rt. VI.

LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
1. No person shall be a Senator unless
a. he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, and,
b. on the day of his election, is at least thirty-five (35) years of age,
c. able to read and write,
d. a registered voter, and
e. a resident of the Philippines for not less than two years immediately preceding the day of the election.
(Sec. 3,Art. VI, 1987 Philippine Constitution)
2. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless
a. he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, and,
b. on the day of his election, is at least twenty-five (25) years of age,
c. able to read and write,
d. except the party-list representative, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and
e. a resident thereof for a period not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election.
(Sec. 6, Art. VI, 1987 Philippine Constitution)
3. Natural-born Filipino who becomes a naturalized alien is restored to his original status of being a
natural-born Filipino by virtue of his repatriation. (Bengson v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal,
357 SCRA 545)
4. Function of the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. The
Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. (Art.
VI, Sec. 17, 1st sentence)
5. Composition of the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal.
Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the
Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the
Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the
party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
(Art. VI, Sec. 17, 2nd and 3rd sentence)
6. Formulae for allocating seats for the party-list representatives:
a. The twenty percent allocation;
b. The two percent threshold; and
c. The three-seat limit.
7. Twenty percent allocation limit for distributing seats for party-list representatives. The total number of
party-list representatives should not be more than twenty percent of the entire membership of the House
of Representatives. [Art. VI, Sec. 5 (3); Veterans Foundation Party v. COMELEC, 342 SCRA 244 (2000)]
8. Two percent threshold limitation for allocating seats for party-list representatives. Only the party which
received at least two per cent of the total votes cast for the party-list are entitled to have a seat in the
House of Representatives. [Rep. Act No. 7941, Sec. 11 (b)]
To have a meaningful representation, the elected party-list representative must have the mandate of a
sufficient number of people. (Veterans Foundation Part, supra)

9. Three-seat limit for party-list representatives. The qualified party-lists shall have a maximum of three
(3) seats in the House of Representatives [Rep. Act No. 7941, Sec. 11 (b)] so that no single group will
dominated the party-list seats. [Veterans Foundation Party v. COMELEC, 342 SCRA 244 (2000)]
Additional seats to which a qualified party list is entitled are determined by the proportion of the total
number of votes it obtained in relation to the total number of votes obtained by the party with the highest
number of votes to maintain proportional representation. While representation in the party-list system is
proportional, a party is entitled to a maximum of three (3) seats regardless of the number of votes it
actually obtained. (Veterans Foundation Part, supra)
10. Disqualifications attendant to being a Senator or a Member of the House of Representatives engaging
in business, or engaging in the practice of a profession:
a. To notify the House or Senate in the filing of a proposed legislation of which they are the authors where
there is a potential conflict of interest and upon assumption of office, to make a full disclosure of their
financial and business interests. (Sec. 12, Art. VI, 1987 Philippine Constitution) It is therefore a given that
they should not also propose bills where there would be a potential conflict of interest, neither should they
participate in the deliberation of bills, even if they are not the authors thereof, where there is a potential
conflict of interest.
b. Not to hold any other office or employment in the government, or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries,
during is term without forfeiting his seat. (1st sentence, Sec. 13, Art. VI, Ibid.)
c. Not to be appointed to any office which may have been created or the emoluments thereof increased
during the term for which he was elected. (2nd sentence, Sec. 13, Art. VI, Ibid.)
d. Not to personally appear as counsel before any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or
quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies. (1st sentence, Sec. 14, Art. VI, Ibid.)
e. Not to be directly or indirectly, interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special
privilege granted by Congress, or ay subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any
government-owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during the term of his office. (2nd
sentence, Sec. 14, Art. VI, Ibid.)
f. Not to intervene in any manner before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where
he is called upon to act on account of his office. (last sentence, Sec. 14,Art.VI, Ibid.)
11. Scope of parliamentary immunity. A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all
offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the
Congress is in session. No Member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any
speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof. (Sec. 11, Art. VI, 1987 Philippine
Constitution)
12. Two kinds of legislative or congressional inquiry when persons may be invited by Congress to appear
before it:
a. Inquiry in aid of legislation; or
b. Inquiry in the exercise of oversight function of Congress. appearing in or affected by such inquiries are
respected. (Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, et al., G. R.
No. 180643, March 25, 2008)
13. Persons may be invited in aid of legislation. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. (Sec. 21,
Art. I, 1987 Philippine Constitution)

14. The exercise of the oversight function of Congress. The heads of the different departments (cabinet
members) may be requested by either House, as the rules of such House shall provide, to appear and be
heard on any matter pertaining to their departments. (Sec. 22, Art. VI, 1987 Philippine Constitution)
Members of the cabinet may be invited under this authority.
The oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is
performed in pursuit of legislation. (Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations, et al., G. R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008)
15. Instances when Cabinet members appear before the Senate or the House of Representatives:
a. Upon their own initiative, with the consent of the President of the Philippines.
b. Upon the request of either House, as the rules of each House shall provide. (1st sentence, Sec. 22, Art.
VI, 1987 Philippine Constitution)
16. Question hour. The practice of members of the Cabinet appearing before Congress is a feature of the
parliamentary system of Government where the members of the Cabinet are responsible to the
parliament and may be the subject of inquiry on any matter pertaining to their departments. Thus our
system of government is strongly presidential but with certain features of the parliamentary system.
17. Limitations upon the exercise by Congress of the question hour privilege:
a. If the appearance by the Cabinet member is upon his own initiative, it must always be with the consent
of the President.
b. If it is upon the request of either House, the invitation should be in accordance with the rules of the
House making the request.
c. The subject matter shall be limited only to any matter pertaining to the department of the Cabinet
member, and no other.
d. Written questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of
Representatives at least three days before their scheduled appearance.
e. Interpellations shall not be limited to the written questions, but may cover matters related thereto.
f. When the security of the State so states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive
session. (Sec.22, Art. VI, 1987 Philippine Constitution)
18. The power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is broad. This is based on the
proposition that a legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information
respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change. [Neri v. Senate Committee
on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, et al., G. R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008 citing
Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 32 (1950)] Inevitably adjunct, thereto, is the compulsory process to enforce
it. (Ibid.)
The power extends even to executive officials and the only way for them to be exempted is through a
valid claim of executive privilege. (Ibid., citing Senate of the Philippines, etc., et al., v. Ermita, et al., G. R.
No. 169777, April 20, 2006)
19. The Congressional power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation has limitations. To be valid, it is
imperative that it is done in accordance with the Senate or House duly published rules of procedure and
that the rights of the persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries are respected. [Neri v. Senate
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, et al., G. R. No. 180643, March 25,
2008]
20. Exec. Order No. 464 is valid insofar as it requires Presidential consent for appearance during the
question hour under Sec. 22, Article VI of the Constitution (Senate of the Philippines, etc., et al., v.

