Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
Nicanor entered the LRT drunk. The guard of LRT approached NAvidad which caused a
misunderstanding and a fist fight. Nicanor was struck by a train when he fell on the tracks.
Heirs of nicanor files damages against LRTA.
RTC: Pay plaintiff. Prudent, the security agency, was also liable for damages
CA: Exonerate prudent.
Issue: WON LRT is negligent?
Held: Yes.
Common carriers should exercise utmost diligence. Contract of carriage has been created.
There was a breach of contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence
required of the common carrier. Prudent should be absolved because its negligence in
selecting its employees was not proven.
Disputable presumptions
PEOPLE V NAVAJA
Facts:
Accused was the object of a buy bust operation but he successfully evaded arrest. He was
then arrested and was charged with Section 4, Article II of R.A. No. 6425. The evidence was
positive for marijuana. The accused denied that he was selling marijuana and that he had
never smoked it. He likewise denied that he was caught selling the prohibited drug
presented as Exhibits "A" and "B" by the prosecution in a buy-bust operation conducted on
30 August 1989. 12 All three (3) defense witnesses testified that the accused has never been
known as "Sindak" and that the accused's namesake, Alexander Navaja alias "Sindak," the
son of Pepe Navaja, was the person selling marijuana in the area; however, the said
"Sindak" was killed in January 1990 by his financier and associate, Oscar Parba.
RTC: guilty due to positive identification of apprehending officer and the buy bust operation.
WON there is a need to present all officers in the buy bust as witness to testify
No. There is no rule of evidence which requires the presentation of a specific or minimum
number of witnesses to sustain a conviction for any of the offenses described in the
Dangerous Drugs Act. It is the prosecuting fiscal's prerogative to determine who or how
many witnesses are to be presented 17 in order to establish the quantum of proof necessary
for conviction. In this case, the prosecution deemed it sufficient to present Pfc. Espina alone
since any other testimony which would have been given by the other members of the buybust team would be merely corroborative in nature. The non-presentation of corroborative
witnesses does not constitute suppression of evidence and would not be fatal to the
prosecution's case.
WON he was positively identified
Yes. no reason to doubt his positive identification of the accused. Although he was eight (8)
to ten (10) meters away from the spot where the transaction took place, considering that
the incident occurred in broad daylight (1:00 o'clock in the afternoon) and, as admitted by
the accused in his Appellant's Brief, the said fence is a wire fence, 24 it could not have been
impossible for Pfc. Espina to see and recognize the accused as the person with whom the
poseur-buyers transacted business.
WON the witness was credible
Yes. the rule is well-settled that the issue of the witnesses' credibility is to be resolved
primarily by the trial court because it is in a better position to decide the question, having
heard such witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the
trial. Accordingly, the trial court's findings on the matter of the credibility of the witnesses
are entitled to the highest degree of respect and would not be disturbed on appeal in the
absence of any showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance which would have affected the result of the case.
PEOPLE V BALUDDA
Facts
The RTC found Baludda guilty of violating Sec 4 of RA 6425. They were apprehended when
the police officers wanted to search the sacks they were carrying. The accused ran away
which made the officers fire shots. The officers looked at the sacks and found marijuana.
The accused contested the legality of their arrest. RTC: Guilty.
WON they were guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Yes. Under the Rules of Evidence, it is disputably presumed that things which a person
possesses or over which he exercises acts of ownership, are owned by him. [9] In U.S. vs.
Bandoc,[10] the Court ruled that the finding of a dangerous drug in the house or within the
premises of the house of the accused is prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus
possidendi and is enough to convict in the absence of a satisfactory explanation. [11] The
constitutional presumption of innocence will not apply as long as there is some logical
connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed, and the inference of
one fact from proof of another shall not be so unreasonable as to be a purely arbitrary
mandate. The burden of evidence is thus shifted on the possessor of the dangerous drug to
explain absence of animus possidendi.[12] In the case under consideration, it is not disputed
that appellant was apprehended while carrying a sack containing marijuana. Consequently,
to warrant his acquittal, he must show that his act was innocent and done without intent to
possess, i.e. without knowledge that what he possessed was a prohibited drug. The legality
of the warrantless search and arrest in the case under scrutiny is beyond question. It bears
stressing that appellant was caught transporting a prohibited drug in flagrante
delicto. Consequently, a peace officer or any private person, for that matter, may, without
warrant, arrest a person when in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; and the person lawfully arrested
may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of an offense, without a search warrant. Hence, the warrantless search in this
case, being an incident to a lawful arrest, is in itself lawful.
