Motivation in Herodotos: The Case of the Ionian Revolt

Author(s): W. G. Forrest
Source: The International History Review, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Jul., 1979), pp. 311-322
Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.
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W.G. FORREST

Motivationin Herodotos:
The Caseof the Ionian Revolt

It is not uncommon to find Herodotos' ideas of historical explanation

described as naive. He was, it is said, too fond of falling back on the divine
as a moving force and, where he stayed at a human level, too fond of
emphasizing personal whim at the expense of those economic, social,
political, or other motives which modern historians have grown to love.1
The role he ascribed to God will not be discussed here, though it is
worth noting briefly that he was somewhat less guilty than he might at first
sight appear. Kroisos suffered, presumably, because God was angry with
him for thinking himself the happiest of men (1:34), but Kroisos' own
reasons for attacking the Persians were human enough, the desire to stop
Kyros before he became too powerful, to annex Kappadokia, to avenge
his brother-in-law, Astyages (1:46, 73). True, he was encouraged by the
Delphic Oracle, but there was ample evidence, more than half a ton of it,
that Kroisos was encouraged by the Delphic Oracle (1:50-1). In a religious
society, a religious motive can be a human motive, and only once, in his
account of the break between Amasis of Egypt and Polykrates (111:40-3),
did Herodotos allow the divine implausibly to extrude what we unbelievers would call normal human motives. With that one exception, Herodotean men are men.
What about his gods? At vm: 13, 'God was doing everything he could to
bring the size of the Persian fleet down to the size of the Greek.' But the
adjustment was not brought about by an old man with a trident: it was
made by a wind, a familiar enough natural phenomenon in that part of
the world to have earned a local name, the 'Hellespontian' (vn: 188). This
was no miracle; this was luck.' Only once did he come near to giving his
1 An even more incoherent version of this argument was given to the Cambridge
Philological Society in February 1977. 1 hope that it has benefited from the discussion; I
know that I have, as I have too from talk with P.S. Derow, R. Padel, G. Devereux, and
many other friends.
TheInternationalHistoryReview, 1, 3, July 1979
cn issn 0707-5332 TheInternationalHistoryReview

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W.G. Forrest
approval to a story of direct intervention by a god, when, at vin: 129, he
recorded a Potidaian tale that Poseidon had swamped some impious
Persians, though even there we note that 'the Potidaians appear to me ev
Xeyeiv' ('to be telling a good story') which is not quite the same as dp#<3
keyeiv ('to be telling the truth'). Even in the famous case of the appearance
of Pan to the runner Philippides before Marathon (vi:iO5), one senses
behind the words 'as Philippides himself reported' potential approval for
Leake's characterization of Philippides as 'the lying Athenian pezodrome.'2 Thus, for Herodotos, God provided a metaphysical framework,
an umbrella under which men operated in the ways that men do, in
principle much as they operate under the umbrella of a Christian god for
a Christian historian or of 'necessity' for some others. For me, Herodotos'
to theion (the divine) is not much more objectionable than a Christian God
or inevitability.
The main question, however, is that of personal explanation. Here
there are some preliminary points. Firstly, Herodotos was not equipped
with the language of sophisticated analysis in many areas where modern
historians take its existence for granted. Men can think psychological
thoughts without benefit of psychological theory, and they can think
economic thoughts without the science of economics. But they are less
likely to make a fuss about them. Given eunomia brought by Lykourgos,
given rich land and a substantial population, Herodotos argued, the
Spartans in the sixth century shot up and flourished and were no longer
content to stay at peace (1:66), which provides as nice a mixture of political,
social, economic, and psychological explanation as one could wish. In
about 540, the Chians refused to sell the Oinoussai islands to the
Phokaians, 'fearing that they might become a new emporion (1:165), an
economic explanation if ever there was one. But it is easy to overlook these
things in Herodotos' throwaway and casual presentation.
Secondly, in part because of this shortage of technical jargon, in part
because of Herodotos' sense of a duty to record what was said even if he
did not believe it, but mainly perhaps because of his desire to indulge his
brilliance as a story-teller, he chose to write descriptive rather than analytic history, to give a full narrative of events in Greece and Persia from
about 550 onwards3 rather than palm us off with a Thucydidean Pentekontaetia.The reader is left to judge for himself, to produce his own
analysis.
Neither of these points elevates the actual importance of the individual
in the making of history, but both, by default as it were, by submerging
2 W.M. Leake, Travelsin the Morea (London 1830), 11,p. 330.
3 M.E. White, 'Herodotus' Starting Point,' The Phoenix 23 (1969), pp. 39-48. 1 should
emphasize more than she does the completeness of the story thereafter.

