Machiavelli Against Republicanism

Machiavelli against Republicanism: On the Cambridge School's "Guicciardinian Moments"
Author(s): John P. McCormick

Source: Political Theory, Vol. 31, No. 5 (Oct., 2003), pp. 615-643
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MACHIAVELLI AGAINST REPUBLICANISM

On the Cambridge School's
"Guicciardinian Moments"
JOHNE McCORMICK
Universityof Chicago
Scholarsloosely affiliatedwith the "CambridgeSchool " (e.g, Pocock,Skinne; Wroli,andPettit)

accentuate rule of law, commongood, class equilibrium,and non-dominationin Machiavelli's
political thoughtand republicanismgenerally butunderestimatetheFlorentine'spreferencefor
class conflict and ignore his insistence on elite accountability. The author argues that they
obscurethe extentto whichMachiavelli is an anti-elitistcritic of the republicantradition,which
theyfail to disclose waspredominantlyoligarchic. Theprescriptivelessons these scholars draw
from republicanismfor contemporarypolitics reinforce rather than reform the "senatorial,"
electorally based, and socioeconomically agnostic republicanmodel (devised by Machiavelli's
aristocratic interlocutor,Guicciardini,and refinedby Montesquieuand Madison) thatpermits
commoncitizens to acclaim but not determinegovernmentpolicies. CambridgeSchool textual
interpretationsandpractical proposals have little connection with Machiavelli's "tribunate,"
class-specific model of popular governmentelaborated in The Discourses, one that relies on
extra-electoralaccountabilitytechniquesand embraces deliberativepopular assemblies.
Keywords: Machiavelli; republicanism;CambridgeSchool; Skinner;Pocock; Pettit;elitism
INTRODUCTION
Republicanism,
in ancientandmodernpoliticaltheoryandpractice,guaranteestheprivilegedpositionof elitesmorethanit facilitatespoliticalparticipationby the generalpopulace(Nippel1980, 1994;Molhoet al. 1991).I
arguethatthisfactis obscuredby scholarsassociatedwiththemostinfluenAUTHOR'SNOTE: This essay was presented at the AmericanPolitical Science Association
meeting,SanFrancisco (September2,2001); theRemarqueInstitute,New YorkUniversity(September21, 2001); and the Departmentof Political Science, Universityof Chicago (December
13, 2001). For commentsand criticisms,I thankEeterBreiner,Bob Dahl, TonyJudt,Jacob Levy,
BernardManin,PatchenMarkell,John Padgett,JenniferPitts, John Pocock, Jerry Seigel, Ian
Shapiro, Carl Shaw, QuentinSkinner,Susan Stokes, Nathan Tarcov,Iris Marion Young,Alex
Wendt,and two anonymousreviewersfor Political Theo.
POLITICALTHEORY,Vol. 31 No. 5, October2003 615-643
DOI: 10.1177/0090591703252159
C)2003 Sage Publications
615
616
POLITICALTHEORY/ October2003
tial approachto the study of classical and early-modemrepublicanism,the

so-called CambridgeSchool. The classical model of republicanism-from
Aristotleto Cicero in theory,from Spartato Rome in practice-assigns specific institutionsor particularfunctionsto the generalor poorersegmentsof
the populationwho govern alongside of, or subservientlyto, aristocratically
dominatedoffices andbodies. The modem form,perhapsbest representedby
Guicciardiniand Madison, permitsthe populace at large to select whichalmost invariablywealthy andnotable-magistrates will rule overthem. The
latterform is often identified as the forerunnerof representative,liberal, or
mass democracy,and even-with properdisassociationfrom ancient,more
"direct"examples-democracy, as such. Theorists such as Pareto (1987),
Michels ([1911] 1990), Mosca ([1896] 1980), and Schumpeter(1942) relished the persistenceof elite dominationoverthe generalpopulacein modem
democracy; more progressive theorists like Dahl (1990) and Przeworski
(1999) seem to be resignedto it. The republican-inherited"minimalist"criterionof populargovernmentgenerallyagreeduponby both sets of democratic
theorists-namely, periodic selection of public officials for specific termsof
office by the generalpopulace-seems insufficientfor contemporarydemocratictheory andpractice.'Criticspoint out thatthe primarilyelectoralconception of populargovernmentdoes not succeed at keeping elites accountable and responsive to the general public (see Bachrach 1967; Habermas
1973; Shapiro2001).
Scholars of republicanpolitical thought associated with the Cambridge
School,suchas Pocock(1975), Skinner(1998), Viroli(1998), andPettit(1999),
often use insights derivedfromtheirhistoricalandtheoreticalresearchin an
attemptto inform, enhance, and broadencontemporarypolitical theory and
practice.2They admirablyshow us what contemporaryliberal democracy,
whatevercommonaltiesit shareswith republicanism,lacks in contrastwith
the lattertradition:for example, the expression of a non-xenophobicpatriotism, attentionto the common good, emphasison duties as opposedto rights,
and the importanceof more substantivepolitical participation(e.g., Viroli
1997; Skinner 1978; Pocock 1985; Pettit 2001).3 However, on the basis of
what follows, I implorethese scholarsto desist in such endeavors.Because of
the traditionaloligarchictendenciesof republicanismI plead with them, and
those influencedby them, to reconsiderthe use of the term and cease in the
attemptto supplementcontemporarydemocracywith insights fromthattradition (see Ackerman1991; Habermas1996; Sandel 1996; Sunstein2001). I
am convinced that republicanism,unless reconstructedalmost beyond the
point of recognition, can only reinforcewhat is worst about contemporary
liberaldemocracy:the free handthatsocioeconomic andpolitical elites enjoy
McCormick/ MACHIAVELLIAGAINST REPUBLICANISM
617
at the expense of the generalpopulace. The groundsfor my plea arebased on

conceptualanalysis andhistoricalexamples,andmy greatestresourcein this
effortis the work of an intellectualfigurevery dearto the CambridgeSchool
scholarsof republicanismmentioned above:Niccolo Machiavelli.4
I have arguedelsewhere (McCormick2001) that Machiavelliis an unacknowledged compromisebetween minimalist or elitist theorists of democracy,on the one hand,and more idealist, participatorytheorists,on the other
(e.g., Barber1990; Sandel 1996). Importantly,I understandthis compromise
to be, as it were, a betterdeal for egalitariandemocratsthanwhat is generally
offered by elitist, minimalist, republican, and/or substantive democrats.
Machiavelliconceded that socioeconomic elites will very likely attainmost
of the positions of political power even in the most popularly inclusive
regimes, but he also shows that the generalpopulace can renderthese elites
more accountablethan do the simple electoral standardsand mechanisms
thatliberaldemocracyhas inheritedfromrepublicanism.On these and other
grounds,I have arguedthat Machiavelli's populist theory of holding elites
to account is closer to a more egalitariandemocratic than to a traditional
republicantheory:unlike the lattertheory of populargovernment,which is
largely acclamatory,Machiavellian democracy is both participatoryand
contestatory.
Beyond conventionalrepublicanprinciplesandpractices,in Book I of The
Discourses, Machiavelliadvocatesproceduresfor the popularindictmentof
officials, judgment by the people on certain kinds of legal cases, and the
establishment of class-specific advocacy institutions; praises the people
gathering collectively in deliberative bodies; and, generally, interprets
Romanrepresentativeinstitutionsin moredemocraticways (e.g., 1.4,1.5,1.7,
1.44,1.57).These practicesandinstitutionsmay seem superficiallyconsonant
with republicanism,but, as I will elaboratebelow, the latterhad always prescribed a much more narrowrole for the populace in republics or "mixed
regimes"-at least too narrowto warrantassociationwith Machiavelliandto
renderrepublicanisma resourcefor contemporaryprogressivepolitics. Thus,
while we owe republicaninterpretersof Machiavelli a tremendousdebt of
gratitudefor calling into question narrowly"tyrannical"or "immoralist"
interpretationsof the greatFlorentine,theirinattentionto the inherentelitism
of traditionalrepublicanismand the steadfastanti-elitism of Machiavelli's
political thoughtrenderstheir attemptsto improvethe contemporarytheory
andpracticeof populargovernmentwantingand even harmful.Before demonstratingthis, however,I would like to reinforce some of the provisional
claims made above.
618
AND DEMOCRACY
MACHIAVELLI,
REPUBLICANISM,
If one thinksalongthe lines of less descriptivetermslike "populargovernment"or "representativegovernment"the continuitybetweenrepublicanism
and minimalist democracyis apparent:there are inherentelitist dimensions
to each. In traditionalrepublicanism,aristocratsare assigned specific political tasks that supposedly complementbut usually supersedethose reserved
for poorerandlowerbornsegmentsof the populace.It is, so to speak,aristocracycombinedwith democracybut with the latterassuminga decidedly subordinate position. Modem minimalist democracy may be understood in
starkestSchumpeterianterms as competitiveoligarchy,that is, the selection
by the generalpopulaceof which set of elites shall rule over,or in at least the
narrowestfunctionalsense, "represent,"them (see Pitkin 1990). Madisonis,
of course, the intellectualconduit for the transitionfrom traditionalto modem popularly constrainedoligarchy, or from republicanismto minimalist
democracy.Madisonfamously defines republicanismin termsof representative government(Madison,Hamilton,and Jay [1788] 1998, no. 10) and "the
total exclusion of the people in their collective capacity"(Madison,Hamilton, and Jay [1788] 1998, no. 63).
Thus, merely a few generationsbefore "democracy"would reappearon
the Westernpolitical horizon,Madisonhad alreadyprecludedfromthe democratic agenda what was a feature of more popularly inclusive republics,
namely,some directinstitutionalembodimentof popularexpressionsuch as
an ombudsman,or tribunate,or an unbiasedmethodfor selecting public officials, such as lot.5Madison'srationalewas not quantitativebut qualitative:it
was not the scale of modernregimes that necessitated representationin his
logic but rather the assumption that elections would produce the "best"
statesmen.As Manin (1997) has demonstrated,the aristocraticcharacterof
elections and the abandonmentof the more egalitarianpractice of lotteries
entailedthe pacificationof moderndemocracybefore its triumph.Tobe sure,
Madisonwas less elitist thanmost of his Americancontemporaries(Pocock
1975, 520). Nevertheless, at his prompting, democracy, representative
democracy,by forgoingany directorunbiasedexpressionof the generalpopulace, would allow elites as much or perhapseven more free reign than did
traditionalrepublicanism,which reservedex ante special offices or tasks for
them. As we will see below, Madisoncould achieve the elitist resultsdesired
by Machiavelli's aristocratic-republican contemporary, Francesco
Guicciardini,without the overtly elitist, formal restrictionson the general
populace's participationin politics.
Machiavelliwantedto constrainor patrolelites in a mannermore radical
than this, such thathis political theory is more populist and anti-elitistthan
619
what passes underthe name of eitherrepublicanor democratictheorytoday.

