British Intelligence and the Turkish National Movement, 1919-22

Author(s): A. L. MacFie
Source: Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 37, No. 1 (Jan., 2001), pp. 1-16
Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4284136
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British Intelligenceand the

TurkishNational Movement, 1919-22
A.L. MACFIE

Readers of Keith Jeffery and Alan Sharp's article 'Lord Curzon and Secret
Intelligence', in ChristopherAndrew and Jeremy Noakes (eds.) Intelligence
and International Relations (University of Exeter, 1987), and Robin
Denniston's Churchill's Secret War (Sutton Publishing, Stroud, 1997),
might be excused for concluding that British intelligence regarding the
Turkish national movement in Anatolia in the period of national struggle,
1919-22, was obtained almost entirely from intercepts of Turkish, Greek,
French, Italian and other telegraphic and radio communications, decoded
where necessary either by British Military Intelligence, Constantinople,or
by the British Code and Cypher School (BCCS), set up in 1919, or its
predecessors, Room 40, Old Building, Admiralty,and MI lb, War Office.
Such was not the case.
Throughout the period of national struggle MI lc, later known as the
Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), and the other, associated British
intelligence services, in particularNaval Intelligence, provided a great deal
of information about events in Anatolia, most of which was obtained, not
from intercepts, but from the more traditional sources of information
available at the time. These included Turkish, Greek, Armenian and Arab
agents, locally recruitedby MI Ic, Constantinople, and the various British
intelligence services, operating in Syria and Mesopotamia; members of the
Ottoman government, the Turkish national movement and the Greek
Orthodox Church, friendly to Britain; employees of the Levant Consular
Service; reports published in the local and foreign press (Journal d'Orient,
YeniGun, Ileri, Hakimiet-i-Millie, Ankara Press Agency, Chicago Tribune
and many others); contacts in the French, Italian and Greek intelligence
services; and British control officers and other personnel posted at strategic
points in Anatolia, until the spring of 1920, when following the Allied
(British, French and Italian) occupation of Constantinople (the previous
occupation had been unofficial), British personnel were either arrested or
expelled from the area. Until the spring of 1920, therefore, information
regarding events in Anatolia was more than plentiful. Only following the
Middle EasternStudies, Vol.37, No.1, January2001, pp.1-16
PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON

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MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

Allied occupation of the Ottoman capital, and the outbreakof civil war in
Anatolia, when direct access to the interior was cut off, did the supply of
information become somewhat restricted, and even then it remained
plentiful, except with regard to the eastern provinces, a remote area, about
which little was known.'
That is not to suggest that British intercepts of Ottoman, Turkish
nationalist, Greek and other telegraphic and wireless communication, made
possible by the co-operation of Cable and Wireless, Constantinople,and by
the installation of a series of listening stations in Mesopotamia, did not
make a significant contributionto the work of the intelligence services. On
the contrary,as the records show, MI Ic (later SIS) was throughoutable to
interceptnot only a substantialpartof the telegraphiccommunicationof the
Ottoman ministries in Constantinople, including the Grand Vizierate, the
War Office and the Ministry of the Interior, but also that of the Turkish
nationalist administration in Ankara, and the principal nationalist army
corps in the interior.
In November 1919, for instance, MI Ic intercepted (or otherwise
obtained - the source of the informationcollected is not always made clear)
telegrams despatched by Kiazim Karabekir,commanderof the XVth Army
Corps, based in Erzerum, regarding the organization of a pan-Islamic
conference, shortly to be convened in Erzerumor Sivas.2In December they
intercepted a telegram, again from Kiazim Karabekir, informing the
Ministry of War in Constantinoplethat a council of sheikhs had assembled
at Kharputto consider what action they might take in the event of a French
occupation of Diarbekir.3In February1920 they interceptedtelegrams from
the Representative Committee in Ankara to the various army corps,
stationed in Anatolia, informing them what attitudethey should adopt in the
event of an Allied attemptto extend their occupation of Anatolia.4In April
they intercepteda telegram from Mustafa Kemal to Salih Pasha, the Grand
Vizier, despatched following the Allied occupation of Constantinople,
opposing the possible appointmentof Damad Ferid Pasha, an enemy of the
nationalists, as Grand Vizier.5 In May they intercepted a telegram from
Fevzi Pasha, informing the Sultan of the opening of the Grand National
Assembly in Ankara, and of the decisions unanimously adopted there.6In
February 1921 they intercepted a telegram from Mustafa Kemal to the
Grand Vizier, calling on the Sultan to acknowledge the sovereignty of the
Grand National Assembly, as established in the Law of Fundamental
Organizationof 20 January 1921. Finally, as Keith Jeffery and Alan Sharp
have shown, in November 1921 they intercepted telegrams despatched by
the Ankara and Constantinoplegovernments, both to each other and to the
various European capitals, regarding possible Allied mediation in the war
then taking place between the Greeks and the Turkish nationalists in

