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Carlyle Thayer
US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton,17th ASEAN Regional Forum Retreat, Hanoi, July 23, 2010
Introduction
Since
1979
the
United
States
has
conducted
a
Freedom
of
Navigation
program
designed
to
challenge
coastal
states
that
adopt
practices
at
variance
with
customary
international
law
with
respect
to
their
maritime
zones.
Specifically,
the
US
challenges
the
right
of
coastal
states
to
regulate
military
activity
in
their
Exclusive
Economic
Zones
(EEZs)
by
deliberately
sending
military
ships
into
these
areas.
The
US
argues
that
these
military
activities
are
not
proscribed
by
the
United
Nations
Conventions
on
the
Law
or
the
Sea
(UNCLOS).
According
to
a
policy
brief
issued
by
the
U.S.
Department
of
State:
U.S.
policy
since
1983
provides
that
the
United
States
will
exercise
and
assert
its
navigation
and
over
flight
rights
and
freedoms
on
a
worldwide
basis
in
a
manner
that
is
consistent
with
the
balance
of
interests
reflected
in
the
Law
of
the
Sea
(LOS)
Convention.
The
United
States
will
not,
however,
acquiesce
in
unilateral
acts
of
other
states
designed
to
restrict
the
rights
and
freedoms
of
the
international
community
in
navigation
and
over
flight
and
other
related
high
seas
uses
The
FON
Program
operates
on
a
triple
track,
involving
not
only
diplomatic
representations
and
operational
assertions
by
U.S.
military
units,
but
also
bilateral
and
multilateral
consultations
with
other
governments
in
an
effort
to
promote
maritime
stability
and
consistency
with
international
law,
stressing
the
need
for
and
obligation
of
all
States
to
adhere
to
the
customary
international
law
rules
and
practices
reflected
in
the
LOS
Convention.1
In
1992
and
again
in
1995
the
Association
of
South
East
Asian
Nations
(ASEAN)
issued
its
first
two
declarations
on
the
South
China
Sea.
The
first
was
in
response
to
growing
tensions
between
China
and
Vietnam
(not
yet
a
member
of
ASEAN)
over
oil
exploration
in
the
South
China
Sea.
The
second
ASEAN
statement
was
issued
in
response
to
Chinas
occupation
of
Mischief
Reef
in
waters
claimed
by
the
Philippines.
This
paper
traces
United
States
policy
on
the
South
China
Sea
from
the
early
1990s
to
the
present.
*
Emeritus
Professor,
The
University
of
New
South
Wales
at
the
Australian
Defence
Force
Academy,
Canberra.
Email:
c.thayer@adfa.edu.au.
Revised
April
1,
2015.
1
U.S.
Department
of
State,
Bureau
of
Oceans
and
International
Environmental
and
Scientific
Affairs,
Maritime
Security
and
Navigation,
http://www.state.gov/e/oes/ocns/opa/maritimesecurity/.
Accessed
March
24,
2015.
3
In
1992
the
U.S.
was
in
the
process
of
vacating
its
military
bases
in
the
Philippines
after
its
leases
ran
out.
The
prime
concern
of
the
George
H.
W.
Bush
Administration
(1989-
1993)
was
to
ensure
safety
of
the
sea-lanes
of
communication
(SLOCs)
for
commercial
and
military
traffic.
The
U.S.
counseled
all
parties
to
refrain
from
using
force.
The
Administrations
of
President
Bill
Clinton
(1993-2001)
and
President
George
W.
Bush
Administration
(2001-09)
followed
the
same
general
policy
line.
United
States
policy
on
the
South
China
Sea
underwent
a
sea
change
under
the
Administration
of
President
Barrack
Obama
(January
2009-present).
In
July
2010
Secretary
of
State
Hillary
Clinton
declared
at
a
meeting
of
the
ASEAN
Regional
Forum
(ARF)
that
the
U.S.
took
no
side
on
the
issue
of
territorial
and
sovereignty
claims
in
the
South
China
Sea.
But
the
United
States
had
a
national
interest
in
the
South
China
Sea
including
freedom
of
navigation,
over
flight
and
unimpeded
lawful
commerce.
Secretary
Clinton
and
other
senior
Administration
officials,
such
as
the
Secretary
of
Defense,
argued
that
all
parties
should
refrain
from
the
threat
or
use
of
force,
settle
disputes
on
the
basis
of
international
law
including
the
United
Nations
Convention
on
the
Law
of
the
Sea.
U.S.
official
argued
that
claims
to
waters
in
the
South
China
Sea
should
be
made
from
land
features.
This
has
remained
U.S.
declaratory
policy
up
to
the
present.
Within
this
framework,
U.S.
policy
has
also
responded
to
developments
in
the
South
China
Sea
by
raising
these
issues
at
ASEAN-centred
multilateral
forums
such
as
the
ARF,
ASEAN
Defence
Ministers
Meeting
Plus
(ADMM
Plus)
and
the
East
Asia
Summit.
The
U.S.
strongly
supports
ASEAN
and
its
efforts
to
get
China
to
fully
implement
the
2002
Declaration
on
Conduct
of
Parties
in
the
South
China
Sea
(DOC)
and
to
move
quickly
to
adopt
a
Code
of
Conduct
in
the
South
China
Sea.
The
paper
concludes
with
a
brief
look
at
Australias
South
China
Sea
policy.
4
Senate
Committee
on
Foreign
Relations.
He
asserted
that
the
United
States
has
a
vital
interest
in
maintaining
stability,
freedom
of
navigation,
and
the
right
to
lawful
commercial
activity
in
East
Asias
waterways
(italics
added).
And
more
pointedly,
after
reviewing
recent
cases
of
Chinese
intimidation
against
American
oil
and
gas
companies
working
with
Vietnamese
partners,
Marciel
stated,
We
object
to
any
effort
to
intimidate
U.S.
companies.2
Testimony
of
Deputy
Assistant
Secretary
Scot
Marciel,
Bureau
of
East
Asian
and
Pacific
Affairs,
U.S.
Department
of
State
before
the
Subcommittee
on
East
Asian
and
Pacific
Affairs,
Committee
on
Foreign
Relations,
United
States
Senate,
July
15,
2009.
3
Mark
Valencia,
The
Impeccable
Incident:
Truth
and
Consequences,
China
Security,
5(2),
Spring
2009,
24.
4
Mark
Valencia,
The
Impeccable
Incident:
Truth
and
Consequences,
China
Security,
5(2),
Spring
2009,
23.
5
For
the
most
detailed
and
comprehensive
account
consult:
Jonathan
G.
Odom,
The
True
Lies
of
the
Impeccable
Incident:
What
Really
Happened,
Who
Disregarded
International
Law,
and
Why
Every
Nation
5
Hainan
when,
on
March
5,
a
Peoples
Liberation
Army
Navy
(PLAN)
frigate
crossed
its
bow
at
a
range
of
approximately
100
yards
without
first
making
radio
contact.
Two
hours
later
a
Chinese
Y-12
aircraft
repeatedly
flew
over
the
USNS
Impeccable
at
low
altitude.
