Northeastern Political Science Association

Why There Cannot Be a Theory of Politics

Author(s): John G. Gunnell
Source: Polity, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Summer, 1997), pp. 519-537
Published by: Palgrave Macmillan Journals
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Why There Cannot Be

a Theory of Politics
John G. Gunnell
State University of New York at Albany

Although the idea of a universal theory of politics, both empirical and

normative, remains pervasive in the discursive practices of political
science and political theory, such a notion can be sustained only in a
trivial sense. Since politics is a historical configuration of conventional
phenomena, it cannot be assigned an ontological or theoretical status.
There can be a theory of politics only in the derivative sense of a
general theory of human conventions, and this entails rethinking some
of the common claims about similarities and differences between
natural and social science. The cognitive issue of a theory of politics
must ultimately be understood in the context of the practical problem
of the relationship between social science and its subject matter.
John G. Gunnell is Distinguished Professor of Political Science in the
Graduate School of Public Affairs at the State University of New
York at Albany.

And this may be properly enough called a convention . . . since the

actions of each of us have a reference to those of the other...
David Hume
The concept of a general theory of politics emanates from diverse perspectives. One distinct source has been, and continues to be, political science's dream in its boldest moments, such as the height of the behavioral
era or more recent hopes associated with rational choice analysis, of
finding one dominant unifying conceptual structure for explaining political phenomena. Such a conceptual structure would, in turn, it was
claimed, yield nomothetic empirical knowledge of politics. In more
modest moods, the goal of the discipline has been to achieve a measure
of theoretical unity either through plural, but converging, analytical
frameworks or through cumulative empirical generalizations. Equally
persistent, however, has been a quite different, and often oppositional,

Polity
Polity

Number44
Volume
XXIX,Number
Volume
XXIX,

1997

Summer
Summer
1997

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520 Why There Cannot Be a Theoryof Politics

quest for a universal theory of politics or "the political." Hannah
Arendt, Leo Strauss, Sheldon Wolin, and others were committedto
recoveringand articulatinga more qualitativesense of the essenceand
preeminenceof politicallife.
My concern is neither to revisit these argumentsnor to examine in
detail contemporaryvarietiesof these generalpositions. Rather, I will
challengethe basic assumptionthat therecan be a generaltheoryof politics. AlthoughI will attemptto unpacksome of the complexitiesinherent
in this argument,the core claim is that politics is a particularhistorical
configurationof conventionalor symbolic phenomenaand cannot, in
itself, be the subject of theoreticalstatements-either empiricalor normative. Conventionsare manifest in and constitutiveof instances of
action and speech, includingpracticessuch as politics, but only conventions as such can be a theoreticalobject. An elaborationof a general
theory of conventionsand human action is beyond the scope of this
essay. My principalconcernis to clarifywhatwe can, and should,mean
whenwe talk about theoryin politicalinquiry.I do, however,discussone
principalsourceof the uneasinessthat attendsthe idea of acceptingpolitics as merelya realmof historicalparticularitiesor conventionaltokens.
This is the problemof the practicalrelationshipbetweensocial science
and politics.
My basicthesis is closelytied to two otherpropositions:that thereis a
logical symmetrybetween theory and fact, and that there is a logical
asymmetrybetween social and naturalscience. Stated abstractly,these
arehardlynovel claims, particularlyin the intellectualambienceof postpositivism,but in the courseof explicatingthem, I will attemptboth to
add weightto the generalclaimsand to distinguishsharplymy formulation from the mannerin which they have most often been framedand
defended.As an entryinto this discussion,I beginwith a selectivereprise
of a certainline of argumentin the philosophyof social science. I focus
on the work of PeterWinchin partbecausehis position is still often not
clearlyunderstoodand in part becausehis work exemplifiesmanyof the
issues and problemsthat I wish to confront.

1. See John G. Gunnell,"PoliticalInquiryandthe Conceptof Action:A Phenomenological Analysis," in Phenomenology and the Social Sciences, ed. Maurice Natanson

(Evanston,IL: NorthwesternUniversityPress, 1973);"PoliticalTheoryand the Theoryof

Action," WesternPolitical Quarterly,34 (September1981);"Politics and the Theoryof

the Conventional Object" in Between Philosophy and Politics: The Alienation of Political

Theory(Amherst:Universityof MassachusettsPress, 1986),ch. 6.