Ermita, et al., G. R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006)

It is within the Presidential prerogative, explicitly provided for by the Constitution, that a department head
who appears before Congress during the question hour at his own initiative must always secure the
consent of the President. (Ibid.)
21. Exec. Order No. 464 is not valid insofar as it requires Presidential consent for appearance during
inquiries in aid of legislation under Sec. 21 of Article VI of the Constitution,
The requirement for consent cannot be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of
legislation.
Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department heads to appear unless
a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President or the Executive Secretary. The
limitation should be with respect to information and not persons. (Senate of the Philippines, etc., et al., v.
Ermita, et al., G. R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006)
22. The revocation of E.O. 464 with regard to inquiries in aid of legislation does in any way limit the
Philippine concept of executive privilege which has Constitutional underpinnings. This is unlike the United
States where executive privilege is further accorded the concept with statutory status. (Neri v. Senate
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, et al., G. R. No. 180643, March 25,
2008 in relation to Senate of the Philippines, etc., et al., v. Ermita, et al., G. R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006)
23. Concept of the executives presumptively privileged communications. There is great public interest in
preserving the confidentiality of conversation that takes place in the Presidents performance of his official
duties. [Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, et al., G. R. No.
180643, March 25, 2008 citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683) Presidential communications are
thus considered as presumptively privileged. The presumption is founded on the Presidents
generalized interest in confidentiality. (Ibid.)
24. Elements of the presidential communications privilege:
a, The protected communication must relate to a quintessential and non-delegable presidential power.
b. The communication must be authored or solicited and received by a close advisor of the President or
the President himself. the judicial test is that an advisor must be in operational proximity with the
President.
c. The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a
showing of adequate need such that the information sought likely contains important evidence and by
the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. (Neri v. Senate
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, et al., G. R. No. 180643, March 25,
2008 citing various cases)
25. Purpose of the executives presumptively privileged communications. The privilege is said to be
necessary to guarantee the candor of presidential advisors and to provide the President and those who
assist him with freedom to explore the alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making
decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express except privately. [Neri v. Senate
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, et al., G. R. No. 180643, March 25,
2008 citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683)
26. The two kinds of executive privilege are:
a. Presidential communications privilege; and
b. Deliberative process privilege. [Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations, et al., G. R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008 citing U.S. Court of Appeals In Re: Sealed Case
No. 96-3124, June 17, 1997)

27. Presidential communications privilege as a kind of executive privilege refers to communications,

documents or other materials that reflect presidential decision-making and deliberations and that the
President believes should remain confidential. [Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public
Officers and Investigations, et al., G. R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008 citing U.S. Court of Appeals In Re:
Sealed Case No. 96-3124, June 17, 1997)]
28. Deliberative process privilege as a kind of executive privilege includes advisory opinions,
recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and
policies are formulated. [Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations,
et al., G. R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008 citing U.S. Court of Appeals In Re: Sealed Case No. 96-3124,
June 17, 1997)]
29. Scope of the executive privilege. The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where
the subject of the inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such
as the area of military and foreign relations.
Under our Constitution, the President is the repository of the commander-in-chief (Sec. 18, Art. VII);
appointing (Sec. 16, Art. VII); pardoning (Sec. 19, Art. VII); and diplomatic (Secs. 20 and 21, Art. VII)
powers. Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, the information relating to those powers
may enjoy greater confidentiality than others. [Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public
Officers and Investigations, et al., G. R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008 citing U.S. Court of Appeals In Re:
Sealed Case No. 96-3124, June 17, 1997)]
30. Operational proximity test to determine who could invoke the executive privilege. The privilege is
confined only to those who have operational proximity: to direct presidential decision-making. Thus, the
privilege is meant to encompass only those functions that form the core of presidential authority, involving
what the court characterized as quintessential and non-delegable Presidential power, such as the
commander in chief power, appointment and removal power, the power to grant pardons and reprieves,
the sole authority to receive ambassadors and other public officers, the power to negotiate treaties (Neri v.
Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, et al., G. R. No. 180643, March
25, 2008 citing CRS Report for Congress, Presidential Claims of Executive Privilege: History, Law,
Practice and Recent Developments at pp. 18-19); the power to enter into executive agreements without
the concurrence of the Legislature which has been traditionally recognized in Philippine jurisprudence
(Neri, supra citing Bernas, S.J., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, A Commentary,
2003 ed. p. 903)
31. Confidentiality in executive privilege, being subject to balancing against other interest is not
absolute. There are exceptions where it may not be availed of:
a. Neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the need for confidentiality of high-level
communications, without more, can sustain an absolute unqualified Presidential privilege of immunity
from judicial process under all circumstances
b. Presidential communications are merely presumptively privileged and that the presumption can be
overcome only by mere showing of public need by the branch seeking access to conversations.
c. Demonstrated, specific need for evidence in pending criminal trial outweighs the Presidents
generalized interest in confidentiality. (Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations, et al., G. R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008 citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683)
32. Congress may not avail of the peoples right to public information in order to obtain information in aid
of because there are differences between the two. The demand of a citizen for the production of

