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NATOs Secretary General and the Use of Force: Willy Claes and the Air
Strikes in Bosnia
Ryan C. Hendrickson
Armed Forces & Society 2004; 31; 95
DOI: 10.1177/0095327X0403100105
The online version of this article can be found at:
http://afs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/31/1/95
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critical policy choices during the Cold War.3 This inattention to the
secretaries general continued in the post-Cold War era. Despite the vast
amount of literature on NATOs evolution in the 1990swhether it
concerns NATOs expansion, its program to assist newly democratized
states in their transitional processes, its institutional and organizational
strength, or its peace-enforcement and peacekeeping activities in the
Balkansvery little analysis or even mention of the role of the
secretaries general in contributing to these changes exists.4
The dearth of analysis on NATOs secretaries general corresponds
closely with the broader literature on leaders of multinational, intergovernmental organizations. Despite the ostensibly growing importance of
such organizations after the Cold War, relatively little research has been
devoted to these leaders.5 Among the research that exists, nearly all
scholarship has been historical and descriptive case studies, without the
development of a widely accepted analytical model for studying such
leaders.6 Similarly, the only major work on NATOs secretaries general
was essentially a historical chronology of its first four civilian leaders,
all of whom led the alliance during the Cold War.7 Thus, no accepted
analytical framework beside the historical and descriptive case study
exists for assessing NATOs secretary general.
Given that the leadership provided by the secretary general is often
exercised in closed-door sessions of North Atlantic Council (NAC)
meetings or in informal meetings in NATOs hallways, the case-study
approachwith reliance upon interviews with senior political and
military leaders at NATOremains the most useful method for examining a secretary general.8 In the case of Willy Claes, enough time has
passed that many key decision-makers are no longer in office or have
retired from political life, and are able to now speak more candidly
about Claes role.
At the same time, the development of a new analytical model for
assessing NATOs secretaries general may help analysts conduct broader
tests of its political leadership, and potentially, to make wider generalizations about other NATO secretaries general. As noted by methodologist Robert Yin, an analytical model can provide direction to a case
study, and if employed well, perhaps can be useful in theory development and replication in future studies. 9 Michael Schechters framework
for assessing Cold War-era intergovernmental, organizational (IGO)
leaders offers a useful starting point in the development of such a
model. 10
When studying the leaders of the World Bank, United Nations
Development Program, and the United Nations Educational, Scientific,
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Table 1
Leadership assessment model for NATOs secretary
general
Potential Leadership Forums
Systemic
Organizational
Civil-military relations
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openly calling for NATO strikes. Some at NATO considered this strategy
a wise diplomatic move, given the systemic constraints at the time.23
To some degree, Claes was helpful in moving NATOs agenda
toward more aggressive military options in 1995. Claes was not a strong
supporter of the UNs role under the dual-key framework, and would
refer derogatorily to the UN at times.24 As noted by a senior NATO
official, Claes was a virulent critic of the United Nations, both publicly
and privately. 25 This position squared with the USs position as
dissatisfaction grew with the United Nations. One important change
implemented in early August 1995 was the removal of the UNs key,
which was taken from Akashi and given to UN Field Commander Gen.
Bernard Janvier. Claes did not produce these results alone, but he was
certainly instrumental. The United States was helpful in removing
Akashis key because Akashi was viewed as tentative and too closely tied
to UN Secretary General Boutros-Boutros Ghali. In this respect, Claes
helped to empower NATO vis-a-vis the United Nations; critics of the
UN knew that Claes was an ally in the cause.
Claes association with the bribery charge certainly damaged his
international reputation and eventually forced his resignation, although
reaction to this scandal was mixed in Brussels. While Claes was still in
office, at nearly all US senior policy-making levels (including the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and the National Security Council) and among the allies
as well, key participants were very concerned that his problems would
damage his ability to lead the alliance.26 Yet even though senior policymakers were concerned about Claes ability to lead, the accusations did not
politically destroy Claes in the short term. Some evidence actually suggests that
Claes power increased in NATO, especially from the US perspective, since
many viewed the accusations as part and parcel of Belgian politics. Since
Claes was no longer involved directly in Belgian domestic politics, it was
felt by many at NATO that Claes was being made the political scapegoat for
his previous political party affiliation, the Belgian Socialist Party.27 For
example, in his memoirs about the Dayton Peace Accords, Richard Holbrooke
openly expressed considerable doubt over the validity of these charges.28
Former Norwegian Ambassador to NATO Leif Metik writes similarly:
We who were close to him the year he was NATOs Secretary
General, avoided forming definite opinions about his possible
guilt or innocence. That question was up to the Courts to
decide. This said, I believe we felt at the bottom of our hearts
that Claes was not criminal who willingly and consciously
had enriched himself in the Agusta affair.29
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Bosnian Serb attacks on Sarajevo in August 1995, when the keys were
turned by both the UN and NATO field commanders, it was the UNs
Janvier and NATOs Leighton Smith who debated the first set of targets
to hit.49 When the bombing campaign proceeded, Adm. Smith delegated
all tactical decisions to US Gen. Michael Ryan, Commander of Allied
Air Forces Southern Europe. The aircrafts used, as well as the targets,
sequence, and timing, were determined by Gen. Ryan, who closely
protected his own authority and prevented extensive political access to
him.50 Thus the evidence suggests that Claes was removed from much of
NATOs military planning, as Gen. Ryan made many of the tactical
decisions for the alliance.
