
same to be falsified, he being
criminally responsible in either case.
Since Heng is the only person who
stood to be benefited by the
falsification of the document that
wasfound in his possession, it is
presumed that he is the material
author of such falsification.
LOPEZ VS PARAS
FACTS: In the month of February 1964,
petitioners Roy P. Villasor, as
administrator of the intestate estate of
the spouses Manuel M. Mejia and
Gloria Lazatin (Special Proceedings No.
48181 of the Court of First Instance of

Manila), together with his copetitioners Angelina Mejia Lopez and

Aurora Mejia Villasor and other heirs of
said spouses, entered into a contract
with respondent Trinidad T. Lazatin for
the development and subdivision of
three parcels of land belonging to said
intestate estate. Subsequently Lazatin
transferred his rights under the
contract to the Terra Development
Corporation. Months later, petitioners
and other co-heirs filed an action in
the Court of First Instance of Quezon
City (Civil Case No. Q-8344) for the
rescission of said contract for alleged
gross and willful violation of its terms.
Thereafter, Lazatin and the Terra
Development Corporation, in turn,
filed with the Fiscal's Office of the City
of Angeles a complaint against
petitioners for an alleged violation of
the provisions of Article 172 in relation
to those of Article 171, paragraph 4, of
the Revised Penal Code. After
conducting a preliminary examination
in connection therewith, the City Fiscal
of Angeles filed with the Court of said
City an information charging
petitioners with the crime of
falsification of a private document
upon the allegation that they made it
appear in the contract mentioned
heretofore that Aurora M. Villasor was
the "guardian" of the minor George L.
Mejia and that Angelina M. Lopez was
similarly the "guardian" of the minor

Alexander L. Mejia, when in truth and

in fact they knew that they were not
the guardians of said minors on the
date of the execution of the document
(Criminal Case No. C-2268).
ISSUE: whether or not there is a
commission of art.172? and when and
where is the offense of falsification of
a private document deemed
consummated or committed?
RULING:YES but the court of angeles
has no jurisdiction over the criminal
act, but the importance of this case is
when and where a falsification of
document comes in.
In the present case, it is the claim of
petitioners a claim supported by the
record that Angelina M. Lopez and
Aurora M. Villasor signed the private
document wherein they are alleged to
have made a false statement of fact,
the first within the territorial
jurisdiction of Makati, and the second
within the territorial jurisdiction of
Quezon City, both within the province
of Rizal.
We now come to consider the question
of when and where is the offense of
falsification of a private document
deemed consummated or committed.
Upon this point, We have ruled clearly
and definitely in U.S. vs. Infante, 36
Phil. 146, that the crime of falsification
of a private document defined and

penalized by Article 304 of the Penal

Code (now paragraph 2, Article 172 of
the Revised Penal Code) is
consummated when such document is
actually falsified with the intent to
prejudice a third person, whether such
falsified document is or is not
thereafter put to the illegal use for
which it was intended.
Again in U.S. vs. Barretto, 36 Phil. p.
207, We said:
. . . The contention of counsel would
seem to be that the information was
defective, in that it fails to set forth
expressly the place where improper
and illegal use was made of the
falsified document, an allegation
which counsel for appellant insists was
absolutely essential for the proper
determination of the court clothed
with jurisdiction over the alleged
offense. But under the definition of the
crime of falsification of a private
document as set forth in Article 304 of
the Penal Code, the offense is
consummated at the time when and at
the place where the document is
falsified to the prejudice of or with the
intent to prejudice a third person, and
this whether the falsified document is
or is not put to the improper or illegal
use for which it was intended. It is
evident, therefore, that the place
where the crime is committed is the
place where the document is actually

