Accounting, Organizations and Society: Michel W. Lander, Bas A.S. Koene, Shelly N. Linssen

Accounting, Organizations and Society xxx (2012) xxxxxx
Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect
Accounting, Organizations and Society

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/aos
Committed to professionalism: Organizational responses of mid-tier

accounting rms to conicting institutional logics
Michel W. Lander a,, Bas A.S. Koene b, Shelly N. Linssen b,1
a
b
HEC Paris, 1, Rue de la libration, 78351 Jouy-en-Josas, France

Rotterdam School of Management Erasmus University, Burgemeester Oudlaan 50, 3062 PA Rotterdam, The Netherlands
a b s t r a c t
We study how mid-tier accounting rms deal with changes in their institutional environment that resulted in a shift in emphasis from the trustee logic to the commercial logic. We
nd that these mid-tier rms selectively adopt practices related to the commercial logic,
while retaining a principal commitment to the trustee logic. Interviews with high level
informants in these rms show how specic strategic choice opportunities serve as independent critical events framing practice-adoption decisions. Main strategic issues for the
mid-tier rms relate to the changing role of the accountant and changes in organizational
structure and practices. As these issues fundamentally challenge characteristics of their
professional identity, there is internal resistance against this transformation. Nonpartnered accountants mainly challenge new roles that upset their extant work routines,
whereas partners resist changes affecting their autonomy. These types of resistance
directly impact the strategic organizational responses of the accounting rms to institutional pressures.
2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Introduction
Over the past two decades the accounting profession
has come under increasing institutional pressure. Financial
globalization (Arnold, 2009) along with technical innovations (Brock, 2006) and a broad shift towards neo-liberal
principles of market economics (Puxty, Wilmott, Cooper,
& Lowe, 1987) are changing the face of accounting. In response, the accounting profession is changing with a leading role for the largest, multinational accounting rms
(Cooper & Robson, 2006) that have created a distinct transnational eld (Suddaby, Cooper, & Greenwood, 2007). The
big 4 rms developed a new, commercial business model
for their operations (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006)
reected in their attitudes in the regulatory arena (e.g.
Corresponding author. Tel.: +33 1 39 67 97 08; fax: +33 1 39 67 70 88.
E-mail addresses: lander@hec.fr (M.W. Lander), bkoene@rsm.nl (B.A.S.
Koene).
1
Consultant.
Cooper & Robson, 2006; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005)

but also in the management of their professionals
(Covaleski, Dirsmith, Heian, & Samuel, 1998; Hanlon,
1996; Kornberger, Justesen, & Mouritsen, 2011).
For other (smaller) actors this has created a professional
eld full of tension between the traditionally dominant
trustee or duciary logic and an increasingly pervasive
commercial or corporate logic (Dezalay, 1995; Hanlon,
1996; Thornton, Jones, & Kury, 2005). In prior studies of
processes of institutional change, scholars have pointed
to the importance of institutional tension based in the
incompatibility of competing institutional logics (Seo &
Creed, 2002; Thornton & Ocasio, 2008; Thornton et al.,
2005). Institutional logics reect the socially constructed
basis of historical patterns of material practices, assumptions, values and beliefs, and rules by which individuals
produce and reproduce their material subsistence, organize time and space, and provide meaning to their social
reality (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999, p. 804). They shape
how organizations and individuals behave and thereby af-
0361-3682/$ - see front matter 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.2012.11.001
Please cite this article in press as: Lander, M. W., et al. Committed to professionalism: Organizational responses of mid-tier accounting
rms to conicting institutional logics. Accounting, Organizations and Society (2012), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.2012.11.001
M.W. Lander et al. / Accounting, Organizations and Society xxx (2012) xxxxxx
fect organizational structures and processes (Greenwood,

Diaz, Li, & Lorente, 2009). While logics are fundamental
and inuential, organizational elds are rarely subject to
a single dominant logic. Rather, rms have to contend with
multiple, often contradicting logics that affect institutional
stability and change (c.f. Lounsbury, 2007; Marquis &
Lounsbury, 2007; Purdy & Gray, 2009; Reay & Hinings,
2005; Thornton, Jones, & Kury, 2005). The institutional logics perspective thus moves beyond the basic constraining
nature of single logics, highlighting the partial autonomy
of actors from social structure (Thornton, Ocasio, &
Lounsbury, 2012, p. 7).
Following Lounsburys (2008, p. 354) lead we look at
how the recognition of multiple logics, and thus multiple
forms of institutionally-based rationality . . .can provide
new insight into practice variation and the dynamics of
practice. We do this through the documentation and analysis of the heterogeneity of organizational responses of
mid-tier accounting rms to the institutional pressures
facing the accounting industry. Where most studies examining institutional change focus on elite actors (Greenwood
& Suddaby, 2006) or mavericks (Leblebici, Salancik, Copay,
& King, 1991), the core of an organizational eld consists of
mainstream rms. The number of studies examining
change within this group has remained limited (Hardy &
Maguire, 2008). While studying the transformation of the
largest accounting rms into Managed Professional Businesses (MPBs; Cooper, Hinings, Greenwood, & Brown,
1996), Greenwood, Suddaby, and Hinings (2002) noted
that the regional and local rms in their study only had
modest sympathy for this new structure and were largely
indifferent to what these rms where doing. To some extent, the mid-sized rms dene themselves by how they
are different from the big 4. One of our respondents described it as: Saying that we want to look like the big 4 is like
swearing in a church! (A3). We investigate the strategic responses (Oliver, 1991) displayed by mid-tier accountancy
rms in the Netherlands in the face of conicting demands
of the trustee and commercial logic.
These mid-tier rms present an interesting sample for
three reasons. First, although still quite large in size (both
in terms of employees and revenues), they are more
embedded in their local national institutional context (Ramirez, 2009). They are, for example, more dependent on
national associations as sites of professionalization than
large professional rms that develop and provide much
of their training in-house (Cooper & Robson, 2006; Ramirez, 2009). Second, our mid-tier organizations tend to
serve smaller, more local clients than the big 4. Hence,
they face different client demands (Ramirez, 2009). Third,
non-partnered professionals still have a great deal of
inuence on the day-to-day operations of our mid-tier
rms, given the relatively small size of the professional
cadre and the relatively easy access to the strategic apex
of the rm. Still, the increased importance of the commercial logic has created a situation where the conicting demands of the commercial and the trustee logic create
ambiguity and the concomitant need for sensemaking
about the implications of logic changes (Thornton
et al., 2012, p. 7) also for our mid-tier rms. When external expectations regarding conicting logics are unclear
there is room for managerial discretion (DiMaggio,

1988; Oliver, 1991). It is therefore unlikely that strategic
responses to conicting logics will be similar across all
actors populating an organizational eld (Pache & Santos,
2010). Given the relative paucity of empirical research on
the topic (Thornton et al., 2012), we investigate how our
mid-tier accounting rms deal with the two logics available for sensemaking and legitimation of choices regarding the future course of their activities.
Besides the relevance to institutional theory, an analysis of mid-tier rms also further illuminates our understanding of the evolution of professions. Essentially
sociological literature identies professions as occupations with special power and prestige, which were
granted a privileged position because they fullled specic societal needs and maintained norms through the
application of specialized bodies of knowledge and because they were devoted to the service of the public,
above and beyond material incentives (Larsson, 1977,
p. x). While institutional scholars in general do not question the original ethical values espoused by the professions, authors in the sociology of professions literature
are much more skeptical, and some even question if this
focus ever really existed (cf. Abbott, 1988; Haskell,
1984; Larsson, 1977; Reed, 1996). Larsson (1977) for instance argued that professionalization is mainly a process
of creating scarcity of resources in order to control the
market for expertise. In a related argument Abbott
(1988) saw professionalization as a way to create a
monopoly for skills and services. This critique of professional self-regulation overly driven by economics is similarly heard in discussions about the consequences of the
development of large rms into more commercially oriented rms (Wyatt, 2003). Discussing the tension between economic and professional motivation, Freidson
argues that although a shifting focus to prot is in itself
not unethical, the maximization of prot is (Freidson,
2001). According to Greenwood (2007) the original balance may have been disturbed to the detriment of professional behavior.
By exploring the ways in which the mid-tier accounting
rms deal with the tensions between the traditionally
dominant trustee logic and the commercial logic, we make
three contributions. In relation to our understanding of the
professions, insight into the sources and motives for resistance to certain structures and processes associated with
the commercial logic forms our rst contribution. While
our study is certainly not the rst to investigate resistance
to commercial practices in accounting rms (Covaleski
et al., 1998; Dirsmith & Covaleski, 1985; Hinings, Brown,
& Greenwood, 1991; Kornberger, Carter, & Ross-Smith,
2010), we do nd different motives underlying this resistance in this group of rms. In part, we observe a fragmented and pragmatic implementation of elements of
the new logic as mid-tier rms select only those elements
that have the perceived potential to resolve concrete managerial challenges regarding specic strategic issues. The
trustee logic thus continues to exercise its effect through
the embedded action of (managing) partners as well as
non-partnered accountants, whom are unwilling to forgo
their professional traditions and norms, because of their
vested interests, but also in order to maintain professional