admissible in evidence. 8 This error, however, is of no moment, considering that the P.C.
investigator, Emiliano Agustin, before whom the declaration was given, testified as a
witness in the case, and he related the statements made to him by Pedro Bagay, and these
statements are clearly admissible as a dying declaration of the latter. The admissibility of
dying declarations is not dependent on their being made in any particular form. It may have
been an oral statement or ejaculation made to a casual bystander, a mere formal statement
to a physician, relative or friend, or answers to questions put by the person to whom the
declaration is made or a writing signed by the declarant, or an affidavit. 9
There is no question that the declaration was made with full realization on the part of the
deceased that he was in a dying condition. Considering the degree and seriousness of the
wound, and the fact that death supervened shortly afterwards, such circumstances may be
considered as substantial evidence of consciousness.
ORDER IN THE EXAMINATION OF AN INDIVIDUAL WITNESS
PEOPLE V SALAS
Mario Abong was originally charged with homicide in the Court of First Instance of Cebu but
before he could be arraigned the case was reinvestigated on motion of the prosecution. As a
result of the reinvestigation, an amended information was filed, with no bail recommended,
to which he pleaded not guilty. Trial commenced, but while it was in progress, the prisoner,
taking advantage of the first information for homicide, succeeded in deceiving the city court
of Cebu into granting him bail and ordering his release; and so he escaped. The respondent
judge, learning later of the trickery, cancelled the illegal bail bond and ordered Abong's rearrest. But he was gone. Nonetheless, the prosecution moved that the hearing continue in
accordance with the constitutional provision authorizing trial in absentia under certain
circumstances.
WON trial in absentia was declared properly
Held: No. The doctrine laid down in that case has been modified by Section 19, which now
allows trial in absentia, Now, the prisoner cannot by simply escaping thwart his continued
prosecution and possibly eventual conviction provided only that: a) he has been arraigned;
b) he has been duly notified of the trial; and c) his failure to appear is unjustified.
The respondent judge was probably still thinking of the old doctrine when he ruled that
trial in absentia of the escapee could not be held because he could not be duly notified
under Section 19. He forgets that the fugitive is now deemed to have waived such notice
precisely because he has escaped, and it is also this escape that makes his failure to appear
at his trial unjustified. Escape can never be a legal justification. In the past, his escape
"rewarded" him by postponing all further proceedings against him and in effect ultimately
absolving him of the charge he was facing. Under the present rule, his escape will, legally
speaking, operate to Ms disadvantage by preventing him from attending his trial, which will
continue even in his absence and most likely result in his conviction.
The right to be present at one's trial may now be waived except only at that stage where
the prosecution intends to present witnesses who will Identify the accused. 9 Under Section
19, the defendant's escape will be considered a waiver of this right and the inability of the
court to notify him of the subsequent hearings will not prevent it from continuing with his
trial. He will be deemed to have received due notice. The same fact of his escape will make
his failure to appear unjustified because he has, by escaping, placed himself beyond the
pale, and protection, of the law.
inconclusive; in his statement, Exhibit 17, nothing points definitely and specifically to
appellant as having fired any shot at all; importantly the one clearly and categorically
referred to as having shot Talastas is Egi or Padrones.
WON the testimony of angeles may be impeached
Held: Yes. It is a basic postulate in the law on evidence that every witness is presumed to be
truthful and perjury is not to be readily inferred just because apparent inconsistencies are
evinced in parts of his testimony. Every effort to reconcile the conflicting points should first
be exerted before any adverse conclusion can be made therefrom. These considerations he
at the base of the familiar rule requiring the laying of a predicate, which is essence means
simply that it is the duty of a party trying to impugn the testimony of a witness by means of
prior or, for that matter, subsequent inconsistent statements, whether oral or in writing, to
give the witness a chance to reconcile his conflicting declarations, such that it is only when
no reasonable explanation is given by him that he should be deemed impeached. the
prosecution did not object to the presentation of Exhibit 17 which was offered expressly for
impeachment purposes, notwithstanding that the defense did not give the witness the
opportunity to give his own explanation of the apparent contradictions in his testimony, the
trial judge and the appellate courts have no alternative but to determine, if they can,
possible reconciliation on the basis alone of logic and common experience. The omission to
object on the ground of failure to lay the predicate is waived by the omission to interpose
the same when the impeaching contradictory statement is offered .
further proof of its authenticity. 10 Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large
must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended
to a private instrument. Notarization is not an empty routine; to the contrary, it engages
public interest in a substantial degree and the protection of that interest requires preventing
those who are not qualified or authorized to act as notaries public from imposing upon the
public and the courts and administrative offices generally.