documents pursuant to his right to information does not have the same obligatory force as a subpoena
duces tecum issued by Congress. Neither does the right to information grant a citizen the power to exact
testimony from government officials. These powers belong only to Congress, not to an individual citizen.
(Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, et al., G. R. No.
180643, March 25, 2008 citing Senate of the Philippines, etc., et al., v. Ermita, et al., G. R. No. 169777,
April 20, 2006)
33. Exercise of congressional privilege to obtain information in aid of legislation is not obtaining
information in matters of public concern. While Congress is composed of representatives elected by the
people, it does not follow, except in a highly qualified sense, that in every exercise of its power of inquiry,
the people are exercising their right to information.
When the members of the Committees of Congress discharge their power, they do so as members of
Congress and not exercising a right properly belonging to the people in general. (Neri v. Senate
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, et al., G. R. No. 180643, March 25,
2008)
34. Exec. Order No. 464 which requires among others certain officers of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) to secure Presidential consent prior to appearance before a Senate Committee. Is this
valid is valid.
Tradition and jurisprudence hold that the commander-in-chief powers of the President are not
encumbered to the same degree of restrictions as that which may attach to executive privilege or
executive control. (Gudani, et al., v. Senga, etc., et al., G. R .No. 170165, August 15, 2006)
35. It appears that the Senate is not anymore considered as a continuing body. The legislative inquiry
must be in accordance with duly published rules of procedure because every Senate is distinct from the
one before it or after. Since Senatorial elections are held every three (3) years for one-half of the Senates
membership, the composition of the Senate also changes by the end of each term. Each Senate may
thus enact a different set of riles as it may deem fit. (Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public
Officers and Investigations, et al., G. R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008 citing Senate of the Philippines, etc.,
et al., v. Ermita, et al., G. R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006)
36. It is legal to setup duly authorized duty-free shops in the SSEZ to sell tax and duty-free consumer
items in the Secured Area. This is in line with the policy enunciated in the law that the Subic Special
Economic Zone shall be developed into a self-sustaining, industrial, commercial, financial and investment
center to generate employment opportunities in and around the zone and to attract and promote
productive foreign investments.
While it is true that Section 12 (b) of Rep. Act No. 7227 mentions only raw materials, capital and
equipment, this does not necessarily mean that the tax and duty free buying privilege is limited to these
types of articles to the exclusion of consumer goods.
It must be remembered that in construing statutes, the proper course is to start out and follow the true
intent of the Legislature and to adopt that sense which harmonizes best with the context and promotes to
the fullest manner the policy and objects of the Legislature.
The concept of inclusio unius est exclusio alterius does not find application because the phrase tax and
duty-free importations of raw materials, capital and equipment was merely cited as an example of
incentives that the SSEZ is authorized to grant, in line with its being a free port zone. Thus, the legislative
intent is that consumer goods entering the SSEZ which satisfy the needs of the zone and are consumed
there are not subject to duties and taxes in accordance with Philippine law. (Coconut Oil Refiners
Association, Inc., etc., et al., v. Torres, etc., et al., G. R. No. 132527, July 29, 2005)

` 37. A Presidential Proclamation that allowed for the limited withdrawal from the Clark Special Economic
Zone or the John Hay Economic Zone of consumer goods tax and duty-free is invalid as the statutory tax
exempt privilege was granted only to the Subic Special Economic Zone and not to John Hay or Clark.
This is so because the Constitution mandates that no law granting tax exemption shall be passed without
the concurrence of a majority of all the members of Congress. (Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc.,
etc., et al., v. Torres, etc., et al., G. R. No. 132527, July 29, 2005 citing John Hay Peoples Alternative
Coalition, et al., v. Lim, etc., et al., G.R. No. 119775, October 24, 2003, 414 SCRA 356)
Furthermore, the law is very clear that the exportation or removal of goods from the territory of the Subic
Special Economic Zone to other parts of the Philippine territory shall be subject to customs duties and
taxes under the Customs and Tariff Code and other relevant tax laws of the Philippines. (Ibid.)

38. The constitutional mandate on initiative and referendum. The Congress shall, early as possible,
provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can
directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the
Congress or local legislative body after the registration of a petition therefor signed by at least ten per
centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by
at least three per centum of the registered voters thereof. (Sec. 32, Article VI, 1987 Constitution)
39. Initiative is the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose and
enact legislation through an election called for the purpose [Sec. 3 (a), Rep. Act No. 6735]
40. Referendum is the power of the electorate to approve or reject a legislation through an election called
for the purpose. [Sec. 3 (c), Rep. Act No. 6735]
41. Differences between the concepts and processes of initiative and referendum. Initiative is the power
of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose and enact legislation through an
election called for the purpose [Sec. 3 (a), Rep. Act No. 6735] WHILE referendum is the power of the
electorate to approve or reject a legislation through an election called for the purpose. [Sec. 3 (c), Ibid.)
42. Restrictions on the Presidential power to authorize the President to fix tariff rates, import and export
quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues. The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within
specified limits, subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export
quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national
development program of the government. [1987 Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 28 (2)]
Art. VII. EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
1. Revocation of E.O. 464 did not in any way diminish the concept of executive privilege. Neri v. Senate
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, et al., G. R. No. 180643, March 25,
2008 in relation to Senate of the Philippines, etc., et al., v. Ermita, et al., G. R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006)
2. Extent of and limitations upon the Presidents power of appointment.
a. Two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting
President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. (Sec. 15, Art. VII,
1987 Philippine Constitution)
b. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the
heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the

armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested
in him in this Constitution. (1st sentence, 1st par., Sec. 16, Art. VII, 1987 Philippine Constitution)
c. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress, may by law,
vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. (2nd and 3rd sentences, Ibid.) These appointments do
not require the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
d. The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of Congress, whether
voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress. (2nd par., Ibid.)
3. Category or categories of officials whose appointments need confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments:
a. Heads of the executive departments,
b. ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or
c. officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain and
d. other officers whose appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution, such as:
1) The Chairmen and Commissioners of the Commission on Audit, Civil Service Commission, and
Commission on Election;
2) The Ombudsman and his Deputies. (Sec. 16, Art. VII, in relation to Art. IX, 1987 Constitution)
The above enumeration may also be used to answer the question What are the six categories of officials
who are subject to the appointing power of the President ?
4. An ad interim appointment is one that is made
a. when Congress is not in session, or is made
b. pending submission to the Commission on Appointments, or is made
c. when the appointee has been by-passed for approval by the Commission on Appointments, for an
office that requires the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
It is not a temporary appointment but a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and
can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office.
5. Acting appointment is a temporary appointment (Sevilla v. Court of Appeals, 209 SCRA 637), that will
not ripen into a permanent appointment unless a new appointment which is permanent is made.
(Marohombsar v. Alonto, 194 SCRA 390)
6. The President may abolish offices because he has been delegated the continuing authority to
reorganize including to abolish the administrative structure of the National Government, to achieve
simplicity, economy and efficiency which must be done in good faith. (Administrative Code of 1987, Book
III, Section 31)
7. Limitations on the pardoning power of the President.
a. The power can only be exercised after conviction by final judgment of the offender;
b. Such power does not extend to cases of impeachment;
c. Persons convicted for violation of the rules and regulations concerning elections cannot be pardoned or
paroled or their sentence suspended without the favorable recommendation of the Commission on
Elections;
d. Pardon cannot be exercised over civil contempts;
e. Pardon cannot be exercised over congressional contempt declared by resolution of either houses of
Congress.

