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LastUpdated::Thursday04December201414:24Mecca

TheDaeshParadoxandPoliticalDisillusionment
Dr.TareqOsman

[ALJAZEERA]

Abstract
ThisreportarguesthattheIslamicState(ISorDaesh)organisationcanbeviewedasaconglomeration
ofanomaliesreflectedonseverallevelsandasexpressionsofgeneralpoliticaldisappointments.Daeshs
first paradox is evident in the context of its emergence in the midst of the Arab Spring, which was
viewed as an indicator of alQaedas ideological death. This first paradox is an expression of
disappointment given what IS preached upon its launch. Daesh presents itself as an Islamic group
seekingtorevivetheprinciplesoftrueIslamthroughtheachievementoftheIslamiccaliphatesystem,
butifthisisachieved,itwillembodytheessenceofthemodernstate,whichDaeshistryingtowipeout.
ThisistheessentialparadoxoftheIslamicState:Itisastateagainstthestate.Thisparadoxclearly
.reflectsthefailureoftheArabnationstate
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Theemergenceofthegroupasanonstateactorcausedgeneralconfusionforforeignpolicymakersof
countriesintheregionandabroad.TheUShasbeenforcedtoengagemilitarilyintheareaoncemore,
inoppositiontoObamasgoaltorefrainfrommilitaryinterventionintheMiddleEast.Turkeyrefusesto
join the military alliance against Daesh so long as it is not also opposing the Assad regime in Syria.
Similarly,theGulfStateswerereluctanttosupportoperationsagainstISbecausetheydonotservethe
goal of overthrowing Assad. Meanwhile, Iran uses its influence in Iraq and Syria in a manner that
Washington views as political blackmail. The emergence of IS represents a setback to the Syrian
.Revolutioninparticular,andanexpressionofgreatdisappointmentfortheArabSpringingeneral
Introduction
TheoutbreakoftheArabrevolutions,(1)beginningwithTunisiaattheendof2010,incitedwidespread
optimism. Some may term the aftermath the disappearance of the Arab Spring(2) because more than
threeyearslater,thereislittleoptimismleft.Eventshavetakenanundesirableturn,withtheexceptionof
(Tunisia,andevenitisstrugglingtokeeptherevolutionontrack.(3
Theconditionsoftheotherrevolutionsarenothealthy:InEgyptthecounterrevolutionhasprevaileddue
to the July 2013 military coup that ousted the first democratically elected president in the history of
modernEgypt.The25Januaryrevolutionhasbecomejustamemoryofthepast.(4)AsforLibya,after
the death of Gaddafi the country plunged into a political and military conflict which shows no sign of
abatement.(5) In Yemen, things are no less complex: the capital Sanaa has fallen into the hands of the
Houthis at an amazing speed.(6) Consequently, alQaeda is flourishing,(7) and occasionally even the
southernmovementcallingforsecessionbecomesactive,causingtheYemenirevolutionslossamidthis
darkatmosphere.TheSyrianrevolutionhasbeencompletelyobscuredbythedustofamultifrontwar,a
.warinwhichIShasemerged(8)asasignificantandcomplexpoliticalandmilitaryforce
ThisreportseekstopresenttheIslamicState(ISIS)asaparadox.Thenatureofthisparadoxisreflected
onseverallevels:inthecontextofitsemergence,initspoliticalessence,andinitsimpactontheforeign
policiesofstatesandintergovernmentalrelations.Thereportarguesthattheseparadoxescanbeviewed
.astheresultofpoliticaldisillusionment
?ISIS:IsittheBlackSwanoftheArabSpring
According to Nassim Taleb,(9) a specific event can be regarded as a black swan if the following three
conditions are met: it is unexpected, the impact of its consequences is great and it is understood and
interpretedafterthefact.(10)Thus,thequestionpresentsitself:canISemergenceinthecontextofthe
ArabSpringbecalledablackswan?TherewasconsensusthattheArabSpring(whichitselfcanbeseen
asanotherblackswan)representedasevereblowtotheideologyofalQaeda.Accordingtothisideology,
fightingtheUSanditsallies(thefarenemy)orauthoritarianArabregimes(thenearenemy)istheonly
pathtoachievingtheIslamicworldsindependence.TheArabrevolutionshaveclearlydemonstratedthat
thisconvictioniswrongandtheArabpeopleswereabletooustauthoritarianregimesthroughpeaceful