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John G. Gunnell 521

I.
More than a generation ago, Winch argued that there could not be
theoriesof social phenomena.His point was that only naturalphenomena, with their inherentregularities,were susceptibleto generalcausal
law-likeexplanations.When social scienceis conceivedin terms of the
methodologyof naturalscience,it is, he claimed,"misbegotten."Social
scienceproperlyunderstood,he suggested,is really a mode of philosophy or fundamentallylike philosophy.Winchdefinedphilosophyas concernedwith conceptualanalysis, and he arguedthat the task of social
scienceis, similarly,to understandthe conceptsthat informconventional
or "rule-governed"and "meaningful"socialaction. Furthermore,since
social science must also specify "what is involved in the concept of a
social phenomenon"and must be concernedwith "givingan accountof
social phenomenain general," it could be said that "many of the more
important theoreticalissues which have been raised in those studies
belongto philosophyratherthan to scienceand are, therefore,to be settled by a priori conceptualanalysisratherthan empiricalresearch."2
This was, for some, a confusing set of claims, since the concernsof
philosophyand social scienceas institutionalizedpracticesare considerably different. Winch'sequationbetweenphilosophyand social science
was, however,part of a rhetoricalstrategydesignedto justify a new version of the old argumentthat social science and naturalscience were
"logicallyincompatible."3Beforepursuingthis issue, however,thereare
severalother featuresof Winch's work that I will bring into focus.
First of all, while harking back to argumentssuch as that of Max
Weberregardingthe ultimatelyhistoricalor idiographicnatureof social
scientificexplanationand the need for an internalor subjectiveunderstandingof social action, Winch's position was explicitlygroundedin
LudwigWittgenstein'saccountof languageand action. One of the principal advancesin this formulation, focused on the public characterof
conventionalactivity, was to escape the difficultiesassociatedwith the
image of intuitive interpretationthat had characterizedthe claims of
individualssuch as R. G. Collingwoodas well as certainGermanidealist
accountsof the human sciences.4Second, despiteWinch'sstress on the
specialattributesof social phenomenathat demanda methodologydifferent from that of the naturalsciences,his work was basicallya meta2. Peter Winch, The Idea of a Social Science and its Relationshipto Philosophy

(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958), pp. 15-18, 40-43 (emphasis added).

3. Winch, TheIdea of a Social Science,p. 73.

4. Most notably Wilhelm Dilthey.

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522 Why There Cannot Be a Theory of Politics

theoreticalchallenge to positivist conceptions of the nature of social
scientificexplanation.Althoughpredicatedon a generalimage of social
reality,it was most essentiallyan exercisein the philosophyof social science. Winch's book, then, cannot be construed as fulfilling his own
demandfor a full accountof the natureof social phenomena,that is, a
thoroughexplicationof the "notion of a form of life as such" whichhe
referredto as a "theoretical"issue. Third, despitethe fact that Winch's
argumentwas directed against the dominant positivist philosophy of
social science,and such ancillarydoctrinesas that of the methodological
unity of science, it was still mortgagedto that philosophy. All of the
images of natural science Winch used as a contrast model in defining
social scientific inquiry were drawn from the positivist account of the
logic and epistemologyof naturalscience.
Fourth, an importantpart of Winch's analysis was to demonstrate
what I will referto as the second-ordercharacterof social inquiry.Just
as philosophyis concerned,for example,with how the first-orderpractice of naturalscienceconceivesof realityand the acquisitionof knowledge, social science must elucidate the assumptionsabout reality and
knowledge in various kinds of social activity. The subject matter of
social scienceis, in Winch'swords, another"discursive"activity.Finally, his accountalso implicitlyraisedthe issue of the practicalas well as
the cognitiverelationshipbetween first and second-orderpractices.He
rejectedboth the "master-scientist"image of philosophythat had been
so centralto the field and that would be challengedeven morepointedly
by later critics, such as RichardRorty,5but he also took pains to disassociatehimself from an "underlabourer"view of philosophyand, by
implication, of social science, which suggested a lack of interaction
betweenthe practiceof understanding"humanconduct" and the practices that were the object of that understanding.6Winch'sformulation,
then, left a fundamentalambiguityabout the practicalrelationshpof
second-orderdiscoursesto theirsubjectmatter.This ambiguitywould be
seizedupon by criticsof a morerationalistbent who, from variousideologicalperspectives,soughtsupportfor a distinctlyjudgmentaland interventionist image of social science and political theory, one that went
beyondmere"understanding"and whatthey believedwerethe relativist
premisesand implicationsof Winch'sposition.7
5. Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979).
6. See, for example, Michael Oakeshott, On Human Conduct (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1975).
7. See, for example, Richard Bernstein, The Restructuring of Social and Political
Theory (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976).

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John G. Gunnell 523

Many similar arguments about the autonomy of social scientific
inquiry, from both the perspectiveof Continentalphilosophy, such as
phenomenology, and post-Wittgensteiniananalytical philosophy, appeared in the next few years.8CharlesTaylor, for example, published
what would become a classicessayabout the interpretiveor hermeneutical characterof social sciencewhich, he claimed, distinguishedit from
natural science's approachto the explanationof "brute data."9 Like
Winch's, Taylor'sanalysisremainedbound withinthe horizon of positivism in terms of his descriptionof the form of explanation,and relationship between theory and fact, that characterizedthe practice of
naturalscience. Furthermore,although Taylor had a great deal to say
about the "textual"natureof socialphenomenaand the particularmode
of inquirythat this required,whathe, like Winch,offered was primarily
an alternativeto the positivist philosophicalimage of social scientific
inquiry.His analogybetweentexts and social action, as well as the theoretical grounds of their similarity,were thinly developed. Taylor did,
however,havemoreto say aboutthe usesof social science.His argument
was informed by a notion of social science as a reflectivecritical endeavor directedtoward social enlightenment.
While these anti-positivistphilosophersof social science stressedthe
conceptualand conventionalcharacterof social reality, their principal
concernwas to challengethe idea of the unity of scienceand to demonstratethat the study of social phenomenarequireda methodologydifferent from that of naturalscience. Their argumentsabout the nature
and autonomyof social inquiryamounted,then, to philosophicalreconstructionsof the logic of social science, and they remainedbeholdento
positivist accounts of natural science. Although their work contained
theoreticalintimations,they did not makegood on theirpromissorynote
to provide what Winch had called a "theoretical"account of "social
phenomenain general."Therewas, in effect, an inversionof epistemology and theory,sincesubstantiveconceptionsof socialrealitywereintroduced largelyin supportof claims about the natureof social scientific
inquiry.Finally,althoughthey focusedon the issue of the cognitiverelationship of social scienceto its subject-matter,they did not, despitethe
pointed and diversepositions taken by individualssuch as Taylor and
MichaelOakeshott, confront adequatelythe issue of the practicalrela8. For representative selections, see Fred Dallmayr and Thomas A. McCarthy, eds.,
Understanding and Social Inquiry (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press,
1977).
9. Charles Taylor, "Interpretation and the Sciences of Man," Review of Metaphysics,
25 (September 1971).

