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Equity Valuation

Inflation, deflation and mean


reversion
Russell Napier
Strategist

Conclusions
Key to mean reversion of CAPE- changing inflationary
expectations
CAPE and Q drive capital creation and are reflexive
Technology is key but it is never as positive for noninflationary growth as it seems
Deflation or inflation rising through 4% will reduce
valuations
Equities can adjust more rapidly than bonds
Deflation comes next and sharply lower equity prices
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The mean reversion of CAPE


CAPE
46
44
42
40
38
36
34
32
30
28
26
24
22
20
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4

Page 3

Slide 4. US Stock Market Value q and CAPE.


q and CAPE to their own averages (log numbers).

1.2

1.2
1

1
q

0.8

CAPE

0.8

0.6

0.6

0.4

0.4

0.2

0.2

-0.2

-0.2

-0.4

-0.4

-0.6

-0.6

-0.8

-0.8

-1

-1

-1.2

-1.2
1900

1910

1920

1930

1940

1950

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

2010

Data Sources: Stephen Wright (1900 - 1952) and Federal Reserve Z1 Table B.102 (1952 - Q2 2013)
for q, and Robert Shiller (updated) from Standard & Poor's for CAPE.

Page 4

But beware inflation near 4%


US inflation and Dow Jones Industrial Average, 1966-1978
1,050

14

1,000

12

950
10

900
850

800
6

750
700

650
2

CPI (LHS)
Dow Jones Industrials - Price Index

66

67

68

69

70

71

72

73

74

600

75

76

77

Source: Datastream

Page 5

78

550

But beware inflation near 4%


US inflation and Dow Jones Industrial Average, 1985-1988
5.0
4.5

2,800
CPI (LHS)
Dow Jones Industrials - Price Index

2,600
2,400

4.0

2,200

3.5

2,000
3.0
1,800
2.5

1,600

2.0

1,400

1.5
1.0
1985

1,200

1986

1987

1,000

1988

Source: Datastream

Page 6

But beware inflation near 4%


US inflation and Dow Jones Industrial Average, 1989-2003
('000)

4.0

12.0
11.5

3.5

11.0
10.5

3.0

10.0
9.5

2.5

9.0
2.0

8.5
8.0

1.5

1.0
1998

CPI F(LHS)
Dow Jones Industrials - Price Index
1999

2000

2001

7.5

2002

2003

Source: Datastream

Page 7

7.0

But beware inflation near 4%


US inflation and Dow Jones Industrial Average, 2002-2009
('000)

6
CPI (LHS)
Dow Jones Industrials - Price Index

15
14
13

12
3
11
2
10
1

8
(1)

2002
Source: Datastream

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

Source: DATASTREAM

Page 8

40

35

38

30

36
25
34
32

20

30

15

28
10
26
Gross

24
22
1929

Net

0
1935

1941

1947

1953

1959

1965

1971

1977

1983

1989

1995

2001

2007

Data Source: NIPA Table 1.14.


Page 9

2013

Profits, after depreciation, but before interest and tax, as


% of net output.

Profits, before depreciation, interest and tax, as % of gross


output.

Slide 63. US Profit Margins 1929 - Q2 2013.

Stability of long term return from equities

% p.a. real return.

Slide 13. The First Remarkable Feature 30 Year Rolling


Returns.
12

12

10

10

0
Bonds

-2
-4
1831

Equities

Cash

-2
-4

1851

1871

1891

1911

1931

1951

1971

1991

Data Sources: 1801 - 1899 Jeremy Siegel , then Elroy Dimson, Paul Marsh & Mike Staunton
1900 - 2012 via Morningstar.

Page 10

2011

Stability of long term return from equities

% p.a. real return.

Slide 13. The First Remarkable Feature 30 Year Rolling


Returns.
12

12

10

10

0
Bonds

-2
-4
1831

Equities

Cash

-2
-4

1851

1871

1891

1911

1931

1951

1971

1991

Data Sources: 1801 - 1899 Jeremy Siegel , then Elroy Dimson, Paul Marsh & Mike Staunton
1900 - 2012 via Morningstar.

Page 11

2011

Deflation in the age of QE


Inflation is always and everywhere a monetary
phenomenon- Friedman
We do not live in a fiat system as so many countries
manage/fix their currencies to others
For EMs external surpluses dictate monetary policy
In fiat systems money is created by commercial banks
and not by central banks
Demographic trends mitigate against credit and money
creation by central banks

Page 12

Smaller US deficits and EM deflation


For almost two decades a widening US current account
deficit was the basis for Bretton Woods II
Earned surpluses allowed liquidity creation and stable
exchange rates in EMs
Since 2009, EMs have borrowed surpluses they did not
earn
The round trip of capital creates liquidity in EMs
A country with insufficient surplus and liquidity can
deflate or devalue and China is particularly vulnerable

Page 13

Source: Datastream

Page 14

1Q14

1Q13

1Q12

1Q11

1Q10

1Q09

1Q08

1Q07

1Q06

1Q05

1Q04

1Q03

1Q02

1Q01

1Q00

1Q99

1Q98

1Q97

1Q96

1Q95

1Q94

1Q93

1Q92

50

1Q91

1Q90

US current-account deficit
(US$bn)

(50)

(100)

(150)

(200)

(250)

6/1/67
5/1/68
4/1/69
3/1/70
2/1/71
1/1/72
12/1/72
11/1/73
10/1/74
9/1/75
8/1/76
7/1/77
6/1/78
5/1/79
4/1/80
3/1/81
2/1/82
1/1/83
12/1/83
11/1/84
10/1/85
9/1/86
8/1/87
7/1/88
6/1/89
5/1/90
4/1/91
3/1/92
2/1/93
1/1/94
12/1/94
11/1/95
10/1/96
9/1/97
8/1/98
7/1/99
6/1/00
5/1/01
4/1/02
3/1/03
2/1/04
1/1/05
12/1/05
11/1/06
10/1/07
9/1/08
8/1/09
7/1/10
6/1/11
5/1/12
4/1/13

When does money printing begin?