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Motivation in Herodotos
other explanations in a non-technical narrative, increase his apparent
importance. There are, however, two more positive considerations.
The bulk of Herodotos' information came from oral tradition; and the
bulk of such tradition tends to recall the startling, the colourful, the
scandalous, and the heroic; and, most startling, colourful scandals or
deeds of valour centre round individuals, not inventories. The British
remember the austerity of Stafford Cripps, not the balance of payments in
the postwar years; and contemporaries will remember the character of
Amin, or even Entebbe, long after the role of the Asian in the life of
Uganda has been forgotten.
Then, most important, Herodotos was writing of, if not in, a period
when individuals did matter more than historians now think they matter
or mattered at any time. A party leader today will impose some of his
personal colour on the party and, conversely, an ancient politician could
not altogether ignore the views of his hetairoi. But Dareios, Polykrates,
Kypselos, and the rest meant more than Mr Trudeau or even President
Carter.
For example, it is an exaggeration to say, as has been said, that in
Herodotos the story of Sparta from 519 to 490 is the story of King
Kleomenes. But the man does dominate, and it would be quibbling to
make much of the fact that sometimes, as at v:64 and in: 148, he appears
only as agent or adviser. Elsewhere the decision is his and his alone. But,
given the powers and privileges of Spartan kings, military, religious,
social, judicial, and constitutional, which Herodotos sketches at vi:56ff., a
strong Spartan king would be a leader in decision-making. One cannot
ignore a commander-in-hief, a man who may have had some special
position in the Gerousia, a man who, if popular, would regularly have a
majority of the ephors on his side.4 The charge against Herodotos would
only begin to look serious if, in making up his mind, Kleomenes was
regularly said to have acted out of personal whim rather than from
reason, if he agreed with his daughter Gorgo because he liked her face,
not because he approved of her sagacity. Sometimes, admittedly, he did.
It was personal affection for Isagoras, or his wife, and personal pique
against the Athenians that led to his two interventions (v:7o, 74). But even
a sane king can sometimes be petty, and it must be remembered that
Kleomenes was mad.5
In short, many a Herodotean story may seem inadequate. But before
the historian condemns it, he must be sure that it is translated properly not
only into his own language but also, if it makes him happier, into his own
4 A. Andre wes, 'The Government of Classical Sparta,' in E. Badian, ed., AncientSocietyand
Institutions(Oxford 1966), pp. 8-10.
5 W.G. Forrest, Historyof Sparta (London 1968), ch. 8.

