*Inhibition/Disqualification of judges

G.R. Nos. 173057-74

September 20, 2010

BGen. (Ret.) JOSE S. RAMISCAL, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
HON. JOSE R. HERNANDEZ, as Justice of the Sandiganbayan; 4TH DIVISION,
SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) seeking to reverse and set aside the Resolution 1 dated May 4, 2006 of
the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 28022-23 and 25122-45. The assailed Resolution
denied petitioners motions for inhibition,2 which sought to disqualify respondent Justice Jose R.
Hernandez, Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, from taking part in said
cases.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner, Retired BGen. Jose S. Ramiscal, Jr., then President of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines-Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS), 3 signed several deeds of
sale for the acquisition of parcels of land for the development of housing projects and for other
concerns. However, it appears that the landowners from whom the AFP-RSBS acquired the lots
executed unilateral deeds of sale providing for a lesser consideration apparently to evade the
payment of correct taxes. Hence, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee conducted an extensive
investigation in 1998 on the alleged anomaly.
In its Report dated December 23, 1998, the Committee concluded that there were irregularities
committed by the officials of the AFP-RSBS and recommended the prosecution of those
responsible, including petitioner, who had signed the unregistered deeds of sale as AFP-RSBS
President. Accordingly, on January 28, 1999, fourteen (14) informations were filed with the
Sandiganbayan against petitioner for violation of Section 3(e) 4 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and for the crime of estafa through
falsification of public documents as defined under paragraph 4 of Article 171 5 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended.6 The informations charging petitioner with violations of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 25122-25133 while those
charging estafa through falsification of public documents were docketed as Criminal Case Nos.
25134-25145.

Then, on July 27, 2003, junior officers and enlisted men from elite units of the AFP took over the
Oakwood Premier Apartments at Ayala Center in Makati City to air their grievances about graft
and corruption in the military. In response to the incident, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
created a Fact-Finding Commission (Feliciano Commission) wherein respondents wife,
Professor Carolina G. Hernandez, was appointed as one of the Commissioners. On October 17,
2003, the Feliciano Commission submitted its Report recommending, among others, the
prosecution of petitioner. President Arroyo then issued Executive Order No. 255 on December 5,
2003, creating the Office of a Presidential Adviser under the Office of the President to implement
the recommendations of the Feliciano Commission. 7 Professor Carolina G. Hernandez was
appointed as Presidential Adviser in the newly created office. Shortly thereafter, respondent
Justice Hernandez was appointed as Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan and assigned to its
Fourth Division.
On October 11, 2004, eight additional informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan against
petitioner. Two were assigned to the Fourth Division of the court, one for violation of R.A. No.
3019, docketed as Criminal Case No. 28022, and the other for estafa through falsification of
public documents, docketed as Criminal Case No. 28023.
On April 6, 2006, petitioner filed two motions to inhibit Justice Hernandez from taking part in
Criminal Case Nos. 25122-45 and Criminal Case Nos. 28022-23 pending before the Fourth
Division. Petitioner cited that Justice Hernandezs wife, Professor Hernandez, was a member of
the Feliciano Commission and was tasked to implement fully the recommendations of the Senate
Blue Ribbon Committee, including his criminal prosecution. Further, the spousal relationship
between Justice Hernandez and Professor Hernandez created in his mind impression of partiality
and bias, which circumstance constitutes a just and valid ground for his inhibition under the
second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court.
In its Consolidated Comment/Opposition,8 the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) asserted
that the grounds raised by petitioner in his motions for inhibition were anchored on mere
speculations and conjectures. It stressed that the recommendation of the Feliciano Commission
was a product of consensus of the members of the Commission which was a collegial body. And
even if Professor Hernandez signed the Report of the Commission to implement the
recommendations of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, the findings of the said Commission did
not remove the presumption of innocence in petitioners favor. Hence, the OSP argued that the
mere membership of Prof. Hernandez in the Feliciano Commission did not automatically
disqualify Justice Hernandez from hearing the criminal cases against petitioners.
On May 4, 2006, Justice Hernandez issued the assailed Resolution, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
ACCORDINGLY, accused Jose S. Ramiscals Motions for Inhibition are DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

Petitioner did not seek reconsideration of the Resolution, but instead filed a petition
for certiorari and prohibition before this Court on the following grounds:
I
THE RESPONDENT HON. JOSE R. HERNANDEZ COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
REFUSING TO INHIBIT HIMSELF FROM THE CASES PENDING BEFORE THE
4TH DIVISION AGAINST PETITIONER NOTWITHSTANDING THAT UNDER RULE 137 HE
IS DISQUALIFIED TO TRY OR SIT IN JUDGMENT IN THESE CASES;
II
THE RESPONDENT 4TH DIVISION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN IS PROCEEDING TO
HEAR THESE CASES WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION AND WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION NOTWITHSTANDING THAT ITS MEMBER, THE
RESPONDENT JUSTICE JOSE HERNANDEZ, IS DISQUALIFIED FROM SITTING OR
TAKING PART IN ITS PROCEEDINGS; AND,
III
THE HON. JUSTICE HERNANDEZ IS DISQUALIFIED FROM TAKING PART IN SITTING
OR HEARING THE CASES AGAINST PETITIONER IN ALL THE CASES PENDING
BEFORE ALL THE FIVE (5) DIVISIONS OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN IN CONSEQUENCE
OF HIS DISQUALIFICATION UNDER RULE 137.9
Essentially, the issue is: Did Justice Hernandez commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in not inhibiting himself from the cases against petitioner pending
before the Sandiganbayan?
Petitioner submits that it was erroneous for Justice Hernandez to deny the motions to inhibit
himself under the second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, when in fact
the basis for his disqualification was the latters spousal relationship with Professor Hernandez,
which situation was governed by the first paragraph of the said section. According to petitioner,
while Professor Hernandez was not directly "pecuniarily interested" in the case, she was more
than so interested in them because as an appointee of President Arroyo, she was receiving
emoluments to monitor the progress of the cases and to see to it that the recommendations of the
Feliciano Commission are fulfilled.
We deny the petition.
The rule on inhibition and disqualification of judges is laid down in Section 1, Rule 137 of
the Rules of Court:

Section 1. Disqualification of judges.No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which
he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which
he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel
within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been
executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior
court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all
parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for
just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.
The Rules contemplate two kinds of inhibition: compulsory and voluntary. Under the first
paragraph of the cited Rule, it is conclusively presumed that judges cannot actively and
impartially sit in the instances mentioned. The second paragraph, which embodies voluntary
inhibition, leaves to the sound discretion of the judges concerned whether to sit in a case for other
just and valid reasons, with only their conscience as guide. 10
In denying the motions for his inhibition, Justice Hernandez explained that petitioner failed to
impute any act of bias or impartiality on his part, to wit:
What can reasonably be gleaned from jurisprudence on this point of law is the necessity of
proving bias and partiality under the second paragraph of the rule in question. The proof required
needs to point to some act or conduct on the part of the judge being sought for inhibition. In the
instant Motions, there is not even a single act or conduct attributed to Justice Hernandez from
where a suspicion of bias or partiality can be derived or appreciated. In fact, it is oddly striking
that the accused does not even make a claim or imputation of bias or partiality on the part of
Justice Hernandez. Understandably, he simply cannot make such allegation all because there is
none to be told. If allegations or perceptions of bias from the tenor and language of a judge is
considered by the Supreme Court as insufficient to show prejudgment, how much more
insufficient it becomes if there is absent any allegation of bias or partiality to begin with. 11
We find the above explanation well-taken and thus uphold the assailed Resolution upon the
grounds so stated. We have ruled in Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Dy Hong
Pi,12 that the mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground for inhibition, especially
when the charge is without basis. Extrinsic evidence must further be presented to establish bias,
bad faith, malice, or corrupt purpose, in addition to palpable error which may be inferred from the
decision or order itself. This Court has to be shown acts or conduct of the judge clearly indicative
of arbitrariness or prejudice before the latter can be branded the stigma of being biased or
partial.1avvphi1
An allegation of prejudgment, without more, constitutes mere conjecture and is not one of the
"just or valid reasons" contemplated in the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules
of Court for which a judge may inhibit himself from hearing the case. The bare allegations of the
judges partiality, as in this case, will not suffice in the absence of clear and convincing evidence

to overcome the presumption that the judge will undertake his noble role of dispensing justice in
accordance with law and evidence, and without fear or favor. Verily, for bias and prejudice to be
considered valid reasons for the involuntary inhibition of judges, mere suspicion is not enough. 13
Petitioner contends that his motions were based on the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137,
but a closer examination of the motions for inhibition reveals that petitioner undoubtedly invoked
the second paragraph by underscoring the phrase, "for just or valid reasons other than those
mentioned above." This was an express indication of the rule that he was invoking. Moreover, it
was specifically stated in paragraph 7 of both motions that "in accuseds mind, such
circumstances militates against the Hon. Justice Hernandez and constitutes a just and valid
ground for his inhibition under the 2nd paragraph, Section 1 of Rule 137, in so far as the cases
against accused are concerned." Hence, there is no question that petitioner relied on the second
paragraph of the Rulewhich contemplates voluntary inhibition as basis for his motions for
inhibition.
And even if we were to assume that petitioner indeed invoked the first paragraph of Section
1, Rule 137 in his motions to inhibit, we should stress that marital relationship by itself is not a
ground to disqualify a judge from hearing a case. Under the first paragraph of the rule on
inhibition, "No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is
pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise...." The relationship mentioned
therein becomes relevant only when such spouse or child of the judge is "pecuniarily interested"
as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise. Petitioner, however, miserably failed to show that Professor
Carolina G. Hernandez is financially or pecuniarily interested in these cases before the
Sandiganbayan to justify the inhibition of Justice Hernandez under the first paragraph of Section
1 of Rule 137.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Resolution dated May 4, 2006 of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 25122-45 and Criminal Case Nos. 28022-23
is AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
With costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. RTJ-93-964

February 28, 1996

LEOVIGILDO U. MANTARING, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE MANUEL A. ROMAN, JR., RTC Branch 42, Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro; and
JUDGE IRENEO B. MOLATO, MTC, Bongabon, Oriental Mindoro, respondents.
DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:
Respondent Judge Ireneo B. Molato is the presiding judge of the Municipal Trial Court of
Bongabon, Oriental Mindoro. On January 7, 1993, an administrative complaint was filed against
him and Judge Manuel A. Roman, Jr., presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro, Branch 42, by Leovigildo U. Mantaring, Sr., who charged them
with conduct unbecoming of members of the judiciary. On February 21, 1994, after the parties
had filed their respective pleadings and supporting documents, this Court dismissed the complaint
against the two for lack of merit. The motion for reconsideration filed by complainant was
subsequently denied.
What is before us now is the Supplemental Complaint filed by Leovigildo U. Mantaring, Sr.
against Judge Ireneo B. Molato, which charges him with harassment. It is alleged that because of
the filing of the first complaint against him, respondent Judge Ireneo B. Molato should have
inhibited himself from conducting the preliminary investigation of a criminal case considering
that the respondents in that case were complainant and his son. Instead, it is alleged, he took
cognizance of the case and ordered the arrest of complainant and his son, Leovigildo Mantaring,
Jr., out of hatred and revenge for them because of the filing of the first case by the complainant.
The Supplemental Complaint was referred to the Office of the Court Administrator which, in a
Memorandum dated 25 November 1994, recommended the dismissal of the case for lack of
merit. Nonetheless, the Court required the respondent Judge Ireneo B. Molato to comment.
In his Comment dated July 6, 1995, respondent judge denies the allegations against him. He avers
that on the application by SPO4 Pacifico L. Fradejas, he issued a search warrant which resulted in
the seizure from a certain Joel Gamo of a home-made gun, a hand grenade, five live ammunitions
for Cal. 38 and three live ammunitions for 12 gauge shotgun; that on August 25, 1993, a
complaint for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition was filed against Joel Gamo in
which the herein complainant Leovigildo, Sr. and his son, Leovigildo, Jr., were included; that
finding that the house in which the firearms and ammunition had been found was owned by
complainant and his son, he concluded that there was probable cause to believe that complainant
and his son were guilty of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition and accordingly ordered
their arrest. Respondent judge claims that he inhibited himself from the case after he was ordered
by the Executive Judge, RTC, Branch 41, Pinamalayan Oriental Mindoro.
In his Reply complainant contends that as the search warrant was issued only against Joel Gamo
and Mantaring, Jr. it was wrong for respondent judge to find probable cause against him on the
theory that, as owners of the house in which the firearms and ammunition were found, they had
constructive possession of the same. He likewise contends that respondent judge did not inhibit
himself until after the preliminary examination was terminated and the warrant of arrest issued,
and only after complainant had filed a petition for inhibition which the Executive Judge found to
be well taken.

On October 16, 1995, this case was referred to the OCA for reevaluation, report and
recommendation. On January 12, 1996, the OCA submitted a Memorandum, recommending
dismissal of the supplemental complaint for lack of merit, for the following reasons:
(1) It is erroneous for herein complainant to equate the application for the issuance of
search warrant with the institution and prosecution of criminal action in a trial court.
(Malaloan vs. Court of Appeals, 232 SCRA 249) Complainant cannot insist that since
his name was not included in the search warrant, the house designated to be searched
did not belong to him, and that he was not present at the preliminary investigation of
witnesses preparatory to the issuance of the questioned warrant of arrest, there was no
basis for respondent judge to order his arrest.
(2) No taint of irregularity attended the issuance by respondent judge of the warrant of
arrest against complainant and his son. Neither was the charge that the warrant of arrest
was issued by respondent judge in the spirit of anger, hatred or harassment purposes
substantiated.
To begin with, it cannot be contended that complainant Leovigildo Mantaring, Sr. could not be
proceeded against simply because he was not included in the search warrant issued against Gamo
and Leovigildo Mantaring, Jr., who is apparently his son. The determination of probable cause in
preliminary investigations is based solely on the evidence presented by the complainant,
regardless of whether or not the respondent in that case is named in the proceedings for a search
warrant. As correctly pointed out by, the OCA,1 the issuance of a search warrant and of a warrant
of arrest requires the showing of probabilities as to different facts. In the case of search warrants,
the determination is based on the finding that (1) the articles to be seized are connected to a
criminal activity and (2) they are found in the place to be searched. It is not necessary that a
particular person be implicated. On the other hand, in arrest cases, the determination of probable
cause is based on a finding that a crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested has
committed it.
In this case, the arrest of herein complainant and his son, together with Joel Gamo, was ordered
on the basis of respondent's finding that the place from where the guns and ammunition were
seized belonged to complainant Leovigildo Mantaring, Sr. and the testimonies of witnesses
presented by SPO4 Fradejas. Of course complainant denies that the house in which the firearms
and ammunition were found belonged to him and claims that at the time of the search he was in
Manila. The provincial prosecutor subsequently dismissed the case against complainant on
precisely these grounds, i.e., that the house did not belong to complainant and he was in Manila at
the time the search and seizure were conducted. But to say this is not to say that respondent acted
arbitrarily or that he abused his powers so as to give ground for administrative disciplinary action
against him. It is only to say that he committed an error of judgment for which complainant's
remedy is judicial.
What we think requires serious consideration is the contention by the complainant that
respondent judge should have inhibited himself from conducting the preliminary investigation of

the criminal case, considering that the respondent was the present complainant, who had earlier
filed an administrative case against the judge and another one.
We are not unmindful of the cases in which it was stated that the mere filing of an administrative
case against a judge by one of the parties before him is not a ground for disqualifying him from
hearing a case.2 An examination of these cases reveals, however, that the administrative cases
were filed during the pendency of the cases, and it is evident that the administrative cases were
filed only to force the judge to inhibit himself from the consideration of the case before him. As
this Court held, if on every occasion the party apparently aggrieved were allowed to stop the
proceedings in order to await the final decision on the desired disqualification, or demand the
immediate inhibition of the judge on the basis alone of his being so charged, many cases would
have to be kept pending or perhaps there would not be enough judges left to handle all the cases
pending in all the courts.3 On the other hand, there is a remedy available to the party seeking the
disqualification of the judge. If he is denied a fair and impartial trial, caused by the judge's bias or
prejudice, he can ask for a new trial in the interest of justice which will be granted if that is really
the case. 4
But, in the case at bar, an administrative complaint against respondent and Judge Manuel A.
Roman, Jr. had previously been filed and it was paramount that respondent was free from any
appearance of bias against, or hostility toward, the complainant. The impression could not be
helped that his action in that case was dictated by a spirt of revenge against complainant for the
latter's having filed an administrative disciplinary action against the judge. The situation called
for sedulous regard on his part for the principle that a party is entitled to nothing less than the
cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
This circumstance should have underscored for respondent the need of steering clear of the case
because he might be perceived, rightly or wrongly, to be susceptible to bias and partiality. For his
judgment must not be tainted by even the slightest suspicion of improbity or preconceived
interest in order to preserve at all times the faith and confidence in courts of justice by any party
to the litigation.5
Indeed prudence should have made respondent judge heed the admonition that "a spotless
dispensation of justice requires not only that the decision rendered be intrinsically fair but that the
judge rendering it must at all times maintain the appearance of fairness and impartiality." 6
Moreover, we think it was improper for respondent judge to have issued the warrants of arrest
against complainant and his son without any finding that it was necessary to place them in
immediate custody in order to prevent a frustration of justice. It is now settled 7 that in issuing
warrants of arrest in preliminary investigations, the investigating judge must:
(a) have examined in writing and under oath the complainant and his witnesses by
searching questions and answers;
(b) be satisfied that probable cause exists; and

(c) that there is a need to place the respondent under immediate custody in order not to
frustrate the ends of justice.
In this case, respondent judge justified the issuance of the warrant of arrest on the following
ground:
In view of the above considerations [referring to the antecedent facts], it is the honest
belief and finding of the Court that there is sufficient probable cause that the crime of
Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition was committed and that the named three
(3) accused Joel Gamo, Leovigildo Mantaring, Sr. and Leovigildo Mantaring, Jr. are the
ones probably guilty thereof for which reason Warrant of Arrest was issued by
undersigned against them.
He thus ordered the issuance of warrant of arrest solely on his finding of probable cause, totally
omitting to consider the third requirement that there must be a need to place the respondent under
immediate custody "in order not to frustrate the ends of justice."
The framers of the Constitution confined the determination of probable cause as basis for the
issuance of warrants of arrest and search warrants to judges the better to secure the people against
unreasonable searches and seizures. Respondent judge failed to live up to this expectation by
refusing to inhibit himself even when his very impartiality was in question and worse by issuing a
warrant of arrest without determining whether or not it was justified by the need to prevent a
frustration of the ends of justice. Parenthetically, the records show that the criminal complaints
against herein complainant and his son were eventually dismissed by the Provincial Prosecutor,
but not without the following parting words:
It cannot be gainsaid that respondents Mantarings were greatly prejudiced and suffered
damages as a consequence of their inclusion in the criminal complaint. The unfortunate
incident could have been avoided had the Honorable Municipal Trial Judge exercised
the necessary prudence and judicial perpecuity [sic] expected of an impartial Judge in
the conduct of preliminary investigation before issuance of warrant of arrest.
WHEREFORE, respondent judge Ireneo B. Molato is REPRIMANDED and WARNED that
commission of similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely. All other charges are
dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 143089

February 27, 2003

MERCEDES R. GOCHAN, ALFREDO R. GOCHAN, ANGELINA R. GOCHAN

HERNAEZ, MA. MERCED R. GOCHAN GOROSPE, CRISPO R. GOCHAN JR. and
MARLON R. GOCHAN, petitioners,
vs.
VIRGINIA GOCHAN, LOUISE GOCHAN, LAPULAPU REAL ESTATE
CORPORATION, FELIX GOCHAN & SONS REALTY CORPORATION and MACTAN
REALTY CORPORATION, respondents.

"On 03 April 1998, private respondents filed a Complaint for Specific Performance and Damages
against petitioners. The case was raffled to respondent Judge Dicdican and docketed as Civil Case
No. CEB-21854.
"On 26 May 1998, petitioners filed their Answer with Counterclaim and affirmative defenses.
"On 07 August 1998, before pre-trial could be conducted, petitioners filed a motion for a hearing
on their affirmative defenses some of which are grounds for a motion to dismiss and therefore
may be the subject of a preliminary hearing pursuant to Section 6, Rule 16, 1997 RCP. The
motion was set for hearing on 11 August 1998.

DECISION
"In an order dated 11 August 1998, respondent judge denied petitioners motion without
conducting a hearing. Respondent judge however did not stop with the denial but went on to rule
on the merits of the affirmative defenses, stating as follows:

PANGANIBAN, J.:
Allegations and perceptions of bias from the mere tenor and language of a judge is insufficient to
show prejudgment. Allowing inhibition for these reasons would open the floodgates to abuse.
Unless there is concrete proof that a judge has a personal interest in the proceedings, and that his
bias stems from an extra-judicial source, this Court shall always commence from the presumption
that a magistrate shall decide on the merits of a case with an unclouded vision of its facts. 1
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing
the January 28, 2000 Decision2 and the May 2, 2000 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-GR SP No. 54985. The decretal portion of the Decision reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Order dated
13 August 1999 denying petitioners Motion for Inhibition and the Order dated 20 August 1999
denying the Motion for Reconsideration are hereby nullified and respondent Judge is hereby
inhibited from further sitting in Civil Case No. CEB-21854 entitled Gochan et. al. vs. Gochan, et
al."4
The assailed Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. 5
The Facts
The facts of the case are summarized by the Court of Appeals in this wise:
"There is no dispute as to the antecedent facts that gave rise to the instant petition involving close
relatives who are either aunties, nieces and nephews or first-cousins.

[T]he Statute of Frauds does not apply in this case because the contract which is the subject
matter of this case is already an executed contract. The Statute of Frauds applies only to
executory contracts. x x x. For another, the contention of the defendants that the claims of the
plaintiffs are already extinguished by full payment thereof does not appear to be indubitable
because the plaintiffs denied under oath the due execution and genuineness of the receipts which
are attached as Annexes 1-A, 1-B and 1-C of the defendants answer. x x x. Then, still for another,
the contention that the Complaint is defective because it allegedly has f[a]iled to implead
indispensable parties appears to be wanting in merit because the parties to the memorandum of
agreement adverted to in the complaint are all parties in this case. Then the matter of payment of
docketing and filing fees is not a fatal issue in this case because the record shows that the
plaintiffs had paid at least PhP165,000.00 plus...
"The above ruling is the subject of a petition for certiorari before this Court docketed as C.A.G.R. SP No. 49084 which is pending resolution on a motion for [re]consideration. Because of the
pendency of this petition, petitioners filed on 28 September 1998 a motion to suspend
proceedings. Instead of suspending proceedings, the respondent judge set the case for pre-trial on
09 November 1998, per Order dated 01 October 1998.
"On 05 November 1998, petitioners counsel Atty. Rolando Lim filed a motion to reset the pretrial from 09 November 1998 to 03 December 1998 on the ground that he had to go to Japan
because of a previous commitment. Atty. Vicente Espina, who attended the pre-trial to explain
Atty. Lims absence, manifested to respondent judge that the petitioners were willing to explore
the possibility of an amicable settlement. In spite of the absence of handling counsel Atty. Lim
and in spite of Atty. Espinas manifestation of a possible compromise, respondent judge
proceeded with and terminated the pre-trial. And in spite of the manifestation of Atty. Espina,
respondent judge indicated in the pre-trial order he issued that the possibility (of a compromise)
is nil.