8. Pardon does not restore offices that have been forfeited. The pardoned convict must apply and
requalify. (Monsanto v. Factoran, 170 SCRA 190) Neither does a pardon restore the right to hold public
office unless such right be expressly restored by the pardon. (Revised Penal Code, Art. 36)
9. Distinctions between pardon and amnesty:
a. Amnesty is usually addressed to crimes against the sovereignty of the State, to political offenses,
forgiveness being deemed more expedient for the public welfare than prosecution and punishment
WHILE pardon condones infractions of the peace of the state.
b. Amnesty is usually general, address to classes or even communities of persons WHILE pardon is
usually addressed to an individual.
c. In amnesty there may or may not be distinct acts of acceptance, so that if other rights are dependent
upon it and are asserted, there is affirmative evidence of acceptance WHILE in pardon there must be
distinct acts of acceptance. (Burdick v. U.S., 236 U.S. 79)
d. Amnesty requires the concurrence of Congress WHILE pardon does not.
e. Amnesty is a public act which the court takes judicial notice WHILE pardon is a private act of the
President which must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned because the courts do not take
judicial notice of it. (Barrioquinto v. Fernandez, 82 Phil. 642)
f. Amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense with which the offender is
charged and the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had
committed no offense WHILE pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequence of an
offense of which he has been convicted.
10. The President is immune from suit during his tenure because:
a. To subject the President to a civil suit would be to create an intolerable condition resulting from a
general civil responsibility. The natural tendency to protect himself from such responsibility will necessarily
result in a delay or inaction on important matters of government; time and efforts of the President would
be uselessly spent in wrangling litigations;
b. Dragging the President to courts for civil suits would certainly engender disrespect and disregard for
the authority that he represents;
c. The President is regarded by the public generally as the official who most nearly represent the people,
who most perfectly epitomizes the government and the State. To put him on trial as a wrongdoer would
practically be putting on trial the government itself;
d. Public policy forbids the court from mulcting the President personally for damages which may result
from the performance of his official duty. (Forbes v. Chioco Tiaco, 16 Phil. 534)
Impleading the President as respondent during her tenure and incumbency in office degrades the dignity
of the office, harass her and detracts her from the performance of her functions. While this may be so,
she is subject to impeachment. (David, et al., v. President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, etc., et al., G. R. No.
171396, May 3, 2006)
11. The Calling-out Power of the President under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution provides that
the President of the Philippines shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines
and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. (Art. VII, Sec. 18, 1st par., 1st sentence,)
12. The constitutional safeguards on the exercise by the President of his power to proclaim martial law.
a. There must actual invasion or rebellion.
b. The duration of the proclamation shall not exceed sixty (60) days.
c. Within 48 hours, the President shall report his action to Congress. If Congress is not in session, it must

convene within 24 hours.

d. Congress by majority vote of all its members voting jointly revoke the proclamation, and the President
cannot set aside the revocation.
e. By the same vote and in the same manner, upon initiative of the President, Congress may extend the
proclamation, if the invasion or rebellion continues and public safety requires the extension.
f. The Supreme Court may review the factual sufficiency of the proclamation, and the Supreme Court
must decide the case within thirty days from the time it was filed.
g. Martial law does not automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the operation of
the Constitution. It does not supplant the functioning of the civil courts and of Congress. Military courts
have no jurisdiction over civilians where civil courts are able to function. (see below for details)
13. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding
sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof
under martial law. (Art. VII, Sec. 18, 1st par., 2nd sentence)
14. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. (Art. VII, Sec. 18, 1st
par., 3rd sentence)
15. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all the Members in regular or special
session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the
President. (Art. VII, Sec. 18, 1st par., 4th sentence)
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension,
convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call. (Ibid., 2nd par.)
16. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation
or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and
public safety requires it. (Art. VII, Sec. 18, 1st par., last sentence)
17. A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning
of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts
and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege
of the writ (Art. VII, Sec. 18, 4th par.) of habeas corpus.
18. The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or
offenses inherent or directly connected with invasion. (Art. VII, Sec. 18, 5th par.)
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially
charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released. (Art. VII, Sec. 18, last par.)
19. The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficient of the
factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the
extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing. (Art. VII, Sec.
18, 54h par.)
20. Pres. Proc. No. 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the President for the Armed
Forces of the Philippines to suppress lawless violence. This is sustained by Sec.18, Art. VII of the
Constitution which provides that, The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of
the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. (David, et al., v. President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,

etc., et al., G. R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006)

21. The following provisions of Pres. Proc. No. 1017 that give the President express or implied powers
are invalid because of lack of authority under the constitution or existing law:
a. To issue decrees;
b. To direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not related to lawless violence as well as
decrees promulgated by the government.
c. To impose standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press.
Under Sec. 17, Article XII the President, in the absence of legislation, cannot take over privately owned
public utilities and private business affected with public interest. (David, et al., v. President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, etc., et al., G. R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006)
22. G.O. No. 5 is valid. It is an order issued by the President acting as Commander-in-Chief addressed to
subalterns in the AFP to carry out the provisions of P.P. No. 1017.
It also provides a valid standard that the military and the police should take only the necessary and
appropriate actions and measures to suppress and protect acts of lawless violence. But the words, acts
of terrorism found in G.O.No. 5 have not been legally defined and made punishable by Congress and
should thus be deemed deleted from the said G. O. While terrorism has been described generally in
media, no law has been enacted to guide the military and eventually the court, to determine the limits of
the AFPs authority in carrying out the provisions of G. O. No. 5. (David, et al., v. President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, etc., et al., G. R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006)
23. Warrantless arrests are not authorized under P.P.1017 and G.O. No. 5. (David, et al., v. President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, etc., et al., G. R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006)
24. The effects of proclamation of a state of a calamity by the President in areas devastated by typhoons.
would have the following effects:
a. The LGUs in the places affected may enact a supplemental budget for the purchase of supplies and
materials or the payment for services to prevent danger to or loss of life or property.
b. The five percent (5%) of the estimated revenue from the regular sources required to be appropriated in
the budgets of the affected LGUs for unforeseen expenditures may be used by them.
c. Science and technological personnel of the LGUs affected shall be paid hazard allowance.
d. Public health workers in the affected LGUs shall be entitled to hazard allowance.
e. The prices of basic commodities in the affected LGUs shall automatically be frozen at their prevailing
levels or placed under automatic price controls.
f. A crime committed in the affected LGUs will be considered aggravated.
25. Exec. Order No. 420 which directs all government agencies and government-owned and controlled
corporations to adopt a uniform data collection and format for their existing ID Systems is valid. There is
no usurpation of legislative authority and violation of privacy. (Kilusan Mayo Uno, et al, v. DirectorGeneral, etc., et al., April 19, 2006 and companion cases)
26. There is no intrusion into legislative powers. EO 420 applies only to government entities that already
maintain ID systems and issue ID cards pursuant to their regular functions under existing law. There is no
grant to such government entities of powers they do not already possess under existing law.
EO 420 is a proper subject of executive issuance under the Presidents constitutional power of control
over government activities in the Executive Department as well as under the Presidents constitutional
duty to ensure that laws are faithfully executed.