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524 Why ThereCannot Be a Theoryof Politics

tionship. This latter issue, however, has historicallyboth driven the
searchfor a theory of politicsand drawnsocial scienceinto the orbit of
the philosophyof science.
II.

The positivistphilosophyof naturalsciencenot only remainsembedded

in the practiceand self-imageof muchof social sciencebut continuesto
constrain attempts to analyze the differencesand similaritiesbetween
naturaland social science. In much of the literatureof CriticalTheory,
for example, from Max Horkheimerto Jiirgen Habermas, a crucial
themehas beenthe distinctionbetweensocialand naturalscience,but the
latterhas been representedin positivistterms.Thereis also a widespread
and more generalassumptionthat the languageof the philosophyof science and its account of scienceis congruentwith the structureof scientific practice.This has been perpetuatedin the post-positivistperiodby
attemptsto redescribe,or even conduct, social sciencein termsof postpositivistaccountsof social scientificexplanation.
This is only one manifestationof a yet largerproblem.Political and
social theoryhas, in a numberof ways, becomeunreflectivelyindentured
to philosophy. In no case is this more true than with respectto the concept of theory. It is very difficult when discussingthe conceptof theory
in naturalsciencenot to resortto some philosophicalrendition,or a remnant thereof, and this syndromehas spilledover into the social sciences.
This is because "theory" is primarilya metatheoreticalterm and concept. Apart from rareexceptions,such as theoreticalphysics,it only has
systematicmeaningin the practiceof talking about science-that is, in
the philosophyof science. Neitherthe languageof sciencenor scientific
practice,for the most part, manifestsany such internallydiscriminated
sphere.Part of the reasonthat social scienceand politicaltheoryare so
obsessedwith the issueof theory,that is, with whatit is, how to makeit,
and how to deployit, is becausephilosophyhas for so long conveyedthe
messagethat theoryis a keycomponentof science.Thismay be meaningful as a metatheoreticalclaim, but it has littleto do withcharting,or constituting,the actual activityof science.
The initiatingissue in the philosophyof scienceat its late nineteenthcenturyinception, which has most fundamentallyshaped its discursive
developmentto this day, is that of the natureof theory. But, as a general
problem, this is a philosophicalratherthan a scientificissue. Although
there have also been parallelargumentsin philosophyabout the nature
of scientificfacts, this concept,like theory,has no distinctcounterpartin
the languageand practiceof naturalscience. The terms may appearin

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John G. Gunnell 525

various contexts in scientific discourse, but the activity of science is
organizedaroundspecificempiricalclaimsof varyingdegreesof generality and not around a metalanguagefor talking about classes of claims
such as theory and fact, and the relationshipbetweenthese classes.
Withinthe practiceof naturalscience,theorysometimesreferssimply
to grandideasor cosmologicalclaimssuchas that aboutthe "big bang."
Often it indicatesgenerallyacceptedideas-such as atomic theory, the
theoryof relativity,and the theoryof evolution. Sometimes,on the contrary,it refersto hypothesisand conjecture-unconfirmedclaims.Occasionally it alludes to the, either circumstantiallyor intrinsically,unobservabledimensionsof physicalphenomena.Finally, it is sometimes
used to designateparticularpotentiallyfalsifiableempiricalclaims such
as the "theories"abouthow the GrandCanyonwas formed.Philosophical concepts of theory, and debates about the definition of "theory,"
have little or no significancewithin the practiceof naturalscience. In
social science,however,muchgreatersignificance,and contentiousness,
surroundsthe conceptof theory, its identity, what possessesthis status,
its role in inquiry, and how it relatesto facts. Much of this discussion,
however,is primarilythe residueof philosophicalissues and burdened
with the baggageattachingto those issues. Is it possible,then, to say anything, of generalsocial scientificrelevance,about a theoryof politicsor about why therecannotbe a theoryof politics-without simplylegislating the meaningof "theory"?
The plural meaning of "theory" in natural science does, indirectly,
indicatea dimensionof the discourseof naturalsciencethat social sciencemightwell emulatebut has beenobscuredby the darkglassof philosophicallymediatedimages.Whatis commonto manyof the diverseuses
of the term "theory" in naturalscience is the assumptionthat theories
are existenceclaims.This is also close to the classicalmeaningof the root
concept-theoria, which was alwaysexplicatedin terms of an oracular
metaphorindicating,whateverthe realmof reality, the apprehensionof
somethingconcreteand existential.It also conveyeda sense of identity
betweenthe act of seeingand the object that was seen. By the eighteenth
and nineteenthcenturies,however,therehad been a fundamentaltransformationin the conceptof theoryas it took on the connotationof speculationabout a separatefactualor phenomenalrealityand was viewedas
a conceptualframeworkfor organizingobservations.
The late nineteenth-centurycrisis of physics, and the conclusionthat
Newtonianmechanicswas only a theory, sealedthe philosophicalfate of
the concept and insuredits subservienceto the idea of a distinct and
givenorderof facts as the beginning,end, and groundof science,and as
the sourceof both the meaningand validityof a superstructureof theo-