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W.G. Forrest
style. Then, if it is still not entirely to his taste, there remains the much
more difficultjob of questioning his own taste before that of Herodotos.
To turn to his account of the Ionian Revolt of which even a very
sympatheticcommentator,A.R. Burn, has somewhatruefully remarked
that 'afterhis manner Herodotus gives only personalgriefs/6 the personal
griefs, that is, of Aristagorasand Histiaios.So, almost, he did.
Among the tyrants whom the Persians installed or encouraged after
their occupation of the Greek cities in Asia Minor was one Histiaios in
Miletos.Histiaiosserved the GreatKing Dareioswell on his ambitiousand
shockinglyunsuccessfulcampaign against the Skythiansin about 514 bc
and was rewarded with the gift of Myrkinos in Thrace, later with the
slightly less covetable position of a Dr Kissinger in Sousa, without Kissinger's mobility. Meanwhile he had had to leave his son-in-law, Aristagoras,to look after his tyrannyin Miletos.Aristagorasdevised a scheme
to annex the powerful Aegean island of Naxos for the Persians and
persuaded the Persian governor at Sardis, Dareios' own brother, Artaphernes, to support him. The expedition against Naxos was then betrayed by his Persiancolleague, Megabates.The failure prompted Aristagoras to withdraw from Persian control and to raise general revolt in
Ionia. Many Ionians responded by expelling or even killing their own
tyrants. Aristagoras'visit to mainland Greece in search of help and the
miserablefate of that help when it came can be ignored. Sufficientto note
that after a while, and a debate on strategy with his political colleagues,
Aristagoraswithdrewto Histiaios'propertyin Thrace where he was,soon
afterwards,killed. Meanwhile,Histiaios,feeling that it was better to rule
in Miletos than serve in Sousa, had, so the story goes, sent a messenger
down to the coast enjoining revolt in the hope that he would then be sent
backhome to control it. He shaved the head of a slave and inscribedon it
the order 'Revolt';when the hair had grown again, the slave set off for
Ionia and arrivedjust as the pot was boiling over. Chronologicaldifficulties abound: how long would it take for a slave'shair to regain a decent
length; how many kilometres of the Royal Road could a slave cover per
diem; how far-sighted was Histiaios? But these questions arise later.
Whether or not Histiaios himself took any part in bringing about the
trouble, his 'purpose' was served and he contrived to persuade Dareios
that he was to be trusted with a peace-makingmission.
On the way, he paused in Sardisbut found Artaphernesso threatening
that he soon absented himself and arrived, first of all, in Chios. By then
6 A.R. Burn, Persia and the Greeks(London 1962), p. 193. In what follows I give no
references to the direct narrative of the revolt, v:28- 126 and vi: 1-43, or to modern
works. See, most recently, P.B. Manville, 'Aristagoras and Histiaios,' Class. Quart. 27
(i977)PP- 80-91.

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Motivationin Herodotos
Aristagorashad run away, but Histiaiosdid not immediatelyresume the
purple. He convinced the Chiansof his virtuous past and future promise
as a revolutionaryleader but, a littler later, failed to convince his own
Milesians. He fled north, acquired some ships from Lesbos, seized the
Hellespont, and there settled down to take vesselscoming from the Black
Sea and hold them unless they were prepared to obey his orders. News of
the fall of Miletosafter the battleof Lade prompted a raid on Chios, then
an expedition against Thasos, and finally a return to Lesbos, whence a
foray on the mainland brought about his death at the hands of Artaphernes and the other Persiangeneral Harpagos. Dareios was not well
pleased with his native servants.
This then is the story, a story of two adventurers. Should there be
something 'deeper' behind the revolt? Something economic, perhaps?
Suggestions have not been lacking. The fall of Sybaris had damaged
Milesiantrade.7Perhaps it had, but mourning for Sybarisscarcelyspells
an evening on friendship with Persia. The fiasco of Dareios' Skythian
campaign in 514, planned to expand Ionian enterprise in the Black Sea,
had produced disillusion.8But, while Thilhellenism' can never be ruled
out as a motive for any of Dareios'actions,it is not easy to see how success
would have had or failure did have any markedeffect on the relationsthat
Milesianand other settlements,Istros,Olbia, Berezan, Pantikapaion,and
the rest, had establishedwith the Skythiansor other nativepopulationsof
the area. Certainly,at Istros, traces of destructionof the right date have
been discovered near the archaic harbour, plausibly associated by the
excavatorswith the Skythiancounter-attack;but the hinterland of Istros
was not Skythianand the natives of Tariverde, for example, may have
suffered as much as or more than the Greeksof the coast- the Skythians
were advancing through alien territoryand mistakesdo happen in wartime. It is wisestto conclude, with ProfessorPippidi,'che (per quantogravi
siano state le perdite sofferte da parte di uno dei belligeranti)il benessere
sia statoin breve ristabilito.'9'Things were soon backto normal.'The only
clear overall pattern is a gradual decline throughout the sixth century of
eastern Greek imports and a gradual, then not so gradual, increase in
Attic. This is not a pattern to raise any eyebrows.In about 496 there were
still enough ships, presumablygrain ships, sailingout of the BlackSea, to
merit Histiaios'attention.
A third source of economic decline has been found in Kambyses'
7 T. Lenschau, Pavlys RealEncyd. (Stuttgart 1914), ix, 'Iones,' i883ff. On the economic
explanation in general cf. R. Meiggs, AthenianEmpire (Oxford 1972), pp. 24ff.
8 Lenschau, art. cit. ; H.T. Wade-Gery (in lectures).
9 D.M. Pippidi, / Grecinet Basso Danubio (Milan 197 1), p. 50.

