(Aparri v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.

L-30057, January 31, 1984)

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; PUBLIC OFFICERS; PUBLIC OFFICE, DEFINED. A
public office is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred by law, by
which for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the
creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign
functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public
(Mechem, Public Offices and Officers, Sec. 1).
2. ID.; ID.; PUBLIC OFFICE, NATURE OF RIGHT THERETO. The right to
hold a public office under our political system is therefore not a natural right. It
exists, when it exists at all, only because and by virtue of some law expressly or
impliedly creating and conferring it (Mechem, Ibid., Sec. 64). There is no such
thing as a vested interest or an estate in an office, or even an absolute right to
hold office. Excepting constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as
regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an
office or its salary (42 Am. Jur. 881).
3. ID.; ID.; APPOINTMENT, DEFINED. By "appointment" is meant the act of
designation by the executive officer, board or body, to whom that power has been
delegated, of the individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office
(Mechem, op. cit., Sec. 102). When the power of appointment is absolute, and
the appointee has been determined upon, no further consent or approval is
necessary, and the formal evidence of the appointment, the commission, may
issue at once. Where, however, the assent or confirmation of some other officer
or body is required, the commission can issue or the appointment is complete
only when such assent or confirmation is obtained (People vs. Bissell, 49 Cal.
407). To constitute an "appointment" to office, there must be some open,
unequivocal act of appointment on the part of the appointing authority
empowered to make it, and it may be said that an appointment to office is made
and is complete when the last act required of the appointing authority has been
performed (Molnar vs. City of Aurora, 348 N.E. 2d 262, 38 Ill. App. 3d 580). In
either case, the appointment becomes complete when the last act required of the
appointing power is performed (State vs. Barbour, 53 Conn. 76, 55 Am. Rep. 65).

4. ID.; ID.; TERM OF OFFICE, DEFINED. The word "term" in a legal sense
means a fixed and definite period of time which the law describes that an officer
may hold an office (Sueppel vs. City Council of Iowa City, 136 N.W. 2D 523,
quoting 67 CJS OFFICERS, secs. 42, 54[11). According to Mechem, the term of
office is the period during which an office may be held. Upon the expiration of the
officer's term, unless he is authorized by law to hold over, his rights, duties and
authority as a public officer must ipso facto cease (Mechem, op. cit., Secs. 396397). In the law on Public Officers, the most natural and frequent method by
which a public officer ceases to be such is by the expiration of the term for which
he was elected or appointed. The question of when this event has occurred
depends upon a number of considerations, the most prominent of which,
perhaps, are whether he was originally elected or appointed for a definite term
or for a term dependent upon some act or event . . . (Mechem, op. cit., Sec. 384).
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; FIXING OF TERM COMPLETES REQUISITES FOR
APPOINTMENT IN CASE AT BAR. The petitioner was appointed as general
manager pursuant to Resolution No. 13 (series of 1960 approved on January
15, 1960) of the Board of Directors of the national Resettlement and
Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA) as per authority of paragraph 2, Section 8
of Republic Act 1160 which gives said Board the power "to appoint and fix the
term of office of the general manager . . ." A careful perusal of the resolution
points out the fact that the appointment is by itself incomplete because of the lack
of approval of the President of the Philippines to such appointment. However,
such appointment was made complete upon approval of Resolution No. 24
(series of 1962 approved March 15, 1962) wherein the President submitted to
the Board his "desire" to fix the term of office of the petitioner up to the close of
office hours on March 31, 1962. The questioned resolution corrected whatever
requisite lacking in the earlier Resolution No. 13 of the respondent Board.
Resolution No. 24, approved by the respondent Board and pursuant to "the
desire of the President" legally fixed the term of office of petitioner as mandated
by paragraph 2, Section 8 of Republic Act 1160.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; FIXING OF TERM IN CASE AT BAR, NOT REMOVAL. In
case at bar, the term of office is not filed by law. However, the power to fix
term is vested in the Board of Directors subject to the recommendation of
Office of Economic Coordination and the approval of the President of