27. There is no violation of the right to privacy regarding the 14 specific data required in EO 420 as these
are routine data for ID systems unlike the sensitive and potentially embarrassing medical records of
patients taking prescription drugs. EO 420 narrowly draws the data collection, recoding and exhibition
while prescribing comprehensive safeguards. (Kilusan Mayo Uno, et al, v. Director-General, etc., et al.,
April 19, 2006 and companion cases)
28. The President may contract foreign loans on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines with the prior
concurrence of the Monetary Board, and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. (1987
Constitution, Article VII, Sec. 20, 1st sentence)
Art. VIII. JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
1. Cases to be heard by the Supreme Court en banc:
a. Cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or law;
b. Cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc;
c. Cases involving the constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations,
orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations;
d. Cases heard by a division when the required majority is not obtained;
e. Cases where a doctrine or principle of law previously laid down will be modified or reversed;
f. Administrative cases against judges when the penalty is dismissal;
g. Election contests for President or vice President.
2. Expanded jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court may now properly determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1, 2nd par., 1987
Constitution)
The political question doctrine which have been justified by the Supreme Court in some decided cases
to maintain a hands-off policy in ruling upon the validity of acts of the executive or legislative department
which should be properly submitted directly to the people for their decision has been diluted through the
expanded jurisdiction of the Supreme Court granted under the 1987 Constitution.
3. The right of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation may be subject to review by the Supreme
Court pursuant to its certiorari powers because it is, in theory, no less susceptible to abuse than executive
or judicial power. [Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, et al.,
G. R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008 citing Senate v. Ermita, April 20, 2006 (488 SCRA 1)]
4. A constitutional issue may be passed upon only if essential to the decision of a case or controversy.
(Heirs of Cesar Marasigan, etc., v. Marasigan, et al., G. R. No. 156078, March 14, 2008 citing Estrada v.
Desierto, G. R. No. 156160, 9 December 2004, 445 SCRA 655, 666)
Even if all the requisites for judicial review are present, the Supreme Court will not entertain a
constitutional issue unless it is the very lis mota (Heirs of Cesar Marasigan, supra citing Griffith v. Court of
Appeals, 428 Phil. 878, 888; 379 SCRA 94, 103 (2002) in turn citing Hontiveros v. Regional Trial Court,
Br. 25, Iloilo City, G. R. No. 125465, 29 June 1999, 309 SCRA 340, 354)
For the Supreme Court to take cognizance of a constitutional issue it
a. must be properly raised and presented in the case, and
b. its resolution is necessary to a determination of the case, i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be the
very lis mota presented. (Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation, G. R. No. 166006, March 14,
2008 citing Tropical Homes, Inc. v, National Housing Authority, G. r. No. L-48672, July 31, 1987, 152
SCRA 540)

5. Operative fact doctrine. An unconstitutional law has an effect before being declared unconstitutional.
The doctrine of operative fact as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and
fair play. (Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation, G. R. No. 166006, March 14, 2008 citing
Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 79732, November 8, 1993, 227 SCRA 509) It nullifies the effects of
an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of
unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The
past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. (Planters Products, Inc, supra citing Peralta v.
Civil Service Commission, G. R. No. 95832, August 10, 1992, 212 SCRA 425)
6. Supreme Court does not abandon its constitutional duty when it required the parties to consider a
proposal that would lead to a possible compromise. It did so to test a tool that other jurisdictions find
effective in settling similar cases, to avoid a piecemeal consideration of the questions for review and to
avert a constitutional crisis between the executive and legislative branches of government. (Neri v. Senate
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, et al., G. R. No. 180643, March 25,
2008)
7. Rationale for referring resolution of constitutional issues for negotiations leading to a compromise.
a. In order to avoid a resolution that might disturb the balance of power between the two branches and
inaccurately reflect their true needs. [Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations, et al., G. R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008 citing United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co.,
179 U.S. App. Supp. D.C., 198, 551 F. 2d. 384 (1976)]
b. Much of the spirit of compromise is reflected in the generality of the language of the Constitution. The
coordinate branches do not exist in an exclusive adversary relationship to one another when a conflict in
authority exists. Rather each branch should take cognizance of an implicit constitutional mandate to seek
optional accommodation through a realistic evaluation of the needs of the conflicting branches in the
particular fact situation. (Neri, supra citing United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 567 F 2d 121 (1977)]
8. Legal standing or locus standi is personal and substantial interest in the case such that he party has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged.
(Automotive Industry Workers Alliance (AIWA),etc., et al., v. Romulo, etc. ,et al., G. R. No. 157509,
January 18,2005 citing Integrated Bar of the Philippines, G. R. No. 141284, 15 August 2000, 338 SCRA
81, 100)
9. Need for locus standi. Corollary to the judicial power is the principle of locus standi of a litigant. He who
is directly affected and whose interest is immediate and substantial has the standing to sue. Thus, a party
must show a personal stake in the outcome of the case or an injury to himself that can be redressed by a
favorable decision in order to warrant an invocation of the courts jurisdiction and justify the exercise of
judicial power on his behalf. (Domingo, et al., v. Carague, etc., et al., G. R. No. 161065, April 15, 2005)
10. Requisites for citizen to have locus standi. He must establish that he has suffered some actual or
threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; b. the injury is fairly
traceable to he challenged action; and c. the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.
(Automotive Industry Workers Alliance (AIWA),etc., et al., v. Romulo, etc. ,et al., G. R. No. 157509,
January 18, 2005 citing Gonzales v. Narvasa, G. R. No. 140835, 14 August 2000, 227 SCRA 733, 740 in
turn citing Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. v. Commission on
Elections, G. R. No. 132922, 21April 1998, 289 SCRA 337, 343)
11. Locus standi to impugn the alleged encroachment by the executive department into the legislative

domain of Congress.
a. Only those who shall be directly affected by such executive encroachment, such as for example
employees who would find themselves subject to disciplinary powers that may be imposed under the
questioned Executive Order as they have a direct and specific interest in raising the substantive issue
therein (Automotive Industry Workers Alliance (AIWA),etc., et al., v. Romulo, etc. ,et al., G. R. No. 157509,
January 18, 2005) or employees who are going to be demoted, transferred or otherwise affected by any
personnel action subject to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies.
b. Moreover, and if at all, only Congress, can claim any injury from the alleged executive encroachment o
he legislative function to amend, modify and/or repeal laws. (Automotive Industry Workers Alliance
(AIWA),etc., et al., v. Romulo, etc. ,et al., G. R. No. 157509, January 18, 2005 citing Gonzales v. Narvasa,
G. R. No. 140835, August 14,2000, 337 SCRA 733, 741)
12. Requisites for a taxpayers suit. A taxpayers suit is properly brought only when there is an exercise of
the spending or taxing power of Congress. (Automotive Industry Workers Alliance (AIWA),etc., et al., v.
Romulo, etc. ,et al., G. R. No. 157509, January 18, 2005 citing Gonzales v. Narvasa, G. R. No. 140835,
August 14,2000, 337 SCRA 733, 741)
There must be established that a disbursement of public funds is in contravention of law or the
Constitution. (Ibid.)
13. Requirements that must be met before taxpayers, concerned citizens and legislators may be
accorded standing to sue:
a. The case should involve constitutional issues;
b. For taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is
unconstitutional.
c. For voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question.
d. For concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental
importance which must be settled early.
e. For legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon their
prerogatives as legislators. (David, et al., v. President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, etc., et al., G. R. No.
171396, May 3, 2006)

