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[G.R. Nos. 131638-39.

March 26, 2001]


PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LORETA MEDENILLA y DORIA, accused-appellant.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
This is an appeal from a joint decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 262, promulgated on November 26,
1997, in Criminal Case Nos. 3618-D and 3619-D finding accused-appellant Loreto Medenilla y Doria guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Sections 15 and 16 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972.[1]
Accused-appellant was charged in Criminal Case No. 3618-D for violating Section 15, [2] Article III of R.A. No. 6425. The
information reads as follows:
That on or about the 16th day of April, 1996 in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable court, the above-named accused, not being lawfully authorized to possess any regulated drug, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and give away to another 5.08 grams of white crystalline substance positive to
the test for methampetamine hydrochloride (shabu) which is regulated drug, in violation of the above cited law.[3]
Accused-appellant was also charged in Criminal Case No. 3619-D for violating Section 16, [4] Article III of R.A. No. 6425
with an information which reads as follows:
That on or about the 16th day of April, 1996 in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being lawfully authorized to possess any regulated drug, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and/or (sic) under his custody and control four (4) transparent plastic
bags containing white crystalline substance with a total weight of 200.45 grams, which were found positive to the test for
methampetamine hydrochloride (shabu) which is regulated drug, in violation of the above cited law.[5]
Arraigned on June 25, 1996, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. [6] Joint trial ensued thereafter.
The prosecutions version, as gathered from the testimonies of SPO2 Bonifacio Cabral, SPO1 Neowille De Castro and P/Sr.
Insp. Julita T. De Villa, is as follows:
On April 14, 1996, a confidential informant arrived at the office of the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) in camp Crame
and reported to SPO2 Bonifacio Cabral that there is a certain person engaged in illegal drug pushing activities in Caloocan,
Malabon and Mandaluyong. SPO2 Cabral reported the matter to his superior, Police Senior Inspector Manzanas. [7] Accordingly,
Sr. Insp. Manzanas directed SPO2 Cabral to confirm the veracity of the report. Thus, SPO2 Cabral requested the confidential
informant to contact the suspected drug pusher to introduce him as a possible buyer.[8]
On April 15, 1996, the informant returned to the NARCOM office and told SPO2 Cabral that he had arranged a meeting
with the suspected drug pusher. The two then proceeded to the pre-arranged meeting place at a Seven Eleven Store along Boni
Avenue, Mandaluyong City. At around 5:30 p.m., accused-appellant arrived on board a Toyota Corolla. [9] Without alighting from
his car, accused-appellant spoke with the informant. [10] The informant introduced SPO2 Cabral to accused-appellant as a
prospective buyer of shabu. Accused-appellant inquired how many grams of shabu he wanted to buy and SPO2 Cabral replied
that he needed five (5) grams. The suspect then offered the shabu at the price of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) per gram to
which SPO2 Cabral agreed.[11] Accused-appellant told SPO2 Cabral to return the following day. They agreed that the pick up
point would be at the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) Building also along Boni Avenue. Upon their return to Camp
Crame, SPO2 Cabral and the informant reported the results of their meeting to Sr. Insp. Manzanas. Based on their information, a

buy-bust operation was planned. SPO2 Cabral was designated to act as the poseur-buyer with SPO2 de Castro as his backup. Sr. Insp. Manzanas was assigned to stay in the car and await the signal to be given by SPO2 Cabral, through his pager,
before apprehending accused-appellant.
At around 3:30 in the early morning of April 16, 1996, the buy-bust team proceeded to the agreed meeting place at the
UCPB Building in Boni Avenue. [12] Upon reaching the area, SPO2 Cabral alighted from the car while the other operatives
positioned themselves in strategic areas. [13] After thirty (30) minutes, accused-appellant arrived. [14] after talking for a short time
with SPO2 Cabral, accused-appellant asked the former if he had the money. [15] SPO2 Cabral showed the bundle of money[16] and
accused-appellant told him to wait. When he returned, SPO2 Cabral gave him the money and, in exchange, accused-appellant
handed a pack containing a white crystalline substance. [17] As planned, SPO2 Cabral turned on his pager which prompted the
backup operatives to close in and apprehend accused-appellant. [18] SPO2 Cabral asked accused-appellant if he could search the
latters car. Accused-appellant acceded to the request and, as a result, SPO2 Cabral found a brown clutch bag at the drivers seat
of the car. Inside the clutch bag, they found therein four plastic bags containing a white crystalline substance which they
suspected was shabu.[19]
Accused-appellant was brought to Camp Crame for booking. SPO2 Cabral and SPO1 de Castro then submitted the
substance they confiscated to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. [20] They thereafter brought accused-appellant to the
PNP General Hospital for a medical and physical examination.[21]
The laboratory report on the white crystalline substance showed that the same tested positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu[22] and that the contents of the substance sold weighed 5.08 grams while those taken from the bag had a
total weight of 200.45 grams. The report reads:
PHYSICAL SCIENCES REPORT NO. D-448-96

CASE: Alleged Viol of RA 6425

SUSPECT/S:

LORETO MEDENILLA

TIME AND DATE RECEIVED: 2145H 16 April 1996


REQUESTING PARTY/UNIT:

C, SOU-HQS-PNPNARCOM

Camp Crame, Quezon City


SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:
Exh A One (1) brown MARUDINI CLUTCH BAG containing the following specimens:
1. One (1) heat sealed transparent plastic bag marked as Exh A-1 with 5.08 grams of white crystalline substance:
2. Four (4) transparent plastic bags marked as Exhs. A-2 through A-5 each with white crystalline substance and
having a total weight of 200.45 grams. xxx
PURPOSE OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION:
To determine the presence of prohibited and/or regulated drug. xxx
FINDINGS:
Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated specimens gave positive result to the tests for Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride, a regulated drug. xxx