standards in the clients interests.
Second, we contribute to the literature on institutional
logics and change. Fundamental changes in environmental
conditions lead to organizational change (Romanelli &
Tushman, 1994). Within the accountancy sector, changes
such as increased regulation, automation of services and
changing client demands have recently punctuated a long
period of stability. These signicant environmental jolts
(Meyer, 1982) are hypothesized in prior literature to result
in revolutionary transformations of organizations rather
than their evolutionary development (Greenwood &
Hinings, 1996; Romanelli & Tushman, 1994; Tushman &
Romanelli, 1985). Yet, this is not what we observe in our
group of mid-tier rms. Our work on the micro-level
shows co-existence of old and new values and beliefs
(Brock, Powell, & Hinings, 2007) in the early phases of
institutional change in this segment of the accounting
industry. The mid-tier rms respond by addressing separate and specic strategic and structural issues, as invoked
by the new logic. In their response they do not necessarily
draw on the new commercial logic, but on elements of the
logic that, for them, is most applicable to the situation at
hand. As such we nd a process of blending experimentation2 where actors use eld logics as institutional toolkits,
a nding that bears close resemblance to Swidlers cultural
toolkit argument (Swidler, 1986) and Thorntons logics perspective where actors balance elements of multiple logics to
t the particularities of a specic situation (Thornton, 2004).
Our work therefore offers insights in the early stages of the
organizational sedimentation process (Cooper et al., 1996)
related to eld level institutional change, rather than evidence of a comprehensive transformational embrace or outright rejection of the structures and processes associated
with the novel commercial logic.
Our third contribution is to the literature on Professional Service Firms (PSFs) as we address the issue of generalizability of extant ndings to other (segments of)
professional elds (Von Nordenycht, 2010). While
acknowledging that the big 4 have a profound inuence
on the accounting profession and its regulation (Cooper &
Robson, 2006), the change in institutional logics and associated practices (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006) in these
rms cannot straightforwardly be extrapolated to the
other actors in the accounting industry. While the big 4
rms are dealing with multinational clients in a supranational arena, our mid-tier rms are well-established in
their national setting, engaging primarily with local clients
and experiencing greater inuence of national professional
organizations (Ramirez, 2009). Our ndings indicate that
the commitment to the traditional trustee logic is considerably stronger within this group of more locally grounded
rms. Thus, Greenwood and Suddabys (2006) nding that
a group of elite rms pushes a comprehensive and consistent agenda propagating the commercial logic does not
translate to the group of mid-tier rms. This suggests that
organizational responses to conicting or changing logics
may differ systematically across the different demographic
This termed was suggested by one of our reviewers.
strata into which organizational elds tend to be segmented (Ramirez, 2001).
Theoretical orientation
Shifting institutional logics
The accounting industry has always faced contradicting
expectations from a professional and a commercial logic.
Yet traditionally the professional trustee logic (Suddaby
& Greenwood, 2005) in which professional values and a
feeling of societal guardianship is central to the professional identity was dominant. Professional audit practices
are the core of the accountants activities and as these
activities mean applying an esoteric body of knowledge
to complex problems, they enjoy high levels of discretion
and autonomy (Greenwood, Hinings, & Brown, 1990).
Additionally, senior members, who typically own and
manage the rms, are responsible for their particular practice areas and hence place priority hereon. In practice this
means that the strategy of the rm can be described as the
aggregate of the partners individual interests (Pinnington
& Morris, 2003). In terms of organizational systems and
practices, these rms rely primarily on informal and collegial control mechanisms at the expense of more formal and
hierarchical systems (Greenwood et al., 1990).
However, recently the accounting industry experienced
a number of upheavals that challenge traditional professional practice and the centrality of the trustee logic. First,
computer aided audit systems have reduced the complexity and labor intensity of the audit process (Brock, 2006). In
the Netherlands, the introduction of a standardized software language XBRL results in increased efciency and
ultimately less billable hours in the consolidation practice
(ING Economic Bureau, 2010). On the client side, the increased emphasis on costs and the internet and mobile
technologies that allow for shopping around, adds to the
pressure on audit fees (Ahroni, 1999). Second, due to globalization, accountancy organizations now have to deal with
international standards and needs of their international
clients (Nachum, 1996). This brings new knowledge
requirements for accountants and challenges in the local
integration of global standards (Botzem & Quack, 2009).
Third, statutory protection for providing services has been
reduced or removed (Hart, Schlesinger, & Maher, 1992).
This results in growing intra- and inter-professional competition (Gray, 1999). Fourth, the Sarbanes-Oxley act has
also induced changes in the organizational structure of
accounting rms (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006), increasing organizational process controls and reducing the
importance of the individual accountant. In the Netherlands, for those rms that perform statutory audits of annual and consolidated accounts, the Wet toezicht
accountantsorganisaties (Wta; law on the supervision of
accounting rms), has been implemented. This law entails
that accountancy rms require permits for statutory
audits, the allocation of which is determined by a number
of stringent quality demands. This has led to a decrease in
the number of rms allowed to conduct audits. The Wta
has created a large barrier of entry as the costs of these
permits are signicant. There are the direct costs of obtaining and maintaining this permit as well as indirect costs
stemming from the investments rms have to make in
their quality systems (ING, 2010). Finally, rms face
changes in client demands. Clients are not only more critical towards the service they receive, but also demand
more and different services, i.e. full service advice (ING,
2010). As such, the role of the traditional accountant is
slowly being shifted towards that of an advisor to the rm
(Ramirez, 2009).
The accounting profession at crossroads
These developments shift the control over professionals
from the professionals to market competition and hierarchical control through management in organizations (Hanlon, 1996, 1997). This directly weakens the effects of social
closure and economic monopoly, two important historical
foundations for maintaining the professions. Social closure
is the process by which jurisdictional boundaries are
drawn around a particular set of knowledge and skills to
make it possible for a profession to ensure quality and
competence by providing special educational credentials.
Economic monopoly both ensures the quality of the profession as well as the discipline of its members by muting
competition (Freidson, 2001). Related, economic monopoly
ensures the development and maintenance of quality because it allows the professions, for instance, to set tariffs
and entry barriers and prohibit advertising (Freidson,
1984; Suddaby et al., 2007). While the accounting industry
has always faced conicting demands from the professional and the commercial logic, the aforementioned
changes pushed accounting rms to rationalize their service delivery process replacing the traditional partnership
form by the MPB form (Cooper et al., 1996), which emphasizes the efciency of structures and processes. Additionally the large accounting rms broadened their activities
to consultancy services (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006).
This has led them to forego their professional independence (Covaleski, Dirsmith, & Rittenberg, 2003) and an
emphasis on the application of expertise in the interest
of public service (Pinnington & Morris, 2003) for the concept of value added (Covaleski et al., 2003; Pinnington &
Morris, 2003). Following the shift to a more commercial logic the large accounting rms also developed more deliberate management practices. To assure efciency and avoid
strategic drift (Lorsch & Tierney, 2002) the large accounting rms introduced formal strategic planning and governance, emphasized marketing and work with centralized
nancial systems (Morris & Pinnington, 1998).
Institutional dynamics and strategic responses
Changing institutional demands naturally result in a
changed organizational eld. On the eld level, the literature on institutional logics shows four possible outcomes
of the clash between logics: the incorporation of elements
of a new logic into the dominant one (e.g. Glynn, 2000), the
hybridization of elements of both the old and new logic
(e.g. Colyvas & Powell, 2006; DAunno, Sutton, & Price,
1991; Purdy & Gray, 2009), a shift from the old dominant
logic to the newly introduced logic (e.g. Thornton, 2002;

Zilber, 2002) or the permanent co-existence of both logics
(e.g. Lounsbury, 2007; Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007; Reay &
Hinings, 2005, 2009; Scott, Ruef, Mendel, & Caronna, 2000).
While in these studies the effects on the macro-level are
evident, the processes by which micro-level dynamics lead
to these outcomes are rarely investigated. Oliver (1991, p.
145) points to the lack of attention to the strategic behaviors that organizations employ in direct response to the
institutional processes that affect them. Drawing on institutional and resource dependence theory she describes
how organizations within the eld react and behave. To
cope with institutional demands rms can employ ve different strategic responses: (1) acquiescence, organizations
accede to institutional pressures; (2) compromise, organizations seek a balance to manage inconsistencies between
institutional expectations and organizational objectives;
(3) avoidance, organizations try to preclude the necessity
of conformity; (4) deance, organizations actively resist
institutional expectations; and (5) manipulation, organizations actively try to redene the institutional expectations.
Following the publication of this seminal work, a productive research stream developed to uncover which strategic
responses are employed by rms in various settings.
However, in most studies, authors discuss rm responses to changes in specic institutional practices rather
than wholesale shifts between logics. Additionally, the
possible responses of these rms are generally limited to
acquiescence/adopt or deance/non-adopt of a specic
practice. For example, adoption or resistance has been
investigated for cesarean surgeries (Goodrick & Salancik,
1996), university recycling programs (Lounsbury, 2001),
divisionalization (Thornton, 2002), issue management
practices (Greening & Gray, 1994), work family issues
(Milliken, Martins, & Morgan, 1998), and TQM systems
(Westphal, Gulati, & Shortell, 1997). In a signicantly smaller set of studies, authors went beyond the dichotomy of
adoption/non-adoption and directly investigated all ve
strategic responses, however again these studies focused
on single practices, rather than broader shifts in logic
(e.g. Goodstein, 1994; Ingram & Simons, 1995).
Several in-depth case studies look at eld level changes
in institutional logics, but in these studies the simultaneity
and congruence of strategic responses by rms are
implicitly assumed rather than formally investigated (e.g.
Hoffman, 1999; Townley, 2002). Thornton et al. advocate
further study of the effects of macro-level logics on the micro-dynamics arguing the simultaneous existence of multiple institutional logics and addressing the need to further
investigate how logics relate to changes in identities and
practices (Thornton et al., 2012).
A review of accounting research points to a similar lack
where research on practice development has been extremely fruitful but has tended to ignore broader institutional dynamics in favor of more micro-processual
studies of how accounting systems shape and are shaped
by intra-organizational dynamics (Lounsbury, 2008, p.
356). For example, studies of large accounting rms show
the importance of the new role of managers for the
advancement of the commercial logic. Kornberger et al.
(2011) point out how in these rms the role of the manager
serves as a rite of passage in the corporate career where

individuals learn to navigate a complex network of multiple players in a new role connected to the ongoing rationalization and economization of the rm. In similar vein,
Covaleski et al. (1998) as well as Dirsmith et al. (1997)
highlight how management by objectives threatens the
core professional characteristics of autonomy and partner
discretion and how they subsequently subvert, transform
and bend the practice.
While investigating such specic practices is important
as they invariably alter professional identity, we are interested how mid-tier rms adapt their whole portfolio of
structure and processes in view of the growing importance
of the commercial logic. Besides documenting the organizational responses of mid-tier accounting rms, we are further interested in their underlying rationale for the
demonstrated strategies. In previous studies authors show
that encroachment on professional autonomy has been a
strong driver for resistance against novel practices. They
also show that organizational members differ in their opinions with regard to these practices (Covaleski et al., 1998;
Dirsmith et al., 1997; Hinings et al., 1991). Recently, Pache
and Santos (2010) have argued that the type of strategic response given by rms is not solely determined by external
forces but rather by the internal representation of these
external forces. Their study highlights the importance of
perceptions of the existing internal audiences of the relevant external forces and the logics by which they operate
(Friedland & Alford, 1991). We further investigate this
diversity in opinions by evaluating how attitudes towards
strategic responses differ between partnered and nonpartnered accountants in our mid-tier accounting rms.
In this study we thus investigate how mid-tier accounting rms deal with the multiple, conicting logics available
for identity formation and practice development in their
eld of accounting practice. We specically address how
intra-organizational representation of these logics takes
shape and affects rms responses to the main strategic
challenges in the eld.
Methods
Rationale
The aim of this research is to elaborate our current theoretical understanding (Lee, Mitchell, & Sablynski, 1999) of
the impact of multiple institutional logics and the heterogeneity of organizational responses. Similar to Greenwood
and Suddaby (2006) we use inductive reasoning to map
organizational responses to institutional pressures as perceived in the demographic of mid-tier accounting rms.
In order to document changes in structures and systems
and the ways in which these changes coincide with institutional templates large scale comparative studies are
necessary (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996, p. 1047). They
are necessary as changes involve difcult to measure concepts (e.g. resistance) and radical changes take lengthy
periods of time. Hence we opted for a qualitative, multiple
case study (Eisenhardt, 1989) and use event sequencing of
historical and contemporary processes (Lee et al., 1999)
within and between cases. In order to disentangle the process of organizational change we draw on interview and
archival data.
Research context: The Dutch accountancy sector
The accountancy rms included in the sample are
drawn from the 22 largest accountancy rms listed directly
behind the big 4 rms. In terms of size (turnover and number of full-time employees) mid-tier rms differ substantially from the big 4 accounting rms. In the ranking of
largest accounting rms in the Netherlands the big 4 are
followed by three rms with prots in excess of 100 million and employing over 1000 fte. The following six rms
have over 50 million in prots and employ over 500
employees. Finally, the remaining 13 mid-tier rms have
prots in excess of 15 million and employ more than
150 employees (www.accountant.nl).
Data sources
We dene our sample geographically, which is a tried
and tested sampling method for professional organizations
whose operations are contingent on the jurisdiction in
which they are active (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Ruef
& Scott, 1998) Our data was collected from 2009 to 2011,
under the jurisdiction of the Nederlandse Beroepsorganisatie voor Accountants (NBA; Dutch Accounting Association).
Our primary sources of data are interviews with 34 senior-level informants within 11 mid-tier accounting rms
in the Netherlands with turnover ranging from 17.4 to
215.7 million and 161 to 1950 employees (see Table 1).
Our informants were theoretically sampled on a number
of characteristics (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). First, the informants needed to have insight in the strategic plans of the
rms. Preferably and most of our informants were
the informants needed to be (managing) partners and as
such have decision making authority. Secondly, the informants represented the different service areas of the rm
such as the audit branch, the consolidation branch and
the scal branch.
As we study conicting institutional logics we are tapping into cognitive aspects such as perceptions, thought
and interpretation. Therefore, we are at the risk of several
biases (Miller, Cardinal, & Glick, 1997). In order to mitigate
subject biases, we used multiple informants (at least three,
save for one rm where only the managing partner contributed to the study) per rm. The added benet of using
multiple informants is that it often results in richer data
(Schwenk, 1985). In the rst instance, the managing partner or director was contacted and informed about the
studys objectives and asked to participate in an interview.
Subsequently, using snowball sampling (Kerlinger, 1986),
we asked the rst informant to specify at least two other
potential informants. The interviews ranged from one to
one and a half hour in length. We always started by asking
for background information on the rm as well as the
informant. Hereafter, open-ended questions were used to
elaborate on ve important forces for change in the
accounting industry. Open-ended questions lead to higher
accuracy in reports (Miller et al., 1997). Examples of ques-
Table 1
Informant information.
Firm/informant number
A1
A2
A3
A4
B1
B2
B3
C1
C2
C3
D1
D2
D3
D4
E1
E2
E3
F1
F2
F3
G1
G2
G3
G4
H1
H2
H3
I1
I2
I3
J1
K1
K2
K3
Informants
Turnover = 215.7 million
# FTE = 1950
OOB licensed
# FTE = 1160
OOB licensed
# FTE = 1280
# FTE = 866
OOB licensed
# FTE = 756
Turnover = 59 million
# FTE = 636
# FTE = 465
OOB licensed
# FTE = 476
# FTE = 293
# FTE = 161
# FTE = 180
tions are: What are the ve most important changes in

