Daza v Singson

Facts:
Petitioner Rep. Raul Daza was a member of the Liberal Party (LP) and one of the representatives
who was chosen to represent said party in the Commission of Appointments (CoA). A political realignment
in the lower house resulted when the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was reorganized. Twenty
four members of the LP formally resigned from that party and joined LDP. This increased the total number
of LDP members to 157 while the LP was left with only 17 members. The House if Representatives
consequently revised its operation in the Commission of Appointments. They withdrew the seat occupied
by petitioner Cong. Daza and the chamber elected a new set of CoA representatives which consisted of
the original members except Cong. Daza who was replaced by Rep. Luis Singson. In this petition, Rep. Daza
challenges his removal alleging the reorganization of the representation is not based on a permanent
political realignment because LDP is not a duly registered political party and has not yet attained political
stability.
ISSUE: WoN a change resulting from a political realignment validly changes the composition of the
Commission on Appointments
HELD:
YES. The SC has resolved the issue in favour of the House of Representatives to change its
representation in the Commission on Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that may transpire
in the political alignments of its membership. However, it is understood that such changes must be
permanent and do not include the temporary alliances or factional divisions not involving severance of
political loyalties or formal disaffiliation and permanent shifts of allegiance from one political party to
another.
The constitutional provision that there shall be a CoA consisting of 12 Senators and 12 members
of the HREP elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties
therein connotes the authority of each House to see to it that this requirement is duly complied with. As
a consequence, it may take appropriate measures not only upon the initial organization of the Commission
but also subsequently thereto. The House is clothed with authority to declare vacant seats in the CoA and
fill said vacancies when the ratio in the representation of the political parties in the House is materially
changed.

Coseteng v Mitra
Facts:
Petitioner Anna Coseteng, lone candidate elected to the lower house under the KAIBA party seeks
appointment to the Commission on Appointments and House Tribunal on a request where she is backed
by nine congressmen. The House previously elected from the Coalesced Majority parties 11 out 12
congressmen to the CA and later on, added Roque Ablan, Jr. as the twelfth member, representing the
Coalesced Minority. Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was also organized as a party, prompting the
revision of the House majority membership in CA due to political realignments and the replacement of

Rep. Daza (LP) with Rep. Singson (LDP). Petitioner prays that the Court declare the election of respondent
Ablan, Singson and the rest of the CA members null and void on the theory that their election violated the
constitutional mandate of proportional representation because the New Majority (LDP) is entitled to only
9 seats and members must be nominated and elected by their parties. She further alleged that she is
qualified to sit in the CA because of the support of 9 other congressmen from the Minority.
Issue: Whether or not the members of the CA were chosen on basis of proportional representation.
Held:
Yes. The petition was dismissed because the revision in House representation in CA was based on
proportional representation, contrary to what the petitioner believes. The composition of the House
membership shows that there are 160 LDP members in the House, comprising 79% of the House
membership. This granted them a rounded-up 10 seats in the CA and left the remaining two to LP and KBL
as the next largest parties. KAIBA, being a member of the Coalesced Majority, is bound by the majority
choices. Even if KAIBA were an opposition party, its lone member Coseteng represents less than 1% of the
House membership and, hence, does not entitle her a seat in the 12 House seats in CA. Her endorsements
from 9 other congressmen are inconsequential because they are not members of her party and they
signed identical endorsements for her rival, Cong. Verano-Yap.
The jurisdiction issue over political question was also settled in Daza vs Singson where it was held
that the Constitution conferred the Court with expanded jurisdiction to determine whether grave abuse
of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed by the other government
branches.

Guingona v Gonzales
Facts:
Following the 1992 elections, the senate was composed of 15 LDP senators, 5 NPC senators, 3
LAKAS-NUCD senators, and 1 LP-PDP-LABAN senator. The parties agreed to use the traditional formula to
suffice the requirement that each house must have 12 representatives in the COA -- (No. of Senators of a
political party x 12 seats) Total No. of Senators elected. The results of such a formula would produce 7.5
members for LDP, 2.5 members for NPC, 1.5 members for LAKAS-NUCD, and 0.5 member for LP-PDPLABAN. Romulo, as the majority floor leader, nominated 8 senators from their party because he rounded
off 7.5 to 8 and that Taada from LP-PDP-LABAN should represent the same party to the CoA. This is also
pursuant to the proposition compromise by Sen Tolentino who proposed that the elected members of
the CoA should consist of eight LDP, one LP-PDP-LABAN, two NPC and one LAKAS-NUCD. Guingona, a
member of LAKAS-NUCD, opposed the said compromise. He alleged that the compromise is against
proportional representation.

Issue: W/N the election of Senators Romulo and Tanada as members of COA is in accordance with Article
6, Section 18 of the Constitution

Held:
NO. Article VI, Section 18 assures representation in the COA of any political party who succeeds
in electing members to the Senate, provided that the number of Senators so elected enables it to put a
representative in the COA. Drawing from the ruling in the case of Coseteng v Mitra, Jr. a political party
must have at least 2 senators in the senate to be able to have a representative in the COA, so that any
member less than 2 will not entitle such a party a membership in the COA. In the light of the foregoing
and on the basis of the applicable rules and jurisprudence on the matter before this court, we declare the
election of Senator Albert Romulo and Senator Wigberto Tanada as members of the COA as null and void
for being in violation of the rule on proportional representation under Article VI, Section 18 of the
Philippine Constitution. Accordingly, a writ of prohibition is hereby issued ordering the said respondents
Senator Romulo and Senator Tanada to desist from assuming occupying and discharging the functions of
members of the COA; and ordering the respondent Senate President Neptali Gonzales, in his capacity as
ex-officio chairman of COA, to desist from recognizing the membership of the respondent Senators and
from allowing and permitting them from sitting and participating as members of said commission.

Tio v Videogram Regulatory Board

Facts:
Presidential Decree No. 1987, entitled An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board, was
enacted in 1985 and gave broad powers to the VRB to regulate and supervise the videogram industry. As
it sought to minimize the economic effects of piracy. There was a need to regulate the sale of videograms
as it has adversely affected the movie industry and the proliferation of videograms has significantly
lessened the revenues being acquired from it; holding that such loss may be recovered if videograms are
to be taxed. In Section 10 of PD 1987 imposes a 30% tax on the gross receipts payable to the LGUs.
Valentin Tio, in 1986, assailed the said Act as it is alleged to be unconstitutional especially with regards to
Section 10 thereof, which imposed the 30% tax on gross receipts, as it is a rider provision and is not
germane to the subject matter of the law, and that there is also undue delegation of legislative power to
the VRB, an administrative body, because the law allowed the VRB to deputize, upon its discretion, other
government agencies to assist the VRB in enforcing the said Act
Issue: WoN PD 1987 is unconstitutional.
Held:
No. The Constitutional mandate regarding the one subject-one title has been sufficiently complied with
if the title be comprehensive enough to include the general purpose which a statute seeks to achieve. As
to the assailed Presidential Decree, the questioned provision is necessary and germane to, the general
object of the PD, which is the regulation of the video industry through the VRB as expressed in its title.
The tax provision is not inconsistent with, nor foreign to that general subject and title. As a tool for
regulation it is simply one of the regulatory and control mechanisms scattered throughout the PD. Anent
the second point of the petitioner, the Court holds that there is no undue delegation of legislative powers

to the VRB where the Board is not being tasked to legislate. What was conferred to the VRB was the
authority or discretion to seek assistance in the execution, enforcement, and implementation of the law.
Besides, in the very language of the decree, the authority of the BOARD to solicit such assistance is for a
fixed and limited period with the deputized agencies concerned being subject to the direction and
control of the [VRB].