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BRITAIN AND THE TURKISH NATIONAL MOVEMENT,

1919-22

Anatolia; and from November 1922 to July 1923 they interceptedtelegrams

despatched by the Ankara government to the Turkishnationalist delegation
attending the Lausanne peace conference.8
Telegrams intercepted and decyphered by MI Ic or BCCS were
occasionally identified thus: 'The Following is a Decypher of a Turkish
Telegram Which Has Been Obtained from a Very Secret Source and Must
Not Be Circulated'. The secret appears to have been well kept. Though
Mustafa Kemal clearly suspected that his telegrams were being intercepted,
he does .not appear to have discovered how. In a Weekly Summary of
Intelligence Reports, made by MI lc on 27 May 1920, it was reportedthat
Mustafa Kemal had called on all telegraphists operatingin areas controlled
by nationalists to perform their duties conscientiously. Those who failed to
do so would be subject to the death penalty. On no account must they allow
enemy gold to tempt them into taking actions likely to bring about the 'ruin
and destructionof the nation'.9
Evidence that British intelligence also intercepted wireless signals
broadcast in Anatolia is contained in a General Staff Memorandumon the
Situation in Turkey,composed in March 1920. In western Anatolia, the War
Office reported, the Turkish nationalists appeared to possess only four
wireless sets, all light, portable, and with a radius of not much more than a
hundredmiles.'0
In the period preceding the rise of the Turkish national movement in
Anatolia, the British intelligence services concentratedtheir attentionon the
gatheringof informationabout the workings of the Committee of Union and
Progress (CUP), the secret society, laterpolitical party,which dominatedthe
Turkish political scene from the period of the Young Turk Revolution of
1908 to the end of the First WorldWarand beyond. In a majorreporton the
CUP, composed in March 1919, shortly before the Greek occupation of
Smyrna (Izmir), they were able to provide detailed information on the
history, organization and leadership of the Committee, together with
accounts of its relations with the Sultan, the political parties, many recently
formed, and the press. For the most part,the informationcollected, no doubt
from a variety of sources, proved reasonably correct, though somewhat out
of date. Ziya Gokalp, the noted Turkishnationalistthinker,was identified as
the present 'Director of policy', responsible for issuing importantdecrees
and death sentences. Djavid Bey, a donme (convert, member of a JudaeoIslamic syncretist sect, founded in the seventeenth century), and Minister of
Finance in a numberof CUP governments, was identified as the 'best Brain
in the society', responsible for finance and propaganda.In his work Djavid
Bey was said to be assisted by Hussein Djahid Bey, whose influence
was exercised mainly in financial quarters,which were 'not always German
or Jewish'.

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MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

TalaatPasha, until recently GrandVizier, was said to remain in effective

control of the Committee,throughsecret channels. His whereaboutswere not
known, but it was believed that he remained either in or near the Ottoman
capital (in fact he had fled, first to the Crimea and then to Berlin). Enver
Pasha, until recently Minister of War,and Djemal Pasha, Ministerof Marine
and rulerof Syria, were also said to remainin touch with the Ottomancapital
(both had in fact fled, ending up like Talaatin Berlin);but both were regarded
as completely discredited and unlikely to play any furtherpart in Turkish
politics. Ismail Djanbulat,a CUP chief of the secret police, was believed to
remaineffective, acting as a link between the organizationand the 'forces of
terror'.Beha Bey, a lawyer, and leading memberof the organization,was said
to carryconsiderableweight in the masonic movement, frequentlyassociated
by British intelligence with the CUP, in particularthe Grand Orient Lodge.
Dr Nazim, also a leading member, was unlikely, it was said, to returnto the
Ottomancapital. Rezmi Bey, a donme and recent presidentof the Permanent
CourtMartial,and Arab Kiamil Pasha, an Under Secretaryof State for War,
were said to be the most prominentarmy membersof the CUP. Surprisingly,
in the report,no mention is made of MustafaKemal Pasha, the laterleader of
the Turkishnational movement, though some mention is made of Fethi Bey,
a close friend and political collaboratorof Mustafa Kemal's, once president
of the CUP central committee. Mention is also made of Raouf Bey, also a
later leader of the Turkishnational movement, described in the report as a
'hot head', ready for anything.
According to the General Staff, Intelligence, report, following the
appointmentof Izzet Pasha as Grand Vizier, in October 1918, members of
the CUP, officially dissolved in November, formed a new party, the
Tejeddud (Renovation) Party, described as being merely 'a cloak for the
CUP', in order that they might carry on the struggle following the defeat of
the Ottoman Empire in the war. Other parties and groups identified by the
General Staff report include Hurriyet Perveran Ammi (Liberal Popular
Party) set up by Fethi Bey, Muhafiz-i-Millie (National Defence), Wilson
Principleri Osmanli Firkasi (Society of Turks professing the principles of
PresidentWilson), and TurkOjaghy (The TurkishHearth).The exact nature
of the funds available to the CUP and its supporters,in the post-war period,
was not known, but it was believed that they were substantial, possibly
totalling as much as ?30-40 million, much of it invested abroad.2
It should not be assumed, the General Staff Intelligence report
concluded, that the CUP was now an ineffective organization. On the
contrary, it remained active, enjoying the support not only of many
members of the police, the army and the Ottoman administration,but also
of a loyal corps of fedais (men preparedto sell themselves 'body and soul'
to the committee, 'assassins', and guardiansof secret stores of arms).'3