YTURRALDE V AZURIN
Facts:
Defendant Consuelo G. Azurin was close to Carmen Yturralde even when she was still a
child. Because Baltazara Yturralde, elder sister of Carmen, was the wife of Consuelo's uncle,
Pedro Gella, and was her godmother. Everytime she went to Sibalom to visit and stay with
her uncle and aunt, she met Carmen who was then staying with Baltazara. She fondly called
Carmen Yturralde Tia Carmen. By 1925, Carmen and Consuelo's relationship was closer. For
in that year, the Azurins transferred their residence to Sibalon where defendant, Dr.
Raymundo Azurin, Consuelo's husband, became the President of the Sanitary Division. Dr.
Azurin in time became the family physician of the Pedro Gellas and also of Carmen
Yturralde. During the last war, Dr. Azurin, who was a guerilla assigned in Kalibo, Aklan, on a
number of occasions had to travel by foot from Kalibo just to be able to administer
treatment to Baltazara who was then suffering from cancer of the tongue. It is not disputed
that on February 13, 1955, Dr. Azurin went to Sibalom on an urgent call because Carmen
Yturralde had suffered a stroke. She became partly paralyzed. From then on, Dr. Azurin
attended to her. plaintiff Cipriano Yturralde came over to the house of the Azurins at San
Jose, told them of Carmen Yturralde's desire to see them. The couple went to Carmen's
house. Carmen informed them that the reason for the call was that she wanted to donate
her properties to Consuelo. Reason for the donation was the fear entertained by Carmen
that her brother, Cipriano a gambler, would only waste her properties if she predeceased
him. Carmen then wanted an assurance that from the produce of the lands, the Azurins
would support her and her brother, Cipriano, construct a house for them, and repair, put in
good condition, and maintain Carmen's family mausoleum. The Azurins accepted. All of
these were taken up in the presence of plaintiff. The Azurins took steps to have the deed
registered. They learned that the Torrens titles were with the spouses Mariano Vagilidad and
Luz Manaquit upon loans from them obtained by plaintiff Cipriano Yturralde. The spouses
Vagilidad refused to part with the titles upon the averment that the obligation really was
Carmen's, not Cipriano's. This led the Azurins to take two court actions: First, a petition in
the cadastral proceedings to procure delivery of the titles to them; and Second, upon
learning that there was an alleged document judgment of mortgage executed by Carmen
Yturralde in favor of the Vagilidads. Plaintiff claimed the deed was fraudulently made by the
Azurins.
WON the deed was a fraud
Held: no. A rule of long standing which, through the years, has been adhered to is that a
notarial document is evidence of the facts in clear, unequivocal manner therein expressed.
It has in its favor the presumption of regularity. To contradict all these, as plaintiff now seeks
to do, there must be evidence that is "clear, convincing and more than merely
preponderant." 13 Our task now is to weigh the evidence with a view of ascertaining
whether plaintiff has made out a case conformably to the foregoing standard. It is
undisputed that plaintiff has been a priest of the Philippine Independent Church for a long
time. He talks and writes Spanish very well. He knows how to read English. The judge below,
who signed the decision and who had the opportunity to observe plaintiff on the witness
chair, gave the opinion that although plaintiff was already old and a little bit deaf, he was
"fairly intelligent to say the least, and definitely ... not feeble-minded." This is the man who
claims to have been misled by defendant Dr. Raymundo Azurin.
In addition to the foregoing, other circumstances there are which betray plaintiff's testimony
as thoroughly unbelievable. If the intention of the Azurins were to palm off donation for
mere administration, they would not have chosen such a time when not only plaintiff but the
latter's nephew, a person also of mature age, were present. They would not have then
exhibited the document, allowed the execution thereof. The ways of fraud are such that it is
unlikely that the Azurins would risk the success of their alleged nefarious scheme in the
presence of those who, by the nature of things, are bound to protect the interests of a close
relation.