the rms environment that led to changes in the mindset
of the rm?; and Why were these changes seen as
important in the rm? Subsequent questions were used
to uncover the effects of these forces on the strategy and/
or structure in the last 5 years within the informants rm.
Example questions are: What were the inuences of these
changes on organizational structures and practices?;
What is the best response to the changes for your rm
in terms of strategies, structures and practices?; Why
was this response (not) chosen? and; Was there any
resistance to the changes in the rm? All interviews were
recorded and transcribed. The total number of transcribed
pages amounted to 1400 double-spaced pages. In order to
minimize retrospective bias (Miller et al., 1997), we asked
informants to reect on real time and retrospective change
or non-change events. This motivated informants to tell
their story on (non-)changes in their rm and the substantiation of accounts through instructive examples. We also
provided anonymity for both the informants as well as
the rms they represent to encourage openness with regard to the strategic responses of the rms (Miller et al.,
1997). As our informants were at the heart of organizational decision making, they were exceptionally knowledgeable and reliable regarding the events they were
CEO (20 years at rm)

National senior manager (3 years at rm)
Managing partner (8 years at rm)
Regional managing partner (25 years at rm)
Regional managing partner (7 years at rms)
Managing partner audit (9 years)
Managing partner accountancy (2 years at rm)
Senior policy maker HR (5 years at rm)
Director general business affairs (15 years at rm)
National managing partner (28 years at rm)
National managing partner and member of the board (21 years at rm)
CEO (6 years at rm)
Managing partner and member of the board (40 years at rm)
Partner (2 year at rm)
Senior relations manager (1 year at rm)
Regional manager tax and international affairs (11 years at rm)
Regional manager accountancy (21 years at rm)
Managing partner and international representative (9 years at rm)
National managing partner and member of the board (29 years at rm)
Managing partner audit (15 years at rm)
Managing partner accountancy (16 years at rm)
Compliance ofcer and director of education (8 years at rm)
Senior Manager (3 years at rm)
Managing partner audit, member of the board (5 years at rm)
Director Audit (13.5 years at rm)
Managing partner (1 year at rm)
asked to describe (Kumar, Stern, & Anderson, 1993; Seidler,

1974). Subsequently, we compared responses of the multiple informants of a rm on these change issues. Substantial
differences between the accounts of informants of the
same rm would indicate retrospective biases or an unreliable interview protocol. In fact, we did not nd signicant
difference between the instructive examples of respondents of the same rm (Seidler, 1974).
With this approach our 34 informants provided a sufciently rich sample, for three reasons. First, informants
were high-level rm members and therefore very suitable
for our objective. Second, together the studied organizations represent 50% of the mid-tier rms in the Netherlands. Third, in the rst three rms we investigated, we
interviewed four respondents. However the added value
of the last interviews, in terms of additional insights, was
limited; we felt saturation was reached. Given the above
and the fact that respondents indicated that these interviews meant a signicant time investments on their part,
we decided to limit the number of informants to three
per rm if data saturation was reached. At this point we
must make one caveat. Within-rm consistency in our
informants answers may, in part, be the consequence of
our sampling method. While snowball sampling is a common method for obtaining informants, a possible disad-
vantage is that the principal informant will refer to likeminded additional informants. The resulting community
bias could limit the diversity of generated responses and
ultimately wrongfully anchor organizational responses.
While we cannot rule out some level of bias we feel our
ndings are valid rst, as we asked informants to describe
concrete examples of change and non-change events
which allow informants to tell their story and second we
used secondary data sources for validation of the change
events that our informants described in order to ascertain
their accuracy, and mitigate potential subject bias (Jick,
1979). Archival data on both changes in the industry and
changes within rms were consulted when available. We
used three different kinds of archival information. First,
we used annual reports (20082010) of the professional
accountancy association in order to determine key trends
as well as important legislative changes within the accountancy industry. Secondly, we perused the companies websites to uncover any press releases (from 2008 to 2011) for
descriptions of major changes the rms have gone through.
Finally, we used information drawn from industry journals
(e.g. Maandblad voor Accountancy and Bedrijfseconomie
(MAB; Monthly journal on accountancy and business economics)). Information herein was analyzed after the interviews were held and was used to supplement both the
information on forces for change in the eld, as well as
changes that were initiated by various actors in the eld.
These data were primarily used to corroborate the information drawn from the interviews however at times it
was used to supplement our data.
Data analysis
The data analysis had both a planned and emergent
character. During the analysis the authors shifted back
and forth between raw data and theory in order to make
sense of the effect of conicting logics on organizational responses (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). In doing so, we focused
on three basic questions: (1) what forces for change are
mentioned by the rm; (2) what elements of the rm did
these pressures inuence; and (3) what were the organizational responses given by the rm? The process involved
two distinct steps.
Stage 1. Case studies were written for each of the rms
in the sample based on informant quotes as well as archival data (Graebner, 2009) and varied in length between 20
and 40 pages. In these case studies, rst, the drivers of
institutional change that resulted in conicting institutional logics were coded. Following common inductive
processes, we went from broad generic classication of
the issues related to the questions above in the rst coding
round, to more specic categories in coding round two
such as drivers stemming from rules and regulation, or
automation of processes. These drivers were subsequently
analyzed for their relation to the two existing institutional
logics. However, as it is difcult to empirically identify
institutional logics we followed Jarzabkowski, Matthiesen,
and Van de Ven (2009) by searching for indicators of these
logics in our data. We looked in particular for evidence of
norms, beliefs and values associated with each of these
logics such as quality standards and professionalism for
the trustee logic and efciency and protability for the

commercial logic. For the organizational points of contention we open-coded rst for broad categories (e.g. accountant to advisor, organizational governance, etc.). These
broad categories were specied to the particular issues
pertaining to that category (i.e. for organizational governance: background management & decision making).
When coded, these organizational points of contention
could be grouped in two categories (Table 2) of strategic
themes for our mid-tier rms: (1) the changed role of the
accountant; and (2) changes to the organizations structure
and practices.
In the third round we looked for specic examples of
the categories. For example, for organizational governance,
the authors coded whether a rm engaged in directive or
consensus decision making.
The nal step in writing the individual case studies was
coding the organizational responses (Oliver, 1991) to each
of the organizational points of contention. We excluded
the avoidance strategy, as in all our cases the rms engaged with at least one of the logics legitimating their
praxis. If rms continued to comply with the demands of
the professional/trustee logic, they acquiesce to these demands. If they felt that they needed to reconcile demands
from both logics, rms are assigned the compromise strategy. If rms chose to follow the new commercial logic on a
particular issue, they are assigned the deance strategy as
they are defying the old logic. Finally, if rms went beyond
what was demanded by the commercial logic, we classify
their strategy as manipulation, as they are trying to change
the logic to their standards.
Independent of each other, two authors coded these responses and tactics in order to ensure consistency. The
interrater reliability score was .84, indicating good reliability (Cohen, 1968). When assigned responses differed, the
authors discussed and determined the appropriate coding.
Table 3 provides the coding scheme for rm A documenting the various strategic responses for specic strategic
issues.
To investigate internal representation we coded for two
clusters of representation. In professional accounting rms,
internal representation seems to be particularly salient
with professionals who have been socialized in their profession and are committed to maintain its values, mainly
based on the long established trustee logic. To capture
the impact of internal representation, we coded for two
groups: non-partnered accountants and accountants who
were partners of the rm.
Stage 2. Once all case studies were written and coded,
we conducted a cross-case analysis (Eisenhardt, 1989).
This cross-case analysis served two purposes. First, by
comparing the perspectives of the rms, we established
an overview of the institutional pressures on these rms
that could be related to the trustee logic or the commercial
logic. This overview is presented in the rst part of our
ndings section.
Secondly, we analyzed the strategic responses to institutional pressures of the rms in our sample for the main
strategic issues identied. In addition to the executed
strategy, we also looked at the reasons the informants gave
Table 2
Organizational change categories.
Role of the accountant
Organization
Accountant to advisor
Core business(consolidation-advise)
Training
(Advisory) services
Formal business development
Range of services, specialist concept
Client acquisition (reactiveproactive)
Cold acquisition
Automation of services
Portals/online service
XBRL
Organizational governance
Background management/board members
Decision making/voting (all-directive)
Performance pay system
Division prots
Evaluation functionality
Organizational structure
(Merging) number of locations
Critical mass
Separation audit and advisory
Service lines
Staff services
Internationalization
Network
Clients/services
Table 3
Organizational response strategies and tactics.
Examples of strategies for organization A
Strategy
Quote
Deance
R1: Yes, we are trying to increase the number of advisory products
Manipulate
R1: We have created a bachelor in cooperation with a university to train our people
to be able to advise clients
R2: We have hired a business manager, and with him a strategy for new product
development mainly related to automation
R2: We want to provide business through a full service concept, but also want to hold
on to the bottom of the market
R1: We are way ahead in terms of web based access. We give presentations on it, to
show that
R3: We do too little. However, it is a key point for us to increase efciency in the audit

Accountant to
Core business
advisor
Training
(Advisory) services
Deance
Automation of
services
Organization
Organizational
governance
Performance pay
system
Organizational
structure
Formal business
development
Range of services,
specialist concept
Deance
XBRL
Compromise
Background
management/board
members
Decision making/
voting
Division prots
Acquiesce
R1: A non-professional needs to be very good to be accepted by a professional, I

doubt we would accept a non-professional at a similar level
Compromise
R1: I would be in favor of more directive decision making, but you need to know
when you are directive or when you need to convince
R2: Another sore spot is the reward system. Everyone gets the same based on a point
system, but we do not have a differentiated performance pay system
R2: Our performance system has criteria such as how good are you with your clients,
what is your protability and how satised are your people
R3: It has been debated whether to merge locations, however a lot of people were
against it
R2: You need a large club to get scale advantages from you IT investments, as well as
being able to specialize
R3: Our rm still has a mixed practice, so we did not separate audit and advice
Evaluation
functionality
(Merging) number of
locations
Critical mass
Separation audit and
advisory
Service lines
Staff services
Clients/services
Manipulate
Acquiesce
Deance
Acquiesce
Deance
Acquiesce
Compromise
Deance
Deance
R1: It is a matrix structure organized geographically and through service lines