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BRITAIN AND THE TURKISH NATIONAL MOVEMENT,

1919-22

The fact that Mustafa Kemal Pasha received no mention in the British
Staff, Intelligence, report of March 1919 does not mean that he entirely
escaped the attention of the intelligence services in the period immediately
following the end of the First World War.In February 1919 his name was
included, along with those of Kiazim Karabekir,at that time GOC Gallipoli
Army Corps, Ismet Bey, Under Secretaryof State, and some 40 or so others
in a list of persons connected in one way or another with the CUP, whose
discharge from the army or removal from office was requested.4
Most of the information collected by the British on the rise of the
national movement, in its first phase, was collected, it would seem, not by
the British intelligence services, but by the various British control officers,
relief officers and other officials stationed in, or passing through,
Anatolia; though it is not always possible to make a clear distinction
between intelligence and non-intelligence sources. Thus in July 1919
Commander Heathcote-Smith, RNVR, wrote a 'History of the
Movement', based on information collected during a journey from
Constantinople to Trebizond and back.'5 In the same month Captain
Perring, a relief officer stationed in Samsun, wrote a report describing the
recent activities of Mustafa Kemal Pasha and Raouf Bey in his area.'6In
October the control officer in Samsun, probably Captain Hurst, wrote a
Report on the Political Situation in the Samsun Area; and in November
Captain Hadkinson, a relief officer, wrote a Report on the Conditions in
the Vilayet of Bursa, after a two-month stay in the area.'7It was no doubt
on the basis of these and other, similar reports that, in the autumn of 1919
the War Office felt able to put together a 'History of the National
Movement', probably the most accurate of the short accounts of the
national movement produced at the time.'8
Much of the information collected by the British control and relief
officers and others, in the course of their duties, was remarkablydetailed,
though not always entirely accurate. In a 'General Report on the Irregular
TurkishArmy', operatingin the neighbourhoodof the territoryoccupied by
the Greeks in western Anatolia, and on the feelings of the Turks in the
interior, which had given rise to the 'IrregularMovement', the Control
Officer, Akhissar, following a personal visit to the area carried out in July
1919, was able to provide detailed information regarding the organization,
numbers,leadershipand morale of the armedbands operatingin the 'Aivali,
Pergama, Soma, Akhissar, Salihli, Odemish, Aidin and Chinar' areas.'9
Information provided in this report was later used by General Milne,
Commanderof the Army of the Black Sea, in a 'Report on the Strengthof
the Ottoman Army in Anatolia', drawn up in October 1919.2? According to
a note attachedto the report,the figure given for the armedbands operating
in the Smyrna area - a total of approximately 20,000 - was probably

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MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

overestimated, as their information had in most cases been obtained from

the leaders of the bands, who were inclined to exaggerate. Estimates given
by the Greek headquarterswere also considered to be exaggerated. A later
report, composed in October 1919, suggested that, in the Aidin district,
there were more than 20,000 irregularsunder arms; on the Smyma (Izmir)
front, up to 25,000; and in the Balyk-Hissar district, about 10,000.21
Most of the information collected by British intelligence regarding the
foundation of the Turkishnational movement in Anatolia was obtained then
from non-intelligence sources (though as we have seen the distinction was
never clear cut). But that does not mean that the intelligence services were
not busy, in that period, recruiting agents and collecting information. In
December 1919 Major Hay, Constantinople, reported to the Director of
Military Intelligence, London, that General Staff, Intelligence,
Constantinople, had recently succeeded in planting an agent in a 'small
group of persons' in the Ottoman capital, who were apparentlyseeking, on
behalf of the Soviet Government, to establish contact with Mustafa Kemal
and the other nationalist leaders. Volunteering to go to the interior, as an
emissary of the group, accompanied by another volunteer, the agent was
reported to have succeeded in travelling as far as Balyk-Hissar, where he
met Kiazim Pasha, Commanderof the 61st Division. At the meeting Kiazim
Pasha declared that he was, himself, sympathetic to the Bolshevik cause,
and wished to work with the Communists,but he did not believe the Turkish
people would respond positively to Bolshevik propaganda, which might
prove counterproductive.Successful propagandain Turkey could only be
carried out on national and religious grounds. According to the agent's
report, Kiazim Pasha's staff were not at that time in touch with any of the
separatist 'republics' of Russia - neither with Azerbaijannor with Georgia.
But Mustafa Kemal was said to have made contact with both.22
Not that Bolshevik propaganda in Anatolia in that period was nonexistent. In the Weekly Summary of Intelligence Reports for the week
ending 14 January 1920, MI Ic reported that Bolshevik propaganda,
propagatedby Bolshevik agents, was rife in the Bandirmaarea.23Bolshevik
agents in Turkey, it was reported, had been instructed to work solely on
nationalist and pan-Islamic lines.
The Weekly Summary of Intelligence Reports for the week ending 14
Januaryalso stated that secret information,recently obtained, suggested that
the OttomanMinistry of Warwas engaged in the direction of nationalistand
pan-Islamic intrigue in the former Ottoman Arab provinces, India,
Afghanistan and Azerbaijan. A mission, headed by one Jabbara,had been
instructedby the Ministry of Warto remain in contact with the 'Sheikhs', a
group which was presumed to include Ibn Saud, the ruler of Nejd, and Ibn
Rashid, the ruler of Ha'il. Kiazim Karabekir,Commander of the XVth