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W.G. Forrest
occupation of Egypt.10 But, between 525 and 499, Ionians were not at war
with Persia: how would they be affected? There is no reason to think that
Egyptians or their new Persian masters would want less Greek oil or wine,
fewer Greek pots or putains than they had wanted before. Indeed it seems
not unlikely that the restriction of Greek trade to Naukratis earlier imposed by Amasis was now lifted.11 Our only evidence is Herodotos, who
says, at in: 139, that crowds of Greeks followed in Kambyses' train, some
for trade, some as soldiers, some as tourists. This smacks more of a Gold
Rush than a Great Depression.
But the decisive point on the economic side in general is another simple
statement by Herodotos, at v:28. 'Miletos at this same time had reached
the peak of her prosperity and was the glory of Ionia.' It was not poverty
or weakness that prompted the Ionian Revolt.
A second explanation merits and has been given more weight by many:
that it was general discontent with tyranny, particularly with an externally
imposed tyranny, a desire for 'freedom,' that caused the trouble.12 But it
can scarcely be said that Herodotos himself has overlooked this factor.
The dependence of the tyrants on Persian support and their domestic
unpopularity had been stressed by Histiaios at the Danube in 5 14 (iv: 137).
Now Aristagoras gives up his tyranny in Miletos and introduces isonomia
'so that the Milesians should join with him willingly' (v:37). Willingly.The
Mytilenaians too liked the idea of isonomia well enough, or disliked their
tyrant well enough, to stone him to death. The Milesians again would not
take Histiaios back 'once they had had a taste of freedom' (vi:5). The
Persians themselves after the final defeat of the Ionians at Lade showed
that they had learnt their lesson, recognized the force of Greek feeling,
and through Mardonios 'set up democracies in the cities' (vi:43). Once
again, Herodotos' style blunts the impact of these remarks and, more
regrettably, he assumed that everybody would know why tyrants were
obnoxious, and why, or rather what, freedom was desirable. But the
remarks are there and the historian is entitled to press them. But not too
far. The tyrants had been tolerated for quite some time and the Ionians
had even let slip an obvious opportunity for revolt in 5 14- 13 when none,
it seems, rushed to join Byzantion and its neighbours in immediate reaction to Dareios' northern disgrace (v:26); in 499 only one city killed its
tyrant and not all need have rallied to Aristagoras' call. Ephesos, for
10 J. Boardman, The GreeksOverseas2(Penguin 1973), p. 103.
1 1 There is no ambiguity at Hdt. 11:178-9 (against R.M. Cook, 'Amasis and the Greeks in
Egypt,' Journal Hell. Stud. 57 [1937], pp. 227-37). Tne restriction was imposed by
Amasis, lifted some time before Herodotos' visit. This invasion is one suitable moment.
12 Most attractively and adventurously by J.L. Myres, 'Persia, Greece, and Israel,' Palestine
ExplorationQuarterly85 (1953), pp. 8-22.