the
the
the
the

Philippines. Resolution No. 24 (series of 1962) speaks of no removal but an

expiration of the term of office of the petitioner.
7. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; NO NEED OF CONSTRUCTION WHERE
THE STATUTE IS CLEAR. The statute is undeniably clear. It is the rule in
statutory construction that if the words and phrases of a statute are not obscure
or ambiguous, its meaning and the intention of the legislature must be
determined from the language employed, and, where there is no ambiguity in the
words, there is no room for construction (Black on Interpretation of Laws, Sec.
51). The courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature
apart from the words (Hondoras vs. Soto, 8 Am. St., Rep. 744). The reason for
the rule is that the legislature must be presumed to know the meaning of words,
to have used words advisedly and to have expressed its intent by the use of such
words as are found in the statute (50 Am. Jur. p. 212).
(Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 86564, August 01, 1989)
ELECTION; QUALIFICATIONS OF CANDIDATE FOR PUBLIC OFFICE,
CONTENDING REQUIREMENTS. The probability that many of those who
voted for the petitioner may have done so in the belief that he was qualified only
strengthens the conclusion that the results of the election cannot nullify the
qualifications for the office now held by him. These qualifications are continuing
requirements; once any of them is lost during incumbency, title to the office itself
is deemed forfeited. In the case at bar, the citizenship and voting requirements
were not subsequently lost but were not possessed at all in the first place on the
day of the election. The petitioner was disqualified from running as mayor and,
although elected, is not now qualified to serve as such.
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11. ID.; ELECTION; CANDIDATE OBTAINING THE SECOND HIGHEST

NUMBER OF VOTES; NOT QUALIFIED TO REPLACE THE DISQUALIFIED
CANDIDATE; SANTOSRULING REVERSED. Finally, there is the question of
whether or not the private respondent, who filed the quo warranto petition, can
replace the petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The simple reason is that as he
obtained only the second highest number of votes in the election, he was
obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City. Re-examining Santos v.

Commission on Election, 137 SCRA 740 the Court finds, and so holds, that it
should be reversed in favor of the earlier case of Geronimo v. Ramos, which
represents the more logical and democratic rule. There the Court held it would be
extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right
to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is
proclaimed a winner and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the
majority of which have positively declared through their ballots that they do not
choose him.
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(Borromeo v. Mariano, G.R. No. 16808, January 03, 1921)

1. QUO WARRANTO; JUDGES; APPOINTMENT, TRANSFER, AND

REMOVAL. B was appointed Judge of the Twenty-fourth Judicial District on
July 1, 1914. He qualified and took possession of office on that date. On
February 25, 1920, he was appointed Judge of the Twenty-first Judicial District
and M was appointed Judge of the Twenty-fourth Judicial District. B has since
the latter date refused to accept appointment to the Twenty-first Judicial
District. Held: That B is lawfully entitled to the possession of the office of
Judge of the Court of First Instance of the Twenty-fourth Judicial District.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; "APPOINT," CONSTRUED. The term "appoint" found
in the proviso to section 155 of the Administrative Code, is well-known in law
and whether regarded in its legal or in its ordinary acceptation, is applied to
the nomination or designation of an individual.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. Judges of First Instance are not appointed Judges
of First Instance of the Philippine Islands but are appointed Judges of the
Courts of First Instance of the respective judicial districts of the Philippine
Islands. They hold this position of Judge of First Instance of definite districts
until they either resign, reach the age of retirement, or are removed through
impeachment proceedings. The intention of the law is to recognize separate
and distinct judicial offices.