Machiavelli is not guilty of the idealism of direct,participatory,or substantive democratswho think thatpopularcontrol solves all problems,and who
eschew confrontation with the challenging "iron law of oligarchy":
Machiavelli concedes that elites, socioeconomic and political-often combined-will emerge througheven the most populist political arrangements.
Nor, however, is Machiavelli guilty of the negligence of minimalistdemocratictheoristswho, following Schumpeter,grantelites fartoo much leeway
when acknowledgingthe inevitabilityof their rule. Here Machiavelli is by
contemporarystandardsnot a republicanbutrather,alternately,an elite-wary
minimalistdemocrator an elite-realisticparticipatorydemocrat.Thus,while
therearereasonsMachiavelli'spolitics might appropriatelybe called "republican"(thatis, afterall, the word he used), in fact, when comparedwith general connotations of the term, it proves to be something of a misnomer.
According to historiansof republicanRome (e.g., Nicolet 1980; Jolowicz
1967; Millar 1998), the CambridgeSchool intellectualhistoriansof republicanism (e.g., Pocock, Skinner,andViroli), and analyticallyinclined scholars
of political representation(Manin 1997), post-Athenianpopulargovernment
generally entails the selection, ratification,or arbitrationof the elite by the
people. But Machiavelli's conception of popular governmentin The Discourses (1997a) goes farbeyond this model of popularparticipation.Therefore, drawing upon previous work, and on the basis of evidence provided
below, I arguethatMachiavelli'spoliticaltheoryis morefundamentallydemocratic thanit is republicanaccordingto currentconventionaland scholarly
understandingsof either "republicanism"or "democracy."6
OF
"CAMBRIDGE
SCHOOL" INTERPRETATIONS
AND REPUBLICANISM
MACHIAVELLI
Pocock and the GuicciardinianRepublicanModel
John Pocock, while the least prescriptive of the "CambridgeSchool"
scholarson whom I focus in this essay, neverthelessestablishesthe interpretive frameworkfor understandingMachiavelli and republicanismthat the
otherscholarsmentionedwill follow. In particular,this interpretativeframework will shape their attemptsto address contemporaryissues in political
theory, specifically, the deficiencies of liberal democracy.Pocock's (1975)
magisterialTheMachiavellianMomentarguesthatRenaissancepolities and
intellectualssoughtto reconcile classical republicantexts with both a Christianworldviewandthe novel historicalcircumstancesthatconfrontedthem:
620
Civic humanistsposed the problemof a society, in which the political natureof man as
describedby Aristotlewas to receive its fulfillment,seeking to exist in the frameworkof
a Christiantime-schemewhich deniedthe possibility of any secularfulfillment.(P.vii)
The resultingtheory of political stability,what I termrepublicanexistentialism, grappledwith "theproblemof the republic'sexistence in time"andproposed that a republicanregime characterizedby a governo misto was best
suitedto enduringandflourishingin humantime (p. vii). Fromthe standpoint
of this political existentialism,7Machiavelli, the theorist par excellence of
fortuna and virtui,becomes something like the founder of modem popular
regimes and their analysis. However, had Pocock accentuatedsocial and
institutionalarrangementsin the regimes and theorists that he studies over
questions of political temporalityand endurance,he might have more accurately titled the book The GuicciardinianMoment.After all, it is the eliteprivilegingrepublicanmodel espousedby Machiavelli'syoungercontemporaryand sometimes interlocutor,FrancescoGuicciardini(Gilbert1965), that
eventuallywins out and becomes the forerunnerof modem liberaldemocracies. This recognized, the "Florentinerepublicanism"inheritedby contemporarypopularregimes perhapsought to be much less celebratedby advocates of democraticgovernmentthan it often is.
In Pocock's (1975) work, the theme of a republic's "temporalfinitude,"
the fact that it was "finite and located in space and time," overwhelmsthe
author'srecognitionof a majorsourceof such finitude,class conflict, andthe
frank acknowledgment of the institutional means most often adopted in
republicanismfor dealingwith it, aristocraticallydominatedpopularregimes
(pp. viii, 3). While I would neverdiscountMachiavelli'sinnovativethoughts
on political contingency (see McCormick 1993), I suggest that if we look
beyond issues of republicanexistentialism,modem popular governmentis
institutionally and socioeconomically much more Guicciardinian than
Machiavellian.A majorsubtextofPocock's book, nevermade explicit,is that
the more egalitarianpolitical models proposedby, for instance, Savonarola,
Giannotti,and,especially,Machiavelli,lose outto the Guicciardinianmodel.
Whenreadfromthis perspective,Pocock's workis particularlyfrustrating
precisely because it provides ample evidence for such conclusions even if
Pocock does not draw them himself. After all, Pocock does not ignore the
issue of elites or of socioeconomically reflected institutionalarrangements.
Forinstance,he recountsbeautifullyAristotle'stheoryof aristocraticelites, a
theory that was in principle egalitarianbecause the aristocracycould conceivably entail the entire citizenryof a polity: Pocock (1975) points out that
there were in Aristotle
621
a variety of categories recognized as forming elites of this sort: the good, the wise, the
brave,the rich, the wellborn,and so on. But it is importantto rememberthatsuch elites
were in theoryas manyas the identifiablevalue-goalswhich men pursued,andthatsince
everycitizen hadbeen definedas possessing his own value-priorities,therewas in principle no citizen who did not belong to as many of these elites as he had chosen values for
special emphasis. (Pp. 69, 73)
Of course wealth and pedigree tended to define what individuals from

which families would count as elites in practice.Pocock's recountingof the
notion of republicanelites, or ottimati in the Italian context, bears this out,
even if it distinguishes the wealthy and well-born, as such, from crude
oligarchs.The latter,unlikegenuineottimati,would attemptto hold monopolistic rule over a regime and preventthe pooreror lower born citizens from
contributinganythingat all to its governance:the ottimatiwere the
inner circle of influentialFlorentinefamilies who considered themselves an elite and
identifiedthemselveswith the few in the Aristotelianscheme [who] cannotexercisetheir
naturalfunctionof leadership,or develop the virtuespertainingto it, unless thereis a participantnon-elite or many for them to lead. (Pocock 1975, 118-19)
With this in mind, Pocock (1975) recountsFlorence's attempt,after the

flight of the Medici in 1494, to establishandpracticea morepopularlyinclusive republic, a governo largo, rather than an ottimati-dominated one, or what
was known as a governo stretto:
The formerclearly does not mean a constitutionwhich extends citizenshipto all or even
to the popolo or "many"as a defined social group-the constitutionof 1494 did not
explicitly do that-but ratherone which, by refusingto confine citizenshipto an exactly
defined (stretto) group among the inhabitants,acknowledges that civic participationis
good, somethingthatmen aim at, thatdevelops men towardgoodness, thatis desirableto
extend to as many men as possible. (P. 118)
And to his credit, Pocock is forthrightabout the success of the ottimati,to