R1: We have staff services with their own directors, who all report to one partner
R1: Being in an international network allows you to service your clients in a uniform
manner
for their particular strategy. The outcomes of this analysis

are presented in the second part of our ndings.
Findings
Multiple logics, conicting demands
For the mid-tier accounting rms, we see that there is a
clash of logics and that the drivers of this clash place divergent demands on the organizations. In the next section we
describe how conicting demands produce heterogeneous

responses. Table 4 shows how both logics relate to the
main drivers of change (strategic challenges).
Trustee logic. The original trustee logic (Thornton et al.,
2005) places emphasis on professional values and technical expertise of the accountants. Following this logic, all
organizational systems should be geared to accommodate
these demands. Firms deliver a narrow range of professional auditing-related services, around which the rm is
organized. Consensus decision making is the norm and
decision making is done at the local ofces. Prots are

shared and accountants and partners are not directly held
accountable for their nancial performance (Greenwood &
Suddaby, 2006). The issue of accountability is directed
mostly towards professional norms and values and the
quality of the auditing practice.
Several of the pressures faced by the set of mid-tier
rms support these values. The more stringent rules
and legislation put forward by the professional
associations as well as the government reinforce the
importance of the technical qualities and duciary
responsibilities of the accountants. If these quality standards are not met, permits to conduct audits of annual
accounts will not be provided. Two such permits exist,
of which the OOB-permit for organizations of public
importance (i.e. banks, public rms, as well as stocklisted rms) sets the most stringent demands. The normal permit allows accounting rms to audit organizations that exceed the threshold for mandatory
deposition of annual accounts. These pressures forced
rms to invest in quality systems. Coupled to the assurance of quality through legislation is the automation of
the processing of invoices as well as through the
introduction of XBRL systems, which provide realtime information on the companys nances. XBRL output is increasingly requested by banks when deciding
to provide loans. Clients also stimulate the trustee logic
as they increasingly demand that their accountants are
available and knowledgeable on their particular situation,
as well as locally present. This requires generalist
knowledge on the part of the accountant, local
decision making capabilities and a large number of local
ofces.
Commercial logic. Although from a trustee logic perspective the drivers of change demand a focus on, and an
investment in the attainment of high quality standards,
they at the same time force rms to be more commercially
oriented. The investments in quality systems as well as in
automation systems and XBRL demand a certain scale
within the organization in order to make investments
lucrative. This however puts a strain on existing practices
such as collegial decision making and local presence.
Additionally, when the core product of the accountant,
the consolidation of annual accounts, becomes automated,
the corresponding prot margins drop signicantly. As a
result, the accounting rms seek other sources of revenue.
We observe that most rms start developing specialized
advisory services. This shift to more advice type of services
is also demanded by the clients. Clients want to be advised
on ways to improve their bottom line. This again stimulates the formation of advisory services. Additionally,
international rms demand their mid-tier accounting rm
to venture internationally, which brings about new sets of
control and performance management processes to improve coordination, at the expense of collegial controls present under the trustee logic. Finally, the
economic crisis has also impacted the mid-tier accounting
rms directly, forcing them to proactively approach clients
and provide a broader range of services with higher prot
margins.
Organizational responses to conicting demands

The two logics thus present contradicting demands on
how rms should organize themselves in terms of strategy,
structure, systems and processes. Our data show that the
balance between these views differs between organizations and between strategic issues. This leads to different
organizational responses on specic strategic issues. These
ndings will be discussed next. We sequentially analyze
organizational responses to the strategic issues around
the two main themes: the changing role of the accountant
and the implications for organizational structure. Our ndings show that organizations are not consistent in their
choice of strategic responses. Rather for each strategic
choice, the rms make a separate evaluation of what logic
to follow.
At times, organizations are not able to conduct the
strategy they want because of internal resistance. Considering the two clusters of internal representation we therefore also analyzed how our respondents position partners
and non-partners towards the different strategic issues,
thus identifying the locus of resistance towards institutional change.
The changing role of the accountant
Changes in government legislation have, besides forcing
the mid-tier accounting rms to focus on quality, also
introduced elements of free-market competition the industry. Additionally, diminishing revenues from their core
business (consolidation and auditing of annual statements)
due to technological improvements and changing client
demands, force the mid-tier rms to change. Clients now
expect their accountants to advise them on how to improve their business. Related to this changing role, our data
show that the rms need to decide: (1) to which degree
and how do they want to make the transition possible;
(2) what services they want to deliver; (3) how much effort
they place in client acquisition; and (4) how heavily they
invest in automation of their services. Table 5 provides
an overview of rm responses with regard to the changing
role of the accountant. In general there are in three groups
of rms that can be clustered together based on their inclination to adopt practices from the new logic.
Almost all rms recognize that, as their core business is
changing, the role they play as an accountant also has to
change. They try to do this in two ways. First, almost all
rms except for rms D and K express the need to automate the process of creating annual accounts. Although
they continue to see this part of their work as important,
it is no longer the main source of income. Hence it needs
to be as efcient as possible. As one respondent illustrated
his rms deance strategy:
We have digitalized the consolidation department. It is
really an assembly-line idea. The creation of annual
accounts needs to be efcient. This together with advisory
services is essential. Both need to be perfect, it is not that
one is less than the other, but you just need to automate
those things that can be made more efcient H1.
10
Table 4
Drivers of strategic change and their effects according to the trustee and commercial logics.
Example quotes
Effect according to
trustee logic
Drivers
Effect according to commercial

logic
Example quotes
E1: Regulation for accountancy

rms has changed to such as
extent that we have made our
audit branch a separate
entity. Responsibilities and
duties are such that they are
in line with AFM demands.
We have increased our quality
we now have tighter
procedures
More stringent
certication demands
place emphasis on
quality controls and
professional values
Rules and
regulation
The increased quality demands

requires rms to invest in quality
systems and controls, this
requires sufcient size (critical
mass) to make this worthwhile
E1: The investment in quality

due to increased regulation has
cost us tons of money and had a
tremendous impact on the
organization
K2: Introducing a quality system

costs money and as a result you
need to expand
F3: When you look at the
regulatory changes, this has
had a tremendous impact on
the internal organization of
the rm
D1: This forces us to send
nancial messages via the
internet at an agreed
standard. A few years ago, the
government forced us to sign
a covenant to deliver nancial
statements in XBRL format
A1: We have an international

network that others do not
have, but we also have a
personal approach that ts
our customer segments. They
demand this of us
H1: Our clients want their
accountant close by, so that if
something goes wrong you
can quickly react. Because we
know the local network we
can help in all sorts of ways
Automation and standard

reporting language
systems place emphasis
on quality controls and
professional consistency
Automation
and XBRL
Automation and standard

reporting language systems
reduce prots from core product,
the annual statement, forcing
accounting to engage in different
services
Clients demand local

presence and generalist
approach of their
accountant
Client
demands
Clients not only demand an

annual statement, but also
advice on how to improve their
performance. Additionally
international clients demand
international services
Economic/
market
conditions
The dire economic situation in

general and the difcult market
conditions in the accounting
sector in particular have pushed
rms to place emphasis on new
business generation and
development, efciency and
change in services
B2: Another big change has of

course been technology. The
invoice processing, which we
used to do in the past is
disappearing because of
computers. This means we need
to change our business model
from making gures to
explaining them. When you go
from producing to explaining
gures; that demands a different
skill set
E1: XBRL should reduce the
administrative burden by being
able to quickly connect with the
banks, tax authority and
chamber of commerce. This
should really improve efciency
and is a very exciting
development
C1: Clients have less interest in
looking back, they have got that
covered with their bookkeeping
software, what they seek is a
partner in business that will help
them look forward
F2: Clients are no longer

interested in the annual
statement; they are interested in
what they can do with those
gures
C2: Well what you see is that the
crisis actually ensures change
takes place automatically; you
end up with lower prots so you
need to do something.
J1: I think the accountancy

market will continue to
consolidate. It is very scary as it
looks like there is overcapacity
on the supply side
11
Table 5
Firm specic responses relating to the role of the accountant.a
Acquiescence
Compromise
Deance
Manipulation
K
J, K
B, C, D, E, G, I
C, D, E, G, H
A, H, J
F
A, B, I

Range of services, specialist concept
Cold acquisition
A, B, D, H, J
A, C, F, J
D, G, I
B, C, H, J
E, K
B, D, E, G, H, I, K
F, K
XBRL
E, I
A, C, E, I
B, C, H, J
B, F, J
A, F
D, K
Core business
Training
(Advisory) services
Firms have not commented on all strategic choices. If that was the case they were not assigned a strategy.
The primary reason why rms differ with regards to the

extent in which they embrace the new role of the account
lies in the value they attach to the old role. During the
interviews, it became clear that strategies in relation to
the changing role of the accountant were often adapted
in the face of internal resistance by non-partner accountants and in some cases by partners. This is illustrated in
Table 6.
Firms B, C, E, G, H and I are somewhat between logics, as
they perceive the need to change their service portfolio but
develop it in an ad hoc manner with their core service, the
consolidated account, as basis for these advice services.
They also have not yet developed specialized services to
any great extent, although some specialized services for
specic industries are present. Respondents from these
rms emphasize the need to limit their diversication to
competencies within the accountancy profession:
[The advisory services] are clearly nancial and accountancy related. Risk management, insurance, independence,
integrity, those are the most important elements, so we
clearly do not see ourselves as a consultancy rm D4.
At one point you lose your way. You end up offering a type
of service of which you think what has that got to do with
accountancy? Thats what you see happening with the big
4. . .I think it is important that you can still see a clear link
with the original professions. Management consulting is
something completely different. I think its dangerous G3
You have to offer things you are good at. We are good
with numbers, so offer services involving numbers. The
question is do we really know anything about strategy?
Is that part of the job of an accountant? What are the borderlines? I think every rm can make its own decision, but
we try to reect if we are not moving to far away from our
core qualities H3.
However, most also indicate that their accountants in
general resent change and if it where up to them, in ten years
time they would still do the same thing (H3), and that
change leads to fear and fear leads to resistance (E1). They

describe them as used to looking to the past not the future
(C3), preferring not to have too much contact with difcult
clients (K2) and in general question what this change
means for them. Therefore, these rms offer their accountants training options to provide them with the necessary
skills and prepare them for change. However, a number
of respondents indicate the transition is a lengthy process.
Firms A, F, and J have fully embraced the new role.
They invest heavily in developing new products; offer a
wider range of services, complemented with industry specic or product specic specialized services. To achieve
this, they sidestep the accountants who stick to their old
role:
However, we do this with a lot of non-accountants. We
are more and more attracting people from a different background, with other competencies. I dont believe you can
retrain accountants J1.
In rm J, accountants that did receive training opportunities openly rebelled to the point where the board was
asked to intervene. Another example is rm F; the rst to
have relation managers. As the average accountant does
not have the communication or commercial skills necessary
(F3), they often attract non-accountants, who brainstorm
free of charge with clients to discover their needs. Subsequently the back ofce caters to these demands and delivers the services, ranging from accounting, organizational or
law related advice.
The nal set of rms rms D and K still comply predominantly with the trustee logic. Although rm D perceives the need to develop new products and invests in
them, it is not investing signicantly in automation in order make the creation of annual accounts as efcient as
possible. Some informants indicate this is mostly due to
inertia rather than professional determination:
With these things [innovations in XBRL and services]
things need to hurt rst before we start acting. . ..during
Table 6
Locus of resistance to the changing role of the accountant.
(Advisory) services
Client acquisition
Core business
Training
Cold Acquisition
XBRL
Accountants
Partners
A, C, D, E, F, H, I, J, K
E, G, I, J
D, K
D, G, H, I, K
B
K
K
G, H, I, K
B, D, K
12
partner meetings weve talked about it but nothing happens. Entire groups are just not entrepreneurial enough;
partners are not entrepreneurial enough to see that now
is the time to be creative. First things really have to start
hurting before anything will actually change D3.
People dont want to look too far ahead as long as money
keeps rolling in. K1
Another new technique introduced because of increased market competition is cold calling. This practice
was frowned upon and deemed unprofessional until relatively recently. Although a number of rms (D, G and I)
make use of it, most rms resist or sparingly use this practice, both at the level of the non-partnered accountant and
the partner. Almost all rms remark that their relationship
with clients is based on trust: its a trusting relationship,
youre not selling pens or coffee machines, we are selling
added value in a trusting relationship (H2). They describe
their role as shifted from a controller to an advisor (A1,
H1), a sparring partner (B1) or even to a general practitioner (F2). Hence most agree that they need to compete
on quality through specializations and not on price and
that accountants are hesitant to use it [cold calling] as they
feel they need this trust relationship (K1).
In all, the shifting role of the accountant is not wholeheartedly embraced by partners and non-partners alike.
Partners perceive the need to complement their existing
practices with advisory services, as long as it relates to
their original profession. Non-partnered accountants however are fearful and resistant to this change as it forces
them to draw on a completely different set of abilities as
compared to their original work. This results in differing
organizational responses ranging from limited addition of
advisory services to addition of related services by training
accountants or by decoupling the back ofce from the
frontline or hiring non-accountants. With regard to the
possibility of advertising and a more pro-active market approach, rms obtain new leads in various ways. Nevertheless, cold calling is still considered undesirable for the most
part as it violates the trust relationship with clients
respondents perceive to be essential for selling their advisory services.
The changing organizational practices
The drivers for change do not only inuence the role of
the accountant, they also inuence organizational practices. Main drivers here are: imposed rules and regulation
that demand high control of quality; developments in
technology that require more formal organization, a coherent organizational system, and critical mass; the globalization of clients has led rms to join international
networks, which in turn demand certain changes in structural arrangements; and, demands of clients for more specialized advisory services that again have implications for
critical mass. Our data show that organizations have to
decide how they respond in four important ways: (1) rms
make choices about their governance system (maintain
their traditional form of organizational governance
through collegial decision making, place the management
of the rm in the hands of a non-professional, or engage
in directive decision making); (2) rms need to decide on

