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2 Price Discrimination
Matilde Machado
Download the slides from:
http://www.eco.uc3m.es/~mmachado/Teaching/OI-I-MEI/index.html
Other than the names on the packages and a bit of different description, the products are identical; and
even the styles of the packages are identical. Putting advertisements for both packages in the same
catalog is a poor way of creating market separation: If I had hair and needed to cut it, I would simply buy
the Trim-a-Pet for my personal use and save the $5. This is a bad attempt at market separation.
Industrial Organization- Matilde Machado
The Caff Nero outlet in London I visited recently has different prices for take-out
and in-store cups of coffee 1.65 for take-out, 1.75 for in-store.
Given the costs of space for tables to sit at, and the need to own and wash cups
and saucers, the price difference must be way too small to make this costbased price discrimination. But it cant be demand-based price
discrimination either I dont see why the demand elasticity should be
lower for in-store than for take-out. My guess is that it is cost-based in part,
but that the difficulty in separating the two markets leads to the small price
difference. The woman sitting at the next table is drinking coffee out of a
take-away cup, having clearly paid the lower price, but enjoying the in-store
ambience (and free Wifi). I think it just doesnt pay for the baristas to police
table usage, so that knowledgeable customers pay the lower price
whereas a gullible American like me pays the higher price!
Industrial Organization- Matilde Machado
pM
DWL
c
qM
Monopolists Profits
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
P
p1
p2
Aggregate
Demand = sum of
all individual
demands
Uniform price pm
qM
qM=qC
Total quantity
sold under
perfect
discrimination
Note: there are no efficiency losses (no DWL)! The total quantity sold
is the same as under perfect competition
Industrial Organization- Matilde Machado
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T(q)=A+pq
total paid
for q units
19
Examples:
Electricity, water ,etc
Polaroid photos
Amusement park
Taxi
Razor blades
Disco
Industrial Organization- Matilde Machado
20
10
T(q1)/q1
q0
q1
T(q0)/q0
The average price when consumer buys q1 is lower than when
he buys q0: T(q1)/q1< T(q0)/q0
Industrial Organization- Matilde Machado
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A=Sc/n
P=pc
MC
Uniform price
pm
T(q)=Sc/n+pcq
Sc
pc
Aggregate
Demand
qM
qM=qC
Note: There are no efficiency losses, no DWL! The total quantity sold is
again the same as in perfect competition. p=pc maximizes the consumer
surplus in order to be extract by the monopolist through the payment of A.
Industrial Organization- Matilde Machado
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11
S = [ p (q ) p c ]dq
c
23
Ti(q)=Ai+pcq
where pc=MC and Ai=Sic(consumer is
surplus when p=pc)
24
12
25
26
13
27
28
14
Max} p D ( p ) C D ( p )
{
p1 , p2 ,... pm i =1
i =1
Aggregate Demand
=Total production
FOC:
= 0 for i = 1,...m
pi
Di ( pi ) + pi Di( pi ) C Di ( pi ) Di( pi ) = 0
i =1
Di ( pi )
pi C (Q )
1
=
[ pi C (Q)] =
pi
i ( Di ( pi ))
Di ( pi )
29
1
pi 1
= C (Q)
i ( Di ( pi ))
Marginal Revenue i
i > j pi < p j
2.2. Price Discrimination
30
15
31
32
16
33
http://economics.about.com/b/2008/01/02/real-life-price-discrimination-an-example.htm
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17
Bronze Gold
Monthly fee
17,5
36,0
29p
18p
The firm wants those consumers that call more often to select the Gold plan
and that those that call less select the bronze (instead of selecting another
firm). Note in this example the firm uses two-part tariffs to engage in 3rddegree price discrimination.
Industrial Organization- Matilde Machado
35
(2)
Selection The air company wants to make sure that the businesstype consumer i.e. the one with highest willingness to pay does not
want to travel Economy. How to achieve this? limit the price
differential between the Business and the Economy class. Given that
the price in the Economy class is given by (1) this imposes an upper
bound on the Business class ticket. That is if the price of the
Business ticket is too high then the client prefers Economy.
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18
High
Low
Consumer type 1
20
10
Consumer type 2
13
37
38
19
39
Formally:
10-pB
Surplus of consumer
type 1 when buying
High quality
9-pB
Surplus of consumer type 2
when buying Low quality
Industrial Organization- Matilde Machado
Surplus of consumer
type 1 when buying
Low quality
13-pA
Surplus of consumer type 2
when buying High quality
2.2. Price Discrimination
40
20
41
20 - p A 10 pB
p A pB 20 10 = 10
9 - p 13 p
p p 13 9 = 4
A
B
A
B
20 - p A 0
p A 20
9 - pB 0
pB 9
A constraint needed
to avoid type 1 to
prefer low quality
A constraint needed
to avoid type 2 to
prefer high quality
p A 10 + pB
p A 10 + 9 = 19
p 4+ p
p 4 + 9 = 13
A
A
B
p A = 19
p A 20
p A 20
pB = 9
pB = 9
Industrial Organization- Matilde Machado
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21
43
pB = 9
pA = 19
The monopolists profit is:
=[0,5(19-0)+0,5(9-0)]=14N > than the
profit of selling a single product or package
Therefore the firm prefers to offer the two
products at these equilibrium prices.
Note: The monopolist extracts all the surplus from consumer type
2 (the low-demand consumer) and leaves consumer 1 with
positive surplus : 20-19=1>0
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22
High
Low
Consumer type 1
20
10
Consumer type 2
13
11
45
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