The Allah That Failed

Ibn Warraq

iven that I am rather skeptical of the very possibility of a scientific survey of apostates, it is difficult for me
to make any psychological, sociological, or anthropological generalizations based on fewer than fifty personal testimonies
that would be valid outside this particular group. No quick portrait of the typical apostate is likely to appear-some are young
(students in their teens), some are middle-aged with children; some are scientists, while others are economists,
businesspeople, or journalists; some are from Bangladesh, others are from Pakistan, India, Morocco, Egypt, Malaysia, Saudi
Arabia, or Iran. Our witnesses, nonetheless, do have certain moral and intellectual qualities in common: for instance, they are
all comparatively well educated, computer literate with access to the Internet, and rational, with the ability to think for
themselves. However, what is most striking is their fearlessness, their moral courage, and their moral commitment to telling
the truth. They all face social ostracism, the loss of friends and family, a deep inner spiritual anguish and loneliness-and
occasionally the death penalty if discovered. Their decisions are not frivolously taken, but the ineluctable result of rational
thinking.
I had once thought of calling this whole anthology The Allah That Failed, as a homage to the famous testimonies of former
communists collected together in The God That Failed.' There are very useful analogies to be drawn between com munism
and Islam, as Maxime Rodinson2 and Bertrand Russell have pointed out, between the mindset of the communists of the
1930s and the Islamists of the 1990s and twenty-first century. As Russell said,
Among religions, Bolshevism [Communism] is to be reckoned with Muhammadanism rather than with Christianity and
Buddhism. Christianity and Buddhism are primarily personal religions, with mystical doctrines and a love of contemplation.
Muhammadanism and Bolshevism are practical, social, unspiritual, concerned to win the empire of this world.3
Hence the interest in the present situation and its haunting parallels with the communism of the Western intellectuals in the
1930s. As Arthur Koestler said, "You hate our Cassandra cries and resent us as allies, but when all is said, we exCommunists are the only people on your side who know what it's all about."' And as Richard Crossman wrote in his
introduction to The God That Failed,
Silone [an ex-Communist] was joking when he said to Togliatti that the final battle would be between the Communists and
ex-Communists. But no one who has not wrestled with Communism as a philosophy and Communists as political opponents
can really understand the values of Western Democracy. the Devil once lived in Heaven, and those who have not met him are
unlikely to recognize an angel when they see one.5
Communism has been defeated, at least for the moment; Islamism has not, and unless a reformed, tolerant, liberal kind of
Islam emerges soon, perhaps the final battle will be between Islam and Western democracy. And these former Muslims, to
echo Koestler's words, on the side of Western democracy are the only ones who know what it's all about, and we would do
well to listen to their Cassandra cries.
NOTES
1. A. Koestler, ed., The God That Failed (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1950). Other former Communists in the collection
included Ignazio Silone, Andre Gide, Richard Wright, Louis Fischer, adn Stephen Spender.
2. Maxime Rodinson, "Islam et communisme, une resemblance frappante" [Islam and commonumism, a striking
resemblance], Le Figaro, Paris, September 28, 2001.
3. Bertrand Russell, Practice and Theory of Bolshevism (London: Allen & Unwin, 1921), pp. 5, 29, 114.
4. Koestler, The God That Failed, p. 7.
5. R. Crossman, Introduction to The God That Failed, ed. A. Koestler (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1950), p. 16.