protest. Moreover, political Islam movements were able to reach the apex of power or at least to
participate in government through democratic means. It can be said the Arab Spring has caused great
embarrassment to alQaeda. The rebellious peoples paid little attention to alQaedas leaders who, ever
since,havebeentryingtocatchupwiththeeventsoftheArabSpring.ItwasthoughtthattheArabSpring
wasthebeginningoftheendofalQaeda.Butinstead,breakingtheSyrianrevolution,ISemergedasthe
.mostextremeversionofalQaeda
This was outside the scope of expectations, and has had enormous geopolitical and humanitarian
consequences. Now that IS has become a tangible reality, it is possible to interpret and analyse the
reasons forits emergence, and to studythe various consequences that resultedfrom thisemergence.In
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.otherwords,ISmeetsthecriteriaofablackswanifexaminedintheArabSpringscontext
DaeshsparadoxicalbirthcanbeinterpretedasadisappointmentintheArabSpring.Thoughtheprimary
goalofthisspringwastoremovetheauthoritarianregimesthroughcivilandpeacefulmeans,alltheArab
Spring cases share the reality of not accomplishing their full mission.(11) They differ in the degree of
their failure and in the causes underlying this failure, so can IS emergence be considered a realistic
consequence of this failure? The reality is that disappointment at this failure has rekindled the idea on
which alQaeda was established: there is no way to bring about radical change, except by fighting. It
allowed the proponents of this idea to proudly say: We've repeatedly confirmed to you that you will
.neversucceedthroughdemocracy
AlQaedaneverbelievedintheArabSpring.OnlywhenthesituationinSyriamorphedintogeneralwar
did alQaeda begin to treat it as a real spring, and then only to its advantage. The moment the Syrian
revolution was forced into war is the moment of the Arab Springs failure and the moment IS was
allowed to emerge. This is the paradox of Daeshs emergence in the context of the Arab Spring: it
.representsacrudeexpressionofdisappointment
Daesh:stateagainstastate
It is clear that that Daesh considers the modern nationstate as its enemy. It seeks, according to an
imperial perception of Islam, to remove the regional state formed after the colonial era, and replace it
withanIslamicCaliphatestate.ThisleavesthequestionoftheISrealityandwhetheritisregardedasthe
latestrevolutionarymovementinthefaceofWesternimperialism,orasasocialIslamicfundamentalist
movement.PerhapsthebestapproachtounderstandDaeshistoviewitasamodernstate.Surprisingly
enough,ithasallthestructureneededfortheriseofthemodernstate,oratleasttheHobbesLeviathan
state.(12) In that state, everyone is subject to the Mortal God and He monopolises the right to use
violenceinabsoluteterms.Sothisistheparadox:theIslamicState,whichpresentsitselfasanenemyof
themodernstate,isessentiallyamodernstate.Inreality,itrepresentsthemodernstateinitsugliestform,
thetotalitarianstate.Inheranalysisofthephenomenonoftotalitarianism,HannahArendtassertsthatthe
architecture of the totalitarian system consists of the following: charisma, historical ideology, a
suppressionmachineandapropagandasystem,summarisingfacism,NazismandStalinismasthethree
(totalitarianmodelsinherstudy.(13
EvenalimitedstudyofDaeshanditspracticesrevealsthatithasallthecomponentsofthisarchitecture:
Itadoptsanideologythatencapsulatesavisionforthecourseofhistory.Itworkstoachievethisvision
(theideologyoftheCaliphate),andseestheIslamicCaliphateasitsdestinyforhistoryscourseandwill
takeallnecessarymeasurestorapidlyachievethisendinthisworld.ItseemsclearthatDaeshrushedits
announcementoftheestablishmentoftheIslamicCaliphateafteritgainedcontroloverpartsofIraqand
Syria.Also,Daesh,asstrangeasitmaybe,possessesalevelofcharismarepresentedinthecaliph,asan
heirtotheprophetwhohastheresponsibilityofdirectingbothreligiousandsecularpolicy.Intermsof
thesystemofrepression,IShasturnedeveryonewhobelongstoitintoakillingmachine,claimingthat
thisistheconceptofjihad.Asforthepropaganda,thereisnodoubtthatDaeshhasastrongpropaganda