their management control systems, moving from traditional professional and collegial controls to performancepay systems that can stimulate new client acquisition
and successful delivery of new advisory services; (3) rms
reevaluate their organizational structure following more
stringent quality demands; and (4) rms need to decide
how to respond to the increasing client demand for international services. Table 7 provides an overview of rm responses with regard to organizational structures and
practices.
All rms agree that given their shift to more specialized
services and automation they need critical mass, either by
consolidating locations or by increasing the size of their
ofces:
That [critical mass] is just necessary for the continuity of
your services, but also for your people. You enter as junior
and when you are alone, what opportunities for personal
development do you have? H2
If you want to compete, you just need volume in order to
offer specialized services and to be able to make future ICT
investments. You need it to ensure the quality to be able to
make the move from a lot of administrative work to more
advisory services and to act as coach of an entrepreneur
F3.
Similarly, most rms have separated their audit branch
from their other services although this is not required by
law for this group. Again this change is made to ensure
quality:
Mostly in order to ensure quality, in order to be able to do
sufcient audits and to ensure control. I am convinced that
if you conduct too few audits, you start making mistakes
F3.
Although consolidation of a number of ofces has taken
place in some rms, they also all agree that they require a
local presence to best service their clients:
Well actually if you look at the situation from a cost
reduction perspective, it is of course important to have
fewer ofces. But when you look from a commercial perspective and the way we are positioned in the market
for small and medium-sized rms you have to show your
face in the market. Also, I believe that the ofces cant be
that big that people are scared of the sheer size of an ofce.
You need to meet their way of doing business B1.
We start to observe differences in rm responses when
it comes to topics that affect the vested interests of the
partners: the decision making process, performance-pay
schemes and the presence of non-professionals as managers. We can discern two clusters of rms. The rst cluster
of rms (A, B, C, D, E, G, H, I and K) makes little changes
with regard to their organizational practices and continues
to adhere to the demands of the trustee logic. Most rms
still have partners who manage the rm through collegial
decision making processes. These processes however, are
slightly more directive to reduce differences in implementation of strategic decisions.
13
Table 7
Firm specic responses relating to organizational structures and practices.a
Organization
Acquiescence
Compromise
Organizational
governance
Background management/board
members
Decision making/voting
A, B, D, F, G, I
C, H, K
C, H, K
A, B, D, E, G, I
Division prots
Evaluation functionality
A, E, G, H, I, J, K
K
C
C, F, H, I, J
B, D, F
A, D, E
(Merging) Number of locations

Critical mass
Separation audit and advisory
Service lines
Staff services
A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, K
C, D, F, G, H, I, K
C
A, H
C
A, B, E
B, D, E, F, H, I
B, D, G, I
A, B, D, F, G, H, I, J
A, K
Network
Clients/services
E, J, K
E, J
C, F, H, I
B, F
G
A, G
D
D
a
Deance
Manipulation
E, J
F
Firms have not commented on all strategic choices. If that was the case they were not assigned a strategy.
Its a little back and forth. Sometimes people are fed up

with the constant discussion and want the board to be
more directive. On the other hand if you are too directive
you get criticism, we are all partners with a vote, and they
all want to use it. So you need balanceA1.
Within and between these clusters there again is great
divergence in the practices these rms adopt and resist.
For some rms in the rst cluster, informants point to
the diverse constellation of practices and partners (D4) or
their own little islands (I3) as the reason for their resistance. They want to ensure that their own people come
rst. . . and just as long as things get arranged for their ofce
(A4). Other informants point to the differences with the big
4 rm that they left, as the desired freedom that they did
not had there, but do have in their mid-sized rms.
At least we have the illusion, and I think that it is true in
practice, that we have the freedom to create and develop
our own ideas, celebrate our successes but also bear the
consequents of our ways of working. Just the freedom of
entrepreneurship that you lack in any big ofce G1.
Therefore most rms indicate they decide on the strategic plans centrally but locally they have the freedom to put
it into practices as you think best (E1).
This is clearly related to the clear absence of non-professional managers and the reason is unambiguous:
I think that if you are in a managing position and you
dont know what is happening with the clients, that is just
not good. You need to have day-to-day experience B1.
Another practice these rms resist is performance-pay
schemes, because there is not much applause for it (E1).
As local presence is necessary, as long as there is agreement on the roles in the rm and on how partners contribute and as long as ofces do not seriously underperform,
partners do not perceive the need to change the equal profit sharing system. In fact:
But in the really big ofces, you can see it gets greedy,
with those differentiated prot shares focussed on individual performance. It may be that it is necessary in large
rms in order to keep it manageable. But undoubtedly it
will lead to political games that are not in the interest of
the entire organization G3.
One informant goes even further by stating that the reason they have not implemented such a system is that: We
dont have prot maximization as a main goal. We just
want to earn enough to continue the business and be able
to offer a certain level of quality in our services (C1).
Finally some rms decide to cater to the international
wishes of their clients, most by joining an international
network as they do not want to open up ofces abroad.
This however is clearly related to client demand.
The second cluster of rms consists of only two rms
rms F and J that have adapted most of their structures to
the new commercial logic. Firm J has a non-professional
managing partner, whereas Firm E has ofce managers in
charge of its local ofces. Firms F and J have abandoned
collegial decision making in favor of more directive forms.
As rm J indicates:
We do not discuss strategy monthly because we just dont
allow it. We did that before but in order to create a steady
course we stopped. Otherwise you keep changing direction J1.
Firm F also works with differential performance-pay
systems for partners and employees (Yes, we have performance-pay systems down to the secretary including a share in
the prot, F2) and has high levels of directive decision
making. At the same time, however, Firm J has decided to
create more and smaller ofces throughout its region, signicantly smaller than the average ofce of the other midtier rms but more importantly which would not be
staffed with accountants.
Imagine a nice place where you can meet with clients,
where you can discuss strategy, where there are big whiteboards. Well you dont need accountants there; we have
put them together in one ofce. J1.
However, rm J is an exception. Overall there is relatively little change in the practices and structures of most
organizations. Where resistance to changes in the role of
the accountant was located more at the level of non-partnered accountants, the resistance against changes in organizational structure and practices is solely attributed to the
partners. Especially with regard to the governance of the
rm, almost all informants indicated that a non-professional as managing partner would not be accepted as they
14
Table 8
Locus of resistance to the organizational structure and practices.
Organization
Accountants
Partners
Organizational governance
Background management/board members

Decision making/voting
A, B, D, F, G, I
A, C, G, I
Division prots
E, G, H
(Merging) Number of locations

Service lines
D
A
Network
D, G
believe a rm grasp of the profession is necessary to run

the rm. Similarly most partners still want a say in the
strategic direction of the rms, hence these rms still employ, for the majority, collective decision making processes. The sources of resistance are shown in Table 8.
Clearly our mid-tier rms have little interest in changing
the basic structure and identity of their accounting rms,
cherishing their professional norm of autonomy.
Discussion
In this study we set out to investigate organizational responses by mid-tier accountancy rms in the face of conicting institutional logics. While most studies describe
how institutional changes trigger institutional action by
either elite (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006) or maverick actors (Leblebici et al., 1991), we focused on mainstream actors in an organizational eld. Based on our analysis of
interviews with 34 top management level informants of
11 mid-tier accounting rms and an investigation of secondary material, we make three main contributions. We
enhance understanding of how the characteristics of
accounting as a profession affect organizational resistance
and change in mid-tier rms. Second, we shed light on the
concrete organizational responses in mid-tier accounting
rms to institutional change. Third, we question the generalizability of PSF research.
Sociology of professions and organizational resistance
Our rst contribution is to the literature on the sociology of professions and our understanding of the drivers
of change in the accounting industry. Academics have been
critical about the motivations of professionals for maintaining their status. They have challenged the extent to
which claims to social closure and economic monopoly
are legitimated by the professions societal function and
responsibility (Reed, 1996; Tinker, 1985). Instead they
see these activities merely as means to constitute and control the market by creating scarcity for their resources (Freidson, 1984; Larsson, 1977). As the accounting industry
developed, the shift in emphasis from trustee logic to commercial logic (Dezalay, 1995; Hanlon, 1996) and its consequences have been referred to as evidence of this position.
While big 4 rms argued for the necessity of an evolution
towards a more client-oriented and more consciously
managed rm in order to provide high-quality accounting
services (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005), indicative of the
difculty of this move away from the trustee logic are
the ENRON scandal (Covaleski, Dirsmith, & Rittenberg,

