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NOCOMORA DIGESTS
PRESCRIPTION
People v. Pacificador, March 13, 2001 (G.R. No. 139405)
Facts: On October 27, 1988, herein respondent, Arturo Pacificador, and his erstwhile coaccused, Jose T. Marcelo, were charged before the Sandiganbayan with the crime of violation of
Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act allegedly committed on or about and during the period from December 6, 1975 to January 6,
1976., while accused Pacificador was then Chairman of the Board of the National Shipyard and
Steel Corporation, a government-owned corporation, and therefore, a public officer, and Jose T.
Marcelo, Jr., then President of the Philippine Smelters Corporation, a private corporation.
Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the Information on two grounds, one of which is
extinguishment of the crime by prescription. Petitioner contends that the provision of Act No.
33267 on prescription of offenses punishable under special laws is not applicable to the instant
criminal case for the reason that Republic Act No. 3019 provides for its own prescriptive period.
Section 11 thereof provides that offenses committed and punishable under the said law shall
prescribe in fifteen (15) years. However, inasmuch as Republic Act No. 3019 does not state
exactly when the fifteen-year prescriptive period begins to run, Article 91 of the Revised Penal
Code should be applied suppletorily.
Issue: W/N the crime has already prescribed?
Held: Yes. In this case, as the offense involved is the violation of R.A. 3019, a special law, it
follows that in computing the prescriptive period of the offense, it is not the provision contained
in the Revised Penal Code that should govern but that of Act No. 3326. x x x
In Zaldivia vs. Reyes, Jr., (211 SCRA 277), the Supreme Court, in a clear language, held that
the proceedings referred to in Section 2 of Act No. 3326 are "judicial proceedings" and do not
include administrative proceedings. x x x
The offense imputed on accused was allegedly committed from December 6, 1975 to January 6,
1976. The offense prescribed on January 3, 1986, or ten years from January 6, 1976.
It has been settled that Section 2 of Act No. 3326 governs the computation of prescription of
offenses defined and penalized by special laws. In the case of People v. Sandiganbayan, this
Court ruled that Section 2 of Act No. 3326 was correctly applied by the anti-graft court in
determining the reckoning period for prescription in a case involving the crime of violation of
Republic Act No. 3019, as amended. In the fairly recent case of Presidential Ad Hoc FactFinding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, we categorically ruled that:
Since the law alleged to have been violated, i.e., paragraphs (e) and (g) of Section 3, R.A. No.
3019, as amended, is a special law, the applicable rule in the computation of the prescriptive
period is Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, which provides:
SECTION 2. Prescription should begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of
the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and institution of
judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. (Emphasis ours)

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The prescription shall be interrupted when the proceedings are instituted against the guilty
person and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting
double jeopardy.
This simply means that if the commission of the crime is known, the prescriptive period shall
commence to run on the day it was committed.
It can be gleaned from the Information in this case that respondent Pacificador allegedly
committed the crime charged "on or about and during the period from December 6, 1975 to
January 6, 1976." Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019, as amended by B.P. Blg. 195, provides that the
offenses committed under the said statute shall prescribe in fifteen (15) years. It appears
however, that prior to the amendment of Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 by B.P. Blg. 195 which was
approved on March 16, 1982, the prescriptive period for offenses punishable under the said
statute was only ten (10) years. The longer prescriptive period of fifteen (15) years, as provided
in Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 as amended by B.P. Blg. 195, does not apply in this case for the
reason that the amendment, not being favorable to the accused (herein private respondent),
cannot be given retroactive effect. Hence the crime prescribed on January 6, 1986 or ten (10)
years from January 6, 1976.
The petitioner, however, vehemently denies having any knowledge of the crime at the time it
was allegedly committed by the respondent. It claims that the crime charged in the Information
should be deemed as discovered only on May 13, 1987 when the then Solicitor General,
Francisco Chavez, filed a complaint with the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG) against the respondent, for violation of the provision of R.A. No. 3019, as amended.