14. Former COA Chairmen and Commis-sioners do not have legal standing to bring suit questioning
validity of COA Organizational Restructuring Plan because they have not shown a personal stake in the
outcome of the case or an actual or potential injury that can be redressed by the Courts favorable
decision. They themselves admitted that they do not seek any affirmative relief nor impute any improper
or improvident act against the said respondents and are not motivated by any desire to seek affirmative
relief from COA or from respondents that would redound to their personal benefit or gain. They failed to
show any present substantial interest in the outcome of the case.
Nor may they claim that as taxpayers, they have legal standing since nowhere in their petition do they
claim that public funds are being spent in violation of law or that there is a misapplication of taxpayers
money. (Domingo, et al., v. Carague, etc., et al., G. R. No. 161065, April 15, 2005)
15. Locus standi may be waived. The rule on standing, however, is a matter of procedure, hence, can be
relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers and legislators when the public interest
so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overarching significance to
society, or of paramount public interest. (Automotive Industry Workers Alliance (AIWA),etc., et al., v.
Romulo, etc. ,et al., G. R. No. 157509, January 18, 2005 citing Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil.368 [1949];
Dumlao v. Commission on Elections, G. R. No. L-52245, 22 January 1980, 95 SCRA 392, 404 and other

cases)
16. The CSC is a party adversely affected who may appeal a decision of the Court off Appeals that
reversed an order of the CSC terminating a municipal employee because it has been mandated by the
Constitution to preserve and safeguard the integrity of our civil service system. But a former mayor is not
a party in interest. ( Dagadag v. Tongnawa,etal., G. R. Nos. 161166-67,February 3,2005 citing Civil
Service Commission v. Dacoycoy, G. R. No. 135805, April 29, 1999, 306 SCRA 405; cited in Francisco
Abella, Jr., v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 1525754,November 17, 2004, 442 SCRA 507)
The incumbent mayor may interpose the appeal because of his power to appoint and remove municipal
employees. Whenever his order imposing administrative sanctions upon erring municipal personnel is
challenged, he should be allowed to defend his action considering that he is the appointing and removing
authority. The second reason why he has legal personality is because the salaries of municipal officials
are drawn from the municipal funds. (Dagadag, supra)
17. There was no executive interference in the judicial functions of the Supreme Court, when the
Secretary of Finance forwarded to the Chief Justice a memorandum attaching a copy of the Foreign
Chambers Report dated October 17,2001 because the memorandum was merely noted to acknowledge
its filing. It had no further legal significance. (J. G. Summit Holdings, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.
R.No.124293, January 31,2005)
18. Some of the constitutional safeguards to maintain judicial independence are:
a. The Supreme Court is a constitutional body and cannot be abolished by mere legislation.
b. The Supreme Court Justices may be removed only through impeachment.
c. The constitutionally allocated jurisdiction of the Supreme Court cannot be diminished.
d. The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court cannot be increased by law without its consent.
e. Appointees to the Judiciary are nominated by the Judicial and Bar Council and are not subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments
f. The Supreme Court has the exclusive power to discipline judges of lower court.
g. The Members of the Judiciary have security of tenure, which cannot be undermined by a law
reorganizing the Judiciary.
h. Members of the Judiciary cannot be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or
administrative functions.
i. The salaries of Members of the Judiciary cannot be decreased during their continuance in office.
j. The Judiciary has fiscal autonomy.
k. The Supreme Court has the exclusive power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure.
l. Only the Supreme Court can temporarily assign judges to other stations.
m. It is the Supreme Court who appoints all officials and employees of the Judiciary.
19. Article 96 of the Articles of War is service connected for allegedly violating of their solemn oath to
defend the constitution and duly constituted authority, disrespect to the military profession which could
result to discipline that is dismissal from the service. Since it is service-connected it is triable by courtmartial.
The acts which are service connected are not absorbed by the criminal offenses for which they are
being tried before the civil court, which is coup detat. The concept of absorption is peculiarly applicable in
criminal proceedings only and applies only to crimes penalized by the same statute. The serviceconnected acts are penalized administratively while coup detat is a crime.
The declaration of absorption by the court is without legal basis as the law is clear that the Article 96,
conduct unbecoming is service connected. (Gonzales, et al., v. Abaya, et al., G.R. No. 164007, August
10, 2006)

20. Rules for determining who has jurisdiction: civil courts or military courts under Rep. Act No. 7055:
General Rule: Members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and other persons subject to
military law including members of the Civilian Armed Force Geographical Units (CAFGU) who commit
crimes under the Revised Penal Code (like coup detat), other special penal laws or local ordinances shall
be tried by the proper civil court.
Exception: Where the civil court, before arraignment, has determined the offense to be service connected,
then the case is triable by court martial.
Exception to the exception: Where the President in the interest of justice, directs before arraignment, that
any such crimes or offenses be tried by the proper civil courts. (R. A. No. 7055 cited in Gonzales, et al., v.
Abaya, et al., G.R. No. 164007, August 10, 2006)
10. Composition of the Judicial and Bar Council. The Chief Justice as ex oficio Chairman, the Secretary of
Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex oficio Members, a representative of the Integrated
Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private
sector. [1987 Constitution, Article VIII, Sec. 8 (1)]
Art. IX. CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
A. COMMON PROVISIONS
1. The effective operation of the so-called Rotational Scheme for the Constitutional Commissions
requires that the first commissioners should start on a common date and any vacancy before the
expiration of the term should be filled only for the unexpired balance of the term.
B. THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
1. The Civil Service Commission is the central personnel agency of the government charged with the duty
of determining questions of qualifications of merit and fitness of those appointed to the civil service.
C. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
D. THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT
Art. X. LOCAL GOVERNMENT
Refer to discussion below
Art. XI. ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
1. COA has authority to investigate whether directors, officials or employees of government owned and
controlled corporations, receiving additional allowances and bonuses are entitled to such benefits under
special laws.
A local water district, being a government-owned and controlled corporation with special charter created
pursuant to law, P. D. 198, is subject to COA examination. (de Jesus, et al., v. Commission on Audit, G. R.
No. 149154, June 10, 2003)
2. Ombudsman has no jurisdiction to entertain questions on the constitutionality of a law. (Presidential Ad
Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, etc., v. Desierto, etc., et al., G.R. No. 145184, March 14,