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526 Why There Cannot Be a Theory of Politics

reticaltermsand claims. Whatis often not understood,however,is that
the philosophyof logical positivism,whichcodified this view, as well as
much of later empiricismwas, despite its rejection of metaphysics,
informedby idealistphilosophy. This was the case both with respectto
the notion of theoryas a mentalconstructfor organizingperceptionand
with respectto the assumptionthat factualrealitywas conveyedby, and
ultimatelyamountedto, propositionsbasedon observationsreducibleto
sensory experience.This entailed a rejection of what might be called
theoreticalrealism,or the assumptionthat theoriesare themselvesbasic
existence claims, and the adoption of a variety of instrumentalistaccounts of theory. Theory was conceivedas a conceptualtool for generalizingabout, and economicallystructuringand explaining,epistemologically and ontologicallyindependentobservablefacts.
Duringthe twentiethcentury, instrumentalismas a theory of theory
swept the social sciences.It prevailedin part becauseit was propagated
by the positivistsand logical empiricistswho dominatedthe philosophy
of science.But the attractionof instrumentalismalso had its roots in the
history of the social sciences. These disciplinessprang from practical
concernsand were conceivedas instrumentsof social change. Practical
instrumentalismand cognitive instrumentalismwere mutuallyreinforcing. Finally, the instrumentalistinterpretationmade the goal of emulating naturalscienceseem more plausible.If theories, despitetheir somewhat depreciatedepistemologicalstatus, were a hallmarkof advanced
sciencebut in the end somewhatarbitraryschemesand devicesfor dealing with given facts, scienceseemedwithinthe reachof everyone.There
has been a long historyof cognitiveinstrumentalismin social science,but
more recent classic statementsof the instrumentalistaccount of theory
have been articulatedby a wide range of individualsincludingMilton
Friedman,TalcottParsons,AnthonyDowns, and a varietyof behavioral
political scientists.10

remainsthe pervasiveimage of theoryin the practice

Instrumentalism
of social science.However,it is a particularlyperniciousformulation.In
additionto its problemsas a philosophicalaccountof theory, it subverts
what I have distinguishedas theoryand theorizingwithinthe activityof
social science. This is the class of claims, withinany practiceof knowledge, that addressesand answers, explicitlyor implicitly, the issue of
what kindsof thingsexist and the mannerof their existence.A theory is
what may be called an empiricalontology. Theories are neither con-

10. See Gunnell, Between Philosophy and Politics, ch. 2, for a discussion of instrumentalism in political theory and in the philosophy of science.

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John G. Gunnell 527

ceptual constructions that explain facts nor generalizations from facts.

They are the claims that tell us what there is to be explained-or described and evaluated. Facts are simply particularized theories, and
theories are generalized facts. Both theories and facts are specified by the
criteria of justified belief operative in a particular disciplinary matrix and
community of inquiry."'
If we bracket the wide variety of things that are usually called theory in
social science, theory, in the sense that I have used the term, is nevertheless always present. The facts discriminated and described by social science, upon which various conceptual schemes and models are imposed,
are informed by theories of social reality, but these theories are usually
submerged, unreflective, and unexplicated. Such persuasions as rational
choice analysis and the "new institutionalism," for example, both imply
theories, albeit quite different, of human action and social conventions
in general, but they are seldom specified or defended. Both are essentially frameworks for analyzing patterns of behavior, but the concept of
behavior as such tends to remain theoretically opaque.
III.
Two explicit, but quite different, attempts to elaborate a theory of
action, and conventionality, are represented in the 1951 work of Parsons
and Shils and the 1984 treatise by Habermas.12The former was largely an
attempt to combine behaviorist psychology and positivist philosophy.
The latter was certainly more complex, but suffered from a persistent
inversion of epistemology and theory. Habermas tailored his analysis of
action to justify his image of a critical social science and to support
a claim about universal grounds of normative judgment. Quentin
Skinner's work represents yet another example of a move toward theory
which falters as theory becomes subservient to the defense of a particular
epistemology of historical understanding and textual interpretation.13
Anthony Giddens has attempted to reconcile notions of agency and
structure and to develop a general theory of action, but, on close inspec11. For a fuller discussion, see John G. Gunnell, "Realizing Theory: The Philosophy of
Science Revisited," Journal of Politics, 57 (November 1995).
12. Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils, eds., Toward a General Theory of Action
(Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1949); Jiirgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action,
Vol. 1, Reason and the Rationalization of Society (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984).
13. James Tully, Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and His Critics (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1988); John G. Gunnell, "Interpretation and the History of
Political Theory: Apology and Epistemology," American Political Science Review, 76
(June 1982).

