Human Nature and Virtue in Mencius and Xunzi:

An Aristotelian Interpretation
Yu Jiyuan"

Given the substantial amount of ink that has been poured over the issue of
human nature in Xunzi ~
and Mencius ~q~, it might appear to be reckless
even to think that there is anything new to say about it .1 Nevertheless, motivated by the following three perplexities, I venture to revisit this age-old controversy. First, I note that, whereas the goodness and evilness of human nature
has been such a dominant theme in Chinese philosophy, it does not excite
much interest in Aristotle and other Greek philosophers. What does this contrast suggest? Second, historically, Xunzi's challenge fails and this becomes one
of the reasons that he was excluded from mainstream Confucianism after the
Han Dynasty. Mencius, in contrast, comes to define the orthodoxy of Confucianism. Yet, in contemporary scholarship, the table is turned. Mencius' position has usually been thought to be naively optimistic and lacking empirical
support. Xunzi's view, on the contrary, is thought to be realistic and close to
the prevailing Western view that humans axe by nature egoistic. 2 If this is true,
what is the philosophical value of Mencius' position in contemporary ethics?
* Associate Professor of Philosophy, State University of New York at Buffalo, Buffalo, NY
14260-4150; email: jyyu@acsu.buffalo.edu.
Dao:A ]0urna/9r
PhYos0phyDecember 2005, Vol. V, No. 1, pp. 11-30.
9 2005 by Global Scholarly Publications. All fights reserved.
1 Some scholars have reached the conclusion that the issue itself might not be so important in our
understanding of Xunzi and his relation with Mencius. I take it that this is par@ out of the frustration that no way out of the controversy appears on the horizon. For instance, L. H. Yearley
remarks, "Whether Hsun Tzu's [Xtmz~ famous fomaula, 'human nature is evil', is a later interpolation, a rhetorical device to emphasise the difficulty of self-cultivation, or a conscious rectification of the term 'nature', that simple formula ought not to be overemphasized because it casts
little light on either Hsun Tzu or on his relationship to Meneius" (Yearly 1980: 465). See also
Hansen: 337.
z For example, Donald Munro believes that "One reason why Mencius held that m,n's nature is
good was his logical confusion of the ideal man with the actual man" (Munro: 72). A. C. Graham
comments: "We are now almost morbidly aware of the difficulty of proving that apparently disintexested actions do not have egoistic motives and that apparently instinctive reactions are not
socially conditioned" (Graham: 29). Hansen has a good summary of the general scholarly view:
"Typically, Western treatments of Mencius' psychological theory, drawing on traditional Western
cynicism about human nature, regard Mencius' view as lacking any empirical support" (Hansen:
167).

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Dao:A Journalof ComparativePhilosophyV.1

Third, while it is normal in the Warring States period that philosophers from
different schools dispute each other, Xunzi takes Mencius, a feUow Confucian,
as his target when he puts forth his thesis, in chapter 23 of the Xun~j, that human nature is evil. How can this be explained? How is this Xunzi-Mencius debate rehted to the project that Confucius FL~ himself envisions?
My article is in four sections. I start, in Section I, with an introductory discussion of the concept of x'ing '~ in Xunzi and Mencius, to show that Xunzi has
an internal inconsistency in his philosophy, and that this inconsistency makes
his rehtion with Mencius ambiguous. While commentators usually seek to find
a solution to explain away this inconsistency, I try to understand how Xunzi is
caught in this inconsistency. Section II compares Xunzi's criticism of Mencius
with Mencius' actual defense of Confucius' da0 ~ to show that, in his explicit
attack, Xunzi does not do justice to Mencius. I claim that Xunzi's difference
from Mencius should be traced back to Xunzi's criticism of the general assumption in early Chinese philosophy that human da0 is imparted from Heaven
(tian 5~) and is the embodiment of Heaven's daa. Section III argues that it is for
developing an alternative defense of Confucius' dao, rather than for establishing
an alternative theory of human nature, that Xunzi puts forth the thesis that
human nature is evil. The dispute oyez the goodness or evilness of human nature between Mencius and Xunzi should be understood as one between two
alternative defenses of Confucius' da0. In the final section, I introduce Aristode's view about the relation between human nature and ethics and use it as a
mirror to assess the philosophical significance of the Mencius/Xunzi difference. When Mencius is said to be naive and Xunzi more realistic, it is usually
the Christian theory of original sin and/or Hobbes's theory, of natural state that
are used as the referential framework(s). Aristotle, whose ethics does not start
from the assumed dominant Western view that human beings are naturally egoistic, is rarely mentioned in this context)Yet, in the light of Aristotle's approach to ethics, we have a standpoint from which to appreciate the significance of Mencius' theory.

I. The Concept of X / n g ~
With Mencius' thesis that human nature is good as his target, Xunzi claims that
"Human nature is evil; any good in humans is acquired by conscious exertion"
(Xun~ 23.1a). 4 By this, he does not mean that human nature is originally corrupted or that we are born with evil itself. Rather, his meaning is that we are
born with unlimited sensuous and selfish desires that naturally urge us to satisfy
them. Yet resources in the world are limited and cannot satisfy unlima'ted de-

3 There has been a debate regarding whether Aristotle's eudaimonism is egoistic or altruistic.
However, even ff we rhi, k that his position is egoistic, he is advocating for the love o f one's rationality. That is a completely different issue from the question whether original human nature is
selfish.
4 Unless otherwise indicated, translation o f Xunzi is from John Knoblock.

Ytr Hlnnan Nature and V'mue in Mencius and XunTi

13

sires, s Therefore, evil, by which Xunzi means partiality, malice, perversity, and
rebelliousness (23.3a), inevitably arises. Evil, then, is the result of the tension
between limited goods in the world and unlimited human desires.
Mencius has no difficulty accepting the view that we have desires that lead
to evil When he says that human nature is good, he does not mean that the
whole of human nature is good. There are many aspects of x'ing that human
beings share with other animals and that are neither good nor bad (see Mendus
7b24), and there are also xing of dog and xing of ox (6a3). For Mencins, x'ing
includes such things as physical inclinations to eat certain types of food, to listen to certain sounds, to feel aversion towards bad smells, etc. (7b24; 6a7). Furthemaore, there is a natural hierarchy of values and importance among various
parts of human beings: "He who nurtures the parts of smaller importance is a
small man; he who nurtures the parts of greater importance is a great man"
(6a14; see also 6a15).
However, for Mencius, human nature includes something else. In everyone's natural endowment, there is an organ called xin &, (heart/mind) that carties with it four inborn seeds to moral behaviour (duan ~).6 When properly
cultivated, these four seeds will blossom as four major Confucian virtues (Mendus 6a6). The heart of compassion, the sense of shame and disgust, the sense of
compliance and respect, and the sense of right and wrong, are four innate seeds
in human beings. They are not fused into us from outside and we do not have to
learn or work in order to get them. In fact, we have them just as we have four
limbs (Mendus 2a6). When these seeds grow and become mature, they turn into
four virtues: benevolence (ten 4_7_),dutifulness (yi ~), observance of propriety (li
~), and wisdom (zhi ~). This is what he means by the goodness of human nature.
Apparently, Mencius is fully aware that human nature itself is a complex, indusive of elements that axe good, but also of elements that axe either morally
neutral or have little moral value. This leads us to ask whether Mencius employs the term xing in different ways. Etymologically, xqngis cognate in Chinese
with sbeng fl~ (to be born): "The inborn is what is meant by 'nature' [sbengzbi wei
xing ~ ' ~ ] )
(Mencius 6a3). 7 In this sense, xing corresponds to "nature," for
the latter is cognate in Latin with nasci (to be born). It is in this root sense of
xing that Mencius says that there are many :a'ngs that human beings share with
other animals, and that there are also xing of dog and xing of ox. However,
when Mencius claims that human xing is good, he refers only to one part of this
complex, the part that is composed of the four seeds. As he states at Mendus
7a21: "That which an exemplary person follows as his nature [:a'ng], that is to
say, benevolence, tightness, the rites and wisdom, is rooted in his heart." Here
xing is confined only to the four seeds, the flourishing of which makes a noble
person ~ / u n z / ~ ) .
s "MI people desire and dislike the same things, but since desires are many and the things that
satisfythem relativelyfew,this scarcitywillnecessarilylead to conflict"(Xun~i10.1).
6The Chineseterm duanhas also been translatedas "roots," "sprouts,""beginnings,""stirrings,"
"germs,"etc.
7 Unless otherwise indicated, the translation o f the Mendus is based on D. C. Lau.