4. ID.; ID.; ID. The proviso to section 155 of the Administrative Code
must be given a meaning which will not render abortive the main portions of
the law, especially those relating to the removal of judges.
5. ID.; ID.; ID. Appointment and qualification to office are separate
and distinct things. Appointment is the sole act of those vested with the power
to make it. Acceptance is the sole act of the appointee. Persons may be
chosen for office at pleasure; there is no power in these Islands, however,
which can compel a man to accept the office.
6. ID.; ID.; ID. The language of the proviso to section 155 of the
Administrative Code does not empower the Governor-General to force upon
the judge of one district an appointment to another district against his will,
thereby removing him from his former district.
7. ID.; ID.; ID. The reasonable force of the language used in the
proviso to section 155 of the Administrative Code taken in connection with the
whole of the Judiciary Law, and the accepted canons of interpretation, and the
principles of the law of public officers, leave room for no other construction
than that a Judge of First Instance may be made a judge of another district
only with his consent.
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(General Manager, Philippine Ports Authority v. Monserate, G.R. No.

129616, April 17, 2002)

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; DE FACTO OFFICER, ELUCIDATED. While petitioner Anino's

appointment to the contested position is void, as earlier discussed, he is
nonetheless considered a de facto officer during the period of his incumbency.
A de facto officer is one who is in possession of an office and who openly
exercises its functions under color of an appointment or election, even though
such appointment or election may be irregular.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; DE JURE OFFICER MAY RECOVER SALARIES FROM THE DE
FACTO OFFICER. In Monroy vs. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled that a
rightful incumbent of a public office may recover from a de facto officer the salary

received by the latter during the time of his wrongful tenure, even though he
(the de facto officer) occupied the office in good faith and under color of title.
A de facto officer, not having a good title, takes the salaries at his risk and must,
therefore, account to the de jure officer for whatever salary he received during the
period of his wrongful tenure. In the later case of Civil Liberties Union vs.
Executive Secretary, this Court allowed ade facto officer to receive emoluments
for actual services rendered but only when there is no de jure officer.
DaCTcA

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DE JURE OFFICER ENTITLED TO BACKPAY

DIFFERENTIALS FROM DE FACTO OFFICER. The rule is that where there is
a de jure officer, a de factoofficer, during his wrongful incumbency, is not entitled
to the emoluments attached to the office, even if he occupied the office in good
faith. This rule, however, cannot be applied squarely on the present case in view
of its peculiar circumstances. Respondent had assumed under protest the
position of Administrative Officer sometime in the latter part of 1988, which
position she currently holds. Since then, she has been receiving the emoluments,
salary and other compensation attached to such office. While her assumption to
said lower position and her acceptance of the corresponding emoluments cannot
be considered as an abandonment of her claim to her rightful office (Division
Manager), she cannot recover full backwages for the period when she was
unlawfully deprived thereof. She is entitled only to backpay differentials for the
period starting from her assumption as Administrative Officer up to the time of her
actual reinstatement to her rightful position as Division Manager. Such backpay
differentials pertain to the difference between the salary rates for the positions of
Manager II and Administrative Officer. The same must be paid by petitioner Anino
corresponding from the time he wrongfully assumed the contested position up to
the time of his retirement on November 30, 1997.
(Lo Cham v. Ocampo, G.R. No. L-831, L-876, L-878, November 21, 1946)
1. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; RESTRICTIONS NOT GIVEN
UNLESS EXPRESSED. Statutory provisions should not be given a
restricted meaning where no restriction is indicated. Just as the express

enumeration of persons, objects, situations, etc., is construed to exclude those

not mentioned, so no distinction should be made where none appears to be
intended.
2. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE; LAWYER APPOINTED BY
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE TO ASSIST FISCAL; AUTHORITY, SCOPE OF.
A lawyer appointed by the Secretary of Justice pursuant to section 1686 of the
Revised Administrative Code, as amended by section 4 of Commonwealth Act
No. 144, to assist a fiscal, is authorized to sign informations, made
investigations and conduct prosecutions. If the legislature had wanted to forbid
him to discharge said functions, it would have said so or indicated its intention
by clear implication. There is nothing so sacrosanct in the signing of
complaints, making of investigations and conducting of prosecutions that only
an officer appointed by the President or one expressly empowered by law may
be permitted to assume these functions. Certainly a lawyer who is invested
with the same authority as might be exercised by the Attorney General or
Solicitor General is presumed to be competent to be entrusted with any of the
duties, without exception devolving on a prosecuting attorney.
3. PUBLIC OFFICERS; PUBLIC OFFICE; DUTIES INCLUDED. The
duties of a public office include all those which truly lie within its scope, those
which are essential to the accomplishment of the main purpose for which the
office was created, and those which, although incidental and collateral, are
germane to, and serve to promote the accomplishment of the principal
purposes.
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Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc.

vs Santiago
Posted on March 5, 2013

58 SCRA 493
1974
The Public Service Commission (PSC) imposed a fine on a radio company for failure to
render service expected of a radio operator.