falsified, and that the improper or

illegal use of the document thereafter
is in no wise a material or essential
element of the crime of falsification of
a private document; . . . .
Applying the above ruling to the facts
before Us, it would appear that if the
private document subject of the
information was falsified by the
persons therein charged, the act of
falsification the signing of the
document and the coetaneous intent
to cause damage was committed
and consummated outside the
territorial jurisdiction of the City of
Angeles, and that whether the falsified
private document was thereafter put
or not put to the illegal use for which it
was intended, or was signed by the
other contracting party within the
territorial jurisdiction of the City of
Angeles is in no wise a material or
essential element of the crime of
falsification of the private document,
nor could it in any way change the fact
that the act of falsification charged
was committed outside the territorial
jurisdiction of Angeles City. Thus, that
the City Court of Angeles has, no
jurisdiction over the offense charged is
beyond question.
ALFELOR SR. VS BONIFACIO
Jurisprudence sited in this case to
serve as a guide for art.172

FERNANDO, J.:

The Judiciary Act 1 and the Rules of

Court 2 set forth with clarity the
jurisdiction of a municipal court over
crimes. That was the point stressed by
petitioners to respondent Judge. 3 It
did not avail, their motion to dismiss a
falsification charge against them
having been denied. They did point
out that in the very complaint itself it
was admitted that it was in another
municipality where such alleged
falsification took place. Respondent
Judge was not persuaded; he accepted
the view set forth in the objection to
the motion to dismiss that the
municipal court of Tigaon, his station,
was vested with jurisdiction as it "is
one of the intervening municipalities
where the jeep carrying the ballot box
(the contents of which were allegedly
falsified) passed through." 4 He
maintained that falsification is a
continuing offense. He did not budge,
notwithstanding his attention being
called to authoritative decisions that
affirmed the contrary. Clearly then,
there is merit to this petition. certiorari
and prohibition lie.
The principal petitioner, Felix O.
Alfelor, and respondent Felix A.
Fuentebella were congressional
candidates in the second district of

Camarines Sur in the 1965 elections,

with the latter being proclaimed as
winner resulting in the filing of an
electoral protest by the former. 5
Respondent Fuentebella in turn
charged his opponent and the other
petitioners in the municipal court of
Tigaon, Camarines Sur, presided by
respondent Judge, with falsification of
public or official documents contained
in the ballot box of a precinct in
Parubcan, Camarines Sur, the alleged
criminal act having taken place in still
another municipality, Iriga, Camarines
Sur. 6 There was on the part of
petitioners a motion to dismiss on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction, the situs
of the alleged falsification being in
another municipality, Iriga, Camarines
Sur. 7 Respondent Judge in the
challenged order issued on April 29,
1967 denied the motion to dismiss on
the ground that falsification was a
continuing offense. 8 A motion for
reconsideration was filed. It was
denied. 9 Hence this petition for
certiorari and prohibition.
As noted at the outset, the petition
merit.

1.
Reference was previously made
both to the Judiciary Act and the Rules
of Court as to the jurisdiction of
municipal courts to try criminal cases

being confined only to such offenses

committed within the limits of the
territories appertaining to their
position. 10 In the latest case in point,
Lopez v. City Judge, 11 Justice Dizon,
as ponente, restated the basic rule
thus: "It is settled law in criminal
actions that the place where the
criminal offense was committed not
only determines the venue of the
action but is an essential element of
jurisdiction (U.S. v. Pagdayuman, 5
Phil. 265). Thus, under the provisions
of Section 86 of the Judiciary Act of
1948, municipal courts have original
jurisdiction only over criminal offenses
committed within their respective
territorial jurisdiction." 12 As was
pointed out by him, such a doctrine
goes back to U.S. v. Pagdayuman, 13 a
1905 decision. Beltran v. Ramos, 14
Ragpala v. Justice of the Peace of
Tubod, 15 People v. Yumang 16 and
People v. San Antonio 17 may likewise
be cited on this point.
2.
That much, as was pointed out
by Justice Dizon, is settled law. It is to
be assumed that respondent Judge
would not deliberately ignore what it
commands. His persistence can be
ascribed to his view that falsification is
a continuing offense. He was led to
conclude, therefore, that an ingredient
thereof took place within his
jurisdiction. Here his stand is
decidedly opposed to what this court

has uniformly and consistently held.