14

Dao:A Journalof Corz~arauvePbilowpbyV. 1

For Mencius, the reason to single out this part from the complex of human
nature is that it detemames a human being qua a human being and thus distinguishes human beings from other animals. As he says: "Whoever is devoid of
the heart of compassion is not human, whoever is devoid of the heart of shame
is not human, whoever is devoid of the heart of courtesy and modesty is not
human, and whoever is devoid of the heart of fight and wrong is not human"
(Mendus 2a6). If one completely casts away these seeds, he is not much different from the beasts (Mendus 6a8). If one preserves and develops these seeds, he
becomes an exemplary person. Mencius further explicates that "Slight is the
difference between man and the brutes. The common man loses this distinguishing feature, while the gentleman retains it" (Mendus 4b19). To say that the
difference between man and the brutes is slight indicates that the greater portion of the human nature complex, that is, desires and appetites, is the same as
animal nature. It is the four seeds that set us apart from other animals. Accordingly, in saying that x'ing is good, Mencius is referring to the unique characteristic of human beings, excluding the parts that human beings share with other
animals.
To sum up, x'ing in Mencius has two senses: (1) whatever is inborn; and (2)
the inborn human characteristic. When Mencius says that xing is good, he uses
the second and narrow sense.
Let us then turn to see in what sense Xunzi uses the term x'ing. In his own
definition: "What characterizes a man from birth is called his 'nature' [xing].
What is produced out of harmony of inborn nature, out of the sensibilities of
the organ tallying as the senses respond to stimuli, and what from birth is effordess arid spontaneous is called 'nature' [x/ng]" (Xun~ 22.1b). In this passage,
x'ing covers what we have from birth and their tendencies, our senses and faculties, and anything else that we possess but do not need to work for.s In other
words, it means all the features that a person is equipped with from birth. This
amotmts to the first sense of xing in Mencius (what is inborn). The problem
begins when we ask about the contents of "what is inborn." In explicating his
thesis that human nature is evil, Xunzi appears to be saying that in our nature
there are only different forms of appetitive desire. Other dements that do not
naturally lead to evil, or elements that might even lead to good, do not seem to
exist. This becomes explicit shortly afterward in his text. As he says, "This behag the case, it"we consider man as he is at birth and nothing else, then he lacks
ritual and moral principles and is unaware of them.... This being the case, if we
consider man as he is at birth and nothing else, then it is perversity and rebelliousness that characterize him" (Xun~i 23.2b).
Yet, elsewhere, we find that Xunzi acknowledges that we have good things
in our original human makeup or constitution. He claims that human beings
have an inborn sense of y / ~ , "the sense of morality or justice" (in K_noblock's
translation), which distinguishes human beings from other anim,ls (Xun~i 9.16a).
8 Xunzi uses this definition repeatedly: "As a general rule, 'inborn nature' embraces what is spontaneous from Nature, what cannot be learned, and what requires no application to master"
(23.1c). Again, "What ca~aot be gained by learning and cannot be mastered by application yet is
found in man is properly termed 'inborn nature"' (ibid).

Ytr Human Nature and Virtue in Mencius and Xunzi

IS

He holds that everyone in the street has the innate and natural faculty (zbi ~) to
understand necessary ethical principles and the innate and natural ability (/u H) to
practice them (Xun~ 23.5a).9 He also says that men, because of their inner constitution, always respond appropriately to the virtue of others (Xun~' 3.8; for textual
evidence, see Monro: 198). Accordingly, what is inborn is not just selfish sensuous desires, but also includes good traits, impulses, and abilities.
We thus see that, although Xunzi defines xing as "what is inborn," he uses
the term in two inconsistent ways: (1) what is inborn is a mixture of good and
bad elements; and (2) what is inborn includes only sensuous passions and desires. Xunzi's inconsistency makes his relation with Mencius unclear. When he
seeks to refute Mencius' thesis that xing is good and replaces it with the thesis
that xing is evil, he talks as if both of them had the same definition of x'ing. Yet,
in his thesis, xing refers only to selfish passions and desires, whereas in Men(flus' thesis, x'ing means special human characteristics. They do not mean the
same thing by xing. When Xunzi ascribes to our nature some good traits and
tendencies and takes human nature as a mix, Mencius does not have a problem
in agreeing with him. l~ More important, although he does not deny that human
beings have sensuous desires, Mencius concentrates on the good part of the
complex of human nature. Xunzi does not directly face this special and most
important sense of xing in Mencius.
At 9.16a, Xunzi says: "Fire and water possess vital breath but have no life.
Plants and trees possess life, but lack awareness. Birds and beasts have awareness, but lack a sense of morality and justice [yi ~]. Humans possess vital
breath, life, and awareness, and add to them a sense of morality and justice [yt].
It is for this reason that they are the noblest beings in the world." In this passage, vital breath (or energy), life, and awareness axe all mentioned as unlearned
natural or inborn qualities. Since yi is introduced as a parallel to these natural
features, the logic of the text requires that_y/must also be an unlearned natural
or inborn quality, a quality that distinguishes human beings from other animals.
Following Xunzi's definition of x/ng; it should belong to our xing. The passage,
then, is inconsistent with his position that human nature is evil. Nivison, however, suggests thaty/is meant in this passage not as a Confucian virtue, but as
"innately an unfilled and undetemained capacity to think morally," or as "a bare
capacity that has no positive content" (Nivison 1996a: 322, 324; see also Nivison 1996b: 213). This solution to Xunzi's inconsistency has been influential. I
think it is right to say thaty/cannot mean a fully developed virtue here, and I
also agree that it means a capacity. However, it is not clear that this capacity is
morally bare or neutral. The notion of y/has been closely associated with Conlucian ethical value, and it is also one of Mencius' four seeds. If.y/were just a
neutral ability, it could be used both for moral and immoral ends. Yet, in
9Knoblock translates :~hi~ (literally"quafity") as "substance,"andju ~, (literally"condition,"
"ability'~ as "resources."It is worth mentioningthat B. Watson renders zhi as "essentialfaculties," andju as "potentialityability"(Watson:166-167).
t0This leads A. C. Grahamto claimthat "In the case of Hsun Tzu [Xtmzi]there is good reasonto
doubt whether the label he pinned on himselfto distinguishhimselffrom Menciusgivesan adequate idea of his position"(1989: 248).