2003) and the recent nes imposed on the big 4 rms for
audit failure (Financial Times, 2012a, 2012b). According
to Wyatt, greed has inuenced professional accountants
such that the core values of the professional rm were
undermined by primarily commercial interests (Wyatt,
2003, p. 6) and Greenwood (2007) argues that the balance
between prots and professionalism has shifted to the detriment of professional behavior. Academics note that the
shift has led to an emphasis on prot-maximization (Elliot,
1999 in Samuel, Covaleski, and Dirsmith (2009)). This shift
inherently also meant the adoption of new sets of organizational structures and practices associated with this commercial logic (Cooper et al., 1996; Greenwood & Suddaby,
2006; Hanlon, 1996, 1997).
In our sample, we observe that the choices that the midtier rms make in terms of their structures and processes
draw on both economic and professional rationales. However the professional logic seems to remain dominant. While
the leadership of these rms understands that they have to
offer more advisory related services because their core product will no longer be protable in the near future, the types
of services they offer are closely related to their original profession. They argue that to offer anything not connected to
the profession would endanger professional standards. In
professional services rms, the individual professionals
job description and identity are directly informed by the
standards of the profession that to a large extent also make
up the organizations institutional environment (Greenwood et al., 2002; Scott, 2008; Suddaby & Greenwood,
2005). Furthermore it is part of the professionals identity
and responsibility to actively maintain the professional
institution, thereby resisting the commercial market logic
(Freidson, 2001). Similarly, while the big 4 attract different
sorts of experts to provide their advisory services, 9 out of
our 11 rms dismiss this idea. Of course, commercial and
economic arguments do play a role. Most rms decide to
automate their consolidation services as well as remain
close to the clients as these clients demand their local presence. However, they argue from a professional perspective
that the separation of audit and advisory is necessary to ensure continued quality of both. Also most rms do not engage in cold calling as yet again this goes against their
professional identity and is not helpful given the long-term
trust relation they seek with their clients. In all, while of
course the aim of these rms is also to make a prot, which
in itself does not contradict the professional ethics and service to society ideals (Freidson, 2001), their explanations for
reported changes are very much geared towards maintaining professional standards and the quality of services. These
ndings mirror what Hanlon (1997) found in the law industry where professionals in smaller rms continue to draw on
much of the social service ethos and rhetoric and are hostile
to managerialism. In sum, we argue that the sun is not setting on professionalism in mid-tier accounting rms. Their
embeddedness in the original professional logic with an
emphasis on service ethic is still strong and is supported
by the type of relationship requested by their local clients.
A second insight we draw from our rms is that
although in some cases top management does see the merit
of a proposed change, often it is unable to align its internal
constituency. While partners underscore the need to offer
advisory services in order to ensure protability, non-partnered accountants resist this practice as they are risk averse
and afraid of the implications of this shift. Hence a slow
process of training and formal business development is
put in place to provide them with skills and knowledge necessary to make the change. We also nd evidence of resistance at the level of the partners. Covaleski et al. (1998)
as well as Dirsmith et al. (1997) nd in their studies on
the introduction of management by objectives that administrative partners wish to control and shape behavior of
practice partners and non-partnered accountants but that
this is resisted by practice partners as it limits their autonomy. We see a similar resistance to structures and processes that limit partner autonomy. In the rms in our
sample most managing partners and practice partners
alike, are still actively involved in the delivery of services
and as such resist the same practices and structures. For instance they resist the merging of locations, very directive
forms of decision making, individualized performance-pay
systems and the presence of non-professional managers.
For future research it could be of interest to explore what
the shift from the trustee to the commercial logic, and the
concomitant development of organizational structures and
processes, means for the non-partnered, non-managing
accountants. While our informants report them to be in general risk averse, the reason for their resistance is still unclear.
Their importance as a source of resistance however is clear
as rms do have to adapt their organizational responses to
move them into the zone of acceptability (Ansari, Fiss, & Zajac, 2010; Lewis & Seibold, 1993; Radnor, Feller, & Rogers,
1978) for this group of professionals.
Organizational responses, archetype change and institutional
logics
Our second contribution is to the literatures on organizational responses, archetype change and, particularly, institutional logics. Studies of organizational responses to
institutional pressures (Oliver, 1991) are numerous but often focus on the adoption or non-adoption of specic practices (e.g. Ang & Cummings, 1997; Fiss & Zajac, 2004,
2006; Goodrick & Salancik, 1996; Greening & Gray, 1994;
Lounsbury, 2001, 2007; Milliken et al., 1998; Rao & Sivakumar, 1999; Thornton, 2002; Westphal et al., 1997). Also,
studies investigating the eld level end-states in institutionally complex elds show a number of different outcomes
like a shift from the old dominant logic to the newly introduced logic (e.g. Thornton, 2002; Zilber, 2002); the introduction of elements of a new logic into a dominant one (e.g.
15
Glynn, 2000) or the hybridization of elements of both the

old and new logic (e.g. Colyvas & Powell, 2006; DAunno
et al., 1991; Purdy & Gray, 2009). However, little is known
regarding the micro-level processes of how organizations
and actors respond to competing institutional pressures, in
which the process of eld level change has yet to be played
out. In this paper, we look at how accounting rms strategically respond and develop their portfolio of practices. Doing
this, we heed the call for more research connecting eld logics, organizational practices and industry institutional
change (Lounsbury, 2008; Thornton et al., 2012) and provide
further insight into early stage blending experimentation by
organizations: a situation where organizations experiment
with the development of novel practices following changes
in the inter-institutional system that shift the relative
importance of multiple eld-level logics.
Besides clearly documenting how the existing institutional logics place conicting demands on our sample
rms, we nd that in their responses to pressures from
the trustee and commercial logics, our mid-tier rms do
not choose one consistent strategy vis--vis the institutional pressures. Mid-tier accounting rms respond selectively and independently to strategic and structural
issues invoked by the new commercial logic. Most rms remain adherents to the trustee logic in which they are still
heavily embedded (Granovetter, 1985; Greenwood & Hinings, 1996; Maguire, 2007; Oliver, 1997). Due to the previously mentioned sources of organizational resistance and
the perceived suitability of elements of both logics for
resolving concrete managerial challenges, strategic responses to the challenges of the new commercial logic differ substantially between rms. Thus we see a fragmented
implementation of elements of the new logic, not based on
the internal coherence of the logics at hand. This is in line
with a toolkit perspective of logics where logics guide individuals focus of attention, but where the activation of aspects of specic institutional logics is contingent on their
applicability and relevance in a specic situation (Thornton et al., 2012, p. 84). Our ndings thus indicate that relevant situational cues come from both the issue at hand
and the organizational role of the actors involved. Our actors seem to draw on logics as sort of cultural toolkits (Swidler, 1986), highlighting their partial autonomy from social
structure, allowing them to pick and choose their responses. However, while dependent on situational cues,
our ndings indicate that we cannot place the mechanism
of action completely outside the person. A criticism on the
original cultural toolkit-perspective is that it is without a
clear mechanism of motivation. This criticism is motivated
by the nding of earlier research that much cultural information is inherently contradictory and cognitively stored
without truth value, it therefore cannot be a theory of
motivation (e.g. DiMaggio, 1997). According to Boltanski
and Thvenot (1991) the role of values in a toolkit perspective is for justication, rather than moral motivation. We
would argue that our mid-tier accountants do not just
selectively use applicable institutional logics for analysis
and decision justication. While they draw on both economic and professional rationales, their argumentation reects both elements of rational justication and moral
motivation drawn from the relevant fundamental institu-
16
tional logics in the inter-institutional system the professional and market logics (Thornton et al., 2012). This moral
motivation is especially pronounced with regard to
changes that impact the values associated with their original professional identity that have been imprinted through
socialization.
Our ndings thus highlight the relevance of further research into how situational and positional circumstances
affect individuals focus of attention and their evaluation
of applicability and relevance of institutional logics in decision-making processes. Furthermore, further investigation
of how actors choose and use elements of logics for justication and/or moral motivation of choices in processes of
institutional change seems warranted to better understand
the dynamics of practice developments in elds governed
by multiple conicting institutional logics.
Our nding that these mid-tier accounting organizations draw on institutional logics as a toolkit contradicts
expectations of integral change towards organizational
archetypes based on the new (commercial) institutional logic. Institutional logics involve values and beliefs by which
individuals produce and reproduce their material subsistence (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999). As such they directly
inuence organizational structures and processes (Greenwood et al., 2009). This is closely related to the concept
of interpretive schemes which underlie organizational
archetypes. Archetypes are interconnected structures and
systems that together support the particular values and
norms at the heart of the substantiated interpretive
scheme (Greenwood & Hinings, 1993). This would thus
mean that logics and archetypes should form logical and
interrelated practices which should be shown in a similar
conguration. Examples are studies of the development
of Multidisciplinary Practice in accounting rms (Greenwood et al., 2002) or the Managed Professional Business
in law rms (Cooper et al., 1996) as archetypes that reect
the emphasis on the commercial logic.
Such coherence however is not observed in our group of
mid-tier rms. The toolkit approach our mid-tier rms employ to deal with each of the specic issues they face, results in hybrid structures on the organizational level
(Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta, & Lounsbury,
2011). These organizational strategies in the face of institutional complexity resonate with the process of sedimentation in the development between archetypes (Cooper et al.,
1996). However, while sedimentation is a process of between-archetype changes by coupling mutually constitutive interpretive schemes on top of each other, we are
unsure if this is the case for our mid-tier rms. The rms
continue to draw heavily on the professional interpretive
scheme and move only in small incremental ways towards
a more commercial scheme. However, as we are still in the
early stages in the transformation of the mid-tier segment
of the accounting eld, it is too soon to judge if this is the
start of a process of between archetype change or a within
archetype change. This may well be a case of what Morris
and Pinnington (1999) imply as a more recursive and
reexive model where old and new values and systems
interact and reinterpret each other (Brock et al., 2007, p.
244). An interesting area for future research here is the
inuence of a hybrid organizational structure on organiza-
tional objectives such as performance and professionalism.

As archetype theory is premised on congurational theory
in which organizational structures and practices act in a
complementary way (Greenwood & Hinings, 1993), in this
perspective using a toolkit approach leads to blending of
logics and subsequent loss of coherence between organizational systems and processes. Additionally, given that
many of the mid-tier rms experience internal resistance
to these espoused changes, it begs the question if these hybrid rms will be equally successful in achieving their
objectives.
On the institutional eld level, there is evidently not a
wholesale move to the commercial logic in the accounting
eld. Where the commercial logic and its related archetype
is present in the big 4 rms, among mid-tiers we are in a
period where several competing organizational designs exist. As such, the process of diffusion looks more like a process of institutional bricolage (Aldrich, 2010) and we
cannot detect any logical interrelatedness of practices.
Considering the institutional development of the eld of
accounting it thus seems warranted to further follow up
and investigate the ways in which the theorization of the
competing logics (Greenwood et al., 2002) and the incremental adaptation of organizational practices result in
competing and evolving organizational designs.
Generalizability of PSF research
A third contribution we make is to the literature on PSFs
by addressing the issue of generalizability (Von Nordenycht, 2010). Much of the ndings relating to the shift
from the trustee to the commercial logic are premised on
evidence from case study research (Malhotra, Morris, &
Hinings, 2006). There are however, certain contingencies
that raise questions regarding the generalizability of the
extent of this shift across different strata of professional
elds (Cooper et al., 1996; Pinnington & Morris, 2003) as
well as between professions (Malhotra & Morris, 2009).
Our ndings offer insights in both types of generalizability
issues and heed the call for research that goes beyond the
larger rms (Malhotra, Morris, & Hinings, 2006, p. 198).
In terms of inter-professional comparisons, Malhotra
and Morris (2009) suggest a number of contingencies that
can explain differences in support for the trustee or commercial logic. First, PSFs that draw on normative knowledge (e.g. law rms) are likely to have a professional
organizational form, whereas those PSFs that draw on syncretic knowledge (e.g. accounting rms) are likely to have a
professional-bureaucratic hybrid organization. Also, strong
social closure should lead to limited specialization and
resistance of diversication. Additionally, a high degree
of face-to-face interaction with clients should lead to a
large number and more dispersed ofces. Overall, the accumulated studies suggest that accounting rms, because of
these characteristics have moved more to the MPB form
(cf. Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006) whereas law rms more
closely resemble a sedimented form remaining closer to
the professional form (Ackroyd & Muzio, 2007; Pinnington
& Morris, 2003). Our ndings however paint a slightly different picture. Our mid-sized accounting rms follow the
same path as medium-sized law rms in which profession-
alism remains dominant. For instance, mirroring Cooper