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528 Why There CannotBe a Theoryof Politics

tion, his constructionis largelya compositeof variousmetatheoretical
claims about the natureof social scientificexplanation.14
Whetherthey focus on language,action, speech,or texts, whatWinch,
Taylor,Habermas,Skinner,Giddens,and many othershave in common
is the claim that social reality is conventionaland that this entails a
speciallogic and idiom of inquiry.Yet the theoryof conventionsremains
obscureand incomplete,in part becauseof their focus on distinguishing
social sciencefrom naturalscience. Thereare groundsfor reconsidering
this matter,and at least one reasonto embracenaturalscienceas a model
-but not because of some philosophicalimage of natural science or
some philosophicaldogma about the unity of scientific explanation.
Rather,the naturalsciencesrepresentwhat I will call determinatepractices of knowledge.Such practicesare fundamentallyidentifiedby the
fact that they are predicatedon explicit theories or basic substantive
realityclaims. Theremay be a numberof reasonswhy theory in social
sciencecannot, or is unlikelyto be, as paradigmaticand hegemonicas in
natural science, but if there is to be any validity accorded to postpositivistphilosophiesof social sciencethat stressunderstandingconventional objects, they must be theoreticallyredeemed.Yet despitethe functional parallelbetweentheory in naturaland social science, that is, the
need in both cases for an accountof the kind of phenomenawhichthey
address,it is still necessaryto differentiatelogicallybetweentheseclasses
of enterprise.
We often bark up the wrong gum tree when we pursuethe issue of
whatdistinguishesnaturalsciencefrom socialscience.Fromone perspective, it is, or should be, the same thing that distinguishesone natural
sciencefrom another-the theoretical,and factual, domainthat defines
its units and boundaries.Yet there remainsa nagging,and reasonable,
belief that the social sciencesare somehowgenericallydifferentfrom the
naturalsciences.I will insistthat they are, but not exactlyfor the reasons
that have been traditionallyinvoked, even though I will arguethat the
distinctiondoes turn on the conventionalityof social phenomena.
The answeris certainlynot that the naturalsciencesdeal with a special
kind of facts that can be discriminatedby attributessuch as hard, objective, observable, unchanging,or brutish. All facts, as such, whether
social or natural,are logicallyequal. Factsare neitherthingsnor a class
of things but rathera class of propositions.Winch, Taylor, and others

14. Anthony Giddens, New Rules of Sociological Method (New York: Basic Books,
1976); The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1984).

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John G. Gunnell 529

were really saying that there is a fundamental difference in the manner of

cognition; that there is something about natural phenomena that is distinct and separate from their explanation or the claims of a knower,
while understanding social phenomena involves achieving a certain sort
of identity with, or sharing of, the ideas and intentions behind behavior.
Winch even hinted that the full understanding of a human practice might
entail at least vicarious participation.
These arguments were on the right track with respect to their focus on
the conventional character of social phenomena, but their image of the
cognitive relationship between social science and its object led them to
draw incorrect conclusions. To the extent that it makes sense to talk
about some general basic difference in kind between natural and social
phenomena, and to draw out the cognitive entailments of the conventionality of the latter, the genre of arguments advanced by individuals
such as Taylor has seriously misconstrued, if not transposed, the character of this difference.
IV.
The world, the order of reality, explained by natural science is not a
world that is in some prior fashion experientially given. It is, in a radical
sense, constituted by the theories and facts of science; it is a discursive
residue of scientific practice. We may speak metaphorically about
natural science explaining or interpreting nature, but while we may find
it soothing to believe, metaphysically, in the autonomy of nature, we
know it only through the language of science or some other logically
comparable realm of discourse (religion, common sense, etc.). The field
of geology is a paradigm case. When basic geological theories change, it
is not only the earth that changes but the history of the earth-a history
that can be nothing other than a retrospective projection or extrapolation
of those theories. In an intellectual climate influenced by postmodernism, it may be more tempting than ever to suggest that the meaning of
texts and other conventional objects is a function of their interpretation
and the theories of which, and by which, the interpreter is possessed.
There is an important element of truth in this claim, but it is not the element that has usually been extracted.
What distinguishes natural science, and a number of other knowledge
practices that I will designate as consisting of primarily first-order discourses, is that while their accounts of their subject matter may change
internally or compete with one another externally, it makes no sense to
ask about the identity of the phenomena apart from the theoretical constructions that are constitutive of such phenomena. There is no theo-

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530 Why ThereCannotBe a Theoryof Politics

reticallyneutralworld or a languagein whichto conveyit. The worldis
not a piece of commoncurrencythat can be cashedin at any knowledge
bank. As Nelson Goodmanput it, "the uniformityof naturewhich we
marvelat or the unreliabilitywe protestbelongs to a world of our own
making."15
The social sciencesand philosophy,however,belongto the categoryof
second-orderdiscourses.They are activitiesthat study other activities.
They are supervenientpractices that cognitively confront a subject
matterthat is discursivelypreconstitutedand preinterpreted.This world
of humanconventionis "given" in a mannerin whichthe naturalworld
is not. The worldof particularsocial practicesencounteredby social science is not theoreticallyconstructedby social science.Sincethe meaning
of that world, both its presentand the past, may seem to be infinitely
contested in second-orderinquiry, it is tempting to suggest that the
meaningof social phenomenais always relativeto an interpretationof
them. Similarly,many are wont to say that there is no literal or final
meaningof a text, since meaningis a functionof the authorityof interpretive communities.16This kind of claim has merit, but it requires
unpackingand examination,and there is an importantsense in which
this is less true of social sciencethan of naturalscience.
Whentalkingabout the interpretationof a text, it is importantto distinguish, although few discussionsdo, betweeninterpretationwithina
practiceand interpretationbetweenpractices.Whileit wouldbe perfectly
reasonableto claim, for example,that the meaningof a scientifictreatise
is a function of the interpretationthat scientistsascribeto it, it is much
more difficult to make the claim that the meaningof such a text, or the
meaningof a social practice,is a function of externalor second-order
interpretations.Texas as well as configurationsof social phenomena
have a certainbasic conceptualautonomy. Theirmeaningis not, in the
first instance, a product of externalinterpretationany more than the
meaningof scientificdiscourseis a productof the philosophyof science.
Indigenousinterpretationsmay, however,be challengedby second-order
discourses.
The "world" whichtraditionalphilosophicalepistemologyhas so long
soughtto vouchsafeby transcendingparticularhistoricalfirst-orderconstructionsis, indeed, as Goodman and Rorty have suggested,a world
with which we can dispense.As Goodmannoted