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Dao:A Journalof ComparativePhilosophyV.1

Xunzi's own description, it is because of this sense o f morality and justice (yt)
that humans alone can form societies. "Why can man form a society? I say it is
due to the division of society into classes. How can social divisions be translated into behaviour? I say it is because of humans' sense o f morality and justice
[yt]" (Xun~ 9.16a). It appears thatfi is committed to social relation and order.
This is hardly a bare capacity.
Also, when Xunzi claims that everyone in the street has the innate and natural
faculty and ability, one could argue that these faculties and abilities are simply intellectual, and thus they are not in conflict with the thesis that human nature is evil
Yet what Xtmzi says is that everyone has the innate and natural faculty to understand necessary ethical principles and the innate and natural ability to practice
them. Clearly, natural faculty and ability lean toward morality, and are not just
bare capacities. More importantly, even if we grant that yi is a bare capacity, it
still does not explain away Xunzi's inconsistency. In saying that human nature
is evil, Xunzi holds that our nature contains only the desires that lead to evil.
Yet innate abilities and tendencies do not necessarily lead to evil. This should
be sufficient to show that Xunzi is inconsistent. In my view, the inconsistency
is intrinsic to Xunzi himself. Even Nivison, who has taken such great pains to
reconcile Xunzi's positions, nevertheless acknowledges that, "[l]ike all of us,
Xunzi must have developed with time; and like most of us, he had difficulties
making completely consistent sense of his own position" (Nivison 2000: 186).
What is important is for us to understand the reason for Xunzi to say, in contrast to Mencius, that human nature is evil, and why he also ascribes a good
aspect to our human nam.re. In other words, why is Xunzi caught in this inconsistency?

II. Mencius and Confucius' Dao

It is interesting to note that when Xunzi says in chapter 23 that Mencius is
wrong, he is not so much interested in directly dealing with Mencius' justification o f the innate goodness of human nanlre, such as Mencius' criticism o f a
number of alternative positions and his positive proofs, including the influential
Well and Child story. Rather, Xunzi focuses on what he understands as the
consequeaac.e o f Mencius' position. In his view, Mencius' position renders Confucius' daa useless and the Confucian sage kings unnecessary.
Mcncius claims that man's nanlre is good. I say that is not so.... [C]an one truly take
man's inborn nature to have as its essential characteristic correctness, accord with
natural principles, peacefulness,and order? Were that the case, what use would there
be for sage kings, and what need for ritual and moral principles? And even supposing that there were sage kings and ritual and moral principles, what indeed could
they add to correctness, natural principles,peace, and order! (Xunzi 23.3a)
According to this description, Mencius' view becomes a threat to, rather than a
defence of, the Confucian tradition.
Is this a fair criticism? To answer this question, we need to trace back to see

Ytr Hlanan Nature and Vmue in Mencius and Xnnzi

!7

why and how Mencius defends Confucius' da0. Mencius himself describes his
mission in this way:
When the world declined and the Way [da0]fell into obscurity, heresies and violence
again arose.... The words of YANG Zhu ~ and Modi ~ fill the empire. The
teachings current in the empire are those of either the school os Yang or the school
of Mo.... If the ways of Yang and Mo do not subside and the way of Confucius is
not proclaimed, the people will be deceived by heresies and the path of morality [teny/U.m] will be blocked.... [T]hereforeI am apprehensive. I wish to safeguard the way
of the former sages against the onslaughts of Yang and Mo and to banish excessive
views. (Mencius3b9)
It is the goal of Confucius to find human dao. Confucius also believes that it
is embedded in the traditional rituals and in the chssics that record the rituals.
This position, according to Mencius, faces grave challenges from Mozi and
YANG Zhu. Mozi contends that the da0 of Heaven should be detected from
men's natural desires rather than from ancient classics. Since it is men's natural
desire to seek benefit and avoid harm, the correct da0 is to maximize the
amount of material goods of the state and to satisfy people's natural desires.
Mozi thus rejects the ritually grounded traditionalism that Confucius holds and
seeks to rephce it with his own utilit, rian position. YANG Zhu's position, in
Mencius' report, is as follows: "YANG Zhu chooses egoism [weiwo ~ , literally
"for myself']. Even if one could benefit the Empire by pulling out one hair he
would not do it" (Mendus 7a26). Following Graham's reconstruction, what
YANG Zhu means is that our xing is the Heavenly endowed capacity of life
force, so the correct da0 is to live out our natural life span. Since getting involved in political affairs carries the risk of being 1filled, one should stay away
from governing, to say nothing about governing the whole empire.
Why are the challenges of Mozi and YANG Zhu so significant that Mencius
has to treat them with such seriousness? The issue is related to the common
framework that is shared by chssical Chinese philosophers before Xunzi. The
s
is that Heaven has its da0 and that everything's well-being depends
on whether it exists or acts in accordance with the dao o f Heaven. With the
decline of the Zhou ~ Dynasty, the dao that the Zhou once claimed to possess
was thought to be lost. The common goal of the classic Chinese philosophers,
then, is to answer the question 'q~Chere is da0?" Each school claims that the
human da0 it establishes is in accordance with the da0 of Heaven. If one can live
in accordance with the human dao, one also embodies the da0 o f Heaven, and
leads a meaningfifl and authentic life. The manifestation of Heaven's da0 in
human beings is called de ~., usually translated as "virtue." This dao-de conceptual framework is at the core o f pre-Xunzi Chinese ethics.
This is the framework within which Confucius works. He even thinks that it
is a mandate of Heaven for him to discover and restore the da0. The Ana/eets
uses a visitor to Confucius as the mouthpiece to express this mission. The visitor says to the disciples of Confucius: "The world has long been without the
Way [da0]. Heaven is about to use your Master as the wooden tongue for a bell"
(Anakcts 3.24). The opponent Mozi also claims that he is searching for the will