Then
the
PLAN
frigate
crossed
Impeccable's
bow
again,
at
a
range
of
approximately
400500
yards.
On
March
7,
a
PLAN
intelligence
collection
ship
contacted
the
Impeccable
over
bridge-
to-bridge
radio
and
informed
its
captain
that
his
ships
operations
were
illegal
and
the
Impeccable
should
leave
the
area
or
suffer
the
consequences.6
On
the
following
day,
five
Chinese
ships
shadowed
the
Impeccable,
including
a
Bureau
of
Maritime
Fisheries
Patrol
boat,
a
State
Oceanographic
Administration
vessel,
a
Chinese
Navy
ocean
surveillance
ship,
and
two
small
Chinese-flagged
trawlers.
The
trawlers
closed
on
the
Impeccable,
coming
within
fifteen
meters
waving
Chinese
flags,
and
ordering
the
Impeccable
to
leave
the
area.
When
one
trawler
moved
closer
to
the
Impeccable
it
was
sprayed
with
water
from
its
fire
hose.
The
Impeccable
then
radioed
the
Chinese
vessels
and
requested
safe
passage
out
of
the
area.
The
two
Chinese
trawlers
then
attempted
to
obstruct
the
Impeccable
by
stopping
abruptly
in
front
of
it
and
dropping
debris
in
the
water.
The
Impeccable
was
forced
to
execute
an
emergency
full
stop
in
order
to
avoid
a
collision.
As
the
Impeccable
attempted
to
depart
the
crew
of
one
of
the
Chinese
trawlers
used
a
grappling
hook
to
try
to
snag
the
Impeccable's
towed
sonar
array
(SURTASS).
The
US
Defense
Department
responded
to
the
USNS
Impeccable
incident
by
dispatching
a
guided
missile
destroyer
to
accompany
the
ship
on
its
next
voyage.7
Tensions
over
the
USNS
Impeccable
incident
abated
on
March
20
when
China
called
an
end
to
its
military
stand
off.
Case
4.
The
standoff
between
the
USNS
Impeccable
and
PLAN
vessels
was
followed
by
the
collision
of
a
PLAN
submarine
with
the
sonar
array
towed
by
the
destroyer
USS
John
S.
McCain
on
June
11,
2009.
The
USS
McCain
was
one
of
three
U.S.
warships
(Outside
of
China)
Should
be
Concerned,
Michigan
State
Journal
of
International
Law,
18(3),
2010,
1-42.
For
a
range
of
views
see:
Eric
A.
McVadon,
The
Reckless
and
the
Resolute:
Confrontation
in
the
South
China
Sea,
China
Security,
5(2),
Spring
2009,1-15;
Ji
Guoxing,
The
Legality
of
the
Impeccable
Incident,
China
Security,
5(2),
Spring
2009,
16-21;
Mark
Valencia,
The
Impeccable
Incident:
Truth
and
Consequences,
China
Security,
5(2),
Spring
2009,
22-28;
Mark
J.
Valencia,
Not
an
Impeccable
Argument,
Nautilus
Policy
Forum
Online,
April
1,
2009;
and
Peter
Dutton
and
John
Garofano,
China
Undermines
Maritime
Laws,
Far
Eastern
Economic
Review,
April
2009,
44-47.
6
For
a
discussion
of
the
legal
positions
held
by
the
United
States
and
China
see:
Sam
Bateman,
Clashes
at
Sea:
When
Chinese
vessels
harass
US
Ships,
RSIS
Commentaries,
March
13,
2009;
Patrick
J.
Neher,
Raul
A.
Pedrozo
and
J.
Ashley
Roach,
In
Defense
of
High
Seas
Freedoms,
RSIS
Commentaries,
March
24,
2009;
and
B.
A.
Hamzah,
EEZs:
US
Must
Unclench
its
Fist
First,
RSIS
Commentaries,
April
9,
2009.
The
RSIS
Commentaries
are
produced
by
the
S.
Rajaratnam
School
of
International
Studies,
Nanyang
Technological
University
in
Singapore.
7
Mark
Valencia,
The
Impeccable
Incident:
Truth
and
Consequences,
China
Security,
5(2),
Spring
2009,
25.
6
participating
in
combined
exercises
with
six
Southeast
Asian
navies
in
waters
off
the
Philippines.
Also
in
July
2009,
Deputy
Assistant
Secretary
of
Defense
Robert
Scher
gave
testimony
to
the
Subcommittee
on
East
Asia
and
Pacific
Affairs
of
the
Senate
Committee
on
Foreign
Relations
regarding
the
Administrations
policy
with
respect
to
harassment
of
U.S.
naval
vessels
(discussed
in
the
section
below).
Scher
outlined
a
four-point
strategy:
In
support
of
our
strategic
goals,
the
[Defense]
Department
has
embarked
on
a
multi-pronged
strategy
that
includes;
1)
clearly
demonstrating,
through
word
and
deed,
that
U.S.
forces
will
remain
present
and
postured
as
the
preeminent
military
force
in
the
region;
2)
deliberate
and
calibrated
assertions
of
our
freedom
of
navigation
rights
by
U.S.
Navy
vessels;
3)
building
stronger
security
relationships
with
partners
in
the
region,
at
both
the
policy
level
through
strategic
dialogues
and
at
the
operational
level
by
building
partner
capacity,
especially
in
the
maritime
security
area,
and
4)
strengthening
the
military-
diplomatic
mechanisms
we
have
with
China
to
improve
communications
and
reduce
the
risk
of
miscalculation.8
As
a
result
of
US
diplomatic
interchanges
with
China
both
of
the
above
concerns
were
satisfactorily
addressed.
In
August
2010,
Assistant
Secretary
of
Defense
Robert
Scher,
acknowledged,
I
am
not
aware
of
any
recent
examples
of
Chinese
intimidation
of
global
oil
and
gas
companies
operating
in
the
South
China
Sea.9
Also,
Scher
did
not
anticipate
another
USNS
Impeccable-type
incident.
Both
navies
are
very
responsible
entities
and
I
don't
foresee
any
kind
of
clashes,
he
stated.
However,
three
years
later
that
was
another
incident
of
Chinese
harassment
of
U.S.
naval
vessels
operating
on
the
high
seas.
On
November
26,
2013,
the
Chinese
aircraft
carrier
Liaoning
left
its
homeport
of
Qindao,
Shandong
province
for
its
first
deployment
to
the
South
China
Sea.
Two
destroyers,
the
Shenyang
and
Shijiazhuang,
and
two
missile
frigates,
Yantai
and
Weifang,
accompanied
the
Liaoning.
The
Chinese
navy
website
reported
that
the
carrier
group
would
carry
out
scientific
research,
tests
and
military
drills. The
Liaonings
deployment
was
closely
monitored
by
the
USS
Cowpens
(CG-63),
a
Ticonderoga-class
guided
missile
cruiser
in
international
waters.
On
December
5,
a
Peoples
Liberation
Army
Navy
(PLAN)
ship
made
radio
contact
with
the
Cowpens
and
asked
it
to
leave
the
area.
The
USS
Cowpens
replied
that
was
in
international
waters
and
declined
to
change
course.
