Hume on moral motivation and artificial virtue

Moral distinctions derived from sentiment, not reason

To have the sense of virtue, is nothing but to feel a satisfaction of a particular kind
from the contemplation of a character. The very feeling constitutes our praise or
admirationWe do not infer a character to be virtuous, because it pleases: But in
feeling that it pleases after such a particular manner, we in effect feel that it is
virtuous. (III.1.ii)
In the first section of Book III of the Treatise, Hume attacks the view that virtue is
nothing but a conformity to reason and that moral rightness and wrongness are discerned
by reason alone. Based on the conclusion of Section II.3.iii, that reason is passions slave
and cannot motivate us to any action, he argues that moral distinctions cannot be based on
reason because they do have the power to motivate us. The moral rightness or wrongness
of an action is supposed to (and does) motivate us to do it or to refrain from doing it. But
reason alone cannot impel us to act or deter us from acting. Reason is wholly inactive,
and can never be the source of so active a principle as conscience, or a sense of morals
(III.1.i).
Secondly, Hume draws on the conclusion of II.3.iii that actions cannot be reasonable
or unreasonable, strictly speaking. They can be based on false beliefs, but that is not the
same as being reasonable or unreasonable. However, actions can be, and are, morally
praiseworthy and morally blameworthy (laudable or blameable). This cannot be the same
as reasonable or unreasonable. Moreover, being based on a false belief does not make an
action morally blameworthy (if I take your umbrella because I falsely believe it is mine,
that excuses rather than convicts me of stealing it).
Hume offers another much-discussed argument in III.1.i, designed to show that virtue
and vice are not matters of fact, whose existence we can infer by reason. He thinks this is
obvious when we reflect on a case of vicious action, such as wilful murder.
Examine it in all lights, and see if you can find that matter of fact, or real existence,
which you call vice. In which-ever way you take it, you find only certain passions,
motives, volitions and thoughts. There is no other matter of fact in the case. The vice
entirely escapes you, as long as you consider the object. You never can find it, till you
turn your reflexion into your own breast, and find a sentiment of disapprobation,
which arises in you, towards this action. Here is a matter of fact; but tis the object of
feeling, not of reason. It lies in yourself, not in the object.
Hume adds that Vice and virtue, therefore, may be compared to sounds, colours, heat and
cold, which, according to modern philosophy, are not qualities in objects, but perceptions
in the mind. As in the case of the impression of necessary connection (discussed in Book
I.3.xiv of the Treatise), we project our own perceptions onto the objects that occasion
them.
According to Hume, then, moral distinctions are based on sentiment or feeling rather
than reason. Just as in Book I, Hume says that belief is more properly an act of the
sensitive, than of the cogitative part of our natures (I.4.i), in Book III he says that
Morality, therefore, is more properly felt than judgd of (III.1.ii). Since moral
distinctions are not founded on reasoning or the comparison of ideas (on thinking), they
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must be founded on impressions (on feeling). Hume thinks it is plain from experience that
what is virtuous produces a pleasant impression or sentiment in us, and what is vicious
produces an unpleasant impression. The pleasure that the contemplation of virtuous acts or
characters elicits in us constitutes our approbation of those acts and characters.
Conjoined with Humes account of the indirect passions, the fact that the
contemplation of virtue produces pleasure explains why we feel pride in contemplating
our own virtuous traits of character and why we love (admire) others who possess such
traits. The contemplation of virtuous traits produces pleasure, which is transferred to the
idea of myself when the trait is mine (thus generating pride), and is transferred to the idea
of you when the trait is yours (producing love).
Humes next question, then, is: How does the pain or pleasure that distinguishes moral
good and evil arise in the human mind?
The artificial virtue of justice
Hume divides virtues into natural and artificial, depending on whether they produce
pleasure and approbation naturally or by means of a contrivance. Justice (by which he
particularly means honesty with respect to property), he claims, is an artificial virtue.
Suppose you have lent me money. Justice requires that I repay you. But what motive do I
have to repay you? Hume rejects the view of those who argue that natural self-interest is
the legitimate motive to all honest actions, because self-love, when it acts at libertyis
the source of all injustice and violence. Nor does he believe that honesty can be explained
by a universal love of mankind, since the extent of our natural benevolence is limited.
How, then, do rules of justice and property arise, and how do we come to approve of
those who keep them and disapprove of those who break them? Like Hobbes, Hume
thinks that humans need to band together with other humans to satisfy their needs; only
through co-operation can we gain the force, ability and security that we lack as isolated
individuals:
By the conjunction of forces, our power is augmented: By the partition of
employments, our ability encreases: And by mutual succour we are less exposd to
fortune and accidents. (III.2.ii)
The advantages of society are no help unless humans know of them, but Hume thinks that
the family provides a kind of natural society which makes us aware of the advantages of
association and co-operation. However, Hume thinks that humans natural selfishness
(though not as absolute as depicted by Hobbes), their tendency to love their own family
more than others, threatens the co-operation with others that is required if we are to reap
the benefits of society. It produces what Hume calls an opposition of passions; each of us
loves or cares about ourselves more than any other single person, and though we love and
care about others as well as ourselves, Hume thinks the strength of our love is proportional
to the degree to which we are related to or acquainted with them. Since we all try to
pursue our own advantage and the advantage of those we care about, our natural passions
are in opposition. This wouldnt matter so much if it were not for the fact that many
human advantages (notably, material goods) are (a) in scarce supply, and (b) transferable.
As the improvement, therefore, of these goods is the chief advantage of society, so
the instability of their possession, along with their scarcity, is the chief impediment.
(III.2.ii)