CONCLUSION:
Exhs. A-1, A-2 through A-5 contain methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug.
REMARKS:
TIME AND DATE COMPLETED: 0740H 17 April 1996[23]
For his defense, accused-appellant presented a different version of the events leading to his arrest.
On or about April 12, 1996, accused-appellant rented a car, a Toyota Corolla, from a certain Jess Hipolito. It was to be used
by his brother for a trip to Pangasinan. [24] On April 15, 1996, his brother turned over the car to accused-appellant with the
instruction to return the car to Jess Hipolito. [25] However, before returning the car, accused-appellant decided to use the same for
a night out with his friends. Accused-appellant, along with four (4) of his friends, namely, Joy, Tess, Willy and Jong-jong, went
to Bakahan in Quezon City for dinner and, thereafter, transferred to Music Box Lounge located in front of the said
restaurant,. After having some drinks, accused-appellant decided to return the car to Jess Hipolito and just take a taxicab with
his friends in going back to their place in Caloocan City.[26] They all proceeded to the condominium unit of Jess Hipolito located
along Boni Avenue in Mandaluyong City.[27] they reached the place at around 2:30 a.m.[28] Accused-appellant told the guard of
the condominium building that he wanted to see Jess Hipolito to retun the car he rented. The guard instructed him to park the car
in front of UCPB. After doing so, accused-appellant, together with Jong-jong and Joy went up to the unit of Jess Hipolito while
their two companions, Willy and Tess, stayed in the lobby. [29] While inside the unit of Jess Hipolito, accused-appellant was
introduced to Alvin.[30] Accused-appellant told Jess Hipolito that he wanted to return the car. However, Jess Hipolito requested
accused-appellant to drive Alvin, using the rented car, to quezon City since the latter was carrying a large amount of money.
[31]
Accused-appellant acceded to the request of Jess Hipolito. They then all went down and, along with Willy and Tess who
were then at the lobby, boarded the vehicle.[32] However, when accused-appellant was about to back out the vehicle, a white car
blocked the rear portion of the car.[33] The passengers of the white car then stepped out of their vehicle and approached
them. One of the passengers of the white car, SPO1 de Castro, asked accused-appellant to roll down his window and, after doing
so, SPO2 Cabral introduced himself and his companions as police officers. [34] Accused-appellant then asked: Bakit po,
sir?[35] In response, one of the police officers said: May titingnan lang muna kami, baba muna kayo.[36] after alighting from the
vehicle, accused-appellant and his companions were frisked. [37] Thereafter, SPO2 Cabral noticed a brown clutch bag being held
by Alvin and confiscated the same. SPO2 Cabral then asked accused-appellant if he can search the car. The latter agreed. SPO2
Cabral searched the car for about 15 minutes but found nothing. [38] SPO2 Cabral then opened the brown clutch bag he
confiscated from Alvin and found plastic sachets containing a white crystalline substance. The police officers then instructed
accused-appellant and his companions to board their vehicle. They were all brought to Camp Crame. [39] When they reached the
said camp, they were instructed to alight from the vehicle one by one. The first one to step out of the vehicle and go inside the
office was Alvin. After 20 minutes, the two women, Tess and Joy, were brought inside the office and, after 30 minutes, accusedappellant, along with the two remaining passengers, Willy and Jong-jong, followed. [40]
When they were all inside the NARCOM office, their personal circumstances were taken down. Thereafter, Jong-jong,
Willy and accused-appellant were separated from the group and placed inside the detention cell. Alvin and the two women were
left behind in the office and were later on released. [41] After a few hours, Jong-jong and Willy were brought out of the detention
cell while accused-appellant, who was then sleeping, was left in confinement. Jong-jong and Willy were brought into the office
and were made to sign a document on a yellow pad, prepared by the police officers. The police officers then cautioned the two
that they will be implicated in the case if they interfered. They were then released and accompanied out to Camp Crame by a
police officer.[42] Accused-appellant was the only one who remained in detention and was, subsequently, solely charged for the
illegal sale and possession of shabu.
While in detention, accused-appellant learned that the vehicle he borrowed from Jess Hipolito was owned by a certain Evita
Ebora, who was also detained in the Mandaluyong City Jail for a drug-related offense. [43]

On November 17, 1997, the trial cour found accused-appellant guilty as charged. The dispositive portion of the trial courts
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accuse LORETO MEDENILLA y DORIA GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Sections 15 and 16, in relation to Section 20, of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Said accused is hereby sentenced to: (a) with respect to Criminal Case No. 3618-D, suffer an
indeterminate sentence of a minimum of one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty (20) days, to a maximum of four (4) years
and two (2) months of prision correccional; (b) with respect to Criminal Case No. 3619-D, suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, and pay a fine in the amount of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00); (c) suffer all the accessories penalties consequent
thereto; and (d) pay the costs.
The shabu involved in this action is hereby confiscated in favor of the government and ordered to be forwarded to the Dangerous
Drugs Board to be disposed of in accordance with law.
SO ORDERED.[44]
Hence, this appeal where accused-appellant raises the following issues:
I.

Was the accused arrested illegally?

II. Was there in fact any buy-bust operation?


III. Was the accused accorded his right to due process?[45]
Being interrelated, we shall discuss the first and second issues jointly.
The defense insist that there was no prior agreement between accused-appellant and SPO2 Cabral for the sale of 5 grams of
shabu on April 16, 1996 and that no buy bust operation actually took place. The prosecutions claim that there was a buy-bust
operation is, according to the defense, belied by the testimonies of accused-appellant and Wilfredo de Jesus that when the
incident took place, accused-appellant was not alone but was accompanied by five (5) other persons. [46] thus, the defense argues
that since there was no buy-bust operation, the arrest of accused-appellant was illegal since the arresting officers were not
properly armed with a warrant of arrest.
Accused-appellants argument deserves scant consideration. The prosecution through the testimonies of SPO2 Cabral and
SPO1 de Castro adequately established the fact that there was a legally conducted buy-bust operation. Their testimonies clearly
showed that their confidential informant reported the drug operations of accused-appellant; that a meeting took place between
accused-appellant and SPO2 Cabral where they agreed on the sale of 5 grams of shabu; that the NARCOM operatives planned a
buy-bust operation; that the said operation was indeed conducted; and that the same resulted in the arrest of accused-appellant
and the confiscation of 5 plastic bags containing a white crystalline substance. In this regard, the testimonies of the police
officers were given full credence by the trial court, to wit:
The prosecution witnesses gave a detailed account of the circumstances surrounding the apprehension of accused Medenilla
from the time Cabral was introduced to accused Medenilla up to the buy-bust operation, which culminated in the arrest of
accused-Medenilla. This Court can find no inconsistency in their testimonies and, as such, gives full faith and credit thereto. In
addition, it is to be noted that no evidence exists to show that the law enforcers failed to perform their duty regularly. Neither
was any evidence presented to show that there was improper motive on the part of said witnesses to falsely implicate accused
Medenilla. On the contrary, it was established that they did not know accused Medenilla prior to the buy bust operation. xxx [47]
The trial courts determination of the credibility of the police officers deserves the highest respect by this court, considering
that the trial court had the direct opportunity to observe their deportment and manner of testifying. [48] Furthermore, in the absence
of any proof of any intent on the part of the police authorities to falsely impute such a serious crime against accused-appellant,