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Dao:A Journalof ComparativePhilosophyV. 1

of Heaven: "Heaven wants righteousness and dislikes unrighteousness. Therefore, in leading the people in the world to engage in practicing righteousness, I
should be doing what Heaven wants" (in Chan: 218). The Daodejing (~Rga~)
states that "[t]o the dao of Heaven none is more kind than another. It is constanfly on the side of the good man" (ch. 79). Zhuangzi ~q~ also claims that da0
is everywhere and operates in all things (see Chan: 203). Different philosophical
schools offer competing accounts of what da0 is, but they all share the assumption that human da0 must accord with the dao of Heaven, and they all believe
that their own da0 is supported by Heaven.
From this background, we can see why the challenges of Mozi and YANG
Zhu are serious. Each of them makes a seemingly convincing case that his dao
conforms to the da0 of Heaven, whereas Confucius' dao of traditionalism is
against human nature. This certainly puts Confucianism on the defensive. It is
indeed true that Confucius' thinking had a weakness and hence was vulnerable
to criticism. On the one hand, Confucius' belief holds to the da0-de conceptual
scheme and therefore implies that we must have the root of de in our original
nature that is from Heaven. Confucius thought that human de that manifests
da0 is ten (humanness), and also believed that, in our nature, there is a part that
forms the natural basis of re~ "Is ren really far away? No sooner do I desire it
than it is here" (Analects 7.30). I take it to mean that we have a natural potential
to become virtuous. On the other hand, Confucius claimed that the da0 should
be found in traditional rituals. For him, the da0 did not prevail in the empire at
his time because of the decline of the rituals and cultures of the Zhou (Analects
3.24; 16.2; 5.6). Based on the conviction that the Zhou rituals can restore order
and achieve harmony for the world, Confucius claimed that pen (humanness) is
"to return to # ~ " (12.1). Yet there is no argument in the Analects to show how
ren is intrinsically related to the muals. A bridge is needed here.
The Doctrine of the Mean ( ~ ) , one of the four books that form the core
classics of Confucianism, introduces, in its opening passage, the term xing, and
connects it to the notion of da0, both the da0 of Heaven and the da0 of humans
O.e., de): "What Heaven imparts to man is called human nature (x/ng0. To follow
our nature is called the way (dao). Cultivating the Way is called education. The
way cannot be separated from us for a moment. What can be separated from us
is not the way" (ch.1). We have an endowed nature from Heaven. The unfolding process is a process of cultivation or education. Since the dao is inherent in
us, it cannot be separated from us and must be a part of who we are. Clearly,
this endowed nature cannot be the complex of our nature, and must be the part
the unfolding of which is what the (human) dao is. The Doctrine of the Mean
makes it clear that the virtue that we cultivate has a natural basis in our human
nature. Here, the question of the cultivation of human dao (or de) becomes a
question of the cultivation of xing. However, although The Doctrine of the Mean
has stated that Heaven confers (good) human nature, it does not offer any explicit argument for the existence of such a natural basis of dao, and does not say
anything either as to how our nature is related to the rituals.
Mencius inherits the idea that the goodness of human nature is ordained by
Heaven: "The heart-mind is what Heaven has given to us" (Mencius 6al 5). Now

Ytr Human Nature and V-trtue in Mencius and Xun~i

19

he faces the task of fining the gaps that the Analects and The Doctrine of the Mean
left His strategy seems to be as follows. The crucial threat that Mozi and
YANG Zhu pose is thek claim that Heaven's dao is on their side, whereas Conlucian dao is against human nature. If Mencius could prove that our genuine
nature is something other than seeking profits or preserving one's life, both
Mozi and YANG Zhu's positions lose ground. If Mencius further proves that
our genuine human nature is something the maturity of which leads to Confucian virtues, he demonstrates that Confucius' vision is in accordance with
Heaven's da0. Accordingly, to fight against Mozi and YANG Zhu, Mencius developed a view that Confucian value is inborn in human nature. The genuine
human x4ng includes the seeds of the four virtues. Against YANG Zhu, Mencius
suggested that :4hAis not life force, and to live out one's natural life span is not
where the true da0 is. As he stated: "Life is what I want;y/is also what I want. If
I cannot have both, I would rather take2i than Fife" (Mendus 6al0). For human
beings, there are things more important than life itself. It seems to me that this
memorable remark is apparently directed at YANG Zhu. By inducting ~ (the traditional rituals), or the sense to obey the 4, among the basic seeds, Mencius undermines the Moist contrast between human nature and Confucian traditionalism. If
the seed to obey # is inborn, then to follow Confucius' da0 is to follow one's
genuine nature. Furt_hemnore, if there is a humanity that we must develop, the
material consequence becomes something external insofar as human dao is concemed. This is why Mencius affirms that '~fflaat is the point of mentioning the
word 'profit'? All that matters is that there should be ten-if" (Mendus lal). The use
of the word "profit" suggests that Mozi is the real target here. Human goodness is
not determined by consequential benefits, but by humanity itself.
The above discussion shows that Mencius' theory of human innate goodness of x'ing is a significant contribution to Confucius' vision. He defends Confucius by building Confucian da0 in human natuze, and by providing a metaphysical and psychological basis for Confucian dao. His theory justifies that
nature and virtue are consistent in Confucius' da0, and thus effectively responds
to the challenges from Mozi and YANG Zhu. Furthermore, although we are
endowed with innate moral seeds, the role of classics, the sages, and teachers
are still important. We axe not born with full-blown goodness, but only with
fragile sprouts. These seeds must be nurtured for persons to be good. Their
growth needs an external envixonment and also requires inner self-cultvafion.
One important aspect of self-cultivation is the constant learning of rituals and
the classics that record them. Rituals and sages play important roles in the shaping of character. Since the learning of rituals is necessary for the seeds to grow
properly, rituals are indispensable.
If this is the case, Xunzi cannot be fight in accusing Mencius of making sages
and rituals useless. It appears that Xunzi not only misrepresented Mencius' notion
of :~'n~ but also missed the point in ctiticising Mencius' defence of Confucius' da0.
Yet how is it possible that he was so mistaken? Is there a deeper reason for him to
attack Mencius in this way? In 23.1c, when Xurmi attacks Mencius for failing to
explain that "ritual principles and moral duties are creations of the sages," he offers
a reason. Mencius, asserts Xunzi, does not know the distinction between nature

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Dao:A ]ournalofComparativePhilosophyV.1

and artifice (u,~"~, in Knoblock's translation, "acquired nature' S. The distinction

between nature and artifice is related to Xtmzi's general theory of the relation between Heaven and mao_ Its introduction in this context indicates that Xunzi's criticism of Mencius presupposes a larger background.
Xunzi has a unique position in classical Chinese philosophy. As mentioned
earlier, it had been a shared framework for Xunzi's predecessors that the correct human da0 is what is dictated by Heaven and must embody the da0 of
Heaven. Xunzi, however, seeks to break up this conceptual scheme. For him,
Heaven, earth, and man form a triad and each has its own way. However, he
does not think that they are connected in such a way that human da0 is what is
dictated by Heaven. Heaven for Xunzi is just the natural world written with a
capital letter and is a spontaneous process. "Heaven possesses a constant way"
(Xun~j 17.3), but it does not prescribe what humans should do. Heaven is simply indifferent towards human affairs: "It does not survive because of the actions of a [sage-emperor] Yao ~; it does not perish because of the actions of a
[wicked king] Jie ~ " (Xun~ 17.1). What humans should do toward Heaven is to
make good use of its natural resources (Xun~ 17.10).
Hence, contrary to the traditional assumption of the accordance between
Heaven and man, Xunzi establishes a dichotomy between them. He even
claimed that "If you understand the division between nature [Tian, Heaven] and
mankind, then you can properly be called a 'Perfect Man'" (Xun~ 17.1). The
distinction between nature and wei (artifice), roughly corresponding to the
Greek dichotomy ofphusis and nomos,is a corollary to the dichotomy of Heaven
and Man. By artifice, Xunzi means that "What must be learned before a man
can do it and what he must apply himself to before he can master it yet is found
in man" (23.lc). The da0 of Heaven belongs to the side of nature, whereas human
da0, or morality, falls on the side of artifice, the product of human effort.
From this background, we can tell that Xunzi saw the challenges from
YANG Zhu and Mozi in a rather different way than Mencius saw them. Mozi
and YANG Zhu attack Confucius within the shared framework that the dao of
man is also the da0 of Heaven, and both of them claim that their dao(s), not
Confucius', are supported by Heaven. Mencius defended Confucius within this
framework and sought to win back the authority of Heaven. Since, in Xunzi's
judgment, Heaven is indifferent to human morality, he thought the challenges
from Mozi and YANG Zhu were themselves groundless. Equally, he must have
thought that Mencius' whole defence was misguided and his theory was also
groundless. The separation of Heaven and man entails that we cannot have a
Heavenly-imparted nature that would dispose us toward virtue.