whom Guicciardinibutnot Machiavellibelonged,at steeringthe republicin a
more elite-dominateddirection,one thatculminatedin the establishmentof a
senatethatusurpedvirtuallyall the political functionspreviouslyperformed
by the more popularlyinclusive GrandCouncil (p. 122, cf. p. 257).
Most strikingly,however,Pocock (1975) recountsGuicciardini'srepublicanismin ways thatforeshadowthe principalelementsof minimalistor elitist
democracy,even if he accepts at face value this noble's distinctionof simple
elitism from unjust oligarchy:Guicciardini's
622
bias in favorof a politicalelite is always explicit;butit is importantto note that... thereis

an equally strongrejection,whetherimplicitor explicit, of formallyclosed oligarchy....
If authorityis to be free it mustbe public;if it is to be public it mustbe impersonal;if it is
to be impersonalthan the group conferringit must be over a certain size. In his own
words, if the foundationof libertyis populargovernment,at Florencethe foundationof
populargovernmentis the distributionof magistraciesand dignities by the Consiglio
Grande.(P. 127)
Guicciardiniconceived of populargovernmentin an acclamatoryor selective

sense, one conducive to the popularselection of officers throughintermediary organs,here the GreatCouncil, much as liberal democracieswould later
use state legislatures or party conventions as such intermediarybodies. In
Pocock's account, Guicciardini seems only more explicit about his antipopularprejudices-prejudices that, for instance, Madison eitherprudently
kept to himself or, being awareof the aristocraticeffects of elections, never
felt the need to considerpublicly:
It seems fairly clear that Guicciardini'stheory as regardsboth election and legislation
rests upon an Aristotelian conception of decision-making by the many. Though not
themselves capableof magistracy,they can recognizethis capacityin others;thoughnot
themselves capableof framingor even debatinga law, they are competentjudges of the
draftproposalsof others.By excluding them fromthe functionsthey areto evaluate,the
principleof impersonalizationis secured. (P. 129)
Pocock (1975) revealsthatthe ottimatitheorists,like Guicciardini,did not

initiallyaddressthemselvesto the problemof temporalityorfortunabecause
they consideredthemselves relatively secure in their positions (p. 156). But
this observation brings an interesting dichotomy into view: the
Guicciardinianinstitutionalmodel that prevails historically is the one that
was not formulatedwith the novel historicalconcept of temporalityidentified
by Pocock in mind. The Guicciardinianrepublicanmodel was not, apparently, most conducive to the theory of political contingency at the core of
Pocock's book, namely, "the politics of time" (p. 183). Only after engagementwith Machiavellidoes Guicciardinihimself takeup republicanexistentialism (e.g., pp. 237, 251). Machiavelli,of course, arguedthata morepopularly inclusive regime could better withstandthe political contingencies of
fortune than elite-dominatedregimes. But Pocock's account suggests that
this intellectual exchange encourages Guicciardinito become even more
exclusively elitist and,hence, vaguely oligarchic in his political orientation.
Therefore,since Machiavelli'smodel of populargovernment(1) did not prevail historicallyand (2) did not affect the model that actuallydid-except to
renderit more elitist-I would ask, What's so "Machiavellian"about this
moment?
623
If this exchange between Guicciardiniand Machiavelli constitutes the

"Machiavellianmoment," then this instance amounts to something little
more momentousthanthe occasion when the populist-republicanshows the
elitist-republicanhow to think abouttemporality-in response to which the
elitist did not changehis theoryexcept to make it less like thatof the populist
theorist of political existentialism.In this spirit, Pocock concludes his first
Guicciardini chapter with reflections on Machiavelli's subordinateclass
position in Florence. However, accordingto Pocock, these non-aristocratic
originspurportedlyinspireMachiavellito launchan "intellectualrevolution"
only tangentiallyrelatedto social class: a revolutionover the temporalityof
mixed regimes andnot one overwith the way in which these regimes arrange
class institutionally(Pocock 1975, 155). Indeed, at the book's conclusion,
Pocock reduces Machiavelli'ssingularcontributionto modem political theory to his development of a philosophy of history for modem political
thought,andhe ignoresany of Machiavelli'sinsights into institutionaldesign
and class interaction(Pocock 1975, 503).
Along these lines, thereareparticularpoints in Pocock's interpretationof
Machiavelli where he underplays the latter's profound anti-elitism. For
instance, Pocock (1975) underestimatesthe extent to which Machiavelli
would recommendeliminating the old nobility in a conqueredterritory(p.
164). He does not think through what might be the ramifications of
Machiavelli's advice to princes to protectthe people againstthe nobility in
these circumstances(The Prince, IX)-something aboutwhich Machiavelli
is more explicit in The Discourses (I.16): with the example of Clearchus,
Machiavellimakes plain the advantagesof securingoneself with the people
by cutting to pieces the wealthy, either literally throughmurderor figuratively through redistribution (see McCormick 2001, 298).8 In another
instance, Pocock recounts how the Guicciardinian attempt to combine
ottimatisupremacywith aspects of governo largo dominatedMachiavelli's
milieu (pp. 185-86). But he does not takeup how Machiavelli,given his class
position and ideas, might have been trying to rearrangethe balance in this
scenario,especially consideringthathe assigns the "guardianshipof liberty"
to the people in TheDiscourses (1.5). Pocock does acknowledge The Discourses as a "democratictheory"of sorts (p. 212), but his understandingof
popularprominencein such a theoryseems to be confinedto the crucialrole
of the "citizen soldier"in Machiavelli'sthought-a role that is much more
soldier thancitizenin Pocock's renderingsince he almostexclusively emphasizes popular inclusion in war-makingnot policy-making. Indeed, Pocock
instructsus thatGuicciardini'sDialogo is a directresponseto Machiavelli's
Discourses to the extent that it identifies virtue, not with the "armedmany"
but with the experienceandprudenceof the few. It would seem that,accord-
624
ing to Pocock, in addition to, or ratherin conjunctionwith, Machiavelli's

political existentialism,all that modem popularregimes inheritedfrom the
Florentinewas the most unsavorycharacteristicof both the regimes and the
theorist:their apparentmilitarism.
This is not to suggest that Pocock is sympatheticwith or is somehow
attemptingto cover up the elitism of Guicciardini'srepublicanism.Rather,I
arguethathis somewhatidiosyncraticpolitical existentialismthesis servesto
confusejust whatthe actuallegacy of Florentinerepublicanismis in modem
popular government,elitism, and renders it difficult to recognize what is
most promisingaboutMachiavelli'spotentialcontributionto our contemporarycircumstances,a democraticanti-elitism.In defense of Pocock (1975),
note his trenchantcriticisms of Guicciardini'slaterwritings,which are even
less confidentin the generalpopulacethanthe earlyones mentionedabove:
Once the distinguishingqualityof the leaderceases to be virtuiandbecomes esperienzia,
[Guicciardini's]belief becomes less plausible, since esperienzia is an acquiredcharacteristicwhich can be evaluatedonly by those who have acquiredsome of it themselves;
and since a republicis not a customarybut a policy-making community,there is little
opportunityfor the manyto acquireexperienceof what governorsdo-a form of experience whose expressionis not custom but prudence.(P. 234)
Pocock points outthatsince his earlierwritingsGuicciardinihas learnedthat

the selection of magistratesthroughelections as opposedto the practiceof lot
will favor the ottimati(p. 234). But Pocock still accepts Guicciardini'sdistinction between republican elitism and crass oligarchy-Guicciardini's
"elitist model of governmentis at every point in the analysis a competitive
meritocracy"-even if one that assuredly favors the rich (p. 248). Pocock
points out thatGuicciardini's"libertyis thatof the elite to develop theirvirtiu
to the full"(p. 235). The people's virtueconsists not in actively defendingthe
liberty of the regime against its own elite or against foreign enemies, as it
does in Machiavelli's theory, but in passively confirmingthe virtue of the
elite. To be sure, even in Machiavelli'sunderstanding,elite lording over the
people cannotbe satisfying to the nobility if it is merely based on force, and
so, in Hegelianterms,the masterneeds the recognition,andnotjust the compliance, of the servant:
Meritocracynecessitatesa measureof democracy.The libertciof the few is to havetheir
virtit acknowledged by the res publica; the liberta of the many is to ensure that this
acknowledgementis trulypublic and the rule of virtii and onore a true one. (P. 253)
625
According to Guicciardini'smodel, the few express their need to dominate,