"After the termination of the pre-trial, respondent judge proceeded to hear the evidence of private
respondents who presented their first witness on direct examination on 18 January 1999. This
first witness was cross-examined by petitioners counsel on 22 January 1999. Further hearings
were set for 28 and 30 April 1999. On 23 April 1999, petitioners counsel Atty. Lim filed an
urgent motion praying that the hearing on 28 April be moved to 30 April 1999 on the ground that
he had to undergo medical tests and treatment on 27 and 28 April 1999, and that his law partner
Atty. Espina would not be able to attend in his behalf because the latter had to attend his brothers
wedding in Kananga, Leyte on 28 April 1999.
"Petitioners counsel went to court on 30 April 1999 and was surprised to learn that his motion to
reset the hearing on 28 April 1999 was disregarded and that trial proceeded with private
respondents counsel conducting a re-direct examination of their first witness and presenting their
second witness on direct examination. During the hearing on 30 April 1999, respondent judge
ordered petitioners counsel to conduct the re-cross examination of the first witness and the crossexamination of the second witness. Petitioners counsel manifested that he had not read the
transcript of stenographic notes taken during the hearing on 28 April 1999 and was therefore not
prepared for cross-examination. However, when respondent judge threatened to waive
petitioners right to examine private respondents witnesses, petitioners counsel had no choice
but to accede to do what he was not prepared for.
"On 05 August 1999, petitioners filed a motion to inhibit respondent judge from further sitting in
the case on grounds of partiality, pre-judgment and gross ignorance of the law. The motion was
set for hearing on 09 August 1999 at 10:00 A.M.
"In an order dated 13 August 1999, respondent judge denied the motion for inhibition on the
ground that petitioners failed to appear to substantiate the motion.
"On 16 August 1999, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of denial which
the respondent judge likewise denied in his Order dated 20 August 1999, reiterating that
petitioners failed to appear during the hearing on the motion."6 (Citations omitted)
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA opined that the apprehensions of respondents about the bias or partiality of Judge
Dicdican in favor of petitioners were well-founded. 7 It held that the totality of the circumstances
showed that he had a glaring animosity towards their case. 8 It further ruled that he had "likewise
displayed petulance and impatience in his handling of the case, a norm of behavior inconsistent
with the cold neutrality of an impartial judge."9
10

The CA based its ruling on the following circumstances pointed out by respondents:

1. Judge Dicdican denied the Motion to Hear Affirmative Defenses filed by

respondents, but in the same Order ruled on its merits without giving them an
opportunity to be heard.
2. The above Order of the judge was too well-prepared to be extemporaneous, leading
respondents to suspect that he was bent on deciding the case in favor of petitioners.
3. Without indicating for the record respondents objections, Judge Dicdican admitted
all exhibits of petitioners and even allowed their witnesses to answer all questions, even
if he had not yet resolved the applicability of the Statute of Frauds.
4. The judge denied respondents requests for postponements, which were reasonable
and justified under the circumstances. Further, during the April 28, 1999 hearing, he
allowed petitioners to present their witnesses even in the absence of respondents
counsel. And, knowing that the counsel was absent when those witnesses testified in the
previous hearing, the judge forced him to cross-examine them in the subsequent April
30, 1999 hearing.
5. During the hearing for respondents Motion for Inhibition, the judge started to hear
the case before the scheduled time.
6. Judge Dicdican issued a Pretrial Order stating that the possibility of a compromise
was "nil" despite the pretrial manifestation of respondents counsel that the parties were
willing to explore the possibility of a compromise.
Hence, this Petition.11
The Issues
In their Memorandum,12 petitioners submit the following issues for our consideration:
"1. Whether or not the respondents are guilty of forum shopping in filing two petitions
for certiorari in the CA based on the same order of Judge Dicdican;
"2. Whether or not the CA was correct in enjoining Judge Dicdican from sitting in the
case at bar on the ground of bias and partiality;
"3. Whether or not filing of a motion for inhibition on flimsy grounds is not a form of
forum shopping."13
Simply stated, the issues in this case are as follows: (1) whether respondents are guilty of forum
shopping, and (2) whether Judge Dicdican should have inhibited himself.

The Courts Ruling

The Petition is meritorious insofar as the second issue is concerned. Judge Dicdican need not
inhibit himself.
First Issue:
Forum Shopping
Petitioners argue that respondents should have raised the issue of Judge Dicdicans alleged bias
and partiality in their first Petition for Certiorari docketed as CA-GR SP No. 49084, not in the
present case docketed in the appellate court as CA-GR SP No. 54985. For filing two Petitions
raising the same issues, respondents allegedly split their cause of action and thus became guilty
of forum shopping. Petitioners further contend that the elements of litis pendentia or res
judicata are present in the case at bar, because the matter raised in this Petition could have been
taken up in the first one.
We disagree. This Court has already definitively ruled on this matter in GR No. 146089. 14 In its
Decision, it was confronted with the very same question raised in this Petition. At issue then is
whether there was forum shopping in the filing of two Petitions for Certiorari -- one for CA-GR
SP No. 49084 and the other for CA-GR SP No. 54985, the precursor of the present Petition.

Although we find that respondents did not commit forum-shopping, still we gave due course to
this Petition on the main issue of inhibition. Petitioners argue that the CA erred when it ruled that
Judge Dicdican should be inhibited from hearing Civil Case No. CEB-21854 on the ground of
bias and prejudice.
A critical component of due process is a hearing before a tribunal that is impartial and
disinterested.19 Every litigant is indeed entitled to nothing less than "the cold neutrality of an
impartial judge." All the other elements of due process, like notice and hearing, would be
meaningless if the ultimate decision were to come from a biased judge. 20 Section 1 of Rule 137 of
the Rules of Court provides:
"SECTION 1. Disqualification of judges. - No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in
which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in
which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to
counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he
has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any
inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of
all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.
"A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for
just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above."21

The Court made a distinction between the two Petitions filed. The first involved the "propriety of
the affirmative defenses relied upon by petitioners [herein respondents] in Civil Case No. CEB21 854."15 The second Petition, which is the subject of the present appeal, "raised the issue of
whether or not public respondent Judge Dicdican was guilty of manifest partiality warranting his
inhibition from further hearing Civil Case No. CEB-21 854."16

The Rules contemplate two kinds of inhibition: compulsory and voluntary. The instances
mentioned in the first paragraph of the cited Rule conclusively presume that judges cannot
actively and impartially sit in a case. The second paragraph, which embodies voluntary inhibition,
leaves to the discretion of the judges concerned whether to sit in a case for other just and valid
reasons, with only their conscience as guide.

Below we quote a more important point:

To be sure, judges may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation. 22 But when
circumstances reasonably arouse suspicions, and out of such suspicions a suggestion is made of
record that they might be induced to act with prejudice for or against a litigant, they should
conduct a careful self-examination.23 Under the second paragraph of the cited Section of the
Rules of Court, parties have the right to seek the inhibition or the disqualification of judges who
do not appear to be wholly free, disinterested, impartial or independent in handling a case.
Whether judges should inhibit themselves therefrom rests on their own "sound discretion." 24 That
discretion is a matter of conscience and is addressed primarily to their sense of fairness and
justice.25

"[T]he two petitions did not seek the same relief from the Court of Appeals. In CA-G.R. SP. No.
49084, petitioners prayed, among others, for the annulment of the orders of the trial court
denying their motion for preliminary hearing on affirmative defenses in Civil Case No. CEB21854. No such reliefs are involved in the second petition, where petitioners merely prayed for
the issuance of an order enjoining public respondent Judge Dicdican from further trying the case
and to assign a new judge in his stead."17
It should be clear that our Decision in GR No. 146089 has become final and executory with the
denial18 of respondents [herein petitioners] Motion for Reconsideration therein.
Main Issue:
Inhibition

However, judges are exhorted to exercise their discretion in a way that the peoples faith in the
courts of justice would not be impaired. A salutary norm for them to observe is to reflect on the
possibility that the losing parties might nurture at the back of their minds the thought that the
former have unmeritoriously tilted the scales of justice against them. 26 Of course, the judges right
must be weighed against their duty to decide cases without fear of repression.

Verily, the second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 137 does not give judges the unfettered
discretion to decide whether to desist from hearing a case. The inhibition must be for just and
valid causes. The mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground for them to inhibit,
especially when the charge is without basis. 27 This Court has to be shown acts or conduct clearly
indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before it can brand them with the stigma of bias or
partiality.28

We are not unmindful of our ruling in the previous Gochan v. Gochan case.36 This Court held
therein that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied the motion of
respondents for a preliminary hearing on their affirmative defenses. But even in that case, two
members of this Court37 dissented and believed that respondent judge (herein Judge Dicdican)
had not committed any grave abuse of discretion in disallowing the preliminary hearing on
respondents affirmative defenses.

In a string of cases, the Supreme Court has said that bias and prejudice, to be considered valid
reasons for the voluntary inhibition of judges, must be proved with clear and convincing
evidence.29 Bare allegations of their partiality will not suffice. It cannot be presumed, especially if
weighed against the sacred oaths of office of magistrates, requiring them to administer justice
fairly and equitably -- both to the poor and the rich, the weak and the strong, the lonely and the
well-connected.30

In any event, this Courts ruling of grave abuse of discretion in a certiorari proceeding such as the
one issued in the earlier Gochan case does not necessarily translate to bias and partiality that
would ipso facto lead to the inhibition of the trial judge. In fact, in the previously cited case, this
Court did not mention any badge of bias or partiality on the part of Judge Dicdican. He was
simply directed to conduct forthwith the preliminary hearing on the affirmative defenses.

Equally important is the established doctrine that bias and prejudice must be shown to have
resulted in an opinion on the merits on the basis of an extrajudicial source, not on what the judge
learned from participating in the case. 31 As long as opinions formed in the course of judicial
proceedings are based on the evidence presented and the conduct observed by the magistrate,
such opinion -- even if later found to be erroneous -- will not prove personal bias or prejudice on
the part of the judge.32 While palpable error may be inferred from the decision or the order itself,
extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias, bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose. At bottom, to
disqualify a judge, the movant must prove bias and prejudice by clear and convincing evidence. 33
Prescinding from the foregoing standards, we do not agree with the Court of Appeals conclusion
that Judge Dicdican has shown a glaring bias against respondents case. His actuations have not
engendered reasonable suspicion as to his fairness and ability to decide the case with the cold
neutrality of an impartial judge. Verily, respondents have not convinced us that Judge Dicdican
should inhibit himself from hearing the case.

To repeat, as long as opinions formed in the course of judicial proceedings are based on the
evidence presented and the conduct observed by the judge, such opinion -- even if later found to
be erroneous on appeal or made with grave abuse of discretion on certiorari -- will not necessarily
prove personal bias or prejudice on the part of the judge. 38
Neither can respondents convince us that they were deprived of due process. The essence of due
process is the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence available in support
of ones defense.39 Where one is accorded an opportunity to be heard, either through oral
arguments or pleadings, there is no denial of procedural due process. 40 Due process was designed
to afford an opportunity to be heard; an oral hearing need not always be held. Moreover, this
constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if the pleader is granted an opportunity to seek
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. 41

Let us now examine one by one the circumstances relied upon by the CA in ruling for the
inhibition of Judge Dicdican.

Judge Dicdicans Order42 denying respondents Motion for Hearing was based on the pleadings
filed by both parties. Respondents filed their Motion to Hear Affirmative Defenses, while
petitioners filed their Comment to the Motion. 43 Thus, it cannot be said that respondent judge
arbitrarily ruled thereon. He thereafter allowed the respondents and petitioners to file their
Motion for Reconsideration44 and Opposition,45 respectively, before deciding on the matter again.

Denial of Respondents Motion to Hear Affirmative Defenses

Character of the Order Denying Respondents Motion

The first circumstance which the appellate court relied upon to show the alleged bias and
partiality of Judge Dicdican was his denial of the Motion to Hear Affirmative Defenses filed by
respondents.34 According to them, even if the judge had denied their Motion, he still ruled on the
merits of their affirmative defenses and thus deprived them of an opportunity to be heard.

Respondents further argue that before hearing their Motion to Hear Affirmative Defenses, Judge
Dicdican had already prepared an Order denying their plea. This is an allegation that they have
not been able to prove. We cannot rely merely on their submissions that he was in fact bent on
ruling against them. Petitioners correctly argued as follows:

The fact that respondents Motion for Hearing was denied does not by itself show bias and
partiality. Clearly, Judge Dicdican based his denial on the Rules of Court, according to which a
preliminary hearing on affirmative defenses is indeed discretionary on the part of a judge. 35 Thus,
Judge Dicdican cannot be charged with bias and partiality, merely on the basis of his decision not
to grant a motion for a preliminary hearing.

"The fact is that Judge Dicdican really dictated his Order in open court with legal citations and
authorities but did not prepare it beforehand. We respectfully submit that said act cannot be
considered as a manifestation of bias and partiality and deprived respondents of due process
because the motion filed by respondents, copy of which was attached as Annex A to the reply of
petitioners was complete with the evidence already attached as annexes thereto and contained

citation of authorities and the opposition of petitioners, copy of which was attached to the reply
as Annex B, contained citations of authorities as well."46
The argument that the Order of Judge Dicdican was too scholarly to be extemporaneous is merely
the conjecture of respondents. This characterization does not show in any way that he was biased
or partial. Besides, as earlier adverted to, both the Motion and the Comment thereto had been
filed days before the hearing thereon. It is not unusual -- in fact, it is expected -- that the judge
would study the Motion and the Comment filed before him. If he prepared well for the
arguments, he should be commended, not faulted.
Besides, Judge Dicdican ruled that the issues raised in the Motion could be determined on the
basis of preponderance of evidence presented by both parties. 47 This means that he did not
foreclose the possibility that the parties would ventilate these defenses during the trial.
To show his fairness, he even allowed the postponement of the pretrial set for that hearing upon
the request of respondents counsel. This act showed that he was in no hurry to decide the case in
favor of petitioners.
As to respondents doubts arising from the alleged "suspicious" appearance of the TSN of the
August 11, 2003 hearing, this Court cannot take it as an indication of partiality on the part of the
judge. Clearly, it was Atty. Jonathan G. Talabo, the branch clerk of court of Branch 11 of the RTC
of Cebu, who had issued the Certification48 dated November 11, 1999. Respondents failed to
prove that Judge Dicdican had a hand in its issuance. What is clear is that the TSN of August 11,
1998 was prepared and signed by Emelyn V. Fuentes, stenographic reporter of Branch 11 of the
RTC of Cebu. Connecting this "suddenly found" TSN to Judge Dicdican is not only speculative,
but also baseless and unfair and will not suffice to bar respondent judge from performing his
lawfully mandated duty.

We do not agree, either, with the appellate courts findings that petitioners witnesses were
allowed to answer all questions asked of them, even if respondent judge had not yet ruled on the
applicability of the Statute of Frauds.
Aside from the fact that these objections are sweeping and unsubstantiated, they should have
been raised before the trial judge himself. Respondents had every opportunity to object to the
questions the witnesses were asked and the answers the latter gave during the trial, based on the
following provision of the Rules of Court:
"Objection to a question propounded in the course of the oral examination of a witness shall be
made as soon as the grounds therefor shall become reasonably apparent."52
As to the striking out of answers, the rule on evidence (Rule 132) provide:
"SEC. 39. Striking out answer. - Should a witness answer the question before the adverse party
had the opportunity to voice fully its objection to the same, and such objection is found to be
meritorious, the court shall sustain the objection and order the answer given to be stricken off the
record.
"On proper motion, the court may also order the striking out of answers which are incompetent,
irrelevant, or otherwise improper."53
Respondents have not shown that they were in any way denied their right to object to questions
propounded in the course of the hearing.
Denial of Requests for Postponement and the Forced Cross-Examination of Witnesses

Admission of Petitioners Exhibits Without indicating Respondents Objections

The CA also ruled that the denial by Judge Dicdican of the postponements requested by
respondents counsels also showed his bias and partiality.

In his Order49 dated June 2, 1999, Judge Dicdican admitted the documentary evidence of
plaintiffs. He did so after petitioners had filed their Formal Offer of Exhibits 50 and respondents
their Comments (on Plaintiffs Exhibits).51 The former was filed on May 5, 1999 and the latter on
May 12, 1999. He issued his Order admitting the evidence of petitioners only on June 2, 1999 or
a good 21 days after respondents had submitted their objections to the formers exhibits.

We disagree. A motion for continuance or postponement is not a matter of right, but a request
addressed to the sound discretion of the court.54 Parties asking for postponement have absolutely
no right to assume that their motions would be granted. Thus, they must be prepared on the day of
the hearing.55

We cannot see how such an Order would translate to bias and partiality. Respondents argue the
judge should have indicated their objections for the record. But it is clear that he indeed allowed
them to file their Comment/Objections to petitioners Formal Offer. It is enough that he allowed
both parties to be heard, and that he decided based on their submissions.

Given this rule, the question of the correctness of the denial of respondents requests for
postponements was addressed to the sound discretion of Judge Dicdican. His action thereon
cannot be disturbed by appellate courts in the absence of any clear and manifest abuse of
discretion resulting in a denial of substantial justice. 56 Since there was no such finding with
regard to the disallowance of the requests for postponement, the CA cannot overturn the decision
of the judge. Much less can it assume his bias and partiality based merely on the denial of the
requests for postponement.

Moreover, respondents cannot claim that all their requests were turned down by Judge Dicdican.
This Court takes notice of the fact that respondents asked for an extension of time to file their
answer and later asked for two postponements of the pretrial. In fact, when the pretrial was
finally set for August 11, 1998, they then filed their Motion to Hear Affirmative Defenses. And
when the judge denied it, they again asked for a postponement of the pretrial, a request that was
readily granted by the trial court.
Respondents fault Judge Dicdican for not postponing the pretrial on November 9, 1998, when
their counsel had to represent the Cebu Lions Club in an international conference in Japan. But
they should be aware that the court had already given them one whole month to procure from the
Court of Appeals a temporary restraining order (TRO) to cause the suspension of the proceedings
in the lower court. So, on November 9, 1998, they were given sufficient time to prepare for the
pretrial. If their counsel learned of the date of the conference only recently, he could have easily
assigned the case to Atty. Vicente A. Espina Jr., his co-counsel. In fact, Atty. Espina, armed with a
special power of attorney to represent respondents, was present in court on the hearing date. He
even admitted that he was able to read the records of the case. Also, as correctly argued by
petitioners counsel, respondents had with them their pretrial briefs which could have guided
them.
As can be seen from the Pretrial Order, respondents were ably represented by Atty. Espina.
Hence, they suffered no prejudice even if the pretrial was not postponed. The trial court observed
during the hearing:
"The Court actually does not consider that as the reason to postpone the pre-trial in this case
because it seemed that there is a pattern to delay. And the Court can not countenance that there
would be no movement of this case. There seemed to be a pattern as observed by the Court. So
we will go on with the pre-trial if there is no possibility of an amicable settlement." 57
It seems that respondents have no one else to blame but themselves for the trial courts denial of
their requests for postponement.
As to the other time when the request of respondents for postponement was denied by Judge
Dicdican, this Court notes that both their counsels -- Attys. Lim and Espina -- were present
during the preceding hearing when the dates of the succeeding hearings were agreed upon. As
stated in the TSN,58 the parties agreed that the next setting would be on April 28, 1999 at 9:00
a.m. and on April 30, 1999 at 10:00 a.m. But on April 23, 1999 -- more than two months after the
trial date had been set and only five days before the scheduled hearing -- respondents counsel
filed an urgent Motion to Reset the hearing to April 28, 1999, because both lawyers allegedly had
other commitments. Petitioners filed an Opposition to the Motion to Reset; thus, respondent
judges denial of the Motion was not at all arbitrary or whimsical.
The appellate court also faults Judge Dicdican for allowing petitioners to present their witnesses
even in the absence of respondents counsel and, on the succeeding hearing, for forcing the
counsel to cross-examine the witness presented previously.

As we have ruled above, parties asking for postponement have absolutely no right to assume that
their motion would be granted and must thus be prepared on the day of the hearing. 59 What
further militates against respondents counsel is his excuse that he was informed by a court
personnel that his Motion to Reset had been granted. 60 Supposedly because of this information,
the counsel was under the impression that there would be no hearing on the last scheduled date.
His assumption that his motion to reset would be granted was bad enough. What was worse was
that, in following up the proceedings of the case, he relied on the unauthorized communication of
an unidentified court personnel. He could have easily verified if there was a hearing, and what
transpired if it indeed there was one. This is the duty imposed upon lawyers.
Due diligence requires that lawyers should obtain timely information from the concerned clerks
of court regarding action on their motions; lack of notice thereof will not necessarily make them
any less accountable for their omission.61
Petitioners correctly argue thus:
"x x x. Judge Dicdican then allowed the counsel for petitioners to conduct the redirect
examination of his first witness, and to conduct the direct examination of his second witness,
giving the petitioners the opportunity to conduct the re-cross examination of said witness and
cross-examination of the second witness on April 30, 1999. Judge Dicdican therefore was very
fair and considerate to respondents in giving them the opportunity to re-cross examine and crossexamine petitioners witnesses instead of considering the respondents to have waived said right
which was within his prerogative."62
Indeed, the right to cross-examine may be waived. 63 The repeated failure of a party to crossexamine a witness is an implied waiver of that right. 64 Respondents in this case were afforded the
opportunity to cross and re-cross examine the other parties witnesses. It was respondents
counsel who failed to take advantage of these opportunities.
Denial of the Motion for Inhibition
The appellate court maintains that during the hearing for respondents Motion for Inhibition, the
judge called the case before the scheduled time.
Again, this is a claim that remains unproven and unsubstantiated. Hence, it cannot be the
extrajudicial source from which can be inferred bias and partiality. Both parties uniformly quote
the proceedings on the hearing date for the case succeeding that on which the Motion to Inhibit
was to be heard:
"COURT:
Were you here last Monday? I did not see you?

ATTY. LIM:

allowed petitioners to file their Opposition thereto71 and thus showed that he wanted to hear both
sides of the issue.

I was here, your Honor.

COURT:
When this case was called, there was no appearance.
COURT INTERPRETER:
He came late, Your Honor.
ATTY. LIM:

We do not find the Order72 denying the Motion for Inhibition arbitrary or whimsical. Respondent
judge clearly explained why the grounds for it were unjust and invalid. On the basis of his
circumspect and judicious ruling, we do not see how bias and partiality on his part can be
inferred.
Thereafter, he allowed a Motion for Reconsideration 73 to be filed with the corresponding
Opposition74 thereto.
We again emphasize that personal bias or prejudice is not proved by the opinions the judge forms
in the course of judicial proceedings, so long as these have been based on the evidence presented
and the conduct observed by the judge, even if such opinions are later found to be erroneous. 75

I was here, your Honor, at 10:00 oclock, your Honor, in fact, there were still many
parties around, your Honor.