system through which it promotes itself, a system that has actively exploited all products of modernity
(whichISclaimstobeagainst),suchassocialmediaandcinematography.(14)Thus,itcanbededuced
thatDaeshisFascist,butbasedonareligiousideology,whichmakesitallthemoredangerous,because
religious ideology provides its adherents with some metaphysical reassurance. This renders them ever
moredaringinimplementingtheirmission,becausetheybelievetheyareexecutingthewillofGodrather
than the will of mankind. Again this is a serious IS paradox: it advocates active hostility towards the
.modernstate,yetitrepresentstheessenceofthisstateinitsawfulformsofviolenceandbrutality
ThedisappointmentreflectedinthisparadoxistheexpressionofthefragilityofthebloatedArabstate,as
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expressed by Nazih Nassif alAyoubi.(15) It is a fragile state although it manifests in the image of
Hobbes monstrous Leviathin. To comprehend this we must return to Carl Schmitts notion that the
essenceofpoliticsistheabilitytolaunchtheexceptionalmoment,i.e.themomentofwar.(16)Thetrue
politicianishewhoownsthedecisionatthisexceptionalmomentthus,thehistoryofpolitics,according
toSchmitt,isthehistoryofwar,withperiodsofpeacethatintermittentlypermeatethestateofwarand
(servethewarinonewayoranother.(17
Accordingly, the state (or the politician) who does not control the decision of war, is politically a
prematurestatethathaslostmuchofitslegitimacyasapoliticalentity.TheArabnationstatecreated
bycolonialismdoesnotconformtoSchmittsnotionofastate,asitdoesnothavetheabilitytolaunch
the moment of its own war. The Arab state makes no clear distinction between friend and foe, which
Schmittseesasafundamentalaspectofthepolitician.WhoistheenemyoftheArabstateagainstwhom
itcanlaunchthemomentofwar?Intheabsenceofanexternalenemy,thisstateautomaticallydirectsits
violenceinwardandtherelationshipofthestatewithsocietybecomesarelationshipofwarinoneaspect
ortheother.AlQaedaemergedtofillthevacuumleftbyastateunabletolaunchwar.Itclearlyredrew
the map of political hostilities. In fact, all of alQaedas activities are directed towards launching a
permanent moment of war. Yassin Haj Saleh coined a tragicomic phrase when he called it a black
marketforthewar,(18)aftertheArabstatesfailedtoprovideitlawfully.Theabsenceofthisobligatory
missed duty (in jihadi lexicon) to launch war partially explains why alQaedas supporters take it
.seriously
Inthiscontext,Daeshaddedawidenedscopeofhostilitiessothatanyonewhobecomesaffiliatedwithit
is a friend and everyone else an enemy. In this obdurate distinction between friend and foe, IS has
adopted metaphysical parameters such as takfir (infidelity), utilised to exclude the apostate from
Islams framework, and then spill his blood and spend his wealth on behalf of the divine. This is the
paradoxofISessenceasastateagainstthestate,andanexpressionofdisappointmentintheArabstates
.failuretoachieveitspoliticalessence
Thechallenge:Daeshandforeignpolicyconfusion
According to political science literature, the Islamic State organisation is a socalled nonstate actor
(NSA), an entity that disputes the states monopoly of the political arena. NSAs are structured entities
withacommandstructure.Theyenjoyindependencefromthestatetowhichtheybelonggeographically
and usually represent a specific ethnic, sectarian or ideological group that has definite political goals.
Since they have the power to potentially achieve these goals, they can influence the states policy.
Accordingly, NSAs can be classified according to two criteria: whether their scope of work is local or
(international,andwhethertheyarearmedorunarmed.(19
Daesh,accordingtothisclassification,isanarmedandinternationalNSA.(20)Ithasaclearleadership
structure (Caliph and governors) and is completely independent from the two countries to which it
geographically belongs (Iraq and Syria). It represents a particular ideological group (a spectrum of
jihadis),andithasinmindaclearpoliticalgoal(theexpansionofdominationandachievingaCaliphate).