We are not convinced. This Court takes notice of the fact that the subject Deed of Sale dated
December 29, 1975 relative to the sale of the parcels of land by the National Steel Corporation
to the Philippine Smelters Corporation, was registered shortly thereafter in the Registry of
Deeds of the Province of Camarines Norte. Subsequently, the Original Certificate of Title No.
0440 in the name of the National Steel Corporation was cancelled and in lieu thereof Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 13060 was issued in the name of the vendee Philippine Smelters
Corporation. On February 28, 1977, the Philippine Smelters Corporation even filed an action for
quieting of title with the then Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, docketed therein as
Civil Case No. 2882,13 which case forms the basis for the Sandiganbayan to deduce that the
subject Deed of Sale may be deemed registered on the said date, at the latest.
While petitioner may not have knowledge of the alleged crime at the time of its commission, the
registration of the subject Deed of Sale with the Registry of Deeds constitutes constructive
notice thereof to the whole world including the petitioner. Well entrenched is the jurisprudential
rule that registration of deeds in the public real estate registry is a notice thereof to the whole
world. The registration is a constructive notice of its contents as well as all interests, legal and
equitable, included therein. All persons are charged with the knowledge of what it contains.
Hence, even if the period of prescription is reckoned from February 28, 1977, the crime had
already prescribed when the Information in this case was filed with the Sandiganbayan on
October 27, 1988.
It bears emphasis, as held in a number of cases, that in the interpretation of the law on
prescription of crimes, that which is more favorable to the accused is to be adopted. The said
legal principle takes into account the nature of the law on prescription of crimes which is an act
of amnesty and liberality on the part of the state in favor of the offender.

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The instant case should be distinguished from the cases of People v. Duque and Presidential
Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto wherein we upheld the view that
the prescriptive period started to run only upon the discovery of the illegal nature of the acts
constituting the offense. The first case involves the crime of illegal recruitment where the
accused, Napoleon Duque, was found to have misrepresented himself to several job applicants
as a registered employment agent duly recognized by the Philippine Overseas Employment
Agency (POEA). Due to the said misrepresentation of the accused, the applicable prescriptive
period began to run not from the time of recruitment of job applicants by the accused but from
the time his recruitment activities were ascertained by the complainants and the POEA to have
been carried out without any license or authority from the government. The second, or Desierto
case, which was decided by this Court on October 25, 1999, involves the grant of alleged
behest loans by certain government-owned and controlled financial institutions to several
individuals and corporations closely associated with the then President Ferdinand E. Marcos
and his relatives. It was alleged that the public officials concerned, who were charged in the
corresponding Informations, connived or conspired with the beneficiaries of the loans in
covering up the anomalous transactions. Under the circumstances, it was impossible for the
State, the aggrieved party, to have known the violations of R.A. No. 3019 at the time the
questioned transactions were made. The prescriptive period started to run only upon discovery
of the alleged illegality of the transactions after the investigations thereon were conducted.

SERMONIA, vs. CA
G.R. No. 109454 June 14, 1994
FACTS:
On 26 May 1992, petitioner Jose C. Sermonia was charged with bigamy before the RTC of
Pasig, Br. 151, for contracting marriage with Ma. Lourdes Unson on 15 February 1975 while his
prior marriage to Virginia C. Nievera remained valid and subsisting.
Petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that his criminal liability for bigamy has
been extinguished by prescription.
In the order of 1 October 1992, respondent judge denied the motion to quash. On 27 October
1992, he likewise denied the motion to reconsider his order of denial.
Petitioner challenged the above orders before the Court of Appeals through a petition
for certiorari and prohibition. In the assailed decision of 21 January 1993, his petition was
dismissed for lack of merit.