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BRITAIN AND THE TURKISH NATIONAL MOVEMENT,

1919-22

Army Corps, stationed in Erzerum, was believed to be acting as

intermediarybetween the Ministry of War and the mission.24
Throughoutthe period of Turkishnational struggle the British remained
well informed about the thinking of the Sultan and his government in
Constantinople. Allied High Commissioners enjoyed direct access to the
Sultan and his ministers, and where necessary additional information was
provided by a host of agents and informers, employed in the Palace and the
Porte. Thus, in the Weekly Summary of Intelligence Reports for the week
ending 19 December 1919, it was reported that the Ottoman government
had decided to send a mission, accompanied by Refik Bey, Keeper of the
Privy Purse, to meet Ahmed Anzavour, a leading anti-nationalist,operating
in north western Anatolia; and in a similar summary, drawn up about the
same time, that the Sultan had recently consulted Tewfik Pasha about the
possibility of reappointingDamad Ferid Pasha as GrandVizier.25
In the Weekly Summary of Intelligence Reports for the week ending 25
March 1920, it was reported that, according to a source within the Palace,
the Sultan was much relieved at the recent arrest of nationalist leaders in
Constantinople (20 or so nationalist deputies had been arrested, following
the Allied occupation of the Ottoman capital, and 150 or so intellectuals,
sympathetic to the nationalist cause).26Had the Allies not taken action, he,
the Sultan, would have been obliged to do so himself. Fears of a coup d'etat,
it was reported,about the same time, had led to a strengtheningof the Palace
guard. In the event of an Allied decision to expel the Turks from their
capital, it had been suggested that the Imperial Family leave immediately
for Anatolia. Konya might provide a suitable place of residence.27In the
Weekly Summary of Intelligence Reports for the week ending 22 April, it
was reported that Princess Ulvieh had recently visited the Sultan and told
him that the nationalists were planning to crush Anzavour; and that in view
of the numbers and resources of the nationalists, resistance to them would
only lead to the useless shedding of Muslim blood. Anzavour's movement,
which was merely aiding the British, was most unpopularin the Muslim
world. All the princes of the Imperial House agreed. Nationalist success
might lead to the dethronementof the Sultan.28
The Allied occupation of Constantinople,carriedout on 16 March 1920,
proved a turningpoint in the history of the national struggle, leading to the
closure of the Ottoman Chamberof Deputies in Constantinople;the setting
up of a Grand National Assembly in Ankara; the despatch, by the Sultan
and his government in Constantinople, of an 'Army of the Caliphate' to
Anatolia, to suppress the nationalists; a prolonged period of civil war and
an eventual nationalist victory - a victory which, short of a total Greek
defeat of the national forces in Anatolia, made the imposition of the harsh
peace treaty envisaged by the Allies (a peace treaty was actually signed by

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MIDDLEEASTERNSTUDIES

the Ottoman government at Sevres on 10 August 1920) unlikely, if not

impossible.29About these and other related events, British intelligence was
as usual well informed. In the Weekly Summaryof Intelligence Reports for
the week ending 22 January 1920, it was reported that in view of the
possible loss of Constantinople to Turkey (the Allies, having in January
decided to allow the Sultan and his government to remain in
Constantinople, yet intended to use the threat of expulsion to compel
Turkish acceptance of the proposed peace treaty), the nationalists were
planning to form armed bands of fedayis who, under the direction of the
National Defence Organization, would organize sabotage, strikes and
general disturbancesin the Ottomancapital. Funds for the operation would
be provided by Unionist societies located in the area.30
In the Weekly Summary of Intelligence Reports for the week ending 8
April it was reported that General Staff Intelligence, Constantinople, had
recently received a copy of a letter, purportedto be from Mustafa Kemal to
Raouf Bey, regardingthe possible loss of Turkishcontrol of the Straits;and
in the summaryof the following week that Halide Edib Hanim, the famous
authoress, Dr Adnan Bey, her husband, Ferid Bey, a former Minister of
Works, and Jelalledin Arif, Presidentof the OttomanChamberof Deputies,
had arrivedin Ankara.3'In the Weekly Summaryof Intelligence Reports for
the week ending 22 April, it was reported that the nationalists intended to
form a constituent assembly in Ankara.32And in the Weekly Summary of
Intelligence of Reports for the week ending 8 July, it was reportedthat the
operations authorized by the Paris Peace Conference - in June the Allies
had authorized a Greek advance in the area of the Straits, threatened by
advancing nationalist forces - had brought about an atmosphere of
hopelessness and tension in nationalist circles, though a French business
man, recently returnedfrom Ankara, reported that order and security had
been maintained.33
Trainscrowded with troops, well armed and disciplined,
were moving westward. As far as one could judge, there were no Germans
in Ankara,but at Eskishehir there were civilians of doubtful nationality.
According to the French businessman, a decided split had occurred
within the nationalist party. A more moderate group of prominent military
officers, led by Ali Fuad Pasha, Colonel Ismet Bey and NurreddinPasha,
had joined together to terminate the dictatorshipof Mustafa Kemal. Their
programmeincluded such objects as a separation of the executive and the
legislative authority, a reconciliation with the central government, the
strengthening of the prestige of the Khalifate and Sultanate, and direct
negotiations with the Entente powers. If based on fact, this reportwould, it
was remarked,be 'of great interest'.34
Throughoutthis period a close watch was kept on the couriers employed
by the Ankara regime to communicate with their supporters in