III. Xunzi and Confucius' Dao

The above discussion provides a larger context for us to understand the real
difference between Mencius and Xunzi. It also gives us a better understanding
of the puzzling phenomenon that Xuazi chooses to ignore Mencius' argument.
If Xunzi believed that Mencius' thesis about human nature is based on a wrong

Ytr Human Nature and V'tttue in Mencius and X.nzi

21

assumption, and since he had undermined this assumption, there is of course

no need to bother with detailed arguments for the thesis. However, we have
not yet had a direct answer to the question o f why Xunzi put forth a thesis that
human nature is evil and contrasted it to Mencius' theory of human nature.
Indeed, a new question emerges. Confucius held the framework that human da0
embodies Heaven's da0, and he was even said to be following Heaven's mandate to find human dao. Given Xunzi's dichotomy of Heaven and man, Xunzi
must have denied the natural basis of Confucius' da0 and his divine mission.
How, then, can Xunzi still be a Confucian?
Xunzi's dichotomy of Heaven and man was, as is well known, influenced by
the Daoist notion of Heaven and nature. In his famous "pipes-of-Heaven" metaphor in chapter 2 of the Zhuang'r Zhuangzi likens each school's da0 to a pipe of
Heaverz Heaven blows on all pipes and favours neither Confucianism nor Moisn~ From Heaven's point of view, says Zhuangzi, all da0s are equally natural
Clearly, this inspired Xunzi to affirm that Heaven is neutral and does not provide
specific moral guidance. However, although Daoists criticize all normative value
systems, they still hold the assumption that the correct human da0 must accord
with the da0 of Heaven. For Zhuangzi, since all da0s are equally possible and there
is no ground to judge among them, the best way to live is to avoid being locked
into one partial perspective. Instead, given the nature of the da0 of Heaven, we
should be flexible, tolerant, and spontaneous: "Never follow one stubborn
course of action and thus deviate from Tao" (see Chan: 206).
In contrast, Xunzi went beyond Daoism on two fronts. First, he severed the
relation between human dao and Heaven's da0, and drew a sharp distinction
between nature and artifice. Even though Heaven is spontaneous and morally
neutral, it does not entail that human beings should be spontaneous as well What
man does is different from what Heaven does. On this ground, Xunzi accused
Zhumagzi of forgetting man: "Zhuang Zhou was blinded by nature and was insensible to men" (Xun~ 21.4). It is inevitable for human beings to be guided by
some scheme of values. Second, Xunzi affirmed that, whereas all other conventional moral systems are biased, Confucius' ritual da0 is not. Xunzi says,
Confucius was humane, wise, and also free from obsession. This is why his study of
methods that could produce order deserves to be considered equal to that of the
Ancient Kings. One school achieved the universal Way, drew conclusions based
upon it, and employed k, but did not become obsessed with what it has perfected
and accumulated. Thus, the moral authority of Confucius was equal to that of the
Duke of Zhou and his reputation was on an equal footing with that of the Three
Kings. (Xun~i21.4)
The Confucian sage-king's ritual da0 is the only correct da0 that human beings
need. The traditional rituals make up the da0 of Confucianism and form the
best way of life. Xunzi is a Confucian because of his deep faith in the role of
traditional rituals: "A man without ritual will not live; an undertaking lacking
ritual will not be completed; and a nation without ritual will not be tranquil"
(Xun~j 2.2). Xunzi thus faced the task of justifying Confucius' da0 of traditionalisrrL The function of rituals lies in preserving order and social hamaony. In the

22

Dao:A Journalof ComparacivePhilosophyV.1

Anakcts, the function o f rituals is related heavily with harmony: " O f the things
brought about by the rites, harmony is the most valuable" (Analects 1.12). Xunzi
apparently followed this line of thinking and focused also on the point that the
da0 of rituals is the only alternative to chaos and disorder. If the human world is
inevitably chaotic before rituals are established, rituals are by all means indispensable. However, how can one prove that the human world is naturally chaotic?
I think that it is to make a case here that Xunzi introduced his thesis that human nature is evil. He postulated the evilness o f human nature in order to justify
the value o f the Confucian ritual dao. The beginning of chapter 23 indicates that
this is his reasoning. In 23.1a, immediately after introducing and explamiug his
thesis that human nature is evil, he draws a contrast between chaos and rituals:
'q2aus, it is necessary that man's nature undergoes the transfomaing influence of a
teacher and the model and that he be guided by ritual and moral principles"
(Xunz/23.1a). We are born with unlimited desires that naturally lead to chaos, and
only ritual principles can channel these desires and create order. Then, in 23.1b,
he repeats: " N o w since human nature is evil, it must await the instructions o f a
teacher and the model before it can be put aright, and it must obtain ritual principles and a sense of moral right before it can become orderly. ''11 Once again, ritual
principles are necessary to correct the natural results o f our inborn nature. Furthermore, in the same section, the evilness of human nature is used to explain
why the sages created ritual principles: "In antiquity, the sage kings took man's
nature to be evil, to be inclined to prejudice and prone to error, to be perverse
and rebellious, and not to be upright or orderly. For this reason they invented
ritual principles and precepts o f moral d u ~ ' (Xun# 23.1b).
When Mencius argued that x'ing is good, he rejected three alternative positions: (1) human nature is neither good nor bad; (2) human nature can become
good or it can become bad; (3) some axe good by nature, and some are bad
(Mendus 6a6). It is worth noting that Xunzi's thesis that human nature is evil is
not mentioned. In my view, this suggests that Xmazi's thesis is not really a conventional view. It is a theoretical construction for Xunzi to defend the traditionalism o f Confucius. 12 Xunzi's defense strategy looks problematic. He is
supposed to defend Confucius against other schools, given that there axe many
daos other than the Confucian da0 o f traditionalism. H e should make a case
that, given the evilness o f human nature, the Confucian ritual dao is, in contrast
to the daos o f other schools, the best or the only remedy for the chaotic situation in the world, and is uniquely effective in achieving and maintaining social
order. Howver, Xunzi does not argue in this way in chapter 23. He does criticize numerous philosophers in chapters 6 and 21, but not for this purpose.