andthe many,in a ratherpassive andmechanicalfashion,makesurethatsuch
dominationonly functionsto the good of the regime.
In its actual functioning then, Guicciardini'srepublicanismsomewhat
foreshadows the workings of minimalist democracy. True, while lower
houses typically have more power in contemporarydemocracies,in the aristocraticrepublicanmodel the more populistgoverninginstitution,the Great
Council,"is assumedincapableof initiatinglegislation"(Pocock 1975,255).
But most discussion and debatearepresumedto be the purviewof the upper
house in both models: in fact, Guicciardiniexcludes the GreatCouncil"from
all deliberazione, all framing and discussing of proposed legislation. It
retainsonly the barepower of approvazione,of acceptingor vetoing the proposals laid before it by smaller deliberativebodies" (Pocock 1975, 255).
ForeshadowingMadisoniangovernment,"themany"themselvesareenlisted
only for their effect on the elites and not for prospectiveinsight providedby
anyperspectiveof theirown-not even the passive cum activeMachiavellian
one of the need not to be dominated:Guicciardini"stressedtheirfunctionof
universalizingdecision, of ensuringthatit was free from corruptingparticular interests.The role of the many was less to assert the will of the non-elite
than to maximize the impersonalityof government"(Pocock 1975, 255).
This scenariohas muchmorein commonwith thejustificationsfor andworkings of contemporarydemocracythando impressionisticgeneralizationsthat
identifyMachiavellias founderof modem constitutionalarrangements,specifically, a commonplaceview that attributesto Machiavelli'sinterpretation
of the RomanConstitutionthe originsof the modem separationof powers.9
In terms that anticipatethe oligarchic acclamatorydemocraticpractices
thatthe Italianelite theoristsand, to a lesser extent, Weber([1918] 1998; but
cf. Breiner1995) advocated,andcriticssuch as Habermas([1962] 1989) criticized, Pocock (1975) describes the core of Guicciardini'sgovernmental
ideal:
The elite shall display virtuibefore the eyes of the non-elite. It is for this reasonthat the
deliberazioniof the few requirethe approvazioneof the many,andhe is stronglyopposed
to any attemptby the formerto trespass on the province of the latter.(P. 255)
The people make theirselection on the basis of visual displayas opposedto a

rationalexplanation.Ultimately, without recognizing it, Pocock quite succinctly draws a conclusion from Guicciardini'slater writings that would
definethe essence of moderndemocracymorethanany conclusionone could
drawfrom Machiavelli:"theidentificationof aristocraticwith populargov-
626
emrnment"
(p. 253). And later in the work, in the midst of a discussion of
eighteenth-centurydebates over republicanismin England,Pocock invokes
Guicciardiniin a way thatpresentshim for whathe is, the godfatherof elitist
democracy:
Guicciardini,the most aristocraticallyminded of Florentine republicantheorists, had
made it clear thatthe few needed the many to save them from corruption,andthatwhen
the many acceptedthe few as theirnaturalleaders they did not cease to display critical
judgmentor active citizenship. (P. 485)
The problem, made patently clear in Machiavelli's theory and modem

democraticpractice, is that such patronizing and exclusionary first-order
treatmentof the electoratemakes subsequentandsustainedpopularcriticism
and engagementvery difficult and perhapsimpossible. For elites to remain
uncorrupt,or, in Machiavellianterms, if they areto be preventedfrom inevitably corruptinga regime,the people must engage them in a moreactiveway,
thatis by substantivelyvying for power andresourceswith them.Ultimately,
Pocock is most concernedwith popularanimism in internationalrelations,
that is, war, that helps a republicto better grapplewith fortuneand situate
itself in time. Therefore,Pocock, like most scholarsassociatedwith the CambridgeSchool treatedhere,examinesin only the most generaltermsdomestic
popularexpressionsof ferocityagainstthe nobilityandthe institutionalchannels thatcarriedand sustainedsuch expressions.As Machiavellidescribesit,
the formerare usually appropriateresponses on the partof the people to the
nobility's unquenchabledesireto dominate(e.g., 1.3,1.6, III.11), andthe latter include the veto, the accusations,and referenda(e.g., 1.5, 1.7, 1.8).
Skinnerand RepublicanLiberty
Quentin Skinner is more prescriptive than was Pocock in his use of
Machiavelli and the republicantraditionto inform contemporarypolitical
concerns.10And whereasPocock associates the singularityof Machiavelli's
populism with the prominence of the citizen solider in the latter'stheory,
Skinnerdevotes more attentionto the domestic manifestationsof this role.
Unfortunately,this effortis still insufficientto accentuateMachiavelli'sserious departuresfrom the republicantraditionand his potential as a resource
for contemporarydemocratictheory. Skinneracknowledges the originality
of Machiavelli's political thought with respect to social discord (Skinner
1981, 65-66; 1990, 130, 136). But he interpretsthis discord in terms of an
"equilibrium"where equally dangerous motivations, those of the nobility
and those of the people, arebalanced.He often moves from a recognitionof
627
the two differentsocial types thatMachiavelliidentifies,popolo andgrandi,

to a discussion of only one type: selfish humanswho, underthe rightpolitical
arrangements,might become virtuouscitizens (Skinner 1983, 10-13). Skinnerextrapolatesa politicaltheoryof libertyon the basis of a social type thatis
characterizedby the unsavoryqualities that Machiavelli attributesto either
the elite, in The Discourses, or mankind,generally,in ThePrince, but only
very seldomly, if ever, with the "people,"as a class."1In general, Skinner
transformsMachiavelli's class-based political-sociology into a sociologically agnostic one focused on abstractcitizens.
In the first place, this mode of interpretationnormativelyequates noble
and popularmotivationsin a very un-Machiavellianway (cf. 1.5, 1.46), and,
second, it rendersclosed and docile the open-ended, dynamic, and "wild"
quality of social discord describedby Machiavelli in TheDiscourses (1.4).
Machiavelliis only ableto praiseconflict in such a radicalmannerbecausehe
separatesand perhapsprivileges the motivations of the Roman plebs over
those of the nobility. Machiavelli can recommend contention precisely
because the people, as the "guardiansof liberty,"have the "honest"aim of
wishing to avoid domination(1.5). Had Machiavelli formulatedhis political
sociology in the mannerthat Skinnerimplies, that is, that the people are in
essence as equally ambitiousas the nobles, then the resultwould be the kind
of intransigent and corruption-inducingfactional conflict that Skinner
rightlynotes traditionaland contemporaryrepublicanismto have abhorred.
It is manifestin Book I of TheDiscourses thatMachiavelliidentifiesexhibitions of popularambitionin Rome as a legitimateresponseto the farmore
unlimited and dangerousambition of the nobles (McCormick2001, 299300).12 It would not be until a laterwork, "Discourseon FlorentineMatters"
(Machiavelli[1520] 1997b), thatMachiavelliseems to equatethe ambitions
of the people and the nobles as casually as Skinnerwrongly insists thatthe
Florentinedoes in the Discourses on Livy (Skinner 1981, 66). I will offer an
explanationfor why Machiavelli does so below when I turnto the work of
Viroli.But regardingthe use of the termand concept of equilibrium,Skinner
is muchcloser to the Polybianview (Polybius 1979, 317-18) thatMachiavelli
attemptsto radicalize.Skinnerleaves underspecifiedthe particulararrangements thatensurethatthe antagonisticnoble-plebrelationshipdoes not lead
to the demise of Rome:he does not look beyonda summarydescriptionof the
constitutional arrangement of consuls, senate, and tribunes-that
Machiavelli lifted from Polybius-and he largely ignores how Machiavelli
describes noble-pleb interactionswithin and without these institutionsin
practice-descriptions thatoften departdramaticallyfromLivy's histories.13
Thus,even thoughSkinneracknowledgesthatthe dynamicamongthe different partsof Rome's constitutionalarrangemententailedconflict in TheDis-
628
courses, because Skinnerfocuses on the aspects that are faithfulto classical