Ithassufficientmilitaryandeconomiccapacitytomakeittherichestandmostpowerfulnonstateactor
ofall.ThisleavesthequestionofthethreatDaeshposestovariouscountries'foreignpoliciesasanNSA,
atboththeinternationalandregionallevels,andhowthischallengeisembodiedintheformofaparadox
.thatexpressesapoliticaldisappointment
Washington:thecurseoftheMiddleEast
Obamas2008arrivalattheWhiteHouseusheredinradicalchangestotheAmericanstrategythatwas
adopted during the Bush Junior era from 2000 through 2008, which aimed to consolidate US pre
eminenceinaunipolarworld.Tothatend,Bushadoptedtheprincipleofpreemptiveorpreventivewar,
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and allowed Washington to send troops wherever it desired, a strategy that reaped a bitter harvest in
Afghanistan and Iraq. Subsequently, Obama attempted to reestablish a plurality of polarity and allow
othercountriestoshareinthemanagementoftheinternationalregime.Americanforeignpolicybecame
more modest and less militarised, with Obama seeking to redress what Bush and his inner circle of
neoconservativeshaddestroyed.Heaimedtoavoidenteringintoanywar,andsoughttofocuslessonthe
Arabworld,givingthePacificgreaterforeignpolicyprominencewhileadoptingapolicyofleadership
from behind to manage the Middle East. Indeed, this was the applied policy in dealing with the Arab
Spring events (which surprised the US as well as everyone else), and was clearly manifested in the
(Obamaadministration'scautiousattitudetowardstherevolutions.(21
However, following three years of leadership from behind, there are numerous questions regarding
what Washington achieved in Syria. Oneof the answersisthe Islamic States rapid ascension!Indeed,
manycriticismshavebeendirectedatWashington'sforeignpolicytowardtheSyrianrevolution.Critics
arguethatWashingtonsreluctancetointerveneandtoppleAssadpavedthewayforSyriatobecomea
destination for jihadis from all around the world, culminating in Daesh. This emergence forced
WashingtontoreturntotheArabworldunderabroadcoalitiontofightIS,areturnwhichObamahad
.struggledtoavoid
This is the irony, then: Washingtons reluctance to seriously support the Syrian revolution, in order to
avoidrepeatingtheIraqfiasco,anditsdesiretostayawayfromtheArabworld,isactuallyresponsible(at
least partially) for the emergence of IS, which forced the US to return to the region.(22)Thisparadox
expressesdisappointmentinWashingtonsinabilitytodistanceitselffromtheMiddleEast,whichappears
.tobeacursethathauntstheUS,onefromwhichitcannotescape
Turkey:theKurdishchallenge
When Washington began to rally allies for its war against ISIS, Turkey was notably reluctant to
participate in coalition operations. Since Ankara is an irreplaceable ally in this context, because of its
military potential and its geopolitical position that facilitates targeting IS in both Syria and Iraq, US
diplomats tirelessly urged Turkey to enter the coalition.(23) Ankara is clearly not Daeshs ally, yet it
refused to fight what ultimately represents an ideological and military threat to Turkey. This section
.addressesthefactorswhatpreventingTurkeyfromconductingmilitaryoperationsagainstDaesh
AlthoughAnkarabelievesthatISisathreat,itseesnorealpointinengaginginawaragainstISinboth
SyriaandIraq.Rather,AnkarawantstomakefightingISonlypartofacomprehensivestrategyaimedat
toppling the Assad regime. Ankara believes that the USled coalition has completely dropped from its
agenda the goal of overthrowing Assad, engaging instead in a questionable and likely protracted war
againstISIS.WhatcomplicatesmattersforAnkaraisthatDaeshhascapturednearly100Turkishsoldiers
inanareabehindtheSyrianbordercalledtheTombofSuleimanShah,whichhousesthetombofOsman
Shah, founder of the Ottoman Empire.(24) Daesh was also previously holding a number of Turkish
diplomatsinthecityofMosul,butAnkaramanagedtoliberatethemthroughnegotiations.Allofthisis
.anotherreasonTurkeydoesnotwanttobecomeinvolvedindirectcombatwiththeIslamicStategroup
ThiswasevidentduringtheKobanicrisis,abordercityencircledbyIS.Daeshisobduratelydetermined
to control it despite all the airstrikes launched by the coalition thus far. Ankaras reluctance is not due
solelytoitsstrategytonotengageinawaragainstIS,butalsobecauseKobanihappenstobecontrolled
bytheKurdishDemocraticUnion,anarmoftheKurdistanWorkersParty(PKK)inSyria,whichTurkey
regardsasaterroristorganisationthatithasfoughtforthreedecades.Turkeywantsanyinterventionto
defendthecitytobepartofnegotiationstrategieswiththeLabourParty,whichisasignificantinternal
(Turkishpolicyissue.(25
Turkey then, wanted the US to intervene more deeply in Syrian affairs. It wanted a regional and
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internationalcoalitioninwhichitwouldplayakeyroleinordertooverthrowAssad.Itisreluctanttojoin
exactlytheexistingalliancewhichparadoxicallytargetsISandnotAssad.TheTurkishpositiontowards
ISisakintohiddenhostilityorcoldwar.Turkeysattitudeexpressesdisappointmentatpolicytowards
Syria,particularlybecauseithasbeenunabletoachievetheoverthrowofAssadsincetheoutbreakofthe
.SyrianrevolutionanddoesnotwanttoengageinawaragainstDaeshwhichdoesnotalsoservethisgoal
?GulfStates:withoragainstIS
The Gulf States policy toward ISIS can be inferred from their position towards the Syrian revolution.