et al. (1996) we also nd that democracy is important
and compensation schemes remain tolerant in terms of
performance. Additionally, we nd that they maintain a
large number and often dispersed local ofces due to client
demands and engage in limited specialization and resist
diversication even though social closure has been lessened of late. Our ndings thus suggest that the extent of
social closure, the degree of face-to-face interaction or
the type of knowledge employed may account for some
of the differences in organizational forms between professions; but that the extent of embeddedness of small and
medium-sized rms in their local institutional context is
also of signicant inuence (Greenwood et al., 2002; Ramirez, 2009) and leads to similar developments for midtier rms in the elds of accounting and law.
Within professions there are segments that have different and even conicting value positions (Strauss, 1975)
due to these differences in embeddedness. Evaluating variation in organizational forms among professional service
organizations Malhotra et al. (2006) indicate the need for
further investigation of these within-profession differences. Where Hanlon (1997) already found divergent responses to the commercial logic in the law industry with
professionals in smaller rms continuing to draw on much
of the social service ethos and rhetoric, we nd that the
changes in the big-4 accounting rms identied by Greenwood and Suddaby (2006) cannot straightforwardly be
extrapolated to the mid-tier rms in the accounting industry. As these rms remain more embedded in their local
institutional context, they are more dependent on the national associations as sites of professionalization than large
professional rms that develop and provide much of their
training in-house (Cooper & Robson, 2006; Ramirez, 2009).
Also they service a different type of clientele (Ramirez,
2009) and their professionals have greater inuence on
the day-to-day dealings within their rms. In contrast
the big 4 in Greenwood and Suddabys (2006) research
are operating in an international arena, dealing with multinational clients in a supra-national arena. Our mid-tier
rms are well-established in their national professional
arena and our ndings indicate that professional norms
are stronger with this group. This echoes the nding of
Greenwood et al. (2002) who noted that the regional and
local rms in their study had only modest sympathy for
the new organizational form of the big 4 rms. We clearly
see the group of mid-tier rms responding to the conicting institutional logics that have been recognized in previous research on the big 4 accounting rms. However, while
these large rms had a relatively comprehensive/consistent agenda pushing the commercial logic, our study suggests that organizational responses to conicting or
changing logics may be subject to different dynamics
across different sets of actors within an organizational
eld. Greenwood and Suddaby (2006, p. 44) documented
organizational change within the big 4, and asked: how
inuential are professional norms when required to stretch
across very different organizational members, ranging
from elite, central rms, to modestly sized, local rms?
We would argue that they are quite strong for both partnered and non-partnered professionals in mid-tier
17
accounting rms. In order to address the issue of generalizability both across and within professions we call for future micro-level research in order to determine how and to
what extent embeddedness in local institutional environments explains the continued adherence of mid-sized
and small rms to the trustee logic and as a consequence
its related organizational form.
Acknowledgements
Michel W. Lander would like to thank the AXA Research
Fund for its nancial support and Bas A.S. Koene would like
to thank the Erasmus Trust Fund and the Stockholm Centre
for Organizational Research for their support.
References
Abbott, A. (1988). The system of professions: An essay on the division of
expert labor. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Ackroyd, S., & Muzio, D. (2007). The reconstructed professional rm:
Explaining change in English legal practices. Organization Studies, 28,
729747.
Ahroni, Y. (1999). Internationalization of professional services:
Implications for accounting rms. In D. M. Brock, M. J. Powell, & C.
R. Hinings (Eds.), Restructuring the professional organization:
Accounting, health care and law. London: Routledge.
Aldrich, H. E. (2010). Beam me up, Scott(ie): Institutional theorists
struggle with the emergent nature of entrepreneurship. In W. D. Sine
& R. J. David (Eds.), Research in sociology of work. Bingley: Emerald
Group.
Ang, S., & Cummings, L. L. (1997). Strategic response to institutional
inuences on information systems outsourcing. Organization Science,
8, 235256.
Ansari, S. M., Fiss, P. C., & Zajac, E. J. (2010). Made to t: How practices
vary as they diffuse. Academy of Management Review, 35, 6792.
Arnold, P. J. (2009). Institutional perspectives on the internationalization
of accounting. In C. S. Chapman, D. J. Cooper, & P. B. Miller (Eds.),
Accounting, organizations & institutions: Essays in honour of Anthony
Hopwood. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Boltanski, L., & Thvenot, L. (1991). On justication: The economics of
worth. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Botzem, S., & Quack, S. (2009). (No) limits to Anglo-American accounting?
Reconstructing the history of the International Accounting Standards
Committee: A review article. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 34,
988998.
Brock, D. M. (2006). The changing professional organization: A review of
competing archetypes. International Journal of Management Review, 8,
157174.
Brock, D. M., Powell, M. J., & Hinings, C. R. (2007). Archetypal change and
the professional service rm. In W. A. Pasmore & R. W. Woodman
(Eds.), Research in organizational change and development. Bingley:
Emerald Group.
Cohen, J. (1968). Weighed kappa: Nominal scale agreement with
provision for scaled disagreement or partial credit. Psychological
Bulleting, 70, 213220.
Colyvas, J. A., & Powell, W. W. (2006). Roads to institutionalization: The
remaking of boundaries between public and private science. Research
in Organizational Behavior, 27, 315363.
Cooper, D. J., Hinings, B., Greenwood, R., & Brown, J. L. (1996).
Sedimentation and transformation in organizational change: The
case of Canadian law rms. Organization Studies, 17, 623647.
Cooper, D., & Robson, K. (2006). Accounting, professions and regulation:
Locating the sites of professionalization. Accounting, Organizations &
Society, 31, 415444.
Corbin, J., & Strauss, A. (2008). Basics of qualitative research (third ed.).
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Covaleski, M. A., Dirsmith, M. W., & Rittenberg, L. (2003). Jurisdictional
disputes over professional work: The institutionalization of global
knowledge expert. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 28, 323355.
Covalski, M., Dirsmith, M., Heian, J., & Samuel, S. (1998). The calculated
and the avowed: Techniques of discipline and struggle over identity
in big six public accounting rms. Administrative Science Quarterly, 43,
293327.
18
DAunno, T., Sutton, R. I., & Price, R. H. (1991). Isomorphism and external
support in conicting institutional environments: A study of
drug abuse treatment units. Academy of Management Journal, 34,
636661.
Dezalay, Y. (1995). Turf battles, or class struggles: The
internationalization of the market for expertise in the professional
society. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 10, 149169.
DiMaggio, P. J. (1997). Culture and cognition. Annual Review of Sociology,
23, 263287.
DiMaggio, P. J. (1988). Interest and agency in institutional theory. In L. G.
Zucker (Ed.), Institutional patterns and organizations: Culture and
environment. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger.
Dirsmith, M., & Covaleski, M. (1985). Informal communications,
nonformal communications and mentoring in public accounting
rms. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 10, 149169.
Dirsmith, M. W., Heian, J. B., & Covaleski, M. (1997). Structure and agency
in an institutional setting: The application and social transformation
of control in the big six. Accounting Organization and Society, 22, 127.
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). Agency theory: An assessment and review.
Academy of Management Review, 14, 5774.
Financial Times (2012a). Deloitte accused over MG Rover links. <http://
www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/d0ae2c10-4ce2-11e1-874100144feabdc0.html#axzz1yKyiN2AP>.
Financial Times (2012b). PwC ned 1.4m for audit failure. <http://
www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/b2b4332e-36d7-11e1-b74100144feabdc0.html#axzz1yKyiN2AP>.
Fiss, P. C., & Zajac, E. J. (2004). The diffusion of ideas over contested
terrain: The (non)adoption of a shareholder value orientation among
German rms. Administrative Science Quarterly, 49, 501534.
Fiss, P. C., & Zajac, E. J. (2006). The symbolic management of strategic
change: Sensegiving via framing and decoupling. Academy of
Management Journal, 49, 11731193.
Freidson, E. (1984). The changing nature of professional control. American
Review of Sociology, 19, 120.
Freidson, E. (2001). Professionalism: The third logic. Chicago, IL: University
of Chicago Press.
Friedland, R., & Alford, R. (1991). Bringing society back in: Symbols,
practices, and institutional contradictions. In W. W. Powell & P. J.
DiMaggio (Eds.), The new institutionalism in organizational analysis.
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Glaser, B., & Strauss, A. (1967). The discovery of grounded theory. Chicago,
IL: Aldine.
Glynn, M. A. (2000). When cymbals become symbols: Conict over
organizational identity within a symphony orchestra. Organization
Science, 11, 285298.
Goodrick, E., & Salancik, G. F. (1996). Organizational discretion in
responding to institutional practices: Hospitals and Cesarean births.
Administrative Science Quarterly, 41, 128.
Goodstein, J. D. (1994). Institutional pressures and strategic
responsiveness: Employer involvement in work-family issues.
Academy of Management Journal, 37, 350382.
Graebner, M. E. (2009). Caveat Venditor: Trust asymmetries in acquisitions
of entrepreneurial rm. Academy of Management Journal, 52, 435472.
Granovetter, M. (1985). Economic action and social structure: The problem
of embeddedness. American Journal of Sociology, 91, 481510.
Gray, J. T. (1999). Restructuring law rms: Reexivity and emerging
forms. In D. Brock, M. Powell, & C. R. Hinings (Eds.), Restructuring the
professional organization: Accounting, health care and law. London:
Routledge.
Greening, D. W., & Gray, B. (1994). Testing a model of organizational
response to social and political issues. Academy of Management
Journal, 37, 467498.
Greenwood, R., Diaz, A. M., Li, S. X., & Lorente, J. C. (2009). The multiplicity
of institutional logics and the heterogeneity of organizational
responses. Organization Science, 21, 521539.
Greenwood, R. (2007). Your ethics. In L. Empson (Ed.), Managing the
modern law rm. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Greenwood, R., & Hinings, C. R. (1993). Understanding strategic change:
The contribution of archetypes. Academy of Management Journal, 36,
10521081.
Greenwood, R., & Hinings, C. R. (1996). Understanding radical
organizational change: Bringing together the old and the new
institutionalism. Academy of Management Review, 21, 10221054.
Greenwood, R., Hinings, C. R., & Brown, J. (1990). P2-form strategic
management: Corporate practices in professional partnerships.
Greenwood, R., Raynard, M., Kodeih, F., Micelotta, E. R., & Lounsbury, M.
(2011). Institutional complexity and organizational responses.
Academy of Management Annals, 5, 317371.
Greenwood, R., & Suddaby, R. (2006). Institutional entrepreneurship in