APOSTASY,
HUMAN RIGHTS,
AND ISLAM

he very notion of apostasy has vanished from the West, where one talks of being a "lapsed Catholic" or
"nonpracticing Christian" rather than an "apostate." There are certainly no penal sanctions for converting from Christianity to
any other superstitious flavor of the month, from New Ageism to Islam. In Islamic countries, on the other hand, the issue is
far from dead, as the examples given earlier attest.
Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) states: "Everyone has the right to freedom of thought,
conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and
observance."'
The clause guaranteeing the freedom to change one's religion was added at the request of the delegate from Lebanon, who
was a Christian.' Lebanon had accepted many people fleeing persecution for their beliefs, in particular for having changed
their religion. Lebanon specially objected to the Islamic law concerning apostasy. Many Muslim countries objected strongly
to the clause regarding the right to change one's religion. The delegate from Egypt, for instance, said that "very often a man
changes religion or his convictions under external influences with goals which are not recommendable such as divorce." He
added that he feared in proclaiming the liberty to change one's religion or convictions the UDHR would unwittingly
encourage "the machinations of certain missions well known in the East that relentlessly pursue their efforts with a view to
converting to their faith the populations of the East."3 Significantly, Lebanon was supported by a delegate from Pakistan
who belonged to the Ahmadi community, which, ironically, was to be thrown out of the Islamic community in the 1970s for
being "non-Muslim." In the end, all the Muslim countries except Saudi Arabia voted for the UDHR.
During discussions of Article 18 in 1966, Saudi Arabia and Egypt wanted to suppress the clause guaranteeing the freedom to
change one's religion. Finally a compromise amendment proposed by Brazil and the Philippines was adopted to placate the
Islamic countries. Thus "the freedom to change his religion or belief" was replaced by "the freedom to have or adopt a
religion or belief of his choice."4 Similarly, in 1981, during discussions on the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms
of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, Iran reminded everyone that Islam punished apostasy by
death. The delegate from Iraq, backed up by Syria, speaking on behalf of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference,
expressed his reserve for any clauses or terms that would contradict the Islamic Sharia, while the delegate from Egypt
feared that such a clause might be exploited for political ends to interfere in the internal affairs of states.5
The various Islamic human rights schemes or declarations, such as the Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights
(1981), are understandably vague or evasive on the issue of the freedom to change one's religion, since Islam itself clearly
forbids apostasy and punishes it with death. As A. E. Mayer says:
The lack of support for the principle of freedom of religion in the Islamic human rights schemes is one of the factors that
most sharply distinguishes them from the International Bill of Human Rights, which treats freedom of religion as an
unqualified right. The [Muslim] authors' unwillingness to repudiate the rule that a person should be executed over a question
of religious belief reveals the enormous gap that exists between their mentalities and the modern philosophy of human
rights.6
As for the constitutions of various Muslim countries, while many do guarantee freedom of belief (Egypt, 1971; Syria, 1973;
Jordan, 1952), some talk of freedom of conscience (Algeria, 1989), some of freedom of thought and opinion (Mauritania,
1991). Islamic countries, with two exceptions, do not address the issue of apostasy in their penal codes; the two exceptions
are the Sudan and Mauritania. Article 126.2 of the Sudanese Penal Code of 1991 reads, "Whoever is guilty of apostasy is
invited to repent over a period to be determined by the tribunal. If he persists in his apostasy and was not recently converted
to Islam, he will be put to death." The Penal Code of Mauritania of 1984, article 306, reads, "All Muslims guilty of apostasy,
either spoken or by overt action will be asked to repent during a period of three days. If he doesnot repent during this period,
he is condemend to death as an apostate, and his belongings confiscated by the State Treasury." This applies equally to
women. The Moroccan Penal Code seems only to mention those guilty of trying to subvert the belief of a Muslim or try to
convert a Muslim to another religion. The punishment ranges from a fine to imprisonment for up to three years.'

The absence of any mention of apostasy in some penal codes of Islamic countries, of course, in no way implies that a
Muslim in the country concerned is free to leave his religion. In reality, the lacunae in the penal codes are filled by Islamic
law. Mahmud Muhammad Taha was hanged for apostasy in Sudan in 1985, even though the Sudanese Penal Code of 1983
did not mention such a crimes
In some countries, the term apostate is applied to some who were born nonMuslim, but whose ancestors had converted from
Islam. The Baha'is in Iran in recent years have been persecuted for just such a reason. Similarly, in Pakistan the Ahmadiyya
community were classed as non-Muslims, and subjected to all sorts of persecution.
There is some evidence that many Muslim women in Islamic countries would convert from Islam to escape their lowly
position in Muslim societies, to avoid the application of an unfavorable law, especially Shari'a laws governing divorce.9
Muslim theologians are well aware of the temptation of Muslim women to evade the SharFa laws by converting from Islam,
and take appropriate measures. For example, in Kuwait in an explanatory memorandum to the text of a law reform says:
"Complaints have shown that the devil makes the route of apostasy attractive to the Muslim woman so that she can break a
conjugal tie that does not please her. For this reason, it was decided that apostasy would not lead to the dissolution of the
marriage in order to close this dangerous door."10
NOTES
1. Available online at the United Nations Web site: www.un.org/rights/50/ decla.htm.
2. Sami A. Aldeeb Abu-Sahlieh, "Le Delit d'Apostasie Aujour'hui et ses Consequences en Droit Arabe et Musulman,"
Islamochristiana 20 (1994): 93-116, A. E. Mayer, Islam and Human Rights (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991), p. 164.
3. Abu-Sahlieh, "Le Delit d'Apostasie," p. 94.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Mayer, Islam and Human Rights, p. 187.
7. Abu-Sahlieh, "Le Delit d'Apostasie," p. 98.
8. Sarni A. Aldeeb Abu-Sahlieh, Les Musulmans face aux droits de l'homme (Bachum: Verlag Dr. D. Winkler), p. 110.
9. Mayer, Islam and Human Rights, p. 167.
10. Sarni A. Aldeeb Abu-Sahlieh, " Liberte religieuse et apostasie dans l'islam," Praxis juridique et religion 23 (1986): 53;
quoted in Mayer, Islam and Human Rights, pp. 167-68.