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Motivation in Herodotos
example, for all its original geographical involvement, was not engaged in
the final campaign.13 Ionia 'seething with discontent' is perhaps too colourful. All that can be said is that there was something there which
Herodotos described but did not fully define, something to which our two
adventurers could appeal.
We are back with our two adventurers, only to leave them again at once
to point to Herodotos' one serious mistake, or rather the mistake which he
did nothing to prevent the reader from making, that of seeing the revolt
as a revolt against Sousa, not in large part as a squabble with Sardis. He did
not invent but he did sanctify the view of the great campaigns of 480 and
479 as a clash of Greek and barbarian. Aeschylus certainly and
Phrynichos probably had laid the foundations; and perhaps it could be
said that Dionysios of Miletos had done the same, if we knew anything of
his Persikaor of his date.14 But it was Herodotos who fixed the story for all
time. He can hardly be blamed. It was, after all, a Great Event. All those
who fought on one side were Greek and most of those who fought on the
other were barbarian. Those Greeks, the majority, who were not among
'those who had the best thoughts for Greece/ could be recorded but were
easily forgotten in the glamour of the Great Event, which carried him
away as it carries us still. 'We stood alone,' said Winston Churchill, to
which one who remembered the Commonwealth added 'Yes, the whole
500,000,000 of us.' But the myth survives.
Unfortunately, in Herodotos' mind and even more in ours, the distinction crept backwards to sharpen and falsify the picture of the revolt, to
make one forget the ease with which Greeks mingled with barbarians and
to ignore among much else such obvious things as the total mixture of
Karian and Greek in Herodotos' own Halikarnassos that a glance at its
fifth-century prosopography makes so clear.15 The sentiment is too
strong.
But consider the facts. There never has been a race so skilled at infiltration as the Greeks. There has never been an empire within their reach that
they have not contrived to use to their advantage. Under Apries in Egypt
they had ideas above their station. Cato read the signs in Rome but failed;
and 'I, Claudius' is an adequate commentary on the results. To Constantinople, of course, they had some proper claim, which they did not fail to
exploit, while making sure that Constantinople's enemies also had suitable
advisers. Nor did 1453 take Constantinople entirely from them for the
13 Ephesos, like the other absentees from Lade, may have been recaptured by Artaphernes
and Otanes with Klazomenai, but there is no sign of a Persian garrison when the Chians
arrive (vi : 16).
14 R. Drews, The GreekAccountsof EasternHistory(Harvard 1973).
15 E.g. in W. Dittenberger, SyllogeInscr. Graec.3no. 46.

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W.G. Forrest
Phanariots could not be ignored by any Ottoman. More recently, Greek
names have been significant in Alexandria, in British India, and in the
Belgian Congo. More recently still, one has even appeared in the highest if
not the most reputable circles of American politics.
This is not a bad record, and it would be surprising if the same had not
been true of the Persian Empire, as, of course, it was. Greek artists and
artisans helped with the imperial building program. Pliny the Elder (NH
34.68) may have gone too far in seeing the well-hidden hand of Telephanes of Phokaia behind the sculptures of Dareios and Xerxes, and a
humbler modern view of the status of Greeks who worked at Pasargadai
and Persepolis may well be correct. But they were not mere labourers or
craftsmen, being, at the very least, skilled foremen.16 It is surely right to
stress the overall eastern planning of the great palaces as it would be right
to stress the typically collegiate features of St Catherine's, Oxford, but it
took more than a Swedish bricklayer to bring a touch of Stockholm to the
banks of the Cherwell. Again Greek engineers were needed to build
bridges, like Mandrokles of Samos for the Bosporos (Hdt. iv:87-g);
Greek explorers like Skylax of Karyanda for the Indus (iv:44); Greek
doctors like Demokedes of Kroton (111:131-8), royal physician, later the
first Persian cita agent in the west, preferring, however, not to come in for
the gold. Even a purveyor of ready-made cloaks was found in Syloson
(m: 140). And then, at the heart of politics, was Histiaios, by no means the
only Greek to see submission to the king not only as a way to greater safety
for himself, his city, or both, but as offering a chance of still further
advancement within the Persian system, again for self or city or both Artemisia, Demaratos, the Regent Pausanias, or, in a rather different
world, Alkibiades, Lysander, Agesilaos.
But imperial peoples do not always welcome such interference. The
Egyptians under Amasis resented the 'Haunebu who were traversing the
northland'; Cumanus did not share power happily with Felix; and Nasser
did not love the Alexandrian Greeks. Blue-blooded Persians were no
happier at the prospect of contamination; Pharnabazos was quick to put
paid to Alkibiades1 thoughts of direct access to the king; Tissaphernes and
Pharnabazos did not like Lysander's special relationship with Kyros; and
earlier generations had shown similar suspicions. It is hard not to see
something of such rivalry behind Oroites' murder of Polykrates, muddied
though the story is by the accession of Dareios (111:120-6); and behind
Megabazos' intrigue against Histiaios, somewhat misguided as it turned
out, it is clear (v:24). Megabates' punishment of Skylax need not show
16 C. Nylander, Ionians in Pasargadae (Uppsala 1970). Cf . the excellent general summary in
Board man, The GreeksOverseas,pp. 98-105.