However, Gen. George Joulwan notes that Claes had detailed
knowledge of the bombing strategy and was privy to the operational
plans well before Operation Deliberate Force ensued. On two occasions
before the operation began, Claes and Joulwan met and discussed at
length the proposed military operation.51 In these planning phases, Claes
allowed Joulwan considerable leeway in determining the appropriate
military action within the constraints of the various options that the
Council had authorized. Joulwan views Claes decision to grant the
SACEUR some independence in exercising military judgments as very
helpful in achieving NATOs eventual success.52 Even during Council
sessions prior to the strikes, additional evidence suggests that Claes
worked closely with the SACEUR, who pushed the alliance for claritythat is, detailed and specific instructions should the use of force
become a reality.53
Once the bombings began, Claes cooperation with the SACEUR at
Council meetings is another important yet overlooked aspect of civilmilitary leadership relations during the campaign. Due to the SACEURs
sometimes forceful personality, the new type of mission that NATO was
about to engage in, and some natural distaste for strong US leadership
at NATO, Joulwan was viewed with some suspicion by the European
allies.54 To quell these concerns, Joulwan consulted extensively with the
Council on all aspects of the operation during the bombing campaign.55
When Joulwan attended Council sessions, Claes would occasionally ask
the SACEUR tough and detailed operational questions. Such questions
were not necessarily raised because of Claes personal concerns, but
rather they were voiced because Claes could serve as a proxy for allies
who may not have wanted to raise doubts in a Council session with the
SACEUR, but could do so indirectly through Claes.56 Claes thereby gave
political cover to any ambassador who wished to proceed in this
manner, without openly showing any opposition to the SACEUR or to
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any other allies who favored vigorous military action. In this regard,
Claes worked to reduce political and military ambiguity between the
Council and SACEUR, and fostered consensus by serving as a proxy for
those allies who had real concerns.
Claes most significant operational-military role in Operation Deliberate Force came through his decision not to consult with the Council
prior to NATOs use of Tomahawk missiles in northern Bosnia, near
Banja Luka, on September 10. While these strikes officially fit within
the previously agreed-upon option 2 targeting plans, considerable
opposition was expressed later on the use of the Tomahawks, which
some ambassadors viewed as escalatory and a violation of the SACEURs
authority. France expressed the greatest concern, followed by Canada,
Greece, and Spain.57 Moreover, the strikes took place outside of the
southeast zone of action, which some NATO allies viewed as the
principal authorized area of military targeting.58
The request to use Tomahawks came from Gen. Ryan, and had not
been formally discussed by the Council. However, it was clearly
understood by NATO military officials that the use of Tomahawks was
a possible overextension of the mandate given to the SACEUR. 59
Recognizing the political problems that use of the Tomahawks could
cause, Gen. Joulwan did not immediately approve Gen. Ryans request.
Instead, Joulwan waited thirty-six hours in order to gain political
approval from the secretary general.60
Claes relevance and importance here is, first, that he did have
knowledge of the forthcoming Tomahawk strikes. The evidence suggests that Claes was an integral part of the decision to use the Tomahawks, which has been viewed by military analysts as a strategically
critical military maneuver in demonstrating NATOs advanced military
capabilities to the Bosnian Serbs.61 Richard Holbrooke writes that the
psychological effect of such sophisticated weapons, previously used
only in the Gulf War, was enormous.62 Second, Claes supported the
SACEURs and Gen. Ryans military judgment without verbal consultations with the Council. The SACEURs discussions with Claes on the
Tomahawks occurred on a weekend, when many NATO ambassadors
were not readily available in Brussels.63 Yet in NATOs first sustained
bombing campaign ever, Joulwans communication with Claes and the
thirty-six hour notice given to the secretary general would have
certainly allowed Claes ample opportunity to call an emergency meeting, or at a minimum, to phone key allied ambassadors and notify them
of the forthcoming missile strikes. Moreover, if the use of Tomahawks
was viewed in US military circles as potentially controversial, it seems
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Conclusion
Much has been written about the tragic events in Bosnia as well as
NATOs transformation in the post-Cold War era. In NATOs first
sustained bombing campaign, Operation Deliberate Force involved a
host of decision-makers, including military and political leaders from
the UN and NATO, as well as the sixteen allied governments. Since
NATO had never engaged in a military operation of this nature, it would
be difficult to predict what sort of role the secretary general would play
in this operation. Based on Cold War-era experience and research,
coupled with the many leadership impediments that Willy Claes faced
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Notes
Authors Note: The author thanks Jon Clausen, Col. Robert Owen, Patricia Shields, and
the anonymous reviewers of this manuscript for their assistance and helpful critiques.