Lidasan v Comelec
Facts:
The President signed into law House Bill 1247, known as Republic Act 4790 and due to such
enactment, twelve barrios in two municipalities in the province of Cotabato are transferred to the
province of Lanao del Sur which brought about a change in the boundaries of the two provinces.
Consequently, Bara Lidasan, resident and taxpayer of the detached portion of Parang, Cotabato, and a
qualified voter for the 1967 elections, herein petitioner, prays that Republic Act 4790 be declared
unconstitutional as it did not sufficiently indicate in the title of the said Act that in creating Dianaton, it
would be including in its territory several barrios from Cotabato. Pursuant to this law, COMELEC
proceeded to establish precincts for voter registration in the said territories of Dianaton.
Issue: WoN R.A. 4790 is unconstitutional for violating the one title-one subject rule
Held:
YES. The constitutional requirement is that no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace
more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill which is aimed against the evils, of
the so-called omnibus bills, and log-rolling legislation, and against surreptitious or unconsidered
enactments. This constitutional provision thus precludes the insertion of riders in legislation -- a rider
being a provision not germane and necessary to the subject matter of the bill. The title of the assailed Act
projects the impression that only Lanao del Sur is affected by the creation of Dianaton as seen in the
phrase "in the Province of Lanao del Sur," read without subtlety, therefore makes the title misleading and
deceptive. The known fact is that the legislation has a two-divided purpose combined in one statute: (1)
it creates the municipality of Dianaton purportedly from twenty-one barrios in the towns of Butig and
Balabagan, both in the province of Lanao del Sur; and (2) it also dismembers two municipalities in
Cotabato, a province different from Lanao del Sur; these purposes should be declared in the Title as these
are not necessarily ancillary to one another.

Cruz v Paras
Facts:
The crucial question posed by this certiorari proceeding is whether or not a municipal corporation,
Bocaue, Bulacan, represented by respondents, can, prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade, the operation
of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such clubs employing hostesses. It is contended that
Ordinance No. 84 entited: AN ACT GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS AND COUNCILS THE POWER

TO REGULATE THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF CERTAIN PLACES OF

AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS, assailed as invalid is tainted with
nullity, the municipality being devoid of power to prohibit a lawful business, occupation or calling,
petitioners at the same time alleging that their rights to due process and equal protection of the laws
were violated as the licenses previously given to them was in effect withdrawn without judicial hearing.
On November 5, 1975, two cases for prohibition with preliminary injunction were filed with the Court of
First Instance of Bulacan. The lower court dismissed the case contending that the prohibition of night
clubs were done in practice of their police power.
Issue: W/N Ordinance No. 84s title is void on its face or unconstitutional
Held:
Yes. It is entitled: AN ACT GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS AND COUNCILS THE POWER
TO REGULATE THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF CERTAIN PLACES OF
AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS. 18 Its first section insofar as
pertinent reads: The municipal or city board or council of each chartered city shall have the power to
regulate by ordinance the establishment, maintenance and operation of night clubs, cabarets, dancing
schools, pavilions, cockpits, bars, saloons, bowling alleys, billiard pools, and other similar places of
amusement within its territorial jurisdiction: 19 Then on May 21, 1954, the first section was amended
to include not merely the power to regulate, but likewise Prohibit 20 The title, however, remained
the same.
The power granted remains that of regulation, not prohibition. There is thus support for the view
advanced by petitioners that to construe Republic Act No. 938 as allowing the prohibition of the operation
of night clubs would give rise to a constitutional question. The Constitution mandates: Every bill shall
embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. 21 Since there is no dispute as
the title limits the power to regulating, not prohibiting, it would result in the statute being invalid if, as
was done by the Municipality of Bocaue, the operation of a night club was prohibited.

Tobias v Abalos
Facts:
Invoking their rights as taxpayers and as residents of Mandaluyong, herein petitioners assail the
constitutionality of RA 7675 known as An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly
Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong. Sponsored by then-incumbent congressional
representative of Mandaluyong, the Act was deemed ratified and in effect following a plebiscite held on
April 10, 1994 where only 14.41% of the voting population attended and where 18,621 voted in the
affirmative.
Petitioners herein assert that the RA 7675, especially section 49 thereof, is violative of the
Constitutional mandate, Article VI, Section 26 (1) of the 1987 Constitution, regarding the titling of a bill
which specifies that Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be

expressed in the title thereof. Petitioners aver that by including section 49 of RA 7675, it effectively 1)
converts Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city and 2) divides the congressional district of San
Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts. Petitioners contend that the second purpose of RA 7675
is not germane to the subject matter if the same Act, it is in clear violation of the one subject-one bill
rule as provided by the Constitution.
Issue: WoN the designation of a new Congressional district is not germane to RA 7675 and is thus
violative of the one subject-one bill provision of the Constitution.
Held:
NO. In accordance with Article VI, Section 5 (3) of the Constitution, which provides Each city with
a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative, creating a separate congressional district is not a separate subject matter from the
conversion into a highly urbanized city, rather, it is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion.
The title of the statute in contention speaks of the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized
city, it is necessarily included in the act that a separate congressional district be apportioned to the City.
Moreover, the one title-one subject rule has been liberally construed by the judiciary so as not
to impede legislation as it was held in Sumulong v COMELEC that the rule should be given a practical
rather than a technical construction. It should be sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title
expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to that general subject.

Demetria v Alba
Facts:
Petitioners, as members of the National Assembly/Batasang Pambansa, are assailing the
constitutionality of the first paragraph of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177, otherwise known as
the Budget Reform Decree of 1977. The section states that, The President shall have the authority to
transfer any fund, appropriated for the different departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the
Executive Department, which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or
activity of any department, bureau, or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after
its enactment.
Issue: Whether or not the first paragraph of Section 44 of PD No. 1177 is constitutional.

Held:
YES. The Constitution provides that, Sec. 16[5]. No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer
of appropriations, however, the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional commissions may by law be authorized to augment any
item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their
respective appropriations.

The prohibition to transfer an appropriation for one item to another was explicit and categorical
under the 1973 Constitution. However, to afford the heads of the different branches of the government
and those of the constitutional commissions considerable flexibility in the use of public funds and
resources, the constitution allowed the enactment of a law authorizing the transfer of funds for the
purpose of augmenting an item from savings in another item in the appropriation of the government
branch or constitutional body concerned. The leeway granted was thus limited. The purpose and
conditions for which funds may be transferred were specified, i.e. transfer may be allowed for the purpose
of augmenting an item and such transfer may be made only if there are savings from another item in the
appropriation of the government branch or constitutional body.
Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177 unduly over extends the privilege granted under said
Section 16[5]. It empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau,
office or agency of the Executive Department to any program, project or activity of any department,
bureau or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without
regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from which the
same are to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which
said transfer is to be made. It does not only completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental
law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor
thereof. Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and void.

Guingona v Caraque
Facts:
The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for debt
service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated under RA 6831, otherwise known as the General Approriations
Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion, while the appropriations for the DECS amount to P27,017,813,000.00. The
said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by PD No. 18, entitled Amending Certain
Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign
Borrowing Act), by PD No. 1177, entitled Revising the Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize the
Budgetary Innovations of the New Society, and by PD No.1967, entitled An Act Strengthening the
Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on its Contingent Liabilities Arising
out of Relent and Guaranteed Loans by Appropriating Funds For The Purpose.
Petitioners herein assail the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for debt service, it
being higher than the budget for education, therefore it is against Section 5(5), Article XIV of the
Constitution which mandates to assign the highest budgetary priority to education.