GDP DEFLATOR (ANNUAL %) : Global World International

18

16

14

12

10

Source: Datastream

Page 15

Source: Datastream

Page 16

2013

2012

2011

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

2000

1999

1998

1997

1996

1995

1994

1993

1992

1991

1990

1989

1988

1987

1986

1985

1984

1983

1982

1981

1980

US current-account deficit as % of GDP - A new era


(%)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

The shrinkage in the deficit is structural


The shale oil and gas revolution means fewer US dollars
in the hands of foreigners
Chinese manufacturing wages have risen 3x since end2007 in US$ terms, US hourly wages just 12%
The baby-boom generation is degearing and saving; and
this means less consumption and fewer imports
If the US is to run structurally smaller deficits. then
Bretton Woods II is unfit for purpose
EMs will deflate or devalue; either will bring a global
deflation
Page 17

US visible trade deficit with China (% of GDP) - Shrinking


0.0

(%)

(0.5)

(1.0)

(1.5)

(2.0)

(2.5)

90

91

92

93

94

95

96

97

98

99

Source: Datastream

Page 18

10

11

12

13

Chinas capital inflows and outflows (US$bn)


9000
8000
7000
6000
5000

Pane 1 BOP - CAPITAL & FINANCIAL ACCOUNT


(DEBIT) : China ex Hong Kong and Macau
(Country)

4000

Pane 1 BOP - CAPITAL & FINANCIAL ACCOUNT


(CREDIT) : China ex Hong Kong and Macau
(Country)

3000
2000
1000

8/1/14

2/1/14

8/1/13

2/1/13

8/1/12

2/1/12

8/1/11

2/1/11

8/1/10

2/1/10

8/1/09

2/1/09

8/1/08

2/1/08

8/1/07

2/1/07

8/1/06

2/1/06

8/1/05

2/1/05

8/1/04

2/1/04

8/1/03

2/1/03

8/1/02

2/1/02

8/1/01

2/1/01

8/1/00

2/1/00

Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream

Page 19

Chinas gross external indebtedness


900

(US$bn)

800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream

Page 20

2012

2013

Family holdings of debt by age of head, 2007 and 2010 surveys

Family
characteristic
Age of head (years)
Less than 35
35-44
45-54
55-64
65-74
75 or more

Secured by resi property


Primary
Other
residence
37.3
59.5
65.5
55.3
42.9
13.9

3.3
6.5
8.0
7.8
5.0
0.6

Instalment
loans

Credit-card
balances

Credit lines not


secured by resi
property

Other

Any debt

65.2
56.2
51.9
44.6
26.1
7.0

48.5
51.7
53.6
49.9
37.0
18.8

2.1
2.2
1.9
1.2
1.5
-

5.9
7.5
9.8
8.7
4.4
1.3

83.6
86.2
86.8
81.8
65.5
31.4

Source: Federal Reserve Survey of Consumer Finances

Page 21

US personal savings as a % of disposable income

Source: Datastream

Page 22

Five-year-TIPS-implied inflation versus MSCI EM Index (US$)


2.6

(%)

Five-year-TIPS-implied inflation

MSCI Emerging Markets Index (RHS)

2.4

1,300

1,200

2.2

1,100

2.0
1,000
1.8
900
1.6
800

1.4

700

1.2
1.0
1 Jan 10

12 Oct 10

23 Jul 11

2 May 12

10 Feb 13

21 Nov 13

Source: Datastream

Page 23

600
1 Sep 14

Gross External Debt Table


Gross External Indebtedness 3Q 2014
(US$bn)
Source: Joint External Debt Hub and World Bank

Argentina
Belarus
Brazil
Bulgaria
China
Chile
Columbia
Croatia
Czech Republic
Ecuador
Georgia
Hungary
India
Indonesia
Kazakshtan*
Korea
Malaysia

148
41
540
49
874
137
98
58
127
19
13
190
456
292
155
429
213

28%
53%
24%
90%
8%
52%
25%
100%
64%
19%
81%
147%
22%
22%
34%
28%
68%

Macedonia
Mexico
Mongolia
Pakistan
Peru
Phillipines
Poland
Romania
Russia*
Serbia
South
Africa
Thailand
Turkey
Ukraine
Uruguay
Venezula

7
419
19
56
61
58
370
120
679
36

73%
32%
158%
24%
29%
20%
67%
59%
33%
80%

142
143
397
136
24
119

42%
38%
49%
101%
44%
27%

* exchange rate movements since end September 2014 will have pushed external debt to GDP ratios well about 35%

Page 24

Conclusions
The size of the US current account deficit is a key driver
of global liquidity but it is not growing
Structural reasons - shale oil and gas, rising Chinese
wages, baby boom degearing - stop the deficit growing
The de-gearing of the baby boom generation restricts the
effectiveness of monetary policy
EMs, particularly in Eastern Europe, have borrowed too
much in foreign currency.
Six years after the launch of QE we get deflation anyway
and a move to government action
Page 25

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