TheirprimaryconcernwastobringdowntheAssadregime,particularlyinthecasesofSaudiArabiaand
Qatar.Inthiscontext,theyinitiallysupportedvariousSyrianoppositionfactions,buttheIslamicStates
emergence upset their calculations. IS engaged in a fight with the rest of the opposition factions and
achieved significant victories. All the support provided by Gulf countries to overthrow Assad has thus
.beeninvain,andinsteadoffightingAssad,theirallieshadtodefendthemselvesagainstIS
WashingtonwasannoyedbecauseSyriahadbecomeattractivetoJihadisandwasincreasinglycontrolled
byDaesh,andtheUSblamedtheGulfStatesforturningSyriaintoaJihadihaven.(26)WhenWashington
gathereditsalliestocarryoutoperationsagainstISinbothIraqandSyria,variousGulfStatesjoinedthis
coalition.However,thereisaquestionofwhethertheGulfStatesreallywanttoeliminateIS.Inactual
fact,theirpositionisstrikinglysimilaringoal(albeitwithdifferentstartingpoints)tothatofTurkey.Yes,
ISrepresentsapotentialideologicalandmilitarythreattotheGulfStates,butaslongastheISthreatis
confinedtoIraqandSyria,theothermoreimportantgoalistooverthrowAssad.Sincethisgoalisnot
(prioritisedbythecoalition,thereisnorealenthusiasminRiyadhorDohaforcoalitionoperations.(27
Thus,itcanbesaidthattheGulfStatespositionhereisthesameasthatofTurkey:sincethebeginning
of the Syrian revolution, both have actively sought to create an internationalregional alliance to
overthrowAssad,buttonoavail.ThissituationreflectsthedisappointmentoftheGulfStates'policiesin
Syria.TheyhavebeenunabletotoppleAssad,andconsequentlyunabletoweakenTehran'sinfluencein
theregion.Instead,thereversehashappened.ThereisnosigntheAssadregimewillcollapsesoon,and
.Iranssphereofinfluenceandpowerintheregionissteadilyincreasing
Iran:WhentheEnemyBecomesUseful
At the ideological level, IS is undoubtedly an enemy of Iran,(28) but this may not be the case at the
politicallevel.Iran'smajorgoalinSyriaistokeepBasharalAssadsregimeintactandtopreventthefall
ofDamascusintothehandsofanIslamicorproRiyadhregime.ItsgoalinIraqistosupportaregimethat
maintains the influence Tehran achieved after the US invasion in 2003. This section of the report
.addressesISimpactTehransgoalsbeforeandaftertheinterventionofWashingtonanditsallies
InIraq,IShasposedarealthreattoTehransinterests.IthasdominatedlargeareasofIraq(Mosuland
Anbar), forcing Tehran to abandon its man Nouri alMaliki and instead support Haider alAbadi as a
moreconsensualalternative.Militarily,TehranwascompelledtosendIranianleaderstoIraqtosupport
the Iraqi army and Kurdish Peshmerga forces in their fight against IS, and it also brought its affiliated
militiasinIraq(aswellassomebroughtinfromSyria)tofightIS.(29)Butultimately,Tehran'slossesin
Iraqcannotberegardedasheavy:alAbadiisstillShiaandhisrelationshipwithTehranisnotnoticeably
bad enough to say that Tehran has lost its influence over the Iraqi government. The new government,
(whichwassupposedlyaimedatreducingSunnimarginalisation,isstillinthehandsofShiafactions.(30
InSyria,ISexpansionandinfluenceisconsiderablylessthanitisinIraq,sincethereareseveralother
Jihadientities(suchasalNusraFrontandAhraralSham)aswellastheoppositionforcesthatdefected
from the Syrian army, all engaged in fighting Assad. Among all these, IS does not represent the most
significant danger to the Assad regime. It was busy establishing itself in territories not controlled by
Assad,anditalsoengagedinabitterwarwithitsfellowmujahideen(fighters).Ironically,beforethe
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USled coalition began operations, IS did not constitute the main danger to Assad, thus it was not the
.maindangertoIranianinterestsinSyria
IranisundoubtedlynothappyaboutDaeshsemergence,becausethegroupultimatelyfallssquarelyinto
thecategoryofTehransrealopponents.Thus,coalitionattacksonISactuallyfavourTehransinterests
inIraqandinSyria.Howthen,canIransvirtualdiscontentwiththecoalitionbeexplained?(31)Tehran