11In 19.1a, the rituals are said to have the function of3~n~, division, or in Knoblock's translation,
to apportion things. It channels the desires of everyone by defining what a member of each social
class is entitled to on the basis of the position and status of individuals and classes in society.
i2 It is worth mentioning that D. Munro also thimks that the topic of the evilness of hnm~o nature
is not Xunzi's main concern, but is derived from Xonzi's concern with "issues of chaos and poverty, and their causes and institutional remedies" (Mtmro: 193). For Munro, "Had developing a
theory of human nature been his [Xtmzi's] interest, I doubt that Xunzi would have left in such a
mess" (Munro: 198).

Yu: Hlrnan Nature and V'mue in Mencius and Xun~i

23

Indeed, the failure to recognize the value of ritual principles is also one o f his
main charges against philosophers o f other schools.
The case that Xunzi makes, instead, is against Mencius, a fellow Confucian.
His target in chapter 23 is Mencius' thesis that human nature is good. His criticism o f Mencius focuses on the negative impact on the roles o f sages and ritual
principles. Mencius' theory is said to fail to explain the origin o f ritual principles
and to make sages and ritual principles useless. In 23.3b, he summzrires his
difference with Mencius as follows: "Hence, ff the nature o f man were good,
then one could dispense with sage kings and put aside ritual and moral principles.
But since the nature of man is evil, we must adhexe to the sage kings and esteem
ritual and moral principles" (Xun~ 23.3b). In other words, whereas Mencius' defense does more damage than good for Confucius' ritual da0, Xunzi's theory of
the evilness of human nature effectively justifies the value o f it_
Given this, I would like to suggest that Xunzi's thesis, as a defence o f Confucius' ritual da0, is more an internal matter o f Confucianism. Xunzi, o f course,
defended Confucianism against other schools, but his theoretical postulation
that human nature is evil is not to argue for the superiority o f Confucianism
over other schools. Rather, his goal is to compete with Mencius. Moreover, it is
not so much about human nature per se, but serves to demonstrate that he himself, not Mencius, is the true defender o f Confucius' da0. It seems to me that
chapter 23 is intended to be read by other Confucians rather than by philosophers o f other schools. 13 Xunzi's thesis does grant a more essential role to sagekings and their rituals. If human nature originally has seeds disposed toward
vLrmes, as Mencius suggests, sages and rituals can only nurture and guide the
development o f these seeds. In Mencius' own words, "The sole concern o f
learning is to go after this strayed heart" (Mencius 6al 1). In Xunzi's case, ritual
principles substantially alter original human nature and impose a value system
upon it from outside. Yet, the important point is not that who assigns a bigger
role to the ritual order o f the sages. It is this: between Mencius and Xunzi,
whose defense is more loyal to the original vision o f Confucius?
Mencius believed that what he said is nothing more than an exposition o f
what is implied by Confucius. Right after his exposition o f the four seeds, he
states:

The Book of O&s says, Heaven produces the teeming masses, and where there is a
thing there is a norm. If the people held on to their constant nature, they would be
drawn to superior virtue. Confucius commented, "The author of this poem must
have had knowledge of the way [dao]. Thus where there is a thing there is a norm,
and because the people hold onto their constant nature they axe drawn to superior
virtue." (Mendus 6a/6) 14
13In chap. 6, Xtmzi lists Mencius as one of the twelve philosophers who he considers "cloak
pernicious persuasions in beautiful language and present elegantly composed but treacherous
doctrines and so create disorder and anarchy in the world" (6.1). Here he condemns Mencius by
using almost the same language that Mencius uses to condemn Mozi and YANG Zhu. Xunzi's
bitterness is apparent
14Translation revised. In Lau's translation, only the first sentence ("the author of this poem must
have had knowledge of the Way") is a quotation of Confucius. Yet in the Chinese original the

24

Dao:A JournalofComparativePhilosophyV.1

On the strength of this passage, Confucius is said to believe that human beings
possess a constant nature that, if held on to, leads towards virtue. Furthemaore, in
support of his azgument that human nature must have the heart-mind that contains
the seeds of ten andyi, Mencius quotes the following saying of Confucius: "Confucius said, 'Hold on to it and it will rein,in; let go of it and it will disappear. One
never knows the time it comes and goes, neither does one know the direction.' It is
perhaps to the heart this refers" (Mendus6a8). Again, Confucius is said to acknowledge that there is an original constant nature for people to preserve and develop.
Xunzi's thesis can also claim to have a root in Confucius. Confucius says:
'~Fo subdue oneself and return to ritual is to practice humaneness" (Anakcts
12.1). What needs to be subdued in "oneself" Q~'E) must be sensuous desires.
In a sense, Xunzi's thesis can be seen as a philosophical commentaU on Analects 12.1. The commentary is creative, but hardly loyal to the original. It was not
Confucius' view that the "self" has only boundless sensuous desires that inevitably lead to evil. The Chinese word that is translated as "subdue" is ke ~,
which can be taken to "cultivate". Moreover, Confucius firmly believed that we
have the potential to be virtuous. More importantly, Confucius shared the da0de conceptual scheme, and even Hnims that "Heaven is the author of de that is
in me" (Analects 7.22). Mencius sought to improve Confucius' da0 within the
scheme of Confucius. In contrast, Xunzi abandoned this conceptual scheme in
his dichotomy of Heaven and man. I believe that Confucius would much more
appreciate Mencius' version. Xunzi developed some aspects of Confucius' da0,
but abandoned others. Confucius would have taken issue with this, for he believed that his da0 is unified (Analects4.15).
It is well known that, although Xunzi fundamentally differed with Mencius
on the issue of the goodness and badness of human nature and the relation
between Heaven and man, he shared similar positions with Mencius on many
other Confucian topics, such as the malleability of human nature; the possibility
for everyone to perfect himself; the importance of self-cultivation; kingly government; moral education; and the proper guidance of a true teacher; etc. (see,
e.g., Graham 1989: 250; Goldin: 10-11). However, a puzzle naturally arises at
this juncture. Since Xunzi rejected the metaphysical basis of Confucius and
Mencius and started from such a radically opposite theoretical premise, how
could he still hold these Confucian positions? Xunzi indeed faced some serious
problems. First, he believed that eveuone has the same nature: "As a general
rule, the nature men share is one and the same whether they be a Yao and Shun
or a Jie and Robber Zhk The gentleman and the petty man share one and the
same nature" (Xunx~ 23.4a). If this is the case, how do sages transform themselves and become good before they create rituals to transform others? Xunzi
was fully aware of this problem (see Xunzi 23.2a and 23.4a), but he failed to
provide a sensible answer. Whether he could answer has been a matter of controve~sy (see Kline). The second is the problem of moral motivation. In Plato's
Republic, Thrasymachus raises a question that becomes the central issue of
Western moral philosophy: If morality or justice is other people's good, why
quotationincludesthe last sentenceof this passage.