ISSUE: WON the automatic appropriation for debt service is unconstitutional it being higher than the
budget for education

HELD:

No. While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution Congress is mandated
to assign the highest budgetary priority to education, it does not thereby follow that the hands of
Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives of the national
interest and for the attainment of other state policies or objectives. Congress is certainly not without any
power to provide an appropriation that can reasonably service our enormous debt. It is not only a matter
of honour and to protect the credit standing of the country but for the very survival of the State when our
economy is at stake. Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated an amount for debt service bigger than
the share allocated to education, the Court finds and so holds that said appropriation cannot be thereby
assailed as unconstitutional.

Philconsa v Enriquez
Facts:
Petitioners assailed the validity of RA 7663 or General Appropriations Act of 1994. The GAA
contains a special provision that allows any members of the Congress the Realignment of Allocation for
Operational Expenses, provided that the total of said allocation is not exceeded. Philconsa claims that only
the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives are the ones authorized under the
Constitution to realign savings, not the individual members of Congress themselves. President signed the
law, but Vetoes certain provisions of the law and imposed certain provisional conditions: that the AFP
Chief of Staff is authorized to use savings to augment the pension funds under the Retirement and
Separation Benefits of the AFP.

Issue: Whether or not RA 7663 is violative of Article VI, Section 25 (5) of 1987 Constitution.

Held:
Yes. Only the Senate President and the Speaker of the House are allowed to approve the
realignment. Furthermore, two conditions must be met: 1) the funds to be realigned are actually savings,
and 2) the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the items of expenditures to which said transfer to
be made. As to the certain condition given to the AFP Chief of Staff, it is violative of Sections 25(5) and
29(1) of the Article VI of the Constitution. The list of those who may be authorized to transfer funds is
exclusive. The AFP Chief of Staff may not be given authority.

Belgica v Ochoa
Facts:
The so-called pork barrel system has been around in the Philippines since about 1922. Pork Barrel
is commonly known as the lump-sum, discretionary funds of the members of the Congress. It underwent
several legal designations from Congressional Pork Barrel to the latest Priority Development Assistance

Fund or PDAF. The allocation for the pork barrel is integrated in the annual General Appropriations Act
(GAA).
Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in the following manner:
a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house; broken down to P40 million for hard projects
(infrastructure projects like roads, buildings, schools, etc.), and P30 million for soft projects (scholarship
grants, medical assistance, livelihood programs, IT development, etc.);
b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to P100 million for hard projects, P100 million for soft
projects;
c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to P100 million for hard projects, P100 million for
soft projects.
The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of funds whereby certain cabinet
members may request for the realignment of funds into their department provided that the request for
realignment is approved or concurred by the legislator concerned.

Presidential Pork Barrel

The president does have his own source of fund albeit not included in the GAA. The so-called
presidential pork barrel comes from two sources: (a) the Malampaya Funds, from the Malampaya Gas
Project this has been around since 1976, and (b) the Presidential Social Fund which is derived from the
earnings of PAGCOR this has been around since about 1983.

Pork Barrel Scam Controversy

Eversince, the pork barrel system has been besieged by allegations of corruption. In July 2013, six
whistle blowers, headed by Benhur Luy, exposed that for the last decade, the corruption in the pork barrel
system had been facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles had been helping lawmakers in funneling their
pork barrel funds into about 20 bogus NGOs (non-government organizations) which would make it appear
that government funds are being used in legit existing projects but are in fact going to ghost projects.
An audit was then conducted by the Commission on Audit and the results thereof concurred with the
exposes of Luy et al.

Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others filed various petitions before the
Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of the pork barrel system.

ISSUES:
1.) W/N the congressional pork barrel system is constitutional.
2.) W/N presidential pork barrel system is constitutional.

HELD:
1. NO, the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional because it violates
the principles of Separation of Powers, Non-delegability of Legislative Power, Local Autonomy, and of
Check and Balance.
Separation of Powers -- As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the release of
funds. The executive, on the other hand, implements the laws this includes the GAA to which the PDAF
is a part of. Only the executive may implement the law but under the pork barrel system, whats
happening was that, after the GAA, itself a law, was enacted, the legislators themselves dictate as to which
projects their PDAF funds should be allocated to a clear act of implementing the law they enacted a
violation of the principle of separation of powers. This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the
PDAF, the executive will still have to get the concurrence of the legislator concerned.
Non-delegability of Legislative Power -- As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in
Congress alone. That being, legislative power cannot be delegated by Congress for it cannot delegate
further that which was delegated to it by the Constitution. Exceptions to the rule are:
(i) Delegated legislative power to local government units but this shall involve purely local matters;
(ii) Authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared
national policy in times of war or other national emergency, or fix within specified limits, and subject to
such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage
and wharf age dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development
program of the Government.
In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual legislator to identify the projects to which
his PDAF money should go to is a violation of the rule on non-delegability of legislative power. The power
to appropriate funds is solely lodged in Congress (in the two houses comprising it) collectively and not
lodged in the individual members. Further, nowhere in the exceptions does it state that the Congress can
delegate the power to the individual member of Congress.
Principle of Checks and Balance -- One feature in the principle of checks and balances is the power
of the president to veto items in the GAA which he may deem to be inappropriate. But this power is
already being undermined because of the fact that once the GAA is approved, the legislator can now
identify the project to which he will appropriate his PDAF. Under such system, how can the president veto
the appropriation made by the legislator if the appropriation is made after the approval of the GAA
again, Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting which effectively renders the constitutionally-given
power of the President useless.

Local Autonomy -- As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage their local affairs.
Through their Local Development Councils (LDCs), the LGUs can develop their own programs and policies
concerning their localities. But with the PDAF, particularly on the part of the members of the House of
Representatives, whats happening is that a congressman can either bypass or duplicate a project by the

LDC and later on claim it as his own. This is an instance where the national government meddles with the
affairs of the local government and this is contrary to the State policy embodied in the Constitution on
local autonomy. Its good if thats all that is happening under the pork barrel system but worse, the PDAF
becomes more of a personal fund on the part of legislators.

2. YES, the presidential pork barrel is valid. The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the presidential
pork barrel is that it is unconstitutional because it violates Section 29 (1), Article VI of the Constitution
which provides No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made
by law. Petitioners emphasized that the presidential pork comes from the earnings of the Malampaya
and PAGCOR and not from any appropriation from a particular legislation.
The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which created the Malampaya Fund, as well
as PD 1869, which amended PAGCORs charter, provided for the appropriation -- (i) PD 910: Section 8
thereof provides that all fees, among others, collected from certain energy-related ventures shall form
part of a special fund (the Malampaya Fund) which shall be used to further finance energy resource
development and for other purposes which the President may direct; (ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section
12 thereof provides that a part of PAGCORs earnings shall be allocated to a General Fund (the Presidential
Social Fund) which shall be used in government infrastructure projects. These are sufficient laws which
met the requirement of Section 29, Article VI of the Constitution. The appropriation contemplated therein
does not have to be a particular appropriation as it can be a general appropriation as in the case of PD
910 and PD 1869.