We find, as did the lower court, that the deed of donation was properly executed.
Since the donation was made in a public document specifying the immovables donated, and
the conditions for the donation, and that acceptance thereof was made in the same deed of
donation, 18 that donation should be given effect.
CA: No acquittal
WON the petitioner is guilty
Held: No. Section 20, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that "before any
private document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and
authenticity must be proved either:
(a) by anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
Thus, prior to the admission in evidence of a private writing, the identity and
authenticity of the document sought to be presented must first be reasonably
established. Where there is no proof as to the authenticity of the executor's signature
appearing in a private document, such private document should be excluded. The
documentary evidence submitted by the complaining witness are private instruments, being
instruments executed by private persons without the intervention of a public notary or of
other persons legally authorized, by which document some disposition or agreement is
proved, evidenced, or set forth (U.S. v. Orera, 11 Phil. 596 [1907]).
Being private instruments, their due and valid execution and their genuineness and
authenticity must first be established, either by the testimony of any one who saw the
writing executed or by evidence of the genuineness of the handwriting of the maker hereof.
A painstaking perusal of the testimony of the prosecution's sole witness reveals,
however, that the due execution and authenticity of these documents were never proved. In
fact, the prosecution took no effort to prove the due execution and authenticity of these
documents during the presentation of their sole witness. Absent such proof, these
documents are incompetent as evidence. It is elementary that this Court cannot rightly
appreciate firsthand the genuineness of an unverified and unidentified document; much
less, accord it evidentiary value. Moreover, the documents submitted are mere photocopies
of the originals. Thus, they are secondary evidence and as such are not admissible unless
there is ample proof of the loss of the originals
HOW GENUINENESS OF HANDWRITING PROVED RULE 132 SEC 22
SECURITY BANK V TRIUMPH LUMBER
FACTS:
it appears that plaintiff is a depositor in good standing of defendant banks branch at Sucat,
Paraaque. Plaintiff also claims that due to defendant banks gross negligence and
inexcusable negligence in exercising ordinary diligence in verifying from plaintiff the
encashment of plaintiffs checks whose amount exceed P10,000.00 and in determining the
forgery of drawers signatures, the aforesaid three (3) checks were encashed by
unauthorized persons to the damage and prejudice of the plaintiff corporation. Plaintiff then
requested the defendant to credit back and restore to its account the value of the checks
which were wrongfully encashed in the amount of P300,000.00 but despite due demand the
defendant failed to pay its liability. On the basis of such factual environment, the trial court
The evidence in question refers to Exhibits "F," receipt for P2,250.00 dated January 20,
1976; "F-1," receipt for P750.00 dated February 23, 1976, "F-2," receipt for P1,000.00 dated
March 20, 1976; and "F-3," receipt for another P1,000.00 dated July 29, 1976, all showing
the varying amounts paid by Leonor Taguba to Elvira Mato Vda. de Oate. These exhibits
were marked at the pre-trial for the purpose of identifying them. In fact, the payment of
P5,000.00 was admitted by herein petitioners in the same pre-trial. Herein subject exhibits
were also incorporated and made part of the records of this case.
SHERATON PALACE V QUIJANO xxxx
PEOPLE V BARELLANO
Epifanio Cabales and his friends Simplicio Garong, Benjamin Alico and Jose Dayola were
drinking tuba in the evening of August 14, 1993 at the side of the auditorium in the middle
of Barangay Tigbao, Matalom, Leyte when he was approached from behind and shot at the
right side of the head with a .38 (paltik) revolver. He fell down on the ground face up. As he
lay thus, his assailant fired a second shot which hit him at the right side of his upper
lip. Thereafter, the malefactor walked away and then fired a third shot in the air.
For the fatal shooting of Epifanio Cabales, accused Pacifico Barellano @ Junior was
indicted for Murder in an Information
Rtc: Guilty
WON the medico-legal photocopy will be admissible
The argument that the xerox copy of the autopsy report should not be admitted in evidence
inspite of his counsels admission of its authenticity will not extricate accused-appellant
from his predicament. Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that the document is indeed
inadmissible in evidence and is not given any evidentiary weight, still it would not alter the
judgment of conviction because accused-appellant was found guilty primarily on the basis of
the testimonies of the eyewitnesses who positively identified him as the perpetrator of the
crime. The fact of death was sufficiently established through the credible and
straightforward testimonies of these eyewitnesses who saw the victim die as a result of the
gunshot wounds inflicted by accused-appellant.