1.
2.
See especially the three-volume set, Gustav Schmidt (ed.), A History of NATO: The
First Fifty Years (New York: Palgrave, 2001). See also Ian Q. R. Thomas, The
Promise of an Alliance (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997).
3.
Robert Hunter, who later became US Ambassador to NATO, writes that the SACEUR
exercised the greatest influence during the Cold War: civilian institutions in NATO
have paled beside the continuing influence of the military structure of the Alliance.
Robert Hunter, Security in Europe (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press,
1972), 61. See also Robert S. Jordan (ed.), Generals in International Politics (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1987).
4.
Excellent research has been conducted on Operation Deliberate Force, but Claes
role has gone untreated within this body of research. See Col. Robert Owen (ed.),
114
Deliberate Force: A Case Study in Effective Air Campaigning (Maxwell Air Force
Base, AL: Air University Press, 2000) and Tim Ripley, Operation Deliberate Force:
The UN and NATO Campaign in Bosnia, 1995 (Lancaster, UK: CDISS, 1999). Other
research that makes important contributions, but makes little mention of the secretary general, includes Benjamin S. Lambeth, NATOs Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operation Assessment (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2001); Anthony S.
Cordesman, Lessons and Non-lessons of the Air and Missile Campaign in Kosovo
(Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001); Thomas S. Szayna, NATO Enlargement, 20002015
(Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2000); Celeste A. Wallander, Institutional Assets and
Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War, International Organization 54 (2000):
705735; Pierre Martin and Mark R. Brawley (eds.), Alliance Politics, Kosovo, and
NATOs War: Allied Force or Forced Allies (New York: Palgrave, 2000). Some
recent research, although limited in scope, discusses the secretary general. See Ronald
D. Asmus, Opening NATOs Door (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002).
See also Michael Ruhle, Preface: Manfred Worners Legacy and NATO, in Anton
A. Bebler (ed.), Civil-Military Relations in Post-Communist States (Westport, CT:
Praeger, 1997); and Ryan C. Hendrickson, NATOs Secretary General Javier Solana
and the Kosovo Crisis, Journal of International Relations and Development 5, 3
(2002): 240257.
5.
See Kent J. Kille and Roger M. Scully, Executive Heads and the Role of Intergovernmental Organizations: Expansionist Leadership in the United Nations and the
European Union, Political Psychology 24, 1 (2003): 175198.
6.
For recent examples, see Helen Drake, Jacques Delors: Perspectives on a European
Leader (New York: Routledge, 2000); Michelle Cini, The European Commission:
Leadership, Organization and Culture in the EU Administration (Manchester, UK:
Manchester University Press, 1996); James Barros, Trygve Lie and the Cold War:
The UN Secretary General Pursues Peace, 19461953 (Dekalb: Northern Illinois
University Press, 1995).
7.
8.
For a short discussion of the evolution of the secretary generals role, see Sean Kay,
NATO and the Future of European Security (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield,
1998), 3639.
9.
Robert Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods, 2nd ed. (Thousand Oaks,
CA: Sage Publications, 1994).
10. Michael G. Schechter, Leadership in International Organizations: Systemic, Organizational and Personality factors, Review of International Studies 13, 3 (1987): 197
220.
11. Although little has been published on Secretary General Manfred Woerners leadership at NATO, many of his colleagues maintain that Woerners personality impacted
NATO across a number of spectrums. See Ruhle, Preface: Manfred Worners
Legacy.
12. Ibid.
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116
30. Author interviews with former Canadian Ambassador to NATO John Anderson (July
2003) and Netherlands Ambassador Veenendaal (July 2003).