the testimonies of SPO2 Cabral and SPO1 de Castro on the buy-bust operation are deserving of belief due to the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty accorded to law enforcers. [49] Clearly, accused-appellants mere denial and
concoction of another arrest scenario cannot overcome the positive testimonies of the police officers.
Even the supposed corroborative testimony of Wilfredo de Jesus is not credible since the said witness appeared to have
been making a mockery of the proceedings before the lower court as noted by the trial judge, to wit:
COURT:
You better refrain from smiling, I have been warning you. You keep on laughing.
Atty. Arias:
Your Honor, because he laughs.(interrupted)
COURT:
No, he is laughing.
xxx
COURT:
And keep on laughing.
Atty. Arias:
He is smiling your Honor.
COURT:
No, he is not smiling, you can ask him. I do not understand why this guy is keep (sic) on laughing.
Atty. Arias:
Binabalaan ka na bata. Huwag kang tatawa, huwag kang ngingiti kundi magsalita ka ng maayos at tiyak at
tahasan.[50]
The testimonies of accused-appellant and Wilfredo de Jesus are not convincing since they are replete with numerous
inconsistencies and improbabilities. First, accused-appellant testified that the Bakahan restaurant and the Music Box lounge
they went to on the evening of April 15, 1996 are located in Quezon City. [51] However, Wilfredo de Jesus claimed that the said
establishments are located in Mandaluyong.[52] The divergence of their assertions on the location of these establishments goes
into the credibility of their claim that they were together with other people and had a night out on the evening of April 15,
1996. Second, accused-appellant claimed that at the time the police officers approached the car prior to the arrest, one of the
officers requested them to alight from the vehicle.[53] On the other hand, Wilfredo de Jesus testified that when the police officers
approached them, they were forcibly pulled out of their vehicle. [54] Their inconsistency on this matter renders questionable the
veracity of the claim of Wilfredo de Jesus that he was present during the arrest of accused-appellant by the NARCOM
operatives. Third, their claim that they were at the parking lot of UCPB in Boni Avenue at around 3:00 oclock in the morning of
April 16, 1996 to return the rented vehicle to Jess Hipolito is hard to believe. Human experience dictates that one does not return
a rented vehicle to its owner in the early hours of the morning. Business transactions, such as returning a rented car, would

ordinarily be transacted during regular hours of work or, perhaps, even earlier but definitely not during the hours of
dawn. Fourth, both accused-appellant and Wilfredo de Jesus claimed the improbable scenario that, after they were accosted by
the police officers, they were all brought to camp Crame by riding the same vehicle they rented. If this is believed, then two
unlikely situations are made to appear. Either all the six original passengers boarded the vehicle along with a seventh passenger,
one of the NARCOM operatives who will ensure that they will proceed to the camp, or only the six original passengers boarded
the car to go to Camp Crame and they were just escorted by the police officers who all rode another vehicle. The first situation
is implausible since a bantam car, like a Toyota Corolla, can only accommodate five, at most six, fully grown adults but,
definitely, not seven. On the other hand, the second situation is contrary to human experience since it will not be in accord with
good police operating procedure to allow a group of suspects arrested for a drug-related offense to board a vehicle by themselves
and drive the same to the police headquarters.
Furthermore, if there were indeed five other passengers on board the vehicle aside from accused-appellant, why were they
not charged or, at least, booked in the records of the NARCOM? No proof, not even an allegation, was presented by the defense
to reasonably explain why charges were not lodged against these alleged other passengers. The most that accused-appellant did
was to claim in his appeal brief that the reason why the other suspects were not charged was because the police officers feared
that bad luck might befall them if all were charged. Thus, he argues:
xxx Due to the belief of karma, the Narcom operatives instead of filing case or cases against all the other occupants of the car
together with the accused, the Narcom operatives filed only one case and that is against the accused and in open court denied the
presence of the other companions of the accused.[55]
Clearly, such type of reasoning and justification shows that accused-appellant is already grasping at straws in order that he
may be acquitted, through whatever allegation, legal or otherwise, of the crimes he is charged with.
We now come to the third issue raised by accused-appellant that he was denied due process. In this regard, accusedappellant claims that he was deprived of such constitutional right on the following grounds:
a) the denial of the court a quo of the motion of the accused through his counsel to have the
questioned shabu quantitatively examined; and
b) the bias attitude of the presiding judge of the lower court.[56]
Accused-appellant admits the veracity of the quantitative test conducted by the PNP Crime Laboratory on the 5 plastic
containers of the white crystalline substance which resulted in the issuance of Physical Sciences Report No. D-448-96. [57] This
was stipulated upon by accused-appellant when the forensic chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory, P/Sr. Insp. Julita T. de Villa,
was presented as a witness, to wit:
Prosec. Paz:
The testimony of the witness is formally offered to prove in both cases, Crim. Cases No. 3618-D and 3619-D, that in
Crim. Case 36180D that the white crystalline substance which was sold by the accused Loreto Medenilla to the police
operatives was examined by the witness and found positive to the test of shabu and weighs 5.08 grams and in Crim.
Case No. 3619-D to prove that accused Loreto Medenilla y Doria that the four (4) transparent plastic bags found in the
possession of the accused with a total weight of 200.45 grams was found positive to the test of shabu as examined by
the witness, your Honor.
May we know from counsel for the accused if he is willing to enter into a stipulation?
COURT:
Atty. Arias, are you willing to enter into stipulation?

Atty. Arias:
I will admit that the witness is an expert, second, I admit that there was an examination conducted by her and that the
result of her examination was reduced into writing.
COURT:
And it was found positive that the specimen submitted to the crime lab was shabu.
Atty. Arias:
Yes, your Honor, according to the examination and I will also state for the record that the witness does not know
where the specimen came from, how the specimen came into being.
x

Prosec. Paz:
May we request counsel for the accused to admit the authenticity and veracity of this document prepared by witness
after examining the specimen and the findings as stated in the initial laboratory report.
Atty. Arias:
As we have stated earlier, your Honor, that the result of her examination was reduced into writing, this is the result of
the examination, so be it, your Honor.
x