The
Cowpens
was
then
shouldered
by
a
PLAN
Amphibious
Dock
Ship
that
suddenly
crossed
its
bow
at
a
distance
of
less
than
500
meters
and
stopped
in
the
water.
The
USS
Cowpens
was
forced
to
take
evasive
Testimony
of
Deputy
Assistant
Secretary
of
Defense
Robert
Scher,
Asian
and
Pacific
Security
Affairs,
Office
of
the
Secretary
of
Defense
before
the
Subcommittee
on
East
Asia
and
Pacific
Affairs,
Senate
Committee
on
Foreign
Relations,
United
States
Senate,
July
15,
2009.
9
Daniel
Ten
Kate,
U.S.
Sees
No
Recent
China
Pressure
on
Global
Oil
Companies
in
South
Sea,
Bloomberg
News,
August
17,
2010.
7
action
to
avoid
a
collision.
The
two
ships
made
bridge-to-bridge
contact
to
ensure
safety
of
navigation.
There
were
no
further
incidents.
In
March,
April
and
May
of
2014
China
conducted
a
number
of
interceptions
of
U.S.
surveillance
aircraft
in
international
air
space
over
the
East
China
Sea
and
South
China
Sea.
On
August
19
a
particularly
dangerous
incident
occurred
when
a
Chinese
J-11
challenged
a
U.S.
Navy
P-8
Poseidon
aircraft
approximately
215
km
east
of
Hainan
Island
in
international
airspace.10
The
J-11
flew
alongside
the
Poseidon
at
a
distance
of
six
to
nine
metres
from
the
Poseidons
wing
tip.
It
flew
over
the
Poseidon
and
then
flew
at
a
ninety-degree
angle
passing
in
front
of
the
plane.
This
was
a
maneuver
to
show
the
Chinese
jet's
missiles
to
intimidate
the
U.S.
aircraft.
It
was
an
extremely
dangerous
action
because
the
Chinese
pilot
was
unsighted.
Finally,
the
Chinese
jet
did
a
barrel
roll
over
the
Poseidon
coming
within
14
metres
of
the
aircraft.
The
White
House
described
the
incidengt
a
"deeply
concerning
provocation."
10
Carlyle
A.
Thayer,
China
Recklessly
Endangers
US
P-8
Poseidon
Aircraft,
Thayer
Consultancy
Background
Brief,
August
23,
2014.
11
Jeffrey
Bader,
Obama
and
Chinas
Rise:
An
Insider's
Account
of
America's
Asia
Strategy
(Washington,
D.C.:
Brookings
Institution
Press,
2012),
104-105.
8
In
this
respect,
the
South
China
Sea
is
an
area
of
growing
concern.
This
sea
is
not
only
vital
to
those
directly
bordering
it,
but
to
all
nations
with
economic
and
security
interests
in
Asia.
Our
policy
is
clear:
it
is
essential
that
stability,
freedom
of
navigation,
and
free
and
unhindered
economic
development
be
maintained.
We
do
not
take
sides
on
any
competing
sovereignty
claims,
but
we
do
oppose
the
use
of
force
and
actions
that
hinder
freedom
of
navigation.
We
object
to
any
effort
to
intimidate
US
corporations
or
those
of
any
nation
engaged
in
legitimate
economic
activity.
All
parties
must
work
together
to
resolve
differences
through
peaceful,
multilateral
efforts
consistent
with
customary
international
law.
The
2002
Declaration
of
Conduct
[sic]
was
an
important
step
in
this
direction
and
we
hope
that
concrete
implementation
of
this
agreement
will
continue.12
ASEAN
Regional
Forum.
Prior
to
the
17th
ARF
ministerial
meeting
in
July
2010,
several
ASEAN
members
encouraged
the
United
States
to
make
a
statement
on
the
South
China
Sea.13
The
US
responded
affirmatively
and
privately
advised
selected
members
of
the
ARF
of
the
position
that
Secretary
of
State
Hillary
Clinton
would
adopt
and
lobbied
them
in
advance
to
make
supporting
statements.14
The
discussions
at
the
17th
ARF
were
not
public.
Secretary
Clinton,
however,
spoke
to
reporters
immediately
after
the
ministerial
meeting.
She
stated
at
a
press
conference:
The
United
States,
like
every
other
nation,
has
a
national
interest
in
freedom
of
navigation,
open
access
to
Asias
maritime
commons,
and
respect
for
international
law
in
the
South
China
Sea.
We
share
these
interests
with
not
only
ASEAN
members
and
ASEAN
Regional
Forum
participants
but
with
other
maritime
nations
and
the
broader
international
community.
The
United
States
supports
a
collaborative,
diplomatic
process
by
all
claimants
for
resolving
the
various
territorial
disputes
without
coercion.
We
oppose
the
use
or
threat
of
force
by
any
claimant.
While
the
United
States
does
not
take
sides
on
the
competing
territorial
disputes
over
land
features
in
the
South
China
Sea,
we
believe
claimants
should
pursue
their
territorial
claim
and
the
company
[sic]
and
rights
to
maritime
space
in
accordance
with
the
UN
convention
on
the
law
of
the
sea.
Consistent
with
customary
international
law,
legitimate
claims
to
maritime
space
in
the
South
China
Sea
should
be
derived
solely
from
legitimate
claims
to
land
features.
The
U.S.
supports
the
2002
ASEAN-China
declaration
on
conduct
of
parties
in
the
South
China
Sea.
We
encourage
the
parties
to
reach
agreement
on
a
full
code
of
conduct.
The
U.S.
is
prepared
to
facilitate
initiatives
and
confidence
building
measures
consistent
with
the
declaration.
Because
it
is
in
the
interest
of
all
claimants
12
Dr.
Robert
M.
Gates.
Secretary
of
Defence,
United
States,
Strengthening
Security
Partnerships
in
the
th
Asia-Pacific,
presentation
to
the
First
Plenary
Session,
the
9
IISS
Asian
Security
Summit,
The
Shangri-La
Dialogue,
Singapore,
June
5,
2010.
IISS
is
an
acronym
for
International
Institute
of
Strategic
Studies.
13
Jeremy
Page,
Patrick
Barta
and
Jay
Solomon,
U.S.,
Asean
to
Push
Back
Against
China,
The
Wall
Street
Journal,
September
22,
2010.
14
Barry Wain, Asean caught in a tight spot, The Straits Times, September 16, 2010.
9
and
the
broader
international
community
for
unimpeded
commerce
to
proceed
under
lawful
conditions.
Respect
for
the
interests
of
the
international
community
and
responsible
efforts
to
address
these
unresolved
claims
and
help
create
the
conditions
for
resolution
of
the
disputes
and
a
lowering
of
regional
tensions
(emphasis
added}.15
Clinton
said
that
resolving
disputes
related
to
the
South
China
Sea
was
pivotal
to
regional
stability.
China
was
aware
of
US
plans
to
raise
the
South
China
Sea
issue
and
approached
individual
ASEAN
countries
and
made
its
objection
to
internationalizing
the
issue
clear.16
China
argued
that
negotiations
on
the
South
China
Sea
should
be
settled
bilaterally
between
China
and
each
claimant.