Declaration of the Absence of the Possibility of a Compromise

COURT:

Finally, Judge Dicdican was charged with bias, based on his pretrial Order stating that there was
no more possibility of a compromise among the parties.

As far as the minute is concerned, it is not reflected that you were here. When the case
was called you were not here. The court could not be at the mercy of the parties, so, the
court has to act. So, the court stand by that order. So you are not ready."65
Respondents maintain that "[o]n the date of said hearing, counsel for respondents was present at
10:00 a.m. However, he learned that the hearing of the case was called earlier upon order of
Judge Dicdican. Counsel for respondents then decided to leave the courtroom, to inquire later,
albeit unsurprised."66
Without presenting any proof of their presence on the hearing date at the designated time, the
arguments of respondents counsel lose force and credence. Such arguments become even less
convincing when validated against the records of this case. As shown by the Minutes of the
Session67 held on August 9, 1999 at 10:00 a.m., only the counsels for plaintiffs [herein
petitioners] were present.
It should be observed that the entries in official records made in the performance of duty by a
public officer of the Philippines or by some other person especially enjoined by law are prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated. 68 This means that, in the present case, such evidence is
satisfactory, more so because it has been uncontradicted by opposing evidence. Also, when the
court interpreter69 signed the Minutes of the Session, it is presumed that official duty was
regularly performed.70
In any event, Judge Dicdican cannot be accused of evading the Motion filed for his inhibition. He
allowed it to be filed and even cancelled one hearing until the resolution of that Motion. He also

From the time the original Complaint was filed up to the date of the pretrial, the parties had more
than seven months to enter into a compromise agreement. This was more than sufficient time. It
escapes this Court why, exactly on the day of the pretrial, respondents suddenly informed the
court that it was exploring the possibility of a settlement. Besides, their absence during the
pretrial negated the sincerity of their desire to enter into a settlement. We take note of the
following argument of petitioners:
"But Judge Dicdican did not believe in their sincerity to pursue an amicable settlement of the case
since they had already filed their first petition for certiorari seeking the issuance of a TRO/Writ of
Preliminary [lnjunction] enjoining him from taking further proceedings in the case below.
Furthermore, they were never present at the scheduled pre-trials and hearings of the case." 76
ALL TOLD, a perusal of the records of this case will reveal that respondents failed to adduce any
extrinsic evidence to prove that Judge Dicdican had been motivated by malice or prejudice in
issuing the assailed rulings. They simply lean on his series of allegedly adverse rulings, which
they characterize as tainted with bias and partiality. We note that his rulings resolving the various
motions or requests they had filed were all made only after considering the arguments raised by
all the parties. It is true that he erred in some of his rulings, but such errors do not necessarily
translate to prejudice. The instances when he allegedly exhibited antagonism and partiality
against respondents and/or their counsels did not deprive them of a fair and impartial trial.
The parties should be guided by the words of this Court in Pimentel v. Salanga:77

"Efforts to attain fair, just and impartial trial and decision, have a natural and alluring appeal. But,
we are not licensed to indulge in unjustified assumptions, or make a speculative approach to this
ideal. It ill behooves this Court to tar and feather a judge as biased or prejudiced, simply because
counsel for a party litigant happens to complain against him. As applied here, respondent judge
has not as yet crossed the line that divides partiality and impartiality. He has not thus far stepped
to one side of the fulcrum. No act or conduct of his would show arbitrariness or prejudice.
Therefore, we are not to assume what respondent judge, not otherwise legally disqualified, will
do in a case before him. x x x Prejudice is not to be presumed. Especially if weighed against a
judges legal obligation under his oath to administer justice without respect to person and do
equal right to the poor and the rich. To disqualify or not to disqualify himself then, as far as
respondent judge is concerned, is a matter of conscience."78
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed CA Decision and
Resolution REVERSED andSET ASIDE. The prayer for the inhibition of Judge Isaias Dicdican is
hereby DENIED. He is DIRECTED to proceed with the hearing of CEB-21 854 with all
reasonably speed. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

On 14 December 2010, a complaint was filed by Konrad A. Rubin (Konrad) and his father,
Conrado C. Rubin (Conrado ), against Hon. Evelyn Corpus-Cabochan (Judge Cabochan),
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 98, Quezon City for serious
misconduct, gross ignorance of the law, rendering an unjust judgment and gross inefficiency.
The complaint stemmed from the decision rendered and order of voluntary inhibition issued by
Judge Cabochan in Civil Case No. Q-09-64898.
ANTECEDENT FACTS
A civil case for damages was filed by Konrad before the RTC of Quezon City against Virgine
Calvo, Alexander Ong and Martin Estores, as owner, general manager and employee,
respectively, of Trans Orient Container Terminal Services (co-defendants). The case was raffled
to RTC, Branch 82.
After due proceedings, the presiding judge of RTC, Branch 82 found that the totality of the claim
was onlyP311,977.00, hence, ruled that it was the first level court that had jurisdiction over the
case. The case was dismissed without prejudice to its re-filing before the proper court.
Consequently, Konrad filed the complaint before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) and this
was raffled to Branch 32. The co-defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction for the reason that the additional substantial allegations in the new complaint changed
the very nature of the action, such that the subject matter thereof became incapable of pecuniary
estimation.

*Unjust Judgment

After due consideration of the motion to dismiss and plaintiffs opposition thereto, the presiding
judge of the MeTC issued an order denying the motion to dismiss, upon a finding that the claim
for damages as clearly stated in the complaint is capable of pecuniary estimation, the amount of
which falls within the jurisdiction of the MeTC.
Trial on the merits thereafter ensued.

OCA I.P.I. NO. 11-3589-RTJ

July 29, 2013

KONRAD A. RUBIN and CONRADO C. RUBIN, Complainants,

vs.
JUDGE EVELYN CORPUS-CABOCHAN, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch
98, Quezon City,Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:

On 24 June 2008, a decision was rendered in favor of plaintiff Konrad, directing the codefendants to pay him the amounts of P7,000.00 as temperate damages; P10,000.00 as moral
damages; P10,000.00 as exemplary damages; P10,000.00 as attorneys fees; and P2,901.90 for
litigation costs.
Both of the opposing parties filed a motion for reconsideration.
In an order dated 19 March 2009, the MeTC decision was modified by increasing the award of
moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees to P20,000.00 each.

Still not satisfied with the decision, both parties appealed the case to the RTC of Quezon City.
The case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-09-64898 and was raffled to RTC, Branch 98,
presided over by Judge Cabochan.
On 1 June 2010, Judge Cabochan rendered her judgment on the appeal. She reversed and set
aside the decision of the MeTC based on her finding that the latter court had no jurisdiction over
the original action. She ruled that the RTC had original jurisdiction over the case and pursuant to
Section 8, Rule 40 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, her court "will proceed to try the case on
the merits upon payment of the appropriate docket fees, as if the case was originally filed with it
without prejudice to the admission of amended pleadings and additional evidence in the interest
of justice."1
Konrad filed a motion for reconsideration assailing respondent Judge Cabochans judgment. The
motion was heard on 23 July 2009.
Several days after the hearing of the Motion for Reconsideration, Konrad, together with his
parents, sent a letter entitled "Request For Help" to the executive judge of RTC, Quezon City,
copy furnished Judge Cabochan; the presiding judges of RTC, Branch 82 and MeTC, Branch 32;
the Chief Justice; and the Court Administrator. In their letter, they expressed their grief over the
judgment rendered by Judge Cabochan which allegedly resulted in a mockery of justice. They
claimed that the judgment not only made the litigation of the case very expensive, it also
prolonged the litigation, in violation of the Constitutional provision and the Rules of Court
mandating a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding in court. 2
In reaction to the "Request For Help" letter filed, Judge Cabochan issued an Order 3 voluntarily
inhibiting herself from the case. She noted that while Konrad had already filed his motion for
reconsideration assailing her judgment, he still resorted to an unfair and inappropriate manner of
questioning her ruling. She contended that the letter expressed the complainants serious doubts
on her competence, partiality and integrity. She stressed that should she continue presiding over
the case, her action will appear to be tainted with bias, hence, she deemed it proper to voluntarily
recuse from the case.
To emphasize her point, Judge Cabochan narrated that during the hearing on complainants
motion for reconsideration on 23 July 2010, Conrado requested that he be allowed to say a word
regarding the controversy, which she graciously granted. To everyones surprise, Conrado took
the occasion to express his utter disappointment on the outcome of the case while pointing his
finger at the judge and declaring that the judgment rendered was unacceptable to Conrado. She
contended that the incident, without a doubt, exposed the animosity of Conrado towards her.5
On 25 August 2010, Conrado wrote a letter to Judge Cabochan reacting on the order of inhibition
issued by the latter. He expressed his opposition over the inhibition and denied the finger pointing
allegation of respondent judge. He maintained that he never pointed a finger at the judge, but
only expressed his sentiment over the outcome of the judgment and moved for the speedy

disposition of the motion for reconsideration. He explained that the opposition to the voluntary
inhibition is only for the purpose of giving the judge a chance to justify/rectify herself.
In a resolution dated 28 September 2010, Acting Executive Judge Fernando T. Sagun, Jr. (Acting
Executive Judge Sagun, Jr.), upheld the voluntary recusal of Judge Cabochan. He relied on
administrative circulars and jurisprudence establishing that a judges voluntary inhibition is a
judicial action which does not require prior administrative approval. 6 He maintained that the
question of whether to inhibit in a case is best left to the sound discretion and conscience of the
presiding judge.
Undeterred, complainants filed a Joint Motion for Reconsideration questioning the resolution
issued by Acting Executive Judge Sagun, Jr., maintaining their vigorous opposition to the
voluntary inhibition of respondent judge. They invoked Konrads right to a speedy resolution of
his claim for damages.
Atty. Salvador B. Aguas, counsel for complainant Konrad, likewise filed a Motion for
Reconsideration questioning the acting executive judges resolution. He contended that
respondent Judge Cabochans right to inhibit from further handling the case, particularly in
resolving plaintiff-appellee/appellants Motion for Reconsideration, should not work against the
important right of his client to a speedy disposition of his case, as the judges right to inhibit is
inferior to the superior mandate of the Constitution because such inhibition will not serve public
interest.7
On 4 November 2010, Acting Executive Judge Sagun, Jr., issued an Order 8 denying for lack of
merit the two motions for reconsideration filed by Konrad and his counsel. He directed that
parties and their counsels file any and subsequent pleadings regarding the case before the RTC
where the case had been re-raffled.
Konrad and Conrado, thereafter, filed the instant administrative complaint against Judge
Cabochan. They alleged that Judge Cabochan committed serious or grave misconduct for falsely
accusing complainant Conrado of pointing his finger at her in the presence of the courts staff and
other litigants; claiming that such statement is untrue and absolutely fabricated. They also
claimed that Judge Cabochan acted in gross ignorance of the law when she ruled that it was the
RTC and not the MeTC that had original jurisdiction over the case. Such ruling allegedly
annulled the 19 February 2011 order of a co-equal court that it was the MeTC that had original
jurisdiction over the case. They likewise accused Judge Cabochan of rendering an unjust
judgment for directing the plaintiff to again pay docket fees and undergo rigorous trial after more
than 10 years of litigation which will, in turn, subject Konrad to bear more expenses, and to suffer
more delay and trauma. Finally, they charged respondent judge of gross inefficiency for rendering
judgment on the appeal beyond the 90-day reglementary period, in violation of Konrads right to
a speedy disposition of his case.9
For the alleged infractions, complainants insisted that Judge Cabochan should not only be
dismissed from the service but should also be disbarred.

In her comment dated 10 February 2011, Judge Cabochan refuted point by point the accusations
hurled against her by the complainants. She maintained that she is not guilty of serious or grave
misconduct because she did not falsely accuse Conrado when she stated that the latter pointed his
finger at her while loudly expressing his utter disappointment at the outcome of the case. She
averred that the incident was done in full view of everyone present in the courtroom at that time.
To attest to such fact, she attached to her comment the affidavits of Court Stenographer Gloria E.
de Leon, Court Aide Rosalina C. Nunag, Court Interpreter Joseph H. Garcia and Attorney Romeo
L. Erenio, who all witnessed the incident that transpired during the hearing.
She explained that she is not guilty of gross ignorance of the law because her judgment was based
on her sound appreciation of the evidence on record and the applicable law and jurisprudence on
the matter. Her conclusion that the original jurisdiction was vested in the RTC was done in good
faith and without malice nor with deliberate intention to favor or perpetuate an injustice to any of
the parties. She maintained that her decision is based on the fact that the total amount of damages
claimed was within the RTCs jurisdictional threshold.
She averred that she is likewise not guilty of rendering an unjust judgment because there is no
final decree yet declaring that her judgment was grossly erroneous. She insisted that the filing of
the administrative complaint is premature considering that the parties are not without judicial
remedies to question her ruling.
As regards the charge of gross inefficiency, Judge Cabochan explained that the case was
submitted for decision only after the parties had been given ample opportunity to file their
respective memorandum on appeal. Contrary to complainants allegations, the case was not yet
considered submitted for decision on 29 July 2009. She argued that the reckoning date to
determine the presence of delay is not 29 July 2009 but 4 February 2010, after the issuance of her
Order declaring the case submitted for decision. She noted that in the spirit of fair play and
observance of due process, she issued Orders dated 17 August 2009 and 28 October 2009,
directing co-defendant Martin Estores to file his brief/memorandum. Unfortunately, the latter
Order was returned with the annotation that Mr. Estores had already died.
If ever there was delay in the resolution of the appeal, Judge Cabochan submitted that it was only
for a matter of less than a month and not ten months as alleged by the complainants. She
explained that the delay was attributable to her frail health condition and her courts heavy
caseload.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR
In its report10 dated 26 November 2012, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found
respondent Judge Cabochan not guilty of serious or grave misconduct; of gross ignorance of the
law; and of rendering an unjust judgment. The OCA, however, found her guilty of gross
inefficiency for her delay in rendering a decision on the appeal.

OUR RULING
We agree with the findings of the OCA. The record is bereft of any evidence to prove
complainants contention that Judge Cabochan is guilty of serious or grave misconduct. Other
than complainants and their witness, Atty. Arceli A. Rubins bare allegation that Judge Cabochan
made a false accusation regarding the finger pointing incident, there were no other evidence
adduced to rebut the statements made by respondent judge and her witnesses. Besides, the
affidavit of Atty. Rubin cannot be said to have come from a disinterested person because not only
is she one of the counsels of the complainants, she is also the wife of Conrado and the mother of
Konrad.
On the other hand, the allegation of Judge Cabochan regarding the finger pointing incident is
fully supported by the statements of three of the courts staff and a disinterested lawyer, who were
all present in the courtroom when the incident occurred. Complainants insistence that these
witnesses were influenced by respondent judge into making those statements deserves scant
consideration. In administrative proceedings, not only does the burden of proof that the
respondent committed the act complained of rests on complainants, that burden is not satisfied
when complainants rely on mere assumptions and suspicions as evidence. 11
In the case of Office of the Court Administrator v. Lopez, 12 the Court defined misconduct as "a
transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior
or gross negligence by a public officer." The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the
additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or to disregard established
rules, which must be established by substantial evidence.
It is clear from the aforesaid definition that respondent Judge Cabochan is not guilty of grave or
serious misconduct. Even assuming that Judge Cabochan erred in the narration of facts as stated
in her order of inhibition, still she cannot be held liable in view of complainants failure to
establish that she was motivated by corruption or an intention to violate the law or to disregard
established rules when she made the statement. What has been clearly established is that Conrado
indeed pointed his finger during the alleged incident and even admitted such fact in his reply,
although he claims that it was not directed to the judge but to the counsel for the defendants. 13
We have observed that complainants focused mainly on the finger pointing incident. A perusal of
the order of inhibition, however, would reveal that the incident is not the primary reason for
respondent Judge Cabochans recusal from the case. She cited the "Request For Help" letter as
her main basis as she believed that it is a clear indication that the complainants entertain serious
doubts on her competence, partiality and integrity. She was therefore exercising her judicial
prerogative and discretion whe she recused herself from the case. We have always maintained
that judges, like Caesars wife, should be above suspicion. 14
In People v. Hon. Ma. Theresa L. Dela Torre-Yadao et al., 15 this Court held that voluntary
inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and sound discretion on the part of the judge since

he is in a better position to determine whether a given situation would unfairly affect his attitude
towards the parties or their cases.
Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court sets forth the rule on inhibition and disqualification of
judges, to wit:
SECTION 1. Disqualification of judges. - No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in
which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in
which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to
counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of civil law, or in which he has
been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any
inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of
all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for
just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above. (Emphasis supplied.)
The aforesaid rule enumerates the specific grounds upon which a judge may be disqualified from
participating in a trial. It must be borne in mind that the inhibition of judges is rooted in the
Constitution, specifically Article III, the Bill of Rights, which requires that a hearing is conducted
before an impartial and disinterested tribunal because unquestionably, every litigant is entitled to
nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. All the other elements of due process,
like notice and hearing, would be meaningless if the ultimate decision would come from a partial
and biased judge.16
Certainly, a presiding judge must maintain and preserve the trust and faith of the parties-litigants.
He must hold himself above reproach and suspicion. At the very first sign of lack of faith and
trust in his actions, whether well-grounded or not, the judge has no other alternative but to inhibit
himself from the case.17 The better course for the judge under the circumstances is to disqualify
himself. That way, he avoids being misunderstood; his reputation for probity and objectivity is
preserved. What is more important, the ideal of impartial administration of justice is lived up
to.18 Hence, Judge Cabochan should not be condemned for her recusal in Civil Case No. Q-0964898.
We likewise find the charges of ignorance of the law and rendering of an unjust judgment bereft
of merit.1wphi1 It is clear that Judge Cabochans judgment was issued in the proper exercise of
her judicial functions, and as such, is not subject to administrative disciplinary action; especially
considering that complainants failed to establish bad faith on the part of the judge. Well
entrenched is the rule that a judge may not be administratively sanctioned from mere errors of
judgment in the absence of showing of any bad faith, fraud, malice, gross ignorance, corrupt
purpose, or a deliberate intent to do an injustice on his or her part. 19
Complainants were assailing the propriety of the decision rendered by Judge Cabochan.
Complainants should be reminded that unfavorable rulings are not necessarily erroneous. Should

they disagree with the ruling, there are judicial remedies available for them under the Rules of
Court. As a matter of public policy, a judge cannot be subjected to liability for any of his official
acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith. To hold otherwise would be to
render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the
process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. 20
Moreover, we have explained that administrative complaints against judges cannot be pursued
simultaneously with the judicial remedies accorded to parties aggrieved by the erroneous orders
or judgments of the former. Administrative remedies are neither alternative to judicial review nor
do they cumulate thereto, where such review is still available to the aggrieved parties and the
cases not yet been resolved with finality.21 In the instant case, complainants had in fact availed of
the remedy of motion for reconsideration prior to their filing of the administrative complaint.
Acting Executive Judge Sagun, Jr., was correct when he ruled on the inhibition request in
accordance with existing issuances of the Court and caused the re-raffling of the case to another
RTC in the station for continuation of hearing.22 Interestingly, we note that complainants did not
take it against Judge Romero-Maglaya, the judge to whom the case was reassigned, when the
latter affirmed the ruling of Judge Cabochan regarding the requirement to pay again the docket
fees. Neither did they assail the judgment as being unjust or oppressive.
On the charge of undue delay in resolving the appeal, we adopt the findings of the OCA that
Judge Cabochan is indeed guilty thereof.
We agree with respondent judge that the case could not have been considered submitted for
decision on 29 July 2009 as claimed by complainants. Such assertions were belied by the fact that
Konrad, through his counsel, even filed on 5 October 2009 a Brief for Plaintiff as Appellee to
refute the allegations of co-defendants in their memorandum.
Be that as it may, whether the appeal was decided after ten months from the time it was submitted
for decision, as insisted by the complainants, or slightly less than a month, as admitted by Judge
Cabochan, the inescapable fact is that there was delay in deciding the appeal.
The rules and jurisprudence are clear on the matter of delay. Failure to decide cases and other
matters within the reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition
of administrative sanction against the erring magistrate. 23 The penalty to be imposed on the judge
varies depending on the attending circumstances of the case. In deciding the penalty to be
imposed, the Court takes into consideration, among others, the period of delay; the damage
suffered by the parties as a result of the delay; the number of years the judge has been in the
service; the health and age of the judge; and the case load of the court presided over by the judge.
In the instant case, we find it reasonable to mitigate the penalty to be imposed on respondent
judge taking into consideration that this is her first infraction in her more than 23 years in the
service; her frail health; the case load of her court; and her candid admission of her infraction.

Thus, we admonish respondent judge to be more circumspect in the exercise of her judicial
functions to ensure that cases in her court are decided within the period required by law.
WHEREFORE, the complaint of serious or grave misconduct, gross ignorance of the law and
rendering an unjust judgment against Judge Evelyn Corpus-Cabochan, RTC, Branch 98, Quezon
City is DISMISSED for lack of merit. For her delay in resolving Civil Case No. Q-09-64898,
Judge Cabochan is ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in the exercise of her judicial
functions. She is warned that a commission of the same or similar offense in the future shall merit
a more severe sanction from the Court. Judge Cabochan is reminded to be mindful of the due
dates of cases submitted for decision in her court to avoid delay in the dispensation of justice.
SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. MTJ-05-1580

October 6, 2010
[Formerly OCA IPI No. 04-1608-MTJ]

In his order dated July 14, 2004, however, respondent Judge denied the motion for immediate
execution,3stating:

LOURDES B. FERRER and PROSPERIDAD M. ARANDEZ, Complainants,

vs.
JUDGE ROMEO A. RABACA, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 25, Manila, Respondent.

A Notice of Appeal dated July 9, 2004, having been seasonably filed by counsel for the
defendant, let the records of the above-captioned case be, as it is hereby ordered, elevated to the
Regional Trial Court of Manila for appropriate proceedings and disposition.

DECISION

In view thereof, no more action shall be taken on the Motion for Execution dated July 8, 2004
filed by the plaintiff thru counsel.

BERSAMIN, J.:
SO ORDERED.
This administrative case charges Hon. Romeo A. Rabaca, then the Presiding Judge of Branch 25
of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (MeTC), with ignorance of the law, disregard of the
law, dereliction of duty, knowingly rendering an unjust interlocutory order, and violation of the
Code of Conduct for Government Officials.