mature elds: The big ve accounting rm. Academy of Management
Journal, 49, 2748.
Greenwood, R., Suddaby, R., & Hinings, C. R. (2002). Theorizing change:
The role of professional associations in the transformation of
institutionalized elds. Academy of Management Journal, 45, 5880.
Hanlon, G. (1996). Casino Capitalism and the rise of the
commericalised service class An examination of the accountant.
Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 7, 339363.
Hanlon, G. (1997). A profession in transition? Lawyers, the market and
signicant others. The Modern Law Review, 60, 798822.
Hardy, C., & Maguire, S. (2008). Institutional entrepreneurship. In R.
Greenwood, C. Oliver, K. Sahlin, & R. Suddaby (Eds.), The Sage
handbook of organizational institutionalism. London: Sage.
Hart, C. W. L., Schlesinger, L. A., & Maher, D. (1992). Guarantees come to
professional service rms. Sloan Management Review, 33, 1929.
Haskell, T. L. (1984). Professionalism versus capitalism: R.H. Tawney,
Emile Durkheim, and C.S. Pierce on the disinterestedness of
professional communities. In T. L. Haskell (Ed.), The authority of
experts. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Hinings, C. R., Brown, J. L., & Greenwood, R. (1991). Change in an
autonomous professional organization. Journal of Management Studies,
28, 375393.
Hoffman, A. J. (1999). Institutional evolution and change:
Environmentalism and the U.S. chemical industry. Academy of
ING Economic Bureau (2010). Accountants aan de vooravond van
ommekeer.
Ingram, P., & Simons, T. (1995). Institutional and resource dependence:
Determinants of responsiveness to work-family issues. Academy of
Jarzabkowski, P., Matthiesen, J., & Van de Ven, A. H. (2009). Doing which
work? A practice approach to institutional pluralism. In T. B.
Lawrence, R . Suddaby, & B. Leca (Eds.), Institutional work: Actors
and agency in institutional studies of organizations. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Jick, T. D. (1979). Maximizing qualitative and quantitative methods:
Triangulation in action. Administrative Science Quarterly, 24, 602611.
Kerlinger, F. N. (1986). Foundations of behavioral research: Educational and
psychological inquiry. New York, NY: Holt, Rinehard and Winston.
Kornberger, M., Carter, C., & Ross-Smith, A. (2010). Changing gender
domination in a big four accounting rm: Flexibility, performance and
client service in practice. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 35,
775791.
Kornberger, M., Justesen, L., & Mouritsen, J. (2011). When you make
manager, we put a big mountain in front of you: An ethnography of
managers in a big 4 accounting rm. Accounting, Organizations and
Society, 36, 514533.
Kumar, N., Stern, L. W., & Anderson, J. C. (1993). Conducting
interorganizational research using key informants. Academy of
Larsson, M. S. (1977). The rise of professionalism: A sociological analysis.
Berkeley: University of California Press.
Leblebici, H., Salancik, G. R., Copay, A., & King, T. (1991). Institutional
change and the transformation of interorganizational elds:
An organizational history. Administrative Science Quarterly, 36,
333363.
Lee, T. W., Mitchell, T. R., & Sablynski, C. J. (1999). Qualitative research in
organizational and vocational psychology, 19791999. Journal of
Vocational Behavior, 55, 161187.
Lewis, L. K., & Seibold, D. R. (1993). Innovation modication during
intraorganizational adoption. Academy of Management Journal, 18,
322354.
Lorsch, J. W., & Tierney, T. J. (2002). Aligning the stars: How to succeed when
professionals drive results. Boston, Mass: Harvard University Press.
Lounsbury, M. (2001). Institutional sources of practice variation: Stafng
college and university recycling programs. Administrative Science
Quarterly, 46, 2956.
Lounsbury, M. (2007). A tale of two cities: Competing logics and practice
variation in the professionalizing of mutual funds. Academy of
Lounsbury, M. (2008). Institutional rationality and practice variation:
New directions in the institutional analysis of practice. Accounting,
Organizations & Society, 33, 349361.
Maguire, S. (2007). Institutional entrepreneurship. In S. Clegg & J. R. Bailey
(Eds.), International encyclopedia of organization studies. London, UK:
Sage.
Malhotra, N., & Morris, T. (2009). Heterogeneity in professional service
rms. Journal of Management Studies, 46, 895922.
Malhotra, N., Morris, T., & Hinings, C. R. (2006). Variation in organizational
form among professional service organizations. Research in the
Sociology of Organizations, 24, 171202.
Marquis, C., & Lounsbury, M. (2007). Vive la resistance: Competing logics
and the consolidation of U.S. community banking. Academy of
Meyer, A. D. (1982). Adapting to environmental jolts. Administrative
Science Quarterly, 27, 515537.
Miller, C. C., Cardinal, L. B., & Glick, W. H. (1997). Retrospective reports in
organizational research: A reexamination of recent evidence.
Milliken, F. J., Martins, L. L., & Morgan, H. (1998). Explaining
organizational responsiveness to work-family issues: The role of
human resource executives as issue interpreters. Academy of
Morris, T., & Pinnington, A. (1998). Promotion to partner in professional
service rms. Human Relations, 51, 324.
Morris, T., & Pinnington, A. (1999). Continuity and change in professional
organizations: Evidence from British law rms. In D. M. Brock, M. J.
Powell, & C. R. Hinings (Eds.), Restructuring the professional
organization: Accounting, health care & law. London: Routledge.
Nachum, L. (1996). Winners and losers in professional services: What
makes the difference? Service Industries Journal, 16, 474490.
Oliver, C. (1991). Strategic responses to institutional processes. Academy
of Management Review, 16, 145179.
Oliver, C. (1997). Sustainable competitive advantage: Combining
institutional and resource-based views. Strategic Management
Journal, 18, 697713.
Pache, A., & Santos, F. (2010). When worlds collide: The internal dynamics
of organizational responses to conicting institutional demands.
Academy of Management Review, 35, 455476.
Pinnington, A., & Morris, T. (2003). Archetype change in professional
organizations: Survey evidence from large law rms. British Journal of
Management, 14, 8599.
Purdy, J. M., & Gray, B. (2009). Conicting logics, mechanisms of diffusion,
and multilevel dynamics in emerging institutional elds. Academy of
Puxty, A. G., Wilmott, H. C., Cooper, D. J., & Lowe, T. (1987). Modes of
regulation in advanced capitalisms: Locating accountancy in four
countries. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 15, 315340.
Radnor, M., Feller, I., & Rogers, E. (1978). The diffusion of innovation: An
assessment. Evanston, IL: Center for the Interdisciplinary study of
Science and Technology, Northwestern University.
Ramirez, C. (2001). Understanding social closure in its cultural context:
Accounting practitioners in France (19201939). Accounting,
Organizations and Society, 26, 391418.
Ramirez, C. (2009). Constructing the governable small practitioner: The
changing nature of professional bodies and the management of
professional accountants identities in the UK. Accounting,
Organizations and Society, 34, 381408.
Rao, H., & Sivakumar, K. (1999). Institutional sources of boundaryspanning structures: The establishment of investor relations
departments in the Fortune 500 industrials. Organization Science, 10,
2742.
Reay, T., & Hinings, C. R. (2005). The recomposition of an organizational
eld: Health care in Alberta. Organization Studies, 26, 351384.
Reay, T., & Hinings, C. R. (2009). Managing the rivalry of competing
institutional logics. Organization Studies, 30, 629652.
Reed, M. (1996). Expert power and control in late modernity: An
empirical review and theoretical synthesis. Organization Studies, 17,
573597.
Romanelli, E., & Tushman, M. L. (1994). Organizational transformations as
punctuated equilibrium: An empirical test. Academy of Management
Journal, 37, 11411166.
Ruef, M., & Scott, W. R. (1998). A multidimensional model of
organizational
legitimacy:
Hospital
survival
in
changing
institutional environments. Administrative Science Quarterly, 43,
877904.
19
Samuel, S., Covaleski, M. A., & Dirsmith, M. W. (2009). On the eclipse of

professionalism in Accounting: An essay. In C. S. Chapman, D. J.
Cooper, & P. B. Miller (Eds.), Accounting, organizations & institutions:
Essays in honour of Anthony Hopwood. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Schwenk, C. R. (1985). The use of participant recollection in the modeling
of organizational decision processes. Academy of Management Journal,
10, 496503.
Scott, W. R. (2008). Lords of the dance: Professionals as institutional
agents. Organization Studies, 29, 219238.
Scott, W. R., Ruef, M., Mendel, P., & Caronna, C. A. (2000). Institutional
change and organizations: Transformation of a healthcare eld. Chicago,
IL: University of Chicago Press.
Seidler, J. (1974). On using informants: A technique for collecting
quantitative data and controlling measurement error in
organizational analysis. American Sociological Review, 39, 816831.
Seo, M. G., & Creed, W. E. D. (2002). Institutional contradictions, praxis
and institutional change: A dialectical perspective. Academy of
Management Review, 27, 222247.
Strauss, A. (1975). Professions, work and careers. New Brunswick:
Transaction Books.
Suddaby, R., Cooper, D. J., & Greenwood, R. (2007). Transnational
regulation of professional services: Governance dynamics of eld
level organizational change. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 32,
333362.
Suddaby, R., & Greenwood, R. (2005). Rhetorical strategies of legitimacy.
Administrative Science Quarterly, 50, 3567.
Swidler, A. (1986). Culture in action: Symbols and strategies. American
Sociological Review, 51, 273286.
Thornton, P. H. (2002). The rise of the corporation in a craft industry:
Conict and conformity in institutional logics. Academy of
Thornton, P. H. (2004). Markets from culture: Institutional logics and
organizational decisions in higher education publishing. Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press.
Thornton, P. H., Jones, C., & Kury, K. (2005). Institutional logics and
institutional change in organizations: Transformation in accounting,
architecture and publishing. In C. Jones & P. H. Thornton (Eds.),
Research in the sociology of organizations. London: JAI Press.
Thornton, P. H., & Ocasio, W. (1999). Institutional logics and the historical
contingency of power in organizations: Executive succession in the
higher education publishing industry, 19581990. American Journal of
Sociology, 105, 801843.
Thornton, P. H., & Ocasio, W. (2008). Institutional logics. In R. Greenwood,
C. Oliver, K. Sahlin, & R. Suddaby (Eds.), The Sage handbook of
organizational institutionalism. London: Sage.
Thornton, P. H., Ocasio, W., & Lounsbury, M. (2012). The institutional logics
perspective: A new approach to culture, structure, and process. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Tinker, A. M. (1985). Paper prophets. New York, NY: Praeger.
Townley, B. (2002). The role of competing rationalities in institutional
change. Academy of Management Journal, 45, 163179.
Tushman, M. L., & Romanelli, E. (1985). Organizational evolution: A
metamorphosis model of convergence and reorientation. In L. L.
Cummings & B. M. Staw (Eds.), Research in organizational behavior.
Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
Von Nordenycht, A. (2010). What is a professional service rm? Towards
a theory and taxonomy of knowledge intensive rms. Academy of
Management Review, 35, 155174.
Westphal, J. D., Gulati, R., & Shortell, S. M. (1997). Customization or
conformity? An institutional and network perspective on the content
and consequences of TQM adoption. Administrative Science Quarterly,
42, 366394.
Wyatt, A. (2003). Accounting professionalism: They just dont get it!
<aaahq.org/AM2003/WyattSpeech.pdf>.
Zilber, T. (2002). Institutionalization as an interplay between actions,
meanings, and actors: The case of a rape crisis center in Israel.

Accounting, Organizations and Society: Michel W. Lander, Bas A.S. Koene, Shelly N. Linssen

Enviado por

Dados do documento

Título original

Direitos autorais

Formatos disponíveis

Compartilhar este documento

Compartilhar ou incorporar documento

Opções de compartilhamento

Você considera este documento útil?

Este conteúdo é inapropriado?

Direitos autorais:

Formatos disponíveis

Accounting, Organizations and Society: Michel W. Lander, Bas A.S. Koene, Shelly N. Linssen

Enviado por

Direitos autorais:

Formatos disponíveis

Accounting, Organizations and Society xxx (2012) xxxxxx

Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect

Accounting, Organizations and Society

Committed to professionalism: Organizational responses of mid-tier

HEC Paris, 1, Rue de la libration, 78351 Jouy-en-Josas, France

Cooper & Robson, 2006; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005)

fect organizational structures and processes (Greenwood,

there is room for managerial discretion (DiMaggio,

vested interests, but also in order to maintain professional

This termed was suggested by one of our reviewers.

strata into which organizational elds tend to be segmented (Ramirez, 2001).

logic to the newly introduced logic (e.g. Thornton, 2002;

serves as a rite of passage in the corporate career where

tions are: What are the ve most important changes in

CEO (20 years at rm)

asked to describe (Kumar, Stern, & Anderson, 1993; Seidler,

the trustee logic and efciency and protability for the

R1: Yes, we are trying to increase the number of advisory products

Role of the accountant

R1: A non-professional needs to be very good to be accepted by a professional, I

R1: It is a matrix structure organized geographically and through service lines

for their particular strategy. The outcomes of this analysis

describe how conicting demands produce heterogeneous

decision making is done at the local ofces. Prots are

Organizational responses to conicting demands

Effect according to commercial

E1: Regulation for accountancy

The increased quality demands

E1: The investment in quality

K2: Introducing a quality system

A1: We have an international

Automation and standard

Automation and standard

Clients demand local

Clients not only demand an

The dire economic situation in

B2: Another big change has of

F2: Clients are no longer

J1: I think the accountancy

Formal business development

The primary reason why rms differ with regards to the

change leads to fear and fear leads to resistance (E1). They

in directive decision making); (2) rms need to decide on

Performance pay system

(Merging) Number of locations

Its a little back and forth. Sometimes people are fed up

Background management/board members

Performance pay system

(Merging) Number of locations

believe a rm grasp of the profession is necessary to run

the ENRON scandal (Covaleski, Dirsmith, & Rittenberg,

Glynn, 2000) or the hybridization of elements of both the

tional objectives such as performance and professionalism.

alism remains dominant. For instance, mirroring Cooper

Greenwood, R., & Suddaby, R. (2006). Institutional entrepreneurship in

Samuel, S., Covaleski, M. A., & Dirsmith, M. W. (2009). On the eclipse of

Você também pode gostar