2008 citing Estarija v. Ranada, G. R. No. 159314, June 26, 2006, 492 SCRA 652, 665)
3. Courts should not interfere with the Ombudsmans investigatory power, exercised through the
Ombudsman Prosecutors, and the authority to determine the presence or absence of probable cause,
except when the finding is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. (Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, etc., v. Desierto, etc., et al.,
G.R. No. 145184, March 14, 2008 citing Collantes v. Marcelo, G. R. Nos.167006-07, August `14, 2007,
530 SCRA 142, 150-151))
4. it is the duty of the Ombudsman to investigate on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any
public official, employee, office or agency when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper, or inefficient. [Article XI, Sec. 13 (1), 1987 Constitution)
5. Ombudsman has the power to suspend preventively for a period not exceeding six (6) months without
any notice or hearing. It is merely a preliminary step in an administrative investigation and not a final
determination of guilt. (Garcia v. Mojica, 314 SCRA 207 [1999])
6. The Ombudsman has the power to impose administrative penalties upon erring public officers or
employees which is not merely recommendatory.
The OMB has the power to directly impose the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure,
or prosecution of a public officer or employee, other than a member of Congress and the Judiciary, found
to be at fault, within the exercise of its administrative disciplinary authority as provided in the Constitution,
Republic Act No. 6770, as well as jurisprudence. (Office of the Ombudsman v. Lisondra, et al., G. R. No.
174045, March 7, 2008)
7. This power gives the said constitutional office teeth to render it not merely functional, but also effective.
Section 21 of Republic Act No. 6770 provides:
Sec. 21. Officials Subject To Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. The Office of the Ombudsman shall
have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the Government and its
subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including Members of the Cabinet, local government,
government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except over officials who may be
removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary. (Office of the
Ombudsman v. Lisondra, et al., G. R. No. 174045, March 7, 2008)
8. Constitutional officers who may be removed through impeachment:
a. the President;
b. the Vice-President,
c. the Members of the Supreme Court;
d. the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and
e. the Ombudsman. (Art. XI, Sec.2, 1987 Constitution)
9. Grounds for impeachment of the various constitutional officers.
a. Culpable violation of the Constitution,
b. Treason,
c. Bribery,
d. Graft and corruption,
e. Other high crimes, or
f. Betrayal of public trust. (Art. XI, Sec.2, 1987 Constitution)

10. Cronyism which involves unduly favoring a crony to the prejudice of public interest is a form of
violation of the oath of office which constitute betrayal of the public trust, a ground for impeachment.
11. An administrative officer given by statute the rank of Justice is not a member of the Judiciary, but of
the Executive Department. He may therefore be investigated by the Ombudsman. The Supreme Court
does not have jurisdiction to investigate because it would be violative of the concept of separation of
powers. (Noblejas v. Teehankee, 23 SCRA 405 [1968])
Art. XII. NATIONAL PATRIMONY AND ECONOMY
1. National patrimony refers not only to our natural resources but also to our cultural heritage. (Manila
Prince Hotel v. Government Service Insurance System, 267 SCRA 408)
2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forms of
potential energy, fisheries, forests, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests
or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. (Art. XII, Sec. 2,
1st par., 1st sentence)
3. Under the Regalian doctrine, the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land
premised on the basic doctrine that all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State. [Republic v. Manna Properties ,Inc., etc. citing
Pagkatipunan v. Court of Appeals, 429 Phil. 149; 390 SCRA 343 (2002)]
4. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. (Art. XII, Sec.
2, 1st par., 2nd sentence)
5. Land areas reclaimed by a government corporation organized for the purpose of reclamation could not
sell the reclaimed lands to private corporations. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to
agricultural lands.
Private corporations or associations may to hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by
lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years and not
to exceed one thousand hectares in area. [1987 Constitution, Art. XII, Sec. 3, 1st par., 3rd and 4th
sentences; Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, 384 SCRA 152 (2002)]
6. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State. (Art. XII, Sec. 2, 1st par., 3rd sentence)
7. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or
production-sharing agreements, with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per
centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. (Ibid., 4th sentence)
Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than
twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water
rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power,
beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant. (Ibid., 5th and 6th sentences)
8. The President may enter into agreements with foreign corporations involving either technical or
financial assistance for large scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and
other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real
contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State

shall promote the development and use of local scientific and technical resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision,
within thirty days from its execution. (Art. XII, Sec. 2, 4th and 5th par.)
9. The 1987 Constitution specifically declares that all
lands of the public domain, waters, fisheries and other natural resources belong to the State. Included are
fishponds, which may not be alienated but merely leased. Possession thereof, no matter how long, cannot
ripen into ownership. ( Menchavez, e al., v. Teves, Jr., G.R. No. 153201, January 26, 2005 citing Republic
of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 374 Phil. 209, 219; 315 SCRA 600, September 30, 1999)
10. The agreement of co-shareholders to mutually grant the right of first refusal to each other, by itself,
does not constitute a violation of the provisions of the Constitution limiting land ownership to Filipinos and
Filipino corporations.
In fact, it can even be said that if the foreign shareholdings of a landholding corporation exceeds 40%,it is
not the foreign stockholders ownership of the shares which is adversely affected but the capacity of the
corporation to own land - that is, the corporation becomes disqualified to own land. (J.G. Summit
Holdings, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, et al., G. R. No. 124293, January 31, 2005)
11. No law disqualifies a person from purchasing shares in a landholding corporation even if the latter will
exceed the allowed foreign equity, what the law disqualifies is the corporation from owning land.
The constitutional prohibition applies only to ownership of land. It does not extend to immovable or real
property as defined under Article 415 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, we would have a strange situation
where the ownership of immovable property such as trees, plants and growing fruit attached to the land
would be limited to Filipinos and Filipino corporations only. (J.G. Summit Holdings, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, et al., G. R. No. 124293, January 31, 2005)
12. The Filipino First or preferential use concept mandates that the State shall promote the preferential
use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods, and adopt measures that help make
them competitive. (Sec. 12, Article XII, 1987 Constitution)
13. The statutory grant of tax and duty-free importation into the Subic Special Economic Zone does not
violate the preferential use concept of the Constitution because it allows an exchange on the basis of
equality and reciprocity, frowning only in foreign competition that is unfair. (Coconut Oil Refiners
Association, Inc., etc., et al., v. Torres, etc., et al., G. R. No. 132527, July 29, 2005 citing Tanada v.
Angara, G. R. No. 118295, May 2, 1997, 272 SCRA 18)
14. Granting proprietary protection for the active ingredient of a pesticide for seven years from the date of
such registration does not constitute an unlawful restraint of trade which violates the concept of free
enterprise enshrined in the Constitution because there is implied a reservation to the government of the
power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the general welfare [First Management Association of
the Philippines (PMAP) v .Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority (FPA), G. R. No. 156041, February 21, 2007
citing Association of Coconut Desicators v. Philippine Coconut Authority, 349 Phil. 782; 286 SCRA 109
(1998)] considering that the unregulated use and proliferation of pesticides would be hazardous to our
environment.
15. The mere fact that incentives and privileges are granted to certain enterprises to the exclusion of
others does not render the issuance unconstitutional for espousing unfair competition. [First Management
Association of the Philippines (PMAP) v .Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority (FPA), G. R. No. 156041,