According to the complainants, their counsel talked with respondent Judge about the matter.
Allegedly, respondent Judge told their counsel that "if you think the court is wrong, file a motion
for reconsideration." With that, the plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration, which respondent
Judge nonetheless denied in his order dated July 28, 2004,4 thuswise:

The complainants were the President and the Executive Director of the plaintiff in Civil Case No.
176394-CV of the MeTC, an ejectment suit entitled Young Womens Christian Association, Inc.
v. Conrado Cano. After trial, Civil Case No. 176394-CV was decided on June 22, 2004 by
respondent Judge,1 who disposed as follows:

Considering that the Court has already given due course to the appeal of the defendant which was
perfected within the reglementary period, no more action will be taken on the Motion for
Reconsideration dated July 19, 2004 filed by the plaintiff thru counsel.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendant ordering the latter as follows:

The Branch Clerk of Court is hereby directed to immediately forward the records of this case to
the Regional Trial Court, Manila.

(a) to vacate the premises located at Ground Floor, YMCA, 1144 Gen. Luna St.,
Ermita, Manila; and surrender possession thereof to plaintiff;
(b) to pay plaintiff the sum of Php45,211.80 representing his arrears in rentals from
February 2003 to July 2003 at Php7,535.30 a month plus the further sum of
Php7,535.30 a month as reasonable value for the continued use and occupation of the
premises starting August 2003 until the same is finally vacated and possession thereof
is turn-over to plaintiff;
(c) to pay the plaintiff the sum of Php20,000 as attorneys fees; and
(d) to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
On July 12, 2004, the plaintiffs counsel filed a motion for immediate execution, praying that a
writ of execution be issued "for the immediate execution of the aforesaid Judgment." The plaintiff
cited Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court as basis for its motion. 2

SO ORDERED.
The complainants averred that respondent Judges denial of their motions had rendered their
victory inutile, and had unfairly deprived the plaintiff of the possession of the premises. They
further averred that respondent Judges refusal to perform an act mandated by the Rules of Court
had given undue advantage to the defendant to the plaintiffs damage and prejudice.
The Court required respondent Judge to comment on the administrative complaint against him.
In his comment dated September 16, 2004,5 respondent Judge denied the charges. He explained
that he had honestly thought that his court had lost jurisdiction over the case pursuant to the
provision of Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court (which provides that "in appeals by notice
of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due
time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties") once he had given due course
to the defendants notice of appeal. He claimed that he had issued the orders in good faith and
with no malice after a fair and impartial evaluation of the facts, applicable rules, and
jurisprudence; and that if he had thereby committed lapses in the issuance of the orders, his doing
so should be considered as error of judgment on his part.

He lastly insisted that he did not know personally the parties in Civil Case No. 176394-CV, and
had absolutely no reason to give undue favor or advantage to the defendant; that the complainants
did not submit evidence to show that the orders had been issued for a consideration, material or
otherwise, or that his issuance of the orders had been motivated by ill-will or bad faith.
In their reply dated September 22, 2004,6 the complainants contended that respondent Judge
exhibited his ignorance of the law and procedure in relying on Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court which referred to appeals from the Regional Trial Court; that Rule 40, which contained
provisions on appeal from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts, and which
provided in its Section 4 that the perfection of the appeal and the effect of such perfection should
be governed by the provisions of Section 9 of Rule 41, concerned appeals by notice of appeal in
general; and that instead, the applicable rule should be Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.
The complainants pointed out that respondent Judge apparently did not know that appeal in
forcible entry and detainer cases was not perfected by the mere filing of a notice of appeal (as in
ordinary actions) but by filing of a notice of appeal and a sufficient supersedeas bond approved
by the trial judge executed to the plaintiff to pay the rents, damages and costs accruing down to
the time of the judgment appealed from. They asserted that respondent Judges invocation of
good faith and error of judgment did not absolve him of liability, because he had grossly
neglected his duties mandated by law by failing and refusing to act on their motion for immediate
execution and motion for reconsideration and by giving due course to the appeal despite no
supersedeas bond having been filed and approved by the trial court.

supersedeas bond executed in favor of the plaintiff to answer for rents, damages and costs, and, if
the judgment of the court requires it, he should likewise deposit the amount of the rent before the
appellate court from the time during the pendency of the appeal.Otherwise, execution becomes
ministerial and imperative. (Philippine Holding Corporation vs. Valenzuela, 104 SCRA 401 as
cited in Hualam Construction and Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA
612, 626).
In the case at bar, defendant seasonably filed his Notice of Appeal dated 9 July 2004 on 13 July
2004; he however failed to file any supersedeas bond. Prior to the filing of such notice of appeal,
more specifically on 12 July 2004, complainants have already filed their Motion for Execution
dated 8 July 2004. Instead of acting on the Motion for Execution, respondent Judge Rabaca gave
due course to the appeal in an Order dated 14 July 2004 and directed his Branch Clerk of Court to
elevate the records of the case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The Branch Clerk of Court
however failed to forward the records to the RTC. This fact is clear from Judge Rabacas Order
dated 28 July 2004 wherein he directed the Branch Clerk of Court to forward the records of the
case to the Manila Regional Trial Court immediately.
From the foregoing, it is clear that when the complainant moved for the immediate execution of
Judge Rabacas decision, the latter still had jurisdiction over the case. He therefore clearly erred
when he refused to act on the Motion for Execution. The relevant question that we should resolve
however is whether such error is an error of judgment or an error amounting to incompetence that
calls for administrative discipline.

In his memorandum dated January 13, 2005,7 then Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.,
now Associate Justice of the Court, recommended that the administrative complaint against
respondent Judge be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter; and that respondent Judge be
fined in the amount of P5,000.00 with warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would
be dealt with more severely, based on an evaluation of the charges, as follows:

Judge Rabaca claims that he refused to act on the complainants Motion for execution because he
honestly thought that when he gave due course to the defendants appeal which was seasonably
filed, and ordered the elevation of the records to the appellate court, his court already lost
jurisdiction over the case.. In making his ruling, respondent asserts he relied on the provisions of
Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. This provision reads as follows:

EVALUATION: We agree with the complainants that respondent erred when he did not act on
complainants motion for immediate execution.

In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the
appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.

Section 19, Rule 70 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure provides:

He likewise allegedly relied on the ruling of the Court in Administrative Matter OCA IPI No. 031513-MTJ: Susana Joaquin Vda. De Agregado vs. Judge Thelma Bunyi-Medina, MeTJ wherein
the Court said that-

"SEC. 19. If judgment is rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue immediately upon
motion, unlessan appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a
supersedeas bond, approved by the Municipal Trial Court and executed in favor of the plaintiff to
pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from, and
unless, during the pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent
due from time to time under the contract, if any, as determined by the judgment of the Municipal
Trial Court. XXXX XXXX XXXX."
It is clear from the foregoing that the perfection of an appeal by itself is not sufficient to stay the
execution of the judgment in an ejectment case. The losing party should likewise file a

Respondent Judge is correct in saying that she had lost jurisdiction to entertain the motion for
execution after the perfection of the appeal and after she issued an order to transmit the records of
the case to the appellate court for review.
The facts of the case against Judge Bunyi-Medina are however different from those prevailing in
the instant case. In the Medina case, the fifteen (15) day period within which to perfect the appeal
had already lapsed before the complainant therein moved for the execution of the execution
judgment. Clearly therefore, appeal had already been perfected. In the instant case, although the

defendant had filed his appeal, the period to appeal had not yet lapsed since the plaintiff still had
his own period to appeal from the judgment and such period had not yet lapsed. The provision
relied upon by judge Rabaca, more specifically, Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, clearly
states that, "In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon
perfection of the appeals filed on due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other
parties." Moreover and more importantly, the herein complainants filed their Motion for
Execution even before the defendant had filed his Notice of Appeal. Such motion was therefore
still well within the jurisdiction of the lower court.
It is basic rule in ejectment cases that the execution of judgment in favor of the plaintiff is a
matter of right and mandatory. This has been the consistent ruling of the Court in a number of
cases involving the same issue posed before the respondent judge. Respondent Judge is expected
to know this and his justification of erroneous application of the law, although mitigating, could
not exculpate him from liability.
We agree with and adopt the evaluation of the Court Administrator.
Indeed, respondent Judge should have granted the plaintiffs motion for immediate execution
considering that the defendant did not file the sufficient supersedeas bond despite having
appealed. Granting the plaintiffs motion for immediate execution became his ministerial duty
upon the defendants failure to file the sufficient supersedeas bond. Section 19, Rule 70, of the
Rules of Court clearly imposes such duty, viz:
Section 19. Immediate execution of judgment; how to stay same. If judgment is rendered
against the defendant, execution shall issue immediately upon motion, unless an appeal has been
perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a sufficient supersedeas bond, approved by the
Municipal Trial Court and executed in favor of the plaintiff to pay the rents, damages, and costs
accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from, and unless, during the pendency of the
appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time under the
contract, if any, as determined by the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court. In the absence of a
contract, he shall deposit with the Regional Trial Court the reasonable value of the use and
occupation of the premises for the preceding month or period at the rate determined by the
judgment of the lower court on or before the tenth day of each succeeding month or period. The
supersedeas bond shall be transmitted by the Municipal Trial Court, with the other papers, to the
clerk of the Regional Trial Court to which the action is appealed.
xxx
Respondent Judges excuse, that he had lost jurisdiction over the case by virtue of the defendants
appeal, was unacceptable in light of the clear and explicit text of the aforequoted rule. To begin
with, the perfection of the appeal by the defendant did not forbid the favorable action on the
plaintiffs motion for immediate execution. The execution of the decision could not be stayed by
the mere taking of the appeal. Only the filing of the sufficient supersedeas bond and the deposit
with the appellate court of the amount of rent due from time to time, coupled with the perfection

of the appeal, could stay the execution. Secondly, he could not also credibly justify his omission
to act according to the provision by claiming good faith or honest belief, or by asserting lack of
malice or bad faith.1avvphil A rule as clear and explicit as Section 19 could not be misread or
misapplied, but should be implemented without evasion or hesitation. To us, good faith, or honest
belief, or lack of malice, or lack of bad faith justifies a non-compliance only when there is an asyet unsettled doubt on the meaning or applicability of a rule or legal provision. It was not so
herein. And, thirdly, given that his court, being vested with original exclusive jurisdiction over
cases similar to Civil Case No. 176394-CV, had been assigned many such cases, he was not a trial
judge bereft of the pertinent prior experience to act on the issue of immediate execution, a fact
that further exposed the abject inanity of his excuses.
We agree with the complainants insistence, therefore, that respondent Judges omission to apply
Section 19 was inexcusable. He had ignored the urging to follow the clear and explicit provision
of the rule made in the plaintiffs motion for immediate execution. Had he any genuine doubt
about his authority to grant the motion for immediate execution, as he would have us believe, he
could have easily and correctly resolved the doubt by a resort to the Rules of Court, which he
well knew was the repository of the guidelines he was seeking for his judicial action. Neither was
it relevant that he did not know any of the parties, or that he did not corruptly favor the defendant
by his omission. His mere failure to perform a duty enjoined by the Rules of Court sufficed to
render him administratively accountable.
This case is an opportune occasion to remind judges of the first level courts to adhere always to
the mandate under Section 19, Rule 70, of the Rules of Court to issue writs of execution upon
motion of the plaintiffs in actions for forcible entry or unlawful detainer when the defendant has
appealed but has not filed a sufficient supersedeas bond. The summary nature of the special civil
action under Rule 70 and the purpose underlying the mandate for an immediate execution, which
is to prevent the plaintiffs from being further deprived of their rightful possession, should always
be borne in mind.
The recommended penalty of P5,000.00 with warning that a repetition of the same or similar act
would be dealt with more severely is also correct. The Court Administrator rationalized the
recommendation of the penalty thuswise:
Under A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, Gross Ignorance of the Law or Procedure is classified as serious
offense for which the imposable penalty ranges from a fine to dismissal. However, we find
respondents acts not ingrained with malice or bad faith. It is a matter of public policy that in the
absence of fraud, dishonesty or corrupt motive, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not
subject to disciplinary action even though such acts are erroneous. In Domingo vs. Judge
Pagayatan, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1751, 10 June 2003, the penalty of fine in the amount of five
thousand pesos was deemed sufficient where it was held that respondents lack of malice or bad
faith frees him from administrative liability but not for gross ignorance of the law.
We concur with the rationalization of the Court Administrator. Verily, even if respondent Judges
omission would have easily amounted to gross

ignorance of the law and procedure, a serious offense under Section 8, 8 Rule 140, of the Rules of
Court, as amended, the fact that the complainants did not establish that malice or bad faith
impelled his omission to act, or that fraud, dishonesty, or a corrupt motive attended his omission
to act demands a downgrading of the liability. In the absence of any showing that he had been
held guilty of any other administrative offense, 9 and without our attention being called to other
circumstances that might demonstrate respondent Judges dark motives for his inaction, we
should find and consider the recommended penalty of P5,000.00 with warning that a repetition of
the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely to be commensurate to the offense. 10
WHEREFORE, we find respondent JUDGE ROMEO A. RABACA, Presiding Judge of
Branch 25, Metropolitan Trial Court, in Manila guilty of ignorance of the law and procedure, and,
accordingly, impose upon him a fine ofP5,000.00 with warning that a repetition of the same or
similar act would be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. RTJ-01-1648

August 22, 2002

BASA AIR BASE SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION, INC., complainant,

vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT JUDGE GREGORIO G. PIMENTEL, JR., GUAGUA,
PAMPANGA, BRANCH 50,respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
On February 1, 2001, the Office of the Court Administrator received a verified administrative
complaint from Col. Romeo T. Romero, President of Basa Air Base Savings and Loan
Association, Inc. charging respondent Judge Gregorio G. Pimentel, Jr. of RTC Branch 50,
Guagua, Pampanga, with gross ignorance of the law, grave partiality and/or knowingly rendering
an unjust judgment and unreasonable delay in rendering judgment in Criminal Case Nos. G-2768
and G-2772.

counsel: "O, may masasabi ka pa ba?" to which defense counsel replied: "Wala na, sir. Thank
you."
On the charge of gross ignorance of the law and knowingly rendering an unjust judgment,
complainant cites in part the judgment of acquittal, thus:
"Moreover, the prosecution was not able to present any direct evidence which proves the fact in
issue that indeed the accused took, stole and carried away the amount of P5,500.00 not anyone of
the witnesses presented by the prosecution testified that he has seen the accused commit the
crime charged, they merely identified said documents which were allegedly prepared on
December 15, 1989 but were however discovered and unveiled only in July, 1990." (Decision,
Crim. Case No. G-2768)
"No direct evidence proves the fact in issue that the accused indeed took, stole and carried away
with intent to gain the amount of P9,000.00 as presented by the prosecution. Prosecution only
relied on some documents allegedly bearing the initials of the accused." (Decision, Crim. Case
No. G-2772)

The facts: In 1990, the complainant, a non-stock savings and loan association in the Philippine
Air Force charged its teller Asuncion Roque with twenty (20) counts of qualified theft for
mishandling its funds. Some of the cases against the accused were raffled to Branch 50 presided
by respondent RTC Judge Gregorio Pimentel, Jr.

Complainant alleges that their cases were for qualified theft committed by the accused who, as
teller, already had physical possession of the money, hence, there was no need of direct proof to
establish the fact of stealing. Allegedly, it can be established by documentary evidence and
witnesses who knew the transactions.

The administrative charges against respondent arose from two (2) of these qualified theft cases,
Criminal Case Nos. G-2768 and G-2772. The first charge is unreasonable delay in rendering a
judgment. Complainant alleged that although the prosecution filed its last Memorandum in
Criminal Case No. G-2768 on August 2, 1999 and in Criminal Case No. G-2772 on July 25,
2000, respondent took almost eighteen (18) months to decide the case. Section 15 (1) of the
Constitution mandates lower courts to decide cases within three (3) months.

On the charge of delay, respondent alleges that he merely "inherited" the two (2) qualified theft
cases. He did not hear the testimony of the witnesses and was unfamiliar with the facts of the case
when they were reassigned to him. He further claims that it had been barely two (2) years when
he was appointed as judge and, in that period of time, he inventoried all the cases re-assigned to
him and tried his best to apprise himself with their status. Hence, respondent urges that the delay
in the disposition of the two cases was beyond his control and was not done with bad faith or
malice. Respondent appeals to this Court for leniency and understanding of the situation.

The second charge is for grave partiality and/or knowingly rendering an unjust judgment in the
same two cases. Complainant alleges that one Conrado Baluyut, accuseds common-law spouse
and a former member of the complainants Board of Trustees, was reportedly seen frequenting the
chambers of respondent judge during the pendency of the criminal cases before his sala.
Complainant likewise gripes that the accused and her counsel had advance information on the
favorable result of the decision in the two (2) criminal cases against her as they were already
rejoicing when they arrived in court for the promulgation of the judgment. This suspicion was
bolstered when the representative of complainants counsel observed that the defense became
restless when they learned that the assistant provincial prosecutor assigned to both cases could
not appear for the promulgation. The defense allegedly exerted every effort to find an available
prosecutor so the promulgation could proceed as scheduled. True enough, when the judgment was
promulgated, the accused was acquitted in both case. After the promulgation, the representative
of complainants counsel heard respondent judge make the parting statement to the defense

On the charges of gross ignorance of the law, grave partiality and knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment, respondent claims that the same are blatant lies, conjectures and suspicions. He adds
that he cannot be liable for every erroneous decision he renders for the duty to deliberate does not
impose the duty to decide right.
Thereafter, the parties exchanged reply, rejoinder and other pleadings buttressing their positions.
After evaluating the case, the Office of the Court Administrator recommended that respondent be
held administratively liable for his failure to decide the subject criminal cases within the
prescribed period and that he be fined one thousand pesos (P1,000.00). However, it recommended
that the charges of partiality, gross ignorance of the law and knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment be dismissed for lack of merit.

We agree with the recommendation.

On the charge of delay in the rendition of judgment, the Court has always considered a judges
failure to decide a case within the prescribed period of three (3) months as gross inefficiency for
which the imposition of a penalty of fine or suspension is proper.1 In the case at bar, respondent
failed to observe Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which mandates that a
judge shall dispose of the courts business promptly and resolve cases within ninety (90) days
from the submission of the last pleading required. Respondent admitted his failure but pleads for
compassion on the ground that he was a newly-appointed judge and he merely "inherited" most
of the cases pending before him. We cannot consider the excuse as valid. Judges burdened with
heavy caseloads should request the Court for an extension of the reglementary period within
which to decide their cases if they think that they cannot comply with their judicial duty. This
Court, aware of the predicament of most judges, invariably grants said request for good reasons
and upon proper application.2 Respondent judge failed to discharge his basic duty of asking for an
extension of time to decide the subject cases and the omission is without any reason.
On the charges of gross ignorance of the law, grave partiality and/or knowingly rendering an
unjust judgment, the evidence must show that the respondent judge committed an error that was
deliberate, malicious, gross and patent.3 A charge knowingly rendering an unjust judgment
constitutes a criminal offense. The keyword in said offense is "knowingly." Thus, the complainant
must not only prove beyond reasonable doubt that the judgment is patently contrary to law or not
supported by the evidence but that it was also made with deliberate intent to perpetrate an
injustice.4 A judges mere error in the interpretation or application of the law per se will not
warrant the imposition of an administrative sanction against him for no one is infallible.
Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper consideration are sufficient
defenses that will protect a judicial officer from the charge of rendering an unjust decision. 5 In
the case at bar, the mere fact that the respondent found that the prosecution failed to establish
accuseds guilt beyond moral certainty is not an indiciumof his bias. Complainant has not
shown by clear and competent evidence that respondent was moved by bad faith,
corruption, vengeance or some other ill-motive in acquitting the accused. 6 We reiterate that
not every error of judgment renders a judge liable for no judge is beyond error.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court finds respondent Judge Gregorio G. Pimentel, Jr. guilty of
failing to render judgment in criminal Case Nos. G-2768 and G-2772 within the prescribed period
and a FINE of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00) is imposed on him. He is ADMONISHED to be
more circumspect in the performance of his judicial functions as a repetition of the same or
similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely. The charge of gross ignorance of the
law, grave partiality and/or knowingly rendering an unjust judgment against respondent is
dismissed.
SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. RTJ-09-2190

April 23, 2010
(Formerly OCA IPI No. 08-2909-RTJ)
HADJA SOHURAH DIPATUAN, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE MAMINDIARA P. MANGOTARA, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is an Affidavit-Complaint1 dated May 12, 2008, filed by complainant Hadja
Sohurah Dipatuan against respondent Judge Mamindiara P. Mangotara, Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court (Regional Trial Court) of Iligan City, Branch 1, for Gross Ignorance of the Law and
Grave Abuse of Authority.
The antecedent facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows:
On September 5, 2001, a criminal case for murder, docketed as Criminal Case No. 3620-01 was
filed against Ishak M. Abdul and Paisal Dipatuan, complainants husband, before the Regional
Trial Court of Marawi City, Branch 10, then presided by Judge Yusoph Pangadapun, for the
killing of Elias Ali Taher. Judge Pangadapun died during the pendency of the case. The case was
transferred to different judges designated by the Supreme Court to act as Presiding Judge of
Branch 10, namely, Judge Amer Ibrahim, Judge Rasad Balindog, Judge Macaundas Hadjirasul,
Judge Moslemen Macarambon, respondent Judge Mamindiara Mangotara, and Judge Lacsaman
Busran.