31. Background interview, senior NATO official A (October 2002).
32. Ronald M. Reed, Chariots of Fire, in Owen (ed.), Deliberate Force (see note 4),
406-407. See also Ivo H. Daalder, Getting to Dayton (Washington, DC: Brookings
Institution Press, 2000), 7779.
33. Background interview, senior US defense official A (June 2002).
34. Authors interview with Lt. Gen. Montgomery (July 2002); background interview,
senior US defense official A (June 2002).
35. Hunter interview (July 2002).
36. Joulwan interview (October 2002).
37. Joulwan interview (January 2003). It should also be noted that former US Ambassador to NATO, Robert Hunter, was also at times ahead of his own administration in
his desire for NATO to exercise military options. Hunters view that use-of-force
options were needed was well known within the alliance before the Clinton administration eventually came to that conclusion. Claes and Hunter shared the belief that
serious military strikes were needed much earlier than Operation Deliberate Force.
Background interview, senior US defense official A (June 2002).
38. Montgomery interview (July 2002). Norwegian Ambassador to NATO Lief Metik
also notes that Claes was short tempered. Metik notes that he witnessed Claes on
one occasion when he exploded in rage at a NATO defense ministers meeting.
Metik correspondence with author (January 2003); background interview, senior US
defense official A (June 2002).
39. For the full range of Security Council decisions, see Jane Boulden, Peace Enforcement: The United Nations Experience in Congo, Somalia, and Bosnia (Westport, CT:
Praeger, 2001), 8395.
40. Rick Atkinson, Air Assault Set Stage for Broader Role, Washington Post (November 15, 1995), A1; David L. Dittmer and Stephen P. Dawkins, Deliberate Force:
NATOs First Extended Air Operation (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses,
1998), 2021. See also Ripley, Operation Deliberate Force, 242244.
41. This understanding had been reached between Claes and SACEUR General George
Joulwan before these events occurred. Joulwan interview (January 2003).
42. Holbrooke, To End A War, 99.
43. Background interview, senior US defense official A (June 2002).
44. Rick Atkinson, In Almost Losing its Resolve, NATO Alliance Found Itself, Washington Post (November 16, 1995), A1. Joulwan interview (January 2003).
45. Hunter interview (July 2002).
46. Richard Holbrooke, To End A War, 120; Robert Owen, Summary, in Owen (ed.)
Deliberate Force (see note 4), 499.
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47. Hunter interview (July 2002); senior US defense official A (June 2002).
48. Christopher M. Campbell, The Deliberate Force Air Campaign Plan, in Owen
(ed.), Deliberate Force (see note 4), 99110.
49. Mark A. Bucknam, The Influence of UN and NATO Theater-Level Commanders
on the Use of Airpower Over Bosnia During Deny Flight: 19931995 (doctoral
dissertation, Kings College, University of London, 1999), 209212.
50. John C. Orndorff, Aspects of Leading and Following: The Human Factors of
Deliberate Force, in Owen (ed.), Deliberate Force (see note 4), 355357. See also
Mark J. Conversino, Executing Deliberate Force: 30 August14 September 1995,
ibid., 132133.
51. One meeting between Claes and Joulwan took place at the NATO air base in Villa
Franca, Italy, and another in Claes office at NATO headquarters soon before the
bombings. Joulwan interview (October 2002).
52. Joulwan interview (January 2003).
53. Joulwan interview (October 2002); background interview, senior NATO official B
(October 2002).
54. Background interview, senior US defense official A (June 2002). See also Gen. Sir
Michael Rose, Fighting For Peace: Bosnia 1994 (London: Harville Press, 1998),
122123.
55. Hunter interview (July 2002); background interview, senior US defense official A
(June 2002); background interview, NATO military official A (October 2002).
56. Hunter interview (July 2002); background interview with senior US defense official
A (June 2002).
57. Holbrooke, To End A War, 143.
58. Rick Atkinson and Daniel Williams, NATO Rejects Demand to End Bombing;
Russia Warns Alliance on Bosnia Campaign, Washington Post (September 12, 1995),
A1.
59. Ripley, Operation Deliberate Force, 281.
60. Joulwan interview (January 2003).
61. For an excellent discussion of the symbolic importance of the Tomahawk missiles,
see Robert C. Owen, Summary, in Owen (ed.), Deliberate Force (see note 4),
491492; Conversino, Executing Deliberate Force, ibid., 153.
62. Holbrooke, To End A War, 143.
63. Joulwan interview (January 2003). See also Bucknam, The Influence of UN and
NATO Theatre-Level Commanders, 228.
64. Joulwan interview (January 2003).
65. Ripley, 286; background interview, senior NATO official B (October 2002).
66. Joulwan interview (October 2002).