Nonetheless,
eleven
of
the
ARFs
twenty-seven
members
joined
the
United
States
in
raising
maritime
security/South
China
Sea
issues:
Brunei,
Malaysia,
the
Philippines,
Vietnam,
India,
Indonesia,
Singapore,
Australia,
European
Union,
Japan
and
South
Korea.
Cambodia,
Laos
and
Myanmar
did
not
raise
the
South
China
Sea
issue,
while
Thailand
was
most
vocal
in
urging
a
non-
confrontational
stance
towards
China.
The
Chinese
Foreign
Minister
Yang
Jiechi
was
visibly
taken
aback
and
described
Clintons
remarks
as
orchestrated,17
virtually
an
attack
on
China
and
asserted
nobody
believes
theres
anything
that
is
threatening
the
regions
peace
and
stability.18
Greg
Torode
reported
that
Foreign
Minister
Yang
was
shocked
and
accused
his
US
counterpart
of
unleashing
an
anti-China
plot.
According
to
John
Pomfret:
Foreign
Minister
Yang
reacted
by
leaving
the
meeting
for
an
hour.
When
he
returned,
he
gave
a
rambling
30-minute
response
in
which
he
accused
the
US
of
plotting
against
China
on
this
issue,
seemed
to
poke
fun
at
Vietnams
socialist
credentials
and
apparently
threatened
Singapore,
according
to
US
and
ASEAN
officials
in
the
room.
China
is
a
big
country
and
other
countries
are
small
countries,
and
that
is
just
a
fact,
he
said
staring
directly
at
Singapores
foreign
minister,
George
Yeo,
according
to
several
participants
at
the
meeting.19
15
Hillary
Rodman
Clinton,
Secretary
of
State,
Remarks
at
Press
Availability,
National
Convention
Center,
Hanoi,
July
23,
2010.
Later
Assistant
Secretary
of
State
for
East
Asian
and
Pacific
Affairs
Kurt
Campbell
offered
this
clarification:
what
the
South
China
Sea
claimant
states
want
is
for
the
United
States
to
support
a
process.
Theres
not
a
desire
for
a
facilitator,
to
be
perfectly
honest.
16
Barry Wain, Asean caught in a tight spot, The Straits Times, September 16, 2010.
17
Mark
Landler,
Offering
to
Aid
Talks,
U.S.
Challenges
China
on
Disputed
Islands,
The
New
York
Times,
July
23,
2010.
18
Battle of the South China Sea, The Wall Street Journal, July 28, 2010.
19
John
Pomfret,
U.S.
takes
a
tougher
line
with
China,
The
Washington
Post,
July
30,
2010.
See
the
follow
up
account
by
Donald
K.
Emmerson,
Chinas
frown
diplomacy
in
Southeast
Asia,
Asia
Times
Online,
October
4,
2010.
10
2nd
US-ASEAN
Leaders
Meeting.
Prior
to
the
2nd
USASEAN
Leaders
Meeting
in
New
York
in
September
2010,
a
copy
of
the
draft
joint
statement
drawn
up
by
the
United
States,
as
host,
was
leaked
by
the
media
in
Manila.
Associated
Press
(AP)
reported
that
the
U.S.
draft
statement
included
the
wording
that
the
leaders
oppose
the
use
or
threat
of
force
by
any
claimant
attempting
to
enforce
disputed
claims
in
the
South
China
Sea20
and
reaffirmed
the
importance
of
freedom
of
navigation,
regional
stability,
respect
for
international
law
and
unimpeded
commerce
in
the
South
China
Sea.
Some
ASEAN
members
supported
the
draft,
while
others
had
reservations.21
However,
both
the
US
and
ASEAN
were
in
agreement
on
supporting
a
full
implementation
of
the
2002
Declaration
of
Conduct
of
Parties
in
the
South
China
Sea
and
encouraging
the
eventual
conclusion
of
a
regional
code
of
conduct
for
the
South
Chins
Sea.
Three
days
prior
to
the
2nd
US-ASEAN
Leaders
Meeting,
Chinese
foreign
ministry
spokesperson
Jiang
Yu
stated
We
are
concerned
about
any
kind
of
statement
that
might
be
issued
by
the
U.S.
and
ASEAN
over
the
South
China
Sea.
Words
or
acts
that
play
up
tensions
in
the
region
and
concoct
conflicts
and
provocations
in
relations
between
countries
in
the
region
are
against
the
common
wish
of
the
countries
in
the
region
to
seek
peace
and
development.22
Finally,
Jiang
concluded,
We
firmly
oppose
any
country
having
nothing
to
do
with
the
South
China
Sea
issue
getting
involved
in
the
dispute.
This
will
only
complicate
rather
than
help
solve
the
issue.23
The
official
Joint
Statement
dropped
references
to
the
use
or
threat
of
force
and
did
not
even
mention
the
South
China
Sea
by
name.
Paragraph
eighteen
(of
twenty-five
paragraphs)
declared:
We
reaffirmed
the
importance
of
regional
peace
and
stability,
maritime
security,
unimpeded
commerce,
and
freedom
of
navigation,
in
accordance
with
relevant
universally
agreed
principles
of
international
law,
including
the
United
Nations
Convention
on
the
Law
of
the
Sea
(UNCLOS)
and
other
international
maritime
law,
and
the
peaceful
settlement
of
disputes.24
An
official
read-out
by
The
White
House
issued
immediately
after
the
summit
stated:
20
Teresa
Cerojano,
Associated
Press,
Manila,
Obama,
ASEAN
to
call
for
peaceful
end
to
sea
spats,
September
19,
2010.
21
Jeremy
Page,
Patrick
Barta
and
Jay
Solomon,
U.S.,
Asean
to
Push
Back
Against
China,
The
Wall
Street
Journal,
September
22,
2010.
22
Quoted
in
Christopher
Bodeen,
China
Criticizes
planned
US-ASEAN
statement
on
South
China
Sea,
Canadian
Press,
September
21,
2010.
23
Xinhua,
China
Concerned
about
Possible
U.S.-ASEAN
Statement
on
South
China
Sea
Issue,
September
21,
2010.
24
nd
The
White
House,
Office
of
the
Press
Secretary,
Joint
Statement
of
the
2
U.S.-ASEAN
Leaders
Meeting,
September
24,
2010.
11
The
President
and
the
leaders
also
agreed
on
the
importance
of
peaceful
resolution
of
disputes,
freedom
of
navigation,
regional
stability,
and
respect
for
international
law,
including
in
the
South
China
Sea.25
Why
was
the
Joint
Statement
watered
down?
Several
ASEAN
states
took
the
view
that
now
was
not
the
time
to
antagonize
China.
They
also
argued
that
it
was
not
in
ASEANs
interest
to
be
seen
as
leaning
towards
the
United
States
in
a
dispute
over
the
South
China
Sea.
One
source
reported
a
high-ranking
ASEAN
diplomat
as
observing,
It
would
not
have
been
fair
to
include
the
issue
in
a
statement
from
a
meeting
in
which
China
was
not
present.
We
also
did
not
want
to
give
the
impression
that
we
were
willing
to
do
whatever
the
United
States
said.