Prosec. Paz:
May we also request that the counsel will admit the weights of the specimens as found by the forensic chemist.
Atty. Arias:
Everything is written in the document.[58]
However, despite this admission, accused-appellant filed a motion to require the forensic chemist to conduct a quantitative
as well as a qualitative analysis on the subject menthamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu to determine its purity. [59] The trial
court, after the prosecution filed its Comment/Opposition [60] to the motion, issued an Order, dated March 17, 1997, denying the
motion, to wit:
This resolves the motion filed by the accused through his counsel praying that the forensic chemist be required to conduct a
qualitative and quantitative analysis on the subject methamphetamine hydrochloride.
Records will show (TSN dated October 23, 1996) that the defense counsel, with the express conformity of the accused, had
agreed to enter into stipulations or admissions of facts concerning the nature, quality and quantity of the specimens submitted for
chemical analysis. The results of said analysis indicated that said specimens were positive to the test for shabu, and they
weighed 5.08 and 200.45 grams, respectively. These results were explicitly admitted by both the accused and his counsel. The
only matter that was not admitted was the alleged source of the stuff, it being denied that it was found in and taken from the
possession of the accused. The defense counsel who was given the opportunity to cross-examine raised the forensic chemist

when she was presented, never raised the issue or even suggested that what was examined could not have been pure shabu, and
that if such was the case, it was necessary to determine which part is shabu and which was otherwise. It appears that this idea is
merely an after-thought. To the mind of the Court, the attempt to have the specimens examine at this stage of the action, when
the prosecution had already terminated the presentation of its evidence and is, in fact, about to make a written formal offer of
exhibits, can have no other purpose than to repudiate the findings of the forensic chemist, which had already been previously
admitted. This cannot be permitted bythe Court as it detracts from the full respect that must be accorded to judicial admissions
that have been freely and intelligently made. As correctly observed by the prosecution, said judicial admissions are conclusive
and binding upon the accused. The judicial admission that the stuff submitted for analysis, weighing 5.08 and 200.45 grams,
respectively, are indeed shabu forecloses any further challenge as to its alleged purity. To speculate at this stage of the action
that the stuff is not pure shabu is to virtually repudiate the findings of the forensic chemist, previously admitted without any
qualification that the stuff analysed were indeed such illegal drug. This can no longer be permitted by the Court.
WHEREFORE, the instant motion is DENIED for lack of merit.[61]
In the instant appeal, accused-appellant insists that he should have been allowed by the trial court to have
the shabu subjected to a quantitative test by the PNP Crime Laboratory. He argues that such a test is crucial in view of the nature
of the penalties for the violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, which are graduated depending on the
amount of regulated or prohibited drugs involved in a case. Accused-appellant claims that a quantitative test will definitely
show that the shabu involved herein is not pure and, as such, is less than 200 grams contrary to the assertion of the prosecution
that it is 200.45 grams. He anchors this argument on the contention that shabu is never 100% pure but, at most, is only 85%
unadulterated.[62]
We find that the trial court committed no reversible error in denying the motion. When the defense stipulated with the
prosecution that the results of the laboratory examination, as reflected in Physical Sciences Report No. D-448-96, were true and
correct, the accused-appellant, in effect, admitted that the substance examine was indeed methamphetamine hydrochloride
having a weight of 5.08 grams, for Criminal Case No. 3618-D, and 200.45 grams, for Criminal Case No. 3619-D. Accusedappellant made no qualifications on the veracity of the PNP Crime Laboratorys finding on the total weight of the examined
shabu. In fact, no cross-examination was conducted by accused-appellants counsel on the witness, P/Sr. Insp. Julita de Villa,
regarding this matter. Thus, when the defense tried to renege on the previous stipulation by filing a motion requesting for a
quantitative test on the shabu involved herein, the trial court was correct in denying the same.
Furthermore, in the case of People vs. Barita,[63] we held that there is no need to examine the entirety of the submitted
specimen since the sample testing is representative of the whole specimen, we held:
We are not persuaded by the claim of accused-appellants that in order for them to be convicted of selling 2,800 grams of
marijuana, the whole specimen must be tested considering that Republic Act 7659 impose a penalty dependent on the amount or
the quantity of drugs seized or taken. This court has ruled that a sample taken from one of the packages is logically presumed to
be representative of the entire contents of the package unless proven otherwise by accused-appellant.[64]
This ruling was reiterated in People vs. Zheng Bai Hui,[65] thus:
To recall, appellants sold the NARCOM operatives a substance weighing 992.3 grams. This amount is more than the minimum
of 200 grams required by the law to warrant the imposition of either reclusion perpetua or, if there be aggravating,
circumstances, the death penalty. Appellants however foist the probability that the substance sold could contain additives or
adulterants, and not just methamphetamine hydrochloride. Thus, the actual weight of pure shabu could be less than 992.3 grams,
thereby possibly reducing the imposable penalty.
The contention has no merit. We rejected a similar argument in People vs. Tang Wai Lan:
Accused-appellant then argues that the tests were not done for the entire amount of drugs allegedly found inside the bags. It is
suggested that since the law, Republic Act No. 7659, imposes a penalty dependent on the amount or quantity of drugs seized or

taken, then laboratory test should be undertaken for the entire amount or quantity of drugs seized in order to determine the
proper penalty to be imposed.
The argument is quaint and even borders on being ridiculous. In the present case, even assuming that the confirmatory tests
were conducted on samples taken from only one (1) of the plastic packages, accused-appellants arguments must still fail.
It will be recalled that each of the plastic packages weighed 1.1 kilograms, an amount more than sufficient to justify
imposing the penalty under Sec. 14 of Rep. Act No. 6425 as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659. A sample taken from one (1) of he
packages is logically presumed to be representative of the entire contents of the package unless proven otherwise by accusedappellant. Therefore, a positive result for the presence of drugs is indicative that there is 1.1 kilogram of drugs in the plastic
package from which the sample was taken. If it is then proved, beyond reasonable doubt, xxx that accused appellant transported
into the Philippines the plastic packages from which samples were taken for tests, and found positive as prohibited drugs, then
conviction for importing shabu is definitely in order.
Thus, if the prosecution proves that the sample is positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, it can be presumed that the
entire substance is shabu. The burden of evidence shifts to the accused who must prove otherwise. Appellants in this case have
not presented any evidence to overcome the presumption.
It is clear, therefore, that when accused-appellant stipulated that the weight of the examined specimens for Criminal Case
Nos. 3618-D and 3619-D totaled 5.08 and 200.45 grams, respectively, he in effect admitted that the said amounts of shabu are
pure and unadulterated. Moreover, accused-appellant made no reservations as to his admission on the veracity of the results as
reflected in Physical Sciences Report No. D-448-96. His only concern, at that time, was to make it clear that the forensic
scientist who examined the confiscated substance was not aware of where the specimen came from. [66]This was in accord with
the theory of the defense that it was not accused-appellant but a companion, Alvin, who was in possession of the confiscated
substance. Thus, due to the absence of any reservation on the total weight of the shabu examined, accused-appellant can no
longer be heard to go back on his previous admission by requesting a quantitative test of the same.
Nevertheless, accused-appellant argues that a quantitative test should be allowed in view of an alleged circular issued by
this Court sometime in 1996 directing the PNP Crime Laboratory to conduct a qualitative and a quantitative examination on all
illegal drugs submitted to the said office in relation to a case. [67]
This argument of accused-appellant is totally bereft of any legal basis. This Court never issued any such circular requiring
the PNP Crime Laboratory to conduct quantitative and qualitative tests on substances which they examine. It is clear that this
argument was resorted to by counsel for the defense in order to mislead the trial court and this court into acquitting his
client. This contemptuous conduct of counsel for the defense will be dealt with appropriately.
Accused-appellant also claims that the biased attitude of the trial judge deprived him of due process. In this regard, he cites
in his appeal brief a single instance when the judge allegedly revealed his bias, to wit:
COURT:
Mark it.
Q

What happened after the accused handed to you one pack of crystalline substance?