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Motivation in Herodotos
more than ill tempered contempt for Greek dignity. But the quarrel with
Aristagoras which it provoked brought out the real question, 'Who is the
master now?,' and Aristagoras' straight answer is more than enough to
explain Megabates' betrayal of the expedition to the Naxians, an extreme
reaction, perhaps, but by no means as incredible as it has seemed to many.
It is yet another Herodotean 'personal whim' which on reflection is
neither whimsical nor even entirely personal. Then finally there is Artaphernes. That Dareios should trust a Greek to sort out trouble in a
Persian province was bad enough; but that his own brother should trust a
Greek to solve his problems was intolerable. He was prepared to take
quick and unauthorized action at once and, in killing Histiaios, even more
desperate action later, not in a fit of temper against a rebel, but because he,
and Harpagos, were still afraid that Histiaios 'might rise again to a position of influence with Dareios' (v:2g).
It was not, of course, that things were quite so simple, for blood is
sometimes not as thick as ambition. Vespasian could bring himself to talk
to Narcissus;17 Megabates saw Aristagoras as a threat but Pausanias as a
possible son-in-law (v:32); Oroites' offer to Polykrates must have seemed
plausible even if entirely insincere; and as for Pharnabazos and Alkibiades! Histiaios, too, could intrigue with Persians against Persians. The
treachery of a messenger he sent to Sardis from Chios led to the execution
of many Persians with whom he had had previous discussions 'on these
matters' and this was no small affair, the removal of a few insignificant
dissidents. 'Sardis was in chaos' (vi:4).
But above all this confused conflict was the Great King himself, Dareios.
It was he who had to choose between Greek and Persian and it is clear that
he was at the very least open-minded. He it was who wrote the famous
letter to his satrap chiding him for his interference with Apollo, 'ignoring
my family's attitude to the god,'18 who patronized Mandrokles, Skylax,
Demokedes - and Syloson, who was even a keen reader of the sports pages
in the western press (in: 137). He had trusted Histiaios and, unlike Sargon
in his brusque treatment of an earlier Greek trouble-maker,19 still trusted
him so much that nothing that he did after leaving Sousa destroyed his
faith or so blackened Histiaios' name in the family circle that it could not
be used by Artabanos in 480 as an example of loyalty (no one would use
Quisling among Norwegians in similar circumstances). That is what we
have to hold on to. Nothing that Histiaios did after leaving Sousa was
blatantly, demonstrably against the King of Kings.
17 Suetonius Vesp.4. 1.
18 R. Meiggs and D.M. Lewis, GreekHist. Inscr.yno. 12, w. 26-8.
19 D.D. Luckenbill, AncientRecordsof Assyriaand Babylonia (Chicago 1926-7), nos. 30, 62,
194-

