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How new are new wars?

Wider debate - economic agenda of belligerents


- local populations caught up in conflict
- external actors
Economic globalisation, but what is the exact impact of this on the new wars?
Not massively helpful term - too broad, aspirational? Definitions.
Try to avoid totalising pretensions. Frederick Cooper - we need concepts that are less
sweeping, more precise ... which seek to analyse change with historical specificity rather
than in terms of a vaguely defines and unattainable endpoint.
But some aspects of global change - particulalry economic ones - more useful. Economic
globalisation.
Technological change, financial liberalism (deregulation) much more transnational trade,
foreign direct investment.
Some criticism of hyperglobalisation this has, to a large extent been North-North, intraindustry. International (and with hierarchies), rather than truly global.
How does it affect nature/prevalence of interstate conflict?

Unequal - mostly to developed economies, widens inequalities. Economic globalisation <->


socioeconomic dislocation <-> outrbreak of violence.
Sustained by global processes, that benefit from a more deregulated international
economy. Belligeraents - vested economic interestin continued conflict.
Greater openness in world economy -> rapid transmission of socioeconomic tensions - e.g.
highly mobile capital leading to violence, uncertainty in politically fragile, ethnically divided,
economically weak states - Indonesia 1997-8.
But hard to make statement that economic globalisation inherently conflict-generating.
Berdal - cant really explain where/when/how armed violence will take place with
globalisation theory.
Economics of civil wars?
War economies - devastating to society as a whole, but can benefit certain elites with
vested interests. Crystallisation of war economy - lets look at individual cases.
Economic logic of war
Angola - carefully researched modern war economy. MPLA, UNITA both benefited from
external patronage, but becomes more civil in the years after end of Cold War. Despite
sanctions, take advantage of alluvial deposits - amass significant fortunes. Exploit
revenues from oil wealth - economic, personal wealth for MPLA. Abundance of natural
resources - allows MPLA and UNITA to consolidate military positions.
DRC - access/control to coltan, diamonds, cobalt, copper, gold (Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda
all interested). - April 2001 UN report.
Reno - conditions of modern warfare an instrument of enterprise and violence as a mode
of accumulation.
Conflicts in Liberia (Charles Taylor believed to make $75 million per year 1990-4 by levying
taxes on Liberians diamond, gold, iron ore, rubber, timber exports), even while a rebel.
Acute state weakness - economic opportunities for some.

Where chains of command weak, plunder opportunities great - both sides have an interest
in reaping benefits, avoiding long, drawn-out battles. 1993-7 - Thai army, Khmer Rouge
collaborate in gem trade, logging. Petrol barons in Serbia/Croatia (economic, not racial
unity). Angola - government, UNITA business deals, including sales of weapons.
Fragmentation - local/military commanders begin to become more concerned with the
profit-creation than the military concerns.

These networks of criminality/war are often tied into regional networks


Sierra Leone - Nigeria, Guinea, Liberia.
DRC - Angola, Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, Namibia, Zimbabwe.
Transborder linkages in Balkans.
Afghanistan - Barnett Rubin describes a political economy of war and peace - central
Asian republics, Pakistan, Dubai, Iran.
Are these new?
Joroen de Zeeuw, Georg Frerks - yes, globalisation/resource extraction.

War economies not self-sustaining - need external resources to keep them


going/perpetuated.
Some evidence of contemporary civil wars coming from integration into world markets oil/diamonds Angola, Stephen Ellis each Liberian warlord of any substance had alliances
with foreign businessmen and at least one foreign government. Rubin - Afghan drug/gem
trade.
Not a new barbarism - self-interest of local elites, vulnerable populations concerned with
survival, xternal actors looking for a profit.
But are these new?
Three sets of difficulties with greed and grevance model.
- Fails to account for different motives at different levels producing violent behaviour.
Cultural factors? Belief in fate to rule. Mobutu Sese Seko, Jonas Savimbi (remarkably
stable ceasefire reached remarkably soon after his death). Jokahr Dudayev, would-be
Chechen leader. Opportunities for seizing economic power (and his followers took them),
but he was too concerned with Chechen independence project. Social protest, national
protest, and brigandage have been mutually reinforcing and cannot easily be
disentangled - Anatol Lieven. Bosnia - paramilitary looting for economic agendas, but in
an ethnic/nationalist framework.
- Lacks historical context. There have been lots of premodern looting/warlord-y types
conflicts - military contractors living off the land during the 30 years war. Historical
setting of individual wars - in Africa, historical conflict between sociopolitical groups e.g.
coastal elites vs. peoples of hinterlands.
- Exaggerates importance of economic linkages. From 1970s, UNITA was already funding
itself from hardwood/ivory/diamond sales. In the 1990s, these just become spun off into
businesses, more, taking better advantage of profit opportunities. Global integration
makes this easier, more difficult to monitor. BUT - came at a time when former Warsaw
pact ctounries were unable to control their arms/large criminal networks. Neighbouring

countries provided transport corridors to allow them in. Clearly not just globalisation, but
several factors working together.

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