Immediately, I switched on our voyager pager which prompted my backup to subdue the suspect and introduce
ourselves as Anti Narcotics police, sir.

COURT:
By the way, did you not give the money to the accused when he handed to you the alleged substance?

I gave it to him, your honor.

COURT:
So the money was already in the possession of the accused when you received the shabu from him.
A

Yes, your Honor.[68]

We fail to see how this single noted instance of questioning can justify a claim that the trial judge was biased. We have
exhaustively examined the transcript of stenographic notes and determined that the trial judge was more than equitable in
presiding over the hearings of this case. Moreover, a judge is not prohibited from propounding clarificatory questions on a
witness if the purpose of which is to arrive at a proper and just determination of the case. Thus, in Zheng Bai Hui, we said:
In any case, a severe examination by a trial judge of some of the witness for the defense in an effort to develop the truth and
to get at the real facts affords no justification for a charge that he has assisted the prosecution with an evident desire to secure a
conviction, or that he had intimidated the witnesses for the defense. The trial judge must be accorded a reasonable leeway in
putting such questions to witnesses as may be essential to elicit relevant facts to make the record speak the truth. Trial judges in
this jurisdiction are judges of both the law and the facts, and they would be negligent in the performance of their duties if they
permitted a miscarriage of justice as a result of a failure to propound a proper question to a witness which might develop some
material bearing upon the outcome. In the exercise of sound discretion, he may put such question to the witness as will enable
him to formulate a sound opinion as to the ability or the willingness of the witness to tell the truth. A judge may examine or
cross-examine a witness. He may propound clarificatory questions to test the credibility of the witness and to extract the
truth. He may seek to draw out relevant and material testimony though that testimony may tend to support or rebut the position
taken by one or the other party. It cannot be taken against him if the clarificatory questions he propounds happen to reveal
certain truths which tend to destroy the theory of one party.[69]
The sale of less than 200 grams of methampethamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug, is punishable with a penalty ranging
from prision correccional to reclusion temporal, depending on the quantity.[70] Thus, if the regulated drug weighs less than 66.67
grams, then the penalty is prision correctional, if 66.67 grams or more but less than 133.33 grams then the penalty is prision
mayor, and if 133.33 grams or more but less than 200 grams then the penalty is reclusion temporal. In Criminal Case No. 3618D, the amount of shabu involved weighs 5.08 grams, as such the appropriate penalty is prision correccional. There being no
aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the penalty shall be imposed in its medium period or from 2 years, 4 months and 1 day
to 4 years and 2 months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum penalty shall be within the range of prision
correccional medium and the minimum penalty shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed or, in this
case, arresto mayor. It is, therefore, clear from the foregoing that the trial committed an error in imposing an indeterminate
sentence of 1 year, 8 months and 20 days, as minimum, to 4 years and 2 months, as maximum, of prision
correccional. Accordingly, this must be modified.
On the other hand, the possession of 200 grams or more of shabu carries with it the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death
and a fine ranging from Five hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00). Since no
aggravating circumstance attended the commission of the offense, the trial court, in Criminal Case No. 3619-D, was correct in
imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua with a fine of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00).
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig is hereby AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant Loreto Medenilla y Doria is hereby found GUILTY of violating Sections 15 and 16 of
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, and hereby sentenced: (a) in Criminal Case No. 3618-D, to
suffer an indeterminate sentence of 6 months of arresto mayor to 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional; and (b) in
Criminal Case No. 3619-D, to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00).
Counsel for the defense, Atty. Marcelino Arias, is hereby ordered to explain within ten (10) days why he should not be cited
in contempt for citing an inexistent circular in his pleadings.

10

SO ORDERED.

PROSECUTOR JORGE D. BACULI,


Complainant,
- versus JUDGE MEDEL ARNALDO B. BELEN, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 36, CalambaCity, Laguna,
Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a verified Complaint[1] dated May 8, 2008 of Prosecutor Jorge D. Baculi (complainant) charging Judge
Medel Arnaldo B. Belen (respondent), Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Calamba City, Laguna, Branch 36,
with Grave Misconduct, Misbehavior, Gross Ignorance of the Law, Disbarment, Grave Abuse of Authority, Harassment,
Oppressive and Malicious Conduct, and Violation of: (1) Articles 204 and 206 of the Revised Penal Code; (2) Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 6713; (3) Code of Judicial Conduct; (4) Supreme Court (SC) Administrative Circular No. 1-88; (5) The Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act; and (6) Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, relative to Criminal Case No. 13240-2005-C
entitled People of the Philippines v. Jay Ballestrinos for Frustrated Homicide.
The facts, as summarized by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), and which we adopt, are as follows:
Complainant Prosecutor Baculi states that he is the Provincial Prosecutor of Zambales detailed in
Calamba, Laguna. On 1 April 2005, he filed against the accused Jay Ballestrinos [accused] an information for
frustrated homicide docketed as Criminal Case No. 13240-2005-C.
In an Order dated 18 May 2005, respondent Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen directed the complainant to
submit evidence that the notice of preliminary investigation was duly served and received by the accused. On
23 May 2005, complainant Baculi, through a Joint Manifestation/Comment, informed the court that despite
several opportunities given, the accused failed to submit his counter-affidavit.
On 7 February 2006, respondent Judge Belen directed herein complainant Baculi to explain why he
should not be cited in contempt of court for making unfounded statements in his pleadings.
In the course of the proceedings, complainant Baculi filed several pleadings (i.e. [1] Motion to Dismiss
and/or Cancel Proceedings with Voluntary Inhibition and [2] Urgent Reiterative Motion to Dismiss and/or
Hold in Abeyance the Proceedings and/or Resolution of the Citation for Contempt with Voluntary Inhibition
and Complaints for Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave Misconduct, Abuse of Authority and Acts Unbecoming
a Lawyer and Member of the Judiciary, Harassment and Oppressive Conduct.)
In an Order dated 11 December 2006, respondent Judge Belen granted complainant Baculis motion to
reschedule the hearing to 8 and 15 February 2007. In a Decision dated 18 December 2006, respondent Judge
Belen found complainant Baculi guilty of direct contempt of court for making scurrilous and contumacious
statements in the latters Urgent Reiterative Motion, the pertinent portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Jorge Baculi GUILTY of direct contempt
and sentenced him to pay the fine of ONE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED (P1,500.00)
PESOS and to suffer imprisonment of ONE (1) DAY.
The bail for the provisional liberty of the accused is fixed at P500.00.
SO ORDERED.
In another Decision dated 7 June 2007, complainant Baculi was cited for indirect contempt of court and
sentenced to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) and to suffer imprisonment of three (3) days.