By
deleting
South
China
Sea,
we
saved
the
face
of
both
China
and
the
United
States.26
ASEAN
Defence
Ministers
Meeting
Plus.
The
ASEAN
Defence
Ministers
Meeting
Plus
(ADMM
Plus)
held
its
inaugural
meeting
in
Hanoi
on
October
12,
2010.
The
ADMM
Plus
comprised
eighteen
defence
ministers,
ten
from
the
ASEAN
states
and
eight
dialogue
partners:
Australia,
China,
India,
Japan,
South
Korea,
New
Zealand,
Russian
Federation
and
the
United
States.27
ASEAN
Defence
Ministers
reached
consensus
that
issues
related
to
the
South
China
Sea
would
not
be
part
of
the
formal
agenda
and
that
no
reference
to
the
South
China
Sea
would
be
included
in
the
final
joint
declaration.28
ASEAN
defence
ministers
decided
that
the
formal
agenda
would
include
five
defence-related
issues:
humanitarian
assistance
and
disaster
relief,
maritime
security,
counter-terrorism,
peacekeeping
operations
and
military
medicine.29
The
ADMM
Plus
meeting
was
structured
to
identify
common
interests
and
areas
for
practical
cooperation
in
order
to
avoid
becoming,
to
use
the
words
of
Lt.
Gen.
Nguyen
Chi
Vinh,
a
place
for
a
war
of
words.30
But
no
restrictions
or
pre-conditions
were
put
on
the
eight
non-ASEAN
ministers.
When
directly
asked
about
this
point,
Australias
25
The
White
House,
Office
of
the
Press
Secretary,
Read-out
of
President
Obamas
Working
Luncheon
with
ASEAN
Leaders,
September
24,
2010.
26
Seas fill with tension over Chinas moves, The Asahi Shimbun, October 2, 2010.
27
The
Defence
Minister
from
Russia
did
not
attend;
Russia
was
represented
by
the
Deputy
Chief
of
Staff
(Valery
Gerasiov).
The
US
delegation
was
the
largest
with
thirty-five
officials
out
of
fifty
delegates
in
attendance.
China
withheld
the
titles
and
areas
of
responsibility
of
its
delegation
but
analysts
who
poured
over
their
names
were
quick
to
spot
that
all
were
important
experts
involved
in
South
China
Sea
affairs.
28
Kazuto
Tsukamoto,
Yusuke
Murayama
and
Kenji
Minemura,
At
key
meet,
Beijing
tones
down
stance
on
South
China
Sea,
The
Asahi
Shibun,
October
14,
2010.
29
VN set for defence ministers meeting, Viet Nam News, October 8, 2010.
30
Quoted
in
John
Ruwitch,
Vietnam
defence
talks
to
steer
clear
of
controversy,
Reuters,
October
8,
2010.
12
Defence
Minister
Smith
replied,
as
far
as
Australia
is
concerned,
and
Im
sure
it
applies
generally
and
broadly,
there
were
no
preconditions
for
this.31
Seven
participants,
including
the
United
States,
Japan,
South
Korea,
Australia,
Malaysia,
Singapore
and
Vietnam,
raised
concerns
about
territorial
disputes
in
the
South
China
Sea.32
Secretary
Gates
began
his
presentation
by
arguing,
What
is
now
essential
is
that
these
bilateral
relationships
be
supplemented
by
strong
multilateral
institutions
to
promote
regular
dialogue
and
consultation.
Gates
argued
that
in
order
to
enhance
the
regions
common
security:
we
must
establish
both
shared
rules
of
the
road
and
pursue
greater
transparency
meaning
that
as
we
improve
our
military
capabilities,
we
must
discuss
these
developments
together.
This
provides
assurance
that
our
capabilities
are
not
directed
against
others
in
the
region
and
that
they
will
be
used
for
common
ends.
Gates
then
enunciated
four
principles
essential
to
regional
peace
and
stability:
free
and
open
commerce,
a
just
international
order
that
emphasizes
rights
and
responsibilities
and
fidelity
to
the
rule
of
law,
open
access
by
all
to
the
global
commons
(sea,
air
space
and
cyberspace),
and
resolution
of
conflict
without
the
use
of
force.
Secretary
Gates
then
framed
US
policy
towards
the
South
China
Sea
with
these
words:
Disagreements
over
territorial
claims
and
the
appropriate
use
of
the
maritime
domain
appear
to
be
a
growing
challenge
to
regional
stability
and
prosperity.
On
that
note,
we
are
encouraged
to
see
claimant
nations
in
the
South
China
Sea
making
initial
steps
to
discuss
the
development
of
a
full
code
of
conduct,
in
line
with
the
2002
ASEAN
Declaration
on
the
Conduct
of
Parties.
We
applaud
this
multilateral
approach
and
we
stand
ready
to
help
facilitate
such
initiatives.
The
U.S.
position
on
maritime
security
remains
clear:
We
have
a
national
interest
in
freedom
of
navigation;
in
unimpeded
economic
development
and
commerce;
and
in
respect
for
international
law.
We
also
believe
that
customary
international
law,
as
reflected
in
the
UN
Convention
on
Law
of
the
Sea,
provides
clear
guidance
on
the
appropriate
use
of
the
maritime
domain,
and
rights
of
access
to
it.
By
adhering
to
this
guidance,
we
can
ensure
that
all
share
equal
and
open
access
to
international
waterways.
The
United
States
has
always
exercised
our
rights
and
supported
the
rights
of
others
to
transit
through,
and
operate
in,
international
waters.
This
will
not
change,
nor
will
our
commitment
to
engage
in
activities
and
exercises
together
with
our
allies
and
31
Minister
for
Defence
Stephen
Smith,
MP
Interview
with
Linda
Mottram,
Radio
Australia,
Defence
Media
Centre,
Canberra,
October
13,
2010.
32
Kazuto
Tsukamoto,
Yusuke
Murayama
and
Kenji
Minemura,
At
key
meet,
Beijing
tones
down
stance
on
South
China
Sea,
The
Asahi
Shibun,
October
14,
2010
and
Lt.
Gen.
Nguyen
Chi
Vinh
quoted
in
Deutsche
Presse-Agentur,
Defence
meeting
in
Hanoi
calms
South
China
Sea
Disputes,
October
12,
2010.
Some
reports
claims
eight
ministers
spoke
on
the
South
China
Sea.
13
partners.33
Secretary
Gates
reiterated
Secretary
Clintons
offer
to
facilitate
multilateral
discussions
on
a
code
of
conduct
for
the
South
China
Sea.
At
the
conclusion
of
the
ADMM
Plus
meeting
Vietnam
as
Chairman
issued
a
statement
that
specifically
mentioned
the
South
China
Sea.
Paragraph
12
stated:
Some
delegates
touched
upon
traditional
security
challenges,
such
as
disputes
in
the
East
Sea
[sic].
The
meeting
welcomed
efforts
by
concerned
parties
to
address
the
issue
by
peaceful
means
in
conformity
with
the
spirit
of
the
Declaration
on
the
Conduct
of
Parties
in
the
East
Sea
[sic]
(DOC)
of
2002
and
recognized
principles
of
international
law,
including
the
United
Nations
Convention
on
the
Law
of
the
Sea
(UNCLOS
1982).34
U.S.