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BRITAIN AND THE TURKISH NATIONAL MOVEMENT,

1919-22

Constantinople. Many of these couriers, it was believed, were Turkish

women, belonging to the Islamic Women's Work Association set up by
Enver Pasha's wife, Najie Sultane. The route followed was believed to be
Kartal-Samandra-Shile-Dudurlu-Guive-AdaBazar. Railway and landing
stage officials were employed to pass on information; but it was accepted
that many couriers escaped detection.35
British perceptions regarding the nature and identity of the national
movement in Anatolia remained confused throughoutthe period of Turkish
national struggle; but in August 1920 SIS, Constantinople,received a report
from a 'well educated and intelligent' Turkishgentleman, recently returned
from Anatolia, which helped them resolve many of their difficulties. In the
report,the 'well educated and intelligent' Turkishgentleman explained that
the national movement in Anatolia was divided into two main factions: a
Unionist faction, led by Eyub Sabri, who believed that in order to obtain
effective Bolshevik assistance it was necessary to adopt Bolshevism, with
all its consequences; and a 'genuine' nationalist faction, led by Mustafa
Kemal, who wished to make use of Bolshevik assistance for their own
purposes but did not wish to adopt the Bolshevik social system. About 100
deputies in the Grand National Assembly had been won over to the
Bolshevik cause, and their numbers were growing. They were in constant
communication with Talaat Pasha, the 'principal protagonist of Islamic
Bolshevism in Europe', who with the assistance of the Russians and
Germans was making every effort to obtain control of the national
movement; and they had organized a 'Green Army', or People's Party, to
rouse the Islamic world against Europe. Mustafa Kemal's position in
Anatolia was, therefore, by no means secure. The Bolsheviks, in Moscow,
with whom he had recently established relations, had no intention of pulling
his chestnuts out of the fire. If they ever did offer armed assistance it would
almost certainly take the same form as that given to the ephemeral
'Republic' of Azerbaijan.36
The report from the 'well educated and intelligent' Turkish gentleman
made an immense impression on the officials at the British foreign office.
As D.G. Osborne minuted on 23 September 1920, this report showed that
there were two parties in Anatolia and not only one. The weaker was that of
Mustafa Kemal, who, induced by patriotic and religious motives, was
endeavouring to resist the peace terms and the resultantdismembermentof
Turkey.The stronger,gaining ground every day, was that of the Unionists,
that of Enver, Talaat and the CUP - Jew-German-Bolshevik - a far more
dangerous party, who were not concerned with the defence of Turkey, but
with the organization of a pan-Islamic Bolshevik offensive throughoutthe
east, primarily directed against the British. Enver and his associates had
sacrificed Turkey to the Bolshevik conception of pan-Islam and accepted