11

Complainant Baculi filed a Notice of Appeal with Motion and Manifestation dated 5 July 2007 praying that
the execution of the decision finding him guilty of indirect contempt be suspended pending his appeal.
Respondent Judge Belen, in an Order dated 6 August 2007, directed complainant Baculi to post, within
two (2) days from receipt thereof, a supersedeas bond of Thirty Five Thousand Pesos (P35,000.00) in order to
stay the execution of the Decisions dated 18 December 2006 and 7 June 2007. Complainant Baculi moved for
a reduction of the bond but the same was treated as a mere scrap of paper for failure to comply with the notice
of hearing under Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.
Respondent Judge Belen, in an Order dated 20 August 2007, directed the clerk of court to issue the Writ
of Execution and a Warrant of Arrest to implement the decision of 18 December 2006 and 7 June 207. Said
order also directed the Philippine National Police to assist the branch sheriff in the enforcement of the
Warrant.
On 5 October 2007, complainant Baculi filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Resolve Motions (i.e. [1]
Manifestation/Motion and Notice of Appeal with Motion/Manifestation both dated 5 July 2007 and Motion
for Reconsideration dated 21 August 2007) which motion was considered functus officio in an Order dated 9
October 2007 considering that the subject motions were already resolved in the Order of 6 August 2007.
Complainant Baculi, on 24 October 2007, moved that the Order dated 20 August 2007 be set aside. On
26 October 2007, he again filed a Manifestation with Motion arguing that his motion for reconsideration dated
21 August 2007 complied with the rules on notice of hearing.
In his twin Orders of 24 March 2008, respondent Judge Belen declared that the Decisions dated 18
December 2006 and 7 June 2007 are final and executory.
On 28 April 2008, complainant Baculi filed a Motion for Reconsideration and to Set Aside Decisions of
December 18, 2006 and June 7, 2007 and all Orders of March 24, 2008.
Thereafter, complainant filed the instant Complaint, asseverating, among others, that respondent violated Section 7, Rule
71 of the Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence in holding him liable for indirect contempt because the use of
contemptuous language in a pleading, if submitted before the same judge, would constitute only direct contempt of court; that
complainant's conviction had no basis because the pleadings in question did not contain any vulgar, vile or unethical statements
that would be an affront to the dignity of the court; that the supersedeas bond of P35,000.00 fixed by the court to stay the
execution was excessive, confiscatory and unconscionable; and that respondent was induced by revenge and ill motive, since it
was complainant who indicted respondent in a libel case filed by one Prosecutor Ma. Victoria Sunega-Lagman, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 15332-SP, now pending before the RTC, Branch 32, San Pablo City. Thus, complainant charges respondent
with abuse of the courts power to cite persons for contempt.
Moreover, complainant claims that respondent is suffering from power complex and other psychiatric, emotional and
mental disorders because the latter has an inordinate feeling of superiority and shows no remorse for his
wrongdoings. Complainant also posits that respondent incurred delay when the latter failed to resolve his
Manifestations/Motions dated October 23 and 24, 2007 within the reglementary period. Lastly, complainant argues that the twin
Orders of March 24, 2008, which declared the Decisions dated December 12, 2006 and June 7, 2007 final and executory, were
procedurally infirm considering that his Manifestations/Motions dated October 23 and 24, 2007 are still pending resolution
before the court.
In his Comment[2] dated June 11, 2008, respondent denies that the contempt proceedings against complainant were
motivated by revenge. He asserts that he would not have initiated the same, had complainant not filed pleadings that were
contemptuous in nature. Respondent presupposes that since complainant did not appeal the Decisions dated December 18, 2006
and June 7, 2007 to the Court of Appeals, the decisions already became final and executory. Respondent claims that he issued the
said decisions and orders strictly in the performance of his judicial functions, and cannot be held administratively liable in the
absence of a declaration from a competent tribunal that those decisions and orders suffered from legal infirmities or were tainted
with grave abuse of authority. Respondent argues that, pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence, complainant should first exhaust
judicial remedies before coming to the OCA by way of an administrative complaint.
We fully agree with the submission of the OCA that in the absence of fraud, bad faith, evil intention or corrupt motive, the
complainant may not be allowed to question the judiciousness of the decisions rendered and orders issued by the respondent,

12

since the same may only be assailed through the appropriate judicial remedies under the Rules of Court and not through an
administrative complaint. In this case, complainant did not exhaust available judicial remedies to challenge the decisions and
orders. Moreover, the OCA found that the complainant failed to prove that respondent was guilty of delay in the resolution of
pending incidents. Settled is the rule that in administrative proceedings, the burden of showing that the respondent committed
the acts complained of devolves on the complainant. In fact, if the complainant, upon whom rests the burden of proving his
cause of action, fails to show in a satisfactory manner the facts upon which he bases his claim, the respondent is under no
obligation to prove his exception or defense.[3]
However, we also agree with the OCA's finding that respondent is guilty of gross ignorance of the law for citing
complainant for indirect contempt.
In Re: Conviction of Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, RTC, Br. 121, Caloocan City in Crim. Cases Q-97-69655 to 56 for
Child Abuse,[4] we held:
Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court, such conduct as tends to
bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice parties,
litigant or their witnesses during litigation.
There are two kinds of contempt punishable by law: direct contempt and indirect contempt. Direct
contempt is committed when a person is guilty of misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court as to
obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the court, offensive
personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or
deposition when lawfully required to do so. Indirect contempt or constructive contempt is that which is
committed out of the presence of the court. Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede,
obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice would constitute indirect contempt.[5]
A pleading containing derogatory, offensive or malicious statements submitted before a court or judge where the
proceedings are pending constitutes direct contempt, because it is equivalent to misbehavior committed in the presence of or so
near a court or judge as to interrupt the administration of justice. [6] In this regard, respondent committed a serious blunder when
he cited complainant for indirect contempt.
Compounding this blunder, even if we assume that complainant's unfounded and contumacious statements in his
pleadings translate to indirect contempt as respondent mistakenly believed, respondent failed to follow the proper procedure
therefor[7] under Section 4 of Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, which particularly provides:
SEC. 4. How proceedings commenced. Proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated motu
proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed by an order or any other formal charge
requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt.
In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with
supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and upon full
compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned. If the
contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal action pending in the court, the petition for
contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided separately, unless
the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge and the principal action for
joint hearing and decision. (Emphasis supplied.)
As correctly observed by the OCA, there was no order issued by respondent for the charge of indirect contempt against
complainant to be docketed separately; neither was there an order that the said charge be consolidated with the principal action.
In sum, respondent simply incorporated or integrated the proceedings for indirect contempt with the principal case. This fortifies
the OCAs finding that respondent is grossly ignorant of basic procedure. [8] When the law is so elementary, such as the provisions
of the Rules of Court, not to know, or to act as if one does not know the same, constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
Correlatively, respondent failed to conform to the high standards of competence required of judges under the Code of
Judicial Conduct, which mandates that:
Rule 1.01. A judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence.
Rule 3.01 A judge shall x x x maintain professional competence.