isaware of the extent of its influencein both Iraq andSyria, an influencethatcanbe harnessedinthe
fight against IS. It is also aware that Washington recognises this influence and its importance. Thus,
Tehran would like to invest its influence in order to change the direction of its relationship with
Washington. Tehran was looking to be annexed even semiformally to the alliance led by Washington
against ISIS, as this would mean it gained recognition as a regional power. In return for exerting its
influence in support of the coalition, Tehran hoped to gain some concessions in its protracted nuclear
.negotiationswiththeP5+1group
In fact, Washington exhibits great confusion in response to this implicit offer from Tehran. There are
reportsaboutaprivatepoliticalmessagefromObamatotheSupremeLeaderofIranthatspeaksofUS
IraniancoordinationtofightIS,(32)buttherearealsopublicandongoingassurancesfromWashington
thatitrejectsIran'soffer,(33) and that there is no coordination between Washington and Tehran in the
contextofthewaragainstIS.(34)Thus,Washingtonstandsbetweenthehammerandtheanvil:itknows
what assistance Iran can offer in the (tense) battle against IS, but it is not ready to recognise Iran as a
.regionalpower,norisitreadytomakerealconcessionsontheissueoftheIraniannuclearpowers
Ultimately,theoutcomeofISemergenceinIraqandSyria,andtheUSledinterventiontofightit,appear
tobeapoliticalgainforIran.ItsinfluenceinIraqhasnotbeenaffectednegativelyonthecontrary,ithas
beenincreasedsignificantlybyIranianmilitarypresenceandShiamilitiasupporttodefendBaghdadand
IraqiKurdistanagainstIS.IranisplayingtheroleofthesaviourinIraq,andinSyriathecoalitionstrikes
arespectacularlywellalignedwithIranianinterestsastheycontributedirectlytostrengtheningtheAssad
.regime
In yet another dimension of this paradox, the Islamic State, the ideological enemy of Iran, is actually
useful to it in one way or another. Though this paradox expresses disappointment, it does not express
disappointment at Iranian policies in the region. On the contrary, it represents US and Gulf State
disappointment,becauseitseemsthatWashington'spoliciessinceits2003invasionofIraqcontributeto
.theinterestsofIran,whichisironic,givenWashingtonsseemingeagernesstodotheopposite
Conclusion
ISaforementionedparadoxesrelatetoitsemergenceinthecontextoftheArabSpring,thenatureofits
politicalessence,andtheconfusionitbringstotheforeignpoliciesofregionalcountriesandtheUS.Asa
nonstateactor,Daeshhasrepresentedarealchallengeforthetwocountriesinwhichitgeographically
operates:IraqandSyria.InIraqitcausedtheoverthrowofalMalikisgovernmentandtheadventofa
newgovernment.ItalsofacilitatedexternalinterventioninIraq.InSyria,ISnegativelyimpactedthepath
oftheSyrianrevolution,andactuallygavecredencetoAssadsinsistentportrayaloftheSyrianrevolution
.asadisruptionledbyterroristsandextremists
Daeshhasalsowroughtconfusionintheforeignpoliciesofstatesthatareactiveintheregion.TheUS
ultimatelyfounditselfleadingmilitaryoperationsagainstISwhichfurtherstrengthentheAssadregimein
Syria,aswellasincreasingIran'sinfluenceintheregioninonewayoranother.TheUSmayevenfind
itself obliged to make political deals with Iran, making Washington appear to stand in same trench as
Tehran and Assad. Washingtons relationship with Ankara is already prone to tension due to Turkeys
hesitancetojointheallianceagainstIS.Ankaradoesnotseeanypointinthealliancesoperationsagainst
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.DaeshalonewithoutacomprehensivestrategythatincludesAssadsoverthrow
Daeshs paradoxes embody several general disappointments. For the Gulf States, after three years of
investmentintheSyrianopposition,ISemergedtoannihilatetheiraspirations.Turkeydoesnotseeany
progression towards its goal of achieving Assads ouster. The US was again dragged into a military
intervention in the region, even after it had vowed not to get involved in the Arab world anymore.