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10

MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

the principles of Lenin. They were disseminating those principles by means

of the Green propagandistArmy.37
In September 1920 SIS, Constantinople, composed a report on TurcoBolshevik co-operation, based on information supplied by a Turkishagent,
recently returnedfrom Baku, acquaintedwith the principalUnionist leaders.
This report,as the authorof an introductionwrittenby a British intelligence
officer remarked, confirmed the impression recently given by the
'intelligent and well-educated' Turkishgentleman;but to some extent it also
modified that impression. Whilst it was true that Unionists in Europe, led by
Talaat, were promoting a pan-Islamic-Bolshevik alliance, aimed at the
destructionof the British Empire in Asia, Unionists who had witnessed the
depredationsof the Bolsheviks in Transcaucasiaand CentralAsia, shocked
by what they had seen, were becoming increasingly sceptical. Nevertheless
the Unionists would probably be preparedto go furtherdown the Red road
than Mustafa Kemal and his followers, whose aspirations regarding a
possible union with other Muslim countries were motivated purely by
Turkishinterests. Mustafa Kemal's policy could not be dignified by the term
pan-Islamist, except in a degraded sense of the expression. As for the
activities of Talaat and the other Unionist leaders, resident in Europe, the
'hidden hand' shaping their complicated schemes could not as yet be
identified; but in TranscaucasiaHalil Pasha, Enver's uncle, was clearly a
guiding spirit.38
The extent to which British officials depended on informationprovided
by SIS and the other intelligence services, particularlywith regardto events
in Transcaucasia,is made clear in a memorandumentitled 'Note Presented
to Lord Curzonon Relations Between Bolsheviks and TurkishNationalists',
presented in November 1920.39In this the anonymous authorremarkedthat
the Foreign Office had practically no original reports on the subject. They
were almost entirely dependent on information supplied by SIS. Two very
full and detailed reports,recently drawn up by the WarOffice and the India
Office - the first entitled 'Examination of the Cause of the Outbreak in
Mesopotamia' and the second 'Mesopotamia: Causes of Unrest' (a report
drawn up in two parts by Major N.N.E. Bray, a special intelligence officer
attachedto the Political Department,India Office) - had attemptedto make
sense of the information available. Bray, in his report, had attempted to
relate the events taking place in Anatolia, Syria and Mesopotamia to the
conclusion of a Bolshevik-Turkish alliance, supposedly concluded by Enver
Pasha and Lenin in Moscow, and to a series of anti-imperialistorganization
set up by Talaat Pasha and other CUP leaders, resident in Europe. But
definite evidence of Russian assistance to the Turkishnationalistsremained
scanty, owing to the fact that the majority of the reports received had been
written by anonymous agents, whose accuracy could not be vouchsafed. So

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BRITAIN AND THE TURKISH NATIONAL MOVEMENT, 1919-22

11

far, it seemed the Bolsheviks had provided the nationalists with little
effective aid: merely a 'small sum of money' and an 'unknown quantity of
military supplies'.40
Later reports, issued by SIS, Constantinople, confirmed the Foreign
Office in its belief that a substantialdivide existed between the Unionists,
led by Talaatand Enver, in exile, and the nationalistsled by Mustafa Kemal.
In a report drawn up in May 1921, following the failure of a peace
conference convened in London in March, SIS, Constantinople reported
that the extremists (the Unionists) had gained ground. On Mustafa Kemal's
advice, the Grand National Assembly had voted against ratification of the
agreements concluded by Bekir Sami Bey, the nationalist Foreign Minister,
at the London conference, as ratificationof the agreements might lead to a
cessation of supplies from Russia.4'It was to be expected, therefore,that the
Ankara government would pursue a strong, pro-Bolshevik policy. Not that
Mustafa Kemal was, himself, necessarily fully committed to that approach:
As regardsMustafa Kemal's attitude,there is no doubt that, on the one
hand, he is strongly opposed to Bolshevik doctrines, but that on the
other hand, one of the fundamentalprinciples of his foreign policy is
close co-operation with the Soviet Government.He is also opposed to
Enver Pasha on personal grounds, but it does not appear that this
hostility is extended to Unionist doctrines. It is difficult, in fact, to
distinguish between the pan-Turanianismof the Committee of Union
and Progress and the pan-Islamism of Mustafa Kemal and his
supporters.The keynote, however, to Mustafa Kemal's attitude is his
all-dominating ambition, through the influence of which his policy is
based upon two main principles: one involving the adoption of an
extreme Nationalist policy, completely in harmony with that of the
majority of the members of the Great National Assembly, and the
other involving consistent opposition to Communist doctrines, to
which also the great mass of the Nation is equally hostile. By this
espousal of extreme Nationalism, Mustafa Kemal Pasha secures the
support of the extremists, including probably a considerable number
of the Unionists, while by his opposition to Bolshevism he acquires
the confidence of the moderate party also. In this manner he has
succeeded in maintaining himself in that position of domination
which alone can satisfy his nature, and which renders unlikely any
settlement either with the Central Government or with the Allies
which would involve his relegation to a less prominentposition.42
In the same report it was noted that information received from a
'prominent member of the Nationalist organization in Constantinople', an
'original' member of the CUP, suggested that leading members of the CUP,