In this recourse, petitioner contends that his criminal liability for bigamy has been obliterated by
prescription. He avers that since the second marriage contract was duly registered with the
Office of the Civil Registrar in 1975, such fact of registration makes it a matter of public record
and thus constitutes notice to the whole world. The offended party therefore is considered to
have had constructive notice of the subsequent marriage as of 1975; hence, prescription
commenced to run on the day the marriage contract was registered. For this reason, the
corresponding information for bigamy should have been filed on or before 1990 and not only in
1992.
On the other hand, the prosecution maintains that the prescriptive period does not begin from
the commission of the crime but from the time of discovery by complainant which was in July
1991.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the prosecution of Jose C. Sermonia for bigamy has already prescribed.
HELD:
No. The non-application to the crime of bigamy of the principle of constructive notice is not
contrary to the well entrenched policy that penal laws should be construed liberally in favor of
the accused. To compute the prescriptive period for the offense of bigamy from registration
thereof would amount to almost absolving the offenders thereof for liability therefor. While the
celebration of the bigamous marriage may be said to be open and made of public record by its
registration, the offender however is not truthful as he conceals from the officiating authority and
those concerned the existence of his previous subsisting marriage. He does not reveal to them
that he is still a married person. He likewise conceals from his legitimate spouse his bigamous
marriage. And for these, he contracts the bigamous marriage in a place where he is not known
to be still a married person. And such a place may be anywhere, under which circumstance, the
discovery of the bigamous marriage is rendered quite difficult and would take time. It is therefore
reasonable that the prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy should be counted only from the
day on which the said crime was discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their
agency.
Romualdez v. Marcelo, etc. et al 479 SCRA 89 (G.R. Nos. 165510-33, July 28, 2006)
Facts: Respondent Ombudsman argued that applying the provisions of Art.91 RPC suppletorily, the
absence of petitioner from the Philippines from 1986 to 2000 prevented the running of the
corresponding prescriptive period for the offense charged (violation of RA 3019 Anti-Graft & Corrupt
Practices Act: Failure to file SAL 1967-1985 as Ambassador Extraordinary & Plenipotentiary, and
1963-1966 as DFA Technical Assistant).
Issue: WON the offense charged already prescribed?
Held: Yes. Act No. 3326, which governs the computation of prescription of offenses defined by and
penalized under special laws, provides in relevant part that prescription shall begin to run from
discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
Reiterating the earlier case of People vs. Duque (G.R. No, 100285, Aug.13, 1992), it declared that
the aforequoted phrase should be either considered as surplusage or should be deemed preceded
by the word until.
SC called attention to the fact that Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326 is conspicuously silent as to whether that
absence of the offender bars the running of the prescriptive period. Such silence of the law can only
be interpreted to mean that Sec. 2 of Act 3326, unlike the explicit mandate in Art. 91, did not intend
such an interruption of the prescription. Had the legislature intended to include the accuseds
absence from the Philippines as a ground for the interruption of the prescriptive period in special
laws, it could have easily been provided in Act 3326, in the same manner that it expressly so
provided in Sec. 281 of R.A. 8424, the Tax Reform Act of 1997, and other cases.

SUBSIDIARY LIABILITY

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Basilio v. CA, March 17, 2000 (328 SCRA 341, G.R. # 113433)
Facts: Simplicio Pronebo was charged with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property with double homicide and double physical injuries. Accused was convicted
of Reckless Imrpudence resulting in the death of Danilo Advincula and is hereby sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and four (4) months, as minimum to six (6)
years of prision correccional, as maximum, and to indemnify the heirs of Danilo Advincula
P30,000.00 for the latters death, P31,614.00, as actual and compensatory damages.
P2,000,000.00 for the loss of his earning capacity. P150,000.00, as moral damages, and
P30,000.00 as attorneys fees, plus the costs of suit."
Thereafter, the accused filed an application for probation, so that the above judgment became
final and executory.
Pertinently, the trial court also found that at the time of the vehicular accident accused Pronebo
was employed as the driver of the dump truck owned by petitioner Luisito Basilio.