sourcesandnot those thatare less faithful,he misses just how innovativeand
energeticMachiavelli's socio-political contentiousnessreally is.
If Machiavellihad left the nobles andthe people to find an "equilibrium"
throughthe Polybianly described formal structuresalone the result would
havebeen one of two outcomes:on the one hand,aristocratictriumphandoligarchyor, on the other,populartriumphand Caesarismmuch earlierthan it
actually emerged. For Machiavelli, equilibrium, properly understood, is
intense socioeconomic antagonismbetween classes that stops just short of
one or the other party'srecourseto a domestic or foreign militarysolution.
The lattermay indeed destroythe power of the opposing social class, but it
also compromisesthe potentialpower of the partythatenlists, for instance,a
Caesaror King of France,to put down their opponentby force. An equilibrium of contest between plebs and grandi that stops shortof this republican
equivalentof "going nuclear,"as Machiavellidescribes it, can only be regulated through institutions and practices that Skinner largely ignores: the
concilium, contiones, accusations, appeals, and attemptsby the people to
sharein the spoils andoffices held by the nobility,and so forth.Skinnermentions accusations as institutionaldevices that minimize slander and hence
inhibit the proliferation of factional strife (Skinner 1981, 71-72), but
Machiavellipresentsthem primarilyas means by which lesser citizens can
chastise, expose, or bring down "great"ones (1.7). Hence Skinner puts a
fairlytypical Cambridgespin-accentuating the neutralizationof conflicton what is actually a Machiavellian inclination in The Discourses toward
active, insubordinate,and impudentanti-elitism.
In his more prescriptivework, Skinner(1998, esp. 108, 110-12) drawson
Machiavelliandrepublicanismto tracethe rise anddecline of a "neo-roman"
notion of libertyin the historyof Westernpolitical thought.He uses the term
"neo-roman,"ratherthan"republican,"for this notion of liberty,because the
formermay be realizableunder a monarchy,while the latter,by definition,
generallycould not (pp. 11, n. 31; 55, n. 174; 56, n. 176). Forexample,mixed
governmentin the English republicanmodel often made a place for a monarchwhose power is mixed with aristocraticand bourgeois institutions.On
the otherhand,Machiavellianmixed governmentincludeda kingly element,
ratherthan a monarchper se, althoughhe concedes thatpeople can live free
undera prince given the properconditions,as Skinnerrightlypoints out (p.
54). Skinnercharacterizesneo-roman liberty as the ability of regimes and
individualsto enjoy theirexistence andpropertywithoutthe actualintervention of another regime or person, and without arrangementsthat make a
potentialinterferencealongthese lines possible, whetherit actuallyoccursor
629
not. Skinner has often associated this notion of liberty with Machiavelli
(Skinner1983 13, n. 9). On the contrary,classical liberalismonly defines liberty in termsof the absence of actual interference,and so ignoredthe forms
of dependenceor subordinationthat living with the threatof arbitraryintervention entailed (Skinner 1998, ix-x; but see Holmes 1995, 13-41).
In an interestingfootnote (Skinner 1998, x, n. 3), a remarkpregnantwith
possible insights into Machiavelliandemocracy,its practices and its goals,
Skinnernotes how "strikinglyprominent"is the languageof romanlibertyin
Marx's analysis of capitalist socio-political relations. In fact, Marx is the
greatestprogenitorof the critiqueof structuralpower thatshouldhave been a
resourcefor both Skinner'sand, as we will see, Pettit'sattemptsto formulate
an alternativeto classical liberalnotions of liberty-an alternativethat does
not also fall into the pitfalls of Berlin's positive-negativelibertydichotomy
thatboth Skinnerand Pettitcriticize. Machiavelli,Marx, andthe power critics haveperhapsmore in commonwith Skinner'sandPettit'sgoals thanwith
the republicanismto which the latterare so devoted.
On a relatednote, a persistentproblem in Cambridgehistoricaland normative analysis is inattentionto social domination, such that when Pettit
finally tries to address it, his reliance on the republican tradition, seen
througha Cambridgelens, seems inappropriate.Skinner'sanalysis of neoroman liberty insists that this liberty was not, as some have argued,a goal
exclusively reservedfor free regimes and that it obtained for individualsas
well. But the dominationthat Skinnershows republicanintellectualsto be
criticizingis almost alwayspolitical and seldom social-most likely because
of the prominence of absolutist-executiveabuse of power in these debates
(Skinner 1998, 17). To be sure, Skinner'sneo-romanconceptionis available
for applicationagainstillegitimate social hierarchiesthat eitherstructurally
or directly interfere with people's liberty. But it is not theorized as such
except in an ambiguousgestureagainstBerlin at the very conclusionof Liberty before Liberalism (Skinner 1998, 119). Machiavelli certainly would
have appliedsuch a neo-romannotion of libertyagainstthe theorists,such as
Milton, Sidney, and Neville, who developed it and whose aristocraticand
anti-populistleanings Skinnermakes explicit (Skinner 1998, 32).
In short, largely due to his underspecifying of class conflict in
Machiavelli, Skinner'sconception of neo-romanliberty is noticeably weak
on social domination.It mostly focuses on political domination:specifically,
the way that subject-regimesand specific populationsaretreatedby, respectively, imperial and absolutist rulers. But most economic inequality and
social injustice do not fall into these categories. In The Discourses,
Machiavelli, for his part,was concernedwith dominationof the people by
630
those of wealth andstatus,notjust by tyrants.Machiavellitheorizedremedies

to subordinationthat do not conform with the enslavement or servitude
examplesthatoccupy Skinner(1998, 37). Noble dominationof the people is
not identicalto thatof masterover slave, imperialpower over subjectcity, or
tyrant over oppressed people, and yet it is described with something
approachingmoraldisapprobationby Machiavelli.Ultimately,Skinneruses
Machiavelli to narrowlyreduce the concept of dominationto overweening
rule by a tyrantand arbitrarysway over a subject city. But this seriouslydistorts Machiavelli's actual theory of liberty and diminishes the efficacious
applicationof his theory to contemporarycircumstancesof injustice.
Viroliand the Equation of Popular and Elite Excess
Skinner'sprominentprotege,MaurizioViroli, farsurpasseshis teacherin
analyzingclass relationsin Machiavelli'spolitical thought.In fact, no one's
scholarshipis so clearly motivatedby affection and admirationfor the great
Florentineas is Viroli's, and this gives his work an intensityand insightrare
among studies of Machiavelli representativeof any interpretivestripe (see
Viroli 2000). Viroli (1998) points out a tension in the Florentine's work
betweenmoments,on the one hand,whereMachiavelliis in "fullagreement"
(p. 117) with the republicantraditionand, on the other,where he is "heterodox" from that tradition(p. 126). While the latter approachto the thinker
touches upon Machiavelli's populism, the former,much more dominantin
Viroli's account,serves to thrustMachiavelliback into the conventionaltheory of mixed governmentthat ultimately facilitates elite dominationof the
people. Viroli's work certainlysheds new light on the place of law, rhetoric,
patriotism,and liberty in Machiavelli'sthought (pp. 5-10; cf. Viroli 1990),
but it also tends to underplay the ramifications of the latter's distinction
between elites and the people.
Viroli recountsthe two ways thatrepublicswere conceived as mixed governmentsin traditionalrepublicanism:one entails"theruleof elective magistrateswith limitedtenureappointedby the sovereignbody of the citizens....
Rulers are elected by the citizens and are bound by the laws of the city"
(Viroli 1998, 117); the otherarrangesinstitutionsin a way that"wisely combines the virtues of monarchy,aristocracyand populargovernment"(Viroli
1998, 117). In this context Viroli assertsthatMachiavelliwas "in full agreement with the traditionthatI have outlined"(Viroli 1998, 117): specifically,
Viroli demonstrateshis adherenceto the rule of law and mixed government.
Whatthis readingof Machiavelli as a "faithful"republicanomits is the fact
that the "tradition"often allowed differentlaws to apply to nobles and the
631
generalcitizenry and thatthe mixed qualityof its institutionalarrangements

favoredthe nobility.Inthe "mix"of institutions,economic elites almostinevitably wound up with agenda-setting,policy-forming, and law-enforcing
capacities not availableto the people. Most importantly,Viroli's approach
overlooks the fact that these are two elements of republicanism that
Machiavelli'sDiscourses specifically attemptsto undermine:legal inequality and asymmetricalinstitutionalarrangements.Machiavelli(1997a) lauds
the attemptby the plebs to gain paritywith the nobility, and he praisespractices beyond the mere selection of magistratesor the simple balance among
institutionsby which the people kept Romanelites accountable(e.g., 1.4,1.5,
1.7,1.44,1.57; cf. McCormick2001, 303-6). Also at odds with the traditional
republican notion of the people's place in a socio-political "mixture,"
Machiavelliapprovesof pleb attemptsto sharein the wealth andhonorof the
nobility-so long as these attemptsfall shortof resortsto violence (1.37).
Viroli does go furtherthan any CambridgeSchool scholarin explicating
and evaluatingMachiavelli'scomparisonand contrastof the Romannobility
and plebs (Viroli 1998, 124-25). But he understatesMachiavelli's novelty
when he expressly identifies the Florentine'sidea of "well-orderedpopular
government"with Cicero's conception, according to which "each component of the city has its properplace" (Viroli 1998, 125). An obvious difference between Cicero'sandMachiavelli'snotions of the "properplace"of the
people in theirrespectivemodels of a well-orderedregime is thatCicero,the
Roman senator,while praising the people interpretstheir place as subordinateto the nobility and senate (Cicero 2001,284-90), while Machiavelli,the
Florentinecitizen, ascribesthe people an ascendantplace over the former.14
Like Skinner,therefore,Viroli too readilyequatesthe purportedexcesses of
the people with those that Machiavelli quite definitively attributesto the
nobility. In his interpretationof The Discourses, Viroli disproportionately
weighs and inappropriatelyequates Machiavelli's evaluationsof noble and
popularmotivationsand actions. For instance,Viroli invokes Machiavelli's
ultimate conclusion that noble ambition was the most dangerousforce in
Roman politics but concludes his evaluationsby citing exclusively the few
isolated incidents where Machiavelli chastises the people and their agents,
the tribunes,for excessive ambition(Viroli 1998, 126).
Viroli most forcefullymakes his case along these lines by drawingon the
aforementioned"Discourse on FlorentineMatters,"Machiavelli's ([1520]
1997b)recommendationsfor reformingthe Florentinerepublic(Viroli 1998,
125). Inthis text, Machiavellidoes indeedspecify the possibilitythatthepeople could gain too muchpowerin a republic,therebydeprivingthe nobilityof
theirproperrole, andhence underminingthe polity as a whole, andthatthey
632
had, in fact, done so in Florence on occasion, as had various oligarchicalliances, on occasion. Viroli (1998) recounts that in Florence, according to
Machiavelli,
the people wantedcompletelyto excludethe nobility from-thegovernmentin orderto "be
alone in the government."Whereasthe desire of the Romanpeople to share the highest
honorswith the nobles was reasonable,that of the people of Florencewas injuriousand
unjust.(P. 126, emphasisadded)
However,Viroli does not considerthatMachiavellishows how the people