Araullo v Aquino
Facts:
Annually, Congress approves the General Appropriations Act (GAA) or budget. In general, it
contains an estimate of revenues and funding sources, which are usually (1) taxes, (2) capital revenues
(like proceeds from the sales of assets), (3) grants, (4) extraordinary income (like dividends of government
corporations) and (5) borrowings. The budget also contains itemized public expenditures allotted to the
three main branches of government (executive, legislative and judicial) and the independent agencies
(Commission on Audit or COA, Commission on Elections or Comelec, Office of the Ombudsman, etc.). The
current budget totals about P2 trillion.
Often, the estimated revenues are exceeded by actual receipts. These excess funds are referred
to as unprogrammed funds. Examples are unexpected large dividends from government institutions like
the Social Security System and Government Service Insurance System. Often, too, the estimated
expenditures are not spent; hence savings occur. The DAP aims to pool these unspent funds, and uses
them to fund projects that stimulate the economy. Citing the World Bank, the Supreme Courts decision
(p.36) acknowledged the programs success, saying that the continued implementation of the DAP
strengthened growth by 11.8% year on year while infrastructure spending rebounded from a 29%
contraction to a 34% growth as of September 2013.

Issues: The following acts and practices under the Disbursement Acceleration Program, National Budget
Circular No. 541 and related executive issuances UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being in violation of Section
25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the doctrine of separation of powers, namely:
(a) The withdrawal of unobligated allotments from the implementing agencies, and the declaration of the
withdrawn unobligated allotments and unreleased appropriations as savings prior to the end of the fiscal
year and without complying with the statutory definition of savings contained in the General
Appropriations Acts;
(b) The cross-border transfers of the savings of the Executive to augment the appropriations of other
offices outside the Executive; and
(c) The funding of projects, activities and programs that were not covered by any appropriation in the
General Appropriations Act.
Held:
The DAP is not an appropriation measure and does not contravene Section 29(1), Article VI. The
President, in keeping with his duty to faithfully execute the laws, had sufficient discretion during the
execution of the budget to adapt the budget to changes in the countrys economic situation. He could
adopt a plan like the DAP for the purpose. He could pool the savings and identify the PAPs to be funded
under the DAP. The pooling of savings pursuant to the DAP, and the identification of the PAPs to be funded
under the DAP did not involve appropriation in the strict sense because the money had been already set
apart from the public treasury by Congress through the GAAs. In such actions, the Executive did not usurp
the power vested in Congress under Section 29(1), Article VI of the Constitution [that no money shall be
paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law].
Requisites of a valid transfer of appropriated funds under Section 25(5), Article VI. The transfer of
appropriated funds, to be valid under Section 25(5), [Article VI of the Constitution], must be made upon
a concurrence of the following requisites, namely: (1) There is a law authorizing the President, the
President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, and the heads of the Constitutional Commissions to transfer funds within their respective offices;
(2) The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the appropriations for their respective offices;
and (3) The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the general appropriations law for their
respective offices.
It is then indubitable that the power to augment was to be used only when the purpose for which
the funds had been allocated were already satisfied, or the need for such funds had ceased to exist, for
only then could savings be properly realized. This interpretation prevents the Executive from unduly
transgressing Congress power of the purse.

Tolentino v Sec. of Finance

Facts:

The Value-added tax (VAT) is equivalent to 10% of the gross selling price or gross value in money
of goods or properties sold, bartered or exchanged or of the gross receipts from the sale or exchange of
services. Republic Act No. 7716 otherwise known as the Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law, was
enacted into law, it widens the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by
amending the National Internal Revenue Code. Consequently, various suits for certiorari and prohibition,
challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7716 on various grounds were filed. The petitioners
alleged that in enacting Republic Act No. 7716, Congress violated the Constitution since it was not passed
by the Senate but was simply consolidated with the Senate version (S. No. 1630) in the Conference
Committee to produce the bill which the President signed into law. The following provisions of the
Constitution are cited in support of the proposition that because Republic Act No. 7716 was passed in this
manner, it did not originate in the House of Representatives and it has not thereby become a law.
Furthermore, Petitioners' contention is that Republic Act No. 7716 did not "originate exclusively"
in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Section 24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact
the result of the consolidation of two distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7716 violates Article VI, Sections and 26 of the Constitution.
HELD:
No. This argument will not bear analysis. It is only the revenue bill which is required by the
Constitution to "originate exclusively" in the House of Representatives. It is important to emphasize this,
because a bill originating in the House may undergo such extensive changes in the Senate that the result
may be a rewriting of the whole. The possibility of a third version by the conference committee will be
discussed later. To persevere that a revenue statute must substantially be the same as the House bill
would be to deny the Senate's power not only to "concur with amendments" but also to "propose
amendments." It would be to violate the coequality of legislative power of the two houses of Congress
and in fact make the House superior to the Senate.

Certainly, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax
bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come
from the House of Representatives. This is based on the theory that, the members of the House are
elected from the districts, can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. Nor does
the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill
from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill.
No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings on separate days because the President had certified the same as urgent.
Under the constitution, the certification of a bill by the President the requirement of 3 readings on
separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of
legislative practice.

Lung Center v QC
Facts:

Lung Center of the Philippines is a non-stock, non-profit entity established by virtue of PD No.
1823. It is the registered owner of the land on which the Lung Center of the Philippines Hospital is erected.
A big space in the ground floor of the hospital is being leased to private parties, for canteen and small
store spaces, and to medical or professional practitioners who use the same as their private clinics. Also,
a big portion on the right side of the hospital is being leased for commercial purposes to a private
enterprise known as the Elliptical Orchids and Garden Center. Lung Center seeks exemption from real
property taxes when the City Assessor issued Tax Declarations for the land and the hospital building.
Petionters filed a claim for exemption on its averment that it is a charitable institution with a minimum of
60% of its hospital beds exclusively used for charity patients and that the major thrust of its hospital
operation is to serve charity patients. The request was denied, and a petition hereafter filed before the
Local Board of Assessment Appeals of Quezon City (QC-LBAA) for reversal of the resolution of the City
Assessor. Petitioner alleged that as a charitable institution, is exempted from real property taxes under
Sec 28(3) Art VI of the Constitution. QC-LBAA dismissed the petition. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
judgment of the CBAA.
Issue: WoN the Lung Center of the Philippines is a charitable institution and is therefore exempt from
real property taxes.
Held:
YES but NO. The petitioner is a charitable institution within the context of the 1973 and 1987
Constitution but, NO, they are not exempt from real property tax. Under PD 1823, the petitioner is a nonprofit and non-stock corporation which, subject to the provisions of the decree, is to be administered by
the Office of the President with the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Human Settlements. The
purpose for which it was created was to render medical services to the public in general including those
who are poor and also the rich, and become a subject of charity. However, under the Constitution, in
order to be entitled to exemption from real property tax, there must be clear and unequivocal proof that
(1) it is a charitable institution and (2)its real properties are ACTUALLY, DIRECTLY and EXCLUSIVELY used
for charitable purposes. While portions of the hospital are used for treatment of patients and the
dispensation of medical services to them, whether paying or non-paying, other portions thereof are being
leased to private individuals and enterprises. The portions occupied by the hospital used for its patients
are exempt from real property taxes while those leased to private entities are not exempt from such taxes.

Tan v Del Rosario

Facts:
Petitioners herein assail the constitutionality of RA 7496 as having been violative of their right to
due process as the same Act, known as the Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme (SNIT), is violative of
the uniform and equitable rules of taxation as required by the Constitution in Article VI, Section 28.
Petitioners aver that the Act takes a step back from the net income basis of taxation and imposes a

taxation based on gross income. Petitioners asserts that the Act is not uniform and is thereby in violation
of the Constitution.
Issue: WoN the Constitutional mandate on the uniform and equitable rules on taxation is violated by RA
7496.
Held:
NO. The enactment of RA 7496 or the Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme does not violate
the uniformity and equitability in the rules of taxation. As held in Pepsi Cola vs City of Butuan, uniformity
in taxation is not violated as long as 1) the standards that are used therefor are substantial and not
arbitrary, 2) the categorization is germane to achieve the legislative purpose, 3) the law applies, all things
being equal, to both present and future conditions, and 4) the classification applies equally well to all
those belonging to the same class.
It may be true that in the new rule, allowable deductions have been significantly reduced prior to
the amendment; however, it merely shifts the income taxation to a more schedular approach in the
deductions that can be made only when provided for in the law and, the fact that it was decreased, does
not necessarily make the new rule not uniform nor equitable.