Pivot
to
Asia.
On
coming
to
office
in
2009,
Obama
Administration
officials
quickly
declared,
the
United
States
is
back
in
Asia.
The
United
States
acceded
to
the
ASEAN
Treaty
of
Amity
and
Cooperation,
appointed
a
permanent
ambassador
to
the
ASEAN
Secretariat
and
revived
the
annual
ASEAN-United
States
leaders
meeting.
In
2012,
the
United
States
announced
that
with
its
withdrawal
from
Iraq
and
eventual
withdrawal
from
Afghanistan,
it
will
pivot
to
the
Asia-Pacific
and
quarantine
defence
cuts
from
the
Pacific
Commands
Area
of
Responsibility.
The
heightened
importance
of
the
Asia-Pacific
was
underscored
in
January
2012
with
the
release
of
a
new
national
defense
strategy,
Sustaining
U.S.
Global
Leadership:
Priorities
for
21st
Century
Defense.
This
document
stated:
U.S.
economic
and
security
interests
are
inextricably
linked
to
developments
in
the
arc
extending
from
the
Western
Pacific
and
East
Asia
into
the
Indian
Ocean
region
and
South
Asia
creating
a
mix
of
evolving
challenges
and
opportunities.
Accordingly,
while
the
U.S.
military
will
continue
to
contribute
to
security
globally,
we
will
of
necessity
rebalance
toward
the
Asia-Pacific
region.
Our
relationships
with
Asian
allies
and
key
partners
are
critical
to
the
future
stability
and
growth
of
the
region.
We
will
emphasize
our
existing
alliances,
which
provide
a
vital
foundation
for
Asia-
Pacific
security.
We
will
expand
our
networks
of
cooperation
with
emerging
partners
throughout
the
Asia-Pacific
to
ensure
collective
capability
and
capacity
for
securing
common
interests
[emphasis
in
original].35
33
US
Secretary
of
Defense
Robert
Gates
Remarks
at
ASEAN
Defense
Ministers
Meeting
Plus
8
in
Hanoi
12
October
2010.
For
assessments
see:
Greg
Torode,
US,
neighbours
push
China
on
sea
rights,
South
China
Morning
Post,
October
13,
2010
and
Merle
David
Kellerhalls,
At
ASEAN
Meeting,
U.S.
Defense
Secretary
Calls
for
Greater
Trust,
Bureau
of
International
Information
Programs,
U.S.
Department
of
States,
America.govCompList@State.gov,
October
12,
2010.
34
Full
text
of
ASEAN
official
statement:
First
ADMM+
Chairmans
Statement,
Vietnam
News
Agency
website,
Hanoi,
in
English,
October
13,
2010.
35
st
Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21 Century Defense (January 2012), 2.
14
The
United
States
responded
to
Chinas
naval
build-up
and
development
of
anti-
access/area
denial
capabilities
by
strengthening
its
posture
on
Guam,
stepping
up
weapons
and
equipment
sales
to
the
Philippines,
negotiating
new
arrangements
with
Australia
giving
the
U.S.
greater
access
to
training
facilities
near
Darwin,
and
basing
Combat
Littoral
Ships
in
Singapore.36
The
U.S.
has
deployed
thirty-one
of
its
fifty-three
fast
attack
submarines
to
the
Pacific
and
stepped
up
its
anti-submarine
warfare
program.
Eighteen
of
the
U.S.
subs
are
home-ported
in
Pearl
Harbor;
the
others
are
based
in
Guam.37
Additionally,
the
United
States
has
also
deployed
three
Ohio-class
nuclear
submarines
to
the
AsiaPacific
Indian
Ocean
region.
Each
has
been
modified
to
carry
154
conventional
Tomahawk
cruise
missiles.
In
late
June-early
July
2010,
in
a
calculated
demonstration
of
naval
power,
the
USS
Florida,
USS
Michigan,
and
USS
Ohio
submarines,
simultaneously
surfaced
in
Diego
Garcia
(Indian
Ocean),
Busan
(South
Korea)
and
Subic
Bay
(the
Philippines),
respectively.38
The
United
States
has
stationed
the
fifth-generation
Raptor
aircraft
in
Hawaii.
Also,
the
United
States
is
developing
an
Air-Sea
Battle
concept
to
counter
Chinas
development
of
area-denial/anti-access
capabilities.
According
to
the
new
U.S.
defense
strategy
the
U.S.
military:
will
invest
as
required
to
ensure
its
ability
to
operate
effectively
in
anti-access
and
area
denial
(A2/AD)
environments.
This
will
include
implementing
the
Joint
Operational
Access
Concept,
sustaining
our
undersea
capabilities,
developing
a
new
stealth
bomber,
improving
missile
defenses,
and
continuing
efforts
to
enhance
the
resiliency
and
effectiveness
of
critical
space-based
capabilities
[emphasis
in
original].39
U.S.
Reiterates
In
South
China
Sea
Policy.
In
July
2012,
while
on
a
visit
to
Hanoi,
Secretary
Clinton
made
these
prepared
remarks:
Third,
on
maritime
security.
In
Bali,
our
leaders
discussed
the
importance
of
achieving
a
collaborative
solution
on
the
South
China
Sea.
The
United
States
has
no
territorial
claims
there
and
we
do
not
take
sides
in
disputes
about
territorial
or
maritime
boundaries.
But
we
do
have
an
interest
in
freedom
of
navigation,
the
maintenance
of
peace
and
stability,
respect
for
international
law,
and
unimpeded
lawful
commerce
in
the
South
China
Sea.
36
Craig
Whitlock,
Navys
next
stop
in
Asia
will
set
China
on
edge,
Checkpoint
Washington,
November
18,
2011
37
Oyaol Ngirainki, Guam Gets New Sub Buildings, NavyTimes, July 21, 2010.
38
U.S.
Posts
Pictures
of
Nuclear
Sub
in
Show
of
Force,
The
Chosun
Ilbo,
July
8,
2010
and
Mark
Thompson,
U.S.
Missiles
Deployed
Near
China
Send
a
Message,
Time
Magazine,
July
8,
2010.
39
st
Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21 Century Defense (January 2012), 4-5.
15
And
we
believe
the
nations
of
the
region
should
work
collaboratively
and
diplomatically
to
resolve
disputes
without
coercion,
without
intimidation,
without
threats,
and
without
use
of
force.
Ill
have
more
to
say
about
this
later
today
at
the
ASEAN
Regional
Forum.
But
I
want
to
underscore
one
point.
Whenever
possible,
territorial
issues
should
be
resolved
between
the
claimants.
But
broader
questions
about
conduct
in
disputed
areas
and
about
acceptable
methods
of
resolving
disputes
should
be
addressed
in
multilateral
settings
such
as
the
ASEAN
Regional
Forum.
Issues
such
as
freedom
of
navigation
and
lawful
exploitation
of
maritime
resources
often
involve
a
wide
region,
and
approaching
them
strictly
bilaterally
could
be
a
recipe
for
confusion
and
even
confrontation..."