Before Judge Macarambon could render a decision on the case, he was appointed as COMELEC
Commissioner. By virtue of Administrative Order No. 201-20072 dated November 16, 2007, the
Supreme Court designated respondent Judge Mamindiara Mangotara, Presiding Judge of the RTC
of Iligan City, Branch 1, Lanao Del Norte, as Acting Presiding Judge of the RTC of Marawi City,
Branch 10. Later on, Mangotara suffered a mild stroke; hence, the Supreme Court, in a
Resolution dated December 26, 2007, revoked the earlier designation of Judge Mangotara and
designated Judge Lacsaman M. Busran as the new Acting Presiding Judge of Branch 10, by virtue
of Administrative Order No. 220-2007.
On December 28, 2007, Mangotara issued the disputed Decision3 in Criminal Case No. 3620-01
and found both accused Abdul and Dipatuan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder and sentenced them to imprisonment of reclusion perpetua. The trial court ruled that the
prosecution was able to establish that Abdul and co-accused Dipatuan acted in conspiracy in
shooting and killing the victim Elias Ali Taher. The court, likewise, increased the accuseds bail
bond from P75,000.00 to P200,000.00.
On January 21, 2008, the accused filed a motion for reconsideration of the Decision. In an Order
dated February 1, 2008, Mangotara denied the motion for lack of merit. 4 In another Order of the
same date, Mangotara applied the same increased bail bond with regard to accused Ishak M.
Abdul.5 However, again on the same date, Mangotara issued another Order recalling the
foregoing Orders.6
Thus, on May 14, 2008, complainant filed the instant complaint. Complainant alleged that Judge
Mangotara displayed bias and prejudice against her husband Dipatuan when he did not inhibit
himself from the case, considering that he is a relative by affinity and consanguinity of the victim
Elias Ali Taher and that he also came from Maguing, Lanao Del Sur where Taher also used to
reside. Complainant also pointed out that despite the designation of Judge Busran as Acting
Presiding Judge of Branch 10 on December 26, 2007, Judge Mangotara, acting with grave abuse
of authority, illegally and maliciously rendered the December 28, 2007 Decision as well as the
two Orders dated February 1, 2008.
On May 26, 2008, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) directed Mangotara to file his
Comment on the instant complaint.7
In his Comment8 dated June 24, 2008, Mangotara averred that he decided the case on December
28, 2007 as it had been pending for almost seven (7) years. He clarified that his relationship to
the victim is distant and not a basis for disqualification of judges under Rule 137 of the Rules of
Court. Mangotara explained that he received notice of Judge Busrans designation as the new
Presiding Judge only on January 26, 2008 and that when he issued the two Orders dated February
1, 2008, Judge Busran had not yet assumed office; and in the honest belief that Abdul was also
entitled to the benefits of the bail bond fixed by the court for Dipatuan. Mangotara added that,
upon realizing the irregularity of the two Orders issued on February 1, 2008, he immediately
rectified the same and recalled the Orders on the same day. Finally, Mangotara maintained that

his decision was supported by the evidence on record and that the instant administrative
complaint was only meant to embarrass him and destroy his honor and reputation.
Subsequently, in its Memorandum9 dated May 18, 2009, the OCA found Mangotara guilty of
gross ignorance of the law and abuse of authority. The OCA, likewise, recommended that the
instant complaint against Mangotara be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter.
However, in its Resolution10 dated July 22, 2009, the Court resolved to re-docket the instant
complaint as a regular administrative matter and refer the complaint to Court of Appeals
Associate Justice Portia Alio-Hormachuelos for investigation, report and recommendation.
We adopt the recommendation of the Investigating Justice.
On the charge of bias and partiality resulting to grave abuse of authority
We rule in the negative. As correctly observed by the Investigating Justice, complainant indeed
failed to specify the degree of relationship of respondent Judge to a party in the subject case. She
failed to present any clear and convincing proof that respondent Judge was related within the
prohibited degree with the victim. Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1. Disqualification of Judges. - No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he,
or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he
is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within
the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been
executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior
court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all
parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for
just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.1avvphi1
This being the case, the inhibition was indeed discretionary or voluntary as the same was
primarily a matter of conscience and sound discretion on the part of the respondent Judge. When
Mangotara chose not to inhibit and proceed with the promulgation of the disputed decision, he
cannot be faulted by doing so. Significantly, complainant while asserting that Mangotara should
have inhibited in the said case, she nonetheless failed to institute any motion for inhibition.
Moreover, complainant failed to cite any specific act that would indicate bias, prejudice or
vengeance warranting respondents voluntary inhibition from the case. Complainant merely
pointed on the alleged adverse and erroneous rulings of respondent Judge to their prejudice. By
themselves, however, they do not sufficiently prove bias and prejudice.

To be disqualifying, the bias and prejudice must be shown to have stemmed from an extrajudicial
source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned
from his participation in the case. Opinions formed in the course of judicial proceedings,
although erroneous, as long as they are based on the evidence presented and conduct observed by
the judge, do not prove personal bias or prejudice on the part of the judge. As a general rule,
repeated rulings against a litigant, no matter how erroneous and vigorously and consistently
expressed, are not a basis for disqualification of a judge on grounds of bias and prejudice.
Extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias, bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose, in addition
to the palpable error which may be inferred from the decision or order itself. Although the
decision may seem so erroneous as to raise doubts concerning a judge's integrity, absent extrinsic
evidence, the decision itself would be insufficient to establish a case against the judge. 11
Mere suspicion of partiality is not enough. There must be sufficient evidence to prove the same,
as well as a manifest showing of bias and partiality stemming from an extrajudicial source or
some other basis. A judge's conduct must be clearly indicative of arbitrariness and prejudice
before it can be stigmatized as biased and partial. As there was no substantial evidence to hold
Mangotara liable on this point, the Investigating Justice correctly recommended the dismissal of
this charge against him.
Moreover, we likewise found no basis to hold respondent Judge administratively liable anent his
issuance of the Decision dated December 28, 2007. As aptly observed by the Investigating
Justice, Mangotara acted in good faith when he issued the subject decision, since he received
notice of his replacement by Judge Busran, dated December 26, 2007, only on January 26, 2008.
It must be stressed that not every error or mistake that a judge commits in the performance of his
duties renders him liable, unless he is shown to have acted in bad faith or with deliberate intent to
do an injustice. Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations are
sufficient defenses in which a judge can find refuge. In this case, complainant adduced no
evidence that Mangotara was moved by bad faith when he issued the disputed order.
As to the charge of gross ignorance of the law
As to the charge of gross ignorance of the law in so far as his act of increasing the bail bond of
the accused instead of cancelling it, Mangotara did not deny his issuance of said Order. However,
he claims that the issuance thereof was merely an error of judgment.
Indeed, as a matter of public policy, not every error or mistake of a judge in the performance of
his official duties renders him liable. In the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of
a judge in his official capacity do not always constitute misconduct although the same acts may
be erroneous. True, a judge may not be disciplined for error of judgment absent proof that such
error was made with a conscious and deliberate intent to cause an injustice. This does not mean,
however, that a judge need not observe propriety, discreetness and due care in the performance of
his official functions.
Section 5, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure is clear on the issue. It provides:

SEC. 5. Bail, when discretionary. Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense
not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, admission to bail is
discretionary. The application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court despite the
filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not transmitted the original record to the appellate
court. However, if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the
offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed with and resolved
by the appellate court.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The rule is very explicit as to when admission to bail is discretionary on the part of the
respondent Judge. It is imperative that judges be conversant with basic legal principles and
possessed sufficient proficiency in the law. In offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua or death,
the accused has no right to bail when the evidence of guilt is strong. 12 Thus, as the accused in
Criminal Case No. 3620-01 had been sentenced to reclusion perpetua, the bail should have been
cancelled, instead of increasing it as respondent Judge did.
While a judge may not be held liable for gross ignorance of the law for every erroneous order that
he renders, it is also axiomatic that when the legal principle involved is sufficiently basic, lack of
conversance with it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Indeed, even though a judge may not
always be subjected to disciplinary action for every erroneous order or decision he renders, that
relative immunity is not a license to be negligent or abusive and arbitrary in performing his
adjudicatory prerogatives. It does not mean that a judge need not observe propriety, discreetness
and due care in the performance of his official functions. This is because if judges wantonly
misuse the powers vested on them by the law, there will not only be confusion in the
administration of justice but also oppressive disregard of the basic requirements of due process. 13
Clearly, in the instant case, the act of Mangotara in increasing the bail bond of the accused
instead of cancelling it is not a mere deficiency in prudence, discretion and judgment on the part
of respondent Judge, but a patent disregard of well-known rules. When an error is so gross and
patent, such error produces an inference of bad faith, making the judge liable for gross ignorance
of the law.14 It is a pressing responsibility of judges to keep abreast with the law and changes
therein, as well as with the latest decisions of the Supreme Court. One cannot seek refuge in a
mere cursory acquaintance with the statute and procedural rules. Ignorance of the law, which
everyone is bound to know, excuses no one not even judges. IGNORANTIA JURIS QUOD
QUISQUE SCIRE TENETUR NON EXCUSAT.15
We come to the imposable penalty.
Under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, gross
ignorance of the law or procedure is classified as a serious charge. Under Section 11(A) of the
same Rule, as amended, if the respondent is found guilty of a serious charge, any of the following
sanctions may be imposed:

1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may
determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office,
including government-owned or controlled corporations; Provided, however, that the
forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but
not exceeding six (6) months; or
3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.
In this case, a fine of P20,000.00, as recommended by the Investigating Justice, would thus
appear to be an appropriate sanction to impose on respondent Judge, considering that this is his
first infraction in his 13 years of service; his admission of his mistake; and his prompt correction
of such mistake.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds JUDGE MAMINDIARA P. MANGOTARA, retired Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 1, GUILTY of GROSS IGNORANCE
OF THE LAW for which he is FINED in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000,00), to be deducted from his retirement benefits.
SO ORDERED.

*Judge questioning witnesses

-Judicial Affidavit Rule
A.M. No. RTJ-00-1568

February 15, 2001

HON. ROBERT Z. BARBERS, Secretary of the Interior and Local Government, JUANITO
DE GUZMAN and LUCIO MARGALLO IV, petitioners,
vs.
JUDGE PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR., respondent.
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is an administrative complaint for alleged violation of Article 204 (Knowingly
Rendering Unjust Judgment) of the Revised Penal Code, section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019
and sections 4(b) and (c) of Republic Act No. 6713, filed against respondent judge in connection
with his acquittal of the accused LAWRENCE WANG y CHEN in Criminal Case Nos. 96149990, 96-149991 and 96-149992.
On April 10, 1997, complainants ROBERT Z. BARBERS,1 JUANITO DE GUZMAN and
LUCIO MARGALLO IV filed a joint complaint-affidavit with the Office of the Ombudsman
charging respondent Judge PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR., of allegedly violating Article 204 of
the Revised Penal Code, section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, 2and section 4, subsections (b)
and (c) of Republic Act No. 6713.3 Considering the Evaluation Report4 with recommendation of
its Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau, the Office of the Ombudsman endorsed 5the
case to the Office of the Court Administrator on May 9, 1997. It was pointed out in said
Evaluation Report "that respondent is primarily accused of Knowingly Rendering Unjust
Judgment."
The administrative complaint stemmed from the acquittal by respondent judge of Lawrence
Wang, a Hong Kong national who was apprehended by elements of the Public Assistance and
Reaction Against Crime or PARAC, DILG, in Malate, Manila in the early morning of May 17,
1996, the particulars of which are described in the complainants' Joint Complaint-Affidavit 6 dated
April 1, 1997, as follows:
At about 7 p.m. on May 16, 1996, members of the PARAC led by P/Sr. Insp. Lucio
Margallo, IV effected the arrest of SPO1 VERGEL DE DIOS, ROBERTO ANOBLING
and RESTITUTO ARELLANO during an entrapment operation. This trio then called
on their cohorts to bring in additional batch of shabu. After four (4) hours, or at about
11 p.m. of May 16, 1996, PIO REDENTOR TECH and JOSEPH JUNIO arrived to

deliver 150 grams of shabu. Tech and Junio were likewise arrested at 11 p.m. while
they were delivering the shabu to de Dios and company. When interrogated Tech and
Junio disclosed that a big transaction of shabu was about to be made at an apartment
along Maria Orosa St., Malate, Manila. They also admitted that they worked for
Lawrence Wang. Accordingly, the PARAC immediately proceeded to said place and
conducted surveillance or stake-out operations. After three (3) hours, or about 2:10 a.m.
of the following day, May 17, 1996, the PARAC agents saw a man, previously
described by TECH as Wang and identified by a police asset, coming out of the
aforesaid apartment and walking towards a parked BMW car. After Wang had opened
the trunk compartment of the car, the PARAC agents approached Wang and confronted
him to ascertain his identity. P/Sr. Insp. Margallo also prevented Wang from closing the
trunk. They then saw the bags of shabu inside the trunk. A further search yielded cash
amount of P650,000.00 in small denominations, one (1) mechanical scale and one (1)
electronic scale and two (2) unlicensed firearms, namely: (1) AMT automatic pistol,
cal. 380/9mm and (2) Daewoo automatic pistol, cal. 9mm. Accordingly, the accused
was arrested. In all, three (3) arrests were effected, one after the other, during the late
hours of May 16 and the wee hours of May 17, 1996, a time span of only seven (7)
hours.
Three (3) related informations7 were then filed against Wang, which were consolidated in Branch
18 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC, for brevity) of Manila, presided by the respondent judge.
The charges were docketed as Criminal Case No. 96-149990 (for violation of section 16, Article
III of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended),
Criminal Case No. 96-149991(for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 [Illegal Possession
of Firearms]), and Criminal Case No. 96-149992 (for violation of COMELEC Resolution 2828 in
relation to Republic Act No. 7166 [COMELEC Gun Ban]).
Prior to his arraignment, Wang filed a motion for preliminary investigation dated June 11, 1996
which was granted by the trial court in an Order dated June 27, 1996. During the preliminary
investigation before the prosecutor, Wang denied that illegal drugs or unlicensed firearms were
found in his possession. The cases were later remanded to the trial court after Assistant City
Prosecutor Michaela M. Cua submitted a Resolution dated August 22, 1996 finding probable
cause against Wang. Fearing that his objection to his warrantless arrest and search would be
waived by his entering a plea, Wang through counsel filed a Manifestation on November 7, 1996
making of record his continuing objection to his warrantless arrest and praying that the trial court
enter a plea of "not guilty" on his behalf. Acting on Wang's Manifestation, respondent judge
entered a plea of "not guilty" for Wang as reflected in his Order of November 8, 1996.
During the trial, the prosecution presented and offered the testimonies of Insp. Cielito Coronel
and Reynaldo Cristobal of the PARAC team who arrested Wang, and Felicisima Francisco,
forensic chemist of the National Bureau of Investigation, who conducted laboratory tests to
determine if the confiscated substance was indeed "shabu", a prohibited drug.

During the hearing on December 6, 1996, the prosecution formally rested its case. In turn, the
defense filed a motion for leave of court to file a Demurrer to Evidence. The trial court granted
the defense's motion in an Order of the same date and gave Wang a period of twenty-five (25)
days from receipt thereof within which to file a Demurrer to Evidence, and the prosecution a
similar period to file its opposition thereto. An undated Demurrer to Evidence was then filed by
Wang through counsel on January 9, 1997.
Subsequently, Assistant City Prosecutor Winnie M. Edad filed a "Manifestation with Motion"
stating that the prosecution is resting its case against the accused, Wang, insofar as Criminal Case
No. 96-149990 only was concerned but excluding the two (2) remaining cases for illegal
possession of firearms and violation of the COMELEC gun ban, wherein the prosecution claimed
it has not yet rested. Consequently, in an Order dated January 14, 1997, the trial court set further
hearings on the two (2) remaining cases on January 21, February 5, 11 and 12, 1997.
On March 13, 1997, respondent judge issued a Resolution granting Wang's Demurrer to Evidence
and acquitting Wang in the said three (3) closely related cases. Respondent judge declared therein
and made the finding that:
xxx

xxx

xxx

The threshold issue raised by accused in his Demurrer to Evidence is whether his
warrantless arrest and search were lawful as argued by the prosecution, or
unlawful as asserted by the defense.
Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the New Rules of Court, a peace officer may arrest a
person without a warrant: (a) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) when an
offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it, and (c) when the person to be
arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while being transferred from one
confinement to another. None of these circumstances were present when the accused
was arrested. The accused was merely walking from the Maria Orosa apartment and
was about to enter the parked BMW car when the police officers arrested and frisked
him and searched his car. The accused was not committing any visible offense at the
time of his arrest. Neither was there an indication that he was about to commit a crime
or that he had just committed an offense. The unlicensed AMT Cal. 380 9mm
Automatic Back-up Pistol [sic] that the accused had in his possession was concealed
inside the right front pocket of his pants. And the handgun was bantam and slim in size
that it would not give an outward indication of a concealed gun if placed inside the
pants' side pocket as was done by the accused. The arresting officers had no
information and knowledge that the accused was carrying an unlicensed handgun,
nor did they see him in possession thereof immediately prior to his arrest.

Ditto on the 32 bags of shabu and the other unlicensed Daewoo Cal. 9mm Pistol with
magazine that were found and seized from the car. The contraband items in the car
were not in plain view. The 32 bags of shabu were in the trunk compartment, and
the Daewoo handgun was underneath the driver's seat of the car. The police
officers had no information, or knowledge that the banned articles were inside the
car, or that the accused had placed them there. The police officers searched the car
on mere suspicion that there was shabu therein.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Respondent judge then issued on the same day an Order dated March 13, 1997 setting the
promulgation of his aforequoted Resolution on March 20, 1997.
On the day before the scheduled promulgation, SPO3 Cristobal claimed that he received a
telephone call from a person claiming to be the branch clerk of court of RTC Manila, Branch 18.
The caller, according to Cristobal, instructed him to bring to court the next day the money
confiscated from Wang. Cristobal complied.
After the Resolution of March 13, 1997 was promulgated by the trial court, Cristobal was
presented with a special power-of-attorney8 dated February 12, 1997 executed by Wang
authorizing his counsel, Atty. Oliver Lozano, to receive the confiscated money. Cristobal handed
over the money to Atty. Oliver Lozano, but he first required Atty. Lozano to accomplish a receipt
written on the special power-of-attorney itself.
Not satisfied with Wang's acquittal, petitioners Barbers et. al., filed the said Joint ComplaintAffidavit against respondent judge before the Office of the Ombudsman. They also filed an
administrative complaint against the trial prosecutor, Assistant City Prosecutor Edad, for alleged
gross neglect of duty in his handling of the Wang cases. However, on September 6, 1999, the
Department of Justice issued its Resolution dismissing the administrative complaint against Edad
for lack of merit.
After the said Joint Complaint-Affidavit of the complainants (herein petitioners) against
respondent judge was endorsed by the Ombudsman to the Office of the Court Administrator, this
Court required the respondent to comment thereon. After its receipt of the respondent's comment
strongly denying and disputing the administrative charges against him and upon the
recommendation of OCA, this Court referred the matter to the then Court of Appeals Associate
Justice (now Supreme Court Associate Justice) Consuelo Ynares-Santiago for investigation and
report. On September 7, 1998, she submitted her Report recommending that respondent judge be
reprimanded and meted a fine equivalent to six (6) months salary. Her findings were adopted by
the Office of the Court Administrator, per its Memorandum9 of December 2, 1999, to wit:
xxx

xxx

xxx

The conduct of respondent, given the peculiar facts prevailing in this case, leaves much
to be desired vis--vis these legal yardsticks. The abruptness and inordinate haste in
which he dismissed the charges against the accused gave rise to the suspicion that he
railroaded the proceedings to favor the accused.

If the court denies the motion for dismissal, the accused may adduce evidence
in his defense. When the accused files such motion without the express leave
of court, he waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for
judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution."

The records show that two members of the team which arrested Lawrence Wang,
namely P/Insp. Cielito Coronel and SPO3 Reynaldo Cristobal were the only witnesses
who testified on the facts regarding the warrantless arrest and seizure. The principal
witness and leader of the team, P/Sr. Insp. Lucio Margallo IV, who more than anybody
else has the personal knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the arrest of Wang
was never presented as a witness. It must be pointed out in this regard that Margallo, as
leader of the arresting team could have clarified the circumstances surrounding the
arrest of Wang and the seizure of the drugs, firearms and cash found in the car
especially the highly contentious issue of whether or not the trunk of the car which
contained the "shabu" was already open with said prohibited drug in plain view when
he and his team members approached. The record, however, discloses that after the
prosecutor handling the cases conferred with respondent, thereafter, Margallo's
testimony was dispensed with on the dubious ground that it would merely be
corroborative. xxx

The rule is not applicable if the prosecution has not yet rested its case xxx.

The record also reveals that Margallo received only one subpoena to appear in Crim.
Case No. 96-149990 (Violation of Dangerous Drugs Act) on December 6, 1996 xxx.
Unfortunately, he was not able to attend because he was on leave at the time xxx and
only learned about the hearing after December 6, 1996 xxx. Curiously, no other
summons were served on him to testify despite his instructions to SPO3 Cristobal to
manifest in Court that he be subpoenaed to testify xxx. As in Crim. Case No. 96149990, he also received only one (1) subpoena in the other cases but the reason
therefor was for the Evidence Custodian namely, SPO3 Cristobal who was under him,
to bring the confiscated items in court xxx. The only other time he received a subpoena
was when he was required to attend the scheduled hearing on March 20, 1997 and he
was not aware that said notice requiring his presence on said date was already for the
promulgation of the order granting the demurrer to evidence xxx.
The Resolution granting the demurrer to evidence dismissing all three (3) cases against
Wang is likewise anchored on infirm legal moorings.
Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that:
"Sec. 15. Demurrer to evidence. After the prosecution has rested its case,
the court may dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence: (1)
on its own initiate (sic) after giving the prosecution an opportunity to be
heard; or (2) on motion of the accused with prior leave of court.