15. Nelson Goodman, Ways of Worldmaking (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1978), p. 10.
16. Stanley Fish, Is There a Text in this Class? TheAuthority of Interpretive Communities (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988).

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John G. Gunnell 531

While we may speak of determiningwhat versions are right as
learningaboutthe "world," the worldsupposedlybeingthat which
all rightversionsdescribe,all we learnabout the worldis contained
in these rightversionsof it; and whilethe underlyingworld, bereft
of these, need not be deniedto those who love it, it is perhapson
the whole a world well lost.17
We cannot, however,reducethe conventionalworldsof social phenomena to the constructionsof social science. Even though social science's
adoptionof theoreticalinstrumentalismand the idea of the dichotomyof
theory and fact was philosophicallyvulnerable,it may have reflectedan
intuitiveawarenessthat thereis a significantsensein whichsocial science
theoriesare imposedon the facts or, more accurately,that thereis a confrontationbetweentwo realmsof theoryand fact representedin secondand first-orderdiscourses.Thereis, then, in principle,and almostnecessarily, a cognitiveconflict betweensocial scienceand its subjectmatter
whichdoes not exist in the case of naturalscience.Thereis a conflict of
cognitiveauthoritiesconcerningthe issue of appearanceand realityand
such mattersas the identityof the subjectmatter.
At this point we can begin to see the fundamentaldifferencebetween
naturaland social science,and the implicationsof the conventionalityof
social phenomena.The differenceis not rooted in the distinctivenessof
some form of cognitionsuch as "understanding."The conceptof understandingor interpretationas a mode of knowingimpliesthe autonomy
and separateidentity of the object. "Interpretation"derivesfrom the
Latin root interpreswhich means negotiator, and interpretationis,
quite literally,the negotiationof meaning. It involvesa dialecticalrelationshpbetweentwo social constructions-that of the social scientistand
that of the social actor. The distinctivenessof social scienceis, then, a
matter of the relationshipbetween second- and first-orderdiscourses.
But the relationshpof social scienceto its subjectmatteris not only cognitive. It is, at least potentially,also practical.
Thereis a fundamentalwill to power built into all metapracticesand
metadiscourseswith respectto theirrelationshpto theirobjectof inquiry.
A claimto cognitiveauthorityis almostinseparablefrom a claimto practical authority,and a claimto practicalauthorityinevitablyrestson cognitive grounds. Since metapractices,such as social science, usually lack
authoritywithin the sphereof their subjectmatter, their claim to prac17. Nelson Goodman, "The Way the World Is," in Problems and Projects
(Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1972). Also see Richard Rorty, "The World Well Lost," Journal of
Philosophy, 69 (1972).

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532 Why There Cannot Be a Theory of Politics

tical authority must often rest on cognitive grounds, on the idea of theoretical intervention. It is from this concern that the search for a theory of
politics has historically emanated.
V.
Although there is a great deal of philosophical discussion about the problem of "theory and practice," there are definite limits to what can be
said generically about the relationship between what I prefer to call
second- and first-order discourses. Second-order practices-such as
social science, the philosophy of science, and epistemology in generalwere originally discourses of legitimation and critique within the practices from which they became detached and which became their object of
knowledge. Their histories, as separate institutionalized enterprises, could
be construed as a story of successive strategies for reassimilation into
the practices that constitute the object and the recovery of authority. In
the case of the philosophy of science, the normative cast of the language
may represent little more than a vestigial hope that it can speak to scientific practice. The same congenital and persistent urge to meld theory and
practice has more distinctively shaped the discursive development of
social science and its tributaries such as political theory.18
The problem of theory and practice is ultimately a practical problem to
which there is neither a theoretical nor metatheoretical solution. It is a
historical question which can be addressed only by looking at the careers
of philosophy, social science, and other metapractices. There are, however, certain general features and problems that characteristically attach
to these practices, and this brings us back to social science's relationship
to philosophy-a relationship that often borders on unreflective obsequiousness. How do we explain this subservience? The natural sciences are
not so constrained, and are, at most, vaguely aware of philosophical
dicta. It may be in part a matter of disciplinary insecurity, and it may be
in part a consequence of the fact that the social sciences were to some
extent creations of philosophical discourse. But the subservience has still
deeper roots.
The social sciences have frequently turned to philosophy in their
search for authority-particularly to establish a scientific identity and
cognitive legitimacy. This was not simply a matter of intellectual credi-

18. For a discussion of the intellectual history of academic political theory in the United
States, see John G. Gunnell, The Descent of Political Theory: The Genealogy of an American Vocation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993).