in the Roman context had the opportunityto exclude the nobility on several
occasions, only to deferto the latterwhen they recognizedtheirown deficiencies (1.47, III.8). The people of Florence, on the contrary,seldom had the
opportunityto actually exercise such power and subsequentlyexhibit such
self-restraintbecause successive strataof Florentinenobility were notoriously jealous of their own power (see 1.39). Perhapsmore seriously,Viroli
makes no mentionof the fact thatthe "Discourseon FlorentineMatters"was
solicited by Giulio de' Medici (Pope ClementVII) underwhose authoritythe
republicwould be reorganized,andwhose family,along with the otheraristocraticfamilies allied with them,oughtnot be offendedif Machiavelli'splan is
to have any chance of being implemented.Thus, in this particularinstance,
Machiavellijudges it best to attributethe same amountof blame to the people
as he does to the Florentineottimatifor the traditionalfactionaldeficiencies
of Florentinepolitics.
I cannotfully elaboratethis interpretationhere,butthe following is worth
considering.In contrastto ThePrince, which is addressedto a Medici prince
andcontainsthe advice thatthe lattersubordinatethe nobility andelevatethe
people to securea principality,"FlorentineMatters"is addressedto a Medici
oligarch who belongs to an elite class and who, unlike a prince, cannotbe
expectedto turnagainsthis class andform an easy alliancewith the people in
establishing an aristocracticrepublic. Nevertheless, the goals of the two
works might be understood in tandem: The Prince is ostensibly helpful
advice to a princethatactuallyblueprintsthe eventualsupercessionof a principality by popular government,while "FlorentineMatters"is ostensibly
useful advice for nobles who wish to more securely dominatea republicthat
in the end actuallypromotesa morepopularlyinclusiveregime. Oneneed not
adoptthe hermeneuticapproachto Machiavelliset outby Leo Straussandhis
studentsto considerthese issues (see Strauss1958; Mansfield 1979). Viroli,
himself, has demonstratedMachiavelli'sties to the traditionof classicalrhetoric.15But in this instance,he does not pause to considera crucialelementof
rhetorical analysis: the relationship among a speakers' intentions, their
633
words, and the specific audienceto which the latterare addressed.Giventhe

oligarchic addresseeof these specific policy proposals,we should ask: why
mightMachiavelliplace equalblame on the people andthe aristocracyforthe
factionalism of Florentinepolitics? Especially since this assertion contradicts a centralclaim-perhaps the centralclaim-of Machiavelli's greatest
work, TheDiscourses, a work that,we may assume, he intendedfor a fairly
wide audience.In any case, Viroli's interpretationevens the playing field of
political culpabilityin a very un-Machiavellianway, and seriously disrupts
the balance of factionalblame in Machiavelli's political sociology.16
Pettit and the Contestationof Elites
Philip Pettit (1999) has set forththe most ambitiouseffortto put republicanism in the service of contemporarydemocratictheory.But it is less than
clear what his undeniablypowerfulrecommendationsreally have to do with
republicanismat all. Througha very complicatedinterpretationof the tradition, Pettit distinguishes non-interferencefrom non-domination,the latter
principle which he associates with republicanism.Similar to Skinner,with
whom he engages extensively over these issues (Skinner 1998, 22-23, n. 67;
37, n. 114; 70, n. 27; 78, n. 46; 82; Pettit 1999, 27-37, 189, 285, 300-303),
Pettit associates prohibitions against interferencewith liberalism and the
broader,purportedlymore robust,standardof non-dominationwith republicanism. Again, dominationentails a status of subordinationwhetheror not
concreteinterventionby the dominatingagent occurs in actualfact:the mere
threatof interventionis sufficient to invoke domination.But because Pettit
intendsfor his insightsto be more immediatelyandconcretelypracticalthan
does Skinner,it is moredisappointingthathe takesvirtuallyno accountof the
following: the dominationthat, accordingto ancientand even early modem
republicantheoryand practice,the nobility was entitledand able to exercise
over the generalpopulace in republics(Molho et al. 1991, 135-354) and the
dominationthat particularrepublicswere permittedto exercise over other
regimes, includingotherrepublics(Molho et al. 1991,565-640). In this light,
non-dominationseems a peculiarprincipleto derive from republicanism.
In addition,if one were to enlistMachiavelliin a reconstructionof republican theory,one would have to take into accountthat, as statedabove, unlike
conventionalrepublicantheorists he was dismayed by the former kind of
social dominationbut thathe endorsed,perhapseven more enthusiastically,
the latterkind of imperialdomination(e.g., 1.6). On the firstpoint, the fundamentallymixed aspectof republicanregimes, andthe almostuniversalascendancy of nobles within them, entailsnot only "interference"with the lives of
the lower class of citizens but "domination"over them. The following cer-
634
tainly constitutedominationin Pettit's sense: arbitrarypower overthe conditions underwhich citizens of lower birthmay or may not standfor office, can
or cannotchoose magistrates,will be compelledto marchoff to war,arepermittedto marryoutsideof theirclass, when the rules governingthese spheres
would be changed, and so forth.17
Pettitmightrespondthatnon-dominationis a republicanprinciplebecause
it enlists the perspectiveof the generalpopulace,not the nobility,in a mixed
regime. This is, afterall, the method thatMachiavelli adoptsin formulating
somethinglike a standardofjustice in TheDiscourses: thatis, he associatesit
with the people's desire not to be dominated.But I suggest that, consonant
with most Cambridgeapproaches,PettitmisinterpretsMachiavelliin such a
way that the socioeconomic and institutionalpracticesby which the people
secure non-dominationagainstthe elite areneglected-practices, again,that
I arguerenderMachiavellia democratandnot a republican.In the end, Pettit
comes aroundto advocatingsuch Machiavellianmeans himself, associating
them with his model of contestatorydemocracy(Pettit 1999,292-97; 2000).
He theorizes contestatorypractices such as judicial, tribunal,ombudsmenlike, multicameral,and localized institutionsthroughwhich electoratesand
subsetsof themmightreviewor amenddecisions of elected elites. Such institutionsfunctionin a mannerreminiscentof the tribunes,the accusations,and
the appeal in Machiavelli's account of ancient Rome. However,
Machiavelli'sdemocratictheory suggests that contestatorypracticesdo not
function well without accompanying participatorypractices. Hence, the
office of the tribuneswas supplementedwith the generalpopulace'sattempt
to gain legislativepowerfor themselves.As we will see, Pettit,because of his
anxiety over majoritariantyranny,accentuatescontestationover participation.'8 In any case, the similaritybetween contestatoryand Machiavellian
democracy,in name as in spirit, raises the question for Pettit's efforts, why
republicanismat all?
Under the influence of scholars such as Colish (1971), Guarini(1990),
and, of course, Skinner (1981), Pettit emphasizes those passages in
Machiavellithat accentuatethe desire of the generalpopulaceto be left free
from interferencein theirpersons and property,as well as from thefear that
they might be so interferedwith (Pettit 1999, 28). Unfortunately,this literaturefocuses on the abstract"concept"of libertyin Machiavelliat the expense
of attentionto the specific means thatMachiavellideclaresnecessaryfor the
people to takeup in orderto securethis liberty.These means includecompeting for office, establishingclass-specific advocacyinstitutions,openingprocesses of appeals, creatingopportunitiesfor the condemnationof officials,
and facilitatingthe meeting of the people in their collectivity (McCormick
2001, 303-6). Thus, what appearsto be a passive disposition in the abstract
635
turnsout to be a quite animatedone in the concrete.According to TheDiscourses, the people are not only aggressive towardforeign enemies while
serving in the militarybut aggressive against the nobility in the defense of
their otherwise passive disposition not to be dominated.'9This aggressiveness manifests itself in extra-electoralaccountabilitymechanismsaimed at
magistrates,and efforts to share in the wealth and honor of senatorialfamilies. But Pettit eschews the centralityof populism and participatorydemocracyto Machiavelli'spolitical theorybecause he seems to associatethese elements exclusively with radical Rousseauianism and the tyrannical
majoritarianismto which it tends(Pettit1999, 30). Yet"populist"seems to be
an appropriateterm for Machiavelli,given his designationof the people, as
opposedto the nobility,as the "guardianof liberty"andthe generalanti-elitist
spirit of his efforts to theorize how the people might successfully maintain
such a position. Machiavelli'spoliticaltheory,contraPettit,was moreparticipatoryandpopulistthanrepublicanism,generally,and, for thatmatter,than
democracyas usuallyconceptualizedtoday.On these grounds,Machiavelli's
thoughtshould give Pettit cause to ponderwhethercontestatorydemocracy
would be effective or sustainablewithout participatorydemocracy.
Ultimately, Machiavellian democracy and the contestatorydemocracy
thatPettiteventuallyformulateshavemuchmorein commonthaneitherhave
with republicanism,conventionally theorized and practiced. Pettit distinguishes contestatorydemocracyfrommerely electoraldemocracy,which, as
I have suggested above, sharesmany of the same defects as its intellectualpolitical progenitor,republicanism.After invokingthe tyrannyof the majority that elective democracymay pose, Pettit raises the alternateproblemof
keeping elected elites accountableto the electorate:
Since [elections] only allow for a very loose controlof the policies eventuallypursuedby
government,they may fail to stop those elected to power fromnurturingpolicies thatfail
to answerto particularinterestsor frompursuingpolicies in a way thatdoesn't answerto
popularinterests.The electorally democraticstate may be an elective despotism;it may
representa tyrannyof the majorityor indeed a tyrannyof this or that elite group.(Pettit
1999, 293-94)
Given the securepositions of the wealthy in liberaldemocraticregimes(see