In this case, despite the statement in the resolution in question as

well as respondent's claims to the contrary, there is ample evidence
on record that the prosecution had not yet rested its case in
Criminal Cases Nos. 96-149991 and 96-149992 xxx. Particularly
revealing on this point is the "Manifestation With Motion to Set
Above-Entitled Cases for Further Hearing and For Issuance of
Subpoena to Prosecution Witnesses" xxx which avers that:
"THE PEOPLE THRU THE UNDERSIGNED TRIAL
PROSECUTOR, to this Honorable Court most respectfully
manifests that he rested his case only in so far (sic) as the case of
R.A. 6425 is concerned, and not as regards the charge for violation
of P.D. L866 (sic) (Crim. Case No. 96-149991) and the case of
COMELEC Resolution No. 2828 (Crim. Case No. 96-149992);
WHEREFORE, the prosecution respectfully moves this Honorable
Court:
1. To set Crim. Case Nos. 96-149991-92, for violation of P.D. 1866
and COMELEC Resolution 2828, respectively for further hearing
to enable the prosecution to present its evidence;
xxx

xxx

xxx

A circumspect scrutiny of the demurrer to evidence itself xxx will show that
the same can only pertain to Criminal Case No. 96-149990 for violation of
the Dangerous Drugs Act considering that it was filed on January 9, 1997
and the prosecution had not yet rested in Criminal Cases Nos. 96-149991
and 96-149992. In fact, in an Order dated January 14, 1997 xxx, respondent
set hearings for the two (2) cases on January 21, February 5, 11 and 12, 1997.
It is interesting to note in this regard that no demurrer to evidence was filed
after the prosecution had rested its case in Criminal Cases Nos. 96-149991
and 96-149992. Neither was the prior demurrer filed on January 9, 1997
subsequently amended to include these two cases. Despite all these facts,
respondent judge still proceeded to dismiss all three (3) charges against the
accused.

xxx

xxx

xxx

Furthermore, the factual events surrounding the turnover of the confiscated

articles which oddly enough, with the exception of the firearms, were not
marked in evidence xxx only increases the dubiousness of the proceedings.
As has been stated earlier, complainants were unaware, upon being served
with notice to appear on March 20, 1996 that a Resolution dismissing all
three (3) cases on the basis of the undated demurrer to evidence would be
promulgated xxx. Indeed, the document served by the process server made no
mention of the fact that the cases were already submitted for resolution and
that the same would be promulgated on said date xxx. In fact, SPO3 Cristobal
who was Evidence Custodian of the PARAC-DILG was not served a
subpoena commanding his presence on March 20, 1997. xxx Instead, he
received a telephone call on March 19, 1997 from a person who identified
herself as the Branch Clerk of respondent judge's sala instructing him to bring
the confiscated money to court the next day xxx. Thus, upon appearing the
next day, he was surprised to learn that there would be a promulgation. xxx
During the proceedings held March 20, 1997, SPO3 Cristobal was handed a
Special Power of Attorney xxx dated February 12, 1997 executed by the
accused authorizing his counsel to receive the confiscated money in his
behalf xxx. As a precaution, Cristobal made a handwritten receipt on the said
document which he required said counsel to sign xxx. The date of the
execution of the Special Power of Attorney which was more than a month
prior to the promulgation of the resolution only fueled Cristobal's suspicion
that the proceedings were already rigged in Wang's favor xxx.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The factual finding of respondent judge that the "shabu" was not in
plain view when the accused was arrested becomes open to
question in the light of the evidence on record that the compartment
of the car containing the "shabu" was actually already open and the
accused attempted to close the same but was prevented from doing
so by the arresting officers xxx much more so taking into
consideration the fact that P/Sr. Insp. Margallo, the principal
witness for the prosecution who could have shed light on the
circumstances of the arrest and seizure, was not given the change
(sic) to testify. Considering that the accused is a highly
controversial character on account of his notoriety as a big-time
drug lord not to mention the widespread media attention attracted
by the case, respondent judge should have proceeded with more
caution and circumspection in the handling thereof.

xxx

xxx

xxx

However, there is an important aspect to this case which was heretofore not considered. The
respondent judge's Resolution in question dated March 13, 1997 is one of acquittal. It is wellsettled that acquittal in a criminal case is immediately final and executory upon its promulgation;
accordingly, the State may not seek its review without placing the accused in double
jeopardy.10 When the Investigating Justice submitted her Report dated September 7, 1998, the
questioned Resolution of respondent judge acquitting Wang was already the subject of a pending
petition for review on certiorari (G.R. No. 128587)11 which was filed with this Court. It appeared
that after the State received a copy of the said Resolution of respondent judge on March 20, 1997,
the Office of the Solicitor General filed a "Manifestation and Motion" on April 3, 1997 with this
Court praying for an extension of thirty (30) days (or until May 4, 1997, a Sunday) within which
to file a petition for review on certiorari. The motion was granted by the First Division of this
Court in a Resolution dated May 7, 1997. The said petition for review oncertiorari (G.R. No.
128587) which was filed on May 5, 1997 by the Solicitor General together with the Department
of Justice, is still pending in this Court. Following established doctrine, the pendency of the
appeal is sufficient cause for the dismissal of the instant administrative complaint. 12 It has also
been held that the filing of an administrative complaint is not the proper remedy for the
correction of actions of a judge perceived to have gone beyond the norms of propriety, where a
sufficient judicial remedy exists.13 Differently expounded in another case,
As everyone knows, the law provides ample judicial remedies against errors or
irregularities being committed by a Trial Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction.
The ordinary remedies against errors or irregularities which may be regarded as normal
in nature (i.e., error in appreciation or admission of evidence, or in construction or
application of procedural or substantive law or legal principle) include a motion for
reconsideration (or after rendition of a judgment or final order, a motion for new trial),
and appeal. The extraordinary remedies against error or irregularities which may be
deemed extraordinary in character (i.e., whimsical, capricious, despotic exercise of
power or neglect of duty, etc.) are inter alia the special civil actions of certiorari,
prohibition or mandamus, or a motion for inhibition, a petition for change of venue, as
the case may be.
Now, the established doctrine and policy is that disciplinary proceedings and
criminal actions against Judges are not complementary or suppletory of, nor a
substitute for, these judicial remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary. Resort
to and exhaustion of these judicial remedies, as well as the entry of judgment in
the corresponding action or proceeding, are pre-requisites for the taking of other
measures against the persons of the judges concerned, whether of civil,
administrative, or criminal nature. It is only after the available judicial remedies
have been exhausted and the appellate tribunals have spoken with finality, that
the door to an inquiry into his criminal, civil or administrative liability may be
said to have opened, or closed.

xxxx Indeed, since judges must be free to judge, without pressure or influence from
external forces or factors, they should not be subject to intimidation, the fear of civil,
criminal or administrative sanctions for acts they may do and disposition they may
make in the performance of their duties and functions; and it is sound rule, which must
be recognized independently of statute, that judges are not generally liable for acts done
within the scope of their jurisdiction and in good faith; and that exceptionally,
prosecution of a judge can be had only if "there be a final declaration by a competent
court in some appropriate proceeding of the manifestly unjust character of the
challenged judgment or order, and also evidence of malice or bad faith, ignorance of
inexcusable negligence, on the part of the judge in rendering said judgment or order"
or under the stringent circumstances set out in Article 32 of the Civil Code. xxxx 14
The administrative case at bar involves an acquittal on an accused by the respondent judge in
three (3) closely related criminal cases which were earlier consolidated in the court presided by
respondent judge. As a rule, acquittal is immediately final and executory. Consequently, in view
of the pendency in this Court (First Division) of the petition for review on certiorari (G.R. No.
128587), supra, we may not, ordinarily, review here the said judgment of acquittal in those three
(3) criminal cases, the inquiry in this administrative case being limited to the issue of whether the
respondent judge is liable for the charges brought against him. 15 However, to resolve those
charges in the administrative case, it is indispensable that we consider the respondent Judge's
subject Resolution dated March 13, 1997 granting accused Wang's Demurrer to Evidence and
acquitting the latter in the closely related Criminal Cases Nos. 96-149990, 96-149991 and 96149992.1wphi1.nt
In appealing Wang's acquittal, the State is relying on a recognized exception to the general rule in
that where the assailed judgment is void, no double jeopardy results from the re-filing of the
criminal case.16 In view of the pendency of the said appeal, we should, ordinarily, be constrained
from resolving the charge of violation of Art. 204 of the Revised Penal Code for allegedly
knowingly rendering an unjust judgment. However, in this administrative case, justice demands
that we resolve the basic issue relative to the legality or illegality of Wang's warrantless arrest and
search, and the issue on the admissibility of the bags of "shabu," scales and unlicensed firearms
which were confiscated during the warrantless search. These are the very same issues being
litigated in the said appeal.17 Meanwhile, there is as yet no definitive pronouncement by this
Court in G.R. No. 128587,supra, whether respondent's Resolution of acquittal of Wang is
patently erroneous. The jurisprudential rule is that pendency of an appeal from a questioned
judgment renders the filing of administrative charges premature.18
Nevertheless, the foregoing considerations do not prevent us from ruling upon the remaining
charges brought against respondent judge. The first involves an alleged violation of section 3(e)
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which provides:
Corrupt practices of public officers.In addition to acts or omissions of
public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall

constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to
be unlawful:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or
giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in
the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This
provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government
corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The other charge is for the alleged violation of section 4, subsections (b) and (c) of Republic Act
No. 6713 otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees, viz.:
Norms of Conduct of Public Officials and Employees. (A) Every public
official and employee shall observe the following as standards of personal
conduct in the discharge and execution of official duties:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(b) Professionalism.Public officials and employees shall perform and

discharge their duties with the highest degree of excellence, professionalism,
intelligence and skill. They shall enter public service with utmost devotion
and dedication to duty. They shall endeavor to discourage wrong perceptions
of their roles as dispensers or peddlers of undue advantage.
(c) Justness and sincerity.Public officials and employees shall remain true
to the people at all times. They must act with justness and sincerity and shall
not discriminate against anyone, especially the poor and the underprivileged.
They shall at all times respect the rights of others, and shall refrain from
doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public
order, public safety and public interest. They shall not dispense or extend
undue favors on account of their office to their relatives whether by
consanguinity or affinity except with respect to appointments of such
relatives to positions considered strictly confidential or as members of their
personal staff whose terms are coterminous with theirs.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Respondent judge's alleged transgressions consist principally of: (a) resolving the Demurrer to
Evidence when the prosecution had not yet allegedly rested in all three (3) criminal cases; (b)
dismissing all three (3) criminal cases when the Demurrer to Evidence allegedly referred only to
Criminal Case No. 96-149990 relative to the drug charges; and (c) propounding questions during
the clarificatory hearing which revealed his alleged partiality in favor of the accused. After
reviewing the records, we find scant evidence to support the charges as well as the adverse
conclusions of the Honorable Investigator.
A close scrutiny of the record does not support the conclusion of the Investigator that respondent
judge prematurely resolved the Demurrer to Evidence without giving the prosecution ample
opportunity to prove its three (3) cases which were earlier consolidated. The governing rule then,
Section 15, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure 19 provides that:
Demurrer to evidence.After the prosecution has rested its case, the court may dismiss
the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence (1) on its own initiative after giving
the prosecution an opportunity to be heard; or (2) on motion of the accused filed with
prior leave of court.
If the court denies the motion for dismissal, the accused may adduce evidence in his
defense. When the accused files such motion to dismiss without express leave of court,
he waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis
of the evidence of the prosecution. (Underscoring supplied)
During the hearing held on December 6, 1996, Assistant City Prosecutor Winnie M. Edad stated
that he was resting the People's case.20 It was at this time that the defense asked for, and was
given, leave of court to file a Demurrer to Evidence. Perhaps belatedly realizing that it had rested
prematurely, the prosecution filed a "Manifestation with Motion to Set Above-Entitled Cases for
Further Hearing and For the Issuance of Subpoenas to Prosecution Witnesses"21 on December 19,
1996. Respondent judge, in an Order dated January 14, 199722granted that motion and set the two
(2) remaining cases (Criminal Case Nos. 96-149991 and 96-149992) for further hearings. This
fact belies the petitioners' claim that they were denied their day in court. Significantly, during
the hearing held on February 11, 1997, the prosecution rested in all the three (3) cases for
the second time,23 including Criminal Case Nos. 96-149991 and 96-149992. The prosecution
was even able to file an opposition to the Demurrer to Evidence. The record shows that the
proceedings were astened when the defense filed a Manifestation on February 10, 1997 that
it was admitting the existence of the firearms and the lack of license therefor. Hence, there
was not even a need to amend the Demurrer to Evidence inasmuch as the Demurrer to
Evidence, as worded, clearly prayed for the dismissal of all the three (3) cases, namely,
Criminal Case Nos. 96-149990, 96-149991 and 96-149992.
Neither do we discern any impropriety when respondent judge resolved to dismiss all the three
(3) criminal cases filed against Wang. Petitioners claim that the Demurrer to Evidence could
apply only to Criminal Case No. 96-149990 inasmuch as (1) the State has rested allegedly only in
that case, and (2) the docket number stated on the first page of the Demurrer to Evidence referred

only to Criminal Case No. 96-149990. That claim is erroneous. Even if the caption of the
Demurrer to Evidence stated only Criminal Case No. 96-149990, a plain reading of
theentire Demurrer to Evidence leaves no doubt that it also covered Criminal Case Nos. 96149991 and 96-149992. The principal argument of the defense in those three (3) criminal cases is
that Wang was arrested illegally, without a warrant, under circumstances not falling within
recognized exceptions.24 Accordingly, the accompanying search and seizure which yielded the
prohibited articles is also illegal and invalid. Pursuant to constitutional dictates, 25 said articles are
inadmissible in evidence for being "fruits of a poisonous tree." That defense is unequivocally set
forth in the Demurrer to Evidence. The caption of the Demurrer to Evidence which indicated only
Criminal Case No. 96-149990 is not controlling because the body and prayer of the Demurrer to
Evidence refer to all the three (3) closely related cases.
Anent the charge that respondent judge displayed bias and partiality during the trial when he
asked numerous clarificatory questions, we note that the participation of respondent judge in the
conduct of the trial was not by itself condemnable. He could not be expected to remain an
impassive and remote presence during the proceedings, prohibited from asking questions when
proper and necessary, yet all these were done without necessarily transgressing the boundaries of
impartiality decreed by judicial ethics. The mere fact that the presiding judge asked clarificatory
questions during the trial does not make him a biased judge. 26 "He must be accorded a reasonable
leeway in asking questions to witnesses as may be essential to elicit relevant facts and to bring
out the truth."27 Differently stated, "questions to clarify points and to elicit additional relevant
evidence are not improper. The judge being the arbiter may properly intervene in the presentation
of evidence to expedite and prevent unnecessary waste of time."28 The pronouncement of this
Court in United States v. Hudieres29 is illuminating as when it was made in 1914:
The first assignment of error has its basis in the claim of counsel that the trial judge
went to unjustifiable lengths in examining some of the witnesses called for the defense.
It is very clear, however, from a review of the whole proceedings that the only object of
the trial judge in propounding these questions was to endeavor as far as possible to get
at the truth as to the facts which the witnesses were testifying. The right of a trial judge
to question the witnesses with a view to satisfying his mind upon any material point
which presents itself during the trial of a case over which he presides is too well
established to need discussion. The trial judges in this jurisdiction are judges of both
the law and the facts, and they would be negligent in the performance of their duties if
they permitted a miscarriage of justice as a result of a failure to propound a proper
question to a witness which might develop some material fact upon which the judgment
in the case should turn. So in a case where a trial judge sees that the degree of credit
which he is to give the testimony of a given witness may have an important bearing
upon the outcome, there can be no question that in the exercise of a sound discretion he
may put such questions to the witness as will enable him to formulate a sound opinion
as to the ability or the willingness of the witness to tell the truth. The questions asked
by the trial judge in the case at bar were in our opinion entirely proper, their only
purpose being to clarify certain obscure phases of the case; and while we are inclined to
agree with counsel that some of the observations of the trial judge in the course of his

examination might well have been omitted, there is no reason whatever to believe that
the substantial rights of the defendants were in anywise prejudiced thereby.
The transcript of the clarificatory hearing held on February 26, 1997 is reproduced below to show
that the tenor of respondent judge's clarificatory questions, though numerous did not really create
the impression that respondent judge was biased or that he has practically taken the cudgels for
the defense.
xxx

xxx

Q:
And in the course of the investigation of these three men you were able to
discover that Redentor Tech and Joseph Junio were the source of the regulated drug that
were confiscated from the three men that you have arrested?
A:

Yes, sir.

Q:
Now, thru entrapment [based] in your testimony you were able to apprehend also
these two men, Redentor Tech and Joseph Junio?

xxx
A:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT TO THE WITNESS:

Q:

And that was on the evening of what date?

Q:
You, SPO3 Cristobal, were a member of the police operatives that effected the
arrest of the accused in this case?

A:

May 16. The same (interrupted)

A:

Q:

The same date? The same evening?

Q:
From your testimony and that of Police Inspector Cielito Coronel, this Court has
gathered that prior to the arrest of the accused there were three 3) men that your team
arrested. One of whom is a police officer?

A:

Same evening. About 11:00 p.m.

Q:

These two men, Redentor and Joseph they were also investigated by your team?

A:

Yes, sir.

A:

Yes, sir.

Q:

SPO2 Vergel De Dios, Rogelio Anoble and a certain Arellano?

Q:

You were present when they were investigated?

A:

Yes, sir.

A:

I was the one who investigated them.

Q:

When were they arrested?

A;

May 16 on or about 7:00 (interrupted)

Q:
This Redentor, he claimed that he was the talent manager of Glenmore
Modelling Agency?

Q:

P.M.?

A:

P.M., your Honor.

Yes, sir.

Q:
And on the occasion of the arrest of these three men shabu were confiscated
from them?
A:

Yes, sir.

A:

Yes, sir.

Q:

And you also stated that the agency was own (sic) by the accused in this case?

A:

Yes, sir.

Q:
How about the other man, Joseph? Did he also say that he was an employee of
the accused?
A:

He told me that he is a gym instructor.

Q:

So he was not working for the accused?

A:

He is also working for the accused.

Q:

Did he tell you where the delivery of the shabu was to be made?

Q:

As a gym instructor?

A:

No, sir.

A:

Yes.

Q:

Did he tell you who was to make the delivery?

Q:

You mean to say that the gym is also own (sic) by the accused?

A:

No, sir.

A:

He teaches aerobic.

Q:
You said that your team decided to see the accused to ask him to shed light
regarding the drug trafficking activities of Redentor and Joseph?

Q:

In what establishment?

A:

In Glenmore.

Q:

In Glenmore?

A:

Yes, Your Honor. That is our initial purpose.

Q:

To ask him to shed light?

A:

Yes, sir.

A:

Yes. sir.

Q:

These two, Redentor and Joseph at the time of the arrest they were in the xxx

A:

Yes, sir.

Q:
At that time when you decided to look for the accused to ask him to shed light
on the matter concerning the arrest of these two employees in possession of shabu. Did
you and did your team suspect the accused as being involved in the transaction that led
to the arrest of Redentor and Joseph?

Q:

In fact they were in xxx to you the three men which were previously arrested?

A:

Yes, sir. We suspected that he was the source of the shabu.

A:

Yes, sir.

Q:

So you were suspecting the accused as being involved?

A:

Yes, sir.

Q:

In the drug transaction?

A:

Yes, sir.

Q:
Did you ask Redentor and Joseph the source of shabu that you confiscated from
them at the time of the arrest?
A:
Yes, sir. They refuse (sic) to say the source, however, they told me that they were
working for the accused.
Q:
You also testified that Redentor informed you that there was another delivery of
shabu scheduled that morning of (stop) was it May 16 or May 17? The other delivery
that is scheduled on?

Q:
You also testified that you and your team proceeded to Maria Orosa apartment
somewhere in Ermita?
A:

A:

Yes, sir.

On the 17th.

Q:

So it was on the following morning?

Q:
And that apartment was pinpointed to you by Redentor as the place where the
accused could be found?

A:

Yes, sir.

A:

Yes, sir.

Q:

And when you arrived at the apartment you did not enter the apartment?

A:

We conducted a stake out.

Q:

You waited outside?

A:

Yes, sir.

Q:

Q:
And what was the accused doing when you saw him coming out from the
apartment?
A:

They were two. One is supposed to be the driver.

Q:

So he has a male companion?

A:

Yes, sir.

Why? You were expecting the accused to come out from the apartment?
Q:

The accused?

A:
Because of the parked BMW which was described by Redentor as the one used
by the accused.

A:

Yes, sir.

Q:

So there was a BMW car parked in front (sic) of the apartment?

Q:

They were walking together when they came out from the apartment?

A:

Yes, sir.

A:

The driver, sir, is already beside the car.

Q:

And that was described as the car being used by the accused?

Q:

I see. So the driver was waiting inside the car?

A:

Yes, sir.

A:

Not inside. Outside.

Q:

Outside of the car?

A:

Yes, sir.

Q:

But near the car?

Q:
So when the accused came out from the apartment, Redentor and Joseph were no
longer with your team?

A:

Yes, sir.

A:

Q:
You narrated to this court when you saw the accused coming out from the
apartment walking where was the bound? To what direction was he walking? Towards
the car?

Q:
Was (sic) Redentor and Joseph with your team when you proceeded to the
apartment?
A:
Initially they were with us but the rest of the members of the team brought them
to our office.

No, sir.

Q:
Now, you stated or testified that when the accused came out from the apartment,
he was identified by your team. Who identified the accused?
A:

We have in our company an asset who knows the accused.

Q:
When the accused was identified to your team as the employer mentioned by
Redentor you immediately held him surrounded?
A:

Not immediately. We watched what they were about to do.

A:

Towards the car.

Q:
Alright. From the apartment where he came out to the place where the car was
parked, what was the distance? How many meters?
A:

A distance of more or less 15 to 20 meters.

Q:
What did you observe while the accused was walking from the apartment to his
car which has a distance of about 15 to 20 meters? What did you observe in the nature
of the accused while he was walking towards his car?
A:
The accused stopped beside the car. He talked with the driver, supposed to be the
driver and they talked for a while.
Q:
So he walked on the left side of the car. Where (stop) in what portion of the car
did he approached the driver?

Q:
So that was the time when you and your team accosted the accused when the
trunk of his car was open?
A:

Yes, sir.

Q:

And after you accosted the accused, what did you do?

A:

It was Capt. Margallo and I who prevented them from closing the compartment.

Q:

The trunk?

A:

Yes, sir.

A:

Left side, sir.

Q:

Left side?

A:

Yes, Your Honor.

Q:
What transpired when you approached the accused at that point? When you and
your (stop) what is the rank of this Coronel?

Q:

And you saw him talked with the driver?

Capt. Margallo. Sr. Inspector Lucio Margallo.

A:

Yes, sir.

Q:

No. No. Yes. He was the one that approached the accused?

Q:

Then what happened?

A:

And Lt. Coronel.

A:

After they talked, we saw them open the compartment of the car.

Q:

And Police Inspector Coronel?

Q:

At this time your team were observing at the distance?

A:

Yes, sir.

A:

Yes, sir.

Q:

But you were also nearby?

Q:

What was the distance?

A:

Yes, sir.

A:

More or less 15 to 20 meters. We were in a concealed place.

Q:

Who talked with the accused?

Q:

And you were concealed. You could not be seen by the accused?

A:

It was Capt. Margallo.

A:

Yes, sir.

Q:

What did he tell to the accused?

Q:
car?

What happened when you saw the accused and his driver open the trunk of the

A:
I was not able to get what they are talking because I immediately told them that
there were shabu at the compartment.

A:
It was Capt. Margallo and Police Inspector Colonel approached them and upon
seeing them I also went out of my hiding place and the accused was accosted.

Q:

Who made that statement?

A:

I was the one who told them that there were shabu in the compartment.

Q:

You told the accused?

A:

A:
car.

No. I told Capt. Margallo that there were shabu inside the compartment of the

Q:
And there was another gun that was taken from the car and that is underneath the
driver's seat?

Q:

Now, in your declaration and from that of the Coronel the accused was frisked?

A:

A:

Yes, sir.

Q:
When you saw the accused walking towards his car, did you know whether he
was carrying a gun?

Q:

And from the pocket of the pants of the accused was taken a back-up pistol?

A:

No, sir. I believe it was a Daewoo caliber pistol.

Q:

Daewoo? The one that was taken from the possession of the accused?

A:

The AMT back up pistol was handed to me by Capt. Margallo.

Q:

Yes. From whom it was taken?

A:

It was taken from the accused.

Yes, sir.

Yes, sir.

A:

No, sir. It cannot be seen.

Q:

It was concealed?

A:

Yes, sir.

Q:
So the only time that you and your team learned that he was in possession of the
gun is when he was bodily searched?
A:
Yes, sir. That is the only time that I came to know about when Capt. Margallo
handed to me the gun.

Q:
Correct. So when the accused was frisked what gun was taken from him and it
was discovered inside the pocket of his pants?

Q:

Other than walking towards the car, the accused was not doing anything else?

A:

A:

None, sir.

Yes, sir.

Q:
Which one occurred first? The bodily search of the accused or the search of the
trunk or (sic) the car?

Q:
That would invite your suspicion or give indication that he was intending to do
something unlawful or illegal?

A:

I could say it was simultaneously being conducted (sic).

A:

Q:

At the same time?

Q:
When you searched the car, did the accused protest or try to prevent your team
from searching his car?

A:

Yes, Your Honor because they were here while I was at the back.

Q:
So while you and your othermembers (sic) of the team were searching the trunk
of the car, Police Inspector Coronel and another officer, Capt. Margallo were subjecting
the accused to bodily searched?
A:

Yes, sir.

Q:

And you immediately discovered the shabu inside the trunk?