At any rate, it is a trifle too late at this time for accused-appellant to raise the question of
the autopsy reports supposed lack of evidentiary value because he never objected to its
admissibility when it was offered in evidence and was, in fact, admitted to be genuine by his
counsel during trial. The rule is that evidence not objected to is deemed admitted and may
be validly considered by the court in arriving at its judgment. Particularly instructive on this
point is Quebral v. Court of Appeals,[51] where the Court said that:
Even if it were true that Exhibit K consisted of a mere photocopy and not the original of the
petitioners letter, petitioner nevertheless failed to make a timely objection thereto. As to
when an objection to a document must be made, the Court ruled in Interpacific Transit, Inc.
v. Aviles:[52]
Objection to the documentary evidence must be made at the time it is formally offered, not
earlier. The identification of the document before it is marked as an exhibit does not
constitute the formal offer of the document as evidence for the party presenting it.
Objection to the identification and marking of the document is not equivalent to objection to
the document when it is formally offered in evidence. What really matters is the objection to
the document at the time it is formally offered as an exhibit.
In the case at bench, no such timely objection was ever made. Consequently, the evidence
not objected to became the property of the case, and all the parties to the case are
considered amenable to any favorable or unfavorable effects resulting from the evidence. x
x x
Both accused and victim, Cortez, was at a cockpit wen accused fired shots towards Cortez
which caused his death. it is the contention of appellant that the evidence of the
prosecution is not sufficient to establish his identity and guilt as the perpetrator of the crime
charged. In support of that exculpatory proposition
RTC: guilty
WON the evidences/testimonies presented are enough to convict him
Held: Yes. It is perfectly within the discretion of the trial court to accept such portions of the
testimony of a witness as it may deem credible, and reject those which it believes to be
false. The maxim falsus in uno falsus in omnibus is not a positive rule of law and is, in fact,
rarely applied in modern jurisprudence. For this maxim to be invoked, the witness must first
be shown to have willfully falsified the truth on one or more points. But even so - when he is
found to have willfully falsified - this does not make his entire testimony totally
incredible. The court may still, in its discretion, admit and credit those portions worthy of
belief depending upon the corroborative evidence and the probabilities as well as
improbabilities of the case. [39]
Appellant likewise assails the trial court for giving full faith and credence to the testimony of
Allan Miramonte who he claims is a biased witness because of his relationship to the widow
of the victim. It is a familiar rule that the clear and positive testimony of witnesses is not
devalued or impaired by the mere fact of relationship to the victim, when there is no
showing of improper motive on the part of said witnesses. Indeed, their natural interest in
obtaining justice and redress by securing the conviction of the parties responsible for the
crime would deter these relatives from implicating persons other than the real
culprits. [40] No improper motive to testify falsely against appellant was imputed against
the said witness, hence there is no reason not to accord his testimony full faith and
credit. For that matter, it is also worthy of note that herein appellant is also a relative of the
victims wife. [41]
The fact that it took this witness four years before he appeared and gave his testimony in
court should not be counted against or detract from his credibility. Eyewitnesses are
commonly reluctant to get involved in criminal investigators. If witnesses do not come
forward immediately, the fact of delay should not, by itself, be considered as seriously
affecting their credibility. Credibility should be assessed independently on the basis of the
substance of the testimony offered and the surrounding circumstances. [42] The natural
reluctance of a witness to volunteer information to the police authorities in criminal cases is
a matter of judicial notice. [43] He might have deemed it the better part of valor not to give
the name of the accused who was still at large and who probably recognized him. Such
reluctance should not affect his testimony. The decisive factor is that he in fact identified
the accused. [44]
The imputed inconsistencies and contradictions in the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses are minuscule matters which will not affect their credibility. It bears reiteration
and emphasis that inconsistencies in the testimony of witnesses with respect to minor
details and collateral matters do not affect the substance of their declaration, their veracity
or the weight of their testimonies. Minor inconsistencies strengthen rather than weaken the
credibility of the witness for they indicate that they were not coached.