PerhapsthemostseveredisappointmentexpressedbytheemergenceofIS,isthepoliticaldisillusionment
thataroseaftertheArabSpring,becauseitwasseenasaliberationmovementthathadthepotentialto
.changethefaceoftheArabregionforever
____________________________________
.Dr.TareqOsmanisaresearcherspecialisinginIslamicthought
Endnotes
Itisnotincorrecttousethetermrevolutiontocharacterisetheseevents,regardlessoftheacademicdebateaboutitssuitabilitytodescribetherevolution. .1
Somearguethatthemoreaccuratedescriptionisuprisingorrevolt,becauseitdidnotaccomplisharadicalchangeinthecurrentsociopoliticalstatus,which
isaconditioninthedefinitionofrevolution.However,eachoftheseterms:revolution,awakening,uprising,andrevoltareusedassynonymsindescribing
this event. About the concept of revolution, see: Hannah Arendt, On Revolution, 1965, translated by Atallah AbdelWahab, (Arab Organization for
.(Translation,2008
ThetermArabSpringisborrowedfromtheEuropeancontext,wherethewaveofrevolutionsthatsweptEuropein1848and1849wasdescribedbythe .2
termtheEuropeanSpring.ThefirstuseofthetermArabSpringwasinLebanonin2005afterRafikHaririwaskilledandSyriantroopswithdrewfrom
Lebanon.Therewashopeforaneweraofgreaterindependence.ItwasalsousedbyAmericanreportersasanexpressionofoptimismthataccompaniedthe
attemptsofvariousUSadministrationstodemocratisetheMiddleEastinordertosolveitscrises.ThefirstuseofthetermtocharacterisethecurrentArab
revolutions was by Marc Lynch in an article in Foreign Policy magazine, titled, Obama and the Arab Spring in December 2010. The term became
.mainstreamafterthat
On the particularity of the Tunisian case, see: Tunisian Exception: the Success of Reconciliation and its Drawbacks, International Crisis Group, June .3
.2014
.OnthemilitarycoupinEgypt,see:GoinginCircles:theSeriousnessoftheSecondTransitionalPhaseinEgypt,InternationalCrisisGroup,August2013.4
For indepth analysis of the Libyan political and military state after Gaddafi, see: Christopher Chives and Jeffrey Martini, Libya after Gaddafi: Future .5
Lessons
and
Implications,
(Santa
Monica,
CA:
RAND
Corporation,
2014),
available
at:
.http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR500/RR577/RAND_RR577.pdf
See also: Jason Pack and Barak Barfi, In Wars Wake: the Struggle for PostQaddafi Libya, (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East
.Studies,February2012),availableat:http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus118.pdf
.OncurrentHouthipoliticalgains,see:Houthis,fromSaadatoSana'a,InternationalCrisisGroup,June2014.6
The Houthi takeover of the capital Sanaa, with little resistance, provided alQaeda with a real opportunity to emerge again as the sole defender of the .7
tribesinthefaceofalHouthiexpansion.ThishasprovidedanexcellenttribalincubatorforalQaeda,andconferredsignificantlegitimacyonit.Thefightis
.currentlyatitspeakbetweenAnsarAllah(Houthis)andAnsaralSharia(alQaeda),makingYemenonceagainunstableandlost
IS establishment was announced in Syria in April 2013, followed by a June 2014 announcement of the Caliphate and the swearing of allegiance to its .8
Amir,AbuBakralBaghdadiasCaliphofIslam.Duringthattime,theorganisationsnamewaschangedtotheISratherthanISIL.Itisalsonowknownas
.theIslamicStateorDaesh
Nassim Nicholas Najib Taleb is an American academic of Lebanese origin who teaches management science, risk engineering, theories of chaos, .9
.randomnessandunpredictability,Heisthefatheroftheblackswantheory
.NassimTaleb,BlackSwan,(2007),translatedbyHalimNasr,(Beirut:ArabHouseofSciences,2009),10.10
It cannot be denied that the Tunisian revolution is in a better situation than the others. But it also can't be denied that the old regime has maintained a .11
presenceintheTunisianrevolutionaryscene(especiallyafterthelatestparliamentaryelectionsinwhichtheNidaaTunispartywonthehighestnumberof
parliamentary seats). Tunisias elevation is primarily due to its relatively positive outcomes as compared to the negative situations in other Arab Spring
.countries,andnottoanyradicalrevolutionarystandards