Shapiro2000), Pettit's anxiety about a tyrannyof the majority-or at least
over what is relevanthere, the majorityagainst the rich-seems less appropriate than the opposite anxiety: that politics conductedprimarilythrough
elections decisively favors the autonomyof elites. Pettit (1999) continues:
Electoralstandinggives the collective people the power of an indirectauthorin relation
to governmentallaws and decisions. They may not be the authorsof what those in gov-
636
emment say and do but they determine who the authors shall be or at least who the
overseersof the authorsshall be. The problemsjust identifiedwith electoraldemocracy
stem from two sources:on the one hand,the fact that this authorialcontrol is exercised
collectively, so thatminorityvoices may be ignored;and on the other,the fact that it is
exercisedindirectly,so thatotherfactorsmay dictatewhat happens:in particular,factors
that it is not in the common interestto empower.(P. 294)
Thus, the indirectnessof strict electoral democracyallows the space for the
discretionof political elites in the conduct of governmentand the intervention of socioeconomic elites into the politicalprocess. It is this spacethatboth
Machiavellian democracy and contestatory democracy seek to fill with
mechanismsby which the disadvantaged,marginalized,or exploited might
bring elites more directlyto account (see McCormick2001, 309-11).20
In the end, I would suggest that rather than the somewhat tortured
extrapolationof a very fine-tuneddistinction-non-interference versusnondomination-from the history of republicanism,Pettitmight have drawnon
the "power"literaturein democratictheory,specifically,the analysisof structural, as opposed to direct, forms of dominationthat occupies many of the
authorsassociatedwith it.21It seems thatthis would havebeen a morehelpful,
reliable, and appropriateshortcutto Pettit's theory of contestatorydemocracy than the domination-taintedhistory of republicanism.
CONCLUSION
I conclude by summarizinghow Cambridgescholarstend to misinterpret
Machiavelliin ways that artificiallyemphasizehis conformitywith conventional republicanism:they underspecifyclass conflict in his theory with the
resultthat they ignore the institutionalmeans by which the people rendered
elites responsive and held them to account; Cambridgescholars associate
animatedpopularparticipationin Machiavelli'sthoughtprimarilywith militaryconquestas opposedto domesticpolitics;they inappropriatelyequatehis
criticisms of the nobility with those of the people therebyunderminingthe
prominentrole that Machiavelli assigns to the people as "guardiansof liberty"; they focus on his abstract definitions of liberty at the expense of
Machiavelli'sspecific policy recommendationsfor how to maintainit; Cambridge scholars use Machiavelli to formulatea definition of liberty that is
opposedto political oppressionof variouskindsbutthatis actuallyweak with
respect to social domination;and they remain largely silent on the kind of
domestic dominationof the people by elites that was fully consonantwith
republicantheory and very often perpetratedin republicanpractice.
637
The singularfocus on the abstractconcept of liberty and the purportedly

passive political disposition of the generalpopulace in Machiavelli'stheory
conforms with the selective, acclamatory,and "senatorial"quality of minimalist, elite-privileging democratic arrangements.But it overlooks the
active, "ferocious"defense of popularlibertythat is pursuedthroughextraelectoraldevices andpracticesin Machiavelli's"tribunate"reconstructionof
ancient Rome-a social disposition and a set of political institutionswith
constructiveimplicationsfor contemporarydemocratictheory andpractice.
More generally,the misinterpretationscatalogued above yield two results:
Machiavelli's outrage against social domination goes largely overlooked,
andrepublicanismcan be interpretedtoo easily as an anti-hierarchicalpolitical theory.As such, these interpretationsare helpful for neitherMachiavelli
studiesnordemocratictheory.If inclined to suchthings, one mightclaim that
the CambridgeSchool approachto Machiavellihas contributedto a certain
ideological view of modem populargovernment,in which the latterexhibits
a Machiavellian-populistveneer underneathwhich actually obtainsa rather
Guicciardinian-elitiststructure.This would seem to heighten serious suspicions that Madisonian republicanismand subsequentlyliberal-democracy
deliberately secure profoundly oligarchic results through practices that
appearto be the most generallyinclusive andformallyegalitarianin history.
NOTES
1. Dahl (1971) is so dissatisfiedby this state of affairsthat he attachesa differentname,
polyarchy,to elite-dominatedpopularregimes; yet his minimalistformulationof populargovernmentestablishesratherrobuststandardsfor the conductof elections andthe social conditions
under which they take place (see, respectively, Dahl 1990, 71-76, 84-89; 1989, 220-24).
Przeworskionce defined democracy in the very thinnest of terms: specifically, as a scenario
where political losers accept the resultof any procedure-electoral or not-for selectingpolitical elites (e.g., Przeworski1991, 10-12). With elections now firmly establishedas his baseline
(Przeworski1999), he has been exploringthe feasibility of extra-electoraldevices for controlling elites: see Manin, Przeworski,and Stokes (1999).
2. While therearesubtledifferencesin these authors'individualunderstandingsof republicanism(Buttle2001), theyall tendto distinguishthe republicantraditionfroma liberal-democratic
one. SympathetictheoristsDagger,Ryan, and Miller (1997) attemptto combinerepublicanism
andliberalismin the cause of a moreprogressivepolitical theorygenerally,andsee Bellamy and
Castiglione(1996) in the contemporarycontextof Europeanintegration.I tendto follow Holmes
(1995, 5-6) in conceiving modem republicanismand liberaldemocracyas continuouswith each
other,thatthe latterlargely evolved out of the former.On the differencesamongdiscreteeras of
republicanism,see Rahe (1992), and on the commercialaspect of modem republicanism,see
Wooten (1994).
3. These authorssuccessfully show thatsuch aspirationshave been associatedwith republicanism,in differentplaces andat varioustimes, butI will suggestthatthey havefailedto render
638
them the definitivecharacteristicsof republicanism.On the contrary,I define republicanismin