13

Time and again, we have held that competence is the mark of a good judge. [9] When a judge displays an utter lack of
familiarity with the rules, he erodes the public's confidence in the competence of the courts. Such is gross ignorance of the law.
Having accepted the exalted position of a judge, he owes the public and the court the duty to be proficient in the law.
Unfamiliarity with the Rules of Court is a sign of incompetence. Basic procedural rules must be at the palm of his hands. A judge
must be acquainted with legal norms and precepts as well as with procedural rules. Thus, this Court has been consistent in ruling
that when the law is so elementary, for a judge not to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Verily, failure to
follow basic legal commands embodied in the law and the rules constitutes gross ignorance of the law, from which no one is
excused, and surely not a judge like respondent.[10]
It is well settled that the power to punish a person in contempt of court is inherent in all courts to preserve order in judicial
proceedings and to uphold the orderly administration of justice. However, judges are enjoined to exercise the power judiciously
and sparingly, with utmost restraint, and with the end in view of utilizing the same for correction and preservation of the dignity
of the court, and not for retaliation or vindictiveness. [11] It bears stressing that the power to declare a person in contempt of court
must be exercised on the preservative, not the vindictive, principle; and on the corrective, not the retaliatory, idea of punishment.
[12]
Thus, in Nazareno v. Hon. Barnes, etc., et al.,[13] we held:
A judge, as a public servant, should not be so thin-skinned or sensitive as to feel hurt or offended if a
citizen expresses an honest opinion about him which may not altogether be flattering to him. After all, what
matters is that a judge performs his duties in accordance with the dictates of his conscience and the light that
God has given him. A judge should never allow himself to be moved by pride, prejudice, passion, or pettiness
in the performance of his duties. He should always bear in mind that the power of the court to punish for
contempt should be exercised for purposes that are impersonal, because that power is intended as a safeguard
not for the judges as persons but for the functions that they exercise.
Under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, gross ignorance of the law or procedure is classified as
a serious offense, punishable by dismissal from the service, suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more
than three but not exceeding six months, or a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceedingP40,000.00.[14]
We take note that in Mane v. Belen,[15] respondent was reprimanded for having exhibited conduct unbecoming of a
judge. In the said case, respondent went out of bounds when he engaged on a supercilious legal and personal discourse. [16] Thus,
respondent appears to be undeterred despite the reprimand and the warning previously given that any repetition of similar
infractions shall be dealt with more severely. Given the circumstance, suspension from office for six (6) months without salary
and benefits is in order.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Calamba City,
Laguna, Branch 36, is hereby found GUILTYof gross ignorance of the law and is hereby SUSPENDED from office for a period
of six (6) months without salary and other benefits. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts
shall merit a more serious penalty.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-62449 July 16, 1984
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
ATTY. RAUL H. SESBRENO, accused-appellee.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellant.
R E S OL U T I O N

14

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:


This appeal from an order quashing an information furnishes occasion to reiterate the ambits of the well-established doctrine of
privileged communications. The appeal was certified to us by the Court of Appeals on a finding that it involves a pure question
of law.
In an Information filed on March 4, 1981, the City Fiscal's Office of Cebu City accused Atty. Raul H. Sesbreno of the crime of
libel based on alleged defamatory statements found in a pleading entitled "PLAINTIFF'S REPLY TO DEFENDANTS
OPPOSITION DATED MARCH 9TH" dated March 11, 1980 filed in Civil Case No. R-18181 entitled"HEIRS OF ROBERTO
CENIZA, ET AL. V. DANIELA CENIZA UROT" now pending litigation before Branch IV of the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
14th Judicial District.
On March 5, 1981, the accused filed a MOTION TO QUASH INFORMATION. The main thrust of the motion is that on the face
itself of the information, it is obvious that the allegedly libelous statements imputing that Atty. Ramon B. Ceniza is an
irresponsible person, cannot be trusted, like Judas, a liar and irresponsible childish prankster are contained in a pleading filed in
court and, therefore, covered by the DOCTRINE OF ABSOLUTELY PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS; hence, no civil or
criminal liability can arise therefrom.
A decision was rendered by the court a quo quashing the information and dismissing the case for lack of cause of action. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals certified the same to us.
The doctrine of privileged communication that utterances made in the course of judicial proceedings, including all kinds of
pleadings, petitions and motions, belong to the class of communications that are absolutely privileged has been expressed in a
long line of cases (Us v. Salera, 32 Phil. 365; Us v. Bustos, 37 Phil. 732; Giler v. billiard, 43 Phil. 180; Santiago v. Calvo, 47
Phil. 919; People v. Flores, G.R. No. 7528, Dec. 18, 1957; Tupas v. Parreno, 105 Phil. 1304; Unrep., April 30, 1959; Smith Bell
and Co. v. Ellis, 48 Phil. 475; People v. Valerio Andres, 107 Phil. 1046: Sison v. David, 1 SCRA 60; Tolentino v. Baylosis, 1
SCRA 396; People v. Aquino, 18 SCRA 555; Cuenco v. Cuenco, 70 SCRA 235; Elizalde v. Gutierrez, 76 SCRA 448; PCIB v.
Philnabank Employees' Association, July 2, 1981, 105 SCRA 314), The doctrine of privileged communication rests upon public
policy, which looks to the free and unfettered administration of justice, though, as an incidental result it may in some instances
afford an immunity to the evil disposed and malignant slanderer (People v. Castelo, 4 SCRA 947). While the doctrine is liable to
be abuse and its abuse may lead to great hardships, yet to give legal action to such libel suits would give rise to greater
hardships. (Tolentino v. Baylosis, supra). The privilege is not intended so much for the protection of those engaged in the public
service and in the enactment and administration of law, as for the promotion of the public welfare, the purpose being that
members of the legislature, judges of courts, jurors, lawyers, and witnesses may speak their minds freely and exercise their
respective functions without incurring the risk of a criminal prosecution or an action for the recovery of damages (Deles v.
Aragona, Jr., 27 SCRA 633). Lawyers, most especially, should be allowed a great latitude of pertinent comment in the
furtherance of the causes they uphold, and for the felicity of their clients, they may be pardoned some infelicities of language
(Deles v. Aragona, supra).
The doctrine of privileged communication, moreover, is explicitly provided for in the Revised Penal Code, as an exception to tile
general principle that every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it is true, in the absence of "good
intention" and "justifiable motive" (Elizalde v. Gutierrez, supra).
However, this doctrine is not without qualification. Statements made in the course of judicial proceedings are absolutely
privileged that is, privileged regardless of defamatory tenor and of the presence of malice if the same are relevant,
pertinent, or material to the cause in hand or subject of inquiry (Tolentino v. Baylosis, supra;People v. Alvarez, 14 SCRA 901;
People v. Aquino, 18 SCRA 555). A pleading must meet the test of relevancy to avoid being considered libelous (Armovit v.
Purisima, 118 SCRA 247).
As to the degree of relevancy or pertinency necessary to make alleged defamatory matters privileged, the courts are inclined to
be liberal (People v. Alvarez, supra; Malit v. People, 114 SCRA 348). The matter to which the privilege does not extend must be