FACTS
The PSC, acting on complaints by dissatisfied RCPI customers, penalized it with a fine. RCPI
alleged that the Commission was devoid of such competence since the Public Service Act
(C.A. No. 146) expressly exempted radio companies from the jurisdiction, supervision, and
control of such body over their franchises, equipment, and other properties (Sec. 13[a]
thereof) except with respect to the fixing of rates. (Sec. 14 thereof)
The first paragraph of Sec.21 of the Act reads:
Every public service violating or failing to comply with the terms and conditions
of any certificate or any orders, decisions or regulations of the Commission shall
be subject to a fine of not exceeding P200 per day for every day during which
such default or violation continues; and the Commission is hereby authorized and
empowered to impose such fine, after due notice and hearing.
ISSUE
Is there anything in Sec.21 of the Act which empowers the PSC to impose a fine?
HELD
None. The power is neither expressly nor impliedly granted.
In the face of the provision itself, it is rather apparent that the Public Service Commission
lacked the required power to proceed against petitioner.x x x a public official must locate in
the statute relied upon a grant of power before he can exercise it. It need not be express. It
may be implied from the wording of the law. Absent such requisite, however, no warrant
exists for the assumption of authority. The act performed, if properly challenged, cannot
meet the test of validity. It must be set aside.

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(Miguel v. Zulueta, G.R. No. L-19869, April 30, 1966)

1. MANDAMUS

PROCEEDING;
AVAILABLE
TO
PROCURE
ENFORCEMENT OF THE LAW; CASE AT BAR. The placing of the
name "President Garcia Hall" at the facade of the building where the name
"Iloilo Provincial Building" originally appeared is intended to give the
impression that the name refers to the building and not to one of its rooms.
This is contrary to Republic Act 1059. As respondents, specifically, the
Provincial Governor, are in duty bound not only to observe, but even to
enforce the law, they may properly be compelled by mandamus to remove
or rectify an unlawful act if to do so is within their official competence, at
the instance of a taxpayer.

(Aprueba v. Ganzon, G.R. No. L-20867, September 03, 1966)

1. MANDAMUS; OPERATION OF PUBLIC MARKET STALL; WRIT WILL NOT ISSUE TO

CONTROL OR REVIEW EXERCISE OF DISCRETION; CASE AT BAR. Mandamus
will not issue to control or review the exercise of discretion of a public officer where the
law imposes on him the right or duty to exercise judgment in reference to any matter in
which he is required to act (Blanco vs. Board, 46 Phil., 192; Lee Wing vs. Collector, 30
Phil., 368; see II Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 170-171). In the case at bar,
the privilege of petitioners to obtain a renewal of the permit to operate a stall in the Iloilo
City market rested on the sound discretion of respondent, and refusal of the latter to
grant the continuation of the privilege cannot be the subject of an action for mandamus.

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(Morfe v. Mutuc, G.R. No. L-20387, January 31, 1968)

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW;

STATUTES;

NULLIFICATION

OF;

FACTUAL

FOUNDATION

NECESSARY TO OVERCOME PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY. The lower court's decision

declaring as unconstitutional Section 7, Republic Act No. 3019, insofar as it required periodical
submittal of sworn statements of financial conditions, assets and liabilities of an official or
employee of the government after he had once submitted such a sworn statement upon
assuming office, contained no factual foundation on which the nullification of this section of the
statute could be based. In the absence of such a factual foundation, the presumption of validity
must prevail (Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association v. The Mayor of Manila, L24693, July 31, 1967). On this ground alone, the lower court decision could be reversed.

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