terms of the institutionaland sociological attributesof the governo misto or "mixed regime,"
which seem moreuniformlyidentifiablewith republicanismthroughouthistoryin bothworksof
political philosophy and circumstancesof political fact. Of course, more generally,the name
"republic"has also been applied to any regime that is not a monarchy,or a regime that exists
independentof foreignpowers,or a regimethatpermitssome formof "self-government."Apropos the lattersense of the term, I will show how the CambridgeSchool has been consistently
insensitive to the inequitableway that, on the one hand, socioeconomic and/orpolitical elites
and, on the other, common citizens have been entitled to "governthemselves" in republican
theory and practice. On the gender implications of this idealization of republicanismby the
CambridgeSchool, see Springborg(2001). The classic statementof gendered issues of selfgovernment or autonomy in Machiavelli and modem political thought is the recently republished Pitkin (1999).
4. I draw specifically on The Prince (Machiavelli 1998), composed circa 1513 and published in 1532, and TheDiscourses (Machiavelli1997a), composedcirca 1513-19 andpublished
in 1531. I cite these workswith, where appropriate,book and chapterreferencesin parentheses
within the text.
5. On the evolution of democraticinstitutionsand theory, see, respectively,Dunn (1993)
and Held (1997).
I understandthe current
6. Insteadof unspecific notions of "populism"or "participation,"
requirementsof progressive democratictheory and democraticpractice to consist in holding
elites accountableand responsive by the general populace throughan antagonisticspirit and
concreteinstitutionaltechniquesnot confinedto elections. Machiavelliputs greaterstorein both
of these facets of"participation"than:(1) traditionalrepublicanism,which gives wide latitudeto
socioeconomic and political elites; (2) minimalistdemocracy,which focuses narrowlyon electoralpolitics; and(3) substantivedemocracy,which advocatesnot necessarilyclass-antagonistic
participationfor the overallhealth of a political culture.See McCormick(2001, 297, 309-11).
Withthis particularemphasison institutionaltechniquesof elite accountabilityandresponsiveness my approachdiffers from earlier Marxiantreatmentsof Machiavelli undertakenby, for
instance,Gramsci([1925] 1959) and Althusser([1972] 2001). They emphasized,quiteadmirably, the importanceof popularadvocacy and anti-elitistclass conflict in the great Florentine's
work, but, perhaps bewitched by orthodoxMarxist illusions of overcoming elites altogether,
they did not adequatelyaccentuatethe institutionalmeans of controllingthe latter.Othertraditions of continentalsocial andpolitical thought,such as phenomenologyandpoststructuralism,
have explored Machiavelli'spopulism and anti-elitismbut again with a less specific focus on
institutionalaccountabilitymechanismsthan I have in mind in this article. See Merleau-Ponty
([1949] 1990), Lefort (2000), and Vatter(2000). The latteris indicativeof what seems to be a
most welcome contemporaryreemergence of more populist interpretationsof Machiavelli's
political thoughtin general:see also Coby (1999) and Fontana(2001).
7. I am not the first to note the stronglyexistential aspect of Pocock's book. Note how it
inspiresKari Palonen (1998).
8. This example raises the importantissue-crucial for any interpretationof Machiavelli
that privileges The Discourses over The Prince-of the compatibilityor lack thereofbetween
principalityandpopulargovernment.In this instance,I would agree with the object of my criticism in this essay, the Cambridge School, that Machiavelli understooda prince or at least
princelypower to be necessaryfor the establishmentof a regime thatmight become a mixed or
morepopulargovernmentin the future,andforthe reformationor rejuvenationof such a government thathas begun to sustaincorruptionin the present.
639
9. It is difficultto imaginethatMachiavelliwould have approvedof the socioeconomically

agnosticdivision of institutionalcompetencescharacteristicof liberaldemocraticconstitutions,
one in which the wealthy can and generally do occupy all of the branchesof government,or can
rather easily influence the political magistrates who may happen to occupy hem. See
McCormick(2001, 300-301, 303).
10. In fact, Skinner(1973) authoredone of the classic criticisms of democratictheory,one
thatseeks to mediatebetweenempiricalandnormative,minimalistandsubstantiveapproaches.
11. CompareMachiavelli(1998) on "mankindgenerally"and"thepeople generally"in The
Prince (XVII versus IX and XIX).
12. This is not to suggest that Machiavelli is a naive or uncriticalchampionof the people
againstthe nobility: the formerare capable of being manipulated(I.13) and deceived (I.51) by
the latter,even if the intentionsof the people were often good in such instances(1.48);the people
can anddo make bad decisions (1.39,1.53); and,shockingly,given whathe says abouttheirirredeemabletendencytowarddominationandeventuallycorruption,the nobilitywould seem quite
capableof good-faithpersuasionof the people (1.47) and virtuous leadershipin general(III.8).
However,while Machiavelli(1997a) at variouspoints in TheDiscourses considersthe possibility thatpopularexcesses led to the downfallof freeRome (1.5,1.37,1.40,III.24-25),he ultimately
blames the nobility for the demise of Rome's free government,even claiming that they would
have corruptedRome much sooner had it not been for the opposition of the people (1.37). I discuss all of these instances in greaterdepth in McCormick(2001, 306-9).
13. For Machiavelli's departuresfrom Livy, see Mansfield (1979) and Sullivan (1996).
More recently, Sullivan (2001) criticizes Skinner's"republican"interpretationof Machiavelli
for avoiding the morally ambiguous aspects of the Florentine's thought. See also the recent
Strauss-influencedreevaluationof Machiavelli'splace in the history of republicanismby Rahe
(2000).
14. Given the factualsupremacyof the nobles over the people in Rome, I interpretthe normative assessments by Polybius and Cicero that celebrate an equilibriumbetween the two
classes as one that tacitly approvesof this effectually inequitablestate of affairs.
15. Although on Machiavelli'srhetoricalinnovations,see Kahn (1994).
16. And if there is any doubt about who Machiavelli really distrustsmore, see Najemy
(1990) on his privateviews of the Florentineelite.
17. For instance,see Livy (1971,1987), Jolowicz (1967), andNicolet (1980) for the details
of this kind of sway thatthe nobility exercised over the people in the Romanrepublic.
18. See Shapiro(1999) who combines contestatoryand participatorystrategiesin his formulationof "democraticjustice."
19. On the underestimatedMachiavellianquality of controlled or even reflective aggressiveness or "ferocity,"see McCormick(2001) and Lukes (2001).
20. Here contestatory democracy and Machiavellian democracy are consonant with
Young's(1990) appealfor meansby which oppressedidentitygroupsmightbe given greatersay
in the policies that affect them than does conventionalmajoritarianpolitics. However,all three
approachesmust guardagainstdominationof groupsby the elites entrustedwith theiradvocacy
or those chargedwith the conduct of contestatorypractices. Indeed, Machiavelliandemocracy
may be vulnerableto the chargethatthe tribunesexercisedmore influenceon the plebs thanvice
versa even in Machiavelli's stylized depiction of Roman history and politics. See Benhabib
(1996) for contemporaryreflections on reconciling democratic theory and practice with the
claims of specific subsets of the electorateconceived along class, ethnic, or gender lines.
21. Pettit is right to cite Lukes (1975), but he might also have consultedConnolly (1972),
Polsby (1980), Gaventa(1980), Roemer (1982), Bachrachand Botwinick (1992), and Foucault
640
([1975] 1979) (even though the latteris notoriously short on the kind of prescriptionthat concerns Pettit).
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Machiavelli against Republicanism: On the Cambridge School's "Guicciardinian Moments"

Author(s): John P. McCormick

MACHIAVELLI AGAINST REPUBLICANISM

Scholarsloosely affiliatedwith the "CambridgeSchool " (e.g, Pocock,Skinne; Wroli,andPettit)

tial approachto the study of classical and early-modemrepublicanism,the

McCormick/ MACHIAVELLIAGAINST REPUBLICANISM

at the expense of the generalpopulace. The groundsfor my plea arebased on

McCormick/ MACHIAVELLIAGAINST REPUBLICANISM

what passes underthe name of eitherrepublicanor democratictheorytoday.

McCormick/ MACHIAVELLIAGAINST REPUBLICANISM

Of course wealth and pedigree tended to define what individuals from

With this in mind, Pocock (1975) recountsFlorence's attempt,after the

And to his credit, Pocock is forthrightabout the success of the ottimati,to

bias in favorof a politicalelite is always explicit;butit is importantto note that... thereis

Guicciardiniconceived of populargovernmentin an acclamatoryor selective

Pocock (1975) revealsthatthe ottimatitheorists,like Guicciardini,did not

McCormick/ MACHIAVELLIAGAINST REPUBLICANISM

If this exchange between Guicciardiniand Machiavelli constitutes the

ing to Pocock, in addition to, or ratherin conjunctionwith, Machiavelli's

Pocock points outthatsince his earlierwritingsGuicciardinihas learnedthat

McCormick/ MACHIAVELLIAGAINST REPUBLICANISM

According to Guicciardini'smodel, the few express their need to dominate,

The people make theirselection on the basis of visual displayas opposedto a

The problem, made patently clear in Machiavelli's theory and modem

McCormick/ MACHIAVELLIAGAINST REPUBLICANISM

the two differentsocial types thatMachiavelliidentifies,popolo andgrandi,

courses, because Skinnerfocuses on the aspects that are faithfulto classical

McCormick/ MACHIAVELLIAGAINST REPUBLICANISM

those of wealth andstatus,notjust by tyrants.Machiavellitheorizedremedies

McCormick/ MACHIAVELLIAGAINST REPUBLICANISM

generalcitizenry and thatthe mixed qualityof its institutionalarrangements

However,Viroli does not considerthatMachiavellishows how the people

McCormick/ MACHIAVELLIAGAINST REPUBLICANISM

words, and the specific audienceto which the latterare addressed.Giventhe

McCormick/ MACHIAVELLIAGAINST REPUBLICANISM

Given the securepositions of the wealthy in liberaldemocraticregimes(see

McCormick/ MACHIAVELLIAGAINST REPUBLICANISM

The singularfocus on the abstractconcept of liberty and the purportedly

them the definitivecharacteristicsof republicanism.On the contrary,I define republicanismin

McCormick/ MACHIAVELLIAGAINST REPUBLICANISM

9. It is difficultto imaginethatMachiavelliwould have approvedof the socioeconomically

McCormick/ MACHIAVELLIAGAINST REPUBLICANISM

Guarini,Elena Fasano. 1990. Machiavelliand the crisis of the Italianrepublics.In Machiavelli

Molho, Anthony,KurtRaaflauband Julia Emlen, eds. 1991. City-states in classical antiquity

McCormick/ MACHIAVELLIAGAINST REPUBLICANISM

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