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12

MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

recently released from Malta where they had been interned, in particular
Djavid Bey, were endeavouringto recover control of the national movement
in Anatolia, which they claimed to have set up. Mustafa Kemal was
expected to bury the hatchet with Enver Pasha, who was more popularthan
Mustafa Kemal in Germany,Russia and certain Muslim countries.
On the eve of the Battle of Sakarya, August 1921, British intelligence,
as was to be expected, had excellent information on the size and
composition of the Greek expeditionary force in Anatolia; but they were,
according to a report of 6 July 1921, unable to secure accurate information
with regard to the size and composition of the nationalist forces. Evidence
obtained about recent operations, supplemented by reports obtained from
French, Italian and Greek sources, suggested that the nationalist army had
been greatly expanded in recent months, and that its training had been
methodical and efficient. In all probability, therefore, the Greek force,
though superior to the nationalist by a factor of three to two in infantry,
would not succeed in defeating the Turks. No possibility of a 'decisive
victory' existed.43
Following the defeat of the Greek expeditionary force at Sakarya, the
War Office, in a report of 1 October 1921, explained the defeat in terms of
the 'over-wheening' self-confidence of the Greek High Command, the
indifferent quality of the Greek intelligence service, and the inadequate
planning of operations. As a result of the Turkish nationalist victory, the
prestige of Mustafa Kemal had been greatly enhanced. The British
government might, therefore, reasonably assume that henceforth the
moderate party in Ankara would exercise power. There was now no chance
of a returnof Enver Pasha, or of a military alliance being formed between
the nationalists and the Bolsheviks.44
British intelligence in this period appearsto have been remarkablywell
informed about the structureand organizationof the intelligence service set
up by the Ankara regime in the summer of 1921. In a report of 5 October
1921, passed on by the Director of Military Intelligence to the Foreign
Office, GHQ, Allied Forces of Occupation, supplied detailed information
about the structureof the new Directorate,the identity of its directorsand its
principal functions. Branches were reported to have been established in
Rome, Zurich, Berlin, Paris and Moscow, with Rome acting as a centre of
communication.Communicationswith Anatolia were maintainedby way of
Rhodes and Antalya;and a courier system had been set up between Moscow,
Berlin and Rome. The Rome organization was also believed to have
established communication with the Muslim committees in Tripoli and the
Indian KhalifatDelegation. The Constantinoplebranchof the service, which
operated 'under the cloak' of the Ottoman War Office, kept in close touch
with the Deuxieme Bureau of the French army GHQ, Constantinople.45

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BRITAIN AND THE TURKISH NATIONAL MOVEMENT,

1919-22

13

Throughout the remaining months of the Turkish nationalist struggle

SIS, Constantinople, remained remarkably well informed about events in
Anatolia. In January 1922, they were able to pass on to the Foreign Office
information, obtained from a 'trustworthy'source, about the events leading
to the resignation of Raouf Bey as National Commissioner of Public Works,
together with a copy of Raouf Bey's letter of resignation, supplied by an
'independent' nationalist source.46In March they were able to pass on a
summary of information, supplied by 'various' nationalist sources,
regarding the status and characterof the various political parties operating
in the Grand National Assembly. These included the Defence of Rights
Party,the majorityparty,the Clerical Party,the EasternProvinces Party,the
'so-called' Communist Party, the Unionist Group, the Kume Party and the
Tevhid Club Group. The Tevhid Club Group, the report noted, was
composed mainly of supportersof Raouf Bey and Fethi Bey. Although for
many reasons opposed to Mustafa Kemal, Raouf and Fethi were trying to
reconcile the 'various conflicting currents of public opinion' in Turkey.
Most of the deputies in the assembly were army officers and former
members of the CUP.47Finally, in June 1922, CIS, Constantinople,
presented a remarkably detailed report, provided by an 'informant', on
relations between Enver Pasha and Mustafa Kemal. According to this report
Mustafa Kemal, when threatenedby the possible returnof Enver Pasha, had
taken fright and thrown himself 'on his knees' before the Russians,
promising to serve them more loyally if they supported him. This
undertaking, the report declared, Mustafa Kemal had given in writing,
keeping it secret even from his closest advisers. It is not clear if SIS believed
this report,but as the anonymous authorremarked,it cast a new light on the
circumstances leading to Enver Pasha's departurefor Turkestan.48
It is evident that the British intelligence services were for the most part
well informed about events in Anatolia in the period of Turkish national
struggle. In particular,they were aware of the part played in the foundation
of the national movement by the CUP, supposedly dissolved in November
1918; the nature of Mustafa Kemal's relations with the Ottoman
government in Constantinople; the strength of the Turkish nationalist
irregular forces facing the Greeks in western Anatolia; the extent of
Bolshevik and pan-Islamic propagandain the interior; the divisions in the
Grand National Assembly and the national movement, created by the
different policies, pursued by Mustafa Kemal and his opponents; the
complex natureof Mustafa Kemal's relationshipwith the Soviets; the likely
outcome of the battle of Sakarya;and the methods used by the nationalists
to establish relations with Constantinopleand Europe. Subjects about which
they appeared less well informed include the Amasya Declaration of 22
June 1919, seen by some as the founding document of the national