In
2014,
the
United
States
raised
South
China
Sea
tensions,
including
land
reclamation,
with
China
at
their
ministerial-level
Strategic
and
Economic
Dialogue
held
in
Beijing
from
July
9-10.
A
U.S.
Senate
resolution
(S.
RES.412)
adopted
on
July
10,
2014
called
on
China
to
withdraw
its
oil
drilling
rig
HD
981
and
accompanying
ships
from
Vietnamese
waters.
On
July
11,
Deputy
Assistant
Secretary
of
State
Michael
Fuchs
called
for
a
freeze
in
Chinas
provocative
actions
by
at
the
4th
Center
for
Strategic
and
International
Studies
(CSIS)
conference
on
the
South
China
Sea
held
in
Washington,
D.C.
Fuchs
stated:
We
have
called
for
claimant
states
to
clarify
and
agree
to
voluntarily
freeze
certain
actions
and
activities
that
escalate
the
disputes
and
cause
instability,
as
described
in
the
DoC.
He
also
outlined
five
steps
that
the
United
States
was
taking
to
reduce
tensions
and
work
towards
a
negotiated
settlement
of
disputes:
First,
we
have
communicated
our
growing
concerns
from
the
President
down
to
the
Chinese
very
clearly,
both
in
public
and
in
private
most
recently
in
the
Strategic
Security
Dialogue
and
the
Strategic
and
Economic
Dialogue
that
were
held
in
Beijing
earlier
this
week.
U.S.
concerns
are
also
regularly
expressed
at
the
highest
levels
to
other
claimants,
and
we
consistently
encourage
all
claimants
to
clarify
their
claims
and
base
their
claims
on
land
features
in
the
manner
set
out
under
the
international
law
of
the
sea,
as
reflected
in
the
Law
of
the
Sea
Convention
Second,
we
are
working
with
ASEAN
and
the
international
community
to
help
put
in
place
diplomatic
and
other
structures
to
lower
tensions
and
manage
these
disputes
peacefully.
We
are
reinforcing
the
importance
of
exercising
restraint,
lowering
rhetoric,
behaving
safely
and
responsibly
in
the
sky
and
at
sea,
and
resolving
the
disputes
in
accordance
with
international
law.
This
includes
building
habits
of
cooperation
through
mechanisms
like
the
ASEAN
Regional
Forum
and
the
Expanded
ASEAN
Maritime
Forum
Third,
the
administration
has
invested
considerably
in
the
capabilities
of
our
partners
in
the
maritime
domain.
For
instance,
last
December
Secretary
Kerry
announced
an
initial
commitment
of
$32.5
million
in
new
regional
and
bilateral
assistance
to
16
advance
maritime
capacity
building
in
Southeast
Asia.
Including
this
new
funding,
our
planned
region-wide
support
for
maritime
capacity
building
exceeds
$156
million
for
the
next
two
years.
Fourth,
enhanced
U.S.
presence
and
posture
in
the
Asia-Pacific
as
a
result
of
the
rebalance
continues
to
help
ensure
regional
stability
and
deter
conflict.
And
fifth,
we
continue
to
urge
all
parties
to
use
diplomatic
means,
including
arbitration
or
other
dispute
resolution
mechanisms,
to
address
these
issues.
This
includes
encouraging
ASEAN
and
China
to
quickly
complete
a
meaningful
Code
of
Conduct.
An
effective
Code
of
Conduct
would
help
reduce
tensions
by
creating
crisis
management
tools
to
address
contentious
issues
as
they
arise.40
And
significantly,
President
Obama
called
for
the
constructive
management
of
differences
with
China
in
a
telephone
conversation
with
President
Xi
Jinping
on
July
14.
The
U.S.
also
has
supported
the
right
of
the
Philippines
to
lodge
a
claim
to
the
U.N.
Arbitral
Tribunal
to
seek
a
legal
resolution
of
issues
in
dispute.
The
U.S.
also
supports
enhancing
the
maritime
security
capacities
of
the
Philippines
and
Vietnam
through
the
sale
and
donation
of
patrol
boats.
In
December
2014,
the
U.S.
State
Department
issued
a
position
paper
outlining
why,
in
its
view,
Chinas
nine-dash
line
claim
to
the
South
China
Sea
is
invalid
under
international
law.41
40
Remarks
Deputy
Assistant
Secretary
Michael
Fuchs
to
the
Fourth
Annual
South
China
Sea
Conference,
Center
for
Strategic
and
International
Studies,
Washington,
D.C.,
July
11,
2014.
41
United
States
Department
of
State,
Bureau
of
Oceans
and
International
Environmental
and
Scientific
Affairs,
China:
Maritime
claims
in
the
South
China
Sea,
Limits
in
the
South
China
Sea,
No.
143,
December
5,
2014.
17
we
want
it
settled,
because
we
have
a
stake
in
it
60
per
cent
of
our
trade
goes
through
the
South
China
Sea.42
In
August
2012,
Minister
Carr,
while
rejecting
a
direct
diplomatic
role
for
Australia
in
the
settlement
of
territorial
disputes
in
the
South
China
Sea,
offered
two
models
for
consideration
by
the
disputants.
I
want
to
mention
two
relevant
models
that
can
be
adopted
for
countries
to
successfully
manage
competing
interests.
The
first
is
the
Antarctic
Treaty
system.
The
Treaty
came
into
force
in
June
1961
after
ratification
by
12
countries
then
active
in
Antarctic
science.
Its
objectives
are:
to
demilitarise
Antarctica,
establish
it
as
a
zone
free
of
nuclear
tests
and
the
disposal
of
radioactive
waste,
and
to
ensure
that
it
is
used
for
peaceful
purposes
only
Radio
Australia
Transcript,
30
July
2012,
http://www.radioaustralia.net.au/international/radio/program/connect-asia/
australia-should-stay-out-
of-south-china-sea-dispute-says-
carr/987932.
18
August
1997,
they
discussed
the
potential
joint
development
of
an
overlapping
area.
In
June
1992,
Vietnam
and
Malaysia
applied
the
same
principles
in
their
Memorandum
of
Understanding
set
in
place
to
jointly
exploit
a
"Defined
Area"
in
the
Gulf
of
Thailand.
In
1999,
Vietnam,
Thailand
and
Malaysia
also
agreed
on
joint
development
of
an
800
square
kilometre
zone.
With
our
neighbours,
East
Timor,
we
are
jointly
developing
Timor
Sea
petroleum
resources
for
the
mutual
benefit
of
both
countries
based
on
groundwork
laid
with
Indonesia.
I'm
not
saying
that
joint
development
zones
or
an
Antarctic
Treaty-style
system
will
provide
all
the
answers
in
the
South
China
Sea.
But
thinking
creatively
and
constructively
and
examining
models
like
these
provide
a
path
that
deserves
to
be
explored.43
When
Australian
ministers
do
refer
to
the
South
China
in
public
remarks
they
invariably
uphold
the
role
of
international
law
and
the
peaceful
resolution
of
disputes.