Yu: Human Nature and Virtue in Mend.us and Xunzi

25

should I be just? Now, since Xunzi starts from a similnr point that human nature is evil, we can apply Thrasymachus's question to him: If our original nature
is evil, why should we follow ritual principles? In a classic paper, David B.
Wong examines various interpretations of this issue and comes to the conclusion that, "[i]n view of the problems with either interpretation and in view of
the fact that Xunzi gives no clear signal about the status of the desire to do
good, it may well be that he was confused or ambivalent about the status of the
desire. And if this is true, there will be no determinate answers from Xunzi
about the nature of moral transformation" (Wong: 146). 15
I think Wong is fundamentally right in saying that Xunzi was confused.
Here I would like to suggest a somewhat different way to look at Xunzi's confusion. In one peolliar argument, Xunzi infers as follows: one always desires
what he lacks; we desire goodness; so human nature lacks goodness and is evik
"It is plain that man's desiring to do good is the product of the fact that his
nature is evil" (Xunzi 23.2b). If one's xing has an intrinsic desire for goodness,
this can be taken as an internal basis for moral motivation. However, if our
nature already has a natural desire for goodness, this contradicts Xunzi's view
that in human nature there is only a love of profit and the desire to obtain it.
Xtmzi must have already realized this problem when he raised the issue of how
everyone in the street can be a sage (Xunzi 23.5a). His answer is that everyone
in the street has the innate and natural faculty (.~bi~) to understand necessary
ethical principles and the innate and natural ability ~/u .~.) to practice them. He
indeed grants a major role to the mind in the cultivation: "It is natural to our
inborn nature to have desires, and the mind acts to control and moderate
them" (Xunx~22.5a).
Xunzi, then, tried to provide an account of moral motivation and transformation. Yet, in providing this account, he had to acknowledge that there are
also some good elements in our nature. This is, I think, why Xunzi acknowledged that there are positive traits, inclinations, faculties, and abilities in our
inborn nature. The problem is that, if we already have these good elements, he
cannot hold his thesis that human nature is evil. To repeat: to show his superiority over Mencius in defending Confucius' dao, he claimed that human nature
is evil. To maintain the Confucian position that everyone can be good, he had
to put in a number of good elements in human nature. This is why Xunzi gets
into a fundamental inconsistency in his philosophy.

IV. T h i n k i n g from Aristotle

To better understand the significance of the Mencius/Xunzi debate, I tend to
turn to the first puzzle that I listed at the beginning of this article. I concentrate
on Aristotle, with an aim of finding a mirror to appreciate the Mencius/Xunzi

is He proceeds to construe a creative interpretation of moral transformation on Xunzi's behalf, to

the effect that "some raw materials in h u m a n nature that is amenable to being shaped toward a
love o f virtue and a delight in ritual" (Wong: 148).

26

Dan:A Journalof ComparativePhilosophyV.1

debate. Although Atistode does not take as a major concern the goodness or
badness o f human nature, he has made remarks about this topic. A gathering o f
relevant remarks from his wfilings suggests that for Atistode our original nature contains good elements and bad elements. First, he claimed that there axe
good elements in human nature. H u m a n beings have some innate natural tendencies towards certain virtues, which axe called "natural virtue": "For each o f
us seems to possess his type o f character to some extent by nature, since we axe
just, brave, prone to temperance, or have another feature, immediately from
birth" (Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics [NE] VI.13; 1144b3-6; see also Eudemian
Ethics 1229a21-30; 1234a30-31). 16 H e also suggests that we have a natural sense
o f good and evil, o f iust and unjust (Politics 1.2; 1253a16-18). Second, Afistode
also believed that human beings naturally have bad elements:
For man, when perfected, is the best of animals, but, when separated from law and
justice, he is the worst of all; since armed injustice is the most dangerous, and he is
equipped at bLrth with arms, meant to be used by intelligence and excellence, which
he may use for the worst ends. That is why, if he has no excellence, he is the most
unholy and the most savage of animals, and the most B.tllof lust and gluttony. (Po~tics 1.2; 1253a31-37)
Third, Aristotle maintained that moral virtues do not arise out o f nature spontaneously, but result from habit:
Moral virtue comes about as a result of habit.... IN]one of the moral virtues arises in
us by natuxe; for nothing that exists by nature can form a habit contrary to its nature.... Neither by nature, then, nor contrary to nature do virtues arise in us; rather
we are adapted by nature to receive them, and are made perfect by habit. (_N-E,ft.1,
1103a 16-25)
This passage sounds as he is saying that human nature is neutxal.
It seems that in a comparison between Aristotle and Confucianism, ff we
just pick out one or two passages, all sorts o f conclusions seem possible. In the
first view listed above, A.tistotle's natural virtues are similar to Mencius' four
seeds; in the second position, Aristotle sounds like Xunzi who claims that hum a n nature is evil; and in the third view, Aristotle seems to echo Confucius'
saying: "Men axe d o s e to one another by nature. They diverge as a result o f
repeated practice" (Analects 17.2). However, Atistode's view is not so simple;
neither axe the positions o f Confucius, Mencius, and Xunzi. For an effective
comparison, we should examine how Aristotle himself thought his ethics is
related to human nature. Once we follow this thinking, it is not difficult to see
that, for Aristode, what is related to ethics, or what ethics must be based upon,
is neither natural virtues, nor the bad parts, nor the neutrality o f human nature.
Rather, it is human function (ergon).
Aristotle believed that human beings have a function (ergon). "Function" is not
a satisfactory translation of ergon, for it is heavily associated with an instrument or

16A]Ireferences to Anstode willbe indicatedwith tide and standaxdpage numbers thereafter. Unless
otherwise indicated, all translations of Afistode ate based on Jonathan Barnes.

YLr H~'n~n Nature and V-mue in Mencius and X,n~

27

something that can be used as an instrument, and hence easily invites an objection
that human beings should not be thought to have a function (Hardie: 23). However, the ergono f each thing, in its original sense, means, as Plato defines it, "what
it alone can do or what it does better than anything else" (Republic 353a; cf. also
352e). In other words, it is the characteristic activity that a thing uniquely has or
can perform. This is what Aristotle meant by ergon, and Aristotle identified human
function as human rational activity (NE 1098a2-3).
Human function (ergon) must be a part o f human nature (in Greek, pbusis).
EtymologicaUy, the term comes from the verb pbut, "to grow" or "to beget."
This parallels the Chinese term for "nature," that is, :r
which, as mentioned
earlier, is cognate with sheng, "to be born" or "to grow." In Aristotle, phusis, as
many other key terms o f philosophy, is "said in many ways." T. H. Irwin summarizes the use ofpbusis in the N-E: "(1) A thing's nature is its original constitution or tendency apart from human intervention; hence it is contrasted with law
and education .... (2) A thing's nature indicates its function and the final cause or
end to which it tends" (Irwin 1999: 339). I think this is correct. Clearly, it is on
the first sense Aristotle says that human nature is a complex o f rational and
non-rational parts, a mix o f good and evil elements. H u m a n function is a part
o f human nature in this general sense because it is contained in the original
constitution o f a human being. Rationality, or, more precisely, the potential for
being rational, is a part o f natural endowment and is an inborn feature for human beings; it belongs to every normal member o f the human species. Accordingty, we can say that, when Aristotle focused on human function, he focused
on a narrow part o f the human nature complex.
What, then, is the ground for Aristotle to single out human function from the
human nature complex? For Aristotle, a thing's ergon also defines that thing:
'"~nat a thing is is always determined by its function: a thing really is itself when it
can perform its function" (Meteorobeff IV.12; 390a10-12)37Accordiugly, to determine what human function is is to locate the fundamental feature that determines
a human being qua a human being, that is, humanity. Aristotle reaches his view by
distinguishing human beings from other living things:
What then can this [human function] be? Life seems to be common even to plants,
but we are seeking what is peculiar to man. Let us exclude, therefore, the life of nutrition and growth. Next there would be a life of perception, but it also seems to be
common even to the horse, the ox, and every animal. There remains, then, an active
life of the element that has a rational principle. (NE 1097b33-1098a3)
Thus, rational activity is a human function because it is the fundamental feature
that distinguishes a human being from other animals.
Let us further ask: What is the purpose for Aristotle to distinguish between
two senses o f human nature and identify humanity? Aristotle expresses explicidy what his purpose is. T o provide an understanding o f what eudaimonia is, he