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14

MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

movement;the two greatcongresses,organizedby the Defence of Rights

Associations,in Erzerumin July and Sivas in September;the probable
consequencesof the Allied occupationof Constantinople,carriedout in
March1920;the precisestrengthof the Turkishnationalistregularforces
in theearlyperiod;andtheprecisenature
operatingin Anatolia,particularly
of MustafaKemal'srelationshipwiththe Arabsheikhs.
That the informationcollected by the British intelligence services
regardingthe TurkishnationalmovementradicallyaffectedBritishpolicy
may be doubted.Britishpolicy with regardto the OttomanEmpire,in
particularAnatolia,was initiallybased on the principleof partition,laid
down in the secrettreatiesconcludedby the EntentePowersin the First
WorldWar.The retreatfrom his policy that occurredin the period of
Turkishnationalstrugglewas forthemostpartdictatedby a seriesof events
and developments,the implicationsof which could be easily identified
withoutthe assistanceof informationsuppliedby the intelligenceservices.
These events and developmentsincludedthe rise of the Turkishnational
movement;the rapid demobilizationof the Allied forces assembledin
Europeand the Middle East in the First WorldWar;the refusalof the
Americansto accepta mandatefor the Armenianprovinces;the returnof
KingConstantine,anenemyof theEntentePowers,to the Greekthrone;the
failureof the Allies to pursuea unitedpolicy;andthe defeatof the Greek
expeditionaryforce at Sakaryain August-September1921 and its later
expulsionfromAnatolia.
In one area,however,it may be assumedthatthe informationcollected
by Britishintelligencemadea significantdifference.Information
regarding
the natureof the struggletakingplace in Anatoliabetweenthe 'moderate'
party,led by MustafaKemal,andthe 'extremist'party,led by Enver,Talaat,
and the otherCUP leadersabroad,exponentsof a pan-Islamic-Bolshevik
allianceaimedat the destructionof the BritishEmpirein Asia, encouraged
the British,in particularthe WarOfficeandthe Admiralty- well awareof
the advantagesto be gainedfromthe creationof an independentTurkish
state in Anatoliacapableof acting as a bulwarkagainstthe advanceof
Russiain the area- eventuallyto pursuea policy of compromise,which
mightotherwisehaveprovedunacceptable.
Accurateinformation
regarding
events in Anatoliaprovedvital, therefore,in openingthe road,firstto the
LondonConferenceandthento Lausanne.Not thatthe Britishwere quick
to adapttheirpolicy to the realitiesof the new situation.Radicalchangein
Britishpolicy(a recognitionof Turkishsovereigntythroughout
thewholeof
AnatoliaandeasternThrace)had to awaitthe defeatand expulsionof the
Greekexpeditionaryforcein westernAnatolia,accomplishedin September
1922.

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BRITAIN AND THE TURKISH NATIONAL MOVEMENT, 1919-22

15

NOTES
1. For furtherinformationon British intelligence in the period of the First WorldWar and its
aftermath, see C. Andrew and J. Noakes, Intelligence and International Relations,
1900-1945 (Exeter University Press, 1987). Much of the information regarding British
intelligence and the Turkish national movement has been made available in B.N. $im$ir,
British Documents on Ataturk(BDA), 4 vols., 1973-74 (Ankara:TurkTarihKurumu).
2. BDA, Vol.1, No.96, enclosure.
3. Ibid., No.106, enclosure.
4. Ibid., Vol.2, No.41, enclosure.
5. Ibid., No.6.
6. Ibid., No.33, enclosure.
7. Ibid., Vol.3, No.46, enclosure.
8. K. Jeffery and A. Sharp,'LordCurzonand Secret Intelligence', in C. Andrewand J. Noakes,
Intelligence and InternationalRelations, pp.108-21.
9. BDA, Vol.2, No.42, enclosures 1-3.
10. Ibid., No.23.
11. Public Records Office, London, FO 371/4141/49194, General Staff, Intelligence,
Constantinople,The Committee of Union and Progress. For an account of the political
partiesset up by the CUP in the period immediatelyfollowing the end of the FirstWorldWar
see E.J. Zurcher,The Unionist Factor (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1984), Ch.3.
12. FO 371/4141/49194, General Staff Intelligence, Constantinople,The Committee of Union
and Progress.
13. Ibid.
14. BDA, Vol.1, No.1, enclosure.
15. Ibid., No.22, enclosure.
16. Ibid., No.66, enclosure.
17. K. Bourne and D. Cameron Watt, British Documents on Foreign Affairs (BDFA) Part II,
Series B, Vol.1, Docs. 77 and 94.
18. W.O. 32/5733 History of the 'National Movement' in Turkey.
19. E.L. Woodward and R. Butler, Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, First
series, Vol.4, No.509.
20. BDFA, PartII, Series B, Vol.1, Doc. 76.
21. BDA, Vol.1, No. 101, enclosures.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid., No. 112.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid., Nos. 102 and 106.
26. Ibid., Vol.2, No. 1, enclosure.
27. Ibid., No.10, enclosure.
28. Ibid., No.24, enclosure.
29. For an account of the Allied occupationof Constantinopleof 15 March 1920 and the events
which followed see A.L. Macfie, Ataturk(Harlow:Longman, 1994), pp.93-4.
30. BDA, Vol.1, No.119, enclosure.
31. Ibid., Vol.2, Nos. I I and 22, enclosure.
32. Ibid., No.24, enclosure.
33. Ibid., No.73, enclosure.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid., Nos.1Oand 96, enclosures.
36. Ibid., No.92.
37. Ibid., note.
38. Ibid., No. 121.
39. Ibid., No.175. For an account of the two reports referred to, see A.L. Macfie, 'British
Intelligence and the Causes of Unrest in Mesopotamia, 1919-21', Middle Eastern Studies,
Vol.35, No. 1, 1999.
40. Ibid.

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16
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

Ibid., Vol.3, No.126.
Ibid.
Ibid., No.200.
Ibid., Vol.4, No.9.
Ibid., No. 12, enclosure.
Ibid., No.72.
Ibid., No.92.
Ibid., No.115.

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