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W.G. Forrest
The conclusion can be brief. The Ionian Revolt must be seen as a
struggle for power within the Persian Empire as well as against it. For the
leading figures, the question was who was to control Ionia for Dareios,
Artaphernes or the two adventurers. Let Aristagoras get the credit for
subjecting Naxos and who could know what might happen; let Histiaios
get freely down to the coast and who could be sure that he might not keep
his promise to the king. 'I don't agree/ he had said, 'that the Milesians and
my lieutenant are causing troubles that affect your interests ... if they have
I shall fix it' (v: 106), and nothing that he did thereafter can have seemed
wholly inconsistent with that aim. First he had to persuade the Chians: the
story of the tattooed slave, we might guess, did very well in an audience
where it was scarcely verifiable. But failure in Miletos led to a change of
plan, to less direct pressure on the Milesians through their corn supply (in
what else could the captains of laden ships usefully 'obey him' but the
disposal of their cargo?). Then, after Lade, a tricky situation, no doubt a
touch of panic, but still perhaps the thought of some sort of bargainingcounter in the north. Then a bit of bad luck and death, but belief to the last
that everything could be explained - to Dareios. That is the story, much as
Herodotos tells it, and not an absurd story. It is a story which does demand
concentration on court politics, on personal intrigue, on 'personal griefs.'
It would not make sense unless there was strong feeling among the
Ionians against some of their tyrants, the feeling which Herodotos records; and it would be absurd to deny that the eleutheriafor which many of
them fought was national as well as domestic. We may argue, if we wish,
about the proper balance between these elements. My only point is that, in
any answer, one element, the personal ambitions of two men, must keep
something like the prominence which Herodotos gives it. Herodotos was
unkind to Aristagoras and Histiaios, Samians from whom he took much of
his story never like Milesians;20 and we may prefer to see both as shrewd
political operators, each forced to take an almighty risk and each unlucky
in the end. But operators they remain. No one should follow de Sanctis in
comparing either with a Washington or a Mazzini.21
There remain hard criticisms of Herodotos' account, the missing year
(Lade 495 or 494?), the incomplete catalogue of the states involved (was
the revolt pan-Ionian? were any Dorians concerned?).22 There are hard
questions to be asked, why were tyrants disliked? how much patriotic
20 B.M. Mitchell, 'Herodotus and Samos,'/ottra. Hell. Stud. 95 (1975), pp. 75-9121 G. de Sanctis, Problemidi StoriaAntica (Bari 1932), p. 63ff.
22 Above, n. 13. On the Dorians, Herodotos' silence is unfortunate either way. But,
specifically, were Halikarnassians, for example, merely assumed to be included among
the Karians of v: 104? Was there a Persian campaign against the Rhodians (Fr. Gr. Hist.
532 f 1 b-c [32] and d with Komm.)?

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Motivation in Herodotos
feeling was there: but these are real criticisms and real questions. Here,
however, and in many another Herodotean story, we shall have a better
chance of seeing what they are, and perhaps of answering them, if we
clear our minds of the blanket belief that Herodotos was obsessed by the
role of the individual, if we pause to ask precisely what Herodotos thinks
he is explaining, whether he gives a good explanation of it - and whether it
was worth trying to explain.
He was childish, it is said, to think that imitation of a grandfather and
dislike of Ionians could be enough to prompt Kleisthenes to change the
tribal structure of Athens. Childish he would indeed have been. But he is
not explaining the change in tribal structure. Kleisthenes of Sikyon had
merely changed the tribal names and it is not implausible to believe either
that the Athenian learnt from him that names could be used in propaganda or, given Peisistratos' leanings towards Ionia, that there might
seem to be a case for advertising the new Athens' independence of it.23
Kleisthenes' motive for tribal reform is clearly given, to win the support of
the demos which he had previously ignored by giving them a share in
everything.24 As in the case of Aristagoras' abdication in Miletos the
political explanation, regrettably, is not analyzed. But it is there; and it is
by no means unwelcome to have heard on the side that Kleisthenes
despised Ionians.
Sometimes the charge will stand. No amount of rereading of 111:39-43
can detect anything but a personal explanation of Amasis' break with
Polykrates. That may well be sufficient. But the hard-headed irreverent
Amasis of 11:173-5 did not take the decision for the reason that Herodotos
gives. Perhaps it is true that he and not Polykrates took it, and that he took
it more or less alone; but not because he feared the jealousy of the gods.
Sometimes we may even find that the individual has been curiously played
down. Why did Miltiades wait at Marathon until the day of his official
command came round (vi: 110-14)? Surely it was that, with something
approaching a majority of the generals against him, he felt personally
more secure in giving orders when none could deny his right to do so than
in exploiting a technical authority which some might question. But
Herodotos does not say so, nor does he say who was responsible for the
tactical arrangement of the army on the great day - 'this is what happened.'
23 It is not disreputable to believe that Kleisthenes' family had transferred their affection
for Kroisos while he was sitting on Ionians to Kroisos' successors, the Persians; that,
among other things, they opposed helping Aristagoras. Hence, perhaps, some of
Herodotos' disapproval of the Revolt.
24 Reading at v:6g, after Stein, tov ... ot)/jlovirporepov dTraxTfievovtotc {fieraoLoovc,) t<hv
TTCtVTtoV....

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W.G. Forrest
But this is not the place to refight Marathon or to explore Aegean
politics. These last examples are cited only to warn against the temptation
to go away and search for some new blanket belief. Such things may be
comforting, but they are very un-Herodotean.
New College,Oxford

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