t7 This is repeated in the.Collowingpassage: 'r

are defined by their function and power; and
we ought not to say that they are the same when they no longer have their proper quality,but only
that they are homonymous" (Poh'tics1.2; 1253a23-25).

28

Dao: A ]ournal of ComparativePhilosophyV.1

says, we should "first ascertain the function of man" (NE 1.7; 1097a24-25).
Following his position that human function is rational activity, he concludes
that human good, that is, eudaimonia, is "activity of soul in conformity with virtue." Function (ergon) is related to aretg (virtue or excellence) because virtue is
what makes one perform his function well. If its function is well performed, a
thing must have achieved its virtue or excellence. Thus, "the virtue of man also
will be the state which makes a man good and which makes him do his work
well" (NE II.6; 1106a22-23). If we recall that eudaimonia in Greek originally
means "living well" or "doing well," we can see clearly how crucial it is for A.ristotle to identify htanan function or humanity. The function argument is the
basis for his theory of virtue and his theory of happiness. Aristotle appeals to
human function or humanity, because his ethics needs a metaphysical foundation in human nature.
We are now ready to show what Aristotle would have said about Mencius
and Xunzi. Let us take Xunzi first. Xunzi distinguished between human beings
and other things by ascribing to each a special feature. It is worthwhile recalling
the following passage: "Fire and water possess vital breath but have no life.
Plants and trees possess Me, but lack awareness. Birds and beasts have awareness, but lack a sense of morality and justice [yt]. Humans possess vital breath,
life, and awareness, and add to them a sense of morality and justice ~yt). It is for
this reason that they are the noblest beings in the world" (Xunzi 9.16a). This
passage is surprisingly similnr to N E 1097a33-1098a3 (quoted earlier) in which
Afistode identifies human function by distinguishing human beings from other
animals. However, whereas Aristode identifies human fianction or humanity in
order to ground his theory of happiness on it, Xunzi, while knowing what distinguishes humans from animals, chose not to pursue this line of thought. On
the contrary, he based his ethics on the thesis that "human nature is evil." In
other words, he starts from the aspect of human nature that human beings
share with other animals. In A_ristode's view, Xunzi failed to appreciate the significance of humanity.
Aristotle would also have a problem with Xunzi's description of desires and
emotions. For Xunzi, desires themselves are irrational and only lead to conflict.
Desires form a part of human function in Aristotle. Aristotle's notion of human
function as rationality, is broadly conceived; it includes the part of the soul that
has a rational principle in itself, but also includes "the appetitive and in general
the desiring element" (NE 1102b301). For Afistode, desires and emotions are
irrational but "in a sense share [metecbousa] a rational principle" (NE 1102b13).
This part "listens to and obeys" reason, and "this is the sense in which we speak
of paying heed to one's father or one's friends." Furthemaore, "that the irrational
dement is in some sense persuaded by reason is indicated also by the giving of
advice and by all reproof and exhortation" (NE 1102b34-1103a1). Thus, the desiting dement cannot initiate cogitation by itself; yet it can respond to and receive
advice and order. For this reason, Aristotle claimed that this part should also be
said to "have reason" (logon ecbein) (NE 1103a2) and it is a part of human function
(ergon). This part has its excellent state, that is, virtue, called gtbi/egaret6 ethical or
moral virtue (also rendered as "excellence of character").

Ytr Hi,man Nature and V'tttue in Mencius and Xunzi

29

The corollary of the thesis that human nature is evil is "any good in humans
is acquired by conscious exertion" (Xun~ 23.1a). For Xtmzi, the obtaining of
virtue is likened to a warped piece of wood that requires steaming and bending
to be straightened (Xun~ 23.1b). Aristotle would not approve this idea. He fully
realized that virtue is hardly possible without a ground in human nature. External effort can never form a habit contrary to a thing's nature: "For instance the
stone which by nature moves downwards cannot be habituated to move upwards, not even if one tries to train it by tl~owing it up ten thousand times"
(NE 1103a20-22). This can be used to explain why Xunzi had the problem of
explaining moral transformation ff he insists on the evilness of human nature.
Of course, as we know, Xunzi introduced some good elements in human nature, including a natural desire for the good and a theory of mind that can be
fruitfully compared with Aristotle's theory of practical wisdom. In doing so,
Xunzi is closer to Aristotle, but then he contradicts his view of the evilness of
human nature.
As we come to Mencius, we find that Aristotle would find a kindred spirit
Mencius also sought to identify humanity from the human nature complex. The
rationale for him to isolate his na=ow sense of xing from the complex of human
nature was that this good part distinguishes human beings from animals. This, as
shown earlier, is precisely Aristotle's reason for singling out human function from
the complex of human nature. More importantly, Mencius, like Aristotle, grounded
his ethics on the goodness of human nature, that is, what distinguishes human beings from other animals. Although Mencius did not make an explicit statement, the
theory of innate human goodness, judged from the role that it actually plays in
Mencius' ethics, serves the same purpose as the function ~gument does in Aristotle's ethics. For Mencius, ten, the Confucian notion of virtue, is what makes a
man a man (Mendus 7a16). The theory ofxingis the basis for the theory of ren. The
four seeds determine what a human being genuinely is. The person of t~n ~/un~),
that is, the virtuous person or exemplary person, is the flail actn~liTation of these
seeds: "An exemplary person differs from other men in that he retains his heazt"
(Mencius 4b28; cf. 7al). Viewed in this way, Mencius' approach is as follows. To
establish Confucius' da0, to determine what ren is and what makes a person of ren,
we must appeal to what is distinctive of human beings, that is, the good nature of
human beings. Needless to say, Aristotle had a different view from Mencius on
what the special human characteristic is. He did not think that hmmnity is predisposed toward certain special types of moral virtues. We leave it for another occasion to pursue the implications of their difference. For now, I should conclude that
Mencius and Aristotle shared the same general approach to ground ethics on humanity. As Aristotle's human function argument provides the foundation for his
eudaimonism, so does Mencius' theory of human innate goodness contribute to
Confucian ethics, is

is I wish to thank HUANG Yong and two anonymous reviewers o f this journal for their helpful
comnlcIlts.

30

Dao:A JournalofCompara#vePhilosophyV.1

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