Again, Lopez v. City Judge 18 points
the way: "We now come to consider
the question of when and where is the
offense of falsification of a private
document deemed consummated or
committed? Upon this point, We have
ruled clearly and definitely in U.S. v.
Infante, ... that the crime of
falsification of a private document
defined and penalized by Article 304
of the Penal Code (now paragraph 2,
Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code)
is consummated when such document
is actually falsified with the intent to
prejudice a third person, whether such
falsified document is or is not
thereafter put to the illegal use for
which it was intended." 19 United
States v. Infante 20 was decided as far
back as 1917, almost sixty years ago.
Less than a month later that same
year, United States v. Barreto, 21
which spoke to the same effect, was
promulgated. As was pointed out by
Justice Carson who likewise penned
the Infante opinion: "It is evident,
therefore, that the place where the
crime is committed is the place where
the document is actually falsified, and
that the improper or illegal use of the
document thereafter is in no wise a
material or essential element of the
crime of falsification of a private
document; and even if it were
otherwise, the charge that the crime

was committed in a specific place

would seem to be a sufficient
allegation that all of the acts
necessary to its consummation were
in fact done at the place indicated." 22
There is also this opinion of Chief
Justice Avancena in People v.
Villanueva: 23 "The falsification of
each of these six money orders
committed separately by means of
different acts constitutes independent
crimes of falsification. (U.S. v. Infante
and Barreto, 36 Phil. 146), and the
appropriation of the respective
amounts thereof by the defendant,
likewise constitutes different crimes of
malversation." 24 All of the above
cases explicitly ruled on the specific
point at issue. It does not admit of
doubt though that while no such
categorical statement may be found in
other decisions of this Court, it has
always been assumed that falsification
is not a continuing offense. 25
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari
is granted and the order of respondent
Judge of April 29, 1967 and the order
of May 25, 1967 denying the motion
for reconsideration are reversed,
nullified and set aside and declared to
be of no force and effect. The writ of
prohibition is likewise granted,
respondent Judge being enjoined to
desist from taking any further action
on the complaint for falsification of
public and/or official documents filed

against petitioners in his sala except

for the purpose of dismissing the
same. No costs.
PEOPLE VS DIZON
FACTS; That in or about the month of
January, 1922, at Camp Stotsenburg,
in the province of Pampanga,
Philippine Islands, and within the
jurisdiction of this Court of First
Instance, the above-named defendant
Jose S. Dizon, at that time assistant
bookkeeper of the Post Exchange of
said Camp, voluntarily, illegally, and
criminally, and with intent to defraud
said Post Exchange, altered and
falsified the entries on the books kept
by him, and destroyed and rendered
unless certain documents and papers
relative to the accounts of said Post
Exchange, succeeding, through such
fraudulent means, to swindle away the
amount of three thousand nine
hundred and sixty-four pesos and
ninety-one centavos (P3,964.91),
equivalent to 19,824 pesetas,
belonging to the Post Exchange, said
defendant having embezzled said
amount to the prejudice of said Post
Exchange, and in violation of law.

ISSUE: whether or not the accused

committed acts of falsification. And
estafa

RULING:
Yes, A thorough study of the evidence
shows that the accused, Jose S. Dizon,
during the period from October, 1920,
to January, 1922, was in the employ,
as assistant bookkeeper at the Post
Exchange of Camp Stotsenburg, an
army post in the Province of
Pampanga; that during the time of his
employment he brought on credit
various articles from the several stores
of the Post Exchange, for which he
signed chits (vales) showing the
nature and value of the articles so
brought; that said chits as well as chits
signed by other customers were
recorded in the books of the
corresponding stores from which the
articles were bought; that every
morning all of the chits of the
preceding day were turned over to the
office of the Post Exchange, also to be
recorded in the books of said office,
including the ledger (personal
accounts) of the customers; that said
chits were kept in the office of the Post
Exchange, and were returned to the
customers only upon payment of their
account; that Jose S. Dizon, as such
assistant bookkeeper, was the
employee in charge of recording the
sales of the several stores, in cash as
well as on credit, in the books of the
office of the Post Exchange, and also
of the keeping of the said chits and
the recording thereof in the personal