February 21, 2007, citing Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc., v. Torres, G. R. No. 132527, July 29,
2005, 465 SCRA 47, 78]
16. A Japanese national may practice medicine in the Philippines on the basis of reciprocity.. (Board of
Medicine, et al., v. Ota, G.R. No. 166097, July 14, 2008)
Art. XIII. SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS
LABOR
AGRARIAN AND NATURAL RESOURCES REFORM
URBAN LAND REFORM AND HOUSING
HEALTH
WOMEN
ROLE AND RIGHTS OF PEOPLES ORGANIZATIONS
HUMAN RIGHTS
1. Human rights are the basic natural rights which inherent man because of his humanity. The right to life,
dignity and existence may be considered as human rights.
2. Demolition of squatter shanties and other illegal structures do not involve human rights as they impede
the flow of traffic, and pose a danger to life and limb. (Simon v., Commission on Human Rights, 299
SCRA 117)
3. The Commission on Human Rights does not have the power to issue injunctive writs. (Export
Processing Zone Authority v. Commission on Human Rights, 208 SCRA 125) or cease and desist orders
because it does not perform adjudicative powers. (Ibid.)
4. The Commission on Human Rights has limited power of contempt. It may cite for contempt only for
violation of its operational guidelines and rules of procedure that are essential to carry out its
investigatorial powers. (Simon v., Commission on Human Rights, 299 SCRA 117)

Art. XIV. EDUCATION, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLGY, ARTS, CULTURE AND SPORTS
EDUCATION
1. Academic freedom has two aspects:
a. Academic freedom of institutions of higher learning; and
b. Academic freedom of teachers, students and researchers.
2. Scope of academic freedom of institutions of higher learning. Includes the freedom to determine who
may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught and who may be admitted to study. (Garcia v.
Faculty of Admissions, 68 SCRA 277)

Academic freedom grants institutions of higher learning the discretion to formulate rules for the granting of
honors and to close a school.
3. Scope of academic freedom of teachers, students and researchers. The freedom of a faculty member
to pursue his studies in his particular specialty and thereafter to make known or publish the result of his
endeavours without fear that retribution would be visited on him in the event that his conclusions are
found distasteful or objectionable by the powers that be, whether in the political, economic or academic
establishments. (Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 194 SCRA 402)
4. The scope of academic freedom under the 1973 Constitution has been expanded by the 1987
Constitution.
Under the 1973 Constitution, All institutions of higher learning shall enjoy academic freedom. [Art. XV,
Sec. 8(2)]
The above concept was expanded under the 1987 Constitution which states that, Academic freedom
shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning. [Art. XIV, Sec. 5 (2)]
The textual changes in the 1987 Constitution means that academic freedom will not only be enjoyed by
the institutions of higher learning, but also by those who make them up such as teachers, students and
researchers. (Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol.1V, p. 439)
5. At the option express in writing by the parents or guardians religion shall be allowed to be taught to
their children or wards in public elementary and high schools within the regular class hours by instructors
designated or approved by the religious authorities of the religion to which the children or wards belong ,
without additional cost to the Government. [1987 Constitution, Art. XIV, Sec. 3 (3)]
6. Control and administration of educational institutions shall be vested in citizens of the Philippines.
(1987 Constitution, Art. XIV, Sec. 4 (2), 2nd par.)
7. Limitation as to aliens. No educational institution shall be established exclusively for aliens and no
group of aliens shall comprise more than one-third of the enrolment in any school. The provisions of this
subsection shall not apply to schools established for foreign diplomatic personnel and their dependents
and, unless otherwise provided by law, for other foreign temporary residents. (1987 Constitution, Art. XIV,
Sec. 4 (2), 3rd par.)
LANGUAGE
1. For purposes of communication and instruction, the official languages of the Philippines are Filipino
and, until otherwise provided by law, English. (Art. XIV, Sec. 7, 1st par.)
2. English may be changed but not Filipino. The Proviso of until otherwise provided by law refers to
English and not to Filipino.
3. Spanish and Arabic shall be promoted on a voluntary and optional basis. (Art. XIV, Sec. 7, 3rd par.)
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
ARTS AND CULTURE
SPORTS
Art. XV. THE FAMILY

Art. XVI. GENERAL PROVISIONS

1. The flag of the Philippines shall be red, white, and blue, with a sun and three stars, as consecrated and
honoured by the people and recognized by law. (Art. XVI, Sec. 1) which may not be changed or removed
by mere statute.
Art. XVII. AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS
1. The various modes of revising or amending the Philippine Constitution are through
a. a constituent assembly,
b. constitutional convention or
c. peoples initiative. (1987 Constitution, Art. XVII, arrangement and numnbering supplied)
2. Congress as a constituent assembly may by three-fourths vote of all its Members propose any
amendment to or revision of the Constitution. (1987 Constitution, Art. XVII, Sec. 1)
3. Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members may call a constitutional convention or by a
majority vote of all its Members submit the question of calling such a convention to the electorate. (1987
Constitution, Art. XVII, Sec. 3)
4. The people may directly propose amendments to the Constitution through initiative upon a petition of at
least twelve percent of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per cent of the registered voters therein. (Art. XVII, Sec. 2, Ibid.)
5. The phrase vote of all its Members should be taken to mean the vote of the members of the Senate
and the House of Representatives voting separately because it is inherent in a bicameral legislature for
the two houses to vote separately. (III Record of the Constitutional Commission, p. 493)
Art. XVIII. TRANSITORY PROVISIONS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS EXCLUDE: IMPLEMENTING RULES AND
REGULATIONS OF DIFFERENT AGENCIES