Garcia v Executive Secretary

Facts:
Enrique Garcia, a representative from Bataan, assails the validity of Executive Orders Nos. 475
and 478. He argues that Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 are violative of Section 24, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution which provides Sec. 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing
increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the
House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments. He contends that
since the Constitution vests the authority to enact revenue bills in Congress, the President may not assume
such power by issuing Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which are in the nature of revenue-generating
measures.
Executive Order No. 475 reduced the rate of additional duty on all imported articles from nine
percent (9%) to five percent (5%) ad valorem, except in the cases of crude oil and other oil products which
continued to be subject to the additional duty of nine percent (9%) ad valorem. Executive Order No. 478
levied (in addition to the aforementioned additional duty of nine percent (9%) ad valorem and all other
existing ad valorem duties) a special duty of P0.95 per liter or P151.05 per barrel of imported crude oil
and P1.00 per liter of imported oil products.
Issue: Whether or not EO 475 and 478 are constitutional.
Held:
YES. under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of appropriation, revenue and
tariff bills, like all other bills is, of course, within the province of the Legislative rather than the Executive
Department. It does not follow, however, that therefore Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478, assuming

they may be characterized as revenue measures, are prohibited to the President, that they must be
enacted instead by the Congress of the Philippines. Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides:
The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such
limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage
dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the
Government. There is thus explicit constitutional permission to Congress to authorize the President
subject to such limitations and restrictions is [Congress] may impose to fix within specific limits tariff
rates . . . and other duties or imposts . . .

John Hay PAC vs Lim

Facts:
President Fidel V. Ramos issued Proclamation No. 420 Series of 1994 which declared a portion of
Camp John Hay as a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) and created a regime of tax within the John Hay Special
Economic Zone. The proclamation was pursuant to RA 7227 An Act Accelerating the Conversion of
Military Reservations into other Productive Uses, Creating the Bases Conversion and Development
Authority for This Purpose, Providing Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes. Petitioners allege inter alia
that said proclamation in so far as it grants tax exemptions is invalid and is an unconstitutional exercise
by the President of a power granted only to the legislature. Petitioners also contend that the proclamation
violates the rule that all taxes should be uniform and equitable. In maintaining the validity of Proclamation
No. 420, respondents contend that by extending to the John Hay SEZ economic incentives similar to those
enjoyed by the Subic SEZ which was also established under RA 7227, the proclamation is merely
implementing the legislative intent of the said law to turn the US military bases into hubs of business
activity or investment. Respondents insist that the governments policy of bases conversion cannot be
achieved without extending the same tax exemptions granted by RA 7227 to Subic SEZ and other SEZs.
ISSUE: Whether the grant by Proclamation No. 420 of national and local tax exemption and other
privileges to the John Hay SEZ is void for being violative of the Constitution
HELD:
YES. The legislature has the full power to exempt any person or corporation or class of property
from taxation, its power to exempt being as broad as its power to tax. Other than Congress, the
Constitution may itself provide for specific tax exemptions or local governments may pass ordinances on
exemption only from local taxes. The challenged grant of tax exemption would circumvent the
Constitutions imposition that a law granting any tax exemption must have the concurrence of a majority
of all members of the Congress. In the same vein, other kinds of privileges extended to the John Hay SEZ
are by tradition and usage for Congress to legislate upon.
Contrary to the respondents suggestions, the claimed statutory exemption of the John Hay SEZ
from taxation should be manifest and unmistakeable from the language of the law which it is based. If it
were the intent of the legislature to grant John Hay SEZ tax exemptions and incentives to the Subic SEZ, it
would have so expressly provided in the RA 7227.

Fabian v Desierto
Facts:
Teresita Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT Construction Development
Corporation (PROMAT) which was engaged in the construction business with a certain Nestor Agustin.
Agustin was the incumbent District Engineer of the First Metro Manila Engineering District (FMED).
Misunderstanding and unpleasant incidents developed between Fabian and Agustin. Fabian tried to
terminate their relationship, but Agustin refused and resisted her attempts to do so to the extent of
employing acts of harassment, intimidation and threats. She eventually filed an administrative case
against Agustin, which eventually led an appeal to the Ombudsman, but the Ombudsman, Aniano
Desierto, inhibited himself. But the case was later referred to the deputy Ombudsman, Jesus Guerrero.
The deputy ruled in favor of Agustin and he said the decision is final and executory. Fabian
appealed the case to the Supreme Court. She averred that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770
(Ombudsman Act of 1989) pertinently provides that In all administrative diciplinary cases, orders,
directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a
petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or
decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Issue: WoN Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act is valid in accordance with Section 30, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution.
Held:
No. It is invalid for it illegally expanded the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Section
27 of RA 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to the SC from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman
in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of
the Constitution against a law which increases the Appellate jurisdiction of the SC. No countervailing
argument has been cogently presented to justify such disregard of the constitutional prohibition. That
constitutional provision was intended to give the SC a measure of control over cases placed under its
appellate jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate
jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the SC.
Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution is clear when it states that the appellate jurisdiction of
the SC contemplated therein is to be exercised over final judgments and orders of lower courts, that is,
the courts composing the integrated judicial system. It does not include the quasi-judicial bodies or
agencies.

Tolentino v Secretary of Finance

Facts:
Arturo Tolentino et al, herein petitioners, assail the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise known
as the Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law. Tolentino maintains that the revenue bill did not exclusively

originate from the House of Representatives as required by Section 24, Article 6 of the Constitution. Even
though RA 7716 originated as HB 11197 and that it passed the 3 readings in the HoR, the same did not
complete the 3 readings in Senate for after the 1st reading it was referred to the Senate Ways & Means
Committee thereafter Senate passed its own version known as Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino averred that
what Senate could have done is amend HB 11197 by striking out its text and substituting it with the text
of SB 1630 in that way the bill remains a House Bill and the Senate version just becomes the text of the
HB.
ISSUE: W/N the EVAT law is procedurally invalid.
HELD:
NO. The Court rejected the petition, holding that such consolidation was consistent with the
power of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments to the version originated in the HOR. What
the Constitution simply means, according to the 9 justices, is that the initiative must come from the HOR.
There were also several instances before where Senate passed its own version rather than having the HOR
version as far as revenue and other such bills are concerned. This practice of amendment by substitution
has always been accepted. The proposition of Tolentino concerns a mere matter of form. There is no
showing that it would make a significant difference if Senate were to adopt this over what has been done.

