H81FED

Hazards Identification
HAZOP

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Loss Prevention
Loss prevention in chemical industries involve:
Identification

and assessment of major

hazards
Control

of hazards by containment,
substitution, improved maintenance

Control

of process by utilizing automatic

control, relief system , interlock, alarm

Limitation

of loss when accident happens

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Loss Prevention
The major formalized techniques are:

Hazards and Operability (HAZOP)

Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)

Failure mode-and-effect analysis (FMEA)

Safety indexes

Safety audit
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What is HAZOP?

Systematic technique to IDENTIFY potential

HAZard and OPerating problems

A qualitative technique based on guide-words

to help provoke thoughts about the way
deviations from the intended operating conditions
can lead to hazardous situations or operability
problems

HAZOP is basically for safety

Considerable engineering insight is involved

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HAZOP Study
HAZOP study are applied during :
Normal operation
Foreseeable changes in operation, e.g. upgrading,
reduced output, plant start-up and shut-down
Suitability of plant materials, equipment and
instrumentation
Provision for failure of plant services, e. g . steam,
electricity, cooling water

Provision for maintenance.

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HAZOP Team
HAZOP studies are carried out using a
`brainstorming' approach by a team, chaired and
coordinated by a qualified person experienced in
HAZOPs:

Team Leader
Team Secretary
Process Engineer
Mechanical Engineer
Commissioning/Operations
Engineer/Manager
Instrument Engineer
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Strength of HAZOP
HAZOP is a systematic, reasonably comprehensive
and flexible.
It gives good identification of cause and excellent
identification of critical deviations.

The use of keywords is effective and the whole

group is able to participate.
HAZOP is an excellent well-proven method for
studying large plant in a specific manner.

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Weakness of HAZOP
HAZOP is very time consuming and can be laborious with a
tendency for boredom for analysts.

It tends to be hardware-oriented and process-oriented,

although the technique should be amenable to human error
application.
HAZOP does not identify all causes of deviations and
therefore omits many scenarios.

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Guide Words
NONE /No

e.g., NO FLOW caused by blockage; pump failure;

REVERSE

Opposite, e.g., REVERSE FLOW caused by pump

failure

MORE

Quantitative increase, e.g., MORE FLOW, Temp,

LESS

Quantitative increase, e.g., LESS FLOW, Temp,

As Well As

Qualitative increase, e.g. impurity.

PART OF

Qualitative decrease, Change in composition high or

low concentration of mixture; additional reactions in
reactor or other location ; feed change.

Other than

Nothing of the intent happen, completely different

occurs

valve closed or jammed :

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HAZOP Steps
These guide words are applied to flow,
temperature, pressure, liquid level and
composition.

Deviation of these variables from normal operation

is considered

The consequences of these deviations on the

process is then assessed.

The measures needed to correct these

consequences are then established
This process enables a comprehensive evaluation of
Hazard control systems and produces recommendations for any
necessary modifications. The overall result is a reduction in both
hazards and potential operational problems

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Pg 11

HAZOP Study Form

HAZOP STUDY REPORT FORM
TITLE :

Sheet 1 of

LINE 1 :

CAUSES

CONSEQUENCES

DEVIATION

ACTIONS, QUESTIONS OR
RECOMMENDATIONS

12
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A scenario
You and your family are on a road trip by
using a car in the middle of the night. You
were replying a text message while driving at
100 km/h and it was raining heavily. The car
hits a deep hole and one of your tire blows.
You hit the brake, but due to slippery road
and your car tire thread was thin, the car
skidded and was thrown off the road.

13
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Points to ponder
What was the cause of the accident?
What was the consequence of the event?

What can we do to prevent all those things to happen in

the first place?
What other possible accidents might happen on the road
trip?
Can we be prepared before the accident occurs?

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HAZOP
Parameter

Guideword

Possible
Causes

Consequences

Action

Safeguard

Car speed

Too fast
Too slow

Rushing

Skidded when
emergency
brake

- Slow down
- Speed up

-ABS brake
system
-Safety belt
- Air bag

Tire

No thread
Less thread

Tire too old,

often
speeding and
emergency
break

Car skidded

Window
visibility

Low
Very low

Rain

Cannot see the

road

Car light

Dim
No light

Road

With holes
Rocky

Travel time

Night
Foggy

- Check
frequently
- Have spare tire

-Stop car
-Go to nearest
garage
-Use emergency
signal
Breaks the car
tire

- Put a signboard
-Street lights

15

No street light
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-Travel during
daylight

Storage Tank
To
atmosphere
RV-1

Nitrogen

PV-2

To flare

PICA

Equipment & Valve

FV
Flow control valve
T
Tank
P
Pump
PV
Pressure control valve
RV
Relief valve
V
Valve

PV-1

V-8
V-7

V-5
H
From tank
trucks

TIA

Storage
Tank

LIA

V-1

V-2

FICA

PI

L
To process
V-4

FV-1

V-3

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Instrument
L
Level
T
Temperature
P
Pressure
F
Flow
I
Indicator
C
Controller
A
Alarm