The eyewitnesses for the prosecution could not be expected to narrate the incident in
flawless detail or perfect concordance. For one thing, they could not have viewed the same
incident from the same perspective and with the same composure, or lack of it. They also
did not have the same degree of intelligence or power of recollection, let alone articulation
or vividness of language. In these circumstances, the eyewitnesses would naturally differ
on some of the details of the killings without being deliberately untruthful. What is
important is that there was basic agreement on the attack as a whole among all those who
narrated how the killing was committed. [46] The witnesses testifying on the same event do
not have to be consistent in every detail as differences in recollections or viewpoints or
impressions are inevitable. Total recall or perfect harmony is not required. As long as the
witnesses concur on material points, slight differences in their remembrance of the details
do not reflect on the essential veracity of their testimony.
PEOPLE V DANAO
Accused was charged with rape with homicide of a 13 year old girl. He raped, attacked,
strangled and drowned the victim. The forthright testimonies of both Feliciana Gonzaga and
Bonifacio Manacho indubitably point to appellants suspicious presence near the mangrove
swamp at around the time that the victim was raped and killed. Feliciana Gonzagas
testimony was clear and positive that she saw appellant inexplicably following the victim as
the latter was on her way home and would have to pass by the mangrove where she was
later found to have been sexually assaulted and drowned. Bonifacio Manacho was likewise
unequivocal in his declaration that it was appellant whom he saw hastily leaving the vicinity
of the mangrove which was the scene of the crime.
WON the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt
Held: Yes. The testimonies of these two were categorical, consistent and
complementary to the established fact about the joint presence of appellant and the
victim at the mangrove on that day. No ill motives whatsoever have been attributed
to them as to why they should testify against appellant and implicate him in such a
heinous crime. While admittedly Feliciana Gonzaga is a relative of the victim, that
fact alone should not be considered as corrosive of her testimony, especially in light
of the fact that appellant himself is likewise related to the Aparejados. The
concatenation of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses unquestionably leads
to the fair, reasonable and logical inference that it was appellant, and no other, who
had raped and killed the victim, Maria Aparejado. Moreover, the straightforward
declarations of Feliciana Gonzaga and Bonifacio Manacho contradict appellants
insipid and discredited defense of denial and alibi that he was at the house of
Zosima Orma at the time. As between a negative assertion and a positive one, the
latter is understandably and justifiedly given more weight under the rules of
evidence. Additionally, the defenses of denial and alibi are inherently weak and
have always been viewed with disfavor by the courts due to the facility with which
they can be concocted.[17]
In the case of alibi, we once again stress the two requirements which should be
strictly met in order that the same may be of value to the defense, that is, the
accused must prove that he was not present at the scene of the crime at the time of
its commission, and that it was physically impossible for him to have been there at
the time.[18] Without said evidential requisites having been established, reliance on
alibi becomes all the more a liability. Further, it becomes less plausible as a defense
when it is invoked and sought to be crafted mainly by the accused himself and his
immediate relative or relatives.[19]
In the case of appellant, the place where he claimed to be at the time involved
is only about two hundred meters away from the mangrove where the victim was
waylaid.[20] In fact, the houses of Zosima Orna, Feliciana Gonzaga, Bonifacio
Manacho and herein appellant are only meters apart from each another. The
victims house, on the other hand, is only one hundred meters away from the
mangrove where she was found dead. Hence, appellants asseverations on his alibi
are entirely unacceptable. Oddly but significantly, appellant himself testified that at
the time that he, his father and his brother were playing billiards in the house of
Zosima Orna, one of those who watched them play was the victim, Maria Aparejado,
and this was at around 5:30 in the afternoon of that day. He in fact stated that he
saw the victim leave briefly afterwards in the direction going to her house
Moreover, the straightforward declarations of Feliciana Gonzaga and Bonifacio
Manacho contradict appellants insipid and discredited defense of denial and alibi
that he was at the house of Zosima Orma at the time. As between a negative
assertion and a positive one, the latter is understandably and justifiedly given more
weight under the rules of evidence. Additionally, the defenses of denial and alibi are
inherently weak and have always been viewed with disfavor by the courts due to
the facility with which they can be concocted.[17]
In the case of alibi, we once again stress the two requirements which should be
strictly met in order that the same may be of value to the defense, that is, the
accused must prove that he was not present at the scene of the crime at the time of
its commission, and that it was physically impossible for him to have been there at
the time.[18] Without said evidential requisites having been established, reliance on
alibi becomes all the more a liability. Further, it becomes less plausible as a defense
when it is invoked and sought to be crafted mainly by the accused himself and his
immediate relative or relatives.[19]
In the case of appellant, the place where he claimed to be at the time involved
is only about two hundred meters away from the mangrove where the victim was
waylaid.[20] In fact, the houses of Zosima Orna, Feliciana Gonzaga, Bonifacio
Manacho and herein appellant are only meters apart from each another. The
victims house, on the other hand, is only one hundred meters away from the
mangrove where she was found dead. Hence, appellants asseverations on his alibi
are entirely unacceptable. Oddly but significantly, appellant himself testified that at
the time that he, his father and his brother were playing billiards in the house of
Zosima Orna, one of those who watched them play was the victim, Maria Aparejado,
and this was at around 5:30 in the afternoon of that day. He in fact stated that he
saw the victim leave briefly afterwards in the direction going to her house.