Philconsa v Enriquez
Facts:
House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB of 1994), was passed and
approved by both houses of Congress on December 17, 1993. As passed, it imposed conditions and
limitations on certain items of appropriations in the proposed budget previously submitted by the
President. It also authorized members of Congress to propose and identify projects in the pork barrels
allotted to them and to realign their respective operating budgets. Pursuant to the procedure on the
passage and enactment of bills as prescribed by the Constitution, Congress presented the said bill to the
President for consideration and approval. Petitioners assailed the validity of RA 7663 or General
Appropriations Act of 1994.
GAA contains a special provision that allows any members of the Congress the Realignment of
Allocation for Operational Expenses, provided that the total of said allocation is not exceeded.
Philconsa claims that only the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives are the
ones authorized under the Constitution to realign savings, not the individual members of Congress
themselves. President signed the law, but Vetoes certain provisions of the law and imposed certain
provisional conditions: that the AFP Chief of Staff is authorized to use savings to augment the pension
funds under the Retirement and Separation Benefits of the AFP.
Issue: Whether or not RA 7663 is violative of Article VI, Section 25 (5) of 1987 Constitution.
Held:

Yes. Only the Senate President and the Speaker of the House are allowed to approve the
realignment. Furthermore, two conditions must be met: 1) the funds to be realigned are actually savings,
and 2) the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the items of expenditures to which said transfer to
be made. As to the certain condition given to the AFP Chief of Staff, it is violative of of Sections 25(5) and
29(1) of the Article VI of the Constitution. The list of those who may be authorized to transfer funds is
exclusive. the AFP Chief of Staff may not be given authority.

Gonzales v Macaraig
Facts:
Congress passed House Bill No. 19186, also known as the General Appropriations Bill for the Fiscal
Year 1989. As passed, it eliminated or decreased certain items included in the proposed budget submitted
by the President. Pursuant to the constitutional provision on the passage of bills, Congress presented the
said Bill to the President for consideration and approval. Consequently, the President signed the Bill into
law, and declared the same to have become Rep. Act No. 6688. In the process, seven Special Provisions
and Section 55, a "General Provision," were vetoed. The Senate passed Resolution No. 381 a Petition for
Prohibition/ Mandamus with a prayer for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Restraining
Order, assailing mainly the constitutionality or legality of the Presidential veto of Section 55, and seeking
to enjoin respondents from implementing Rep. Act No. 6688.
The Comment submitted by the Solicitor General after several extensions granted, was
considered as the answer to the Petition. Petitioners filed their Memorandum, but eventually filed a
Motion for Leave to file and to Admit Supplemental Petition, which was granted, this time questioning
the Presidents veto of certain provisions. The Solicitor Generals Comment on the Supplemental Petition,
on behalf of respondent public officials was submitted. The Court then required the parties to file
simultaneously their consolidated memoranda, to include the Supplemental Petition, within a period of
thirty days from notice. However, because the original Resolution merely required the filing of a
memorandum on the Supplemental Petition, a revised Resolution requiring consolidated memoranda,
within thirty days from notice. The Consolidated Memoranda were respectively filed by petitioners and
respondents. Thereafter, both Memoranda were noted and the case was deemed submitted for
deliberation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the President exceeded the item-veto power accorded by the Constitution
HELD:
No. The President did not exceed the item-veto and said veto is constitutional. When Sections 55
and 16, therefore, prohibit the restoration or increase by augmentation of appropriations disapproved or
reduced by Congress, they impair the constitutional and statutory authority of the President and other
key officials to augment any item or any appropriation from savings in the interest of expediency and
efficiency. The exercise of such authority in respect of disapproved or reduced items by no means vests
in the Executive the power to rewrite the entire budget, as petitioners contend, the leeway granted being
delimited to transfers within the department or branch concerned, the sourcing to come only from

savings. Furthermore inappropriate provisions must be struck down because they contravene the
constitution because it limits the power of the executive to augment appropriations (ART VI SEC 25 PAR
5.)
Indeed, a Presidential veto may be overriden by the votes of two-thirds of members of Congress
but in the case at hand, the Congress made no attempt to override the Presidential veto. Petitioners
argument that the veto is ineffectual so that there is "nothing to override" has lost force and effect with
the executive veto having been herein upheld.

Bengzon v Drilon
Facts:
Petitioners are retired justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals who are currently
receiving pensions under RA 910 as amended by RA 1797. President Marcos repealed section 3-A of RA
1797 which authorized the adjustment of the pension of retired justices and officers and enlisted
members of the AFP. PD 1638 was eventually issued by Marcos which provided for the automatic
readjustment of the pension of officers and enlisted men was restored, while that of the retired justices
was not. The legislature saw the need to re-enact said R.A.s to restore said retirement pensions and
privilege thus RA 1797 was restored through HB 16297 in 1990. President Aquino then vetoed HB 16297
as well as portions of Section 1 and the entire Section 4 of the Special Provisions for the Supreme Court
of the Philippines and the Lower Courts when her advisers gave the wrong information that the
questioned provisions in 1992 General Appropriations Act were an attempt to overcome her earlier veto
in 1990.
Issue: W/n president Aquino's veto of GAA of FY 1992 is constitutional
Held:
No. General Appropriations Act of Fiscal Year 1992 is valid. Any argument which seeks to remove
special privileges given by law to former Justices on the ground that there should be no grant of distinct
privileges or preferential treatment to retired Justices ignores the Constitutional provision which
provides that the Judiciary must enjoy freedom in the disposition of the funds allocated to it in the
appropriations law. and in effect asks that these Constitutional provisions on special protections for the
Judiciary be repealed. The veto of the specific provisions in the GAA is tantamount to dictating to the
Judiciary how its funds should be utilized, which is clearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy. The freedom of
the Chief Justice to make adjustments in the utilization of the funds appropriated for the expenditures of
the judiciary, including the use of any savings from any particular item to cover deficits or shortages in
other items of the judiciary is withheld. Pursuant to the Constitutional mandate, the Judiciary must enjoy
freedom in law.

Miller v Mardo
Facts:

In a consolidated labor dispute cases, the question whether the regional offices, as established by
the Reorganization Plan 20-A of the Government Survey and Reorganization Commission, holds exclusive
jurisdiction over labor disputes including disputes arising from the Workmens Compensation Law, all
cases affeceting money claims arising from the violation of labor standards on working conditions, and all
cases of unpaid wages over the Courts of First Instance.
The Government Survey and Reorganization Commission was established by RA 997 and amended
by RA 1241, creating for its purpose the abolishment of departments, offices, agencies, or functions which
may not be necessary, or the creation of those which may be necessary for the efficient conduct of the
government service, activities, and functions. Although, admittedly, the same provision under the
Commission refers only to administrative and not judicial functions, by virtue of the process under the
Commissions establishment, namely Sec 6a of RA997 which provides that those submitted by the
President to the Congress, if not revoked or admitted by the same legislative body within 70 session days
shall be deemed approved, and where the Reorganization Plan 20-As delegation of judicial powers to the
regional offices of the Department of Labor was not rejected nor approved by the body, it was deemed
approved by the Congress; therefore validating the delegation of judicial powers to the exclusive
jurisdiction of the regional offices of the Department of Labor.
Issue: WoN the delegation to the Department of Labor the exclusive jurisdiction over labor disputes can
hold ground.
Held:
NO. Section 6(a) of RA 997 cannot bear more weight than the elementary parliamentary
proceedings in a tri-departmental scheme for democracy. The Court likened the Section to Section 20(1)
of the 1935 Constitution and held that the process as provided in Section 6(a) of RA 997 is a dangerous
measure, and cannot be sustained as it dispenses with the passage, as the word denotes, by the two
separate houses of the Congress which effectively defeats the purpose and elementary parliamentary
proceedings in a tri-departmental scheme for democracy. Upon these grounds, the Reorganization Plan
20-A of the Government Survey and Reorganization Commission is decreed invalid and of no effect insofar
as confers exclusive judicial power to the regional offices of the Department of Labor.