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Alifiathan), 1651, translated by Diana Harb and Bushra Saeb, (Abu Dhabi: Kalima for Publication and Dar AlFarabi, .12
.(2011
.(See:HannahArendt,TheFoundationsofTotalitarianism,1973,translatedbyAntoineAbouZeid,(London:DarSaqi,1993.13
,ISrecentlylaunchedahighqualitypromotionalfilmtitledTheFlamesofWar,availableathttp://www.liveleak.com/view?i=22f_1411220248.14
.(NazihNassifMichailAyoubi,OverstatingtheArabstate:PoliticsandSocietyintheMiddleEast,(ArabOrganizationforTranslation,2011.15
.(CarlSchmitt,TheConceptofthePolitical,(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1927.16
.SchmittsideasweremetwithcriticismbecausetheywerelinkedtohisNazism.17
,YassinalHajSaleh,AlQaeda:OurAlternativeEmpire,TheRepublic,9May2014.18
.http://therepublicgs.net/27974
.(WilliamWallace,DaphneJosselin,NonstateActorsinWorldPolitics,(London:PalgraveMacmillan,2002.19
.Itisanonstateactor,butasmentionedaboveitencapsulatestheessenceofthemodernstate.20
See: Developments in the US position on the Syrian Revolution, the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, February 2013, .21
.http://www.dohainstitute.org/release/dbc3913241bd48c1852c3d2e394e5c4b
OsamaAbuIrshaid,IstheUnitedStatesGettingDraggedintoaNewWarintheMiddleEast?ArabCenterforResearchandPolicyStudies,October .22
.2014
Imad Youssef Qaddoura, Turkey and the Issue of Military Intervention: Between the Pressures and Constraints, Arab Center for Research and Policy .23
.Studies,October2014
.ThisareawaspartoftheOttomanEmpire,andafterthefalloftheCaliphate,AtaturkinsistedthatitremainunderthecontrolofTurkey.24
To date (November 2014), the maximum concession from Ankara on Kobani is that it has allowed (under pressure from Washington) some Kurdish .25
PeshmergaforcesfromKurdistan,someFreeSyrianArmy(FSA)forcesandsomemilitaryequipmenttopassthroughitsbordertodefendthetownagainst
.IS
ThemostprominentUSstatementinthiscontextwasmadebyJohnKerryatHarvardUniversityregardingthesupportprovidedbyTurkeyandtheGulf .26
.statestojihadisinSyriaandthesubsequentimpactonDaeshsemergence
The UAE may have been more enthusiastic in this context, probably because of purely ideological reasons, rather than specific foreign policy agenda .27
.reasons
.TheIslamicStatesprioritisationoffightingShiasrepresentsasignificantdifferencebetweenitandalQaeda,whichprioritisesfightingtheWest.28
Phillip
Smyth,
All
the
Ayatollah's
men,
Foreign
Policy,
18
September
2014,
.29
.http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/09/18/all_the_ayatollahs_men_shiite_militias_iran_iraq_islamic_state
,MohammedYamani,IraqiParliamentApprovesNewGovernmentHeadedbyHaidaralAbbadi,Reuters,8Sep2014.30
.http://ara.reuters.com/article/topNews/idARAKBN0H322B20140908
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Parisa

Hafezi,

Iran:

AntiIslamic

State

Coalition

Beset

by

Severe Ambiguity, Reuters, 11 September 2014, .31

.http://ara.reuters.com/article/topNews/idARAKBN0H60XJ20140911
Jay Solomon and Carol E Lee, Obama Wrote Secret letter to Iran's Khamenei about Fighting Islamic State, The Wall Street Journal, 6 November .32
.2014,http://online.wsj.com/articles/obamawrotesecretlettertoiranskhameneiaboutfightingislamicstate1415295291
,AsharqalAwsat,WashingtonRejectsIranianOffertoLinktheFightAgainstISIStoNuclearConcessions,AsharqalAwsat,23September2014.33
.http://classic.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&article=788163&issueno=13083#.VGXwKvmUe3Q
,AlHayat,Washington:WeHaveNotCoordinatedMilitarilywithIrantoFaceISIS,AlHayat,7November2014.34
http://www.alhayat.com/Articles/5557304/%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B4%D9%86%D8%B7%D9%86%D9%84%D9%85%D9%86%D9%82%D9%85
%D8%A8%D8%A3%D9%8A%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%B3%D9%8A%D9%82%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%85%D8%B9
%D8%A5%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%84%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%84%D9%80
.%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B4

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