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Abstract
The positivism-inspired hypothetico-deductive method has dominated research practices in geographical sciences for several decades. Notwithstanding its signicant contribution, as a widely employed protocol, there is a growing recognition that positivist
methods of analysis have failed to accommodate the countless auxiliary assumptions that underlie any geographical research
hypothesis, not only in human geography but also in physical geography and geographical information science. The DuhemQuine
thesis has received a signicant amount of attention in recent years in scientic and logical theory circles, as a progressive alternative
to the hypothetico-deductive method. The thesiss main attraction to contemporary practitioners of science is that it allows methodologically rigorous ways of resolving inconsistencies between a theoretical system and experience. Under the DuhemQuine
thesis, the use of a multiple organisation of hypotheses in geographical research will militate against an over-dependence on the
null-hypothesis which is inconsistent with the fact that conclusions in geographical research are subject to contingent factors such
as human participation, measurement error, and ecological fallacies.
2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Positivism; Hypothetico-deductive method; Multiple hypotheses; DuhemQuine thesis
1. Introduction
The current problems that beset geography and the
future of geographical research in general are the focus
of a great deal of debate among geographers, even
among those who maintain a strong belief in the viability of the diverse, complex disciplines under which geography operates (Thrift, 2002, p. 291). In a frank
statement lamenting the situation of the research methodology game which appears to split geographers into
scientists and non-scientists, Cliord (2002, p. 434) presents a starker assessment:
20 years on, the ridiculing of positivism and the deconstructionist excesses have taken their toll. The philosophical forefront of discussions in physical geography
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poststructuralist and, more broadly speaking postmodern styles of analysis and interpretation, especially in human geography. However, as Robinson (1998, p. 476)
noted, although we do live in a post-positivist era, positivism remains in the picture:
So it would seem more correct to portray geographys
transformation as a widespread rejection of positivism
as the predominant prevailing philosophy or, alternatively, as a move from an essentially technocratic subject
to one that was more people-centred. Again, it should be
stressed that positivism is not entirely absent from
human geography in the 1990s and a technocratic aspect
has grown strongly in importance for at least 15 years
through the emergence of GIS.
Robinsons depiction of geographical information
systems and science as technocratic betrays a dated
view about the nature of research in these elds. However, his assessment of the continuing inuence of positivism as an epistemological context for a great deal of
GIS and spatially integrated social science research is
borne out by recent scholarship (Goodchild and Janelle,
2003). Furthermore, the proponents of positivism continue to defend its relevance, especially in relation to
such important social, economic and political concepts
as the open society (Jarvie and Pralong, 2003).
Logical positivisms main loyal opponent, Karl Popper (19021994), went further by stressing that conrmations should only count if they are the result of
risky predictions; that is to say. . . we should have expected an event which was incompatible with theory
(Popper, 1965, p. 36). Poppers main point was that scientic hypotheses should be subjected to the test of
empirical experience, through a hypothetico-deductive
methodology, which does not have the power to conrm, only to refute (i.e., falsify) in order to provide a
safe means for establishing a viable theory without
resorting to induction which was permitted under former versions of positivism. Most authors tend to classify
this application of positivism by Karl Popper (i.e., the
emphasis on falsication) as critical rationalism to distinguish it from other forms of positivism, including logical positivism (Johnston et al., 2000, pp. 128129).
Geographys association with developments in positivism has been attributed by Guelke (1978) to the publication of Harveys seminal book Explanation in
Geography (Harvey, 1969). However, it is unclear how
much positivism Harvey espoused in his book (Paterson,
1984), or if positivism was in eect an ex post rationalization of quantication . . . ironically, just as the movement was beginning it slow arc of decline (Johnston
et al., 2000, p. 666). Another curious contradiction
regarding the history of positivism in geographical research concerns the widespread adoption of mathematical methods by the supporters of geographys
quantitative revolution when many positivist researchers
have actually doubted the relevance of mathematics in
describing or solving real world problems. As Fotheringham et al. (2002, p. 85) put it, Although p-values
and signicance tests are of some use, their utility is
not as great as some practitioners appear to believe.