ABAKADA Guro v Ermita

Facts:
Before R.A. No. 9337 took effect, petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., filed a petition for
prohibition on May 27, 2005. They question the constitutionality of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337,
amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). Section
4 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of goods and properties, Section 5 imposes a 10% VAT on importation of
goods, and Section 6 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of services and use or lease of properties. These
questioned provisions contain a uniform proviso authorizing the President, upon recommendation of the
Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective January 1, 2006. Petitioners argue that the

law is unconstitutional, as it constitutes abandonment by Congress of its exclusive authority to fix the rate
of taxes under Article VI, Section 28(2) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power which violates Article 6 Section
28(2) of the Constitution.
Held:
NO. There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the
execution of a law. This is constitutionally permissible. Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly
delegate power when it describes what job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of his
authority; in our complex economy that is frequently the only way in which the legislative process can go
forward. Congress did not delegate the power to tax but the mere implementation of the law. The intent
and will to increase the VAT rate to 12% came from Congress and the task of the President is to simply
execute the legislative policy. That Congress chose to do so in such a manner is not within the province
of the Court to inquire into, its task being to interpret the law.

Tanada v Tuvera
Facts:
Invoking the peoples right to be informed on matters of public concerns as well as the principle
that in order for laws to be valid and enforceable they must be published in the Official Gazette or
otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners Tanada et al seek a writ of mandamus to compel Tuvera
et al to publish and/or to cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various Presidential Decrees,
Letters of Instructions, Presidential Proclamations, Executive Orders and Administrative Orders.
Respondents contend that publication is unnecessary since the issuances in question already provide their
own dates of effectivity.
Issue: Whether or not the various Presidential issuances must be published before they take effect
HELD:
YES. Publication is indispensable in legislation. Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that laws shall
take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless
it is otherwise provided. The SC has held that Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication
in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity, as they constitute
important legislative acts. The clear objective of the Civil Code provision is to give the public adequate
notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct. Without such notice and
publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignorantia legis non excusat.
The publication of all presidential issuances of a public nature or of general applicability is
mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their
violation or otherwise impose a burden or the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this
category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as

administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been
circularized to all concerned.

Arnault v Balagtas
Facts:
The controversy arose out of the Government's purchase of 2 estates, the Buenavista and
Tambobong Estates. Petitioner was the attorney in-fact of Ernest H. Burt in the negotiations for the
purchase which was effected. The price paid for both estates was P5, 000,000.
Thereafter, the Senate adopted Resolution No. 8 creating a Special Committee to determine the
validity of the purchase and whether the price paid was fair and just. During the said Senate investigation,
petitioner was asked to whom a part of the purchase price, or P440, 000, was delivered. Petitioner refused
to answer this question, hence the Committee cited him in contempt for contumacious acts and ordered
his commitment to the custody of the Sergeant at-arms of the Philippines Senate and imprisoned in the
new Bilibid Prison he reveals to the Senate or to the Special Committee the name of the person who
received the P440, 000 and to answer questions pertinent thereto. Petitioner filed a habeas
corpus proceeding.
CFI ruled that the continued detention and confinement of petitioner pursuant to a Senate
Resolution No. 114, is illegal, and that the Senate committed a clear abuse of discretion in not considering
his answer naming one Jess D. Santos as the person to whom delivery of the sum of P440,000 was made.
Further, on the ground that that petitioner, by his answer has purged himself of contempt and is
consequently entitled to be released and discharged.

ISSUE: W/N the Senate has the power to punish the petitioner for contempt
HELD:
YES. The Congress or any of its bodies has the power to punish recalcitrant witnesses. This is
implied or incidental or necessary to the exercise of legislative power. The 1987 Constitution adopted the
principle of separation of powers, making each branch supreme within the realm of its respective
authority; it must have intended each department's authority to be full and complete, independent of the
other's authority and power.
Provided that contempt is related to the exercise of the legislative power and is committed in the
course of the legislative process, the legislature's authority to deal with the defiant and contumacious
witness should be supreme, and unless there is a manifest and absolute disregard of discretion and a mere
exertion of arbitrary power coming within the reach of constitutional limitations, the exercise of the
authority is not subject to judicial interference.

The process by which a contumacious witness is dealt with by the legislature in order to enable it
to exercise its legislative power or authority must be distinguished from the judicial process wherein
offenders are brought to the courts of justice for punishment that criminal law imposes upon them. The
former falls exclusively within the legislative authority, the latter within the domain of the courts; because
the former is a necessary concomitant of the legislative power or process, while the latter has to do with
the enforcement and application of the criminal law.

Bengzon v Senate Blue Ribbon Committee

Facts:
PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan against Benjamin Romualdez, et al for engaging in devices,
schemes and stratagems to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense of plaintiff and the Filipino people.
The Senate Minority Floor Leader Enrile delivered a speech before the Senate on the alleged take-over
personal privilege before the Senate on the alleged "takeover of SOLOIL Inc," the FlagShip of the First
Manila Management of Companies or FMMC by Ricardo Lopa and called upon the Senate to look into the
possible violation of the law in the case with regard to RA 3019 (Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).
The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee (Committee on Accountability of Public Officers [SBRC])
started its investigation on the matter. Petitioners and Ricardo Lopa were subpoenaed by the SBRC to
appear before it and testify on what they know regarding the sale of 36 corporations belonging to
Benjamin Romualdez. Lopa and Bengzon refused to testify, invoking their rights to due process, and that
their testimony may unduly prejudice the defendants and petitioners in case before the Sandiganbayan.
SBRC rejected the petitioner's plea to be excused from testifying and the SBRC continued its investigation
of the matter. The Supreme Court intervened upon a motion for reconsideration filed by one of the
defendants of the civil case
ISSUES: WoN the SBRC's inquiry has valid legislative purpose
Held:
No. The power to conduct formal inquiries or investigations is specifically provided for in Sec. 1 of
the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation. Such inquiries may refer to the
implementation or re-examination of any law or in connection with any proposed legislation or the
formulation of future legislation. They may also extend to any and all matters vested by the Constitution
in Congress and/or in the Senate alone. It appears, therefore, that the contemplated inquiry by
respondent Committee is not really "in aid of legislation" because it is not related to a purpose within the
jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the investigation is to find out whether or not the relatives of
the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 RA No. 3019, the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act", a matter that appears more within the province of the courts rather than of the legislature.

Senate v Ermita
Facts:
The President issued E.O. 464, "Ensuring Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers,
Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials appearing in
Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation under the Constitution, and For Other Purposes.
The Senate through its various Committees conducts inquiries and investigations in aid of
legislation and the Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations to various officials of the
Executive Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project
of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National Machinery and Equipment Group. They
also issued invitations on several AFP officials for them to attend as resource persons in a public hearing
for the privilege speech of the some senators. Senate Franklin Drilon received from Executive Secretary
Ermita a letter respectfully requesting for the postponement of the hearing to which various executive
officials have been invited in order for said officials to study and prepare for various issues so they can
better enlighten the Senate Committee on its investigation. However, Sen. Drilon was unable to grant
such request because it was sent belatedly and all preparations are complete within that week. Pres.
Franklin Drilon received from Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita a copy of E.O. 464 and that executive
officials invited were not able to attend because they failed to secure the required consent from the
President.
Several petitions were filed before the court also challenging the constitutionality of E.O. 464 and
infringe on their rights and impede them to fulfill their respective obligations.