15

so palpably wanting in relation to the subject matter of the controversy that no reasonable man can doubt its irrelevance and
impropriety (Malit v. People, supra). In order that a matter alleged in a pleading may be privileged, it need not be in every case
material to the issues presented by the pleadings, It must, however, be legitimately related thereto, or so pertinent to the subject
of the controversy that it may become the subject of the inquiry in the course of the trial (Tolentino v. Baylosis, supra; People v.
Alvarez, supra).
It appears that in connection with the initial formal hearing of Civil Case No. R-18181 on February 7, 1980, appellant Atty.
Ceniza as counsel for the defendant, filed an Urgent Motion to Transfer Hearing, receipt of notice of which was denied by herein
appellee Atty. Sesbreno, counsel for the plaintiff. Upon the latter's representation, the court a quo granted the motion for
postponement, ordering Atty. Ceniza, however, to reimburse Atty. Sesbreno's clients for expenses incurred in attending the
supposed hearing slated that day. A motion for reconsideration was filed by Atty. Ceniza showing evidence of receipt of notice of
hearing by Atty. Sesbreno's office. The same was granted. The court ordered Atty. Sesbreno to show cause why he should not be
declared in contempt for misrepresentation. Against said order, Atty. Sesbreno filed a motion seeking reconsideration with a
counter-motion for contempt against the appellant for reneging on his commitment to reimburse appellee's clients and for
resorting to dilatory tactics. To that, Atty. Ceniza, filed his "Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration, Etc." charging Sesbreno
with misrepresentation, prevarication, and "telling a barefaced and documented lie." Replying to these remarks, Sesbreno then
filed his "REPLY" subject matter of Ceniza's libel suit.
Applying the liberal rule to the case at bar and considering the incidents which preceded it, we find appellee's alleged slanderous
statements pertinent to the motion to cite appellant Ceniza in contempt. Although the language used by defendant-appellee in the
pleading in question was undoubtedly strong, since it was made in legitimate defense of his own and of his client's interest, such
remarks must be deemed absolutely privileged and cannot be the basis of an action for libel (Tolentino v. Baylosis, supra).
However, although it is understandable, if not justifiable, that, at times zeal in the defense of one's client may be carried to the
point of undue skepticism and doubts as to the motives of opposing counsel, the spectacle presented by two members of the bar
engaged in bickering and recrimination is far from modifying (Narido v. Linsangan, 58 SCRA 85). Mutual bickering and
recriminations between brother attorneys detract from the dignity of the legal profession and will not receive any sympathy from
this Court (Javier v. Cornejo, 63 Phil. 293).
Clients, not lawyers, are the litigants. Whatever may be the ill-feeling existing between clients, it should not be allowed to
influence counsel in their conduct and demeanor toward each other or toward suitors in the case. All personalities between
counsel should be scrupulously avoided. In the trial of a case it is indecent to allude to the personal history or the personal
peculiarities and Idiosyncracies of counsel on the other side. Personal colloquies between counsel which cause delay and
promote unseemly wrangling should also be carefully avoided (Canon 17, Canons of Professional Ethics). Lawyers owe respect
not only to the courts and their clients, but also to other members of the Bar.
In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyer's language should likewise be dignified (In re Climaco, 55 SCRA
107, 121). Choice of language is a very important requirement in the preparation of pleadings (Rule 8, Sec. 1; Rule 9, Sec. 5;
Rule 7 Sec. 5, Revised Rules of Court). Appropriately, in the assertion of their client's rights, lawyers even those gifted with
superior intellect are enjoined to rein up their tempers. Greater care and circumspetion must be exercised in the preparation of
their pleadings and to refrain from using abrasive and offensive language (Yangson v. Saladanan, 68 SCRA 42). A becoming
modesty is a desirable trait also of practising attorneys Festin v. Faderanga, 111 SCRA 1).
Time and again we have rebuked and punished lawyers for conduct showing them unfit to practice law. The Supreme Court as
guardian of the legal profession has ultimate powers over attorneys. Its authority to discipline lawyers stems from its
constitutional prerogative to regulate the practice of law and the admission of the persons to engage therein 1 Section 5(5),
Article X, The 1973 Philippine Constitution; In Re Cunanan, 94 Phil. 534, 1954). Apart from the constitutional mandate. the
disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court over attorneys is an inherent power incidental to its proper administration of justice
and essential to an orderly discharge of its judicial functions (Tejan v. Cusi, 57 SCRA 154: In Re Almacen, 31 SCRA 562;
Hilado v. David, 84 Phil. 573; In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Edillon, G.R. No. AC-1928 [IBP Adm.
Case No. DD-1] August 3, 1978). Furthermore, attorneys are the court's constituency to aid in the administration of justice (Doge

16

S. State, 39 NE 745). A lawyer occupies what may be termed a quasi-judicial office since he is in fact an officer of the court, and
like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice (Kerlin v. Culkin, 60 ALR 851). Thus, only those
complying with the strict standards of legal practice are maintained in the roll of attorneys and those falling short thereof may be
disbarred.
Thus, both attorneys are advised accordingly.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED. Atty. Raul Sesbreno is reprimanded and admonished to refrain
from employing language unbecoming of a member of the Bar and to extend courtesy and respect to his brothers in the
profession with a warning that any future infraction of a nature similar to that found in this case shall be dealt with more
severely.
SO ORDERED.

17

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