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John G. Gunnell 533

bility but of practicalpurchase.Knowledgewas the only basis of a claim
on practice.But the social scienceshave also been drawnto philosophy
becausethey sharewithit the generalstructuraldilemmaof second-order
practiceswith respectto their relationshpto their subjectmatter. One
manifestationof this dilemma, in both philosohyand social science, is
the pervasiveconcernwith relativism,which is basicallya displacement
of the theory/practiceproblem that haunts all metatheoreticalpractices.19In the cases of both the philosophyof scienceand politicaltheory,
for example,the issue of relativismhas significantlystructuredthe discourse.
Relativismis usually presentedas primarilya problem in the firstorderpracticesof science, politics, or morals-an immanentand imminent danger that criteriaof practicaljudgment may break down. But
whatusuallyprecipitatesthe concernis the workof someonelike Thomas
Kuhn or Rorty who disclaimsthe ability of philosophyto supplytranscendentalgroundsof scientifictruth.Philosophersclaimthat suchargumentsunderminescientifictruth, and politicaltheoristswarnof the dissolution of society. Karl Popper, for example, suggeststhat such arguments threatenthe integrityand progressof science. Although some,
Allan Bloom for example,claimthat relativismhas actuallyinfectedpolitics, they also claimthat the carrierof the diseaseis philosophy.In each
case, however,the practicalefficacy attributedto academicphilosophy
and social science-both to destroyand save its objectof analysis-quite
belies its actual power and role.
Relativismis an endemicanxietyof second-orderdiscourses,becauseit
is the darkside of rationalism,the abyss that seemsto be openedby the
loss of a belief in transcendentaltruth. But rationalism,or epistemological foundationalism,of some sort, is the primarybasis on which a
second-orderactivityhas, in principleand practice,soughtto trumpthe
account of reality and the criteriaof judgmentin first-orderactivities.
Relativismis, however,not a genuinepracticalissue except in the sense
that the imageof a cognitivestate of naturemay alwayshaunta practice
of knowledgeor a communityof values. And it is also a pseudo-philosophicalproblem,sinceit is reallya manifestationof the issueof the relationshipbetweenthe ordersof discourse.Relativismcan be sustainedas
a genuineissue only if we can acceptseriouslythe projectof philosophical foundationalism.It is only againstthe backgroundof this Quixotic
epistemologicalquestthat the problemarises.Thosewho are criticizedas

19. John G. Gunnell, "Relativism: The Return of the Repressed," Political

Theory, 21
(November 1993).

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534 Why There Cannot Be a Theory of Politics

relativistsusuallydo not deny the idea of rationalityand objectivityin
particularpracticesbut ratherdeny the ability of philosophyto specify
criteriathat transcenda theoreticalcontext.The issueof relativism,however, involves not only the problem of the universalityof knowledge
claimsbut that of the universalityand natureof the objectof knowledge.
And this bringsus back to the initiatingclaim of this essay-that there
cannot be a theory of politics.
VI.

Whilethereare many who, from the standpointof earlypost-positivistic

philosophy of social science, join in the assertionthat politics is not
amenableto nomotheticcausalexplanations,the claimthat therecannot
be a theory about politics in some other universalmanneris less palatable. Many believethat withoutthe idea that politicaltheoryas a practice
can say somethingdeeperand more generalabout politics, than what is
represented in various historical conventional manifestations, the
authorityof theoreticalpractice-of second-orderdiscourse-is weakened. Its claim to a privilegedposition with respectto its subjectmatteris
ultimatelybasedon its putativeaccessto some form of epistemicauthority, and this is, and always has been, the ultimateimpetus behind the
search for a theory of politics. If, however, theoriesare understoodas
ontological claims about what kinds of things exist and the mannerof
theirexistence,then therecannot be a theoryof politics-either descriptive or normative-any more, or less, than there could be a theory of
naturalscience, Christianity,art, or other first-orderpractices.
Politics is a historical form of human convention. We can theorize
about conventionsbut not about their particularmanifestations,just as
we can have theoriesof atomicstructurebut not of particularchunksof
matter.To say, however,that social scienceconfrontsa conventionalor
discursiveworldis not to close the issueof whatthis meanstheoretically.
Conventionsmay be, and have been, construedas appearanceor reality
-as phenomenaor epiphenomena.In the case of Marxisttheory, for
example,conventionsare the basis of particularexplanations,but they
are in turnpredicatedon deepermaterialstructuralformsand dynamics.
For a wide rangeof post-positivistphilosophersof social science,on the
other hand, conventions are the manifestationof ideas, beliefs, and
other mental predicates.If, however, there is nothing ontologicallyor
theoreticallydeeper than convention and discursivepractices,this has
importantimplicationsfor political analysis.
Politics is conventionalby any criteria;the issueis whetherit is merely
conventionalor whetherit is a fundamentaland necessaryform of con-