ISSUE: Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in the Congress.
HELD:
Congress undeniably has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought
in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged,
it must state the reason therefore and why it must be respected. The power of inquiry, a power vested in
the Congress, is expressly recognized in Sec. 21 of Article VI because, according to the Court, a legislative
body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which
the legislation intended to affect or change; thus, making it an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the
legislative function. However, the infirm provisions of E.O. 464, allow the executive branch to evade
congressional requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering
its reasons. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries
in aid of legislation is frustrated.

Sabio v Gordon
Facts:

On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago introduced Philippine Senate Resolution
No. 455 (Senate Res. No. 455), directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred
by the Philippines Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications
Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged
improprieties in their operations by their respective Board of Directors. Senate Res. No. 455 was
submitted to the Senate and referred to the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations and Committee on Public Services. On May 8, 2006, Chief of Staff Rio C. Inocencio, under
the authority of Senator Richard J. Gordon, wrote Chairman Camilo L. Sabio of the PCGG, one of the herein
petitioners, inviting him to be one of the resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the
Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services. The
purpose of the public meeting was to deliberate on Senate Res. No. 455. On May 9, 2006, Chairman Sabio
declined the invitation because of prior commitment.7 At the same time, he invoked Section 4(b) of E.O.
No. 1 which provides that: No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce
evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official
cognizance. The constitutionality of Section 4(b) is being questioned on the ground that it tramples upon
the Senates power to conduct legislative inquiry under Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution.
Issue: WoN All PCGG members or staff are exempt from testifying in any judicial, legislative or
administrative proceeding
Held:
No. Article VI Section 21 provides, "The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its
respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published
rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected." At
any rate, Article VI, Section 21 grants the power of inquiry not only to the Senate and the House of
Representatives, but also to any of their respective committees. Clearly, there is a direct conferral of
power to the committees. This is significant because it constitutes a direct conferral of investigatory power
upon the committees and it means that the means which the Houses can take in order to effectively
perform its investigative function are also available to the Committees. The conferral of the legislative
power of inquiry upon any committee of Congress must carry with it all powers necessary and proper for
its effective discharge. Otherwise, Article VI, Section 21 will be meaningless. The indispensability and
usefulness of the power of contempt in a legislative inquiry is underscored in a catena of cases, foreign
and local.

Neri vs Senate
Facts:
Petitioner, Romulo Neri, herein invokes his right to executive privilege following a summon by the
Senate Committee on the investigation about the anomalous dealings regarding the publicly scrutinized
NBN-ZTE deal. In his capacity as the Director General of the National Economic and Development
Authority or NEDA, he was invited to attend the joint investigation regarding the abovementioned project
where he testified, before invoking his right to executive privilege, that he received an offer of P200

Million as a bribe in exchange for his approval of the project. When further asked questions regarding the
NBN-ZTE project, the petitioner refused to answer invoking executive privilege especially the questions 1)
whether or not the President (Arroyo) followed up the NBN Project, 2) whether or not she directed him
to prioritize it, and 3) whether or not she directed him to approve it.
After invoking executive privilege, he was issued a subpoena requiring him to attend a hearing
and testify which he did not do so saying that he was barred from attending upon the orders of the
President herself stating that the deal contained delicate and sensitive national security and diplomatic
matters.
Issue: WoN executive privilege may be invoked upon the three questions asked to the petitioner
regarding the NBN-ZTE deal.
Held:
YES. In order for a claim to executive privilege to be valid, the Court cited the case of US vs Nixon
where three elements have been laid out in order to claim executive privilege: 1) the protected
communication must relate to a quintessential and non-delegable presidential power, 2) it must be
authored, solicited, and received by a close advisor of the President or the President himself. The judicial
test is that an advisor must be in operational proximity with the President, and 3) it may be overcome by
a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought likely contains important evidence, and
by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
Anent the first element, it is maintained that the information regarding the three questions may
impair diplomatic as well as economic relations with China, and thus was held to be a matter related to
the quintessential and non-delegable presidential power of diplomacy or foreign relations. For the second
element, the petitioner is a member of the Presidents Cabinet. Third, there was no showing of a
compelling need to justify the revocation of the privilege as the questions do not fall under Section 21 of
Article VI of the Constitution regarding information that is in aid of legislation. Whereas this power of the
legislature under section 21 is mandatory upon a compelling interest to aid legislation, the question asked
to the petitioner falls under Section 22 of the same Article which speaks of the Congress oversight
function over the Executive, this power to compel the heads of departments is not mandatory.

Pimentel v Joint Commission

Facts:
Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. seeks a judgment declaring null and void the continued existence
of the Joint Committee of to determine the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass
and preliminarily canvass the votes cast for Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates in the May 10,
2004 elections following the adjournment of Congress sine die on June 11, 2004. The petition corollarily
prays for the issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Joint Committee to cease and desist from
conducting any further proceedings pursuant to the Rules of the Joint Public Session of Congress on
Canvassing. Petitioner posits that with "the adjournment sine die on June 11, 2004 by the Twelfth
Congress of its last regular session, [its] term ... terminated and expired on the said day and the said

Twelfth Congress serving the term 2001 to 2004 passed out of legal existence." Henceforth, petitioner
goes on, "all pending matters and proceedings terminate upon the expiration of ... Congress." To advance
this view, he relies on legislative procedure, precedent or practice [as] borne [out] by the rules of both
Houses of Congress. Petitioners claim that his arguments are buttressed by legislative procedure,
precedent or practice [as] borne [out] by the rules of both Houses of Congress is directly contradicted by
Section 42 of Rule XIV of the Rules adopted by the Senate, of which he is an incumbent member. This
section clearly provides that the Senate shall convene in joint session during any voluntary or compulsory
recess to canvass the votes for President and Vice-President not later than thirty days after the day of the
elections in accordance with Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not the Joint Committee canvassing even Congress session has been terminated is
constitutional.
Held:
NO. Sec. 15. The Congress shall convene once every year on the fourth Monday of July for its
regular session, unless a different date is fixed by law, and shall continue to be in session for such number
of days as it may determine until thirty days before the opening of its next regular session, exclusive of
Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays. The President may call a special session at any time. Contrary to
petitioner's argument, the term of the present Twelfth Congress did not terminate and expire upon the
adjournment sine die of the regular session of both Houses on June 11, 2004.
Section 15, Article VI of the Constitution cited by petitioner does not pertain to the term of
Congress, but to its regular annual legislative sessions and the mandatory 30-day recess before the
opening of its next regular session (subject to the power of the President to call a special session at any
time). Section 4 of Article VIII also of the Constitution clearly provides that "[t]he term of office of the
Senators shall be six years and shall commence, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth
day of June next following their election." Similarly, Section 7 of the same Article provides that "the
Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin,
unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election."
Consequently, there being no law to the contrary, until June 30, 2004, the present Twelfth Congress to
which the present legislators belong cannot be said to have "passed out of legal existence."
The legislative functions of the Twelfth Congress may have come to a close upon the final
adjournment of its regular sessions on June 11, 2004, but this does not affect its non-legislative functions,
such as that of being the National Board of Canvassers. In fact, the joint public session of both Houses of
Congress convened by express directive of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to canvass the votes
for and to proclaim the newly elected President and Vice-President has not, and cannot, adjourn sine die
until it has accomplished its constitutionally mandated tasks. For only when a board of canvassers has
completed its functions is it rendered functus officio. Its membership may change, but it retains its
authority as a board until it has accomplished its purposes.
Since the Twelfth Congress has not yet completed its non-legislative duty to canvass the votes
and proclaim the duly elected President and Vice-President, its existence as the National Board of

Canvassers, as well as that of the Joint Committee to which it referred the preliminary tasks of
authenticating and canvassing the certificates of canvass, has not become functus officio.