How can this impediment be overcome and possession secured? The solution derives from
artifice, Hume claims, not from nature:
or more properly speaking, nature provides a remedy in the judgment and
understanding, for what is irregular and incommodious in the affections. For when
men, from their early education in society, have become sensible of the infinite
advantages that result from it, and have besides acquird a new affection to company
and conversation; and when they have observd, that the principal disturbance in
society arises from those goods, which we call external, and from their looseness and
easy transition from one person to another; they must seek for a remedy...This can be
done after no other manner, than by a convention entered into by all the members of
the society to bestow stability on the possession of those external goods, and leave
every one in the peaceable enjoyment of what he may acquire by his fortune and
industry. By this means, every one knows what he may safely possess; and the
passions are restraind in their partial and contradictory motions. (III.2.ii)
How can the understanding restrain the passions, given that Hume has argued that reason
is the slave of passion? Hume is careful to argue that this restraint is not contrary to these
passions; if it were, it could not be maintained, since nothing can oppose a passion but
another passion. The restraint imposed by the convention of justice is contrary only to the
impetuous (violent) movement of the passions. Our understanding shows us that
abstaining from the possessions of others, provided that they abstain from ours, is the best
way to maintain a society which is necessary to our well-bring and subsistence, and to the
well-being and subsistence of those we care about. Reason or understanding, then, shows
us that conventions of property are needed to secure something we care about. In more
Humean terms, the prospect of pleasure offered by peaceful society leads to a desire for it,
and reasoning indicates the way in which it is to be achieved. No explicit promise is
needed, Hume argues; as long as we all realise that it is our interest to respect each others
goods, we will behave accordingly.
How, then, do we come to attach sentiments of right and wrong to justice and
injustice? Why are we displeased by unjust acts, even when they do not affect our
interests? Humes answer appeals to sympathy, our natural tendency to feel what others
feel. If I see the effects of, say, pain in anothers voice and gestures, that brings to mind
their cause, and forms such a lively idea of that cause that it is converted into the feeling
itself. So I feel unease when I see someone else suffering (III.3.i). When I contemplate an
unjust act, or the vicious character trait that gives rise to it, this brings to mind the
suffering resulting from these causes, and this unpleasant feeling attaches itself to the acts
and traits themselves. Thus I come to feel hatred (contempt, disapprobation) when I think
of dishonesty (injustice) in others, and humility (shame) when I think of dishonesty in
myself.
Thus self-interest is the original motive to the establishment of justice: but a
sympathy with public interest is the source of the moral approbation, which attends
that virtue. (III.2.ii)