PEOPLE V LORENZO
Accused was charged with murder of her husband with a bolo and a fan knife. When the
police arrived at her house, she confessed to the police that she had killed her husband. She
assaulted, stabbed and chopped her husband. The barangay captain and SPO1 Eclipse was
presented as witnesses against her. The defense told another story that it was a certain
Robert Santos that killed her husband and alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the
prosecutions witnesses.
RTC:guilty. She made an extrajudicial confession. There was also a failure to object while the
information was being made before her.
WON she is guilty beyond reasonable doubt
ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE
VIDALLON-MAGTOLIS V SALUD (clerk of court)
Melchor Lagua was found guilty of homicide in Criminal Case Nos. 118032-H and
118033-H before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 163. He filed a
petition to bail while on appeal and such was granted. Meanwhile Atty Madarang
received a phone call from one of the accuseds relatives saying that they still have
a balance and that they sought the help of Rhodora Valdez of RTC Pasig. Atty
Madarang got the number of respondent and acted as the relative of accused. She
found out that the respondent did not preoperly execute the copies of the resolution
and order of release but gave then to Art Baluran, the alleged relative of Lagua.
Respondent denied extorting money from the relatives.
WON the admission of text messages constitute violation of right to privacy of
accused (Salud)
Held:
Text messages have been classified as ephemeral electronic communication under
Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence,[45] and shall be proven by
the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has personal knowledge
thereof. Any question as to the admissibility of such messages is now moot and
academic, as the respondent himself, as well as his counsel, already admitted that
he was the sender of the first three messages on Atty. Madarangs cell phone. This
was also the ruling of the Court in the recent case of Zaldy Nuez v. Elvira Cruz-Apao.
[46] In that case, the Court, in finding the respondent therein guilty of dishonesty
and grave misconduct, considered text messages addressed to the complainant
asking for a million pesos in exchange for a favorable decision in a case pending
before the CA. The Court had the occasion to state:
The text messages were properly admitted by the Committee since the same are
now covered by Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, which
provides:
In 1965, Francisco Comorposa who was working in the land of Oboza was
terminated from his job. The termination of his employment caused a problem in
relocating his house. Being a close family friend of [Marcos] Saez, Francisco
Comorposa approached the late Marcos Saezs son, [Adolfo] Saez, the husband of
Gloria Leano Saez, about his problem. Out of pity and for humanitarian
consideration, Adolfo allowed Francisco Comorposa to occupy the land of Marcos
Saez. Hence, his nipa hut was carried by his neighbors and transferred to a portion
of the land subject matter of this case. Such transfer was witnessed by several
people, among them, Gloria Leano and Noel Oboza. Francisco Comorposa occupied a
portion of Marcos Saez property without paying any rental.
Francisco Comorposa left for Hawaii, U.S.A. He was succeeded in his possession by
the respondents who likewise did not pay any rental and are occupying the premises
through petitioners tolerance.
According to CENR that the land was alienable thus it was adversely, openly and
continuously possessed by Comorposa therefore acquiring ownership through
possession.
MTC: in favor of petitioners
RTC: reversed
CA: upheld rights of respondents
WON the CENR certification has evidentiary weight
Held: YES
Petitioners contend that the CENR Certification dated July 22, 1997 is a sham
document, because the signature of the CENR officer is a mere facsimile. In support
of their argument, they cite Garvida v. Sales Jr.[17] and argue that the Certification
is a new matter being raised by respondents for the first time on appeal.
We are not persuaded.