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John G. Gunnell 535

ventionality.We might say that for Aristotleand Hegel, for example,it
is a fundamentaland necessaryform. Much of contemporarypolitical
theory has also sought some such status for politics. The recent Carl
Schmittrevival,amongboth the Left and Right, is in part fueledby this
ontological temptation to seek the grail of "the Political." Another
recent example of the attempt to give politics theoreticalstatus is the
Derridianpost-Marxismof ErnestoLaclauand ChantalMouffe.20While
the practicalconcernsof the disciplineof politicalsciencemay havebeen
sublimatedand overshadowedby its scientificaspirations,scientismin
political science was originallyrooted in practicalconcerns and in the
belief that only cognitiveauthoritycould lead to, or influence,political
authority.
Muchof the searchfor a theoryof politicsspringsfromthe sameconcerns that have made relativisman obsession in political theory-the
problem of the authority of second-orderdiscourses.Establishingan
ontology of politics, a transcendentaltheory of the political, is very
much tied to the issue of the identityof politicaltheoryand its practical
relationshipto politics. Many believe it is difficult to make normative
claims regardingpolitics without transcendentalsupport. This was in
part what was involved in political science'ssearchfor the State in the
nineteenthcentury;it was also manifestin laterformulationssuch as the
political system. Yet all such attemptsto find a political essence, either
scientificallyor philosophically,and arriveat a definitionof politicsthat
is more than stipulativeor descriptiveprove problematical.
The concept of politics belongs to a genre of concepts with a fundamentalambiguity.To say, as some have, that they are "essentiallycontested" is not quite correct,but they are used in differentand contested
ways. There is a tendencyto define politics by extrapolatingattributes
from the typicalpracticesof politics-such as conflict, power, and interest-or to define politics functionally-such as the authoritativeallocation of values. The next step is often to suggestthat, consequently,politics is necessaryand ubiquitous.Fromthis perspective,it is reasonableto
say that politics is universal,but this is really to say very little. Such
definitionsare at once too broadand too narrow,and to claimanything
universalabout politics on this basis is merelytautological.
Therecan only be a theoryof politics in the derivativesensethat politics is an instanceof humanconventionswhich,in turn, are a theoretical
object,just as in geologytherecannotreallybe a theoryaboutthe forma20. Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Social Theory: Towards a
Radical Democratic Politics (London: Verso, 199); Ernesto Laclau, New Reflections on
the Revolution of Our Time (London: Verso, 1990).

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536 Why There CannotBe a Theoryof Politics

tion of the GrandCanyonexcept as a historicalinstanceof a theoryof
the structureof the earth.No matterwhatwe may wishpoliticsmightbe,
and no matterwhatsome may claimthat it has been, it is, in fact, the historical particularitiesassociatedwith town meetings,city councils, corrupt campaigns, and myriad other sub-forms tied together less by a
model imposed by the social scientistthan by traditionsand the selfunderstandingsof social actors. Thisis not to say that social sciencecannot redescribeor retheorizepolitics;it necessarilydoes so at least in the
limited sense that the language and theories of social science are not
those of society. Butthis returnsus once moreto the fact that the issue at
stake is not just that of a cognitiverelationshipbut a practicalone.
Not only has politics been construedby politicaltheoristsin a variety
of ways that may not have muchto do with actualpoliticalpractice,but
the activity of political theory has also been romanticallydepicted.
Despitethe imagesof it conjuredup in the presentor imposedupon the
past-whether as the potential agent of human emancipationor as a
source of general laws of political behavior-the activity of political
theory is in reality a highly professionalizedacademicsub-field in the
context of the modern university. What the practical relationship
betweenpoliticalscienceand politicsactuallyhas been, is, and might be
is an interestingquestion but one seldom confronted anymoreby the
mainstreamdiscipline.Politicaltheoristsarestill muchabsorbedwiththe
issue of theoryand practice,21but they rarelyengageit in any historically
situatedmanner.Instead,we are presentedwith philosophicalimagesof
politics and politicaltheory and abstractstatementsof the relationship
betweenthem.22TracyStrong, for example,editor of the journalPolitical Theory,statedthat "I take politicsto be that formof humanactivity
which constitutesthe most generalresponseto the simultaneousasking
of the two questions, " 'who am I?' and 'who are we?' " He then
defined "politicaltheory" as "a self-consciouscommunityof discourse
about politics."23This is much like defining science as the attemptto
understandthe world and the philosophyof science as discourseabout
that endeavor.It tells us little about the actualpracticeof eitherand distracts us from thinkingabout the real relationshipbetweenthem.
Only if we returnto politicsas an actualsituatedhistoricalobject and
21. Ian Shapiro and Judith Wagner DeCew, eds., Theory and Practice: Nomos XXXVII
(New York: New York University Press, 1995).
22. See Jeffrey Isaac, "The Strange Silence of Political Theory," Political Theory, 23

(1995).

23. Tracy Strong, The Idea of Political Theory: Reflections on the Self in Political Time
and Space (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), pp. 3-4.

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John G. Gunnell 537

to the deepertheoreticalissue of conventionalityand human action, of
whichpoliticsis a manifestation,can we beginto confrontmeaningfully
the cognitiveand practicaldimensionsof the relationshipbetweenpolitical theoryand politics. This would entail, on the one hand, politicalscience at least relinquishingimagesof theoryderivedfrom an obsolescent
philosophy of science and turningits attentiontowardthe issue of the
basic characterof social phenomena,and, on the other hand, political
theory engaging politics in its particularityrather as a philosophical
abstraction.At such a point, politicalscienceand politicaltheorymight
once again have an intellectual rather than simply a professional
connection.

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