accounts of the customers; that he

voluntarily did not record in his
personal account most of the chits
signed by him for articles bought on
credit, amounting to P3,964.91
(Exhibit J-2), except a few of them
amounting only to P653.77, which
latter amount he paid, leaving only a
balance of P29.43 (Exhibit J-1); that all
the chits for the said amount of
P3,964.91 have disappeared, and that
only a few chits amounting to P199.99
were found properly kept in separate
envelopes (Exhibits I to I-4).
The foregoing facts clearly show that
the accused voluntarily falsified the
ledger (personal accounts) of the
office of the Post Exchange, which was
a commercial document, by not
recording in his own personal account
the chits for articles bought by him
from the stores of the Post Exchange
amounting to P3,964.91, thereby
violating article 301 in relation with
No. 4 of article 300 of the Penal Code,
evidently for the purpose of evading
the payment of said amount. The
same facts also lead us to the
conviction that the accused
maliciously destroyed those chits, for
the same purpose, and also to
obliterate, to some extent, the traces
of his indebtedness, which act
constitutes a violation of paragraph 9
of article 535 of the Penal Code. (U.S.

vs. Tan Jenjua, 1 Phil., 38; U.S. vs.

Kilayko, 31 Phil., 371.)

The evidence clearly establishes the

guilt of the accused beyond a
reasonable doubt, and the findings of
facts of the lower court are in full
harmony therewith. The fifty thousand
errors attributed to the lower court by
counsel for appellant could not be
found in spite of our careful and
painstaking study of the whole record.
The only error of said court noted by
us is the finding, that in the
commission of the crime of estafa the
accused violated article 534 instead of
article 535, No. 9, of the Penal Code.
This error, however, is immaterial as
far as the appellant is concerned, in
view of the fact that under the
provisions of either article the penalty
remains the same.
US VS PONTE
FACTS: That on or about the 6th day of
September, 1909, the defendant
Rufino Ponte was a bonded employee
of the provincial and municipal
government of Calabanga, Ambos
Camarines, and as municipal treasurer
of said pueblo had in his possession
and in his charge the sum of
P3,795.53 and safe valued at P50. The
defendant Pedro Pedraza was the
janitor or porter of the municipal

treasury of Calabanga, and Juan

Alamida, Ignacio Narvades, Agapito
Cada, Alejandro Metram and Esteban
Verata were municipal policemen of
said pueblo of Calabanga, Ambos
Camarines, and as such officers had
committed to them the guardianship
and custody of the municipal treasury
of Calabanga, where the said sum of
P3,795.93 and the safe containing it
were kept.
That the said defendant Rufino Ponte
did maliciously, criminally and
unlawfully misappropriate and make
personal use of the said sum of
P3,795.93, and refused and failed to
render account of the same, as well as
of the safe containing it.
That the defendants Pedro Pedraza,
Juan Alamida, Ignacio Narvades,
Agapito Cada, Alejandro Metram, and
Esteban Verata, did, each and every
one of them, maliciously, criminally
and unlawfully, directly aid said Rufino
Ponte in this malversation by taking
said safe with the said amount from
the municipal treasury and carrying it
to the sitio of Inarian: in violation of
law.
Counsel for the defendants Juan
Alamida, Ignacio Narvades, Agapito
Cada, Alejandro Metram, and Esteban
Verata, demurred to the information
on the ground that as to these

defendants the facts set out in the

information did not constitute the
crime with which they were charged.
The grounds upon which they base
this contention are stated by counsel
as follows:
The crime with which the abovenamed defendants are charged is
provided for and penalized by a
special Act, No. 1740, which has
repealed such provisions of the Penal
Code relating to malversation and
misappropriation as conflict with the
provisions of said Act.
According to the information cited, the
above-named accused were municipal
policemen of Calabanga, where the
crime was committed, and their sole
participation therein was that they
directly aided Rufino Ponte, the
municipal treasurer, in said
malversation by taking the safe with
the sum misappropriate and carrying it
from the municipal treasury to the
sitio of Inarian.
ISSUE: whether or not Public
malversation extends to those who aid
the prinicipal
RULING:

YES, Groizard, in his Commentaries on

article 405 of the Spanish Penal Code,
which is substantially identical with
article 390 of the Philippine Code, says
that:
Doubt, weighty doubt may arise,
nevertheless, regarding the definition
of the crime and of the penalty to be
imposed upon the private party who
abstracts funds with the consent of
the officer charged with their custody.
Shall the person so doing be guilty of
the crime of malversation here
provided for, and shall he suffer the
same penalty as the unfaithful officer,
or shall he be guilty only to the crime
of theft and undergo the punishment
he deserves therefor?
Without overlooking the force of the
arguments we have just cited, we are
inclined to take the first point of view.
We are led thereto by the
consideration that in contending for
the imposition of the same penalty
upon the private party who abstracts
public funds as upon the employee
who gives his consent thereto we
recognize the differentiation with
which crimes are always described
and penalized in the code. In the
action which the text describes as a
crime there is perfect unity: the
private party does not act
independently from the public officer:
rather, he knows that the funds of

which he wishes to get possession are

in the latter's charge, and instead of
trying to abstracts them by
circumventing the other's vigilance he
resorts to corruption, and in the
officer's unfaithfulness seeks and finds
the most reprehensible means for
accomplishing a deed which by having
a public officer as its moral instrument
assumes the character of a social
crime. If the article were not so
interpreted, it would be necessary to
agree that the act, in spite of its
evident unity, would constitute not
one but two distinct crimes, and the
persons participating therein, although
they acted together throughout, would
be guilty of two different kinds of
wrongdoing. Moreover, the rule of
article 80, which prevents extension
from some culprits to others of the
responsibility that arises from their
personal qualities, is restricted by
fundamental principles and by the
article itself, wherein it is applied to
the consideration of the extenuating
and aggravating circumstances which
may affect the persons respectively
responsible for the crime, and it

neither can nor must influence in any

way the characterization of the facts.
One who helps a son kill his father is
an accomplice of parricide: one who
plans with a servant to commit a theft
(hurto), and does commit it, is guilty of
hurto domestic. When the law clearly
defines a crime, as it has here defined
the crime of malversation, those who
in any way participate therein must be
principals, accomplices or abettors
thereof. (Vol. 4, p. 275.)
Viada, in his Commentaries upon the
same article, says:
Shall the person who participates or
intervenes as co-perpetrator,
accomplice or abettor in the crime of
malversation of public funds,
committed by a public officer, have
the penalties of this article also
imposed upon him? In opposition to
the opinion maintained by some jurists
and commentators (among others the
learned Pacheco) we can only answer
the question affirmatively, for the
same reasons (mutatis mutandis) we
have already advanced in Question I of

the commentary on article 314. French

jurisprudence has also settled the
question in the same way on the
ground that the person guilty of the
crime necessarily aids the other culprit
in the acts which constitute the crime.
(Vol. 2, 4th edition, p. 652.)
The reasoning by which Groizard and
Viada support their views as to the
correct interpretation of the provisions
of the Penal Code touching
malversation of public funds by a
public official, is equally applicable in
our opinion, to the provisions of Act
No. 1740 defining and penalizing that
crime, and we have heretofore, in the
case of the United States vs. Dowdell
(11 Phil. Rep., 4), imposed the penalty
prescribed by this section of the code
upon a public official who took part
with another in the malversation of
public funds, although it was not
alleged, and in fact clearly appeared,
that those funds were not in his handy
by virtue of his office, though it did
appear that they were in the hands of
his coprincipal by virtue of the public
office held by him