In Garvida, the Court held:
A facsimile or fax transmission is a process involving the transmission and
reproduction of printed and graphic matter by scanning an original copy, one
elemental area at a time, and representing the shade or tone of each area by a
specified amount of electric current. x x x[18]
Pleadings filed via fax machines are not considered originals and are at best exact
copies. As such, they are not admissible in evidence, as there is no way of
determining whether they are genuine or authentic.[19]
The Certification, on the other hand, is being contested for bearing a facsimile of the
signature of CENR Officer Jose F. Tagorda. The facsimile referred to is not the same
as that which is alluded to in Garvida. The one mentioned here refers to a facsimile
signature, which is defined as a signature produced by mechanical means but
recognized as valid in banking, financial, and business transactions.[20]
Note that the CENR officer has not disclaimed the Certification. In fact,
the DENR regional director has acknowledged and used it as reference in his
Order dated April 2, 1998:
x x x. CENR Officer Jose F. Tagorda, in a CERTIFICATION dated 22 July 1997,
certified among others, that: x x x per records available in his Office, x x x
the controverted lot x x x was not allocated to any person x x x.[21]
If the Certification were a sham as petitioner claims, then the regional
director would not have used it as reference in his Order. Instead, he would
have either verified it or directed the CENR officer to take the appropriate
action, as the latter was under the formers direct control and supervision.
Petitioners claim that the Certification was raised for the first time on
appeal is incorrect. As early as the pretrial conference at the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC), the CENR Certification had already been marked as evidence for
respondents as stated in the Pre-trial Order.[22] The Certification was not
formally offered, however, because respondents had not been able to file
their position paper.
Neither the rules of procedure[23] nor jurisprudence[24] would sanction
the admission of evidence that has not been formally offered during the
trial. But this evidentiary rule is applicable only to ordinary trials, not to
cases covered by the rule on summary procedure -- cases in which no fullblown trial is held.
hospital and took minor Joanne and Jinky home after delivery. Rogelio paid all
the hospital bills and the baptismal expenses and provided for all of minor
Joannes needs recognizing the child as his.
In September 1998, Rogelio abandoned minor Joanne and Jinky, and
stopped supporting minor Joanne, falsely alleging that he is not the father of
the child.
RTC: in favor of petitioner and minor
Ong filed a motion on new trial which has been granted by court. After
the new trial, the court held that Ong is the father of the minor child. Ong
died and was substituted by his heirs.
CA: ordered DNA analysis because of Ongs agreement to do the same.
WON the DNA analysis is proper despite Ongs death
Held: Yes.
with the advancement in the field of genetics, and the availability of new
technology, it can now be determined with reasonable certainty whether
Rogelio is the biological father of the minor, through DNA testing.
DNA is the fundamental building block of a persons entire genetic makeup. DNA is found in all human cells and is the same in every cell of the same
person. Genetic identity is unique. Hence, a persons DNA profile can
determine his identity.
Petitioner argues that a remand of the case to the RTC for DNA analysis is
no longer feasible due to the death of Rogelio. To our mind, the alleged
impossibility of complying with the order of remand for purposes of DNA
testing is more ostensible than real. Petitioners argument is without basis
especially as the New Rules on DNA Evidence28 allows the conduct of DNA
testing, either motu proprio or upon application of any person who has a
legal interest in the matter in litigation, thus:
SEC. 4. Application for DNA Testing Order. The appropriate court may, at
any time, either motu proprio or on application of any person who has a legal
interest in the matter in litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order shall issue
after due hearing and notice to the parties upon a showing of the following:
(a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;
(b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to the type of
DNA testing now requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA testing,
but the results may require confirmation for good reasons;
(c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique;
(d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new
information that is relevant to the proper resolution of the case; and
(e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as
potentially affecting the accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing.
From the foregoing, it can be said that the death of the petitioner does
not ipso facto negate the application of DNA testing for as long as there exist
appropriate biological samples of his DNA.
As defined above, the term "biological sample" means any organic
material originating from a persons body, even if found in inanimate objects,
that is susceptible to DNA testing. This includes blood, saliva, and other body
fluids, tissues, hairs and bones.
Thus, even if Rogelio already died, any of the biological samples as
enumerated above as may be available, may be used for DNA testing. In this
case, petitioner has not shown the impossibility of obtaining an appropriate
biological sample that can be utilized for the conduct of DNA testing.
And even the death of Rogelio cannot bar the conduct of DNA testing.