Indeed, following a strict application of verictionism
by one of its founders, Alfred Ayer (19101989) concluded that mathematics said little about reality, only
how to manipulate abstract symbols purported to represent real world entities and relations (Ayer, 1946).
Scepticism about the limitations of mathematical representation of reality had also prompted one of the most
eminent mathematical philosophers, Bertrand Russell
(18721970) to decide that, in order to uncover the
underlying structures of mathematical objects, mathematics should be reduced to a more representative form,
namely logic (Russell, 1919). To Russell, the existence of
geometric objects and the epistemology of space could
not be answered adequately by empiricists. In geometry
(as also applied in spatial science) a line can be broken
down innitely into smaller segments, and the possibility
that empiricism can enable us to verify a mathematical
line or point as material entities is questionable, since
spatial concepts (such as polygons, lines and points in
GIS) are abstract and not concrete objects that can be
veried through our senses. According to Russell, we
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but gravitational ones act on the planets, all the theories of optics are correct, and so on) entails that Mercury will have orbit o. But Mercury was not observed
to have orbit o. So {T1, T2, . . . , Tn and A1, A2, . . . , An}
must be false according to a positivist-style methodology, because at least one of the laws would not t.
But since the hypothetico-deductive method would
not permit the testing of multiple hypotheses and
assumptions, how could we establish which theory or
hypothesis was at fault?
In evaluating the sort of problem posed by the above
example, Quine (1951, p. 4243) pointed out, Having
reevaluated one statement we must reevaluate some
others, which may be statements logically connected
with the rst or may be the statements of logical connections themselves. But the total eld is so underdetermined by its boundary conditions, experience, that
there is much latitude of choice as to what statements
to reevaluate in the light of any single contrary experience. Quines critique of the limitations of research
informed by the hypothetico-deductive method is reected in the conclusion of a number of geographers
who have noted the inherent contradiction in having
to reject ones core propositions about causal mechanisms and processes only because of apparently disconrming empirical evidence (Chouinard et al., 1984,
p. 375).
Recently, some of the supporters of Popperian positivism have attempted to refute the DuhemQuine thesis
by proposing an interpretation of falsication which can
survive the idea that a theory can be rejected if one of its
hypotheses clashed with an observation (Cross, 1982).
According to this view, a theory T will not normally
be falsied unless there is another theory T 0 that can explain, along with the actual falsifying instance, everything that was contained in the old theory T. To use
the Newtonian example again, Einsteins theory would
be T 0 and Newtons theory would be T, and sophisticated falsicationism can now be moved forward to test
instead the Eddington experiment (which conrmed
Einsteins theory of relativity as a successor to Newtonian physics). However, the use of such immunising
strategies and progressive adjustments (Creath, 1991),
to avert the collapse of the dogma of falsicationism,
contradicts the very anti-conventionalist logic on which
falsicationists operated and accused Duhem of perpetrating (Popper, 1972, p. 78).
To summarise, the use of the DuhemQuine thesis as
an alternative to the hypothetico-deductive methods
which are still used in geographical sciences, especially
by some physical geographers, would entail relegating
the primacy of the null hypothesis (H0) and testing,
for their relative robustness, multiple alternative
hypotheses (i.e., H1, H2, H3, etc.) based on a host of
underlying research assumptions (eld measurement
methods, error propagation, scale, zoning and data
aggregation criteria, and so forth). Further consideration of these issues is discussed in the next section.
6. Conclusion
This paper examined the limitations of the hypothetico-deductive method which has dominated research
practices in geographical sciences for several decades.
Notwithstanding the signicant contribution made by
positivism (in its various evolved forms) to the advancement of scientic thinking in geography and other disciplines, there is a growing recognition that positivist
methods of analysis have failed to accommodate the
many auxiliary assumptions that underlie any research
hypothesis put forward for testing. These failures range
from unquestioning reliance on auxiliary hypotheses
(for instance, about data aggregation, zoning and scale)
to more fundamental expediencies relating to the com-
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