HAZOP Table - level

Cause

Deviation

Consequences

Safe guard

Action

Level
Less

More

NO

1. Rupture
discharge line

Reagent release

Potential fire

LIA

Estimate release quantity

2. V3 open or
broken

Reagent release

Potential fire

LIA

Estimate release quantity

3. V1 open or
broken

Reagent release

Potential fire

LIA

V1 protection

4. Tank rupture

Reagent release

Potential fire

LIA

What external event

cause tank rupture

5. Too much truck

unload

Overfill

Reagent release via

RV1

LIA

Does RV1 allow for

liquid release?
Consider high level alarm
shutoff

6. Reverse flow
from process

Overfill

Reagent release via

RV1

LIA

Consider check valve at

pump discharge
Consider high level alarm
shutoff at feed

Same as less

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HAZOP Table - pressure

Pressure
Less

More

9. Break in nitrogen
or flare line

Reagent release

Potential fire

PICA

Consider independent
PLA

10. Lose nitrogen

Tank implode

Reagent release

PICA

Consider vacuum break

valve

11. PV2 fails closed

Tank implodes

Reagent release

PICA

Consider PAL

12. PICA fails,

closing PV2

Tank implodes

Reagent release

13. PICA fails,

closing PV1

Reagent release via

RV1

Tank rupture if RV1

fails

PICA

What PV1 and RV1

capacity

14. PV1 fails closed

Reagent release via

RV1

Tank rupture if RV1

fails

PICA

Consider independent
PAH

15. V7 closed

Reagent release via

RV1

Tank rupture if RV1

fails

PICA

Is V7 locked open

16. Overfill tank

Truck unload

Tank rupture if RV1

fails

PICA

Consider second high

level shutoff

17. Temperature of
inlet higher
than normal

Reagent release in
RV1

Tank rupture if RV1

fails

PICA

What prevent high temp

of feed
Consider PAH

18. Volatile
impurities in
feed

Reagent release in
RV1

Tank rupture if RV1

fails

PICA

Consider PAH
Consider sampling before
unloading

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Tank not designed for

vacuum

HAZOP Table - composition

Cause

Deviation

Consequences

Safe guard

Action

Composition
Other than

7. Wrong reagent

Possible reaction

As well as

8. Impurities in
reagent

Problem in reactor

Tank rupture

Consider sampling before

unload
Are other material
delivered in tank
Are unloading connection
different

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HAZOP Table - Temperature

Temperature
Less

High

19. Temperature of
inlet cooler
than usual

Possible vacuum

Thermal stress on tank

What are temp limits of

tank

20. Low tank

pressure

See 9-12

Thermal stress on tank

What are pressure limits

of tank

21. temperature of
inlet is higher
than usual

See 17

Thermal stress on tank

What are temp limits on

tank

22. external fire

Tank fails

Reagent release

What could cause

external fire
What are fire protection
capabilities
Is fire protection
adequate

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Planning for HAZOP

Carry out the study

Record the results (may need a secretary)
Follow-up of actions noted
final report contain resolution of all
recommended actions
must appoint someone as leader to check
progress of action
team may meet again if answers to questions do
not simply lead to an action
team may meet again if significant design changes
in interim report

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Responsibility of HAZOP Team Members

HAZOP leader
Plan sessions and timetable
Control discussion
Limit discussion
Encourage team to draw conclusion
Ensure secretary has time for taking note
Keep team in focus
Encourage imagination of team members
Motivate members
Discourage recriminations
Judge importance issues
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Responsibility of HAZOP Team

Members
HAZOP Secretary
Take adequate notes
Record documentations
Inform leader if more time required in taking notes
If unclear, check wording before writing
Produce interim lists of recommendations
Produce draft report of study
Check progress of chase action
Produce final report

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Responsibility of HAZOP Team

Members
Process Engineer
Provide a simple description
Provide design intention for each process unit
Provide information on process conditions and
design conditions
Provide a simple description
Provide design intention for each process unit
Provide information on process conditions and
design conditions

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Responsibility of HAZOP Team

Members
Mechanical Design Engineer
Provide specification details
Provide vendor package details
Provide equipment and piping layout information
Instrument Engineer
Provide details of control philosophy
Provide interlock and alarm details
Provide info on shutdown, safety features

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Responsibility of HAZOP Team

Members
Plant Engineer or Manager
Provide information on compatibility with any
existing adjacent plant
Provide details of site utilities and services
Provide (for study on existing plant) any update on
maintenance access and modifications
Shift Operating Engineer or Supervisor
Provide guidance on control instrumentation integrity
from an operating experience view point
Provide (for study on existing plant) information on
plant stability at the specified control parameters
Provide information on experienced operability
deviations of hazard potential
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Responsibility of HAZOP Team

Members
Chemist
Provide details of process chemistry
Provide details of process hazards (polymerisations,
byproducts, corrosion etc)
Project Engineer
Provide details of cost and time estimation and also
budget constraints.
Ensure rapid approval if required

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Example
Production of DAP (continuous process)
Valve A

Phosphoric Acid
Study line 1
Phosphoric acid delivery line

Valve C
Valve B
Ammonia
Diammonium
Phosphate
(DAP)
Reactor
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HAZOP Study Report on line 1 of DAP

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How about other lines?

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