A:

No, sir.

No, sir.30
xxx

xxx

xxx

The above-quoted questions propounded by respondent judge were necessary for the purpose of
determining and clarifying the basis for resolving the all important issue of the legality or
illegality of the warrantless arrest of Wang and the warrantless search of the latter's car. Herein
respondent judge's aforequoted questions contrast favorably against instances in other cases

wherein it was clearly shown that the judges therein displayed bias against a party litigant. Thus,
there is a case where the questions asked of a witness by the judge therein were adversarial,
malicious and hostile in character.31 There is another case where the sheer volume of questions
asked by the judge therein tended to be leading, misleading, if not baseless and hypothetical. 32 It
has also been held that clarificatory questions asked by the trial court must not amount to
confrontation, probing and insinuation, which are characteristics of a cross-examination. 33

The undisputed facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:

In administrative proceedings, the complainant bears the onus of establishing, by substantial

evidence, the averments of his complaint.34 All told, complainants herein failed to discharge that
burden. Besides, the charges, subject of the administrative case against respondent judge, which
were indorsed by the Office of the Ombudsman to the OCA on May 9, 1997 35 also appear to be
premature in view of the filing on May 5, 1997 and pendency in this Court of the petition for
review on certiorari, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Lawrence Wang y Chen and Hon.
Perfecto Laguio, Jr., etc.", docketed as G.R. No. 128587, supra, (see note no. 10). It has been
held that the pendency of an appeal from a questioned judgment renders the filing of
administrative charges premature.36 Where a sufficient judicial remedy exists, the filing of an
administrative complaint is not the proper remedy to correct the actions of a judge. 37

On 30 June 2009, petitioner Zenia Pagels (Pagels) filed a Petition for Injunction with prayer for
issuance of Preliminary Injunction, Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), Accounting, Damages
and Attorneys Fees against respondents Spouses Reynaldo and Racquel dela Cruz (respondent
spouses). The case was raffled to Branch 30, where respondent judge was the acting presiding
judge. After serving respondent spouses with the Summons, copy of the Petition and Notice of
hearing, respondent judge conducted the hearing and granted the TRO on 2 July 2009. On 3 July
2009, the TRO was implemented resulting in the transfer of possession of the duly-licensed
primary and elementary school and church from respondent spouses to Pagels. On 13 July 2009,
respondent spouses filed their Answer with Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim. During the
14 July 2009 hearing for preliminary injunction, the parties agreed to submit position papers.
Pagels filed her position paper but respondent spouses filed a Motion to Hear their Affirmative
Defenses instead.

WHEREFORE, the administrative complaint against respondent Judge Perfecto A.S. Laguio, Jr.
is herebyDISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. RTJ-11-2298

February 22, 2012

ATTY. RENE O. MEDINA and ATTY. CLARITO SERVILLAS, Complainants,

vs.
JUDGE VICTOR A. CANOY, Regional Trial Court, Branch 29, Surigao City, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is an administrative complaint filed by Atty. Rene O. Medina and Atty. Clarito Servillas
(complainants) against Judge Victor A. Canoy (respondent judge), Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Surigao City, Branch 29, for Gross Ignorance of the Law and
Procedure, Undue Interference and Gross Inefficiency, relative to Civil Case No. 7077 entitled
"Zenia A. Pagels v. Spouses Reynaldo dela Cruz"; Spec. Proc. No. 7101 entitled "Noel P.E.M.
Schellekens v. P/S, Supt. David Y. Ombao, et al."; and Civil Case No. 7065 entitled "Heirs of
Matilde Chato Alcaraz v. Philex-Lascogon Mining Corporation, et al."

The Facts

In Civil Case No. 7077

On 11 August 2009, respondent judge granted the preliminary injunction without need of a bond
pending the hearing of respondent spouses Motion to Hear Affirmative Defenses. On 1
September 2009, respondent spouses filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which respondent judge
set for hearing on 5 October 2009. Subsequently, respondent judge reset the hearing to 16
November 2009 and then to 12 March 2010. Upon assumption as the new presiding judge of
Branch 30 sometime in February 2010, Judge Evangeline Yuipco-Bayana issued an Order
revoking the preliminary injunction earlier issued by respondent judge.
In their Complaint dated 13 September 2010, complainants contend that respondent judge should
be charged with gross ignorance of the law and procedure: (1) for disregarding the basic and
elementary principle that TRO and preliminary injunction are improper remedies to transfer
possession of one property to another whose title has not been clearly established; and (2) for
failure to decide the Motion for Reconsideration within a period of 30 days as required by the
rules and jurisprudence.
In Spec. Proc. No. 7101
Petitioner Noel P.E.M. Schellekens (petitioner Noel) filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
on 19 August 2009. The next day, respondents Aris Caesar B. Servillas, P/S, Supt. David Y.
Ombao, Denelito G. Glico, Alexis E. Espojona, and Rosemarie Catelo testified during the
hearing. On 21 August 2009, which was a holiday, respondent judge issued an Order for the
release of petitioner Noel upon finding that the latter was unlawfully arrested. The Order was
implemented on the same day.

Relative to this case, complainants charge respondent judge of: (1) gross ignorance of procedure
and undue interference in the administrative functions of the Bureau of Immigration by ordering
the release of the expired passport of petitioner Noel, and by preparing the said Order outside of
the courts premises because it was not single-spaced and did not have a stamp by the Clerk of
Court as received; and (2) violating Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct due to his friendly
greeting to petitioner Noel and for acting as counsel for the latter by propounding questions on
the respondents during their testimonies.
In Civil Case No. 7065
On 3 August 2009, defendant Philex-Lascogon Mining Corporation filed a Motion to Dismiss the
Amended Complaint filed by plaintiffs Heirs of Alcaraz on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The
plaintiffs Heirs of Alcaraz submitted their Opposition dated 17 August 2009 and their 2nd
Amended Complaint dated 26 August 2009. However, it was only on 20 September 2010 that
respondent Judge issued an Order denying the Motion to Dismiss. Accordingly, complainants
claim that respondent judge should be held guilty of gross inefficiency and of violating the Code
of Judicial Conduct for his undue delay in resolving a simple Motion to Dismiss.

affidavit of Court Legal Researcher Peter John Tremedal explaining the reasons for the delay of
the hearing. In Tremedals Affidavit, he states that respondent judge instructed him to convene the
counsels first, and to ensure their attendance before respondent judge starts the hearing. In
conclusion, respondent judge asserts that the malicious filing of the baseless complaint was
conduct unbecoming officers of the court for which complainants must be held accountable.
In their Rejoinder and Answer to Counter-Charge dated 1 December 2010, complainants reiterate
their arguments in the Complaint. In the first case, they emphasize that respondent judge
deliberately failed to resolve the Motion for Reconsideration. On the second, complainants argue
that the pendency of the Tolibas administrative complaint cannot divest the Supreme Court of its
jurisdiction to review the actions of respondent judge, more so in the light of new allegations
supported by judicial records. As for respondent Judges alleged tardiness and inefficiency,
complainants point out that the joint affidavit of Prosecutor Chua and Atty. Bejil, Jr. merely
pertained to one particular day. As answer to respondent judges Counter-Charge, complainants
denied the allegation for lack of factual and legal basis.
The OCAs Report and Recommendation

As their final charge, complainants aver that respondent judge is guilty of tardiness and
inefficiency in trying cases before his branch. Complainants state that respondent judge usually
starts the hearing between 9:45 a.m. and 10:00 a.m. in violation of the Supreme Court Circular.

In its Report dated 18 July 2011, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found respondent
judge guilty of undue delay in rendering an order but dismissed the charges of gross ignorance of
the law and gross misconduct for being judicial in nature and for lack of merit.

In his Comment with Counter-Charge dated 5 November 2010, respondent judge preliminarily
states that complainant Atty. Medina is neither a counsel nor a party litigant in Spec. Proc. No.
7101 and Civil Case No. 7065; thus, he has no interest to question perceived irregularities relative
to these cases. With respect to Atty. Servillas, he is neither a counsel nor a party-in-interest in any
of the cases mentioned in the complaint.

In its evaluation, the OCA preliminarily states that in administrative proceedings it is immaterial
whether or not the complainant himself or herself has a cause of action against the respondent.

Relative to Civil Case No. 7077, respondent judge claims that he issued the TRO and preliminary
injunction judiciously and without bad faith or irregularity. He argues that he resolved cases
based on the merits of the case and if there was indeed error, it merely constitutes an error of
judgment. Respondent judge further states that the alleged error was already aptly corrected by
Judge Bayanas reversal. Regarding the alleged delay in the resolution of the Motion for
Reconsideration, respondent judge defends himself by explaining that the Motion was not
submitted for resolution. Respondent judge argues that respondent spouses lawyer (complainant
Atty. Medina) failed to file a responsive pleading to the Opposition to Motion for
Reconsideration and that the hearing of the Motion was further reset to 12 March 2010.
As for Spec. Proc. No. 7101, respondent judge argues that it is already subject of an earlier
complaint filed by Cristita C. Vda. de Tolibas against him. With respect to Civil Case No. 7065,
respondent judge states that the Motion to Dismiss was already resolved.
On the charge of tardiness and inefficiency, respondent judge attached the: (1) 21 October 2010
Joint Affidavit of Prosecutor Maureen Chua and Atty. Jose Begil, Jr.; and (2) 21 October 2010

On the charge of gross ignorance of the law, the OCA held that respondent judge committed an
error of judgment for which he may not be administratively held liable in the absence of bad
faith, malice or corrupt purpose. As to the issue of undue delay in resolving the Motion for
Reconsideration, the OCA likewise held it unmeritorious because the motion was not submitted
for resolution in view of the resetting of its hearing.
As for the charges relating to Spec. Proc. No. 7101, the OCA found that the issues raised by
complainant may be best resolved in another pending case against respondent judge (OCA IPI
No. 09-3254-TRJ) except the alleged violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct for acting as
counsel for the petitioner. The OCA also found the charges of tardiness and inefficiency bereft of
merit because Tremedals Affidavit explained the reason for the late hearing.
On the other hand, the OCA held that respondent judge is guilty of undue delay in resolving the
Motion to Dismiss in violation of the 1987 Constitution. Since it was respondent judges first
administrative offense, the OCA considered it as a mitigating circumstance. The OCA
recommended a fine of P5,000 with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act
shall be dealt with more severely.

This Court, in a Resolution dated 5 October 2011, re-docketed administrative complaint OCA-IPI
No. 10-3514-RTJ as regular administrative matter A.M. No. RTJ-11-2298.
The Courts Ruling
We are partially in accord with the OCAs findings and recommendation.
To settle the issue on complainants cause of action, the OCA correctly observed that
complainants may file the present administrative complaint against respondent judge. As the
Court held in LBC Bank Vigan Branch v. Guzman,1 the objective in administrative cases is the
preservation of the integrity and competence of the Judiciary by policing its ranks and enforcing
discipline among its erring employees.
However, on the charge of gross ignorance of the law, we find respondent judge guilty of the
charge.
Well-settled is the rule that an injunction cannot be issued to transfer possession or control of a
property to another when the legal title is in dispute between the parties and the legal title has not
been clearly established.2In this case, respondent judge evidently disregarded this established
doctrine applied in numerous cases when it granted the preliminary injunction in favor of Pagels
whose legal title is disputed. When the law involved is simple and elementary, lack of
conversance with it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.3 Gross ignorance of the law is the
disregard of basic rules and settled jurisprudence.4
Respondent judge should have been more cautious in issuing writs of preliminary injunctions
because as consistently held these writs are strong arms of equity which must be issued with great
deliberation."5 In Fortune Life Insurance Co., Inc. v. Luczon,6 the Court held the judge guilty of
gross ignorance of the law when he failed to conduct a hearing prior to issuance of an injunction
in violation of the Rules of Court. It was further emphasized inZuo v. Cabredo,7 where it was
held that the act of respondent in issuing the TRO to enjoin the Bureau of Customs and its
officials from detaining the subject shipment amounted to gross ignorance of the law.
A judge may also be administratively liable if shown to have been motivated by bad faith, fraud,
dishonesty or corruption in ignoring, contradicting or failing to apply settled law and
jurisprudence.8 In the present case, the following compounded circumstances manifest bad faith
on the part of respondent judge: (1) in his Comment with Counter-Charge, respondent judge
states that he decided after the parties submitted their position papers, but his Order dated 11
August 2009 indicates that respondent spouses did not file their position paper and the hearing of
the Affirmative Defense was still set on 18 August 2009; (2) respondent judges Order patently
shows facts not entitling Pagels to the preliminary injunction but respondent judge still issued it;
and (3) respondent judge did not require petitioner Pagels to put up a bond without sufficient
justification or showing of exemption.

The error is magnified by respondent judges delay in resolving the Motion for Reconsideration
through the following subsequent acts: (1) he set the hearing of the Motion for Reconsideration
dated 1 September 2009 on 5 October 2009 contrary to the rule providing that the "hearing x x x
must not be later than 10 days after the filing of the motion"; 9 (2) on 18 November 2009,
respondent judge reset the hearing from 16 November 2009 to 12 March 2010; and (3) he failed
to resolve the said Motion despite the non-filing of a responsive pleading to the Opposition on the
Motion for Reconsideration considering that it is not an indispensable pleading for resolution and
the rules provide that "a motion for reconsideration shall be resolved within thirty days from the
time it is submitted for resolution."10
Indeed, when the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a
law or a principle in the discharge of his functions, a judge is either too incompetent and
undeserving of the position and title he holds or he is too vicious that the oversight or omission
was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority.11
Relative to Spec. Proc. No 7101, respondent judge filed a Manifestation dated 2 September 2011
annexing this Courts Resolution dated 13 June 2011 dismissing the case against respondent
judge filed by Cristita Conjurado Vda. De Tolibas. In the Resolution, we adopted the OCAs
evaluation, to wit: (1) respondent judge validly issued the writ of habeas corpus on a holiday, in
accord with the Section 2, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court; and (2) the assailed Order was not
issued to assist petitioner Noel in evading the crime of parricide. It is because the said Resolution
did not address the issues in this Complaint that we modify the findings of the OCA and rule
upon the allegations of complainants.
On the charge of violation of Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, we find the same bereft of
merit. A judge may properly intervene in the presentation of evidence to expedite and prevent
unnecessary waste of time and clarify obscure and incomplete details in the course of the
testimony of the witness.12In City of Cebu v. Gako,13the Court finds nothing irregular when
respondent judge unduly arrogated unto himself the duty of a counsel by calling a witness to the
stand and conducting the latters direct testimony even if the respective counsels were not
interested or did not intend to present said person as their witness. Here, the records show that
respondent judge merely propounded questions to elicit relevant facts from the witness
respondents. The Transcript of Stenographic Notes, by itself, was not sufficient to show bias or
partiality. It has been held that the Court has to be shown acts or conduct of the judge clearly
indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before the latter can be branded the stigma of being biased
and partial.14
On the charge of gross ignorance of procedure and undue interference in the administrative
functions of the Bureau of Immigration, complainants failed to prove the charge with substantial
evidence. In administrative proceedings, complainants have the burden of proving by substantial
evidence the allegations in their complaints. 15 Mere accusations or surmises will not suffice.In the
absence of contrary evidence, what will prevail is the presumption that the respondent judge has
regularly performed his duties.16

On the charge of tardiness and inefficiency, we find the same likewise without merit. Without
evidence as to their truthfulness or veracity, the allegations in the Complaint filed by
complainants remain mere allegations and do not rise to the dignity of proof.
On the charge of undue delay in resolving the Motion to Dismiss, we adopt the recommendation
of the OCA that respondent judge is guilty of the charge and should be fined P5,000. Respondent
judge resolved the said Motion after more than a year and only after the filing of the instant
complaint. Failure to decide cases and other matters within the reglementary period of ninety (90)
days constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative sanction against
the erring magistrate.17This is not only a blatant transgression of the Constitution but also of the
Code of Judicial Conduct, which enshrines the significant duty of magistrates to decide cases
promptly. Canon 6, Section 5 of the Code provides that "judges shall perform all judicial duties
including the delivery of reserved decisions efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness. "
Under Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, gross ignorance of the law is a
serious charge punishable by either: (1) dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the
benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to
any public office, including government-owned and controlled corporation; or (2) suspension
from office without salary and other benefits for more than three but not exceeding six months; or
(3) a fine of more than P20,000 but not exceeding P40,000 while undue delay in rendering a
decision or order is a less serious charge punishable by either (1) suspension from office without
salary and other benefits for not less than one nor more than three months; or (2) a fine of more
thanP10,000 but not exceeding P20,000.1wphi1
Accordingly, we impose a fine of P25,000 for the charge of gross ignorance of the law, taking
into account that in a previous case respondent judge had been sanctioned. 18
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Judge Victor A. Canoy GUILTY of GROSS
IGNORANCE OF THE LAW andUNDUE DELAY in rendering a decision and accordingly
fine him Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000). He isSTERNLY WARNED that a repetition of
similar or analogous infractions in the future shall be dealt with more severely. The other charges
are hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. RTJ-04-1860

September 8, 2004

SPOUSES FLORENCIO & ESTHER CAUSIN, complainants,

vs.
JUDGE LEONARDO N. DEMECILLO, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 24,
CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY,respondent.
RESOLUTION
PUNO, J.:
Before this Court is an administrative complaint filed on August 24, 2001 by spouses Florencio
and Esther Causin, charging respondent Regional Trial Court (RTC) Judge Leonardo N.
Demecillo, Branch 24 of Cagayan de Oro City, with bias and partiality, violation of the Code of
Judicial Conduct for allowing another RTC judge to participate in a case pending before
his sala as counsel for the plaintiff without authority from this Court, and for knowingly
rendering an unjust decision.
The complaint stemmed from a 1994 case for quieting of title 1 filed by Raul F. Lim, represented
by his attorney-in fact Rita Lim, and Pryce Properties Corporation against complainant-spouses
and one Omero T. Dampal. The case which involved the overlapping of boundaries of the
adjacent lots of the parties was raffled off to the RTC, Branch 24 of Cagayan de Oro City,
presided by respondent judge.
Complainant-spouses alleged that Judge Rodrigo Lim, Jr., then RTC Acting Judge of Branch 21,
Cagayan de Oro City and a brother of plaintiff Raul Lim, acted as the latters counsel in the civil
case for quieting of title. They claim that Judge Lim attended the hearings in the case, crossexamined the witnesses, interposed objections at the trials, chose the hearing dates, and delivered
oral arguments in court --- all without special authority from this Court; that when confronted by
them, Judge Lim refused to confirm whether he was hired by the plaintiffs to represent them in
said case; and, that respondent judge allowed Judge Lim to actively participate and intervene in
the proceedings although he knew that the latter was not authorized by this Court to do so.
As to the charge of bias and partiality in favor of the plaintiffs and Judge Lim, complainantspouses alleged that during the trial, respondent judge extended unwarranted consideration to the
plaintiffs as follows: he would wait for the arrival of Judge Lim in court whenever the latter
would be late for a hearing in said case; a scheduled hearing in the morning would be transferred
by respondent judge in the afternoon when he would learn that Judge Lim could not make it in
the morning session; respondent judge would reset the hearings based solely on the convenience
of Judge Lim; all the unreasonable objections interposed by Judge Lim during the trial were
sustained by respondent judge; and, when complainants moved for an ocular inspection of the
subject lots to show to the court the actual location of the disputed boundary, respondent judge
denied their request and sustained the objection of Judge Lim.

Finally, complainant-spouses charged that respondent judge knowingly rendered an unjust

decision in the case when he awarded the disputed portion of the land to plaintiff Lim without
considering the merits of their evidence. 2
In answer to the complaint,3 respondent judge denied the charges. He explained that he allowed
Judge Lim to appear as counsel for the plaintiffs as he presumed that the latter had sought prior
authority to do so from this Court. He pointed out that under Section 21, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court, an attorney is presumed to be properly authorized to represent any cause in which he
appears. Respondent judge also argued that the complainants failed to file a motion questioning
the authority of Judge Lim to appear as counsel for the plaintiffs in said case.
On the charge of bias and partiality, respondent judge explained that: firstly, it has been his
practice to move to the afternoon a hearing that is scheduled in the morning upon the request of
either party rather than postpone or reset it to another day; secondly, he did not consider solely
the convenience of Judge Lim in scheduling the hearing dates as he asked the parties to find a
trial date convenient to them, as borne out by the transcripts of said case; finally, he did not grant
complainants request for an ocular inspection of the subject lots as he believed that the relocation
survey of a licensed inspector would better determine if the two (2)-hectare disputed land
belonged to the land of the plaintiffs or the defendants.
On the charge of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, respondent judge stressed that he
decided the case against the complainants based on the evidence and the law, guided by his deep
sense of justice. He explained that he did not consider complainants defense of prescription and
laches for the following reasons: these were not put in issue in the pre-trial order; acquisitive
prescription could not defeat the title of the registered owner of the land; and, the complainants
failed to prove that plaintiffs incurred in delay in asserting their rights despite knowledge of the
complainants encroachment on their land.
Finally, respondent judge argued that if complainant-spouses doubted his impartiality, they
should have filed a motion to inhibit him and he would have readily granted it. Likewise, he
pointed out that if they had objected to the participation of Judge Lim in the proceedings, it
would have given him reason to inquire from Judge Lim whether he was authorized to appear in
said case. Respondent judge stressed that complainant-spouses did neither and put the blame on
him after losing their case.
In their Reply,4 complainant-spouses reiterated their charge that respondent judge was guilty of
bias and partiality when he allowed RTC Judge Lim to actively participate in the trial of said case
without entering his appearance as plaintiffs counsel. They stressed that there was no special
purpose for Judge Lim to appear as counsel for his brother, plaintiff Raul Lim, as the latter had
already sold his land, subject of the case, to co-plaintiff Pryce Properties Corporation. Thus, they
charged that the participation of Judge Lim in the proceedings served no other purpose than to
influence respondent judge in deciding the case in plaintiffs favor. They insisted that respondent
judge should not have allowed Judge Lim to be involved in the proceedings as he was not a party
to the case, he was not hired by the plaintiffs to represent them and he was not authorized by this

Court to do so. It was not incumbent upon them to inquire into Judge Lims authority as, being
laymen, they did not know that a member of the bench is not allowed to practice his profession.
For his part, Executive Judge Rodrigo Lim, Jr. admitted that he did not secure from this Court an
authority to appear in the proceedings of the case. He explained that his appearance at the trial of
September 20, 1995 was only for the purpose of cross-examining the complainants witness,
Pedro Tellafer, who was a tenant of his father, the original owner of plaintiffs lot. He allegedly
participated in the hearings of said case in good faith as he had personal knowledge of the
witness background. Moreover, it was a family case --- his brother was one of the plaintiffs and
his wife acted as his brothers attorney-in-fact. He argued that he did not engage in the illegal
practice of law as the phrase connotes payment of a fee and he did not receive remuneration for
his participation in the case. Finally, he claimed that the complaint was ill-motivated and was
filed by disgruntled litigants to get even with the Lim family after losing the case, as evidenced
by the fact that it was only filed six (6) years later.5

We uphold the findings of the investigating Justice of the Court of Appeals.