For
example,
when
Australias
Minister
for
Defence
visited
Vietnam
in
August
2012,
he
issued
this
statement
after
meeting
with
Vietnams
Minister
of
National
Defence,
Australia
wants
to
see
these
disputes
resolved
amicably,
in
accordance
with
international
law
and
consistent
with
the
law
of
the
sea.
In
particular
the
UN
convention.44
However,
Australia
is
in
agreement
with
U.S.
policy
and
joins
with
the
United
States
in
including
references
to
the
South
China
Sea
in
joint
statements
issued
after
annual
ministerial
meetings
known
as
AUSMIN.
For
example,
at
the
first
Australian-United
States
ministerial
consultations
after
the
formal
announcement
of
the
U.S
policy
of
rebalancing
to
Asia,
held
in
Perth
on
November
14,
2012,
Point
2
in
joint
communiqu
the
ministers
reaffirmed
that
both
sides
would
support
efforts
by
the
ASEAN
and
China
to
develop
a
Code
of
Conduct
in
the
South
China
Sea.45
The
joint
communiqu
issued
after
the
AUSMIN
meeting
in
Washington,
D.C.
on
November
20,
2013
encouraged
ASEAN
and
China
to
reach
agreement
on
a
substantive
and
meaningful
Code
of
Conduct
in
the
South
China
Sea
as
soon
as
possible.46
This
communiqu
demonstrated
continuity
in
Australian
policy
between
the
former
Labor
Government
(2007-13)
and
the
new
Liberal
National
Coalition
government
elected
in
43
Dr
Lee
Seng
Tee
Lecture,
The
Australian
National
University,
August
21,
1012.
http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/2012/bc_sp_120821.html.
44
Australia calls for South China Sea resolution, Radio Australia, August 30, 20912.
45
AUSMIN
(Australia-United
States
Ministerial
Consultations)
2012
Joint
Communiqu,
November
14,
2012.
http://foreignminister.gov.au/releases/2012/bc_mr_121114.html.
46
AUSMIN
2013
Joint
Communiqu,
November
http://foreignminister.gov.au/releases/Pages/2013/jb_mr_131120.aspx?ministerid=4.
20,
2013.
19
September
2013.
At
the
most
recent
AUSMIN
consultations
held
on
August
12,
2014
in
Sydney,
the
joint
communiqu
devoted
two
paragraphs
to
tensions
in
the
East
and
South
China
Seas.
Australia
and
the
United
States
called
for
respect
for
international
law,
unimpeded
lawful
commerce,
and
upholding
freedom
of
navigation
and
over
flight.47
The
ministers
called
on
claimant
states
to
refrain
from
actions
that
could
increase
tensions
and
to
clarify
and
to
pursue
claims
in
accordance
with
international
law.
The
ministers
also
called
on
claimants
to
effectively
implement
the
Declaration
on
Conduct
of
Parties
in
the
South
China
Sea
by
clarifying
what
types
of
activities
should
be
permissible,
and
what
types
of
activities
should
be
avoided
in
areas
that
are
in
dispute.
Australia
strongly
supports
ASEAN
and
its
position
on
the
South
China
Sea.
For
time-to-
time
Australia
issues
statements
in
response
to
developments
that
heighten
tension
and
threaten
to
escalate
into
violence
and
threaten
the
safety
and
security
of
sea-lanes.
During
the
visit
of
Vietnams
Prime
Minister
Nguyen
Tan
Dung
to
Canberra
from
March
16-18,
Prime
Minister
Tony
Abbott
and
his
guest
issued
a
joint
statement
that
included
the
following
policy
statement:
Both
sides
emphasized
the
importance
of
maintaining
peace,
and
stability
in
the
region,
and
ensuring
security,
safety
and
freedom
of
navigation
and
aviation,
in
accordance
with
international
law,
including
the
United
Nations
Charter
and
the
1982
United
Nations
Convention
on
the
Law
of
the
Sea,
without
resorting
to
the
threat
or
use
of
force.
Both
sides
called
on
all
parties
to
exercise
restraint
and
refrain
from
actions
that
could
increase
tension
in
the
region.
Both
sides
agreed
on
the
urgent
need
to
conclude
a
Code
of
Conduct
for
the
South
China
Sea.
Conclusion
This
paper
has
presented
a
broad
overview
of
U.S.
policy
towards
the
South
China
Sea
from
the
early
1990s
to
the
present.
The
United
States
maintained
a
consistent
policy
under
the
Clinton
and
George
H.W.
Bush
Administrations.
The
U.S.
continually
expressed
its
concern
that
tensions
arising
from
territorial
disputes
could
spill
over
into
conflict.
U.S.
policy
was
limited
to
ensuring
safety
of
the
sea-lanes
of
communication
for
commercial
and
military
traffic.
United
States
policy
on
the
South
China
Sea
underwent
a
sea
change
under
the
Administration
of
President
Barrack
Obama.
In
July
2010
Secretary
of
State
Hillary
Clinton
declared
at
a
meeting
of
the
ASEAN
Regional
Forum
that
although
the
U.S.
took
no
side
on
the
issue
of
territorial
and
sovereignty
claims
in
the
South
China
Sea
it
had
a
national
interest
in
the
South
China
Sea
relating
to
freedom
of
navigation,
over
flight
and
unimpeded
lawful
commerce.
The
U.S.
therefore
urged
all
parties
to
refrain
from
47
AUSMIN
2014
Joint
Communiqu,
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/230524.htm.
August
12,
2014.
20
the
threat
or
use
of
force,
settle
disputes
on
the
basis
of
international
law
including
the
United
Nations
Convention
on
the
Law
of
the
Sea.
This
has
remained
U.S.
declaratory
policy
up
to
the
present.
Australia
generally
adopts
a
low-key
stance
in
public
on
South
China
Sea
issues.
For
example,
in
private
Australia
supports
the
United
States
at
meetings
of
multilateral
regional
institutions.
In
particular
Australia
states
it
has
an
interest
in
security,
safety
and
freedom
of
navigation
and
aviation
in
the
South
China
Sea.
Australia,
however,
does
make
public
comments
on
the
South
China
Sea
at
annual
Australia-United
States
ministerial
meetings.
These
are
general
statements
urging
parties
not
to
threaten
or
use
force,
to
settle
disputes
peacefully
under
international
law
including
UNCLOS.
Australia
also
endorses
ASEAN
policy
towards
the
South
China
Sea
by
publicly
urging
parties
to
exercise
restraint,
and
endorsing
the
implementation
of
the
2002
DOC
and
the
early
conclusion
of
the
COC
for
the
South
China
Sea.
Present
policies
of
the
United
States
and
Australia
do
not
go
far
enough
to
dissuade
China
to
step
back
from
its
aggressive
assertiveness
in
the
South
China
Sea
including
its
present
land
reclamation
activities.
Neither
country
has
fashioned
a
workable
strategy
to
counter
Chinas
use
of
fishermen,
oil
exploration
platforms
and
paramilitary
maritime
law
enforcement
vessels
to
intimidate
and
coerce
Southeast
Asian
states
into
accepting
Chinas
claims
to
indisputable
sovereignty.
In
other
words,
the
policy
of
not
taking
sides
is
in
reality
a
policy
of
acquiescing
to
China.