On March 27, 1991, petitioner Basilio filed with the trial court a "Special Appearance and Motion
for Reconsideration" praying that the judgment dated February 4, 1991, be reconsidered and set
aside insofar as it affected him and subjected him to a subsidiary liability for the civil aspect of
the criminal case. The motion was denied for lack of merit ,petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal.
Meanwhile, private respondent filed a Motion for Execution of the subsidiary civil liability of
petitioner Basilio.
The trial court issued two separate Orders, one denied due course and dismissed Basilios
appeal for having been filed beyond the reglementary period, the other directed the issuance of
a writ of execution against him for the enforcement and satisfaction of the award of civil
indemnity.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court with the
Court of Appeals, alleging that respondent judge acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing: (1) the Order dated September 16, 1991, denying the petitioners motion for
reconsideration of the judgment dated February 4, 1991 insofar as the subsidiary liability of the
petitioner was concerned, and (2) the Order dated April 7, 1992, directing the issuance of a writ
of execution against the petitioner. Before the appellate court, petitioner claimed he was not
afforded due process when he was found subsidiarily liable for the civil liability of the accused
Pronebo in the criminal case. The CA dismissed the petition and the MR filed by the petitioner.
Issue: WON the petitioner as employer may file a Motion for Reconsideration concerning civil
liability decreed in the judgment if he is not a party to the criminal case?
Held: No. He is not a proper party.
The statutory basis for an employers subsidiary liability is found in Article 103 of the Revised
Penal Code. [Art. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. The subsidiary liability
established in the next preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and
corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils,
workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties]. This liability is enforceable
in the same criminal proceeding where the award is made. [Rule 111, Sec. 1: Institution of
criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of

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civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the
civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the
criminal action.] However, before execution against an employer ensues, there must be a
determination, in a hearing set for the purpose of 1) the existence of an employer-employee
relationship; 2) that the employer is engaged in some kind of industry; 3) that the employee is
adjudged guilty of the wrongful act and found to have committed the offense in the discharge of
his duties (not necessarily any offense he commits "while" in the discharge of such duties; and
4) that said employee is insolvent.19 [Yonaha vs. CA, 255 SCRA 397, 402 (1996).]
In Vda. De Paman vs. Seeris, 115 SCRA 709, 714 (1982), the Court observed that the
drawback in the enforcement of the subsidiary liability in the same criminal proceeding is that the
alleged employer is not afforded due process. Not being a party to the case, he is not heard as
to whether he is indeed the employer. Hence, we held:
"To remedy the situation and thereby afford due process to the alleged employer, this
Court directed the court a quo in Pajarito vs. Seeris to hear and decide in the same
proceeding the subsidiary liability of the alleged owner and operator of the passenger bus.
It was explained therein that the proceeding for the enforcement of the subsidiary liability
may be considered as part of the proceeding for the execution of the judgment. A case in
which an execution has been issued is regarded as still pending so that all proceedings
on the execution are proceedings in the suit."
There are two instances when the existence of an employer-employee relationship of an
accused driver and the alleged vehicle owner may be determined. One during the criminal
proceeding, and the other, during the proceeding for the execution of the judgment. In both
instances, petitioner should be given the opportunity to be heard, which is the essence of due
process.
In the present case, petitioner knew of the criminal case that was filed against accused because
it was his truck that was involved in the incident. Further, it was the insurance company, with
which his truck was insured, that provided the counsel for the accused, pursuant to the
stipulations in their contract. Petitioner did not intervene in the criminal proceedings, despite
knowledge, through counsel, that the prosecution adduced evidence to show employeremployee relationship. With the convicts application for probation, the trial courts judgment
became final and executory. The lower court then, did not err when it found that petitioner was
not denied due process. He had all his chances to intervene in the criminal proceedings, and
prove that he was not the employer of the accused, but he chooses not to intervene at the
appropriate time.
The subsidiary liability maybe enforced only upon a motion for subsidiary writ of execution against
the employer and upon proof that the employee is insolvent.