On the charge of bias and partiality, we rule that there is a dearth of evidence on record to prove
complainant-spouses charge. The transcript of records attached by complainant-spouses to their
complaint clearly shows that in ruling on the objections during the trial, respondent judge would
at times sustain or overrule the objection of the lawyer of either party. Thus, from the records, we
cannot discern any pattern of partiality committed by respondent judge in favor of the plaintiff or
Judge Lim. The questions sparingly propounded by respondent judge to the witnesses were
mostly clarificatory in nature. We quote the pertinent portions of the September 20, 1995 TSN of
said case, thus:
ATTY. JARDIN

After the issues were joined, the Court referred the case to the Court of Appeals for investigation,
report and recommendation. At the hearings conducted, complainant-spouses and respondent
judge testified. The case was then submitted for decision. 6

We offer the testimony of our witness, Mr. Tellaper, Your Honor, to prove that he is the
brother of Salvacion Tellaper Relano, and her husband Miguel Relano, as the caretaker
of the land owned by the late Rodrigo Lim, Sr., and he will also testify that Miguel
Relano told him to plant monuments at the boundary per instruction of Rodrigo Lim,
Sr. to Miguel Relano.

After evaluating the case, the investigating Justice made the following observations:

COURT

(1) On the charge of bias and partiality, there is no basis to warrant disciplinary action
against respondent judge as complainants failed to prove their charge by convincing
evidence.

Any comment, Paero?

(2) On the charge of knowingly rendering an unjust decision, the respondent judge
cannot be held liable as the impugned decision was affirmed on appeal by the Court of
Appeals and this Court.

We object [to] the offer of the testimony of witness, on the aspect that he was told
by the late Rodrigo Lim, Sr. to plant the monuments is a hearsay.

(3) On the charge of violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, respondent judge is
liable as he allowed a fellow RTC judge to appear as counsel for one of the parties in a
case pending before his sala without authority from this Court. He rejected respondent
judges explanation that he was busy with the case that it escaped his attention that
Judge Lim was an incumbent RTC judge, prohibited from appearing as counsel in the
case.

ATTY. ACHAS: [plaintiffs counsel of record]

ATTY. JARDIN
He was the one [who] told to plant the monuments.
ATTY. ACHAS
The person who allegedly told him is already dead.

Thus, the investigating Justice recommended: (1) that the charges of bias and partiality,
and knowingly rendering an unjust judgment be dismissed for lack of merit; and, (2)
that a fine of P5,000.00 be imposed against respondent judge for violation of Canon 2,
Rule 2.01 and Rule 2.03 of the Code of Judicial Conduct for allowing the unauthorized
appearance of Judge Lim in the trial of the case, with a stern warning that a repetition
of similar act of impropriety or any misconduct shall be dealt with more severely.7

ATTY. JARDIN
He was instructed and he planted the Ipil-Ipil trees.
COURT

What are you trying to prove, Paero?

We object, no basis.

ATTY. JARDIN

ATTY. JARDIN

The Ipil-Ipil trees were planted among the monuments at the boundary of the land.

He is a resident of that place.

JUDGE LIM

JUDGE LIM

Why not present the sister?

He has to lay the basis.

ATTY. JARDIN

ATTY. JARDIN

He was the one who planted, and in fact there was no dispute prior to this case.

If the witness knows, Your Honor.

COURT

JUDGE LIM

Alright, we will hear from the witness.

He do[es] not know the boundary.

xxx

Q Mr. Witness, you said earlier that in the land owned by Sr. Lim, there is an adjoining
land owned by the defendants Causin, did you not know the boundary of Causin and
Lim?

COURT
If witness knows
A Yes, sir.

JUDGE LIM

xxx

No basis, Your Honor.

A Sr. Lim instructed that the boundary should be planted with Ipil-Ipil trees.

COURT

Q Who was told to plant Ipil-Ipil trees along the boundaries, Mr. Witness?

Lay the basis, Paero.

A My brother-in-law, Miguel Relano.

ATTY. JARDIN

Q And, who did the planting of Ipil-Ipil trees along the boundary?

Q You said earlier, that you resided in the land of Sr. Lim for 30 years, do you confirm
that Mr. Witness?

A The two of us.

A Yes, sir.
Q Mr. Witness, did you know the owners of the land adjoining the land of Sr. Lim?
ATTY. ACHAS

ATTY. ACHAS
May we petition that the previous answer of witness be [stricken] off the record
because it is only a hearsay?

COURT

ATTY. JARDIN

Q Alright, do you know who planted the Ipil-Ipil seeds?

Q Mr. Witness, what is the thing that you do not know about the conflict?

A Miguel was the one who plowed and I was the one who sowed the Ipil-Ipil trees.

JUDGE LIM

xxx
Q Mr. Witness, in your 30 years that you stayed in that area, was there a boundary
dispute between [the] adjoining owners, Lim and Causin?

Counsel is trying to cross-examine his own witness.

ATTY. JARDIN
The Witness, Your Honor, is not highly educated.

ATTY. ACHAS
COURT
Incompetent, your Honor.
He does not know, Paero.
ATTY. JARDIN
xxx
If he knows.
JUDGE LIM
COURT
May I conduct the cross-examination, Your Honor.
Q Alright, is that boundary not the subject of the conflict?
COURT
A Before there was none.
Proceed, Paero.
ATTY. JARDIN
xxx
Q What about now?
ATTY. JARDIN
A As of now, there is a conflict.
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION
Q Did you know when the conflict started, Mr. Witness?
Q Mr. Witness, did you ask for a compensation when you left the area?
A I did not know.
A Yes, we asked.
Q But in your 30 years of stay in that area, was there a conflict in that area?
Q Please tell the Honorable Court, why you asked for compensation?
JUDGE LIM
A Because of our plants.
Already answered, "I did not know."
Q Aside from the plants, did you ask for compensation?

JUDGE LIM

COURT

There was already an answer.

Q How much did you ask?

COURT

xxx

Q Alright, aside from the plants?

JUDGE LIM

A No more, sir.

That is all, Your Honor.

ATTY. JARDIN

COURT

That would be all, You Honor.

Any more witnesses to be presented?

COURT

ATTY. JARDIN

Any re-cross?

Yes, Your Honor, in the person of Domingo Gilot.

JUDGE LIM

xxx

Yes, Your Honor.

ATTY. JARDIN

COURT

DIRECT EXAMINATION

Proceed, Paero.

xxx

JUDGE LIM

ATTY. ACHAS

RE-CROSS

CROSS-EXAMINATION

Q You said that you were paid or compensated for the plants that you were able to plant
on that land, is that correct?

xxx
ATTY. JARDIN

A Yes, sir.
Objection, Your Honor, it is vague.
Q And the total amount that you, your sister Salvacion Relano and Miguel Relano, and
the rest of your relatives, and the relatives of the husband of your sister, was so high
that the Lims refused to pay it?
ATTY. JARDIN
Objection, Your Honor.

COURT
Q Alright, why [were you] dismissed by the Causins?
xxx

Q And, this land that you said where Dampal took over was located in Maitom,
Mambatangan?

As to tenor, let it remain.

ATTY. ACHAS

A Yes, sir.
Q And this Rey Causin, do you know him?
Q And not in Cagayan de Oro?
A Yes, sir.
ATTY. JARDIN
Q How old was he in 1978?
Objection, Your Honor, witness is incompetent.
ATTY. JARDIN
COURT
Objection, Your Honor, witness is incompetent.
Is this area in Bukidnon or in Cagayan de Oro?
COURT
A The address there is Mambatangan, Bukidnon.
He is not competent, Paero.
xxx
ATTY. ACHAS
Q Mr. Witness, you said that you were only informed by Mencede that these Ipil-Ipil
trees at the boundary between the lands of Lims and Causins, is that correct?

Q But, he was very young at that time?

A Yes, because I asked them where the boundary is.

A He was not the one I asked at that time, it was his elder brother.

Q And you did not ask Causin the owner of the property?

Q You said that you asked Mencede of the boundary?

A Because at that time the Causins were not here.

ATTY. JARDIN

Q Because he was staying abroad?

Already answered, Your Honor.

A I do not know, but at that time, Causin was not here.

COURT

Q So, you never got to ask him?

Already answered, Paero.

A I have asked his eldest son.

xxx

ATTY. ACHAS

Q But this is only the belief of Mencede not of Arnold, the older brother of Rey?

We move to strike off from the record the answer of witness as irresponsive.

A Yes, I also inquired the Lims through Salvacion and Miguel Relano, and they told me
that that was the boundary.

COURT

Q But you never got to ask the Causins, because they were not around at that time?

We will just see the monuments and the Ipil-Ipil trees, Your Honor.

ATTY. JARDIN

JUDGE LIM

Misleading, Your Honor, at the first question, he answered that he was not able to
ask

We object, Your Honor, there is already a sketch plan and it has been surveyed,
there is no need for an ocular inspection considering that these documents had
been presented to this Court.

COURT
ATTY. JARDIN
You did not ask him, because they were not there but when they returned, you
asked them?

I dont think the documents will suffice.

A When they returned, I was no longer there.

COURT

xxx

Alright, make your motion in writing, Paero, and we will resolve. 8 (emphases
supplied)

COURT
Are you still presenting another witness, Paero?
ATTY. JARDIN
We have no more witness to present, Your Honor, however, may we ask time to submit
our written offer of exhibits.
COURT
Alright, fifteen days.
xxx
ATTY. JARDIN
We would like also to move, Your Honor, for an ocular inspection to be made by
this Court.
JUDGE LIM
What is the purpose, it is already testified to by the witness
ATTY. JARDIN

Indeed, from a reading of the transcript, we cannot evince bias or partiality on the part of
respondent judge during the proceedings in the case.
As to the denial of the request of complainant-spouses for an ocular inspection of the lots,
respondent judge reasonably exercised his discretion in ordering instead the conduct of a
relocation survey by a licensed inspector. It is the better means to determine who between the
parties encroached on the boundary of the adjacent lands. Bias and partiality can never be
presumed. Bare allegations of partiality will not suffice in the absence of clear and convincing
proof that will overcome the presumption that the judge dispensed justice according to law and
evidence, without fear or favor.9
Neither is there basis to hold respondent judge liable for knowingly rendering an unjust decision
in said case. The key word is "knowingly." For liability to attach, the assailed decision must not
only be found erroneous. As a rule, the acts of a judge which pertain to his judicial functions are
not subject to disciplinary power unless they are committed with fraud, dishonesty, corruption or
bad faith.10 To hold otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon
to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his
judgment.11
In the case at bar, complainant-spouses failed to prove that the judgment is contrary to law or
unsupported by evidence. The records disclose that the assailed decision of respondent judge had
been affirmed on appeal by the Court of Appeals12 and by this Court.13 Neither was it shown that
the judgment was made with deliberate malice or injustice. Thus, their claim is more speculative
than a product of concrete proof. Delayed filing of the complaint against respondent judge after
complainants lost the case on appeal likewise casts doubt on the motive of the complainants.

Nonetheless, we find respondent judge guilty of violating Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct which prescribes that a judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all activities. Rule 2.01 provides that a judge should behave at all times as to
promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. In the case at bar, the
records reveal that respondent judge allowed Judge Lim, then acting RTC Judge of Branch 21 of
Cagayan de Oro City, to actively participate and intervene in the case for quieting of title pending
in Branch 24 of the same court, without authority from this Court. The prohibition for a judge to
appear in a case as counsel for one of the parties is based on public policy. In allowing Judge Lim
to actively involve himself in the trial of the case, represent the interests of the plaintiff therein,
cross-examine the witnesses and register his objections during the trial, the complainants and the
public were given the impression that Judge Lim might or could unduly influence the conduct
and outcome of the litigation. It undermined and compromised in the eyes of the public the
integrity and independence of his court. It was incumbent upon respondent judge to inquire from
Judge Lim whether he obtained authority from this Court to appear in said case. The rule that a
lawyer is presumed to be authorized to appear before a court applies only to lawyers, not judges.
Judges are prohibited from being personally involved in a case unless he himself is a party
thereto. Respondent judge transgressed the rule pertaining to the avoidance, not only of actual
impropriety, but even the appearance of impropriety.14 He failed to comport himself in a manner
that his conduct could bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as an
epitome of integrity and justice. This Court has stressed in countless cases that judges ought not
only to be impartial but should also appear to be impartial. 15 They should continuously encourage
and uphold safeguards for the discharge of judicial duties to reinforce public confidence in the
judicial process which is fundamental to the maintenance of judicial integrity.
Be that as it may, we approve the recommendation of the OCA that the penalty of fine in the
amount of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00) and a warning be imposed against respondent judge.
The records disclose that the same penalty was meted by this Court to Judge Lim in the separate
administrative case filed against him by the complainant-spouses for his active participation as
counsel in the civil case which was decided by respondent judge.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent Judge Leonardo N. Demecillo is meted the penalty of fine in
the amount of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00) for violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.01 and Rule 2.03
of the Code of Judicial Conduct, with a stern warning that a repetition of similar infractions
shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

*Propriety

filed by 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Oliver S. Garcia and duly approved by City Prosecutor
Teilo P. Quiambao. Up to this time, the said intended pleading has not been filed.

A.M. No. RTJ-09-2180

July 26, 2010
[Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 08-2817-RTJ]

WHEREFORE, the Court grants the Motion to Withdraw Information and considers this case as
dismissed.

ROLANDO E. MARCOS, Complainant,

vs.
JUDGE OFELIA T. PINTO, Regional Trial Court, Branch 60, Angeles City, Respondent.

The cash bail posted by the accused is hereby ordered released to him upon presentation of the
original receipt.
SO ORDERED.

DECISION
Angeles City, Philippines, December 22, 2006.
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is a Complaint1 dated February 1, 2008, filed by Rolando E. Marcos
(complainant) against respondent Ofelia T. Pinto (respondent judge), Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 60, Angeles City, for Gross Ignorance of the Law, Knowingly
Rendering an Unjust Judgment/Order and Partiality relative to Criminal Case No. 04-775
entitled People of the Philippines v. Espilo Leyco.
The antecedent facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows:
On September 5, 2001, a criminal case for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) 7610, 2 docketed as
Criminal Case No. 04-775, entitled People v. Espilo Leyco was filed before the RTC of Angeles
City, Branch 60, presided by respondent Judge Pinto. Accused Leyco was arraigned on August
31, 2005. Pre-trial was terminated and trial ensued with the presentation of witnesses.
Meanwhile, while the case was being tried, accused Leyco filed a petition for review with the
Secretary of the Department of Justice and sought to set aside the resolution of the Angeles City
Prosecution Office, which recommended the filing of the information against the accused.
On October 25, 2006,3 a year after the case was filed, the Secretary of Justice, Raul Gonzales,
reversed the resolution of the Angeles City Prosecution and directed the City Prosecutor to file a
Motion to Withdraw the Information filed against accused Leyco. On November 10, 2006, in
compliance with the said directive, the Assistant City Prosecutor handling the subject case filed a
Motion to Withdraw Information. Thus, on November 16, 2006,4 private complainant in the said
case moved for reconsideration of the DOJs resolution.

(Signed)
Ofelia Tuazon Pinto
On February 2, 2007, private complainant filed a motion seeking the reconsideration of the order
of dismissal but was denied.6
On April 15, 2008, Secretary Gonzales denied private complainants motion for reconsideration.
Thus, feeling aggrieved, Marcos, one of the witnesses in the subject criminal case, filed the
instant administrative complaint against respondent Judge Pinto.
Marcos alleged that respondent judge did not even exert any effort to assess whether there was a
valid ground to dismiss the case. He claimed that respondent judge cannot validly dismiss the
case based on the failure of the private prosecutor to file any comment or opposition to the
motion to withdraw information. More so since as of November 17, 2006, the private prosecutor
already withdrew himself from handling the subject case. Complainant also pointed out that
respondent judge did not even set a time frame within which to file the comment or opposition.

On December 22, 2006,5 while the resolution of private complainants motion for reconsideration
was still pending, respondent Judge Pinto granted the Motion to Withdraw Information and
dismissed the subject case. The pertinent portion of the Order reads:

Moreover, complainant alleged that respondent judge manifested bias and partiality in favor of
accused Leyco which he attributed to a special relationship between respondent judge and the
Spouses Leyco. Complainant claimed that respondent judge even acted as the solemnizing officer
at the marriage of Paul F. Leyco, son of accused Leyco. He, thus, questioned the integrity of
respondent judge, considering that the marriage ceremony was held on January 19, 2007 during
the period when respondent judge issued the assailed order of dismissal. To support his claim,
complainant presented a certified true copy of the marriage certificate issued by the National
Statistics Office showing that respondent judge was indeed the one who solemnized the marriage
at the Leycos residence.

On November 13, 2006, the Court gave Atty. Renan B. Castillo, private prosecutor, to file his
comment and/or objection on the Motion to Withdraw Information dated November 10, 2006

On March 5, 2008, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) directed Judge Pinto to file her
Comment on the instant complaint.7

In her Comment8 dated April 2, 2008, Judge Pinto denied the allegations of the complainant and
claimed the same to be misplaced and baseless. She insisted that she exercised judicial discretion
when she issued the Order dismissing the criminal case against Leyco. She emphasized that
Marcos should have resorted to the appropriate judicial recourse instead of filing the instant
administrative complaint.
Judge Pinto likewise argued that complainants allegation that she had been biased and partial to
the accused was unsupported by evidence. She, however, admitted that she was indeed the
solemnizing officer in the marriage of the accused son, Paul Leyco, but stressed that it was her
duty after all to solemnize marriages under the Family Code. She likewise pointed out that she
did not know that the parties were related to the accused. She claimed that she came to know of
such fact only when she was already in the residence of the marrying parties. Judge Pinto insisted
that said act cannot be equated as giving favor to a party in a criminal case contrary to what the
complainant claims.1avvphi1
Finally, Judge Pinto argued that the instant complaint should be dismissed outright, because
complainant Marcos was not the true party-in-interest in the criminal case; thus, he has no locus
standi to file the complaint. Marcos was a mere witness for the prosecution.
In a Memorandum9 dated March 9, 2009, the OCA recommended that the complaint be redocketed as a regular administrative complaint against Judge Pinto. It, likewise, recommended
that the matter be referred to the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals for investigation,
report and recommendation.
The OCA maintained that while Marcos is not the real party-in-interest in the subject case, he can
still file the instant administrative case against respondent judge. It explained that in
administrative proceedings, the issue is not whether the complainant has a cause of action against
the respondent, but whether the employees have breached the norms and standards of the
Judiciary.
Thus, the Court, in a Resolution10 dated April 20, 2009, resolved to re-docket the administrative
complaint as a regular administrative matter against Judge Pinto and referred the matter to the
Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals for raffle among the Justices, for investigation, report
and recommendation.
In compliance, Justice Arturo G. Tayag, 11 in his Report and Recommendation, found the charges
of gross ignorance of the law and knowingly rendering an erroneous or unjust order against Judge
Pinto to be true and with basis. He, however, found the charge of violation of Canon 2 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct to be baseless.
In his Report, Justice Tayag, observed that Judge Pinto did not perform her duty of making an
independent evaluation or assessment of the merits of the case when she dismissed Criminal Case
No. 04-775. He, however, found no basis for violation of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, since he noted that in cases where both the parties requested the solemnizing officer, in

writing, to have the marriage solemnized at a house or place designated by them, such can be
done.
Accordingly, Justice Tayag, after considering that this is the respondents first offense and that
respondent has a good record as a Family Court Judge, recommended that Judge Pinto be meted a
penalty of two (2) months suspension from service without pay.
RULING
While we agree that respondent judge should be administratively held liable for her acts, we,
however, disagree with the findings and recommendation of the Investigating Justice.
To be held liable for gross ignorance of the law, the judge must be shown to have committed an
error that was "gross or patent, deliberate or malicious." Also administratively liable for gross
ignorance of the law is a judge who shown to have been motivated by bad faith, fraud,
dishonesty or corruption ignored, contradicted or failed to apply settled law and
jurisprudence.12 Such is not the case presently before this Court.
In the instant case, it was apparent that the assailed Order of dismissal was solely anchored on the
private prosecutors failure to file his comment and/or objection to the Motion to Withdraw the
Information. Indeed, respondent judge did not perform her duty of making an independent
evaluation or assessment of the merits of the case when she dismissed Criminal Case No. 04-775.
The disputed Order does not contain the facts of the case and the law upon which the dismissal
was based. However, there was also no evidence showing that in issuing said Order, respondent
judge was motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption.
In administrative proceedings like the one at bench, it goes without saying that it is the
complainant who has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the allegations in their
complaint.13 We do not find any evidence to support complainants accusations.
As a matter of public policy then, the acts of a judge in his official capacity are not subject to
disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous. Good faith and absence of malice,
corrupt motives or improper considerations are sufficient defenses in which a judge charged with
ignorance of the law can find refuge. It does not mean, however, that a judge, given the leeway he
is accorded in such cases, should not evince due care in the performance of his adjudicatory
prerogatives.14
With regard to the accusation of impropriety, we find it to be with basis. Section 1, Canon 4 of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary15 enunciates the rule that "Judges
shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities."
Upon assumption of office, a judge becomes the visible representation of the law and of justice.
Membership in the Judiciary circumscribes ones personal conduct and imposes upon him a

number of inhibitions, whose faithful observance is the price one has to pay for holding such an
exalted position. Thus, a magistrate of the law must comport himself at all times in such a manner
that his conduct, official or otherwise, can withstand the most searching public scrutiny, for the
ethical principles and sense of propriety of a judge are essential to the preservation of the
peoples faith in the judicial system. This Court does not require of judges that they measure up to
the standards of conduct of the saints and martyrs, but we do expect them to be like Caesars wife
in all their activities.16 Hence, we require them to abide strictly by the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Here, it appears that respondent judge has failed to live up to those rigorous standards. Her act of
solemnizing the marriage of accuseds son in the residence of the accused speaks for itself. It is
improper and highly unethical for a judge to actively participate in such social affairs,
considering that the accused is a party in a case pending before her own sala. What she should
have done was courteously deny the parties request. Her claim that she was unaware that the
parties were related to the accused fails to convince.
In pending or prospective litigations before them, judges should be scrupulously careful to avoid
anything that may tend to awaken the suspicion that their personal, social or sundry relations
could influence their objectivity. Not only must judges possess proficiency in law, they must also

act and behave in such manner that would assure litigants and their counsel of the judges
competence, integrity and independence.17
Considering the above findings, it is apparent that respondent judges actuations constitute simple
misconduct.
Under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, simple misconduct
is considered a less serious offense, sanctioned with suspension without pay for not less than one
month, but not more than three months, or a fine of not less than Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000.00) but not exceeding Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00).
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Ofelia T. Pinto of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles
City, Branch 60,GUILTY of SIMPLE MISCONDUCT for which she is FINED in the amount
of P10,000.00. She is, likewise,STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar
acts shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.